The Irish Working Class and the War of Independence

Conor Kostick

of rural workers battled white armies of the FFF (Farmers Freedom Force). In the west, where great tracts of land were still owned by absentee landlords, the struggle took the form of small farmers breaking up the large estates or in some cases appropriating them collectively and working them as soviets.1 Yet, of course, it was in the urban centres that the working class displayed the great- ‘Workers Soviet Mills, We Make Bread Not Profits’ est militancy and in addition to an almost continuous sequence of strikes and local general strikes there were five crucial turning points in these revolutionary years created In the coming centenary commemora- by urban working class activity: firstly, a tions of the Easter Rising of 1916 there will general strike against conscription; secondly, be a great deal of enthusiasm for the efforts a general strike at the beginning of 1919 in of that generation to escape the British Em- Belfast; thirdly, the Limerick Soviet of April pire. Yet nearly all the public attention and 1919; fourthly, in April 1920 a soviet take- memorial events will be directed to discus- over of the major towns of Ireland for the re- sion of the role of the senior figures of the na- lease of hunger strikers; and fifthly, through- tional movement. One of the most neglected out 1920, the refusal of transport workers to groups in the social memory of these years move British troops or army equipment. was the working class. Yet it was working class action above all that stymied British On 16 April 1918, with the passage of authority in Ireland. In the revolutionary the Military Service Bill by 301 votes to period of 1918 to 1923, Irish workers made 103, conscription was brought to Ireland. an enormous contribution to the fact that The plans of the War Cabinet, however, Britain lost its ability to govern the country. failed disastrously and not one Irishman was More, they created moments in which an dragged off to the trenches. Instead, the is- alternative to partition emerged, moments sue of conscription was a tipping point. It where it seemed like Ireland might follow brought the country to its feet. And if read- Russia in becoming a republic governed by ers in the Republic today feel that the issue soviets. of the water charges is doing something sim- The argument that Ireland was too ru- ilar, you can imagine how the much more ral to have been able to experience a social life-and-death issue of conscription in 1918 revolution at this time - too dominated by galvanised the population. the church and the outlook of a conservative Crucially, workers entered the conflict peasantry - is refuted by a close look at the as a class and much to everyone’s aston- evidence. Near constant class warfare ex- ishment, including their own, proved them- isted on the land in these years. In the east, selves to be an enormously powerful force. where most of the land was held by large A general strike against conscription took farmers and worked by a rural proletariat, place on Tuesday 23 April 1918, with work there were the most extraordinary scenes all over the country suspended. A ban on and battles involving the derailing of trains, marches for the day from the British author- as rural workers fought for higher standards ities proved unenforceable and almost every of living. There were also scenes reminis- town, especially in the 26 Counties, had its cent of the Great War, in which red armies own march, usually organised by the local 1See Conor Kostick, Revolution in Ireland (Cork, 2009), pp. 118 – 124; Dan Bradley, Farm Labourers’ Irish Struggle 1900 - 1976 (Belfast, 1988).

18 Trades Council. The overall success of the fire, doing remarkably well, only to be forced day’s action was acknowledged by the Irish back with 5,500 casualties. The leaders of Times, which stated that ‘April 23rd will be Loyalism did their best to present the bat- chiefly remembered as the day on which Irish tle as a glorious moment in Ulster history, Labour realised its strength.’2 ‘the record of the Thirty-Sixth Division will The protest not only registered the mas- ever be the pride of Ulster’, said Winston sive opposition to conscription that existed Churchill. Rather, it was the heartbreak in Ireland, it precipitated an upsurge of of Ulster and no wonder when conscription popular activity both on the national and was introduced for the whole of Ireland that social question. Workers’ confidence took northern workers, including members of the a great leap from the success of the ac- UVF, attempted to join the opposition. In tion, which had drawn in hundreds of thou- Tyrone, UVF members even offered to be- sands of workers who had never been in- come members of the IRA in order to fight 4 volved in a strike before. The success of the conscription. strike against conscription brought a spurt The problem that these former loyal- of growth for the Irish Transport & General ists had is that southern labour leaders Workers Union in particular and a rise in had thrown their lot in with a specifically the combativeness of workers: the number catholic opposition to conscription. Tom of strikes doubled compared to the previous Johnson and William O’Brien, the key fig- year. The number of new branches regis- ures in the ILPTUC, were appointed to a tered for the Transport Union leapt from an ‘National Cabinet’ steering committee for average of two a month in 1917 to around the anti-conscription campaign. There they twenty a month for the second half of 1918.3 were joined by Arthur Griffith and Eámonn Having identified this moment as one in de Valera for Sinn Feín and John Dillon which Irish workers began a new phase of and Joseph Devlin for the Irish Parliamen- radical militancy, it is also important to tary Party. There too, they went along with identify too that at the very outset of a surge an appeal by the committee to the catholic in Irish working class militancy, the leaders bishops of Ireland, which resulted in a cler- of the Dublin-based trade unions adopted a ical manifesto against conscription to which disastrous political strategy that was in part Johnson and O’Brien put their names. responsible for allowing Unionism to succeed Where did this leave protestant work- in portioning Ireland. For the labour leaders ers who - in their thousands - were looking took the decision to participate in a catholic for an alternative to Orangeism and Union- and nationalist opposition to conscription, ism? Only with an opposition to conscrip- rather than lead the movement in a secular tion that seemed to point towards the es- direction that sought to include protestant tablishment of a catholic state over Ireland. workers. This approach by Ireland’s trade union lead- Northern workers who had been per- ers, of attempting to be the left flank of suaded to fight for King and Country had catholic nationalist Ireland, was also evi- by now experienced four years of war. Ter- dent in the 1918 elections. On that occa- rible years, which had marked every family. sion Labour stood aside in favour of Sinn The Battle of the Somme in July 1916 had Feín candidates. For historians of the So- been something of a turning point in terms cialist Party tradition, this moment was the of Loyalism. On 1 July 1916, the 36th (Ul- critical one for the entire future of the Irish ster) Division - formed largely out of mem- left in the revolutionary era. For them, the bers of the Ulster Volunteer Force - threw it- failure of Labour to win the electoral leader- self into German machine-gun and artillery ship of the country in 1918 marks the turn- 2Irish Times, 24 April 1918. 3William O’Brien papers, MS 15674 (1) ITGWU Branch returns. 4Nicholas Smyth, Bureau of Military History, WS 721, p. 3. See also Fergal McCluskey, The Irish Revolution 1912 – 23: Tyrone (Dublin, 2014), pp. 75 – 6. 5For example, Peter Hadden, Divide and Rule (Belfast, 1980), p. 88.

19 ing point of the Irish revolution.5 Certainly, an industrial soviet.’7 The Mayor of Belfast there was a problem, particularly for north- admitted ‘as far as the municipal undertak- ern trade unionists, if their colleagues in the ings were concerned [he was] entirely at the south were associating closely with Sinn Feín mercy of the strike committee.’8 A telegram rather than advocating independent working from the Belfast authorities confirmed the class demands. But the Socialist Party has situation, that small businesses were hav- always exaggerated the importance of elec- ing to contact the strike leaders, ‘The work- toral activity. The real turning points of the men [sic] have formed a ‘soviet’ committee, period were not electoral ones but the out- and this committee had received 47 appli- comes of the incredibly radical mass move- cations from small traders for permission ments of workers against opponents ranging to use light.’9 It is noteworthy that the from the British authorities to Irish employ- strike committee consisted of both protes- ers and landowners. tant and catholic trade unionists, with a catholic, Charles McKay, at the head of a The 1919 general strike in Belfast was strike in which protestant workers were the the next major intervention of Irish workers majority. in these years and it arose out of a crisis in the city at the end of the war. There un- The same Monday that the strike began, employment had risen sharply with the re- the British Government announced that it turn of thousands of soldiers. As a result, was going to introduce the eight-hour day the demand was raised by the city’s trade for railway workers. This was to head unions that the working week be reduced off possible solidarity from railworkers for to 44 hours from 54 and that the employ- the engineering strike that was also taking ers utilise the extra hours to provide jobs place in all the major British cities, and for the returned soldiers. When an over- most militantly in Glasgow. In Belfast the whelming vote in favour of the strike be- news did not prevent railworkers unofficially came known, impatient power station and joining the strike on Tuesday 28 January. gas workers struck on Saturday afternoon 25 Other groups of workers joined the move- January 1919. The first response of the ship- ment. Graveyard workers, also without the yard owners was to try to continue work de- sanction of their union leaders, walked out spite the strike, using foremen and appren- to participate in the strike. In the rope fac- tices to keep the yards open. But a sponta- tories, the mainly female workforce learned neous picket of 2,000 strikers broke through that pickets were due to arrive to bring them the gates and brought out the apprentices, out, and they too struck on their own initia- before stoning the company offices for good tive. Meanwhile at the Sirocco engineering measure. By nightfall the strike committee works some strikebreakers and apprentices was in control of not just the power sup- were managing to keep the factory open. ply of the city but the streets. No traffic This was dealt with by cutting off the power could travel down Queen’s Road, for exam- to the factory. In the evening theatres were ple, without a pass issued by them.6 now closed, while few restaurants and hotels could manage a service. The dark streets The correspondent for the Manchester of the city were thronged all the same, with Guardian sent the following report: ‘Soviet’ excited crowds of workers defying the arrival has an unpleasant sound in English ears, of snowy weather. and one uses it with hesitation; but it nevertheless appears to be the fact that the By Thursday momentum was still gath- Strike Committee have taken upon them- ering. A rent strike began in working class selves, with the involuntary acquiescence of districts. In Royal Avenue and North Street, the civic authority, some of the attributes of more plate glass windows were put in to 6Michael Farrell, ‘The Great Belfast Strike of 1919’, The Northern Star, no.3 (1971) and Belfast Newslet- ter, 1 February 1919. 7Belfast Newsletter, 31 January 1919. 8Belfast Telegraph, 3 May 1919. 9PRO, CAB 23/9, WC 523, 31 January 1919.

20 prevent employers draining power allocated engineering factories were now reopening. A for emergency services.10 A major turning gradual drift back to work took place over point in the fortunes of the strike came on the next two weeks until on 24 February 4 February 1919 when the transport work- 1919 the strike was officially ended. Belfast’s ers sent a deputation to the strike committee greatest working class struggle was over, and and asked to be included in the action. The although they did not know it, the leaders leaders of the strike were nervous of taking a of the national movement in the south had step that would result in a major escalation seen a significant turning point pass in their of the dispute. As J. Milan, of the Electrical own campaign. Trade Union told the Newsletter, ‘the strike The leaders of Sinn Feín had no inter- committee adopted a policy of procrastina- est in this strike. This was natural enough tion on the matter... the transport work- from those on the right of the party, such as ers would come out at any time but they Arthur Griffith, who were hostile to indepen- hadn’t called on them as the strike com- dent labour organisation, but even the so- mittee wasn’t sure it could run the city.’11 cialist inclined Minister for Labour, Count- At angry meetings the rank and file strik- ess Markievicz, who at the time was giv- ers demanded that the transport workers be ing fiery speeches in favour of the Workers’ brought out, and that the ‘up-town’ shops Republic,14 had no familiarity with north- (Mackie’s, Combe’s, Sirocco and the Lin- ern working class politics. At no time did field foundry) join the strike also. But bom- Sinn Feín have a strategy for incorporat- barded by newspaper scare stories about ing the north into their struggle for inde- how food supplies would give out if there pendence. This can be seen from their were further escalation, the strike committee eventual adopting, in July 1920, an eco- lacked the resolve to escalate matters further nomic boycott against northern business, and put to the vote a proposal to accept a 47 which Arthur Griffith believed ‘would bring hour working week. Surprisingly the result the unionist gentlemen to their sense very of the ballot went against the strike commit- quickly.’ In fact, the Belfast boycott rein- tee on Friday 14th February by 11,963 votes forced the prospect of partition as although to 8,774.12 it caused an estimated loss of £5million of Sensing a weakening of the strike, how- trade, it proved to northern business they ever, the authorities now made their decisive could get by on their connection to the mar- move and the next day sent in troops that kets of the British Empire.15 had been called up from Dublin. These sol- Outside of the nationalists in the north, diers guarded the power stations and trams. the only constituency that might have been Attempts to move the trams were met with sympathetic to the idea of Irish indepen- running battles from mass pickets.13 The dence were the more militant protestant strike committee refused to implement the workers, who saw the Unionist shipyard decision of a mass meeting held on Cus- owners and employers as their greatest ene- tom House Square on Sunday to call out mies. For over two hundred years there has the transport workers at last. But the rank been a radical, non-sectarian, protestant tra- and file workers had failed to develop any dition in the north, and in 1918 it was most organisational structures independent from strongly represented in the form of the Inde- the strike committee, and although they ex- pendent Labour Party (ILP) and other rev- pressed their anger and frustration at the olutionaries such as those behind the newly committee outside of the hotel where talks created Revolutionary Socialist Party of Ire- were taking place with the employers, the land, which in 1919 was holding meetings 10Belfast Newsletter, 29 January 1919. 11Belfast Newsletter, 4 February 1919. 12Belfast Weekly Telegraph, 22 February 1919. 13Farrell, ‘The Great Belfast Strike of 1919’. 14Irish Independent, 26 April 1919. 15David Harkness, Northern Ireland since 1920 (Dublin, 1983). 16General Prisons Board, Jack Hedley and Belfast Weekly Telegraph, 5 July 1920.

21 in Belfast of up to 500 people.16 In the Orange Lodge master, turned Larkin sup- heightened atmosphere created by the strike port, John Hanna, was one of these. In his for shorter hours, the Belfast left found it- view, ‘during the strike for 44-hours week self with a large audience. They organised the capitalist classes saw that the Belfast the city’s biggest ever demonstration, that workers were one. That unity had to be bro- of May Day 1919 when over 100,000 peo- ken, it was accomplished by appeals to the ple marched from Donegal Place to Ormeau basest passion and intense bigotry.’21 The Park. The organising secretary was Sam mobs also went to Langley Street and burnt Kyle, whose speech on the day emphasised to the ground the hall of the ILP, ‘and as a the Red Flag, internationalism, and the need result the growth of the Labour movement for Belfast to have independent labour rep- was stemmed.’22 resentation.17 In the subsequent local elec- With the crushing of radical organisation tions of January 1920 these activists won an in Belfast, and the decision of the British impressive 12 of the cities 60 seats; the most Cabinet on 8 September 1920 to raise a Spe- remarkable result being that of Sam Kyle cial Constabulary, which absorbed the Ul- who stood in Shankill and topped the poll. ster Volunteer Force into an official security Since this was an election that took place force, the core structures of a future parti- under the newly introduced PR system it is tioned Northern state were secure. possible to prove that his supporters under- The hold of the British authorities over stood that his politics were hostile to union- the rest of Ireland had been steadily weak- ism, as only a tiny percentage of his transfers ening throughout 1919, despite increasingly 18 went to unionist candidates. drastic repressive measures, such as the de- Nevertheless, the influence of the left ployment of the notorious ‘Black and Tans’ over the wider working class was on the in the autumn of that year, and the declara- wane. The partial defeat of the strike led to tion of martial law in more and more parts demoralisation spreading through Belfast’s of Ireland. It was the impact of military rule working class, and at the same time a sudden in Limerick that led to the largest soviet of slump in May 1920 combined with the con- the period, that which took over the running tinuing existence of a large number of unem- of Limerick City on Sunday 13 April 1919.23 ployed ex-veterans to create the conditions There, General C. J. Griffin had declared the under which a sectarian pogrom could take city and part of the county a special military place. That July, the leading Unionist politi- area. In particular, he deployed troops onto cians, such as Edward Carson and James the bridges over the Shannon and insisted Craig used the orange marches to make that everyone needing to cross the bridges speeches advocating an attack on Labour apply to him for a pass. To obtain a pass and Sinn Fein.19 Loyalists, with the com- a letter had to be forwarded from an RIC plicity of the shipyard owners, then organ- sergeant. The costs of the extra policing ised meetings where several thousand unem- were to be levied on the rates. These mea- ployed and ex-servicemen gathered to roam sures were designed to prevent known re- through the factories armed with sledgeham- publicans from moving around the area, but mers and other weapons. Catholics and so- they were too sweeping and crude to be ef- cialists had to flee for their lives. About fective, angering almost the entire local pop- 12,000 workers in all lost their jobs, to ulation. be replaced by the loyalists; some 3,000 of After a twelve-hour discussion as to their those were protestant trade unionists.20 Ex- response to Griffin’s initiative, the local 17Belfast Weekly Telegraph, 8 May 1919. 18Austen Morgan, Labour and Partition (London, 1991) p. 258. 19Belfast Weekly Telegraph, 14 July 1920. 20ILPTUC, Reports 1920 see also Morgan, Labour and Partition. 21ILPTUC, Reports 1920. 22The Irishman, 31 March, 1928. 23The story of the Limerick Soviet is told excellently by Liam Cahill, Forgotten Revolution, Limerick Soviet 1919 (Dublin, 1990).

22 Trades Council took the unanimous decision Because the creamery was closed, there was to call a general strike. They had discussed in fact no shortage of fresh milk at the usual the implications of their action and imme- price. Workers also smuggled food into the diately set up committees to take charge of city past the military with relays of boats propaganda, finance, food and vigilance.24 and even in a funeral hearse.29 The reaction from Limerick’s workers was As money began to fall into short supply, overwhelmingly supportive. Soon water, gas the soviet rose to the occasion once more, and electricity supply was in the tight con- and set up a sub-committee, mainly consist- trol of the committee, who were quickly re- ing of the clerical workers from Cleeves’, to ferred to as the ‘soviet’. Work was allowed oversee the printing and issuing of its own to take place at bacon and condensed milk currency, which came out in one, five and factories, but the bakers and Cleeves’ cream- ten shilling notes. A list of shopkeepers and ery workers walked out anyway to join what merchants who would accept the new cur- was becoming a carnival atmosphere. In all, rency was posted around the town.30 14,000 workers were on strike. Large crowds gathered and moved through the city, dis- cussing events.25 The local RIC telephoned Dublin for at least 300 more reinforcements but Deputy Inspector-General W. M. Davies replied that this was impossible as ‘there are so many strikes going on elsewhere.’ Eventually 50 RIC were sent and permission granted to have military support.26 Not that crime was the force’s concern. During the two weeks of the soviet no looting took place nor a single case arose for the Petty Sessions.27 10 Shilling note issued by the Limerick Soviet The first priority for the soviet was to secure food supplies for the city’s 38,000 in- On Wednesday 16 April 1919 the dispute habitants. A panic over the possibility of looked as though it was about to escalate scarcity was encouraged by Dublin Castle drastically as the local railworkers took the who issued a communiquedenying´ responsi- decision to go on strike, despite a circular bility for any lack of the necessities of life.28 to the contrary from the National Union of The strike leaders responded by asking the Railwaymen’s (NUR) headquarters in Lon- bakers to resume work and fresh bread was don. This raised the possibility of a na- thereafter made available in the mornings. tional railway strike, which indeed, from re- A few delegated shops were given permission ports sent to the NUR offices, seemed likely to open and sell foodstuffs, but only at prices to spread across the channel.31 The strike set by the soviet. These prices were put on was delayed by intervention from an unlikely posters and placed around the town. More source. William O’Brien, general secretary radically still, the soviet decided to expropri- and a key leader of the Irish Labour Party ate 7,000 tons of Canadian grain that was at and Trade Union Council (ILPTUC) sent a the docks. They also set up four depots to telegram to the Limerick railworkers saying, receive food from farms outside the town. ‘railwaymen should defer stoppage pending 24Cahill, Forgotten Revolution, pp. 62 - 4. 25Irish Independent, 15 April 1919. 26Cahill, Forgotten Revolution, pp. 66 - 8. 27Jim Kemmy, ‘The Limerick Soviet’, Saothar 6 (1980). 28Cahill, Forgotten Revolution, p. 68. 29Ibid., p. 74. 30Ibid., p. 75. 31Cahil, Forgotten Revolution, p. 113. 32Irish Independent, 17 April 1919.

23 nation action. National Executive specially workers’ government. But the leaders of the summoned for tomorrow.’32 In Limerick this movement were delegates elected through was taken to mean that the next day a gen- the slow moving workings of the individual eral strike of Irish workers was to be called trade union affiliates. To replace them in a on their behalf. As the leader of the soviet, matter of hours was impossible even if the John Cronin, said in an interview, ‘the na- majority of strikers desired to continue the tional executive council of the ILPTUC will fight. change its headquarters from Dublin to Lim- The Limerick soviet, which had soared to erick. Then if military rule isn’t abrogated, unprecedented heights of working class ac- a general strike of the entire country will be tivity, deflated with a whimper, with consid- 33 called.’ erable damage to the position of the working In fact, having sought advice during the class within the fight for Irish independence. course of three days of talks with leading As a local republican newssheet put it, the nationalists, the leadership of the ILPTUC people had been let down ‘by the nincom- were anxious to defuse the crisis, not es- poops who call themselves the ‘Leaders of calate it.34 After considerable delay, they Labour’.36 finally turned up in Limerick to reveal a Outside of Limerick the curve of work- plan that had been agreed with the nation- ing class militancy was still on the rise. One alist activists, namely the evacuation of the mark of this was the strong response to the population of Limerick. Understandably the idea of holding a day’s strike on Thursday Limerick workers were dismayed by this ab- 1 May 1919 despite bans from the British surd proposition. As word of this scheme and military authorities as well as local started to spread, the middle class, who had employers federations. Thousands partici- been cowed by the strength of the soviet, pated in the action and the ILPTUC claimed suddenly recovered their own political will that it was as effective as the general strike and on Thursday 24 April Bishop Dr Halli- against conscription. In some ways it was nan and the Mayor entered into negotiations all the more impressive in that this time with General Griffin to obtain a compromise there was no sanction from the church or to the pass system. They then issued a let- nationalist leaders. In most small towns it ter the next day insisting on an immediate was the ITGWU that was at the heart of ending of the strike. the action, and their conference report that Stalemated by their own union leader- year boasted, ‘over more than three fourths ship, the strike leaders gave up and effec- of Ireland the cessation was complete and tively called the strike off when they said meetings were held at convenient centres at that all those who did not need to show which the Labour propaganda was zealously passes should return to work immediately. pushed and the red flag of the workers’ cause 37 Rank and file workers, threatening to set up displayed despite police interference.’ another soviet, tore up the posters announc- The high water mark of working class ing this retreat.35 But their position was an struggle in these years was undoubtedly the extremely difficult one. In Russia the sovi- general strike for the release of hunger strik- ets were based on direct elections from the ers that began on Monday 13 April 1920. workplace, so if a body of workers felt they Due to the increase in repression and repub- were being misrepresented they could recall lican activity over a hundred prisoners were their delegate within twenty-four hours and being held in Mountjoy Jail, Dublin, with- give the mandate to another person. In Lim- out having been charged with any offence. erick the label ‘soviet’ was attached to the On 5 April 1920, 36 socialists, trade union- trades council because it was acting as a ists and nationalists took the decision to go 33Ruth Russell, What’s the Matter with Ireland? (New York, 1920) p. 93. 34Cahil, Forgotten Revolution, pp. 106 - 8. 35Ibid., pp. 115 - 7. 36Ibid., pp. 140. 37ITGWU, Annual Report, 1919.

24 on hunger strike. They were joined the next the public lavatories are closed.’42 The sum- day by 30 more of their colleagues. Each day mary of the Manchester Guardian was that, more prisoners joined in the protest action ‘in most places the police abdicated and the until by 10 April there were 91 hunger strik- maintenance of order was taken over by the ers.38 Inside the prison they broke the fur- local Workers’ Councils... In fact, it is no niture and in one wing demolished the walls exaggeration to trace a flavour of proletar- between the cells.39 ian dictatorship about some aspects of the 43 News of the jail protest spread quickly, strike.’ crowds gathering outside the jail grew from As with the Limerick soviet, workers un- hundreds to thousands. By the end of the dertaking such comprehensive action had to first week of the hunger strike some 40,000 resolve the issues of control of food and people were at the entrance to the jail, facing transport. They did so by creating new nervous-looking troops and armoured cars. structures to administer their areas. An ex- As the attention of the country focused on ample of how this occurred is given by an this issue, the executive of the ILPTUC re- eyewitness who found himself in Kilmallock, sponded by calling for a national stoppage. East Limerick, during the strike, ‘a visit to They sent telegrams to the organisers of the local Town Hall - commandeered for the the ITGWU and placed a manifesto for the purpose of issuing permits - and one was strike in the Evening Telegraph.40 struck by the absolute recognition of the so- The strike began with the railworkers of viet system - in deed if not in name. At one the Great Southern and Midland Company table sat a school teacher dispensing bread refusing to move a single train after 4.30pm permits, at another a trade union official on Monday 13 April 1920, except for the controlling the flour supply - at a third a mail train which carried the instruction for railwayman controlling coal, at a fourth a a general strike. Then the Great Northern creamery clerk distributing butter tickets. . . railworkers joined in. The next day most all working smoothly.’44 of the country was halted and governmental The authorities were stunned by the ac- functions fell to local workers’ organisations, tion. The police and military were helpless typically the Trades Council. to intervene in the face of such a widespread The Manchester Guardian reported the and effective movement. They concen- scene in Waterford, ‘the City was taken over trated on guarding the Mountjoy from be- by a Soviet Commissar and three associates. ing stormed: the crowds had suggested they The Sinn Feín mayor abdicated and the So- might take such action by setting fire to a viet issued orders to the population which tank and testing entrances to the jail on Sat- all had to obey. For two days, until a tele- urday 10 April, the night before the general gram arrived reporting the release of hunger strike was called.45 That Sunday a serious strikers, the city was in the hands of these confrontation loomed between the Dublin men.’41 Freedom wrote that ‘never in his- crowds, swelled by organised contingents of tory, I think, has there been such a complete dockers and postal workers, and the British general strike as is now for twenty-four hours soldiers who were ordered to fix bayonets. taking place here in the Emerald Isle. Not a Socialists distributed material appealing to train or tram is running not a shop is open, the soldiers and appealed to them not to not a public house nor a tobacconist; even attack the demonstrators and it seemed as 38General Prison Board, Indexes, 1920 and Watchword of Labour, 17 April 1920. 39Cork Examiner, 7 April 1920. 40William O’Brien, Forth the Banners Go (Dublin, 1969) p. 191. 41In Emmet O’Connor, A Labour History of Waterford, Waterford Trades Council (Waterford, 1989), p. 159. 42 In William O’Brien Papers. 43Ibid. 44Watchword of Labour, 15 May 1920. 45Belfast Weekly Telegraph, 17 April 1920 and General Prison Board, Indexes, 1920. 46Watchword of Labour, 24 April 1920 and Cork Examiner, 15 April 1920.

25 though a critical moment was approach- May 1920, Michael Donnelly, a revolution- ing.46 Would the crowds succeed in breaking ary socialist and friend of James Connolly’s, in? Or would the soldiers open fire even at urged his fellow dockers to refuse to unload the cost of civilian lives and the potential po- the 6,000-ton Polberg and the 1,000-ton ves- litical backlash that would accompany such sel Anna Dorette Boog on the assumption an event? the ships contained motor cars and other The flashpoint was diffused up at the jail equipment for the military.50 Soon porters by Sinn Feín member of Dublin Corporation, and then railworkers were following suit and John O’Mahony, who organised with a num- the action escalated to the boycott of all mil- ber of priests to form a cordon between the itary cargos and troops. soldiers and the crowd and drove the demon- The employers, especially the railway strators back from the jail entrance, shout- owners, reacted by suspending those working ‘in the name of the Irish Republic, go ers who implemented the boycott. The away’. He played the same pacifying role on labour leaders, notably William O’Brien, the Tuesday by which time the authorities negotiated with Arthur Griffith and John had realised the danger and brought up two Dillon that funds left over from the anti- more tanks, several armoured cars, barbed conscription campaign be used to provide wire and considerable reinforcements.47 payments for those who had been laid off. Although Britain was saved from expe- This was agreed and supplemented by a new riencing a ‘Bastille Day’ by the intervention appeal. Over the next six months an aston- of Sinn Feín and the church, the authorities ishing £120,000 was subscribed.51 could not withstand the vast upsurge of so- Over the course of four months, the rail viet activity. They caved in and released all boycott undermined the British army’s abil- the hunger strikers, a situation described by ity to move troops quickly around the coun- the London Morning Post as one of ‘unpar- try. General Macready described the work- alleled ignominy and painful humiliation.’48 ers’ action as ‘a serious set-back for military The lesson, that it was the working class activities during the best season of the year.’ that had the power to shatter the morale of Chief Secretary Sir Hamar Greenwood wrote the troops and police, while raising the con- that it put the Irish administration in a ‘hu- fidence of the national movement, was not miliating and discredited position.’52 The lost on the right-wing press. The Daily News railworkers nearly won a stunning victory drew the following conclusion from the gen- when the Dublin administration conceded eral strike: ‘Labour has become, quite def- that railways would no longer be used to initely, the striking arm of the nation... It transport arms, ammunition and motor fuel. can justly claim that it alone possessed and But the British Cabinet overruled this sur- was able to set in motion a machine pow- render. Instead, they attempted to ‘throttle’ erful enough to save the lives of Irishmen the railway system and get Irish businesses when threatened by the British Government to oppose a boycott that was leading to the and that without this machine Dáil eíreann cessation of rail services across the country. and all of Sinn Feín would have beaten their Eventually, the attrition of sackings told on wings against the prison bars in vain.’49 the workforce. Only an all-out strike could The other major intervention of the have won in the latter stages of the boycott, working class in the War of Independence but the price of assistance from the conserva- was the boycott of the military by transport tive nationalists was that the labour leaders workers, especially the railworkers. On 20 quash such a demand. Although Ireland’s 47Cork Examiner, 12 and 14 April 1920 48London Morning Post, 4 June 1920. 49Daily News, 15 April 1920. 50Mike Milotte, Communism in Modern Ireland (Dublin, 1984), p. 31. 51Cahill, Forgotten Revolution, pp. 86 – 8. 52Charles Townshend, ‘The Irish railway strike of 1920: industrial action and civil resistance in the struggle for independence,’ Irish Historical Studies, XXI.83 (1979), pp. 265 – 82; Neville Macready, Annals of an Active Life (London, 1924).

26 railworkers made a huge contribution to the critically celebrated successful ‘reprisals’ by ability of the IRA to operate with success, the Black and Tans. As Colonel Smyth noto- their own organisation disintegrated. The riously told the RIC at Listowel, ‘no police- best-organised and most militant group of man will get into trouble for shooting any Irish workers were worn out by this boycott, man.’53 Crown forces summarily executed which was ended on 21 December 1920. several young Irishmen during this period With Britain being determined to resist and the Armritsar massacre of 1919 in In- at all costs Ireland becoming a republic, with dia had provided further evidence that the the empire ready to expend a great deal of British army was prepared to shoot civilians. money and very many lives in preventing the So what restrained the officer from pulling emergence of anything more radical than a the trigger in 1920? tightly constrained federal Irish parliament, Despite the burning of their property, the the question arises, what events made them beatings and the deaths, the Irish popula- change their mind? Was it really the actions tion had not been cowed by the British forces of the IRA backed up by a political leader- and they had expressed this not only in their ship in Sinn Feín? voting patterns but also in their mass pop- It is perhaps useful to take one micro- ular activity. A near universal boycott as scopic case study. During the railworkers’ well as the resignations of many magistrates boycott of the British military, it happened had caused the collapse of the legal system. on a number of occasions that a British of- Similar boycotts of the provision of food ficer, furious with the fact that a train full and other supplies to barracks had under- of soldiers was not moving from the station mined the viability of locating Crown forces would go up to the engine, step on the plate, in smaller outposts. Even more effective was draw his revolver and point it at the head of the participation of hundreds of thousands the railway driver. On being told he must of people in strikes directed against the Em- drive the train or he would be shot, the pire. The general strike against conscription driver nevertheless refused to give way. It in 1918 and the strike for the release of so- was the officer who climbed back down and cialist and nationalist prisoners in 1920 had ordered his men to disembark from the train, rocked the British administration and given no doubt with a deep sense of frustration the participants a taste of victory. One of and humiliation. the best-organised trade unions in Ireland When the officer stood with his finger on during the War of Independence was the the trigger and the railworker stood look- National Union of Railwaymen, the solidar- ing at him, why didn’t the officer fire? And ity between their members was unbreakable what gave the railworker the confidence that and their participation in the general strikes he wouldn’t fire? We can reject the ex- had provided a backbone to the actions. If planation that ‘reasonableness’ and ‘non- the officer had shot the locomotive driver, violence’ in the British character came into Irish railway workers (and perhaps too their play. Throughout 1920 there was pressure British counterparts, fellow NUR members) being exerted on the British forces in Ireland would have struck on behalf of their fallen to intimidate the national movement and the comrade and no labour official could have pressure came from the top. The officer who stopped them. stormed along the railway platform would The initial reaction of British Cabinet to have known full well that he was acting ac- the rising aspirations of the Irish population cording to the desires of Lloyd George, Gen- was to quell the movement through force, eral MacCready, and every member of the but repression is a crude tactic and if it fails Cabinet, that the Irish population be made to intimidate the subsequent radicalisation to feel the consequences of acts of insubor- of the oppressed can be catastrophic for a dination. No one at the time felt it nec- ruling class. At some level the British officer essary to disguise the iron hand and most must have sensed that the consequences of of the national British newspapers quite un- shooting the railworker were going to be dis- 53J. A. Gaughan (ed.), Memoirs of Constable J. Mee, RIC (Dublin, 1975), p. 104.

27 astrous for him personally and for those he The latter course was a distinct option and served. His personal safety might have been that preferred by General Macready, but at risk from the IRA, although this consid- while plans were drawn up for the occupa- eration alone might not have held his trig- tion of Ireland by 100,000 troops the major- ger finger, after all, only some 160 British ity of the Cabinet drew back from such a soldiers were killed in Ireland between 1919 potentially hazardous confrontation. They and 1921. Much more intimidating was the changed their strategy for the same reason danger of a mass popular movement arising that the officer did not fire, because of the from the execution of the locomotive driver. danger of a popular backlash, at the centre Could the officer’s future be assured if his of which would have been the working class masters sought for ways to appease such a organisations who had already shown their movement? And while the officer hesitated, capabilities through actions such as the Lim- the railworker faced him with a strength that erick soviet. was more than personal. It must have taken The key conclusion of this article then, a lot of courage to look at the man holding is that the working class movement in the the gun and refuse to obey him. And surely period 1916 - 1923 played an absolutely es- this courage was drawn from a faith in the sential part in the national struggle. With- fact that not only was he right to refuse, but out the willingness of hundreds of thousands also in a belief that there were hundreds of of workers to boycott, strike, demonstrate thousands of his fellow workers who backed and protest, the military activity of the three him? thousand or so IRA members who had man- Despite considerable effort, by the mid- aged to obtain guns would have proven insuf- dle of 1921 the British government had not ficient to make the Cabinet choose the path managed to check the Irish national move- of negotiation rather than repression. The ment. Their position matched that of the Irish working class of this era were actors, officer in the sense that the choice they not just witnesses, in the struggle. faced was to compromise or to unleash hell.