Feminism & Philosophy Vol.2 No.2
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Feminist Perspectives on Dependency Eva Feder Kittay and Ellen K. Feder (Eds.) Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Lanham, 2002, 336Pp
Contemporary Political Theory, 2004, 3, (358–360) r 2004 Palgrave Macmillan Ltd 1470-8914/04 $30.00 www.palgrave-journals.com/cpt The Subject of Care: Feminist Perspectives on Dependency Eva Feder Kittay and Ellen K. Feder (eds.) Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Lanham, 2002, 336pp. ISBN:0742513637. Contemporary Political Theory (2004) 3, 358–360. doi:10.1057/palgrave.cpt.9300147 Before freedom, there is dependency. With dependency comes the need for care. But who exactly does the bulk of life’s caretaking? Why has caretaking work frequently gone unacknowledged as real ‘labor’ (and how have gender, race and class affected its treatment)? Can contemporary political theory effectively displace the ideologically-driven fiction of the citizen as a self- sufficient, independent individual and develop more secure principles and rights to protect dependents and their caretakers? The 16 contributors to this volume raise such questions and insist upon collective attentiveness to the impoverishment and exploitation that often marks the lives of caretakers and their ‘charges’. While tackling many issues from a distinctly feminist perspective, these contributors also provide reflections and proposals that are essential readingfor any political theorist, philosopher or activist currently committed to a substantive vision of freedom and a progressive approach to social justice. Part I provides conceptual analysis and historical insights into the meaning of dependency. Nancy Fraser and Linda Gordon’s notable genealogy explores ‘registers’ of dependency (related to economic, sociological, political and moral-psychological conditions (p. 16)) and how normative claims about those who appear dependent have shifted over time, especially in relation to the dominant discourse of liberal capitalism. -
Cognitive Disability, Capabilities, and Justice Serene Khader Stony Brook University
View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by CommonKnowledge Essays in Philosophy Volume 9 Article 11 Issue 1 Philosophy of Disability 1-2008 Cognitive Disability, Capabilities, and Justice Serene Khader Stony Brook University Follow this and additional works at: http://commons.pacificu.edu/eip Part of the Philosophy Commons Recommended Citation Khader, Serene (2008) "Cognitive Disability, Capabilities, and Justice," Essays in Philosophy: Vol. 9: Iss. 1, Article 11. Essays in Philosophy is a biannual journal published by Pacific nivU ersity Library | ISSN 1526-0569 | http://commons.pacificu.edu/eip/ Essays in Philosophy Essays in Philosophy A Biannual Journal Vol. 9, No. 1, January 2008 Cognitive Disability, Capabilities, and Justice Abstract: I argue that capabilities approaches are useful in formulating a political theory that takes seriously the needs of persons with severe cognitive disabilities (PSCD). I establish three adequacy criteria for theories of justice that take seriously the needs of PSCD: A) understanding PSCD as oppressed, B) positing a single standard of what is owed to PSCD abled individuals, and C) concern with flourishing as well as political liberty. I claim that conceiving valued capabilities as the end of social distribution may help a political theory to meet these criteria. I posit three further adequacy criteria: D) refusing to see PSCD as less than human, E) valuing moral powers other than practical reason, and F) securing space for care and dependency relationships. I show that how well Elizabeth Anderson and Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities approaches meet these criteria depends on their divergent conceptions of what capabilities are for. -
Autonomy, Relationality, and Feminist Ethics
Autonomy, Relationality, and Feminist Ethics JEAN KELLER While care ethics has frequently been criticized for lacking an account ofauton- omy, this paper argues that care ethics’ relational model of moral agency provides the basis for criticizing the philosophical tradttion’s model of autonomy and for rethinking autonomy in relational terms. Using Diana Meyers’s account of autonomy compe- tency as a basis, a dialogical model of autonomy is developed that can respond to internal and external critiques of care ethics. Care ethics has frequently been criticized for failing to address how women’s practice of care places women’s autonomy in jeopardy. The question of the implications of care ethics for our conception of autonomy, however, has been asked less frequently.’ This is the question that concerns me here. After first examining the general terrain of the “autonomy-care ethics debate,” focusing on the difficulties that autonomy and care ethics pose for one another,’ I turn to my central concern: laying the groundwork for a relational model of autonomy. Although it is still unclear whether care ethics will survive as the feminist ethic of the future, it would appear that whatever shape feminist ethics ends up taking, it will incorporate a relational model of moral agency. That is, the insight that the moral agent is an “encumbered self,” who is always already embedded in relations with flesh-and-blood others and is partly constituted by these relations, is here to stay. Thus, although my analysis addresses care ethics in particular, to the extent that other feminist approaches to ethics also rely on a relational model of moral agency, the issues raised here will, I hope, be relevant to feminist ethics more generall~.~ Hyptia vol. -
Ascribing Sexual Orientations
Atlantis Vol. 13 No.2 Spring/Printemps 1988 Ascribing Sexual Orientations Christine Overall Queen's University ABSTRACT The goal of this paper is to suggest a somewhat different approach to the contemporary discussion of human sexual orientations. Instead of examining the nature of sexual orientation itself, it discusses the meanings of ascriptions of sexual orientation. (The discussion is confined to cases where the subject of ascription is female.) The paper begins with a survey of some prevalent ways of interpreting ascriptions of sexual orientation. It then comments on the variations in their meanings, and considers what the speaker is doing when uttering such an ascription. It concludes with some comments about an apparently anomalous sexual orientation, bisexuality. My interest in the ascription of sexual orientations what it is to be a lesbian (let alone a lesbian bisexual), and arose, in part, from three observations which I made over how one is to know whether any person (including one• the course of the past year.1 First, in my investigations of self) is one. ethical issues pertaining to reproductive technology, it became very clear that access to such processes as in vitro I was troubled, then, by both ontological and epistemo- fertilization and artificial insemination by donor is regu• logical problems: What is it to be lesbian or heterosexual lated and limited by means of the physician-enforced stip• or bisexual? How does one know whether a person is ulation that the female candidates for these technologies lesbian or heterosexual -
A History of Women Philosophers Vol. IV
A HISTORY OF WOMEN PHILOSOPHERS A History of Women Philosophers 1. Ancient Women Philosophers, 600 B.C.-500 A.D. 2. Medieval, Renaissance and Enlightenment Women Philosophers, 500-1600 3. Modern Women Philosophers, 1600-1900 4. Contemporary Women Philosophers, 1900-today PROFESSOR C. J. DE VOGEL A History of Women Philosophers Volume 4 Contemporary Women Philosophers 1900-today Edited by MARY ELLEN WAITHE Cleveland State University, Cleveland, U.S.A. Springer-Science+Business Media, B. V. Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Contemporary women philosophers : 1900-today / edited by Mary Ellen Waithe. p. cm. -- (A History of women philosophers ; v. 4.) Includes bibliographical references (p. xxx-xxx) and index. ISBN 978-0-7923-2808-7 ISBN 978-94-011-1114-0 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-94-011-1114-0 1. Women philosophers. 2. Philosophy. Modern--20th century. r. Waithe. Mary Ellen. II. Series. Bl05.W6C66 1994 190' .82--dc20 94-9712 ISBN 978-0-7923-2808-7 printed an acid-free paper AII Rights Reserved © 1995 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht Originally published by Kluwer Academic Publishers in 1995 Softcover reprint ofthe hardcover lst edition 1995 No part of the material protected by this copyright notice may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and retrieval system, without written permission from the copyright owner. Contents Acknowledgements xv Introduction to Volume 4, by Mary Ellen Waithe xix 1. Victoria, Lady Welby (1837-1912), by William Andrew 1 Myers I. Introduction 1 II. Biography 1 III. -
Feminist Theory: a Philosophical Anthology Ann Cudd (Editor), Robin Andreasen (Editor)
To purchase this product, please visit https://www.wiley.com/en-gb/9781405116602 Feminist Theory: A Philosophical Anthology Ann Cudd (Editor), Robin Andreasen (Editor) Paperback 978-1-405-11661-9 November 2004 Out of stock £31.25 Hardcover 978-1-405-11660-2 November 2004 Out of stock £103.00 DESCRIPTION Feminist Theory: A Philosophical Anthology addresses seven philosophically significant questions regarding feminism, its central concepts of sex and gender, and the project of centering women’s experience. • • Topics include the nature of sexist oppression, the sex/gender distinction, how gender-based norms influence conceptions of rationality, knowledge, and scientific objectivity, feminist ethics, feminst perspectives on self and autonomy, whether there exist distinct feminine moral perspectives, and what would comprise true liberation. • • Features an introductory overview illustrating the development of feminism as a philosophical movement • • Contains both classic and contemporary sources of feminist thought, including selections by Mary Wollstonecraft, John Stuart Mill, Simone de Beauvior, Kate Millett, bell hooks, Marilyn Frye, Martha Nussbaum, Louise Antony, Sally Haslanger, Helen Longino, Marilyn Friedman, Catharine MacKinnon, and Drucilla Cornell. ABOUT THE AUTHOR Ann E. Cudd is Professor of Philosophy and Director of Women’s Studies at the University of Kansas. She is co-editor of Theorizing Backlash: Philosophical Reflections on the Resistance to Feminism (with Anita Superson, 2002). Robin O. Andreasen is Assistant Professor -
Narrative Ethics and Vulnerability Kristeva and Ricoeur on Interdependence
Narrative Ethics and Vulnerability Kristeva and Ricoeur on Interdependence Elizabeth Purcell Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy - Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française, Vol XXI, No 1 (2013) pp 43-59 Vol XXI, No 1 (2013) ISSN 1936-6280 (print) ISSN 2155-1162 (online) DOI 10.5195/jffp.2013.575 www.jffp.org This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States License. This journal is operated by the University Library System of the University of Pittsburgh as part of its D-Scribe Digital Publishing Program, and is co-sponsored by the UniversityJournal of Pittsburgh of French and Press Francophone Philosophy | Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française Vol XXI, No 1 (2013) | www.jffp.org | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2013.575 Narrative Ethics and Vulnerability Kristeva and Ricoeur on Interdependence Elizabeth Purcell Boston College Introduction The passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act in 1990 led to the need to define disability and to define the experiences of those with disabilities. Because people with disabilities have been considered to “deviate” from the able-bodied norm and have been systematically oppressed, there came a need to redefine disability in response to the cultural and medical narratives that historically associated disability with defectiveness, insufficiency, and imperfection.1 With the aid of medicine, the goal was to cure the disability and return the body to its original, healthy state. Thus, the body that “has the ‘right’ number of smoothly functional limbs and organs,” does not “drool, spasm, jerk, wheeze, wheel, limp, stutter, piss, or fart uncontrollably either in private or public realms.”2 The power to define and regulate impairment, disorder, malfunction, disfigurement, or dysfunction in either the body or the brain, lay in the hands of medical practitioners. -
H-France Review Vol. 14 (July 2014), No. 112 Florence Lotterie, Le Genre
H-France Review Volume 14 (2014) Page 1 H-France Review Vol. 14 (July 2014), No. 112 Florence Lotterie, Le Genre des Lumières: Femme et philosophe au XVIIIe siècle. Paris: Classiques Garnier, 2013. 336 pp. Bibliography and index of names. $90.00 U.S. (hb). ISBN 978-28124-1025-3. Review by Jennifer M. Jones, Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey Book V of Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Émile, which proposed the striking model of Sophie’s feminine alterity, remains a touchstone for scholars of women and gender in eighteenth-century France. In the past two decades, however, historians have moved well beyond Rousseau in their exploration of the gendered history of the Enlightenment, scouring sources and sites that range from fashion magazines and salons to colonial treatises and pornographic literature. Drawing on the new social history of ideas in the 1970s and inspired by engagement with Jürgen Habermas’s model of the “public sphere” from the late 1980s, gender historians have continued to expand their field of inquiry.[1] Florence Lotterie reminds us, however, that scholars still have much to learn about how philosophy itself was gendered in the eighteenth century. She argues that the figure of the female philosopher stood at the center of both eighteenth-century fears and fantasies about the difference between the sexes and new definitions of philosophy itself. Florence Lotterie, professor of eighteenth-century French literature at the University of Paris VII Denis Diderot, is an especially learned guide to the gendered “mind of the Enlightenment” -
Why Do Women Leave Philosophy?
Philosophers’ volume 16, no. 6 1. When do women leave philosophy? Imprint march 2016 In 2012 in the United States, for every 100 men graduating with a col- lege degree, 141 women graduated.1 For decades now, more women have been enrolled in American universities than men. Yet, during these same decades, the proportion of women who major in philos- ophy has remained stagnant, hovering below one-third. So, while al- WHY DO WOMEN LEAVE most 60% of college graduates are now women, only 30% of philoso- phy majors are women (Department of Education, 2013; Paxton et al., 2012). In the humanities, religion and theology (35.6%) is the closest PHILOSOPHY? SURVEYING major to philosophy when it comes to the underrepresentation of fe- male majors. Among all majors, the only ones with similarly low ratios are economics (31%), physics (19.7%), computer science (22%), and en- gineering (20%).2 STUDENTS AT THE With women getting just 30% of philosophy bachelor’s degrees, it’s no surprise that the ratio of women to men is so low among philos- ophy graduate students (30%) and professors (20.7%) (Paxton et al., INTRODUCTORY LEVEL 2012; Norlock, 2012).3 The underrepresentation and treatment of fe- male graduate students and professors in philosophy has, for good rea- son, received increasing attention in recent years. But there has been limited discussion, and very few empirical investigations, of why so Morgan Thompson∗, Toni Adleberg†, Sam many women say goodbye to philosophy just after being introduced to it. In this article, we offer our initial attempts to gather data to test Sims‡, Eddy Nahmias§ various hypotheses aimed at answering this question and to suggest University of Pittsburgh∗, University of California, San Diego†, 1. -
Front Matter
Cambridge University Press 978-0-521-13211-4 - Capitalism, For and Against: A Feminist Debate Ann E. Cudd and Nancy Holmstrom Frontmatter More information Capitalism, For and Against Political philosophy and feminist theory have rarely examined in detail how capitalism affects the lives of women. Ann Cudd and Nancy Holmstrom take up opposing sides of the issue, debating whether capitalism is valuable as an ideal and whether, as an actually existing economic system, it is good for women. In a discussion covering a broad range of social and economic issues, including unequal pay, industrial reforms, and sweatshops, they examine how these and other issues relate to women and how to analyze effectively what constitutes “capitalism” and “women’s interests.” Each author also responds to the opposing arguments, providing a thorough debate of the topics covered. The resulting volume will interest a wide range of readers in philosophy, political theory, women’s studies, and global affairs. ANN E. CUDD is Professor of Philosophy and Associate Dean for Humanities, University of Kansas. She is the author of Analyzing Oppression (2006), and co-edited (with Anita Superson) Theorizing Backlash (2002) and (with Robin Andreason) Feminist Theory (2005). NANCY HOLMSTROM is Professor Emerita and former Chair of Philosophy at Rutgers University Newark. She is the author of numerous articles on core topics in social philosophy and is the editor of The Socialist Feminist Project: A Contemporary Reader in Theory and Politics (2002). © in this web service Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-0-521-13211-4 - Capitalism, For and Against: A Feminist Debate Ann E. -
Race and Oppression: Philosophical Issues in Voluntary Oppression
RACE AND OPPRESSION: PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES IN VOLUNTARY OPPRESSION BY Roksana Alavi Submitted to the graduate degree program in Philosophy and the Graduate Faculty of the University of Kansas in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Professor Ann E. Cudd Chairperson Committee members Professor Thomas Tuozzo Professor Anthony Genova Professor Rex Martin Professor Mehrangiz Najafizadeh Date defended: 1/31/2008 The Dissertation Committee for Roksana Alavi certifies that this is the approved version of the following dissertation: RACE AND OPPRESSION: PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES IN VOLUNTARY OPPRESSION Committee Professor Ann E. Cudd Chairperson Date Accepted: 3/27/2008 ii Abstract In my dissertation I discuss voluntary racial oppression. In my view coercion is not required for all oppressive situations. The psychologically oppressed, internalizes the expectation of inferiority and becomes one’s own oppressor. This theory of oppression can best explain the situation of racial minorities in the United States. There are no laws discriminating against racial minorities. So, their oppression is not externally inflicted. I provide Sally Haslanger’s theory of race. I believe in this theory of race, passing people are also victim of oppression. I discuss three harms of oppression: violence, economic oppression and stereotyping, and show that they can be both voluntarily and involuntarily inflicted. Although passing people are not victims of direct harm, they internalize the negative stereotypes and become their own oppressors. So, in order to end racial oppression, we ought to address both the political aspects of having rights and bringing everyone to the threshold level of functioning of capabilities. iii Acknowledgements It takes a village to write a dissertation! It is with great pleasure that I express my sincere gratitude to all those “villagers” who helped me to get to this point today. -
Philosophical Issues in Feminism
PHIL 347: Philosophical Issues in Feminism David Black [email protected] December 31, 2014 Course Description Feminism is one of the core social justice movements today. A commit- ment to gender justice raises deep philosophical issues. What is gender? What are justice and injustice? What does specifically gendered justice require? In this discussion-focussed class, we will investigate foundational and topical questions of feminist theory, by both classic and contemporary authors. Topics include: the sex/gender distinction, analyses of gender and op- pression, and choice under oppression. Depending on student interest, we may cover sex-positivity and -negativity, feminist criticisms and episte- mologies of science, the ethics of care, or some other topics. 1 Course Information • Meeting Times: TBD • Class Location: TBD • Office Hours: TBD and by appointment • Prerequisites: One philosophy course or one WGS course or instructor's permission • Required Text: None, readings made available through Sakai. Several papers come from anthologies, but you don't need to buy them. • Registration Index: 04519 2 Course Narrative To oversimplify, feminism is a (collection of) movement(s) to end gender-based oppression. Two of these terms stand out in need of further explanation. First, \oppression". What kinds of things are oppressive and what does it mean for something to be oppressive? In the beginning of the course, we'll try to figure out what oppression is and how it is harmful. Second, \gender". Whose oppression is feminism in particular concerned with? Who counts as a woman or a man (or neither)? What makes a person be of one gender, rather than another? In our second unit, we'll see why most 1 people reject a biological answer and end up distinguishing between sex and gender.