$LU0RELOLW\$LU0RELOLW\ 0DVWHU3ODQ0DVWHU3ODQ 5$3,'*/2%$/02%,/,7< DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE HEADQUARTERS AIR MOBILITY COMMAND 24 October 1997 MEMORANDUM FOR 1998 Air Mobility Master Plan (AMMP 98) Recipients FROM: HQ AMC/XP 402 Scott Drive Unit 3L3 Scott AFB IL 62225-5307 SUBJECT: AMMP 98 1. Attached is the AMMP 98. We have incorporated many comments from throughout the air mobility community in our effort to continually improve this document. Revisions for AMMP 98: • Added the Commander’s Intent to reflect the commander’s perspective and vision on modernization priorities and command issues. • Section One is now AMC’s Future International Security Assessment. • Commander's Assessment "stoplight" charts reflect FY98-FY22 assessments. • Modernization to meet the requirements of Global Air Traffic Management (GATM) and the results of FY97’s “Year of the En Route System” are emphasized throughout. • New text and a roadmap have been included addressing the return of C-130s to AMC’s modernization planning process. 2. This year AMMP 98 will be available on CD-ROM and AMC’s worldwide web homepage (http://www.safb.af.mil:80/hqamc/pa/). We encourage comments to improve next year's AMMP using a feedback sheet located in the back of the AMMP and an electronic version on the AMC homepage. I look forward to reviewing your inputs. Our points of contact are Lt Col Dave Walden and Maj Ron Celentano, DSN 576-4671, Commercial (618) 256-4671, FAX (618) 256-5372 (E-mail [email protected] or [email protected]). WALTER S. HOGLE, JR. Major General, USAF Director of Plans and Programs Attachment: AMMP 98 AMC – GLOBAL REACH FOR AMERICA COMMANDER’S INTENT As USCINCTRANS and Commander of its air component, Air Mobility Command (AMC), I am tasked to provide the warfighting commanders the means to rapidly deploy forces through the Defense Transportation System (DTS) in peace and war. Without adequate resources to provide this service, our national goals and objectives are in jeopardy. The Air Mobility Master Plan (AMMP) is my modernization plan--it serves as our roadmap, in terms of people, infrastructure, and equipment needed to accomplish our assigned mission. Achieving the milestones set forth in this plan is dependent on the mobility force structure needed to accomplish our mission now and in the future, as well as additional capabilities that leverage technology and meet evolving requirements to ensure the air mobility system remains healthy and responsive. My top priority continues to be the buy out and complete maturing of the C-17--the core airlifter of the future. As the C-141 retires, our support to special operations forces must shift to the C-17. The world is still a dangerous place, and the rapid movement of special operations forces is perhaps even more critical today than at any time in our history. This year, we have an additive requirement which was overlooked in previous years. Special operations represents an additional tasking above that factored into the 120 C-17 buy decision. To meet the continuous peacetime alert and wartime deployment requirements, we need an additional squadron of C-17s. I do not have the need for additional C-17 procurement beyond 135 at this time. Our current fleet of Material Handling Equipment (MHE) is short in numbers, lacks high- reach capability, is beyond its service life, and is expensive to maintain. MHE represents the weakest link in the air mobility process. With continued funding, the full buy of 318 Tunner loaders possesses the capability to solve the large cargo handler shortfall. However, our aging fleet of 25K loaders, the backbone of our theater and smaller port capability, is becoming increasingly unreliable--it too requires replacement. Delivery of the Next Generation Small Loader (NGSL) must begin in FY00 if we are to preserve our capability to get the force to the fight. “Restricted Global Reach” is our next most troubling challenge. As you read this, nearly 700 of our air mobility aircraft are being excluded from critical airspace over the North Atlantic. Areas of exclusion will grow unless we equip our fleet with communications, navigation, and surveillance equipment required to meet more stringent airspace performance standards. The importance of preparing now to operate in the twenty-first century is highlighted by our Global Air Traffic Management (GATM) modernization program. We must leverage technologies to enhance the air mobility system so we can improve our overall capabilities. Our fleet upgrades will be costly, but the alternative is delayed force closure and lost combat sorties, putting U.S. interests and lives at risk. Military history is replete with instances of information being more valuable than forces, fuel, or bullets. All aspects of Global Air Mobility must replumb themselves culturally so that passing of timely, accurate information becomes the fundamental prerequisite to successful operations. We must make this the routine standard in peace, contingency and war. We must track every passenger, patient and piece of cargo within the DTS. In-Transit Visibility (ITV) of personnel, patients, and cargo is essential for the warfighter--forces and equipment in the mobility system do the warfighters no good if they don't know where it is or when it's coming. Systems that provide this capability must be automated to avoid "fat-fingering" or manual data entry. Because the need for accurate data is so important, we've established as our goal that "aircraft will not taxi until the data is entered." We must modernize the 35-year-old KC-135 to operate in today's environment. PACER CRAG is our first critical step for KC-135 cockpit modernization, leading the way towards GATM compliance. However, our biggest fleetwide challenge is gaining reduced vertical separation minimum (RVSM) certification and a GATM-compatible interphone system. Additionally, we need to modernize the KC-135E to meet tighter noise compliance standards to be implemented in the United States on 1 Jan 2000. Many KC-135Es are based at civil airfields. They must be made compliant or we risk our ability to continue operation at those fields. Further, our newest tanker, the KC-10, is showing signs of age and also requires modernization to maintain performance levels and FAA certification--primarily, these include GATM upgrades and a wing pylon replacement. We have tanker and airlift aircrew shortages. Our new refreshed analysis confirms a documented shortfall in the number of aircrews and tankers we have for certain wartime taskings. More immediately, we are significantly short of aircrews to fully employ the aircraft we currently have. Stepping up to this requirement to properly capitalize the tanker force will go a long way towards cutting our wartime shortfall while improving peacetime capability and reducing perstempo. We need more aircrews, and we must start with the KC-135--Active, Guard, and Reserve. We heartily welcome the C-130 fleet and personnel back into AMC. The C-130 represents the cutting edge of our combat delivery mission and provides focus for our Defensive Systems programs. To provide the warfighter a "first in" pathfinder force capable of rapid deployment worldwide, we are acquiring an AMC-Precision Approach Capability (AMCPAC) system to operate under adverse weather conditions into austere airfields. It includes a state-of-the-art airport surveillance radar and precision approach radar and microwave landing capability. The next step toward our goal of being able to operate in near zero-zero conditions is to harness synthetic vision technologies that are maturing now. These capabilities on our C-130s will provide warfighting CINCs the first response capability we need but do not have today. Additionally, I have convened a Tiger Team that is doing a first-of-its- kind, top-to-bottom scrub of C-130 requirements, operations, training, configuration, and equipping of the fleet. This Tiger Team includes participation from all mobility air forces and will enable us to not only assess the status of the fleet but also provide a coherent modernization strategy. We need to modernize the C-5 with new engines and avionics. In the long term, we must have access to approximately 250 reliable wide-body military aircraft--120 C-5s and 135 C-17s--dedicated to the delivery of outsize and oversize cargo in peace and war. With C-17s replacing 266 C-141s, we lose a great deal of flexibility and pallet-carrying capability (over 1,000 pallets per day) to respond to multiple mission taskings. Every "tail" is critical. To help overcome this loss and to improve our peacetime and wartime posture, C-5 modernization is a must to correct its unacceptably low mission reliability rate and improve its performance to that of the KC-10. With nearly 80 percent of its service life remaining and to capitalize on previous investments, the decision to modernize the C-5 to levels comparable with other AMC aircraft is more fiscally compelling than replacing the aircraft. This program must begin in earnest in FY00 with earlier Research & Development funds if possible. In the short term, we're programmed to experience a "bathtub" of capability as C-141s retire more quickly than C-17s replace them. This bathtub has serious consequences to our ability to meet wartime and contingency outsize and oversize requirements. In addition, the loss of total "tails" in the mobility system impedes peacetime flexibility, reduces support to theater CINCs, and puts further pressure on the Transportation Working Capital Fund (TWCF)--impacting our business-based bottom line. As a result, I have directed the staff to look at ways to delay the loss of our C-141 capability-- including reverse associate options. Aeromedical evacuation, one of our three primary missions, has continued to provide unparalleled service.