What Is Disruptive Innovation? Twenty Years After the Introduction of the Theory, We Revisit What It Does—And Doesn’T—Explain

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THE BIG IDEA What Is Disruptive Innovation? Twenty years after the introduction of the theory, we revisit what it does—and doesn’t—explain. by Clayton M. Christensen, Michael Raynor, and Rory McDonald

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WHAT IS

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Clayton M. Christensen is is a director at Deloitte the Kim B. Clark Professor Consulting LLP. Rory of Business Administration McDonald is an assistant at Harvard Business professor at Harvard School. Michael Raynor Business School.

Twenty years after the introduction of the theory, we revisit what it does—and doesn’t—explain.

BY CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN, MICHAEL RAYNOR, AND RORY MCDONALD

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The problem with conflating a disruptive innovation with any breakthrough that changes an industry’s competitive patterns is that different types of innovation require different strategic ap- proaches. To put it another way, the lessons we’ve he theory of disruptive learned about succeeding as a disruptive innovator (or defending against a disruptive challenger) will innovation, introduced not apply to every company in a shifting market. If we get sloppy with our labels or fail to integrate in these pages in 1995, insights from subsequent research and experience into the original theory, then managers may end has proved to be a up using the wrong tools for their context, reduc- powerful way of thinking about ing their chances of success. Over time, the theory’s usefulness will be undermined. innovation-driven growth. This article is part of an effort to capture the state of the art. We begin by exploring the basic tenets of Many leaders of small, disruptive innovation and examining whether they apply to Uber. Then we point out some common entrepreneurial companies pitfalls in the theory’s application, how these arise, and why correctly using the theory matters. We go praise it as their guiding star; on to trace major turning points in the evolution of so do many executives at our thinking and make the case that what we have learned allows us to more accurately predict which large, well-established businesses will grow. First, a quick recap of the idea: “Disruption” de- organizations, including Intel, scribes a process whereby a smaller company with fewer resources is able to successfully challenge Southern New Hampshire established incumbent businesses. Specifically, as incumbents focus on improving their products University, and Salesforce.com. and services for their most demanding (and usually Unfortunately, disruption theory is in danger of most profitable) customers, they exceed the needs becoming a victim of its own success. Despite broad of some segments and ignore the needs of others. dissemination, the theory’s core concepts have Entrants that prove disruptive begin by success- been widely misunderstood and its basic tenets fre- fully targeting those overlooked segments, gaining a quently misapplied. Furthermore, essential refine- foothold by delivering more-suitable functionality— ments in the theory over the past 20 years appear to frequently at a lower price. Incumbents, chasing have been overshadowed by the popularity of the higher profitability in more-demanding segments, initial formulation. As a result, the theory is some- tend not to respond vigorously. Entrants then move times criticized for shortcomings that have already upmarket, delivering the performance that incum- been addressed. bents’ mainstream customers require, while pre- There’s another troubling concern: In our expe- serving the advantages that drove their early success. rience, too many people who speak of “disruption” When mainstream customers start adopting the en- have not read a serious book or article on the subject. trants’ offerings in volume, disruption has occurred. Too frequently, they use the term loosely to invoke (See the exhibit “The Disruptive Innovation Model.”) the concept of innovation in support of whatever it is they wish to do. Many researchers, writers, and con- Is Uber a Disruptive Innovation? sultants use “disruptive innovation” to describe any Let’s consider Uber, the much-feted transportation situation in which an industry is shaken up and pre- company whose mobile application connects con- viously successful incumbents stumble. But that’s sumers who need rides with drivers who are willing much too broad a usage. to provide them. Founded in 2009, the company has

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Idea in Brief THE ISSUE THE RESPONSE THE BOTTOM LINE The ideas summed up in the The leading authorities Does it matter whether Uber, phrase “disruptive innovation” on disruptive innovation say, is a disruptive innovation have become a powerful part revisit the central tenets or something else entirely? of business thinking—but of disruption theory, its It does: We can’t manage they’re in danger of losing development over the past innovation effectively if we their usefulness because 20 years, and its limitations. don’t grasp its true nature. they’ve been misunderstood and misapplied.

enjoyed fantastic growth (it operates in hundreds of copiers, offering an affordable solution to individu- cities in 60 countries and is still expanding). It has als and small organizations—and a new market was reported tremendous financial success (the most created. From this relatively modest beginning, per- recent funding round implies an enterprise value in sonal photocopier makers gradually built a major the vicinity of $50 billion). And it has spawned a slew position in the mainstream photocopier market that of imitators (other start-ups are trying to emulate its Xerox valued. “market-making” business model). Uber is clearly A disruptive innovation, by definition, starts transforming the taxi business in the United States. from one of those two footholds. But Uber did not But is it disrupting the taxi business? originate in either one. It is difficult to claim that the According to the theory, the answer is no. Uber’s company found a low-end opportunity: That would financial and strategic achievements do not qualify have meant taxi service providers had overshot the the company as genuinely disruptive—although the needs of a material number of customers by mak- company is almost always described that way. Here ing cabs too plentiful, too easy to use, and too clean. are two reasons why the label doesn’t fit. Neither did Uber primarily target nonconsumers— Disruptive innovations originate in low-end people who found the existing alternatives so expen- or new-market footholds. Disruptive innovations sive or inconvenient that they took public transit or are made possible because they get started in two drove themselves instead: Uber was launched in San types of markets that incumbents overlook. Low- Francisco (a well-served taxi market), and Uber’s end footholds exist because incumbents typically customers were generally people already in the habit try to provide their most profitable and demanding of hiring rides. customers with ever-improving products and ser- Uber has quite arguably been increasing total vices, and they pay less attention to less-demanding demand—that’s what happens when you develop customers. In fact, incumbents’ offerings often over- a better, less-expensive solution to a widespread shoot the performance requirements of the latter. customer need. But disrupters start by appealing to This opens the door to a disrupter focused (at first) low-end or unserved consumers and then migrate to on providing those low-end customers with a “good the mainstream market. Uber has gone in exactly the enough” product. opposite direction: building a position in the main- In the case of new-market footholds, disrupt- stream market first and subsequently appealing to ers create a market where none existed. Put simply, historically overlooked segments. they find a way to turn nonconsumers into consum- Disruptive innovations don’t catch on with ers. For example, in the early days of photocopying mainstream customers until quality catches technology, Xerox targeted large corporations and up to their standards. Disruption theory differ- charged high prices in order to provide the perfor- entiates disruptive innovations from what are called mance that those customers required. School librar- “sustaining innovations.” The latter make good prod- ians, bowling-league operators, and other small ucts better in the eyes of an incumbent’s existing customers, priced out of the market, made do with customers: the fifth blade in a razor, the clearer TV carbon paper or mimeograph machines. Then in picture, better mobile phone reception. These im- the late 1970s, new challengers introduced personal provements can be incremental advances or major

breakthroughs, but they all enable firms to sell more has certainly thrown the taxi industry into disarray: products to their most profitable customers. Isn’t that “disruptive” enough? No. Applying the Disruptive innovations, on the other hand, are theory correctly is essential to realizing its benefits. initially considered inferior by most of an incum- For example, small competitors that nibble away at bent’s customers. Typically, customers are not will- the periphery of your business very likely should be ing to switch to the new offering merely because it ignored—unless they are on a disruptive trajectory, is less expensive. Instead, they wait until its quality in which case they are a potentially mortal threat. rises enough to satisfy them. Once that’s happened, And both of these challenges are fundamentally they adopt the new product and happily accept its different from efforts by competitors to woo your lower price. (This is how disruption drives prices bread-and-butter customers. down in a market.) As the example of Uber shows, identifying true Most of the elements of Uber’s strategy seem to disruptive innovation is tricky. Yet even executives be sustaining innovations. Uber’s service has rarely with a good understanding of disruption theory tend been described as inferior to existing taxis; in fact, to forget some of its subtler aspects when making many would say it is better. Booking a ride requires strategic decisions. We’ve observed four important just a few taps on a smartphone; payment is cash- points that get overlooked or misunderstood: less and convenient; and passengers can rate their 1. Disruption is a process. The term “disrup- rides afterward, which helps ensure high standards. tive innovation” is misleading when it is used to refer Furthermore, Uber delivers service reliably and to a product or service at one fixed point, rather than punctually, and its pricing is usually competitive to the evolution of that product or service over time. with (or lower than) that of established taxi services. The first minicomputers were disruptive not merely And as is typical when incumbents face threats from because they were low-end upstarts when they ap- peared on the scene, nor because they were later heralded as superior to mainframes in many mar- isrupters first appeal to kets; they were disruptive by virtue of the path they followed from the fringe to the mainstream. low-end or unserved Most every innovation—disruptive or not— customers and then begins life as a small-scale experiment. Disrupters tend to focus on getting the business model, rather migrate to the mainstream than merely the product, just right. When they succeed, their movement from the fringe (the low end market. Uber has gone in the of the market or a new market) to the mainstream opposite direction: building erodes first the incumbents’ market share and then their profitability. This process can take time, and a position in the mainstream incumbents can get quite creative in the defense of their established franchises. For example, more market first and then appealing than 50 years after the first discount department to historically overlooked segments. store was opened, mainstream retail companies still operate their traditional department-store formats. Complete substitution, if it comes at all, may take decades, because the incremental profit from stay- ing with the old model for one more year trumps sustaining innovations, many of the taxi compa proposals to write off the assets in one stroke. nies are motivated to respond. They are deploying The fact that disruption can take time helps to competitive technologies, such as hailing apps, and explain why incumbents frequently overlook dis- contesting the legality of some of Uber’s services. rupters. For example, when Netflix launched, in 1997, its initial service wasn’t appealing to most Why Getting It Right Matters of Blockbuster’s customers, who rented movies Readers may still be wondering, Why does it matter (typically new releases) on impulse. Netflix had an what words we use to describe Uber? The company exclusively online interface and a large inventory of

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THE DISRUPTIVE HIGHER INNOVATION MODEL

HIGH END This diagram contrasts product OF THE MARKET performance trajectories (the red MOST PROFITABLE lines showing how products or services improve over time) with PERFORMANCE PERFORMANCE CUSTOMERS WILL PAY FOR customer demand trajectories (the blue lines showing customers’ SUSTAINING TRAJECTORY willingness to pay for performance). PRODUCT PRODUCT ’S As incumbent companies introduce MAINSTREAM higher-quality products or services INCUMBENT (upper red line) to satisfy the high end of the market (where profitability is highest), they overshoot the needs of low-end TRAJECTORY customers and many mainstream customers. This leaves an opening for entrants to find footholds in DISRUPTIVE LOW END the less-profitable segments that incumbents are neglecting. Entrants ENTRANT’S OF THE MARKET LEAST PROFITABLE on a disruptive trajectory (lower red line) improve the performance of their offerings and move upmarket (where profitability is highest LOWER for them, too) and challenge the dominance of the incumbents. TIME

movies, but delivery through the U.S. mail meant 2. Disrupters often build business models selections took several days to arrive. The service ap- that are very different from those of incum- pealed to only a few customer groups—movie buffs bents. Consider the health care industry. General who didn’t care about new releases, early adopters of practitioners operating out of their offices often rely DVD players, and online shoppers. If Netflix had not on their years of experience and on test results to eventually begun to serve a broader segment of the interpret patients’ symptoms, make diagnoses, and market, Blockbuster’s decision to ignore this com- prescribe treatment. We call this a “solution shop” petitor would not have been a strategic blunder: The business model. In contrast, a number of conve- two companies filled very different needs for their nient care clinics are taking a disruptive path by us- (different) customers. ing what we call a “process” business model: They However, as new technologies allowed Netflix follow standardized protocols to diagnose and treat to shift to streaming video over the internet, the a small but increasing number of disorders. company did eventually become appealing to One high-profile example of using an innova- Blockbuster’s core customers, offering a wider se- tive business model to effect a disruption is Apple’s lection of content with an all-you-can-watch, on- iPhone. The product that Apple debuted in 2007 was demand, low-price, high-quality, highly convenient a sustaining innovation in the smartphone market: It approach. And it got there via a classically disruptive targeted the same customers coveted by incumbents, path. If Netflix (like Uber) had begun by launching a and its initial success is likely explained by product service targeted at a larger competitor’s core market, superiority. The iPhone’s subsequent growth is bet- Blockbuster’s response would very likely have been ter explained by disruption—not of other smart- a vigorous and perhaps successful counterattack. phones but of the laptop as the primary access But failing to respond effectively to the trajectory point to the internet. This was achieved not merely that Netflix was on led Blockbuster to collapse. through product improvements but also through the

THE UBIQUITOUS ARTICLES “DISRUPTIVE 2,500 INNOVATION” “Disruptive innovation” and “disruptive technology” are now 2,000 part of the popular business lexicon, as suggested by the dramatic growth in 1,500 the number of articles using those phrases in recent years. 1,000

500

0 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014

SOURCE FACTIVA ANALYSIS OF A WIDE VARIETY OF ENGLISH-LANGUAGE PUBLICATIONS

introduction of a new business model. By building a common strategy for succeeding. This creates a dan- facilitated network connecting application develop- ger: Managers may mix and match behaviors that are ers with phone users, Apple changed the game. The very likely inconsistent with one another and thus iPhone created a new market for internet access and unlikely to yield the hoped-for result. For example, eventually was able to challenge laptops as main- both Uber and Apple’s iPhone owe their success to stream users’ device of choice for going online. a platform-based model: Uber digitally connects 3. Some disruptive innovations succeed; riders with drivers; the iPhone connects app devel- some don’t. A third common mistake is to focus opers with phone users. But Uber, true to its nature on the results achieved—to claim that a company as a sustaining innovation, has focused on expand- is disruptive by virtue of its success. But success is ing its network and functionality in ways that make not built into the definition of disruption: Not every it better than traditional taxis. Apple, on the other disruptive path leads to a triumph, and not every tri- hand, has followed a disruptive path by building umphant newcomer follows a disruptive path. its ecosystem of app developers so as to make the For example, any number of internet-based re- iPhone more like a personal computer. tailers pursued disruptive paths in the late 1990s, but 4. The mantra “Disrupt or be disrupted” only a small number prospered. The failures are not can misguide us. Incumbent companies do evidence of the deficiencies of disruption theory; need to respond to disruption if it’s occurring, but they are simply boundary markers for the theory’s they should not overreact by dismantling a still- application. The theory says very little about how profitable business. Instead, they should continue to win in the foothold market, other than to play to strengthen relationships with core customers the odds and avoid head-on competition with by investing in sustaining innovations. In addition, better-resourced incumbents. they can create a new division focused solely on the If we call every business success a “disruption,” growth opportunities that arise from the disrup- then companies that rise to the top in very differ- tion. Our research suggests that the success of this ent ways will be seen as sources of insight into a new enterprise depends in large part on keeping

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it separate from the core business. That means that the leading incumbents in this market: acceptance for some time, incumbents will find themselves of advance reservations. Consequently, this offering managing two very different operations. from Uber appeals to the low end of the limousine Of course, as the disruptive stand-alone business service market: customers willing to sacrifice a mea- grows, it may eventually steal customers from the sure of convenience for monetary savings. Should core. But corporate leaders should not try to solve Uber find ways to match or exceed incumbents’ this problem before it is a problem. performance levels without compromising its cost and price advantage, the company appears to be What a Disruptive Innovation well positioned to move into the mainstream of the Lens Can Reveal limo business—and it will have done so in classically It is rare that a technology or product is inherently disruptive fashion. sustaining or disruptive. And when new technology is developed, disruption theory does not dictate How Our Thinking About what managers should do. Instead it helps them Disruption Has Developed make a strategic choice between taking a sustaining Initially, the theory of disruptive innovation was path and taking a disruptive one. simply a statement about correlation. Empirical The theory of disruption predicts that when an findings showed that incumbents outperformed entrant tackles incumbent competitors head-on, of- entrants in a sustaining innovation context but un- fering better products or services, the incumbents derperformed in a disruptive innovation context. will accelerate their innovations to defend their The reason for this correlation was not immediately business. Either they will beat back the entrant by evident, but one by one, the elements of the theory offering even better services or products at compa- fell into place. rable prices, or one of them will acquire the entrant. The data supports the theory’s prediction that entrants pursuing a sustaining strategy for a stand- ncumbent companies alone business will face steep odds: In Christensen’s seminal study of the disk drive industry, only 6% of should not overreact sustaining entrants managed to succeed. to disruption by dismantling Uber’s strong performance therefore warrants ex- planation. According to disruption theory, Uber is an a still-profitable business. outlier, and we do not have a universal way to account for such atypical outcomes. In Uber’s case, we believe Instead they should strengthen that the regulated nature of the taxi business is a large relationships with core part of the answer. Market entry and prices are closely controlled in many jurisdictions. Consequently, taxi customers while also creating companies have rarely innovated. Individual drivers have few ways to innovate, except to defect to Uber. a new division focused on So Uber is in a unique situation relative to taxis: It can the growth opportunities that offer better quality and the competition will find it hard to respond, at least in the short term. arise from the disruption. To this point, we’ve addressed only whether or not Uber is disruptive to the taxi business. The limousine or “black car” business is a different story, and here Uber is far more likely to be on a disruptive First, researchers realized that a company’s pro- path. The company’s UberSELECT option provides pensity for strategic change is profoundly affected more-luxurious cars and is typically more expensive by the interests of customers who provide the re- than its standard service—but typically less expen- sources the firm needs to survive. In other words, in- sive than hiring a traditional limousine. This lower cumbents (sensibly) listen to their existing custom- price imposes some compromises, as UberSELECT ers and concentrate on sustaining innovations as a currently does not include one defining feature of result. Researchers then arrived at a second insight:

Incumbents’ focus on their existing customers be- The disruptive effect drives every competitor— comes institutionalized in internal processes that incumbent and entrant—upmarket. make it difficult for even senior managers to shift With those explanations in hand, the theory of investment to disruptive innovations. For example, disruptive innovation went beyond simple corre- interviews with managers of established companies lation to a theory of causation as well. The key ele- in the disk drive industry revealed that resource allo- ments of that theory have been tested and validated cation processes prioritized sustaining innovations through studies of many industries, including retail, (which had high margins and targeted large markets computers, printing, motorcycles, cars, semicon- with well-known customers) while inadvertently ductors, cardiovascular surgery, management edu- starving disruptive innovations (meant for smaller cation, financial services, management consulting, markets with poorly defined customers). cameras, communications, and computer-aided design software. Making sense of anomalies. Additional re- s there a novel technology or finements to the theory have been made to address certain anomalies, or unexpected scenarios, that business model that allows the theory could not explain. For example, we origi- nally assumed that any disruptive innovation took entrants in higher education to root in the lowest tiers of an established market— follow a disruptive path? The yet sometimes new entrants seemed to be compet- ing in entirely new markets. This led to the distinc- answer seems to be yes, and the tion we discussed earlier between low-end and new-market footholds. enabling innovation is online learning. Low-end disrupters (think steel minimills and discount retailers) come in at the bottom of the market and take hold within an existing value network before moving upmarket and attacking that stratum Those two insights helped explain why in- (think integrated steel mills and traditional retail- cumbents rarely responded effectively (if at all) ers). By contrast, new-market disruptions take hold to disruptive innovations, but not why entrants in a completely new value network and appeal to eventually moved upmarket to challenge incum- customers who have previously gone without the bents, over and over again. It turns out, however, product. Consider the transistor pocket radio and that the same forces leading incumbents to ignore the PC: They were largely ignored by manufacturers early-stage disruptions also compel disrupters of tabletop radios and minicomputers, respectively, ultimately to disrupt. because they were aimed at nonconsumers of those What we’ve realized is that, very often, low-end goods. By postulating that there are two flavors of and new-market footholds are populated not by a foothold markets in which disruptive innovation lone would-be disrupter, but by several comparable can begin, the theory has become more powerful entrant firms whose products are simpler, more con- and practicable. venient, or less costly than those sold by incumbents. Another intriguing anomaly was the identifi- The incumbents provide a de facto price umbrella, cation of industries that have resisted the forces allowing many of the entrants to enjoy profitable of disruption, at least until very recently. Higher growth within the foothold market. But that lasts education in the United States is one of these. Over only for a time: As incumbents (rationally, but mis- the years—indeed, over more than 100 years—new takenly) cede the foothold market, they effectively kinds of institutions with different initial charters remove the price umbrella, and price-based com- have been created to address the needs of various petition among the entrants reigns. Some entrants population segments, including nonconsumers. will founder, but the smart ones—the true disrupt- Land-grant universities, teachers’ colleges, two-year ers—will improve their products and drive upmar- colleges, and so on were initially launched to serve ket, where, once again, they can compete at the those for whom a traditional four-year liberal arts margin against higher-cost established competitors. education was out of reach or unnecessary.

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Many of these new entrants strived to improve disruptions are not fundamentally different from any over time, compelled by analogues of the pursuit of others; they don’t have different causal mechanisms profitability: a desire for growth, prestige, and the and don’t require conceptually different responses. capacity to do greater good. Thus they made costly Similarly, it is a mistake to assume that the strat- investments in research, dormitories, athletic fa- egies adopted by some high-profile entrants con- cilities, faculty, and so on, seeking to emulate more- stitute a special kind of disruption. Often these are elite institutions. Doing so has increased their level simply miscategorized. Tesla Motors is a current of performance in some ways—they can provide and salient example. One might be tempted to say richer learning and living environments for students, the company is disruptive. But its foothold is in the for example. Yet the relative standing of higher- high end of the auto market (with customers willing education institutions remains largely unchanged: to spend $70,000 or more on a car), and this segment With few exceptions, the top 20 are still the top 20, is not uninteresting to incumbents. Tesla’s entry, not and the next 50 are still in that second tier, decade surprisingly, has elicited significant attention and in- after decade. vestment from established competitors. If disruption Because both incumbents and newcomers are theory is correct, Tesla’s future holds either acquisi- seemingly following the same game plan, it is per- tion by a much larger incumbent or a years-long and haps no surprise that incumbents are able to main- hard-fought battle for market significance. tain their positions. What has been missing—until We still have a lot to learn. We are eager to recently—is experimentation with new models that keep expanding and refining the theory of disruptive successfully appeal to today’s nonconsumers of innovation, and much work lies ahead. For example, higher education. universally effective responses to disruptive threats The question now is whether there is a novel remain elusive. Our current belief is that companies technology or business model that allows new en- should create a separate division that operates un- trants to move upmarket without emulating the in- der the protection of senior leadership to explore cumbents’ high costs—that is, to follow a disruptive and exploit a new disruptive model. Sometimes this path. The answer seems to be yes, and the enabling works—and sometimes it doesn’t. In certain cases, innovation is online learning, which is becoming a failed response to a disruptive threat cannot be broadly available. Real tuition for online courses is attributed to a lack of understanding, insufficient falling, and accessibility and quality are improving. executive attention, or inadequate financial invest- Innovators are making inroads into the mainstream ment. The challenges that arise from being an in- market at a stunning pace. cumbent and an entrant simultaneously have yet to Will online education disrupt the incumbents’ be fully specified; how best to meet those challenges model? And if so, when? In other words, will on- is still to be discovered. line education’s trajectory of improvement in- Disruption theory does not, and never will, ex- tersect with the needs of the mainstream mar- plain everything about innovation specifically or ket? We’ve come to realize that the steepness business success generally. Far too many other of any disruptive trajectory is a function of how forces are in play, each of which will reward further quickly the enabling technology improves. In study. Integrating them all into a comprehensive the steel industry, continuous-casting technol- theory of business success is an ambitious goal, one ogy improved quite slowly, and it took more than we are unlikely to attain anytime soon. 40 years before the minimill Nucor matched the But there is cause for hope: Empirical tests show revenue of the largest integrated steelmakers. In that using disruptive theory makes us measurably contrast, the digital technologies that allowed and significantly more accurate in our predictions personal computers to disrupt minicomputers of which fledgling businesses will succeed. As an improved much more quickly; Compaq was able to ever-growing community of researchers and practi- increase revenue more than tenfold and reach parity tioners continues to build on disruption theory and with the industry leader, DEC, in only 12 years. integrate it with other perspectives, we will come Understanding what drives the rate of disruption to an even better understanding of what helps firms is helpful for predicting outcomes, but it doesn’t al- innovate successfully. ter the way disruptions should be managed. Rapid HBR Reprint R1512B

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