ASSOCIATION FOR CONSUMER RESEARCH

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Emotion, Scientific Reasoning, and Judgments of Scientific Evidence Caitlin Drummond, University of , USA Baruch Fischhoff, Carnegie Mellon University, USA

We examine how consumers’ ability to reason about and emotional reactions to scientific evidence relate to their judgments of it. In an online study, reasoning ability and emotional reactions to controversial research separately predicted understanding of it, judgments of its quality, and trust in the scientists who conducted it.

[to cite]: Caitlin Drummond and Baruch Fischhoff (2018) ,"Emotion, Scientific Reasoning, and Judgments of Scientific Evidence", in NA - Advances in Consumer Research Volume 46, eds. Andrew Gershoff, Robert Kozinets, and Tiffany White, Duluth, MN : Association for Consumer Research, Pages: 115-120.

[url]: http://www.acrwebsite.org/volumes/2412349/volumes/v46/NA-46

[copyright notice]: This work is copyrighted by The Association for Consumer Research. For permission to copy or use this work in whole or in part, please contact the Copyright Clearance Center at http://www.copyright.com/. Consuming Science: Knowledge, Acceptance, and Judgements of Scientific Information and Technology Chairs: Nicholas Light, University of Colorado Boulder, USA Philip Fernbach, University of Colorado Boulder, USA

Paper #1: A Taxonomy of Opposition to Genetically Modified naturalness, or acceptability in Christian doctrine. These findings Foods suggest that attitudes are based on the moralization of GM foods. Philip Fernbach, University of Colorado Boulder, USA In the third paper, the authors examine how consumers’ ability Nicholas Light, University of Colorado Boulder, USA to reason about—and emotional reactions to—scientific evidence re- late to their judgments. They find that reasoning ability and emotion- Paper #2: Moral Arguments Are Most Persuasive in Changing al reactions to controversial research separately predicts understand- Attitudes of Opponents of Genetically Modified Foods ing, judgments of quality, and trust in the scientists who conducted it. Sydney E. Scott, Washington University in St. Louis, USA In the final paper, the authors explore whether people judge Yoel Inbar, University of Toronto, Canada electricity differently due to its generating source. They demonstrate Paul Rozin, University of Pennsylvania, USA a bias among participants’ evaluations of renewable versus non-re- Paper #3: Emotion, Scientific Reasoning, and Judgments of newable electricity in hypothetical scenarios, when observing light in Scientific Evidence a dark or lit room, and when physically experiencing electric shocks. Caitlin Drummond, University of Michigan, USA With this session, we hope to bring the topic of public accep- Baruch Fischhoff, Carnegie Mellon University, USA tance of science into the field of consumer research, and we believe Paper #4: Green Biases: Consumer Evaluations of Renewable the field is uniquely positioned to take it on. With science, consump- and Non-Renewable Energy Sources tion has heightened societal and commercial importance. We believe Nathan Dhaliwal, University of British Columbia, Canada the session fits well with this year’s conference theme, “Consuming David J. Hardisty, University of British Columbia, Canada in a Post Trust World,” because of clear implications for trust in sci- Jiaying Zhao, University of British Columbia, Canada ence and scientists. The proposed session will appeal to researchers interested in judgement and decision making, policy, consumer well- SESSION OVERVIEW being, emotions, morality, and metacognition. Scientists work to develop knowledge or technologies that can improve the world. In order to have an impact, scientific advance- A Taxonomy of Opposition to Genetically Modified Foods ments must be adopted—or at least tacitly supported—by the people they are designed to help. However, some people oppose scientific EXTENDED ABSTRACT advancements that could objectively improve their lives, despite a Public discourse today is unsettling, either insular or excessive- clear scientific consensus to the contrary. ly hostile. Some people maintain vociferous, unshakeable attitudes The proposed session explores two broad research questions: about complex issues that they do not understand deeply (Caplan, 1. What are the psychological underpinnings of acceptance 2011). Nowhere is this more apparent than in disputes around divi- of—or opposition to—scientific information and technolo- sive scientific topics. In this work, we build on evidence that many gies? people have strong, enduring attitudes about genetically modified 2. What interventions can be designed to successfully bring foods despite a remarkably shallow understanding of the mecha- consumers closer to the scientific consensus? nisms at play (National Science Board, 2016; Ranney, 2016). There There is a growing body of literature examining public attitudes is widespread agreement among scientists that genetically modified toward science. For instance, opposition to scientific information and (GM) foods are safe to consume (AAAS 2012; European Commis- technologies has been attributed to lack of scientific literacy (Ran- sion 2010) and have the potential to provide substantial benefits to ney and Clark 2016), perceptions of unnaturalness (Scott, Inbar, and humankind (Sharma, Kaur, and Singh 2017). Rozin 2016), fears about health (Laros and Steenkamp 2004), The conventional account of this failure to communicate, the and values espoused by individuals’ social groups (Kahan, Jenkins- “deficit model,” appeals to lack of information (Bodmer, 1986): The Smith, and Braman 2011). idea is that people are too ignorant to appreciate counter-arguments, Our session contains four papers that build on this work to shed ignorance leads to reliance on loud voices, which in turn leads to new light on the consumption of science in the domains of geneti- polarization and failure to understand. The standard method to try cally modified food, renewable energy, and the perceived causes of to overcome these deficits is to use education to change attitudes. cancer. Each paper offers evidence to identify anti-science biases, Recently, however, the deficit model has been challenged on the judgments, beliefs, emotions, and behaviors. grounds that educational efforts rarely work (Miller, 2001). In the first paper, the authors set out to taxonomize the psycho- One critical element that governs discourse but is not a focus logical underpinnings of opposition to genetically modified foods. of the deficit model is that people are not merely ignorant, but they Using open-ended participant responses, they find five dominant lay often fail to realize their ignorance. Asking people to try to explain reasons. They experimentally test mechanisms related to these un- how a policy works causes them to not only reduce their estimate of derlying psychologies, and end by suggesting differential interven- their own understanding (Rozenblit and Keil, 2002), but also to mod- tions tailored to each. erate the extremity of their attitude. In other words, causal explana- In the second paper, the authors take a different approach to the tion causes people to become aware that they don’t fully understand, same problem. They examine which types of arguments cause oppo- reducing both hubris and extremism (Fernbach et al., 2013; Sloman nents of genetically modified foods to change their minds. Moral ar- & Fernbach, 2017). guments shift opponents’ attitudes more than arguments about safety, This ignorance and lack of awareness suggests that opposition to genetically modified foods may be caused or exacerbated by gaps Advances in Consumer Research 115 Volume 46, ©2018 116 / Consuming Science: Knowledge, Acceptance, and Judgements of Scientific Information and Technology between subjective and objective knowledge. It also suggests that • Social or political concerns (17 participants) people may have specific false beliefs or unfounded concerns that • Unintelligible responses (55 participants) can be targeted with specific interventions (as opposed to broad edu- This taxonomy suggests that the psychology of GM food op- cation efforts). position is complex. Therefore it is not surprising that “one size fits In our first study, we surveyed a nationally-representative sam- all” educational interventions have not been successful in mitigating ple of U.S. adults (N = 501) to test if subjective-objective knowl- the prevalence of false, anti-science beliefs. Taken together, these edge gaps contribute to GM food opposition. Participants were first studies suggest that more specific interventions, tailored to different asked two questions to measure attitudes: extremity of opposition to psychological concerns, may be more effective at decreasing con- genetically modified foods (1 = no opposition, 7 = extreme opposi- cern about and opposition to genetically modified foods. They also tion), and concern (1 = no concern, 7 = extreme concern). Responses suggest that calibration of subjective and objective knowledge may to these two questions were highly correlated (r=.88), and we av- play an important role in opponents’ openness to educational inter- eraged them to form a measure we call “extremity of opposition”. ventions—if those who know the least think they know the most, Next, participants were asked to judge their understanding of GM they may be unwilling to engage in such interventions. foods (“subjective knowledge”), using instructions and a single-item rating scale adapted from the cognitive science literature (Rozenblit Moral Arguments Are Most Persuasive in Changing and Keil 2002). Finally, we measured scientific literacy (objective Attitudes of Opponents of Genetically Modified Foods knowledge) with fifteen true-false questions adapted from the Na- tional Science Foundation’s Science and Engineering Indicators sur- EXTENDED ABSTRACT vey (NSF 2016), AAAS Benchmarks for Science Literacy (AAAS Genetically modified food (GMF)—food derived from organ- 1993), and recent work on public understanding of science (Durant, isms whose genetic material has been intentionally modified, e.g., Evans, and Thomas 1989; Mielby, Sandøe, and Lassen 2013; Miller, through introduction of a gene from a different organism—has been Scott, and Okamoto 2006). a topic of intense debate. Most consumers in the United States are The results show that as extremity of opposition increases, sci- strongly opposed to GMF, even though the scientific consensus is that GMF is safe for human consumption (AAAS, 2012). We have ence literacy decreases (βextremity= -1.4, t(499) = -4.72, p < .0001), shown that a plurality of all respondents, and a great majority of while judged understanding of GM foods increases (βextremity= .26, t(499) = 6.81, p < .0001). After z-scoring objective and subjective GMF opponents in the USA show a moral as opposed to -based knowledge, we calculated a difference score by subtracting each par- opposition to GMF (Scott et al., 2016). ticipant’s objective knowledge score from their subjective knowl- Across 4 studies and 1,760 opponents, we systematically ma- edge score. This difference score increases as extremity of opposi- nipulate which types of arguments GMF opponents are exposed to and examine attitude change. We are the first to our knowledge to tion increases (βextremity= .28, t(499) = 8.77, p < .0001). We then tested whether objective knowledge predicts subjective knowledge differ- systematically explore different arguments’ effectiveness in the do- entially at different levels of extremity of opposition. We regressed main of GMF opposition. subjective knowledge on science literacy, extremity of opposition In all studies, we defined American GMF opponents’ as indi- and their interaction. The interaction is statistically significant, indi- viduals who agreed they are opposed to “genetically engineering cating that the slope of science literacy on subjective knowledge dif- plants and animals for human consumption”. Opponents answered a fers significantly by extremity of opposition (β_interaction= -.014, set of measures assessing the nature and strength of their opposition, t(497) = -4.56, p < .0001). Objective knowledge is a significant posi- viewed an essay arguing for the acceptability of GMF, then indicated tive predictor of subjective knowledge up to an extremity of opposi- their opposition again on the same set of measures before filling out tion value of 4.77, and turns significantly negative at an extremity demographics. Arguments were of four types: moral virtues of GMF, of opposition value of 7. For extremists, knowing less is associated safety, naturalness, and Christian theology. with thinking one knows more, and vice-versa. 1. Moral Virtues of GMF: We selected an argument about Our second study was exploratory. The goal was to taxonomize moral virtues of GMF because prior work suggests that the main reasons people have for being concerned about or opposed many opponents to GM are moralized opponents (Scott to genetically modified foods, independent of the extant literature. et al., 2016). Moral opponents are typically insensitive to To that end, we used the “concern” question from study 1 to capture risk-benefit evidence, especially about non-moral conse- the responses of only respondents who indicated at least some con- quences (Baron & Spranca, 1997; Tetlock et al., 2000). cern about GM food in a new sample collection on Amazon MTurk, However, we hypothesized that if moralized opponents resulting in 506 complete responses. Those participants were pre- saw a moral counterargument, they might engage in think- sented with the following prompt: “You just indicated some concern ing about tradeoffs and change their minds. In the moral about genetically modified foods. In the text box below, describe essays, participants were told that “genetically engineered your concerns in detail and why you have them. Please be as specific crops can increase health and prevent deaths from malnu- as you can.” We then grouped participants’ open-ended responses trition, especially in the world’s poorest countries” and into five theory-agnostic reasons, which we gave to two hypothesis- the example of golden rice which prevents blindness and blind research assistants, who then coded all responses based on the death from Vitamin A deficiency was explained in depth. five reasons. The research assistants’ coding was consistent across 2. Safety of GMF: Much of the literature suggests that risk 71% of cases, and the remaining 29% of cases were resolved by a perceptions are a major predictor of GMF attitudes (Moon third assistant. This resulted in the following taxonomy of psycho- & Balasubramanian, 2004). In our safety argument, par- logical reasons for GM food opposition: ticipants read an essay arguing that GM food isn’t danger- • Bodily harm concerns (228 participants) ous, and the essay contained polls of scientists and sum- • Fear of the unknown (93 participants) mary statements from reputable scientific organizations. • Feelings of unnaturalness (79 participants) 3. Naturalness of GMF: GMF is considered unnatural, and • Environmental harm concerns (34 participants) perceptions of unnaturalness is linked with GMF opposi- Advances in Consumer Research (Volume 46) / 117

tion (Tenbült et al., 2005). In fact, the unnaturalness of purchasing decisions (e.g. navigating health claims in advertise- GMF may be one reason why people are morally opposed. ments). Although emotions are known to be integral to decision mak- Naturalness essays took a few different forms, some argu- ing (Kahneman, 2011), their role in judgments of scientific evidence ing that GMF was close to selective breeding and therefore has been little studied. We investigate how the emotions evoked by natural, and others arguing that GMF and gene insertion scientific evidence are related to three types of judgments regarding happens in nature. that evidence: understanding of it (Drummond & Fischhoff, 2017), 4. Christian theology: Religiosity has been linked to opposi- judgments of its quality (Broomell & Kane, 2017), and trust in the tion to GMF, and sometimes GMF is viewed as “playing scientists who produced it (Fiske, Glick, Cuddy & Xu, 2002). We god” (Brossard, 2012). Therefore, we presented religious also examine the relationship between these judgments and the abil- arguments that took a few different forms, such as argu- ity to reason critically about scientific evidence (Drummond & Fis- ing that religious texts permit Christians to cultivate and chhoff, 2017), asking whether emotion and reasoning ability make manipulate the environment or that Christians are called separate contributions to consumer judgments of scientific evidence. upon since the fall of man to use their talents and innova- In an online study, 695 participants read a condensed version tions (like GMF) to shelter and feed humanity and improve of a science news report from NPR’s All Things Considered (Harris, the world. 2017) describing research on the role of chance in causing cancer In study 1 (N = 142), opponents were randomly assigned to (Tomasetti, Li & Vogelstein, 2017). We chose the article because it in- one of three arguments (two about naturalness, one about Christian volves an emotionally laden topic and presents evidence that sparked theology); In studies 2 (N = 213) and 3 (N = 692), opponents were controversy, but was not polarized along political or religious lines; randomly assigned to view either a naturalness or Christian theol- we thus believed it would evoke strong, diverse emotions. Partici- ogy argument; In study 4 (N = 713), participants were randomly as- pants reported their emotional reactions to the article in terms of six signed to view a naturalness argument, an argument about the safety emotions found to affect judgments in other domains (Ekman, 1992; of GMF or an argument about the moral benefits of GMF. Lerner, Li, Valdesolo & Kassam, 2015; Dunn & Schweitzer, 2005), We operationalized attitude change in two ways. In both cases, fear, anger, sadness, surprise, happiness, and disgust, on a 5-level arguments about moral virtues of GM were most effective. One mea- scale from 1= very slightly or not at all to 5= extremely. Partici- sure categorized individuals based on the agree-disagree question “I pants then answered a series of dependent measures regarding their oppose this” with respect to GMF. All participants had originally subjective understanding of the research, objective understanding indicated they were opposed to GMF, and if they indicated “dis- (measured by asking participants to summarize the study; responses agree” after argument exposure, they were coded as 1 (became sup- were coded for correctness by two trained coders), perceived quality porters), else 0 (remained opponents). In a meta-analysis across all of the research, and perceived warmth and competence of the scien- four studies, 25.2% of opponents became supporters after viewing tists who conducted it, following Fiske et al.’s (2002) conceptualiza- arguments about moral benefits of GM (95% CI [19.8%, 31.2%]); tion of trust. Finally, participants completed the Scientific Reason- 17.6% became supporters after viewing naturalness arguments (95% ing Scale (M = 6.9, SD= 2.7, alpha = 0.72; Drummond & Fischhoff, CI [13.2%, 22.0%]); 14.5% became supporters after viewing safety 2017), which comprises 11 scenario-based problems measuring the arguments (95% CI [10.3%, 19.7%]), and 10.4% became support- ability to critically evaluate the quality of scientific evidence. ers after viewing religious arguments (95% CI [7.7%, 13.1%]). A We used regressions to predict participants’ responses to our second measure was a pre-post difference score averaged across 12 dependent measures as a function of their scientific reasoning ability items measuring attitudes to GMF (9-point likert scale items about and emotional reactions. We first modeled each dependent variable desires to strictly regulate GM food, desires to consume GM food as a function of scientific reasoning ability, and found that individu- (reverse scored) and desires to take actions to protest and oppose als with greater ability reported greater subjective (B = 0.031, p < GMF cultivation (adapted from Scott et al. 2016; Siegrist, 2000)). 0.01) and objective understanding (B = 0.128, p < 0.001), and rated On this continuous measure, arguments about moral benefits of GM the evidence as of lower quality (B = -0.052, p < 0.001). Ability was shifted attitudes by d = .44 (95% CI [.31, .57]). In comparison, unrelated to judged warmth and competence. arguments about safety shifted attitudes by d = .30 (95% CI [.17, We next added the emotion variables as predictors, assessing .43)]; arguments about naturalness shifted attitudes by d = .28 (95% whether including them improved model fit. We modeled the emo- CI[.20, .36]); arguments about Christian theology shifted attitudes tions in two different ways: (1) we added each emotion as a separate by d = .06 (95% CI[-.05, .17]). predictor, as in the emotion and decision making literature (Lerner et Across 4 studies and 1,760 GMF opponents, we find that argu- al., 2015); and (2) we grouped emotions into those with negative and ing about moral benefits of GMF shifted opponents more than argu- positive valence by creating two indexes: positive emotional arousal ments about its safety, naturalness, or acceptability in Christian doc- (averaging reported happiness and surprise) and negative emotional trine. However, consistent with moralization of GMF attitudes, even arousal (averaging reported fear, anger, sadness, and disgust), as in the best arguments were only moderately effective, with at most 25% the risk analysis literature (Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic & Johnson, of opponents becoming supporters after one of these interventions. 2000). We found that overall, including emotions as predictors im- proved model fit, and modeling emotions separately improved model Emotion, Scientific Reasoning, and Judgments of fit more than modeling them by positive and negative arousal, using Scientific Evidence goodness-of-fit criteria (AIC and adjusted 2R ) that penalize models for the number of predictors. This finding held for all but one mea- EXTENDED ABSTRACT sure: participants’ objective understanding of the evidence was unre- Although scientists are often stereotyped as cold and distant, lated to emotion, however modeled. scientific research has the power to spark controversy and prompt With respect to the specific emotions, we find that sadness is strong emotional reactions in those who encounter it. Scientific re- positively associated with subjective understanding of the article (B search, in turn, is important to a range of lay consumers’ decisions, = 0.096, p < 0.001), while anger and disgust are negatively associated from medical decisions (e.g., whether to vaccinate one’s child) to with subjective understanding (B = -0.147, p < 0.01, and B = -0.185, 118 / Consuming Science: Knowledge, Acceptance, and Judgements of Scientific Information and Technology p < 0.001, respectively). Surprise and sadness were positively related when consciously comparing renewable versus non-renewable en- (B = 0.077, p < 0.01; B = 0.144, p < 0.001), while anger and disgust ergy, people prefer renewable energy. were negatively related (B = -0.18, p < 0.01; B = -0.277, p < 0.01), In Study 1, 332 students were asked about their views of re- to judgments of research quality. Happy and surprised participants newable versus non-renewable energy in hypothetical scenarios. judged the scientists as warmer, (B = 0.187, p < 0.001; B = 0.083, p Participants reported that being electrically shocked by a renewable < 0.01), and more competent (B = 0.089, p < 0.001; B = 0.112, p < energy source would be safer than being electrically shocked by a 0.001); disgusted participants judged the scientists as less warm (B = non-renewable energy source, t(305)=9.52, p<.001,and that a light -0.252, p < 0.01) and less competent (B = -0.248, p < 0.01). bulb powered by renewable energy would produce softer light rela- Overall, our results suggest that scientific reasoning ability and tive to a light bulb powered by non-renewable energy t(305)=7.62, emotional reactions to controversial research predict participants’ p<.001. In Study 2, 478 participants from Amazon Mechanical Turk subjective understanding of it and judgments of its quality; emotion (MTurk) also viewed shocks or light from renewable energy as safer but not reasoning predicts trust in the scientists who conducted it. or softer than from non-renewable energy. In addition, MTurk partic- These results are subject to several limitations: because we studied ipants also viewed renewable energy as more efficient, t(478)=4.99, emotions integral to the stimulus, the signal is inherently less clear p<.001, and more reliable, t(478)=2.32, p=.02, than non-renewable than in studies that examine the effect of a single emotion; we also energy. cannot separate the emotions that participants expressed from the Although Studies 1 and 2 demonstrate a bias in hypothetical participants expressing them. Our results have practical and ethical surveys, Study 3 tested how people evaluate renewable energy when implications for science communications and lay consumers. We witnessing electric outputs first-hand. In this study, 164 students found that those with greater scientific reasoning ability understood evaluated light from two different flashlights, one that had been the evidence better, but thought it was of lower quality, suggest that charged with renewable energy and one that had been charged with knowing more about science can help consumers to better under- non-renewable energy. Participants were first given one flashlight stand scientific evidence presented to them in the media, and also to and were asked to evaluate the quality of the light in a dark room and be more critical of such evidence. We also found that surprised con- in a lit room (order counterbalanced). Next, participants were given sumers thought the research was of higher quality, and placed greater the other flashlight and were again asked to evaluate the light. Par- trust in the scientists who conducted it. Evoking surprise could thus ticipants showed a consistent preference of the light from renewable be a powerful tool for science communicators, but also one subject energy in the within-subjects analysis (e.g. indicated a higher will- to misuse. Further, in this study we deliberately sought a stimulus ingness to pay, F(1,159) = 37.41, p < .001). This was not the case in describing scientific results not (yet) subject to political or religious the between-subjects analysis, where sometimes participants favored polarization; future work might examine the effects of emotion in the non-renewable energy and sometimes favored the renewable en- such situations. ergy. It appears that when people are aware that they are comparing renewable versus non-renewable energy, they answered in such a Green biases: Consumer evaluations of renewable and way to appear pro-renewable energy. But when they are not compar- non-renewable energy sources ing the two types of energy sources, people do not consistently rate renewable energy as being superior. Given that the way in which EXTENDED ABSTRACT a battery is charged has no bearing on the light that is produced, Do people perceive energy from renewable sources as being such findings imply that the preference for renewable energy only different than energy from non-renewable sources? If so, this funda- becomes salient when people are faced with both options. mental misunderstanding about energy may explain people’s deci- In Study 4, 165 students experienced electrical stimulation on sions about when and whether to introduce energy from renewable their arms from two different devices, one that had been charged with sources into their lives. renewable energy and one that had been charged with non-renewable Previous survey-based research on green energy products has energy. Participants first experienced one electrical stimulation de- found that many people hold general positive sentiments around vice during a fixed round where they experienced the stimulation at green products but are ultimately reluctant to purchase them due to a low intensity for 10 seconds. Next, participants experienced the the belief that they are of higher cost and lower quality (Griskevi- same device during a free round where they were free to take the cius, Tybur, & Van den Bergh, 2010; Lin & Chang, 2012; Luchs et intensity to a maximum of 60 and were free to test the device for a al., 2010). Unlike products that have previously been studied (e.g. maximum of 2.5 minutes. Participants then experienced the other laundry detergent) which may in fact differ based on whether they device, first during a fixed round and then during a free round. An- are eco-friendly, electricity has exactly the same physical properties other group of participants were in a control group where they ex- no matter how it is produced. Do people nevertheless view energy perienced both devices during both fixed and free rounds, but were from renewable sources as being different than energy from non- not told by which energy source the device was charged. The order renewable sources? Across four studies, we demonstrate that people in which all participants evaluated the two devices was randomized. do indeed view electricity differently due to its generating source. This allowed for us to examine the first fixed and free rounds for the We demonstrate this bias operating when evaluating hypotheti- between-subjects analysis and examine the first and second fixed and cal experiences with electricity, when directly observing light in a free rounds for the within-subjects analysis. dark or lit room, and when physically experiencing electric shocks. The results from Study 4 were similar to the results from the We also find differences between separate versus joint evaluations Study 3. In the within-subjects analysis participants rated the re- (Hsee, 1996). When making separate evaluations, people do not newable energy as being safer, F(1,84)=5.91, p=.02, more efficient, show a consistent preference for products powered by renewable en- F(1,84)=3.43, p=.07, and expressed a greater willingness to pay, ergy and at times judge them to be worse. But in joint evaluations, F(1,84)=7.59, p=.007. As with Study 3, we see no clear preference products powered by renewable energy are judged to be of superior of one energy source in the between-subjects analysis. Thus, across quality. This may indicate that on an unconscious level, people have both studies people reported renewable energy as being superior only neutral or slightly negative attitudes towards renewable energy, but when they were aware that they were comparing it to non-renewable Advances in Consumer Research (Volume 46) / 119 energy. But when people were not aware that such a comparison was Fiske, Susan T., Amy J C Cuddy, Peter Glick, and Jun Xu (2002), being made, there were no preferences for renewable energy. “A Model of (Often Mixed) Stereotype Content: Competence This research provides a new way of understanding people’s and Warmth Respectively Follow from Perceived Status and views on renewable and non-renewable energy sources, in the ab- Competition,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, sence of objective differences between the two. The findings reveal 82(6), 878–902. new psychological insights that determine the acceptance of renew- Hsee, Christopher K. (1996), “The Evaluability Hypothesis: able energy (Wüstenhagen et al., 2007). 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