Anti-B. Anthracis Polyclonal Antibody (DPAB0093) This Product Is for Research Use Only and Is Not Intended for Diagnostic Use

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Anti-B. anthracis polyclonal antibody (DPAB0093) This product is for research use only and is not intended for diagnostic use. PRODUCT INFORMATION Product Overview Goat Antibody to Anthrax (Multi Strain) Specificity Detects Ames, Sterne and Vollum strains of Bacillus anthracis. B. anthracis is a rod-shaped gram positive bacterium which causes anthrax, an acute infectious disease resulting in macrophage infection and immune suppression. Anthrax mainly affects ruminants, but can also affect humans. Immunogen Gamma inactivated, purified spore preparation of Bacillus anthracis using a mixture of Ames, Sterne and Vollum strains Source/Host Goat Species Reactivity B. anthracis Purification Ion exchange chromatography Conjugate Unconjugated Applications Suitable for use in ELISA. Each laboratory should determine an optimum working titer for use in its particular application. Other applications have not been tested but use in such assays should not necessarily be excluded. Format Purified, Liquid Concentration 1mg/ml (OD280nm) Buffer PBS Preservative 0.09% Sodium Azide Storage Short-term (up to 2 weeks) store at 2–8°C. Long term, store at -20°C. Avoid multiple freeze/thaw cycles. Warnings This product contains sodium azide, which has been classified as Xn (Harmful), in European Directive 67/548/EEC in the concentration range of 0.1–1.0%. When disposing of this reagent through lead or copper plumbing, flush with copious volumes of water to prevent azide build-up in drains. 45-1 Ramsey Road, Shirley, NY 11967, USA Email: [email protected] Tel: 1-631-624-4882 Fax: 1-631-938-8221 1 © Creative Diagnostics All Rights Reserved BACKGROUND Introduction Bacillus anthracis is a rod shaped gram positive bacterium which causes anthrax, an acute infectious disease resulting in macrophage infection and immune suppression. The Ames strain is one of 89 strains of the Bacillus anthracis. It was isolated from a diseased cow that died in Texas in 1981. Researchers at the time mistakenly believed the strain came from Ames, Iowa and mislabeled the specimen. The Ames strain came to wide public attention in association with the 2001 anthrax attacks. Seven letters mailed to media outlets and US Senators on September 18, 2001 and October 9, 2001 contained anthrax bacteria of this particular strain. This strain is a monomorphic disease, mutating slowly if at all. Keywords Bacillus anthracis Ames, Sterne and Vollum strains; Anthrax Multi Strain; Bacillaceae; Bacillus; Bacillus anthracis; Anthrax 45-1 Ramsey Road, Shirley, NY 11967, USA Email: [email protected] Tel: 1-631-624-4882 Fax: 1-631-938-8221 2 © Creative Diagnostics All Rights Reserved.

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