Daniel Scher Innovations for Successful Societies

MANAGING SPOILERS AT THE BARGAINING TABLE: INKATHA AND THE TALKS TO END , 1990-1994

SYNOPSIS In the talks to end apartheid in South , 19 parties sat at the negotiating table. At least 10 of the negotiators had armed wings, and almost all had demands that they were prepared to back up with violence. One in particular possessed the ability to destabilize the country: , leader of the . To get him on board, negotiators employed a number of tactics, including splitting him from his backers, offering compromises and refusing to allow the momentum of the process to be slowed by his boycotts. This memo examines the negotiators’ efforts to manage Buthelezi’s demands and draw him into a coalition, as well as the longer-term consequences of those moves.

Daniel Scher drafted this policy note on the basis of interviews conducted in , and , , in February 2010.

INTRODUCTION government and the opposition in the form of the “I think the dominant factor in our minds African National Congress (ANC)—the task of was that we realized that if we didn’t progress … refashioning the apartheid state into a new, there would have been blood in the streets in democratic system would have been difficult South Africa,” recalled , chief enough. negotiator for the National Party during the talks But the National Party (NP) and the ANC, to end apartheid. Meyer was confident that if while the biggest players, were not the only ones. progress was not made at the negotiating table, At several stages of negotiations, 19 parties held large numbers of citizens would take to the street seats at the negotiating table. At least 10 of these and demand an immediate takeover. The chance parties had armed wings. for a stable, controlled transition would be lost. Lead negotiators for the ANC and the NP Chaos was a very real possibility. had to contend with demands made by small If there had been only two players—the groups prepared to back their appeals with violent National Party representing the apartheid action. These demands ranged from a desire for

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linguistically defined to specific primarily because Buthelezi participated in the requests about the structure of the post-apartheid apartheid government’s system. state. Because of his prominence as a traditional Zulu Among these potential spoilers, Mangosuthu leader, in 1970 the apartheid government Buthelezi, leader of the Inkatha Freedom Party appointed him the leader of the KwaZulu (IFP), stood out clearly. According to a report territory. submitted to the Truth and Reconciliation Buthelezi had the title of , part of the Commission by the Human Rights Committee, Zulu , and he saw himself as the from 1990 until the April 1994 elections, 14,000 leader of the : “One must understand deaths and 22,000 injuries occurred as a result of in the first place that I’m a hereditary leader of my political violence. Of these, the report estimated people, I am a traditional leader by birth.” The that 90% occurred during clashes between area known then as KwaZulu1 was home to the Buthelezi’s supporters and supporters of the bulk of South Africa’s Zulu population. In the ANC. mid-1990s, the Zulu population totaled about 9.2 million, or 23% of the population.2 (By THE CHALLENGE comparison, the population of white South Buthelezi refused to participate in the first Africans was around 3.4 million at that time.3) democratic elections in South Africa until the last After assuming leadership of the KwaZulu minute and boycotted the negotiation process on a territory, Buthelezi formed a Zulu cultural range of issues, including movement, Inkatha Yenkululeko and the role of the Zulu Yesizwe, which was the “The real irony of the IFP in the post-apartheid state. To get forerunner to the Inkatha is that it is not a party. It’s him on board, negotiators employed Freedom Party. Both Inkatha a set of interests which are a number of tactics, including the movement and the party held together by a leader.” splitting him from his backers, remained inextricably linked to —Mike Sutcliffe, offering reasonable compromises, ANC politician Buthelezi, who led Inkatha for and refusing to allow the 35 years and even in 2010 gave momentum of the process to be no intimation of stepping down. slowed by his boycotts. Mike Sutcliffe, an ANC In 2010, Buthelezi, at 84 years old, believed politician and veteran of politics in the province of that he was one of the most misunderstood people KwaZulu-, said, “The real irony of the IFP in contemporary South African history, viewing is that it is not a party. It’s a set of interests which himself as a patriot who was constantly looking to are held together by their leader.” improve the lot of the average South African, In 1976 the apartheid government irrespective of race. But those who interacted nominated Buthelezi for chief minister of the with him had a different perception. They saw newly formed KwaZulu . him as a man whose constant brinkmanship were ethnically defined homelands for black South endangered the negotiation process. Africans and an integral part of the apartheid During the negotiations, Buthelezi’s system. Buthelezi claimed that he consulted with relationship with the ANC was bitter. But it had the ANC, who encouraged him to take the not always been so. As a student, Buthelezi was position. Buthelezi said in an interview, “Albert in the ANC Youth League and had enjoyed Luthuli and Mr. [top ANC strong relationships with the party. However, in leaders at the time] had to speak to my sister—my the 1970s this relationship grew strained, late sister, Princess Morgina—in Benoni,

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requesting her to plead with me that if the people Inkatha and had provided military training to a elected me in the framework of this system which group of Inkatha members. The president at the the apartheid regime was imposing on us I should time, F.W. de Klerk of the NP, claimed no not refuse, because they knew I rejected it.” knowledge of the support provided by the Buthelezi took up the mantle of chief apartheid state, and fired his ministers of defense minister. However, he soon found himself at and law and order. Buthelezi acknowledge the odds with emergent ANC leaders. They saw training but claimed no knowledge of the funding, cooperation with the apartheid government as a and he fired Inkatha’s secretary-general. betrayal of the liberation struggle. They branded The media labeled the Inkatha groups that Buthelezi a collaborator and he came under had received training as hit squads. Buthelezi increased criticism. contested this characterization: “Many times they The issue came to a head at a meeting wanted to assassinate me and those who worked between the ANC, led by Oliver Tambo at the with me in the [KwaZulu] cabinet … and because time, and Buthelezi in 1979 in London. The of that I appealed to the central government for ANC and Buthelezi clashed over his role in the people to protect [us]. And there were those two Bantustans, and his opposition to both the armed hundred young people that were actually trained struggle and sanctions. So bitter was the clash by the South African defense force for us. that shortly thereafter Buthelezi severed all ties Because I was a sovereign citizen, I was entitled to between Inkatha and the ANC. From this point protection by the South African government— forward, the relationship between the two nothing hanky-panky about it.” organizations was characterized by antagonism. Neither side contests that thousands died in The antagonism boiled over into violence violence that pitted Inkatha supporters against between Buthelezi’s supporters and ANC ANC supporters. supporters in the mid-1980s. In 2010, debate Buthelezi was never conclusively linked to continued about the causes of the violence, in acts of violence, and he consistently denied which people were killed on both sides. Buthelezi involvement. “There was not a single meeting of maintained that his people were defending the central committee of the IFP, which ever themselves from onslaught by the reconstituted decided that we should kill anybody or embark on Umkhonto weSizwe, the armed wing of the a war,” he said in 2010. ANC. The ANC’s Sutcliffe claims, on the other However, there were indications that the hand, that “ANC areas were clearly targeted.” scale of violence was related to Inkatha’s fortunes Uncontested statistics of numbers killed on both at the negotiating table. For example, after the sides are hard to find. One reason for this is that announcement of the election date—which many of those killed were unaffiliated. Inkatha was aggravated about since party The ANC blamed much of the violence on a members had not been consulted—a Human shadowy third force operating out of the apartheid Rights Committee report noted that there was an security structures and directing a campaign of so- “instantaneous reaction in terms of the level of called ‘black-on-black’ violence intended to political violence.” undermine the negotiation process. The Inkathagate scandal, revealed by a leading South FRAMING A RESPONSE African newspaper, showed that elements of the It was within this context that Buthelezi state security apparatus had illicitly funded made demands of the negotiators, and the

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negotiators had to respond. Two demands own political vantage, or advantage and benefit emerged as his most central. The first was and not so much for the real issue that was Inkatha’s advocacy of a federal state, and the relevant, namely strong regional government in second was his demand for safeguarding the role order to deliver better services to the people, of the Zulu monarchy. etcetera. … Everybody knew that at the back of it was … a case of how they could gain as much Federalism political position in the whole situation.” Buthelezi had been advocating federalism as The ANC advocated a more centralized, a solution for post-apartheid South Africa for unitary state. Sutcliffe recalled, “We really had a almost as long as Inkatha had existed. “I have view that our struggle was firstly for national always admired the federal state,” he said. “I democracy and to not really waste our time in believe it is the form of government that is best. trying to think of sub-national democratic forms.” … This country is multi-ethnic, and the interests The ANC favored a central state with no of people everywhere are served best by self- provinces, and just local administrations that determination and provinces doing most things.” would, according to Sutcliffe, act as “post boxes of Peter Smith, Inkatha strategist during the national government.” negotiations, said federalism was demanded Debate raged over this issue but was because it was the best form for the new subsumed by other events. In June 1992, Inkatha government: “It wasn’t as if it was something that supporters killed 46 people aligned with the ANC was being sucked out of thin air. It was a proven, in the of outside of tried, tested model that succeeded.” Johannesburg, allegedly in retaliation for prior When asked for models of federal states that attacks on Inkatha supporters. The ANC accused he admired, Buthelezi said, “Well, I admired all the National Party of complicity in the massacre the federal states in the world, I think whether it’s and walked out of the negotiations. Meyer of the the United States or it’s India or it’s , National Party and of the ANC whether it’s Germany, I’ve always thought that scrambled to get the negotiations back on track. the federal form of government is the best for us, A further massacre of ANC supporters in for this country, for our people.” September 1992, this time perpetrated by security With a support base so securely situated in forces of the homeland in its capital Bisho, what would become KwaZulu-Natal, Inkatha had forced the ANC and National Party into an a much more self-interested agenda in advocating agreement to avert further bloodshed. regional devolution of power. Although Buthelezi In late September 1992 the ANC and and his chief advisers deny that they were merely a National Party signed the Record of regional party advocating for what was in their Understanding, a bilateral agreement that laid out best interests, their lock on support in the region a roadmap for continuing with the negotiation meant they stood to gain from a federal model. process, including a set of agreements that Inkatha had understood to still be under GETTING DOWN TO WORK negotiation. Inkatha was furious. Smith Meyer, the chief negotiator for the National articulated Inkatha’s view at the time: “The Nats Party, recalled that this calculus was obvious to and the ANC … were seemingly engaged in a everyone at the table: “I think the problem was parallel process that would, in fact, determine the people that argued strongly in favor of both substantive and procedural matters on a regional and/or federal system were doing it for bilateral basis and on the basis of private the wrong reasons. They were doing it for their arrangements.” Even though actions by Inkatha

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supporters had been the cause of the breakdown other lead negotiators accepted the inclusion of a in the talks, Inkatha withdrew from the provincial level of administration. negotiation process. “This was the complicated part in this. We The National Party’s Meyer recalled: all know between the government and the ANC, “Immediately, once that Record of Understanding if we didn’t make that agreement between them was signed between [Nelson] Mandela and de and us we would not have progressed with the Klerk, the IFP turned everything on us, on both negotiations at all,” Meyer said. “It was in the sides, and said, ‘You excluded us. We’ll walk interest of the country, of the bigger picture, that away. We‘re not going to participate in multi- we made that agreement because otherwise there party talks.’” would have been no progress.” In December 1992, in a move that The decision was viewed by many as a aggravated the ANC, Inkatha said it had generous concession to Buthelezi and the Inkatha. established the state of KwaZulu-Natal within the Federation of South Africa. Mario Ambrosini, an The role of the king Inkatha strategist at the time, described the Having secured a concession on the federal situation: “So, not having a seat or a saying on nature of the post-apartheid state, Buthelezi that table, we spoke very loudly from the side. shifted his focus to the issue of the representation Theoretically, perhaps symbolically, with half a of the Zulu monarchy in the post-apartheid measure of wanting to be real about it, [we constitution. He wanted the role of the king established] the entire KwaZulu-Natal province, provided for and safeguarded. This demand had unilaterally, as a member state of a federation to been a consistent theme during the negotiation be established at a later time.” process, but it became more prominent later in the The Inkatha move had little impact on the negotiations. situation. Ambrosini recalled that it was “an Buthelezi felt a strong connection to the absolute flop because it didn’t produce the type of historical . Buthelezi’s mother, mobilization we thought it would, especially the Princess Magogo kaDinizulu, was the white population was very indolent. … [It] was granddaughter of King , the last king addressed by ignoring it.” of the independent Zulu nation. When King Inkatha attempted to mobilize more support acceded to the throne in for federalism by forming the Concerned South 1971, Buthelezi, a royalist at heart, took control of Africans Group, or COSAG, later renamed the the young king. The previous king had been a Freedom Alliance. COSAG was an unlikely hard-drinking man who had damaged the image political alliance. It brought together white right- of the monarchy. Though the restoration of the wingers pushing for an Afrikaner , monarchy was an end in itself, Buthelezi also had Bantustan puppet leaders eager to secure their pragmatic political reasons. With the backing of own places in the sun, and Inkatha. Regarding the king, Buthelezi could command the loyalty of the makeup of the alliance, Buthelezi conceded, the 300-odd chiefs of the various Zulu clans and “It is true that it was quite a motley gathering.” the traditional authority structures over which As pressure grew to move forward with the they presided. negotiation process and amid continuing worries Buthelezi’s strong stance in favor of the king about the possibility for a large-scale revolution or also reflected the clash between tradition and the uprising, the NP and ANC agreed to forces of change. Smith, the Inkatha strategist, accommodate Inkatha’s and COSAG’s demands said there was “a strong fear that the ANC was so on the hot-button issue of federalism. Meyer and against any form of traditionalism, culture,

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traditional culture and so on that it would do member of the ANC, and de Klerk, president at everything it could to obliterate the entire the time. , chief of the ANC’s institution.” intelligence wing at the time, played a significant Large swaths of the population generally role behind the scene, interviewees said. supported traditional authorities. Many of these ANC members covertly approached the king structures had been in place for centuries and in and other Inkatha members, suggesting that the more rural areas they were the only form of Buthelezi’s actions would cost the king his government. Buthelezi was a product of this position and privileges. Sutcliffe, of the ANC, system and had used it for his own political suggested that Zuma, a Zulu, was an important benefit. factor: “Jacob Zuma, probably given his Ranged against him was an urbane, intelligence background, really focused on the sophisticated ANC elite that included anti- peacemaking process. If you actually look at what traditional leaders. The ANC considered tribal he did, he took the IFP leadership, particularly authorities to be tainted by their history of that leadership immediately below Buthelezi, by manipulation by colonial powers and minority- the hand…[but]…Jacob Zuma’s not the sort of controlled governments. Women members of the person who will ever tell you whether this was the ANC were opposed to traditional patriarchal case.” practices. Traditional authorities also had no Meyer, the National Party chief negotiator, place in the ideology of the ANC’s communist echoed this sentiment, “I keep on thinking today and trade-union allies. that the role that Jacob Zuma and others played in In June 1993, when he failed to get the KwaZulu-Natal to calm down the aspirations, so assurances he wanted on the role of the Zulu to speak, of the traditional communities in monarchy in the post-apartheid state, Buthelezi KwaZulu-Natal, was very fundamental in vowed to boycott the negotiations through the realizing a peaceful transition.” upcoming elections. “This is the issue that almost Zuma and others found the king, tired of cost our participation in the election,” he said. being dominated by Buthelezi, receptive to their Smith defended the decision not to arguments. A popular anecdote recounted by a participate: “We could choose to participate or number of people went that on meeting Mandela not participate. Nobody forces you to participate after his release from prison on , in something. You’re invited to participate and King Zwelithini said, “I sympathize with your you choose to do so. So we went as far as we experience of jail, since I, too, have been wanted to. We saw the futility in proceeding any imprisoned for the past 20 years.” further, so we elected not to go any further.” Meanwhile, de Klerk and Slovo publicly wooed the king in campaign speeches. In one of Dealing with the king these addresses, Slovo said: “We have proposed to Negotiators for the NP and ANC give the Zulu monarchy more powers than those approached this issue on two fronts. While of the Queen of England. But Buthelezi is making some concessions to Buthelezi, they cynically manipulating the Zulu monarchy.”4 moved to drive a wedge between him and the Public perceptions shifted, along with the king’s, king. This strategy was largely orchestrated and pushing Inkatha to participate in the elections. managed by , long-time leader of the Looking back, Buthelezi sighed and claimed that South Party and a leading his opponents “were able to pull the wool over the

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king’s eyes,” although the king’s position did not not going to get what your mandate is. I guess suffer in any measurable way after the advent of the ANC said to them the same.” democracy. Meyer and ANC negotiators were both acutely aware that slowing the momentum of the OVERCOMING OBSTACLES process could plunge South Africa into violence. At the same time as the various parties were In their estimation, the danger of delaying the driving a wedge between the king and Buthelezi, election was greater than the danger of moving they also provided accommodation for the role of ahead without the IFP. Just a day and a half later, the king in the interim constitution, which was Kissinger called Meyer to say he and Carrington intended to pave the way for the elections. were leaving. Following the elections a constituent assembly Several people said that Buthelezi raced after would be established to ratify a new constitution. the delegation and literally caught them at the Buthelezi feared—rightly—that the extensive airport. According to Meyer, Buthelezi had protections provided for the king in the interim hoped that the arrival of Kissinger and Carrington constitution would be left out of the final would be his “big moment,” but the two had just constitution. He wanted some assurance that the come and gone. Buthelezi asked for their role of the king would be assured, and he refused assistance, and Washington Okumo, a high-level to join the elections without this. However, with official from Kenya, agreed to stay and help. He just weeks to go before the elections, lacking the facilitated a meeting between Buthelezi, Mandela king’s backing, and with the demands he made and de Klerk in . De Klerk made a met by the interim constitution—the only commitment to Buthelezi that if Buthelezi document available at the time—his position was participated in the elections, after the elections the increasingly tenuous. issue of the role of the Zulu monarchy would be Just before the elections, there was an put to international mediation. Buthelezi agreed international attempt to pressure the government to participate. and ANC into delaying the elections so that the With the elections back on track, the level IFP could take part. The international violence never reached the scale that some had community feared that violence that could ensue if feared. After the elections, the issue of the king the IFP was not allowed to join. A seven-person was not put to mediation and not addressed. team visited South Africa under the leadership of Some have suggested that de Klerk never intended former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to honor this agreement and that it was merely a and former British Foreign Secretary Lord means to get Buthelezi back into the process while Carrington, seeking to persuade the NP and allowing him to save face. ANC to delay the election. Meyer, the negotiator In 2010, Buthelezi remained scornful of what for the NP, recounted their first meeting: “In the he considered a betrayal. “I feel very bitter about very first meeting I had with them, I said to them, the fact we were actually led down a primrose path ‘I’m sorry; you’re missing the point. You’re by the ANC and in particular Mr. Mandela,” he wasting your time. We’re not going to have the said. However, having participated in the election delayed. You came to cause a conflict in election, won the province of KwaZulu-Natal and South Africa that we’ve never had before.’ I could been appointed Minister of Home Affairs in a see in their faces, both Kissinger and Carrington, new, democratic Government of National Unity, how taken aback they were at this arrogance— Buthelezi found himself locked into the process. saying to them, you’re missing the point. You’re “How could I be the one who wrecks what is

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called the Government of National Unity?,” he exacerbated by a re-drawing of provincial asked. “Because then they would say that … I’m boundaries that separated competent sabotaging something that is meant to promote administrations from incompetent ones. national unity.” [For more on the provinces, see ISS memos, “Negotiating Divisions in a Divided Land: RESULTS AND REFLECTIONS Creating Provinces for a New South Africa, 1993” Using a combination of tactics, negotiators and “Refashioning Provincial Government in were able to defuse the threat of widespread Democratic South Africa, 1994-96”.] violence by supporters of the Inkatha Freedom After the first elections, the ANC extended Party. By compromising on Inkatha’s call for a its influence into KwaZulu-Natal, wresting the federal state and sidestepping other demands, they province from Inkatha’s control in the 1999 were able to get Inkatha and its leader, elections. By putting forward a Zulu candidate, Mangosuthu Buthelezi, back to the negotiating Jacob Zuma, for the 2009 elections, the ANC table. won even more support from Inkatha’s traditional Negotiators also helped to neutralize the base. In 2010, many South Africans thought that Inkatha threat by giving Buthelezi a big enough the party would be lucky to survive the next stake in the post-apartheid government that he elections. had little to gain from further disruptions. Indeed, Inkatha’s clout at the ballot box has In 2010, Inkatha members maintained that weakened. In 1994, Inkatha received 10.54% of their major legacy to South Africa was the the votes cast and won the province of Natal, but establishment of provinces in South Africa. the party received just 4.55% in the 2009 However, the provincial governments have not elections. fared well. In 2010, with the exception of the Gavin Woods, an Inkatha member of Democratic Alliance-led , the Parliament, was ousted in 2004 after summarizing provinces were generally regarded as under- the party’s problems in an internal memo that was performing. All the people interviewed, from leaked to the media. The memo stated, “Inkatha Inkatha strategist Mario Ambrosini to ANC has no discernible vision, mission or philosophical veteran Mike Sutcliffe, agreed that the provinces base, no clear national ambitions or direction, no in their current form entailed massive waste and articulated ideological basis and offers little in the showed little initiative. The provinces suffered way of current, vibrant original and relevant from a basic lack of human resource capacity, policies.”

1 Now part of the province of KwaZulu-Natal 2 1996 STATS SA figures: http://www.statssa.gov.za/census01/Census96/HTML/CIB/Population/28.htm 3 Ibid 4 De Klerk and ANC aim to split Zulus. Jonathan Steele In Cape Town. The Guardian Manchester (UK): Apr 11, 1994.

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