THE UNITED STATES : RESILIENT HURRICANE RECOVERY PLANNING PRACTICES

Tai Harley

A capstone thesis paper submitted to the Executive Director of the Urban & Regional Planning Program at Georgetown University’s School of Continuing Studies in partial fulfillment of the requirements for Masters of Professional Studies in Urban & Regional Planning.

Faculty Advisor: Scott Davis Academic Advisor: Uwe S. Brandes

© Copyright 2018 by Tai Harley

All Rights Reserved

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ABSTRACT

This thesis paper explores new urban planning practices for resilient recovery of the

United States Virgin Islands on the basis of lessons learned from the 2017 hurricanes Irma and

Maria. The findings of this research highlight how climate change requires the US Virgin

Islands to forge new practices for efficient resilient planning and development. Without effective rebuilding practices, every future hurricane season will pose as a threat on the US

Virgin Island’s economy and residents’ welfare. This paper argues that resilient planning initiatives can reduce the disruption of tourism revenue due to loss of infrastructure, telecommunications, and electricity.

KEYWORDS

United States Virgin Islands, Hurricane, Disaster Preparedness, Climate Change, Resilient Urban

Planning, Sustainability, Tourism, Infrastructure, Building Codes

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RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Research question #1 What are the lessons learned from the recent hurricanes Irma and Maria?

Research question #2 What are the current best practices for resilience planning in the United

States Virgin Islands?

Research question #3? Have current best practices incorporated the full spectrum of lessons- learned from recent hurricanes?

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DEDICATION

To my family, friends, and residents of the United States Virgin Islands (my hometown). This

thesis paper is dedicated to the recovery efforts of hurricanes Irma and Maria that has forever changed the way of life, for better or for worst. As the territory rebuilds a resilient community, I

present my paper as a guide for sustainable practices that can ensure recovery efforts are not

misguided, effective, and are of the highest standards.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am overwhelmed with joy that my decision to invest in myself by advancing my professional attributes has become the pillar to true fulfillment and happiness. I am honored and humbled to be a part of Georgetown University’s Urban & Regional Program, and to now be a part of the urban planning fabric of this dynamic city I live in, Washington, DC.

I owe tremendous love and gratitude to my parental units: Cheryl & Dennis Chance & John and Lorna Harley. Thank you for instilling perseverance, confidence, strength, and a passion for education throughout my entire life. I am a reflection of your love, and I am forever thankful for having you throughout this existence.

To my support system that has encouraged, advised, supported, and pushed me to be my best self when I doubted my own abilities, I thank you tremendously: Jackie George, Jacques Harley, Chere Harley, Cadilla George, Tischer Lockhart-Burrows, Dr. J’Ana Brady, Alana Abednego, and Bernita Boxill.

To Shanika DeWindt, I am forever grateful for that day you informed me of the information session for Georgetown University’s Urban & Regional Planning Program. I attended the information session because of you, and it has forever changed the course of my life. Huge thanks Shani!!!

I am thankful for learning from ALL my professors throughout this program! Your professionalism, expertise, and passion for the urban planning discipline has inspired my own passion and has given me guidance on how to successfully navigate my career in this field.

To my advisor for this project Scott Davis: thank you for helping me see the full potential of my vision. I am appreciative of your time and expertise which has been a tremendous component in completing this project.

Thank you to all my classmates that were in the trenches with me over these past two years completing group projects, studying for finals, and completing homework assignments. We did it! We made it!

Finally, to Georgetown University: thank you for selecting me and giving me this opportunity for my professional advancement. I am forever thankful for being a part of this prestigious institution.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract and Keywords ...... 2

Research Questions ...... 3

Dedication ...... 4

Acknowledgements ...... 5

Table of Contents ...... 6

List of Tables ...... 7

List of Figures ...... 8

Introduction ...... 9

Chapter One: Literature Review ...... 13 The Rise of Climate Change ...... 13 Lessons Learned from Past Storms ...... 14 Disaster Preparedness and Risk Management ...... 17 Resilient Planning Practices ...... 18 100 Rockefeller Resilient Cities Program ...... 19

Chapter Two: Professional Best Practice Review ...... 21 Case Study: ...... 21 Bermuda Building Code ...... 23 Bermuda Image: The Bermuda Roof ...... 25

Chapter Three: Research Methodology ...... 29 Methodology ...... 29 Literature Review/Primary Data/Secondary Sources ...... 29

Chapter Four: Research Findings and Analysis ...... 31 September 1995 ...... 31 September 2017 ...... 35 September 2017 ...... 38

Chapter Five: Thesis Articulation ...... 42 United States Virgin Islands First-Year Progress Report (Irma & Maria) ...... 42 USVI Hurricane Recovery and Resilience Task Force Report 2018 ...... 46 Resilient Urban Planning Recommendations ...... 47

Chapter Six: Conclusion ...... 48

Appendix: Interview with Beverly Nicholson-Doty, Commissioner of Tourism ...... 49

Bibliography ...... 51 7

LIST OF TABLES

Table 2.7: Cement Boards Windspeed Criteria ….……………………………………………...28

Table 4.5: Highest Hurricanes Speed Comparison ……………………………………….36

Table 4.13: Mainland United States Tropical Cyclones Causing at Least 1 Billion Dollars in Damage, 1990-2017(Not Adjusted for Inflation) ……………………………………………….41

Table 5.1: Household Income Distribution for the USVI and United States……………………43

Table 5.3: Future Climate Hazards in the US Virgin Islands……………………………………46

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LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.1: Shocks and Stresses…………………………………………………… 20

Figure 2.1: Property Damage of in Bermuda…………………………………22

Figure 2.2: Horizontal Support to Masonry Buildings…………………………………………..24

Figure 2.3: Reinforced Concrete/Connecting Walls……………………………………………..25

Figure 2.4: EPS Bermuda Profile Roof………………………………………………………….26

Figure 2.5: EPS Bermuda Profile Roof………………………………………………………….27

Figure 2.6: EPS Bermuda Roof Installation……………………………………………………..27

Figure 4.1: Best Track Positions for Hurricane Marilyn………………………………………...32

Figure 4.2: Hurricane Marilyn Devastation……………………………………………………...33

Figure 4.3: Hurricane Marilyn Devastation……………………………………………………...33

Figure 4.4: Hurricane Marilyn Devastation……………………………………………………...34

Figure 4.6: Best Track Positions for Hurricane Irma…………………………………………….36

Figure 4.7: Best Track Maximum Sustained (Hurricane Irma)…………………………..37

Figure 4.8: Wind Swath Radius of 35, 60, & 64 Knots (Hurricane Irma)……………………….37

Figure 4.9: Hurricane Maria Passing South of St. Croix, US Virgin Islands……………………38

Figure 4.10: Aerial Views of Hurricane Maria Damage: St. Croix, US Virgin Islands…………39

Figure 4.11: Hurricane Maria’s Track and Category Status Across the Caribbean……………..40

Figure 4.12: Hurricane Maria 48-Hour Rainfall Totals………………………………………….40

Figure 5.2: USVI Weak Economic Activity, Employment, & Population………………………44

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Source: VI Now Introduction

“It is not the strongest of the species that survive, nor the most intelligent, but the one most

responsive to change”- Charles Darwin.

In September 2017, the United States Virgin Islands and neighboring islands experienced two major category five hurricanes that has left the region ravaged. As this paper is being written, we are currently in the middle of the 2018 hurricane season. A year has passed, and recovery efforts are well underway. The concerns of repeating patterns from the last hurricane are deeply rooted in my mind, as growing up in St. Thomas US Virgin Islands, I have firsthand experience of what life was like after hurricanes Hugo in 1989 and Marilyn 1995. Hurricanes

Irma and Maria have created daunting questions: will the U.S. Virgin Islands recovery tactics be quick fixes like previous storms? Will building and roofing codes be thoroughly enforced? Will telecommunications fiber optics be buried underground? Will lampposts be replaced from wooden structures that are easily broken, to steel or cement that can withstand category five and above winds? The extent of the damage to property and infrastructure indicates that sustainable practices were not thoroughly implemented, or completely ignored from hurricane Marilyn.

1 “Where is the U.S. Virgin Islands: Geography” VI Now The Virgin Islands Best Guide. Accessed December 23, 2018. https://vinow-vinow.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/caribbean-map-640x360.jpg 10

As hurricanes Irma and Maria were not the first major hurricanes the territory has faced, and it certainly won’t be the last, this paper argues that the U.S. Virgin Islands can benefit from a new way of planning and development from that of the past. As the territory is located in an active hurricane zone, these recommendations will have long term benefits and will guide preparation for future storms, and most importantly, protect the tourism industry with is the driving force of the economy. It is imperative to rebuild efficiently, especially with federal government allocated funding. The economic impacts of storm destruction and recovery directly affects the entire economic scale for future years with population displacement and reduction, workforce elimination, and threatens the tourism product as top destination for Caribbean travel.

When the territory faces another storm in the near future, and sustainable long-term measures were not implemented, this can affect future funding2 for recovery, jobs stability, housing demand, and community wellness on a large scale. This research is crucial for residents on island communities, not just in the U.S. Virgin Islands, but worldwide.

To find the solutions for progressive resilient hurricane recovery, research will include practices that are not effective, as well as practices that have proven to deliver results in other islands communities that deals with hurricane disaster response. My intent is to find progressive best practices for hurricane recovery and resilience and recommend them to the U.S. Virgin

Islands. These findings should highlight telecommunications reconfiguration, infrastructure design standards, energy and water conservation and restoration, and community wellness as it relates to post storm stressors and healing. In addition, resilient practices will hopefully give the

U.S. Virgin Islands and advantage in recovery time, to continue competing as a top tourism destination.

2 “National Hurricane Center. Costliest U.S. Tropical Cyclones Table Updated”. National Hurricane Center. Accessed 10/13/18. https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/news/UpdatedCostliest.pdf

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The prime goal is for the U.S. Virgin Islands to combat and improve preparation for unavoidable climate change risks that has led to the increase and intensity of hurricanes.

Practices that have not evolved over the years should be reevaluated for improvement or should be replaced with modern practices that lead to long term sustainability. Hurricanes Irma and

Maria can be great teaching tools for what works and what does not work in our technology advanced world. I intend to argue these points in this paper.

Recollection of Hurricane Marilyn 1995

On the evening of September 15, 1995, the lives of the U.S. Virgin Islanders were about to change, as hurricane Marilyn’s intensity and strength threatened to ravish the region.

Forecasters predicted the storm to only be a category 2 upon . Many residents took that forecasting lightly and did not secure their homes as much as they could with the notion that the hurricane wasn’t intended to be that bad. This was the first mistake we Virgin Islanders made.

Any imminent hurricane forecast should be taken seriously, as we’ve learned that night that storm predictability is uncertain and can always change at the last minute.

Life after the storm was difficult at every angle of the community. Families like mine whose homes were destroyed either relocated to other family members whose homes were still livable or relocated to temporary shelters (which were schools). With no electricity to pump water throughout the house out of the cistern (a well like water storage facility built under homes in most Caribbean islands), water was lifted out of the cisterns for via buckets. This task was labor intensive and presumably dangerous. Our only hospital on island was damaged. Military personal assisted with a tent hospital to provide immediate medical care. It took months for students to return to school as schools were shelters, and the remaining schools were damaged.

Food scarcity became an issue a week a later, as damaged supermarkets were looted, and refrigeration and limited ice supply was challenging. Although families prepared for the worst- 12 case scenarios, preparation does not always go as planned, and preparation was not fully adhered to as the storm forecast was misleading. The U.S. Virgin Islands struggled to rebuild economically and structurally, which resulted in quick fixes to regain normalcy as soon as possible.

Twenty-two years later, hurricanes Irma and Maria has exposed, damaged, and challenged previous hurricane recovery strategies and resiliency tactics on a large scale. As a former U.S. Virgin Islands resident who has firsthand experienced the economic, physical, and emotional impacts of a major hurricane, this thesis paper is dedicated to the recovery initiatives of hurricanes Irma and Maria, and to provide sustainable urban planning recommendations for future hurricanes as climate change continues to increase weather-related risk for the region.

These hurricanes have provided an opportunity for the US Virgin Islands to strictly enforce building codes, which would reduce infrastructure damage with future hurricanes, and can provide economic stability to secure the tourism product, which is the main revenue producer.

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Chapter One: Literature Review

The Rise of Climate Change

Hurricane intensity, frequency, and patterns have changed from the 1960s to the 1990s.

In the early 1990s, particularly around 1995, the correlation between climate change and its effects on growing hurricane disasters, marked a turning point that the power of climate change should no longer be ignored. “The effects of climate change can: increase ocean water temperatures, decrease wind shear, and increase which creates conducive environments to form hurricanes.”3 Twenty years ago, hurricane season generally applied to the

Caribbean region and Florida, with an onset of major destructive hurricanes:

(1989), (1992), and Hurricane Marilyn (1995). These storms were well remembered not just for the damaged they imposed on the United States Virgin Islands and

Florida, but their intensified wind speeds were historic. The 1995 hurricane season marks a historic embark for the effects of climate change on storm frequency and intensity. “The ending the El Nino in early 1995 was the gateway for 1995 having the most hurricanes during a season on record where oceanic and atmospheric changes were noted as a result of climate change.”4

Studies of environmental factors of hurricanes from 1995 to the present indicate a common theme of warming ocean temperatures as a direct correlation of climate change to hurricane intensity. On average, storms have developed into the category three to five range on the Saffir Simpson scale. The United States Virgin Islands’ location in the of the Caribbean will be directly impacted with the forecasting for high storm intensity. “Ocean

3 Walsh, Kevin J. E., Suzana J. Camargo, Gabriel A. Vecchi, Anne Sophie Daloz, James Elsner, Kerry Emanuel, Michael Horn, et al. "HURRICANES AND CLIMATE: The U.S. CLIVAR Working Group on Hurricanes." Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society 96, no. 6 (06, 2015): 997-1017. http://proxy.library.georgetown.edu/login?url=https://search.proquest.com/docview/1699538842?accountid=11091. 4 Goldenberg, Stanley B., Christopher W. Landsea, Alberto Mestas-Nunez, and William M. Gray. “The Recent Increase in Activity: Causes and Implications.” Science 293, no. 5529 (Jul 20, 2001): 474-9. http://proxy.library.georgetown.edu/login?url=https://search.proquest.com/docview/213568994?accountid=11091.

14 temperatures that are heated to 28° Celsius pinpoints the benchmark for hurricanes to develop into categories three, four, and five.”5 “It is forecasted that global warming will increase hurricanes in the Caribbean by 2-11% by 2100, where intensity is expected to increase.”6

Hurricane seasons 1995 to 2017 recorded landfall storms supports these findings, where storms are not only intensifying, but are also now occurring in regions outside of the Caribbean. Climate change impacts serves at as a catalyst for a future of uncertainty as to where storms can possibly make direct landfall each hurricane season but has guaranteed that future storms will continue to sustain high levels of wind strength intensity. Climate change adaptation is necessary for sustainable practices to reduce hurricane infrastructure damage and recovery time.

Lessons Learned from Past Storms

The history of past hurricanes and the lessons left behind, both positive and negative, are crucial for understanding the implications hurricanes have upon landfall, and the long-lasting effects the storm produces to the area, people, and economy affected. Prior to the 2017 hurricane season that produced hurricanes Irma and Maria, it has been twenty-two years since the US

Virgin Islands were directly impacted and damaged from a major hurricane. Since 1995, atmospheric technology has advanced significantly providing and advantage and crucial knowledge for storm forecasting. However, there is a disadvantage if knowledge is not enforced by local governments. “With past experiences from previous storms, and with familiarity and knowledge of the daily environment, infrastructure, and economy, local governments are responsible for deferred maintenance and upkeep of infrastructure. These sustainable practices over time are cost effective and can save lives in the event a future major hurricane makes

5 Moore, Winston, Wayne Elliott, and Troy Lorde. "Climate Change, Atlantic Storm Activity and the Regional Socio-Economic Impacts on the Caribbean." Environment, Development and Sustainability 19, no. 2 (04, 2017): 707-726. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10668-016-9763-1. http://proxy.library.georgetown.edu/login?url=https://search.proquest.com/docview/1874149982?accountid=11091. 6 Ibid.

15 landfall. Island townships like the US Virgin Islands and other Caribbean islands rely heavily on their natural resources for tourism revenue. Future or repeated hurricane infrastructure damage can cost islands townships loss of tourism revenue and rebuilding estimates up to $22 billion by

2050 and $46 billion by 2050.”7

Communication amongst local authorities regarding past hurricanes, or the lack thereof, has been highlighted as a prime lesson from past hurricanes. “The ideology of “social memory” where past devastation impacts are simply forgotten or ignored creates a society with a false sense of safety, which in turn, does not advocate for the prioritization of resilient practices.

Effective future hazardous preparation is only effective when past successes and failures are documented, evaluated, and incorporated in future resilience planning.”8 Immediately after a catastrophic event, the prime focus is geared towards survival measures of medical care, food distribution, shelter stability, safety, and livelihood accountability. “In these crucial weeks, months, and first year after an event, resiliency practices should be a focal point in regaining community stability. The fresh memories are what will be the catalysts for acknowledging vulnerabilities, growth, recommendations, and improvements. Historical events awareness and appreciation are crucial communication elements that can forecast resilience achievements, or repeated forfeitures. ”9

The game dodgeball, where participants are either hit by the ball, or have missed completely, provides a level of euphoria to which the participant dares to keep playing, or accepts their luck of not getting hit, and ends the game. The dodgeball scenario is eerily similar

7 Mercer, Jessica, Ilan Kelman, Björn Alfthan, and Tiina Kurvits. “Ecosystem-Based Adaptation to Climate Change in Caribbean Small Island Developing States: Integrating Local and External Knowledge.” Sustainability 4, no. 8 (2012): 1908-1932. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/su4081908. http://proxy.library.georgetown.edu/login?url=https://search.proquest.com/docview/1537428547?accountid=11091. 8 Colten, Craig E. and Amy R. Sumpter. "Social Memory and Resilience in New Orleans." Natural Hazards 48, no. 3 (03, 2009): 355-364. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11069-008-9267-x. http://proxy.library.georgetown.edu/login?url=https://search.proquest.com/docview/234901002?accountid=11091. 9 Ibid. 16 to the results communities either portray or dismiss when spared from a near hit hurricane. Not getting hit by the ball can either create an adherence to imminent caution response or cause an ignore all possible threats reaction. Hurricane forecasting that predicts direct landfall and is categorized as hazardous danger is initially taken seriously. If the storm changes course at the last minute, weakens upon arrival, or misses the targeted area completely, authorities and residents alike are most likely not to adhere or take future precautions seriously, as the near missed overhyped disaster preparation lead to minimum or no storm damage.

This behavior and response are another big lesson learned from past hurricanes.

“Hurricane fatigue in an active hurricane season where storms are predicted for landfall, but either miss completely or are weakened leads to residents not evacuating, not preparing effectively, and leads to complacency.”10 These experiences and responses vary among people and really make a difference for future storm planning and preparation measures. “Near misses of hurricanes influence people’s interpretation of similar hazards, thus influence their future mitigation decisions. Past experiences with hurricanes can subconsciously create mental bias to the representation of the hazard that often promotes unrealistic reassurance.”11 As it’s been over twenty years since the Caribbean has had major hurricanes, this near miss philosophy has been proven during the 2017 hurricane season. “Caribbean and US territories have disregarded their hurricane preparation during drought seasons or years of no hurricane activity becoming complacent with building maintenance and other preparedness practices.”12

10 Tinsley, Catherine H;Dillon, Robin L;Cronin, Matthew A. “How Near-Miss Events Amplify or Attenuate Risky Decision Making.” Management Science. 58, no. 9 (n.d.). 11 Ibid. 12 Moore, Winston, Wayne Elliott, and Troy Lorde. “Climate Change, Atlantic Storm Activity and the Regional Socio-Economic Impacts on the Caribbean.” Environment, Development and Sustainability 19, no. 2 (04, 2017): 707-726. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10668-016-9763-1. http://proxy.library.georgetown.edu/login?url=https://search.proquest.com/docview/1874149982?accountid=11091 17

Disaster Preparedness and Risk Management

According to The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s House Transportation and

Infrastructure Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings and Emergency

Management hearing on recovering from the 2017 hurricane season, “developing resilient communities before a hurricane occurs reduces loss of life and economic disruption. Devasted communities should enforce rebuilding infrastructure better, stronger, and tougher to protect tax payers’ investments in economic stability.”13 Government authorities and residents have a shared responsibility in hurricane preparedness and risk management before annual hurricane seasons to eliminate damage costs, recovery to normalcy time, and community impacts. “Community resilience and community disaster risk management collectively can assure resources for evacuation and response plans and infrastructure investments are used effectively, which in return can aid in preparedness and recovery efforts. Communities that are willingly helping themselves with risk management strategies improve their preparedness skills, which can reduce losses from hurricanes.”14

For the United States and its territories, disaster preparation and risk management procedures are organized on a federal government level, and then is circulated amongst local governments. Political influences play a major role in the disaster funding and improvements of failed practices. Each state establishes their own guidelines for risk management declarations and the allotted funding for covering those expenses. As this varies by state, or territories (as in the US Virgin Islands), it is up the state or territory to determine the relevance and priority of

13 “House Transportation and Infrastructure Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings and Emergency Management Hearing”. Washington: Federal Information & News Dispatch, Inc, 2018. http://proxy.library.georgetown.edu/login?url=https://search.proquest.com/docview/2071489859?accountid=11091. 14 Cox, Jr., Louis Anthony (Tony). “Community Resilience and Decision Theory Challenges for Catastrophic Events.” Risk Analysis: An International Journal 32, no. 11 (November 2012): 1919–34. doi:10.1111/j.1539- 6924.2012.01881.x.

18 risk management funding. For states and territories to receive sufficient funding to prioritize disaster preparedness and risk management, “an assessment of FEMA over the past twenty-five years has problems that can use improvements, which would further increase risk management funding. Some of these areas for improvement are:

• Congressional and presidential pressure to for disaster declarations which impacts tax payers • Generous federal government funding provides limited incentives for states and territories to budget for the different phases of disaster management • Reluctance of states and territories to adapt land use and building codes to improve new construction and rebuilding • The decision on whether or not mitigation should be funded by federal grants or local communities should protect themselves and receive financial assistance when absolutely necessary”15

With improvement to these areas on the federal level, disaster risk management may become a priority to state and territories governments as these improvements highlight preventative measures for future hurricane planning.

Resilient Planning Practices

Modern cities that have vulnerable coastlines or island countries that are surrounded by oceans should rethink their infrastructure design to prepare for changing weather patterns. Often times with these improvement plans in mind, government entities create complexities that either hinder or abolish resilient planning practices. These issues have to become a priority within all government entities and private corporations for the common goal of safety and survival of citizens as we move forward into the next century. “New methods of construction, operation, and logic are needed to address global climate change to promote resilient climate adaption.

Resilience is a necessary component for sustainable development as the risk of exposure to natural phenomena can no longer be ignored.”16

15 Gopalakrishnan, Chennat, and Norio Okada. “Designing New Institutions for Implementing Integrated Disaster Risk Management: Key Elements and Future Directions.” Disasters 31, no. 4 (December 2007): 353–72. doi:10.1111/j.1467-7717.2007.01013.x.

16 Moraci, Francesca, Maurizio Francesco Errigo, Celestina Fazia, Gianluca Burgio, and Sante Foresta. “Making Less Vulnerable Cities: Resilience as a New Paradigm of Smart Planning.” Sustainability 10, no. 3 (2018): 755. 19

Resilient planning practices may be deemed as unnecessary by some as it forces governance to evolve from strategies that have worked and can be improved, and strategies that have failed in the past. It is important to note why resiliency is important not just for the current infrastructure, but for future design elements for future generations. “Cities that are at risk for weather related hazards should value the importance of resiliency as uncertainty leads to vulnerability as catastrophes can’t be predicted completely. In addition, resilient planning would prevent fewer property damage, power outages, and injuries and deaths from catastrophes. These practices serve a purpose of improving the quality of life for housing, health, work opportunities, and livability.”17 Resilience importance has to be considered by all stakeholders: community members, urban planners, architects, engineers, government entities, etc. for resilient planning strategies to implemented in maintaining the built environment.

100 Rockefeller Resilient Cities Program

The Rockefeller Resilient Cities Program has provided a dynamic framework for imminent changing cities. This program has defined resilience as “the capacity of individuals, communities, institutions, businesses, and systems within a city to survive, adapt, and grow, no matter what kinds of chronic stresses and acute shocks they experience.”18 In keeping with the

Rockefeller Resilient Cities program definition of resiliency, they have highlighted that

“resiliency is about developing a proactive and integrated plan that addresses both shocks and stresses from natural disasters and to adverse socio-economic trends.”19 Cities that are at high risk for hurricane landfall after the 2017 hurricane season should invest in proactive approach

doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/su10030755. http://proxy.library.georgetown.edu/login?url=https://search.proquest.com/docview/2110081108?accountid=11091. 17 Tabibian, M. and S. Movahed. “Towards Resilient and Sustainable Cities: A Conceptual Framework.” Scientia Iranica.Transaction A, Civil Engineering 23, no. 5 (2016): 2081-2093. http://proxy.library.georgetown.edu/login?url=https://search.proquest.com/docview/1845160041?accountid=11091.

18 “Frequently Asked Questions”. 100 Resilient Cities. Accessed December 6, 2018. http://www.100resilientcities.org/FAQ/#/-_/ 19 Ibid. 20 incentives that are offered through the Rockefeller Resilient Cities program. San Juan Puerto

Rico, which is a neighbor to the U.S. Virgin Islands, and is also a territory of the United States, is currently a part of the 100 resilient cities program. Puerto Rico’s resiliency story overlaps with the U.S. Virgin Islands, as the territory is highly dependent on Puerto for daily operations and shares the similar economic and infrastructure challenges before and after the hurricanes.

Figure 1.1: Puerto Rico Shocks and Stresses20

Photo Source: 100 Resilient Cities

20 “San Juan’s Resilience Story”. 100 Resilient Cities. Accessed December 24, 2018. http://www.100resilientcities.org/cities/san-juan/ 21

Chapter Two: Professional Best Practice Review

The practice of urban planning continuously evolves to adapt to growing populations, changing economies, and climate change weather related natural disasters. Innovative cities and islands nations alike are making the necessary adaptations to design and building codes, resiliency, and energy conservation initiatives as a response to past lessons and failures.

Every destination has their own unique challenges to combat when enforcing planning principles and can be resolved with collective stewardship amongst local constituents or can be influenced by planning theories practiced by neighboring cities or cities who share similar population, topography, and landscape characteristics. A mere comparison and contrast of what works and what’s not feasible for sustainable practices can serve as the catalyst for forward thinking solutions while eliminating misconceptions and failures.

Case Study: Bermuda

Bermuda, an archipelago of 21 square miles, and a resident population of 65,00021, is located in the Atlantic Ocean hurricane alley, and is highly susceptible to hurricane landfall.

Although Bermuda is not a part of the Caribbean islands’ archipelago, this island nation is similar in size and population to the US Virgin Islands and has had its share of direct hurricane landfall and recovery initiatives. Unlike the US Virgin Islands that is a territory of the United

States, Bermuda is a British colony that is self-governing. Self-governance allows Bermuda to facilitate their own urban planning initiatives without approvals from Britain, through their own parliamentary government.22

21 Archibald Forbes, Keith. “Bermuda and Her Atlantic Islands.” Bermuda Online. Accessed December 4, 2018. http://www.bermuda-online.org/ 22 “Bermuda Islands, Atlantic Ocean.” Encyclopedia Britannica. Accessed December 4, 2018. https://www.britannica.com/place/Bermuda 22

Bermuda’s hurricane history dates back to the 1500s. Early settlements buildings were constructed out of wood which were proven to be unfavorable towards storm survival.

September 1712 marked the planning incentive to establish “building codes” where the ideology to build structures out of limestone instead of wood would excel in combatting wind damage.23 It took centuries for this ideology to come to fruition as hurricanes have impacted Bermuda on average of every century from 1712 to the 2000s. Each storm has documented structural damage to some capacity with some storms reported worse than previous devastation.

The 2003 hurricane season was a historic year for Bermuda, as Hurricane Fabian unleashed its intensity as a category three storm, causing extensive damage, and recorded as one of Bermuda’s worst hurricanes since 1926. Fabian caused eight fatalities, ten feet storm surge, and structural and roof damage to an estimated $300 million (USD).24

Figure 2.1: Property Damage from the Aftermath of Hurricane Fabian25

Photo Source: Bernews Weather

23 “The History of Hurricanes in Bermuda.” The Bermudian. August 16, 2018. https://www.thebermudian.com/home-a-garden/hurricane-season-2018/the-history-of-hurricanes-in-bermuda/ 24 Pasch, Richrard J., Blake, Eric S., Brown, Daniel P. “ Report Hurricane Fabian 27 August-8 September 2003”. National Hurricane Center. November 19, 2003. https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/data/tcr/AL102003_Fabian.pdf 25 “Aftermath of Hurricane Fabian, Sept 5, 2003”. Bernews Weather. Accessed December 4, 2018. http://bernews.com/weather/2003/09/after-hurricane-fabian-sept-5-2003/after-hurricane-fabian-bermuda-sept-5- 2003-2/ 23

Property damage from this storm spearheaded Bermuda’s government to strongly enforce and update their design, building, and construction codes. “On average, buildings are constructed with concrete and limestone, following the British code, with building requirements set to sustain winds of 110 mph. Majority of roofs are constructed out of eighteen inches by 12 inches limestone slates cemented together on timber rafters. Hurricane Fabian damage assessment has concluded that residential properties sustained less damages than commercial properties, roofs damages were partial with few cases of complete roof failure, and effectiveness of the strict building codes prevented Bermuda from facing further catastrophic damages and livelihood disruptions.”26

Bermuda Building Code

The Bermuda Building Act was officially established in 1988 which was the pillar to the

Bermuda Residential Building Code 2014, effective January 12, 2015.27 Formulated by the

Bermuda Government Department of Planning, the building codes are the design and construction standards where buildings consist of “concrete foundations, masonry walls, and concrete or timber roofs. These codes are for properties 5000 square feet or smaller floor area with a maximum two stories. ”28 These parameters are highly effective for residential dwellings with strict compliance to these codes. For new construction or upgrades to existing properties, violations of the building codes are deemed as offences, where the Building Official has authority to issue a stop work notice of section 23B(2) of the Building Act of 1988. Construction

26 Khanduri, Atul. “Bermuda Offers Lessons in Hurricane Preparedness”. Property Casualty 360. September 16, 2003. https://www.propertycasualty360.com/2003/09/16/bermuda-offers-lesson-in-hurricane- preparedness/?slreturn=20181110003622 27 “Bermuda Residential Building Code 2014”. Department of Planning Government of Bermuda. Accessed December 4, 2018. https://docplayer.net/7385999-Bermuda-residential-building-code-2014.html 28 Ibid, 21. 24 is prohibited to continue without written approval from the Building Official.29 Accountability through enforced governance is key to ensuring properties are built or repaired effectively as a defense towards hurricane damage and the future of climate change storm patterns. Bermuda’s model is a great teaching tool for the US Virgin Islands property rebuilding and resiliency initiatives.

Figure 2.2: Horizontal Support to Masonry Walls30

Photo Source: Bermuda Residential Building Code

29 Ibid, 29-30. 30 Ibid. 105. 25

Figure 2.3: Reinforced Concrete/Connecting Intersecting Walls31

Photo Source: Bermuda Residential Building Code

Bermuda Image: The Bermuda Roof

The quality, design, and construction methods of roofs in the Caribbean region are of the most fundamental aspects of hurricane survival and resiliency. Many structures are soundly built with concrete blocks and cement, yet have lackluster roofs made out of wood planks and finished with galvanize (an iron protective layer). Understandably, this method is the quick and easy approach to rebuilding with limited funding, impatience, and desperation for normalcy, but this method has proven to be costlier and more inefficient to hurricane intensity and frequency. In addition, roofs in the Caribbean serve as a double purpose for both shelter and water collection for household usage. Therefore, roofing construction and design with enforced building codes like what is represented in Bermuda is highly recommended as a model towards resiliency.

31 Ibid. 108. 26

Innovative Building Systems (Bahamas) Ltd. has been providing Bermuda residents with the Bermuda Roof design and construction and should consider expanding their business to the

U.S. Virgin Islands. Their roofs are comprised of:32

• Eave slate: molded concrete tile used to fasten eaves to the roof • EPS roof tiles: the traditional Bermuda Style roof • Cement boards: provides more efficiency than plywood, is fire and insect resistant, and hurricane sustainable with tested and approved wind rating • Adhesives: secures EPS tiles to substrate which combats wind uplift, and provides tiles with flexibility to move with the wind • EFIS screws: to fasten EPS tile • Fiber bond: placed over EPS tiles to reduce cracks in the roof • Elastomeric paint: used to coat the roof. Can be in two forms: for non-portable water usage and portable water usage

Figure 2.4: EPS Bermuda Profile Roof33

Photo Source: The Bermuda Roof

32 “Roof Components”. The Bermuda Roof. Accessed December 4, 2018. https://www.thebermudaroof.com/roof- components/ 33 Ibid. 27

Figure 2.5: EPS Bermuda Profile Roof34

Photo Source: The Bermuda Roof

Figure 2.6: EPS Bermuda Roof Installation35

Photo Source: The Bermuda Roof

34 Ibid. 35 “Balmoral Club”. The Bermuda Roof. Accessed December 4, 2018. https://www.thebermudaroof.com/balmoral- club/ 28

Table 2.7: Cement Boards Windspeed Criteria36

36 “Maximum Wind Velocity (MPH) Allowable on Plycem CemDeck Boards”. Plycem. Accessed December 4, 2018.https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5766fce66b8f5b316be8caa9/t/59227dac86e6c0d647bfeadc/14954326209 03/Load+Table_Wind+VelocityMph+-+Plycem+Logo.pdf 29

Chapter Three: Research Methodology

Methodology

The research for this project began with my own personal recollection of experiencing

Hurricane Hugo in 1989 and Hurricane Marilyn in 1995 as a resident of the US Virgin Islands and the impacts both storms had on my life and the community as a whole. The experience of life after the storms was quite difficult as our home had structural damage from both storms

(resided at two different places for each). The electricity was out for almost six months for complete restoration. Infrastructure damage was widespread amongst the hospital, airport, schools, homes, cable/telephone/power lines, and hotels. My research began with FEMA,

NOAA, and the National Hurricane Center that recorded data analytics for the preliminary reports of past storms as well as the data analytics for hurricanes Irma and Maria. The reports confirmed wind intensity, storm surge, fatalities, and damage cost. These statistics were crucial for the core elements of writing this paper.

Literature Review/Primary Data/Secondary Sources

To produce a thorough literature review, I met with our librarian to create a roadmap on the best methods to retrieve dissertations, thesis papers, and academic journals on climate change, hurricanes, the US Virgin Islands, infrastructure, and disaster preparedness and risk management. From these sources, a compilation of lessons learned from past storms, what has been successful, and what needs improvement became a roadmap for the case study research on another island community that also has faced their share of hurricanes, and how did their recovery efforts benefit their economy. The reoccurring themes of the literature review validated that my own personal experiences with hurricane survival and recovery and can still be challenged and improved for future storms. 30

Bermuda was selected as a prime choice for a comparison and contract model of hurricane resiliency in the Caribbean. Like the US Virgin Islands, Bermuda’s location is ideal for hurricane landfall, and have had their share of devastation and recovery efforts. The island country has implemented strict building codes, which has been the solution for infrastructure sustainability from their last major hurricane Fabian in 2003. This building code model is a great recommendation for the US Virgin Islands as this building strategy has also been introduced to (also affected by direct hurricane landfall).

Lastly, the Government of the Virgin Islands has published a one-year post hurricanes anniversary report and a resilience task force report. These reports discussed a roadmap for progression, addressed pertinent issues that were problematic prior to the storms, allocate funding accountability, and recognized the territory’s awareness and response strategies towards climate change. The economy, energy, telecommunications, and infrastructure components are high priority for resilient reconstruction. Failure to correctly address the pre-existing conditions of these sectors, by not efficiently rebuilding, will continue the vicious cycle of extensive damage from category three and higher hurricanes. An interview with the Commissioner of

Tourism provided great insight that further supports how the Virgin Islands can successfully progress from these hurricanes. (See appendix.)

31

Chapter Four: Research Findings and Analysis

Research Findings: 1

The data analysis of Hurricanes Marilyn, Irma, and Maria has proved climate change has increased hurricane intensity as these storms have sustained category three to five windspeeds.

The destruction reported in these storms were catastrophic and fatal, which can predict the

U.S. Virgin Islands are in the direct path for future storms at this level of intensity. This analysis should serve as the catalyst to initiate resilient long-term recovery practices.

Hurricane Marilyn September 1995

An analysis of the National Hurricane Center Preliminary report of Hurricane Marilyn,

September 12-22, 199537, confirms the hurricane made landfall as a category three storm and strengthen upon arrival. St. Thomas was hit directly by the northeastern eyewall, thus sustaining the most damage out of all three islands. Peak winds were reported at 110-115 knots (which converts to 127-132 miles per hour).38 Storm surge was tallied at seven feet with rainfall for all three islands at ten inches. This storm was responsible for 8 deaths: 5 in St. Thomas, 1 in St.

John, 1 in St. Croix, and 1 in Culebra, Puerto Rico.

“Hurricane Marilyn caused severe damage to the U.S. Virgin Islands, in particular to St. Thomas. An estimated 80% of the homes and business on St. Thomas were destroyed and at least 10,000 people were left homeless. Some of the damage was reportedly attributable to lax construction standards and practices. According to FEMA, 30% of the homes on St. John were destroyed and 60% roofless. About 20-30% of homes on St. Croix received damage.”39

37 Rappaport, Edward N. “National Hurricane Center. Preliminary Report Hurricane Marilyn 12-22 September 1995.” National Hurricane Center. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. January 17, 1996. https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/data/tcr/AL151995_Marilyn.pdf 38 “Converting Knots to MPH For Assessment and Translation of Severe Wind Reports.” Storm Prediction Center. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. Accessed October 12, 2018. https://www.spc.noaa.gov/misc/tables/kt2mph.htm 39 Rappaport, Edward N. “National Hurricane Center. Preliminary Report Hurricane Marilyn 12-22 September 1995.” 32

As was noted in the introduction of this paper in my personal reflection of my experience of

Hurricane Marilyn, I recall residents’ not taking the warning too seriously as the storm was predicted to not be that bad. The preliminary report indicates this notion as well. “In Marilyn, there was a perception that the intensity of the hurricane was underestimated. Regardless of the category of the hurricane, they express surprise at the damage and are adamant that wind speeds they experienced were stronger than indicated by the NHC.”40 Hurricane Marilyn has been added to the National Hurricane Center’s costliest storms list.

Figure 4.1: Best Track Positions for Hurricane Marilyn / National Hurricane Center41

Source: National Hurricane Center

40 Ibid., 4. 41 Ibid., 8. 33

Figure 4.2: Hurricane Marilyn Devastation / VI Free Press42

Source: VI Free Press Figure 4.3: Hurricane Marilyn Devastation / The Source US Virgin Islands43

Source: The Source US Virgin Islands

42 McCarthy, John, “The Good News: Peak of Hurricane Season is Over, Or Is It?” VI Free Press. September 11, 2015. http://vifreepress.com/2015/09/the-good-news-peak-of-the-hurricane-season-is-over-or-is-it/ 43 Lohr, Lynda, “Hurricane Marilyn Left Behind Devastation.” The Source US Virgin Islands. September 14, 2015. https://stjohnsource.com/2015/09/14/hurricane-marilyn-left-behind-devastation/

34

Figure 4.4: Hurricane Marilyn Devastation / TV News Photographer44

Source: The Source US Virgin Islands Hurricane Marilyn’s damage created setbacks for proposed building code enforcement set in place after hurricane Hugo, which occurred six years prior. With these codes, “FEMA,

Government of the Virgin Islands, and the private sector would’ve incorporated stronger mitigation to prepare for future storms by rebuilding infrastructure with upgraded building codes to withstand winds of 110 mph, updated the power grid with hardening incentives, and provided educational programs for residents to participate in the mitigation process. The building code requirements would’ve enforced hurricane clips, storm shutters, and anchoring systems to prevent roof failure and debris damage. In addition, plans for burying electrical wires would’ve reduce the need for poles, thus improving recovery time.45

Setting building codes to sustain 110 mph would’ve been inefficient in 1998 as warnings for increased storms and intensity were already predicted for future hurricane seasons. “The

Virgin Islands had an enacted building code in 1964 and both hurricanes Hugo and Marilyn has

44 Richardson, Chuck. “In Black & White with One Closed.” TV News Photographer. April 15, 2013. http://tvnewsphotogoneeyeclosed.blogspot.com/2013/04/11-poor-mans-bar-st-thomas-usvi-1995.html 45 “Report on Mitigation Activities in the US Virgin Islands FEMA-DR-1248-VI.” Federal Emergency Management Agency Region II. October 1998. http://mitigation.eeri.org/files/resources-for-success/00037.pdf 35 proven building practices were inadequate to withstand hurricanes.”46 Hurricane Marilyn’s devastation pinpointing the lack of enforced building codes could have been a crucial turning point for resiliency in the Virgin Islands.

Research Findings 2

The 2017 hurricane season produced seventeen named storms in the Atlantic Ocean with five storms reaching Category 3 and above status. Of those 5 storms, hurricanes Irma and Maria has challenged and exposed the lack of enforced building codes in the US Virgin Islands with extensive infrastructure damage, thus proving the US Virgin Islands needs resiliency improvement to prepare for the effects of climate change, as these storms have impacted livelihoods and the economy, primarily the tourism product.

Hurricane Irma September 2017

The National Hurricane Tropical Cyclone Report Hurricane Irma 30 August- 12

September 201747 reports that hurricane Irma made its third landfall (out of seven) on the U.S.

Virgin Islands at maximum intensity of 155 knots (converts to 178 miles per hour)48 on

September 6, 2017. The hurricane caused 47 deaths in total. Across the Caribbean death totaled:

11 in St. Martin/St. Barthelemy, 9 in Cuba, 4 in , 4 in the , 3 in the U.S. Virgin Islands and , and 1 in , Haiti, and Anguilla. Similar to hurricane

Marilyn, St. Thomas and St. John sustained the most damage out of all three islands.

46 Ibid, 4. 47 Cangialos, John P., Latto, Andrew S., Berg, Robbie. “National Hurricane Center Tropical Cyclone Report 30 August-12 September 2017”. National Hurricane Center National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. June 30, 2018. https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/data/tcr/AL112017_Irma.pdf 48 “Converting Knots to MPH For Assessment and Translation of Severe Wind Reports.” Storm Prediction Center. 36

Table 4.5: Highest Hurricanes Wind Speed Comparison49

Source: ABC News

Figure 4.6: Best Track Positions for Hurricane Irma / National Hurricane Center50

Source: National Hurricane Center

49 Keneally, Meghan. “How Massive Hurricane Irma Compares with Other Deadly Storms”. ABC News. September 7, 2017. https://abcnews.go.com/US/hurricane-irmas-record-power-compares-major-storms/story?id=49675510 50 Cangialos, John P., Latto, Andrew S., Berg, Robbie. “National Hurricane Center Tropical Cyclone Report 30 August-12 September 2017”. 37

Figure 4.7: Best Track Maximum Sustained Winds/ National Hurricane Center51

Source: National Hurricane Center

Figure 4.8: Wind Swath Radius of 35, 60, & 64 Knots/ National Hurricane Center52

Source: National Hurricane Center

51 Ibid., 90. 52 Ibid., 92. 38

Hurricane Maria September 2017

Hurricane Maria impacted the Virgin Islands fourteen days after Hurricane Irma on

September 20, 2017, devastating St. Croix, the most southern island of the Virgin Islands, before impacting Puerto Rico as a Category 5 hurricane. After hurricane Irma, St. Croix and Puerto provided first response aid to both St. Thomas and St. John. Hurricane Maria’s track further crippled the Virgin Islands, with extensive flooding to a severely damaged and unstable infrastructure on St. Thomas and St. John. This storm was responsible for one death in St.

Thomas53 and 2,975 deaths in Puerto Rico.54

Figure 4.9: Hurricane Maria Passing South of St. Croix, US Virgin Islands55

Source: Weather Underground

53 Pasch, Richard, Penny, Andrew B., Berg, Robbie. “National Hurricane Center Tropical Cyclone Report Hurricane Maria (AL152017) 16-30 September 2017.” National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. April 10, 2018. https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/data/tcr/AL152017_Maria.pdf 54 “Puerto Rico Increases Hurricane Maria Death Toll to 2,975.” BBC News. August 29, 2018. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-45338080 55 Henson, Bob. “Maria Slams St. Croix, Rips Across Puerto Rico.” Weather Underground. September 20, 2017. https://www.wunderground.com/cat6/maria-slams-st-croix-now-ripping-across-puerto-rico 39 Figure 4.10: Aerial Views of Hurricane Maria Damage: St. Croix, US Virgin Islands

Source: Jocelyn Augustino, FEMA 56

56 Augustino, Jocelyn. “Aerial Views of Hurricane Maria Damage in St. Croix, US Virgin Islands”. Federal Emergency Management Agency. September 30, 2017. https://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/images/144326 40

Figure 4.11: Hurricane Maria Track and Category Status Across the Caribbean57

Source:

Figure 4.12: Hurricane Maria 48-Hour Rainfall Totals58

Source: National Weather Service

57 “Major Hurricane Maria – September 20, 2017.” National Weather Service. September 20, 2017. https://www.weather.gov/sju/maria2017 58 Ibid. 41

Table 4.13: Mainland United States Tropical Cyclones Causing at Least 1 Billion Dollars in Damage, 1990-2017(Not Adjusted for Inflation)59

Source: National Hurricane Center

59“National Hurricane Center. Costliest U.S. Tropical Cyclones Table Updated”. National Hurricane Center. Accessed 10/13/18. https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/news/UpdatedCostliest.pdf

42

Chapter Five: Thesis Articulation

Argument 1

The U.S. Virgin Islands has acknowledged pre-existing conditions that has contributed to the extent of the hurricanes damage and impact. This recognition addressed the last storms recovery shortcomings that caused significant effects to the economy and weakened the infrastructure.

The Government of the Virgin Islands has been instrumental with public communication of their recovery initiatives that focuses on rebuilding a resilient territory, while taking ownership for failures from the last major hurricane Marilyn in 1995. The government has published comprehensive frameworks to address these pitfalls and a roadmap on how to achieve these improvements. As the one-year anniversary of hurricanes Irma and Maria has just passed in

September 2018, the release of the United States Virgin Islands First-Year Progress Report and the USVI Hurricane Recovery and Resilience Task Force Report has documented transparency, which is critical for recovering efficiently. However, I argue that these pre-existing conditions are negligence that has been overlooked for far too long.

The US Virgin Islands has been facing an economic decline for the past sixteen years. “In

2012, the territory lost Hovensa Hess Oil refinery on St. Croix, resulting to an economic downfall of 2,000 eliminated jobs, thus putting a strain on the tourism sector to be the leading revenue producer for the entire territory. In addition, the local government has been plagued with budget deficits across all agencies on burrowed funds, public debt and unfunded pensions.” 60

With a median income notably lower than the US average, $37,254 compared to $50,22161 there

60 Austin, D. Andrew. “Economic and Fiscal Conditions in the U.S. Virgin Islands”. Congressional Research Service. June 20, 2018. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R45235.pdf 61 Ibid, 6. 43 has been an increase of residents relocating to the mainland for job stability and compensation growth opportunities.

Table 5.1: Household Income Distribution for the USVI and United States62

62 Ibid, 7. 44

Figure 5.2: USVI Weak Economic Activity, Employment, & Population63

Source: Federal Reserve Bank

The territory’s infrastructure has endured deferred maintenance neglect starting with the power source. “Both electrical grids on St. Thomas and St. Croix are outdated and inefficient for industry standards, and require rehabilitation, that is costly in a strained economic climate. As a result, residents of the US Virgin Islands are paying higher electrical bills to offset the cost of fuel and shipping expenses to the territory. On average, residents pay more than 33 cents per kilowatt-hour, three times the US national average of 12.5 cents, and 1.6 times higher than neighboring Puerto Rico. As St. Thomas is separated from St. John by forty miles of water, the isolation of St. John causes high levels of redundancy on the aging grid in St. Thomas, which has resulted in constant widespread power outages on a regular basis.”64

Deferred maintenance on property infrastructure combined with the lack of enforcement of building codes during the rebuilding phase after hurricane Marilyn has been identified as the

63 Bram, Jason. “Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands After Hurricanes Irma and Maria”. Federal Reserve Bank of New York. February 22, 2018. 64 “Transforming Through Recovery United States Virgin Islands First-Year Progress Report Hurricanes Irma and Maria.” Witt Obrien’s. October 16, 2018. https://www.wittobriens.com/wp- content/uploads/USVI_2018%20Recovery%20Progress%20Report.pdf 45 most crucial pre-existing condition that led to the extent of storm damage. “Most properties were not required to perform retrofits or were enforced to updated codes that includes storms shutters and hurricane clips on roofs and were not built to withstand category five storm damage. The lack of infrastructure code regulations prevented the support of resiliency.”65 The Government of the Virgin Islands should apply the lessons learned from hurricane Marilyn twenty-three years ago and hurricanes Irma and Maria a year ago and make enforcing building codes going forward a top priority for the residents of the Virgin Islands. The reduction of structural damage after a storm directly impacts the recovery of a strained economy, especially tourism, normalcy to livelihoods, and protection from future climate change related storms.

65 “USVI Hurricane Recovery and Resilience Task Force Report 2018.” Government of the Virgin Islands. September 8, 2018. https://first.bloomberglp.com/documents/257521_USVI_Hurricane+Recovery+Taskforce+Report_DIGITAL.pdf 46

Argument 2

The USVI Hurricane Recovery and Resilience Task Force Report 2018 has formulated a comprehensive plan that lists resilient practices for rebuilding the territory. A plan of this nature was created after hurricane Marilyn in 1998, but the initiatives were not fully enforced.

These practices are crucial to combat the effects of climate change and must be implemented to prevent a repeat of recovery deficiencies.

Hurricanes Irma and Maria should serve as the ultimate lessons of what works and what does not work in the US Virgin Islands regarding our changing world and warming climate. I argue that if the resilient incentives proposed in the USVI Hurricane Recovery and Resilience

Task Force Report 2018 are not implemented fully to ensure a successful recovery across all sectors, particularly for infrastructure building codes enforcement, the territory will face a downward spiral of continued economic decline, would tarnish the tourism product that is the leading economic source, would further contribute to a population decline, and would limit the amount of federal funding the territory needs for daily operations. This economic and structural vulnerability can resort to the cheaper quick fixes solutions that were implemented in the past, thus reliving the vicious cycle of underpreparing and continued suffering from pre-existing conditions.

Table 5.3: Future Climate Hazards in the US Virgin Islands66

66 Ibid, 34.

47

The 2017 hurricane season was one of the costliest seasons on record. Damages in the US

Virgin Islands were reported as estimated $10.76 billion, and the territory is expected to receive

$8.4 billion in recovery funding.67 With this allotted recovery funding, the Virgin Islands has been granted the opportunity to implement the comprehensive plans listed within the USVI

Hurricane Recovery and Resilience Task Force Report 2018. A few of the noteworthy initiatives that supports this argument (if not implemented will have chaotic consequences in the future) are:68

• Accountability within the Government of the Virgin Islands to enforce building codes (Department of Public Works & Natural Resources) • Implement annual inspections to ensure code regulations and take actions for code violations • Implement mandatory retrofit programs for structures built before 1996 • Hire adequate staff to enforce code compliance • Bury telecommunications lines and install composite poles to withstand category 5 wind speeds • Modernize the electrical grid on St. Thomas & St. Croix • Collaboration with the University of the Virgin Islands to educate on climate change impacts and adaptation practices • Secure the tourism product with infrastructure hardening to keep hospitality workforce and economy afloat

Resilient Urban Planning Recommendations

It is up to the Government of the Virgin Islands and private stakeholders to make the best decisions for the territory to truly invest and bring to fruition the vision portrayed in the USVI

Hurricane Recovery and Resilience Task Force Report 2018. The comprehensive plan has provided solutions to address the pre-existing conditions that facilitated extensive damage to the energy, telecommunications, transportation, water, waste management, housing, and economy sectors. To add to these impressive incentives, I recommend that:

67 Ibid, 247. 68 Ibid, 40, 56,80,140,146, 203,214. 48

• The Government of the Virgin Islands consider and introduce the Bermuda roofing model on all three main islands (and Water Island) to further strengthen properties to reduce property damage and housing displacement • Participate in the global warming/climate change discussion with attendance from local stakeholders to annual conferences • Use the federal funding wisely with accountability to ensure recommendations are administered so that recovery cost and timeframes are reduced for future storms • Further invest in alternative power solutions beyond solar and electrical. Also consider wind and water generated power to capitalize on ocean access

Chapter Six: Conclusion

The research for this paper has supported my argument that the lack of building codes enforcement, deferred maintenance negligence, and the consequences of not administering resilient practices from previous storms has contributed to the devastation caused by Hurricanes

Irma and Maria throughout the US Virgin Islands. The destruction caused direct consequences to the economy as the hurricanes has placed the tourism industry in a low ranking for the 2018 and will continue through 2019 as accommodations are being restored and infrastructure is being rebuilt. The territory has been given an opportunity to do things efficiently as these storms are indicators of what to expect as our planet continues to be impacted by global warming and climate change. Investments in resiliency practices may be costly initially. However, the benefits surpass the cost when lives are saved, homes are secured, and the economy can continue to grow with minimal damage from storm frequency. My hope is for the residents of the Virgin

Islands to never see this level of destruction again or continue to repeat the cycle of lackluster recovery practices, where there are further setbacks after each storm. The U.S. Virgin Islands can truly be an advocate for resilient hurricane recovery planning practices and serve as a model for Caribbean islands.

49

Appendix

Interview with Beverly Nicholson-Doty, Commissioner of US Virgin Islands Tourism69

I had the privilege to conduct a telephone interview with the US Virgin Islands

Commissioner of Tourism Beverly Nicholson-Doty on December 4, 2018. Mrs. Doty provided a recollection on both hurricanes Irma and Maria’s impact on the tourism economy as the territory recovers one year after the storms.

Q: How did the storms impact the tourism product? A: There were multiple impacts where the community and human capital were ravaged and severely impacted. It was challenging to provide hospitality to visitors when our citizens were without homes. Our natural beauty was impacted as infrastructure: roads, electricity, water, and hotels are still being rebuilt. Recovery is an ongoing issue. With limited media coverage (in comparison to Puerto Rico), the Virgin Islands were able to help craft our story about healing, coming together, and how the beauty of the Virgin Islands has returned in an emerging dynamic. To offset the damaged hotel accommodations, there has been a 600% increase in Air B&B and the sharing economy.

Q: How was your department (tourism) instrumental in the recovery process (especially after the storm)? A: A crisis communication protocol was in place which encouraged evacuation as soon as possible before the storm and after. The challenge was evacuations through air capacity where it was challenging to evacuate all tourists out of the territory via flights. During Hurricane Marilyn, we worked with the federal government for tourists’ evacuations. Unfortunately, this did not happen post hurricanes Irma and Maria, as the airport was not prepared for immediate flights outbound. The quickest way to evacuate tourists was via cruise lines. In addition, the Tourism Department worked directly with VITEMA (Virgin Islands Territorial Emergency Management Agency), The Department of Health, and The Department of Human Services to evacuate the most challenged individuals to safer places.

Q: Do you think the Government did a good job with recovery efforts? A: Thus far recovery has been strong, but there are areas that can be improved. There has to be an escalated time related plan to get our tourism product fully restored. Currently, 50% of our hotel rooms are out of service, and we have been out of the market for a year. Visitors are excusing the aesthetics of the storm damage, but the Government should give the partner agencies and the community a recovery timeframe.

Q: What are some lessons learned from the storms? A: From a tourism perspective, as of Q1 2018, the Virgin Islands was still in recovery mode. Tourism has looked at our strategic plan for crisis management as an agency to evaluate what were the best practices, what were the gaps, and how to rewrite crisis management (as crisis in tourism can be in several areas outside of natural disasters). We will need to revisit how

69 Beverly Nicholson-Doty (Commissioner of the United States Virgin Islands Department of Tourism), interviewed by Tai Harley, December 4, 2018. 50 preparation was planned and incorporate more solutions like satellite phones, off island stakeholders, and liaison more with the health department. We will need to be prepared future storms.

Q: Going forward, what are some practices the Virgin Islands should do or not do to prepare for future storm recovery? A: Climate change has potential for many disasters worldwide. The Virgin Islands has to harden infrastructure to get critical assets back online for the overall health and well-being of our people via building codes, water access, etc. What worked well for the Virgin Islands is that we have cisterns for water access, which was critical for hygiene and possibly provided a different experience from other islands. Some areas for evaluation would be St. John who was isolated in storm recovery supplies of food, drinking water and necessities access.

Q: Is there anything else you may want to share as it relates to hurricane recovery that I may not have asked? A: The Virgin Islands being able to reach out to the media to get resources may not have had positive impacts internally. During the worst of times, we have the responsibility to share the truth. Being honest and consistent can be a critical link to get the resources to rebuild effectively. A year later, we have resumed our national advertising campaign to have visitors return as a part of our recovery.

51

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