DOCSLIB.ORG

Crossing the Rubicon Barton 1

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Crossing the Rubicon Barton 1 Crossing the Rubicon Barton 1. Bernstein A Missed Opportunity to Stop the H-Bomb? are in some way limited, the future of our society will come increasingly into peril of the gravest kind. --Panel of Consultants on Disarmament, September 1952 Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/isec/article-pdf/14/2/132/694430/isec.14.2.132.pdf by guest on 24 September 2021 That first thermonuclear] test ended the possibility of the only type of agreement that 1 thought was possible with Russia . an agreement to make no more tests. [It]would have been self-policing. 1 still think that we made a grave error in conducting that test at that time. Those who pushed that thing . without making that attempt have a great deal to answer for.’ -Vannevar Bush, April 1954 “In the thermonuclear tests at Eniwetok,” President Harry S. Truman announced in his January 1953 State of the Union address, “we have entered another stage in the worldshaking development of atomic energy.” This I am indebted for counsel to Coit Blacker, McGeorge Bundy, Alexander Dallin, Peter Galison, Allen Greb, Jonathan Haslam, Gregg Herken, David Holloway, Gail Lapidus, Condoleezza Rice, David Rosenberg, Scott Sagan, Martin Sherwin, and Herbert York; for various sources to Roger Anders, Nancy Bressler, Jack Holl, Sally Marks, and William Tuttle; for support to the Ford Foundation Program in International Security, Barbara and Howard Holme, the Center for the History of Physics (American Institute of Physics), the Harry S. Truman Library Institute, and the Center for International Security and Arms Control; for access to the James Conant papers to Theodore Conant; and for early access to the Lewis L. Strauss papers to Lewis H. Strauss and Richard Pfau. Earlier versions of this paper were presented in 1986-88 to the Peace Studies group and the Nuclear History group at Stanford University, and parts were presented in 1987 to the Institute on Global Cooperation and Conflict summer program at Sussex. Barton I. Bernstein is Professor of History and Mellon Professor of lnterdisciplinay Studies at Stanford University, where he directs the International Relations Program and the International Policy Studies Program. His most recent publications include “America‘s Biological Warfare Program in the Second World War” in the Journal of Strategic Studies, and (with Peter Galison) ”In Any Light: Scientists and the Decision to Build the Superbomb, 1942-1954,” in Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences. 1. Panel of Consultants on Disarmament, “The Timing of the Thermonuclear Test,” undated (probably September 1952), Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter FRUS), 1952-54, Vol. I1 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office [U.S. GPO], 1984), p. 1006. 2. Vannevar Bush in April, 1954; Atomic Energy Commmission (AEC), In the Matter of!. Robert Oppenhezrner (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1954), p. 582. International Security, Fall 1989 (Vol. 14, No. 2) 0 1989 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 132 Crossing the Rubicon 1 133 potential new weapon, he explained, ”moves into a new era of destructive power, capable of creating explosions of a new order of magnitude, dwarfing the mushroom clouds of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.” It was the world’s first test of a thermonuclear de~ice.~ Truman’s statement about the October 31 explosion, tucked into a single Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/isec/article-pdf/14/2/132/694430/isec.14.2.132.pdf by guest on 24 September 2021 paragraph in a lengthy speech, was designed to downplay the recent event. His comment was only the second official mention of the test. He did not disclose that, at about ten megatons, it had literally destroyed a small Pacific island, leaving a gaping crater in the ocean floor. The explosion was about 800 times more powerful than the Hiroshima bomb.4 Warning the Soviets and the world of the dangers of nuclear war, Truman stressed that he wished that the world could pursue only the peaceful atom, and he blamed the Soviets for blocking international control of atomic energy. He said that he, with the American people, would support the incoming Eisenhower administration’s efforts to ”make this newest of man’s discov- eries a source of good and not of ultimate destruction.” But he held out virtually no hope for any control of the arms race or the achievement of a Soviet-American settlement in the near future. He called for continued tough- ness in dealing with the ”masters of the Kremlin” and thus justified building a stockpile of H-b~mbs.~ Such bleak counsel, expressing Truman’s sincere beliefs, concealed dis- putes within the administration on whether, and how, to mention the ther- monuclear test, and, more importantly, even whether to hold it at all. A small group of respected advisers (the Panel of Consultants on Disarmament) had pleaded, unsuccessfully, that the United States not hold the test and that it seek instead an agreement with the Soviet Union not to conduct any thermonuclear tests. Until that first test, these advisers believed that there was a real possibility of blocking the H-bomb. After the test of a thermonu- clear device, an actual weapon seemed only about a year away, and an agreement, impossible. The proposed Soviet-American agreement, had it been established, might have spared the world much of the horror of the hydrogen bomb era; it thus may have constituted a missed opportunity to halt, or at least to slow down, 3. Truman speech, January 7, 1953, in Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman, 1952-53 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1966), p. 1125. 4. Gordon Dean to Dwight D. Eisenhower, November 7, 1952, AEC Document (Doc.) 356, Historian’s Office (HO), Department of Energy (DOE), Germantown, Md. 5. Truman speech, January 7, 1953. International Security 14:2 I 134 the nuclear arms race. Lamenting that there had been, indeed, a lost chance, Vannevar Bush, the major 1952 proponent of the agreement, told a close associate, "I feel that an opportunity was missed and that history will prob- ably record that it was." Bush, the president of the Carnegie Institution and Roosevelt's top World War I1 science adviser, admitted that he had no idea Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/isec/article-pdf/14/2/132/694430/isec.14.2.132.pdf by guest on 24 September 2021 whether the Soviets would have joined in an agreement, but he believed "that the attempt [would have been] worthwhile.'"j Claims of a missed chance, especially when illuminated by recently de- classified sources from that period, inspire an effort to understand more about this little-known 1952 proposal,' why and how it lost, and whether it was seriously considered at the upper levels of the administration. Was this lost opportunity a near miss, blocked by minor contingencies, or was its defeat virtually inevitable, dictated by the Truman administration's attitudes and other powerful forces? This essay argues that, because of the domestic political consensus and the views of the Truman administration itself, there was no likelihood that this 1952 proposal could have won acceptance in the United States. To put these issues in a broad context, the essay also briefly discusses the 1952-53 panel's general report for reorienting American nuclear policy, the relation- ship of these recommendations to the 1953-54 Oppenheimer loyalty-security case, and the question whether the Soviet Union in 1952-53 might have accepted an American proposal to bar all thermonuclear testing. Such a proposal, this article concludes, would have been in the Soviets' interest and might indeed have proved acceptable. 6. Vannevar Bush to James Conant, March 29, 1954, Box 27, Bush Papers, Library of Congress (LC). On Bush, see also AEC, In the Matter of]. Robert Oppenheimer, pp. 561-568. Strangely, in 1954, Bush incorrectly placed this proposal in 1953, not 1952, and also erred by recalling it as only his idea, not a panel recommendation. 7. Until recently, the main sources on the panel were the skimpy references in AEC, In the Matter of Oppenheimer, pp. 247-248,561-568,589-590, and 927-928. The panel is also mentioned, very briefly (usually just a paragraph), in six older studies: Norman Moss, Men Who Play God: The Story of the H-Bomb and How the World Came to Live with It (New York: Harpers, 1968), p. 58; John Major, The Oppenheirner Hearings (New York: Stein, 1971), pp. 142-143; Stanley Blumberg and Gwinn Owens, Energy and Conflict: The Life and Times of Edward Teller (New York: Putnam, 1976), p. 294; Robert A. Divine, Blowing on the Wind: The Nuclear Test Ban Debate (New York: Oxford, 1978), p. 16; Philip Stern, with Harold Green, The Oppenheimer Case: Securify on Trial (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), pp. 194-195; and McGeorge Bundy, "The Missed Chance to Stop the H-Bomb," New York Revim of Books, May 13, 1982, p. 19. In 1988-89, two additional studies briefly treated the 1952 effort: McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (New York: Random House, 1988), p. 228; and Peter Galison and Barton J. Bernstein, "In Any Light: Scientists and the Decision to Build the Superbomb, 1942- 1954," Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences, Vol. 19, Part I1 (1989), p. 328. Crossing the Rubicon I 135 An Earlier Opporfunity The hope for a no-test agreement had first arisen in late October 1949, when eight members of the Atomic Energy Commission’s (AEC) General Advisory Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/isec/article-pdf/14/2/132/694430/isec.14.2.132.pdf by guest on 24 September 2021 Committee (GAC), chaired by physicist J.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Ira Sprague Bowen Papers, 1940-1973
    http://oac.cdlib.org/findaid/ark:/13030/tf2p300278 No online items Inventory of the Ira Sprague Bowen Papers, 1940-1973 Processed by Ronald S. Brashear; machine-readable finding aid created by Gabriela A. Montoya Manuscripts Department The Huntington Library 1151 Oxford Road San Marino, California 91108 Phone: (626) 405-2203 Fax: (626) 449-5720 Email: [email protected] URL: http://www.huntington.org/huntingtonlibrary.aspx?id=554 © 1998 The Huntington Library. All rights reserved. Observatories of the Carnegie Institution of Washington Collection Inventory of the Ira Sprague 1 Bowen Papers, 1940-1973 Observatories of the Carnegie Institution of Washington Collection Inventory of the Ira Sprague Bowen Paper, 1940-1973 The Huntington Library San Marino, California Contact Information Manuscripts Department The Huntington Library 1151 Oxford Road San Marino, California 91108 Phone: (626) 405-2203 Fax: (626) 449-5720 Email: [email protected] URL: http://www.huntington.org/huntingtonlibrary.aspx?id=554 Processed by: Ronald S. Brashear Encoded by: Gabriela A. Montoya © 1998 The Huntington Library. All rights reserved. Descriptive Summary Title: Ira Sprague Bowen Papers, Date (inclusive): 1940-1973 Creator: Bowen, Ira Sprague Extent: Approximately 29,000 pieces in 88 boxes Repository: The Huntington Library San Marino, California 91108 Language: English. Provenance Placed on permanent deposit in the Huntington Library by the Observatories of the Carnegie Institution of Washington Collection. This was done in 1989 as part of a letter of agreement (dated November 5, 1987) between the Huntington and the Carnegie Observatories. The papers have yet to be officially accessioned. Cataloging of the papers was completed in 1989 prior to their transfer to the Huntington.
    [Show full text]
  • Copyright by Paul Harold Rubinson 2008
    Copyright by Paul Harold Rubinson 2008 The Dissertation Committee for Paul Harold Rubinson certifies that this is the approved version of the following dissertation: Containing Science: The U.S. National Security State and Scientists’ Challenge to Nuclear Weapons during the Cold War Committee: —————————————————— Mark A. Lawrence, Supervisor —————————————————— Francis J. Gavin —————————————————— Bruce J. Hunt —————————————————— David M. Oshinsky —————————————————— Michael B. Stoff Containing Science: The U.S. National Security State and Scientists’ Challenge to Nuclear Weapons during the Cold War by Paul Harold Rubinson, B.A.; M.A. Dissertation Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of The University of Texas at Austin in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy The University of Texas at Austin August 2008 Acknowledgements Thanks first and foremost to Mark Lawrence for his guidance, support, and enthusiasm throughout this project. It would be impossible to overstate how essential his insight and mentoring have been to this dissertation and my career in general. Just as important has been his camaraderie, which made the researching and writing of this dissertation infinitely more rewarding. Thanks as well to Bruce Hunt for his support. Especially helpful was his incisive feedback, which both encouraged me to think through my ideas more thoroughly, and reined me in when my writing overshot my argument. I offer my sincerest gratitude to the Smith Richardson Foundation and Yale University International Security Studies for the Predoctoral Fellowship that allowed me to do the bulk of the writing of this dissertation. Thanks also to the Brady-Johnson Program in Grand Strategy at Yale University, and John Gaddis and the incomparable Ann Carter-Drier at ISS.
    [Show full text]
  • The Endless Frontier 75Th Anniversary Edition
    the endless frontier 75th Anniversary Edition VANNEVAR BUSH Reprinted in celebration of the National Science Foundation’s 70th anniversary1 | 1950-2020 Book cover photo: © Arnold Newman Collection via Getty Images SCIENCE THE ENDLESS FRONTIER A Report to the President by VANNEVAR BUSH Director of the Ofce of Scientifc Research and Development July 1945 Foreword by France A. Crdova, 14th Director of NSF Reissued by the National Science Foundation in celebration of the agency’s 70th anniversary and the 75th anniversary of Science—the Endless Frontier CELEBRATING NSF’S 70th BIRTHDAY By France A. Crdova, 14th Director of NSF “...basic research is the pacemaker of technological progress.” That statement is as relevant today as it was in 1945 when Vannevar Bush wrote it in his landmark tract, Science—the Endless Frontier. In the report, submitted to President Harry S. Truman, Bush made the case for creating a new agency that he and others felt was needed to support the underlying basic research essential for combatting disease, ensuring national security, and increasing the standard of living, including supporting new industries and jobs. Bush drew an important lesson from directing the Office of Scientific Research and Development during World War II: “The most important ways in which the Government can promote industrial research are to increase the flow of new scientific knowledge through support of basic research and to aid in the development of scientific talent.” Bush desired that the benefits of scientific re- search realized during the war could have even wider application postwar. He advocated for government funding of basic research in universities, colleges, and research institutes because that’s where the talent was.
    [Show full text]
  • Book Review Tuxedo Park, by Jennet Conant (Simon & Schuster, 2002), 330 Pp., ISBN 0684872870, $26.00
    Book Review Tuxedo Park, by Jennet Conant (Simon & Schuster, 2002), 330 pp., ISBN 0684872870, $26.00 Reviewed by Jane A. Roman Department of Chemistry, Regis College, Weston, MA In the early chapters of this book, Jennet Conant, granddaughter of James Conant former President of Harvard and esteemed scientist, describes brilliantly the life of Alfred Lee Loomis, philanthropist, scientist and Wall Street tycoon. Prompted by the mysterious circumstances surrounding the suicide of her granduncle, William Richards, son of Nobel laureate Theodore William Richards, Jennet using her granduncles’ notes and letters, wrote this biography, which is a small but significant chapter in the history of American science. Her accounts of Loomis depict his relationships with many Nobel Laureates in science and also detail an illicit love affair Loomis had with Manette Hobart, the wife of Garrett A. Hobart III, his protégé and secretary at Tuxedo Park. The setting for most of the book is the region of Tuxedo Park in Orange County, New York where Loomis established a research laboratory, funded solely by his personal fortune. Very important discoveries in radar detection, atomic fission, and other wartime inventions that led the allies to victory over the Germans were made there. Because the circumstances surrounding her granduncle’s death and the hush-up carried out by her family were indicative of the gentry at that time, Ms. Conant was prompted to reveal in her novel the relationship her granduncle had with Loomis in Tuxedo Park. From his papers and letters, she describes how Richards and his friend at Princeton, George Kistiakowsky, came to work at Tuxedo Park, often referring to it as a private scientific playground in the Ramapo Mountains.
    [Show full text]
  • Character List
    Character List - Bomb ​ Use this chart to help you keep track of the hundreds of names of physicists, freedom fighters, government officials, and others involved in the making of the atomic bomb. Scientists Political/Military Leaders Spies Robert Oppenheimer - Winston Churchill -- Prime Klaus Fuchs - physicist in ​ ​ ​ designed atomic bomb. He was Minister of England Manhattan Project who gave accused of spying. secrets to Russia Franklin D. Roosevelt -- ​ Albert Einstein - convinced President of the United States Harry Gold - spy and Courier ​ ​ U.S. government that they for Russia KGB. Narrator of the needed to research fission. Harry Truman -- President of story ​ the United States Enrico Fermi - created first Ruth Werner - Russian spy ​ ​ chain reaction Joseph Stalin -- dictator of the ​ Tell Hall -- physicist in Soviet Union ​ Igor Korchatov -- Russian Manhattan Project who gave ​ physicist in charge of designing Adolf Hitler -- dictator of secrets to Russia ​ bomb Germany Haakon Chevalier - friend who ​ Werner Reisenberg -- Leslie Groves -- Military approached Oppenheimer about ​ ​ German physicist in charge of leader of the Manhattan Project spying for Russia. He was designing bomb watched by the FBI, but he was not charged. Otto Hahn -- German physicist ​ who discovered fission Other scientists involved in the Manhattan Project: ​ Aage Niels Bohr George Kistiakowsky Joseph W. Kennedy Richard Feynman Arthur C. Wahl Frank Oppenheimer Joseph Rotblat Robert Bacher Arthur H. Compton Hans Bethe Karl T. Compton Robert Serber Charles Critchfield Harold Agnew Kenneth Bainbridge Robert Wilson Charles Thomas Harold Urey Leo James Rainwater Rudolf Pelerls Crawford Greenewalt Harold DeWolf Smyth Leo Szilard Samuel K. Allison Cyril S. Smith Herbert L. Anderson Luis Alvarez Samuel Goudsmit Edward Norris Isidor I.
    [Show full text]
  • Lawrence Berkeley Lab.O,R~Tory ' '- '·' R-.: I V L: UNIVERSITY of CALIFORNIA E!::Rkr-·Lt..Ltvrf:NCE I '-~Eflailr",..,.~ IJ
    LBL-26560. C'_~ Lawrence Berkeley Lab.o,r~tory ' '- '·' r-.: I V L: UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA E!::RKr-·Lt..ltVRf:NCE I_ '-~EfLAilr",..,.~ IJ Presented at the Symposium "Science Advice to the President: The First 200 Years," at the Annual Meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, San Francisco, CA, January 18, 1989 Science Advice to the President: During and Immediately after World War II G.T. Seaborg January 1989 . .• t .. _- "l~ ~ ..... ~ .. Prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy under Contract Number DE-AC03-76SF00098. DISCLAIMER This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by the United States Government. While this document is believed to contain correct information, neither the United States Government nor any agency thereof, nor the Regents of the University of California, nor any of their employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, .or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial product, process, or service by its trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States Government or any agency thereof, or the Regents of the University of California. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government or any agency thereof or the Regents of the University of California. ~ '. SCIENCE ADVICE TO THE PRESIDENT: DURING AND IMMEDIATELY AFTER WORLD WAR II Presented by Glenn T.
    [Show full text]
  • William T. Golden October 1950 – April 1951
    Impacts of the Early Cold War on the Formulation of U.S. Science Policy Selected Memoranda of William T. Golden October 1950 – April 1951 Edited with an Appreciation by William A. Blanpied Foreward by Neal Lane Copyright © 1995, 2000 American Association for the Advancement of Science 1200 New York Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20005 The findings, conclusions, and opinions stated or implied in this publication are those of the authors. They do not necessarily reflect the views of the Board of Directors, Council, or membership of the American Association for the Advancement of Science. William T. Golden Contents Contents Foreword....................................................................................................................................................... 4 Preface ......................................................................................................................................................... 6 Acknowledgments ........................................................................................................................................ 7 A Brief Biography ........................................................................................................................................ 8 William T. Golden’s Chronicle of an Era: An Appreciation ....................................................................... 9 Decision Memorandum F.J. Lawton, Decision Memorandum for the President, October 19, 1950................................................ 34 Conversations: 1950 Herman
    [Show full text]
  • Oppenheimer: a Life April 22, 1904-February 18, 1967
    Oppenheimer: A Life April 22, 1904-February 18, 1967 an online centennial exhibit of J. Robert Oppenheimer http://ohst.berkeley.edu/oppenheimer/exhibit/ This print edition of the online exhibit is free for use, reproduction, and distribution for educational purposes as long as this cover page and the acknowlegments page are included. It may not be altered or sold. For other usage questions, please contact the Office for History of Science and Technology, Univer- sity of California, Berkeley, at http://ohst.berkeley.edu. All image copyrights are retained by their hold- ers. © 2004 by The Regents of the University of California. 1 Oppenheimer: A Life April 22, 1904-February 18, 1967 Introduction As Alice Kimball Smith and Charles Weiner have noted, “Part of Oppenheimer’s attraction, at first for his friends and later for the public, was that he did not project the popularly held image of the scientist as cold, objective, rational and therefore above human frailty, an image that scientists themselves fostered by underplaying their per- sonal histories and the disorder that precedes the neat scientific conclusion.” There is a cacophony of conflicting descriptions of Oppenheimer – as friends have remembered him, as historians have analyzed him. He has been labeled both warm and cold, friendly and condescending, affable as well as hurtful. Learning Sanskrit and cultivating the air of an aesthete, as a young professor he stretched the bounds of the scientist’s persona. Yet in the space of a decade, the otherworldly theorist was transformed into a political insider par excellence. His fellow scientists remembered him as a visionary and capable leader at Los Alamos, while his security hearing brought to light foolish mistakes in judgment and human relationships.
    [Show full text]
  • As We May Think, Vannevar Bush
    AS WE MAY THINK by VANNEVAR BUSH THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, JULY 1945 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- This article was originally published in the July 1945 issue of The Atlantic Monthly. It is reproduced here with their permission. The electronic version was prepared by Denys Duchier, April 1994. Please email comments and corrections to [email protected]. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- As Director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development, Dr. Vannevar Bush has coordinated the activities of some six thousand leading American scientists in the application of science to warfare. In this significant article he holds up an incentive for scientists when the fighting has ceased. He urges that men of science should then turn to the massive task of making more accessible our bewildering store of knowledge. For many years inventions have extended man's physical powers rather than the powers of his mind. Trip hammers that multiply the fists, microscopes that sharpen the eye, and engines of destruction and detection are new results, but the end results, of modern science. Now, says Dr. Bush, instruments are at hand which, if properly developed, will give man access to and command over the inherited knowledge of the ages. The perfection of these pacific instruments should be the first objective of our scientists as they emerge from their war work. Like Emerson's famous address of 1837 on ``The American Scholar,'' this paper by Dr. Bush calls for a new relationship between thinking man and the sum of our knowledge. - The Editor ---------------------------------------------------------------------- This has not been a scientist's war; it has been a war in which all have had a part.
    [Show full text]
  • America's Greatest Projects & Their Engineers-II
    America's Greatest Projects & Their Engineers-II By Dom Perrotta, P.E. PDHLibrary Course No 000101 4 PDH HOURS America's Greatest Projects & Their Engineers-II 1. The Manhattan Project This course traces technological events leading up to the dropping of the first two atomic bombs on Japan, including the ideas and the attempts by other nations to develop similar weapons that could ultimately make them the world's strongest military powers. Course describes efforts of many individual U. S. engineers and scientists to achieve this engineering feat. A. Early Events B. The United States Plan C. U. S. Race to Completion D. Result/Summary 1 Introduction A lot has been made about the fact that the two atomic bombs dropped over the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, while they likely brought a quick end to World War II, also killed nearly 130,00 Japanese civilians as well as an estimated 20,000 Japanese soldiers. Unless your Uncle Tony was a part of the U. S. Infantry that battled the Japanese in the Pacific Theater and suffered the trauma and deprivation at the hands of the heinous Japanese military, you might wonder if there could have been a better (more humane) way to end the war. Indeed that is a fair question to ask about the carnage that was wreaked on the mostly innocent Japanese population. However, this course deals with the achievements and successes of the many engineers and scientists who put their lives on temporary hold in order to assure that the worst criminal in world history, Adolph Hitler, would never have the opportunity to reign supreme.
    [Show full text]
  • Scientists and the Decision to Build the Superbomb, 1952-1954
    In Any Light: Scientists and the Decision to Build the Superbomb, 1952-1954 Author(s): Peter Galison and Barton Bernstein Source: Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences, Vol. 19, No. 2 (1989), pp. 267-347 Published by: University of California Press Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/27757627 Accessed: 09-09-2019 20:44 UTC JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at https://about.jstor.org/terms University of California Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences This content downloaded from 206.253.207.235 on Mon, 09 Sep 2019 20:44:00 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms PETER GALISON* AND BARTON BERNSTEIN** In any light: Scientists and the decision to build the Superbomb, 1952-1954 If the development [of the hydrogen bomb] is possible, it is out of our powers to prevent it. All that we can do is to retard its completion by some years. I believe, on the other hand, that any form of international control may be put on a more stable basis by the knowledge of the full extent of the problem that must be solved and of the dangers of a ruth less international competition.
    [Show full text]
  • The First Reactor.Pdf
    .-. DISCLAIMER This repofi was.prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor any agency thereof, nor any of their employees, make any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privateiy owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial product, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States Government or any agency thereof. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government or any agency thereof. DISCLAIMER Portions of this document may be illegible in electronic image products. Images are produced from the best available original document. : The FirstReactor @ U.S. Department of Energy %~ Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Energy T** . and Assistant .%cretary, Management A~f + $a:$;g:::~;.0;0585 @$*6R December 1982 $ This report has been reproduced directly from the best available copy. ,! Available from the National Technical Information Service, U.S. Department of Commerce, Springfield, Virginia 22161. Price: Printed Copy A03 Microfiche AOI Codes are used for Pricing all publications. The code is determined by the number of pages in the publication. Information pertaining to the pricing codes can be found in the current issues of the following publications, which are generally available in most Iibraries: Energy Research Abstracts, (ERA); Government Reports Announcements and 1ndex (GRA and 1); Scientific and Technical Abstract Reports (STAR); and pub- lication, NTIS-PR-360 available from (NTIS) at the above address.
    [Show full text]