War & Democracy Shimko, ch. 4, notes by Denis Bašić Are Democracies More Peaceful? • The idea that democracies are more peaceful than non- democracies has been part of liberal international thought for more than two hundred years, and it is one of those ideas that has seeped from the realm of theory to real- world policy. • Though proponents of democratic peace theory offer a variety of reasons why democracies might be less willing and able to wage war, all versions of the theory share the basic prediction that democracies will not wage war against one another. If the theory is correct, a more democratic world will also be a more peaceful world. • The commonly cited evidence in support of the theory is the absence of any wars between clearly democratic states. What do Skeptics Say? • Skeptics question this evidence, pointing to what they see as convenient and shifting definitions that omit troublesome cases. Some even claim that there have been wars between democratic states (think of WWI.) • Realists in particular are generally unconvinced by the theory and its supporting evidence. Even if we have not yet seen a war between democratic states, realists think our luck is likely to run out. In time, democracies will be subject to the same insecurities and conflicts that have driven nondemocratic states to war. • The coming decades are likely to put the theory to a real- world test as the number of democracies in the world continues to grow. Immanuel Kant, German Philosopher (1724-1804) • Living in an era of absolutist monarchism, Kant argued in his classic work, Perpetual Peace, that the emergence and spread of “republican” (or liberal democratic) political institutions would be accompanied by the emergence of a zone of peace. Kant referred to this as a republican or democratic pacific union. Kant did not argue that democracies would totally refrain from waging wars; he simply argued that democracies would not wage war against other democracies. Peaceful must not be confused with pacifist. More democracies would mean a larger zone of peace, and universal democracy would usher in universal peace. Why did Kant expect democracies to be more peaceful? • Kant believed that in a republic or democracy people are citizens of the state as opposed to subjects of a monarch. • As political subjects, Kant believed, citizens would be able to influence government policy, including decisions about war and peace. As essentially rational creatures (another fundamental assumption of liberalism), people are generally unwilling to support policies that do them harm. • In Perpetual Peace Kant expressed his belief that democratic citizens “will have a great hesitation in embarking on so dangerous an enterprise [as war]” because “this would mean calling down on themselves all the miseries of war.” • These miseries include not only the obvious, such as “doing the fighting themselves, supplying the costs of war from their own resources,” but also “making good the ensuing devastation, and, as the crowning evil, having to take upon themselves a burden of debts which will embitter peace itself and which can never be paid off on account of the constant threat of new wars.” Rational 0r Pacific Public Thesis Democratic Peace Theory • Kant’s explanation is usually referred to as the rational or pacific public thesis, because it sees democratic peacefulness as rooted in the rational self-interest of democratic publics. • This view is no longer very popular as an explanation of democratic peace because the past two centuries provide too many examples of public support, even enthusiasm, for war. People in democratic states greeted World War I with tremendous enthusiasm. • rational or pacific public thesis - The view that democracies are more peaceful because their foreign policies reflect the desires of an inherently rational and peaceful public. • democratic pacific union - The separate peace that Immanuel Kant predicted would exist among democratic states. Many believe that this democratic peace has in fact emerged. Democratic Peace Theory & Its Critics • In some cases, such as the Spanish–American War of 1898, it was the public, spurred by a pro-war press, that pushed a reluctant political leadership into war. • As Robin Fox, a critic of democratic peace theory, observes, “there is rarely very effective opposition to a successful war.” For Fox, the absence of effective antiwar movements against successful wars suggests that there is no general preference for peace, merely a reluctance to fight losing wars. The hesitance for war, which seemed “natural” to Kant, appears not to exist in reality. • Neo-Marxians and many labor movements leaders would in turn claim that human aggressiveness is spurred by peoples’ governments and that the governments control people by “first of all, frightening people, and then demoralizing them.” See this video with Tony Benn, the former UK MP and UK minister. Democratic Institutions & Peace • Even Kant was not content to rely on the assumption that popular opposition to war would be sufficient to create democratic peace. • Kant and others also point to characteristics of democratic systems, namely their institutional structure and political-cultural underpinnings. • In terms of institutions, the most important feature of democracies is that political power and decision making are distributed in a manner that presents obstacles to war making. • In terms of political culture, democratic peace theorists note that successful democratic institutions depend on the widespread adherence to certain values that shape international behavior of democracies. • These institutional and cultural constraints are generally seen as particularly significant in terms of relations among democratic states. Institutional Thesis • The institutional thesis emphasizes that democratic political systems are usually characterized by a dispersion of political power, whereas undemocratic systems usually concentrate power in the hands of a single person or small elite. • Leaders such as Louis XIV, Joseph Stalin, or Saddam Hussein do not generally operate with many domestic constraints on their authority. When Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1991, he did not have to secure the approval of an elected legislature, hostile newspaper editorials, or the next election. This is not to say that he had no worries, because even undemocratic leaders can be overthrown. • The point is simply that, as a general rule, leaders in nondemocratic societies face fewer political constraints than do those in democracies. Checks & Balances • checks and balances - The division of power in democracies among different branches of government (e.g., the president and Congress in the United States). The institutional version of democratic peace sees this dispersion of powers as the critical reason why democracies are less likely to engage in war, especially with each other. • As America’s founders made it clear in The Federalist Papers, making government action difficult was precisely the point of dispersing political power. A certain degree of consensus is required for democratic governments to act, particularly when actions represent radical change or are very controversial. Thus, the essential element of the institutional thesis is that democracies will find it more difficult to go to war, and certainly more difficult to initiate a war, than will nondemocratic governments. Political Cultural Thesis • While the institutional constraint thesis stresses a democracy’s diminished ability to wage war, the political-cultural thesis emphasizes the unwillingness of democracies to go to war. • The argument is that democratic institutions are rooted in widely shared norms about how political conflicts are managed. Democracy requires a consensus that conflicts be resolved without resort to force: Democracies substitute the counting of heads for the breaking of heads. However deep the disagreements over certain issues, very few resort to violence once they lose in the political arena. • In terms of international relations, the political-cultural thesis anticipates that democracies will externalize this norm from the domestic to the international realm. Thus, this norm of peaceful conflict resolution predisposes democracies to favor nonviolent approaches to international conflicts. • political-cultural thesis - A variant of democratic peace theory that sees political and cultural norms or peaceful conflict resolution as the most important reason that democracies are less likely to wage war, especially against each other. Constructivists & Democratic Peace • Constructivists present a slightly different explanation for the democratic peace. • It is not something inherent in democracies preventing them from waging war against each other. What keeps democracies at peace is the internalized norm that democracies do not fight each other. The prohibition on fighting other democracies has become part of what it means to be a democracy—that is, an integral component of the democratic self-image, how democracies identify themselves. • When democracies share this self-image, an “intersubjective understanding” emerges and peace among democracies holds. In a sense, democratic peace theory is an almost self-fulfilling prophecy —the more people, especially elites, in democratic societies tell themselves that democracies do not fight with each other, the more their behavior reflects this belief. why would democracies prefer peace with each other but not with non-democracies?

• “Peace follows if leaders come to recognize that their preference for negotiation is shared.” • Democracies may assume that non-democracies will be unwilling to resolve disputes peacefully. The insight that what matters most is a democracy’s expectations about the conduct it can expect from another nation has led one scholar to revise the democratic peace proposition slightly, pointing out that the critical factor is whether two states perceive each other as democratic, not whether they are democratic according to some previously set criteria. • Some scholars, thus, believe that before WWI British and American leaders did not perceive Germany as democratic. Because they did not think they were dealing with a democracy, the obstacles to war were not operative. What is “Democracy”?

• If asked what makes a country democratic, most people would probably list universal adult suffrage (i.e., the right to vote) as an essential component. • Though this seems uncontroversial, it is not always easily applied. A strict application of this standard would exclude the United States before 1920 when women were not allowed to vote at the federal level (they could vote only in some states). • This standard might even exclude the United States in 1960, because in large parts of the country citizens of African descent were effectively denied their right to vote. • Can a country be considered a democracy when a sizable portion of its adult population is excluded from the franchise by law or practice? the essential features of democracy • Regular elections for major government offices, • Competitive political parties, • Near universal adult suffrage, and • Certain basic political and individual rights. • The inclusion of basic rights that are protected even from democratic majorities leads many to prefer the description liberal democratic states. • The criteria are usually relaxed somewhat when we move back to the nineteenth century, particularly on the issue of voting rights. A country that denied women and others the right to vote in 1900 can still be classified as a democracy, but similar practices today would be disqualifiers. What does it mean “Peaceful”? • Should we look simply at a crude measure, such as the number of wars that nations are involved in? This is certainly easy, but is it a valid measure of peacefulness? • Perhaps a more meaningful indicator is not war involvement, but rather war initiation. • But what about covert operations, threats of force, and military interventions that fall short of a formal state of war? • And what about the provision of military aid and assistance that fuels wars? • The range of behaviors we might look at to get a handle on the peacefulness is quite broad, and our conclusions might differ depending on the measure chosen. The Evidence

• One of the initial studies of democracy and war demonstrated that over the last two centuries there was no difference between democracies and non-democracies in the frequency or duration of their war involvement. This was not the result of democracies always being attacked either, because there was no difference in war initiation. • Rather than disputing these findings, democratic peace theorists have argued that they are not good tests. Kant and others did not predict that democracies would refrain from war. The expectation was that democracies would not fight one another. • So the question is not how many wars democracies have been involved in, but whether they have waged war against each other. Wars between Democracies

• There have been many wars between democracies and non- democracies as well as among non-democracies. But, as Bruce Russett asserts, “there are no clear-cut cases of sovereign stable democracies waging war with each other in the modern international system.” • Several important qualifications in this observation need to be highlighted. • Russett’s observation does not include civil wars, only wars involving sovereign states. • War is defined as an armed conflict between sovereign states resulting in at least 1,000 battle casualties. • Note also the qualifier of stable democracies, which might exclude wars involving new, fledgling democracies. Wars between Democracies 2

• Russett and others recognize close cases that might be classified as wars between democracies: • the War of 1812 between the United States and Great Britain, • the American Civil War, • the Spanish-American War (1896), and • the allies against Finland in World War II. • Upon closer inspection these end up not being wars between democracies. • Britain was not yet a democracy in 1812, • nor was Spain in 1896. • The Confederacy was not a sovereign state during the American Civil War. • And even though Finland was aligned with Germany in World War II, because of its conflict with the Soviet Union, it never fought against the Western democracies. Wars between Democracies Russia vs. Georgia

• A more recent close case might be the 2008 conflict between Russia and Georgia, though this is likely to be rejected on the grounds that Russia is not really democratic, even though it holds regular elections. • Freedom House, an organization whose classifications are often relied upon, categorizes Russia as “not free,” which is usually taken to mean nondemocratic. Recent restrictions on the press and harassment of political opposition led Freedom House to talk about a “return to authoritarianism” in Russia. • Georgia is considered “partially free.” Democracies & Wars Wording

• Some boldly assert that • democracies never have and never will wage war against each other, • whereas others are content with the more limited claim that • democracies are much less likely to fight one another. • But whichever version one is examining, the empirical fact that no democracy has ever gone to war against another democracy appears to many as strong evidence supporting Kant’s prediction vision of democratic pacific union. Improbability of the War between democracy

• Improbability of war occurrence between the democracy, some scholars claim, is not due to the “democratic” nature of the states, but rather to mere statistics. • First, over the last two hundred years there have been very few democratic states. No more than a handful could be considered democratic prior to 1945, and it is only in the last two decades or so that democracies have constituted a majority of the world’s states. • Second, war is a rare event. Even though a war is usually going on somewhere in the world at any given moment, virtually all countries spend most of their time at peace, not war. Peace is the norm in international relations; war is the exception The American Civil War Was it a War between two Democracies?

• Proponents of democratic peace theory usually reject the American Civil War as an instance of democracies fighting because the Confederacy was not a sovereign state recognized as such by other states. • Critics of democratic peace theory point out the fact “that Southerners considered their new confederacy democratic (which it was by the standards of the day) and that most Northerners did not dispute that view (they merely regarded it as beside the point) ...” • The experience of the American Civil War leads to the question “if democratic people could do that to their own, how confident can we be that two democracies divided by culture or race (e.g., the United States and Japan) would recoil from doing so?” WWI Was WWI a War Among Democracies?

• To some, Germany in 1914 seems reasonably democratic—there were regular and competitive elections, political parties represented a full range of political views from far left to far right, there was a free and vigorous press, and adult males were allowed to vote. These facts would make Germany a democracy. • The problem is that German foreign and defense policy was determined by unelected government officials not responsible to the legislature. Germany as a whole may have been somewhat democratic, but its foreign policy apparatus was not. • Though this may be true, Germany seems to be held to a higher standard and subjected to a degree of scrutiny that France, Britain, and the United States manage to escape. Looking more closely at these democracies, one could conclude that most foreign policy decisions in London and Paris were also made with little or no legislative involvement, oversight, or control. Were there any democracies before WWII?

• Critics of democratic peace theory, most notably realists, note that all democracies in 1914 were imperfect. One would not have to look very long to find legitimate grounds to deny the democratic credentials of any country in 1914, starting with the denial of the right to vote to women. And if we look at the denial of the right to African Americans to vote in large parts of the U.S. until 1960, the American democracy turns to be very young. • Hence, the major criticism by realists aimed at liberals is that democratic peace theorists are more interested in finding ways to eliminate troublesome cases than subjecting their theory to rigorous examination. Other ways to explain the peace among democracies

• Empirical correlation is not sufficient grounds for inferring a causal relationship. There is always the possibility that the relationship is spurious—that is, explained by other variables. • Until the post–World War II era the rarity of democracies and their distance from each other severely restricted even the possibility of going to war. Peace between Finland and New Zealand in 1920 can be explained by geography, not shared democracy. • One could point to what sociologists refer to as the in-group/out- group hypothesis, which predicts internal cohesion in the face of an external enemy. It is plausible that peace among democracies in the twentieth century can be explained by the presence of such external threats—fascism in the 1930s and early 1940s and communism throughout most of the post–World War II period. Other ways to explain the peace among democracies 2 • The United States and Great Britain came close to war twice: in 1861, after the North’s naval blockade prevented British commerce with the Confederacy, and again in 1895–1896, in a border dispute between Great Britain and Venezuela. Great Britain was also a party to the third close call, though this time with France in a contest for advantage in Egypt and the critical Suez Canal in 1898. The final crisis pitted France against Germany in 1923, when France militarily occupied German territory known as the Ruhr. Though none of these crises escalated to war, some scholars think, they are relevant for two reasons. • First, the democracies involved seriously contemplated going to war with one another, which in and of itself seems inconsistent with democratic peace theory. • Second, the reasons they managed to avoid war had little, if anything, to do with the fact that they were democracies. In each case, the decision against war was based on assessments of what the interests at stake were and the relative power of the states in conflict. • That is, the democracies remained at peace, but not necessarily for the reasons suggested by democratic peace theory. ”Power and strategic considerations were predominant.”