PAPERS/ETUDES

GERALD J. BOBANGO

The Path to Unity and Autonomy under , 1859-61

The double election of Alexandru loan Cuza as hospodar of l?Ioldavia and in January, 1859, was the beginning rather than the climax of constructing the Romanian nation-state. While much attention has been paid to the diplomatic maneuvers which produced official recognition of Cuza's position by the European powers during 1859, less emphasis has gone into explaining the process whereby the new Romanian regime managed to convert, or subvert, the Convention of 1858 for the Principalities into a status of complete autonomy three years later. At the same time, Cuza had to overcome boiar opposition and regional particularism which threatened to destroy the fruits of his diplomacy. What follows is an attempt to inter- pret, in its broad outlines, the manner in which the newly-bom Romanian state strove to achieve its two major desiderata of internal cohesion and autonomy. 1

Political Organization: Theory and Practice A wide gap existed between the dictates of the Convention of 1858, which was to serve as the constitution of the principalities, and the realities of Balkan parliamentarianism. So long and complicated was the law-making process ordained by the Convention that in the first three years of Cuza's rule most of the vital problems of internal organization remained unsolved. Finance was only one area where chaos was the rule. Much of this failure must be attributed to a deliberate setting of priorities by Cuza and his liberal- nationalists. From the start they chose to observe only those elements of their "constitution" which advanced their purpose of attaining complete union. Domestic problems, therefore, took a back seat to international ones, on grounds that once the had full power to act, internal troubles could be quickly solved. It was an optimistic assessment.

1. This paper is a condensation of a chapter entitled "The Thorny Path to Union, 1859-1861" in my forthcoming book, "The Emergence of the Romanian Nation-State, 1848-1866." It was presented at the Conference on Independence and Modernization in Romanian History held at the University of Wisconsin-Madison,7 October 1977. 11

Adding to the lack of cohesion in the state was the instrument of the Convention itself. In the first four months after the double election little was accomplished simply because the two assemblies, in last and , could not initiate legislation for the United Principalities as a whole. Only the prince and the Central Commission at Foc§ani might suggest legislation covering both states. Thus Ion Heliade Radulescu termed the country "a confederated state with a ," subject to all the limitations of such a political order.2 But the constitutional structure was not in fact that of a confederation. It was clear that the Central Commission was a legislative organ, yet one whose members were not instructed by the states which sent them. The commissioners were to enact all laws not exclusively per- taining to one side of the Milcov or the other. So, when the Commission finally began to function on 10 May, its time was spent in haggling and hair- splitting over its own jurisdiction. And this group of sixteen men, who reflected from the first day the old antagonisms between and Wallachia, was further charged with elaborating a new constitution and approving all measures sent to Foc§ani by the assemblies in the two capitals. Thus, those who could agree on nothing were the watchdogs of the Conven- tion. Moreover, the Commission's life depended on the duration of the assem- blies, whose mandate was optimistically set at seven years. If one assembly were dissolved by the prince, only the members for that state were changed on the Commission. If parliamentary life had been stable in the first years, the Commission might have provided a firm centralizing element. But the erratic nature of Romanian politics and the unwillingness of any assembly to work for long with Cuza's ministries forbade this. Between 24 January 1859 and 24 January 1862, Moldavia saw nine different , while Wallachia went through eleven, the longest of these lasting three months.3 Such a condition caused strong central leadership to revert automatically to the executive and a few selected advisors. The prince had the right of initiative, sanction, promulgation, and pub- lication ; and in his annual messages opening each legislative session, Cuza outlined the needs of the country and demanded fulfillment of the Conven- tion's mandates on social reform. The usual procedure in each assembly was thereupon to choose a committee to compose a "response to the message from the throne," which invariably occasioned lengthy debate and tergiver. sation. When the response, inevitably criticising the government, was pre-

2. Quoted in Constantin C. Angelescu, "Dezvoltarea constitu?ionala a Principatelor Unite de la 1859 la 1862," Studii cercetdri ftiinfifice, 1-2 (1959), 3. 3. Dan Berindei, "Guvemele lui Alexandru loan Cuza (1859-1866): Lista de mini§tri," Revista Arhivelor, serie nouä, 2, No. 1 (1959), 147-63. This is the most thorough listing available.