Fundamentals of Operational Warfighting
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Iraqi Army Takes Control of 'Hotel'
Vol. 1, No. 4 Published by Multi-National Force - Iraq September 7, 2005 Top Stories Iraqi governors from four provinces hold conference in Kirkuk, Page 3 Bomb maker captured near Hit, Page 8 Iraqi Police conduct raid U.S. Army photo by Sgt. 1st Class Kevin Reeves in Bayji, Page 10 Col. Sa’adi, commander of 1st Brigade, 8th Division Iraqi Army accepts the “key” to Forward Operating Base Hotel, Najaf, from Lt. Col. James E. Oliver, commander of 1st Battalion 198th Armor, signifying the transfer of Georgia Soldiers detain authority from Coalition Forces to the Iraqi Security Forces of Najaf. terrorists, find weapons cache, Page 10 Iraqi Army takes control Coalition Operations: Across Iraq, Page 14 of ‘Hotel’ base in Najaf Kirkuk orphans swing on new playground donated By Multi-National Force - West and the nation of Iraq. We have trained and worked long hours to reach this moment,” Public Affairs by Coalition, Page 21 said Col. Sa’adi, commander, 1st Brigade, FORWARD OPERATING BASE 8th Division of the Iraqi Army. Combat Engineers find, KALSU — A ceremony celebrating the The 1st Bn., 198th Armor has assisted destroy enemy weapons, transfer of authority of Forward Operating the people of Najaf since mid-January. Page 22 Base Hotel and the anniversary of the end Thirty-one projects, costing approximate- of hostile activities in Najaf was held at ly $7.5 million, were funded to support the Forward Operating Base Hotel yesterday. Provincial Reconstruction Development Members of 1st Battalion, 198th Armor, Committee. The projects included water 155th Brigade Combat Team, II Marine and sanitation, education, transportation, Iraqis Expeditionary Force (Forward) trans- humanitarian assistance, telecommunica- Taking ferred authority of FOB Hotel, Najaf, Iraq, tions, law and governance. -
If We Fight Iraq: Iraq and the Conventional Military Balance
CSIS_______________________________ Center for Strategic and International Studies 1800 K Street N.W. Washington, DC 20006 (202) 775-3270 (To comment: [email protected] For Updates see CSIS.ORG, “Military Balance”) If We Fight Iraq: Iraq and The Conventional Military Balance Anthony H. Cordesman Arleigh A. Burke Chair for Strategy Center for Strategic and International Studies Revised June 28, 2002 Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved. The Military Balance in the Gulf 7/3/2002 Page ii Table of Contents TRENDS IN THE GULF MILITARY BALANCE - OVERVIEW ...........................................................................................1 IRAQ’S CURRENT MILITARY FORCES .........................................................................................................................3 The Iraqi Army and Key Security Elements...........................................................................................................3 The Deployment of Army and Security Elements...................................................................................................3 The Iraqi Air Force................................................................................................................................................5 The Iraqi Navy.......................................................................................................................................................6 Iraqi Operational Capabilities ..............................................................................................................................6 -
INSTITUTION of ROYAL ENGINEERS Established 1875 Incorporated by Royal Charter 1923
INSTITUTION OF ROYAL ENGINEERS Established 1875 Incorporated by Royal Charter 1923 Patron: HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN Chief Royal Engineer: General Sir Kevin O’Donoghue KCB CBE COUNCIL PRESIDENT Major General C L Elliott CB MBE ... 2002 VICE PRESIDENTS Major General K H Cima ... 2004 Brigadier C M Sexton ADC ... 2005 Colonel C P R Bates ... 2002 MEMBERS Ex Officio CRE (Th Tps) Brigadier C J Boag Comdt RSME Brigadier J D Wootton MBE Comd Geo Engr Gp Colonel D H E Attwater Regt Col Colonel A P Cross Col RE MCM Div Colonel A M Mills CRE 3 (UK) Div Colonel T P Grimshaw Elected Members Colonel M R Cooper 2002 Colonel I M Tait 2004 Lieutenant Colonel M R Bassett BEM 2004 Lieutenant Colonel T F S Smith TD 2004 Warrant Officer Class 1 N Cooke 2004 Coopted Colonel I A Ogden 2005 Corps RSM Warrant Officer Class 1 C Maxwell 2004 Treasurer Lieutenant Colonel J M H Townsley 2001 Secretary Lieutenant Colonel D N Hamilton MBE 2000 Corresponding Members Lieutenant Colonel D N Wilkinson, BLO Pionierschule, Munich Major G M L Coutts, BLO Engineer School, Angers Major W T R Thackwell, Exchange Appointment, Australian SME Colonel J W Shanahan OBE, Engineer School, USA Major M R Watson, Exchange Officer, Construction Engineering Unit, Canada BUDGET, INVESTMENTS, MEMBERSHIP, SCHOLARSHIP, MEMORIAL AND PUBLICATIONS COMMITTEE Chairman Colonel C P R Bates Vice-Chairman Colonel A P Cross Members Colonel I A Ogden Colonel T P Grimshaw Colonel A M Mills Colonel I M Tait Lieutenant Colonel M R Bassett BEM Warrant Officer Class 1 C Maxwell Treasurer Lieutenant Colonel J -
The US Army and the Battle for Baghdad: Lessons Learned
C O R P O R A T I O N The U.S. Army and the Battle for Baghdad Lessons Learned—And Still to Be Learned David E. Johnson, Agnes Gereben Schaefer, Brenna Allen, Raphael S. Cohen, Gian Gentile, James Hoobler, Michael Schwille, Jerry M. Sollinger, Sean M. Zeigler For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RR3076 Library of Congress Control Number: 2019940985 ISBN: 978-0-8330-9601-2 Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. © Copyright 2019 RAND Corporation R® is a registered trademark. Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute www.rand.org Preface This report documents research and analysis conducted as part of a project entitled Lessons Learned from 13 Years of Conflict: The Battle for Baghdad, 2003–2008, spon- sored by the Office of Quadrennial Defense Review, U.S. -
The Status of Iraqi Land Forces and Security/Intelligence Forces: a Guesstimate
CSIS__________________________________________ Center for Strategic and International Studies 1800 K Street N.W. Washington, DC 20006 (202) 775-3270 (To comment: [email protected] For Updates see CSIS.ORG, “Military Balance”) The Status of Iraqi Land Forces and Security/Intelligence Forces: A Guesstimate Guesstimate of Redeployments and Damage to Date Shown in Bold. Key Elements that May Be Involved in the Battle of Baghdad are Shown in Bold Italics Note: No data on independent formations of Commando Units (Up to 10) and Special Forces Brigades (up to 3) Available Revised April 10, 2003 Anthony H. Cordesman Arleigh A. Burke Chair for Strategy Cordesman: Iraqi Forces as of 31 march 2003, 3rd Rev 4/10/03 Page 2 Table of Contents CSIS__________________________________________................................................. 1 Summary........................................................................................................................ 4 1. Regular Army and Republican Guards in the North:........................................... 5 Regular Army Forces in Northern Iraq: Was 2 Mechanized; 6 Infantry Divisions. Probably has lost most major facilities and some 10% of effectiveness. ................... 5 The Northern or 1st Corps of the Republican Guards: Had 1 Armored and 1 Infantry Division plus other forces. Probably has lost all major fixed facilities and some 10% of effectiveness for forces still in north. Elements moved south have probably lost at least 50% of their effectiveness. ................................................................................ -
Top Stories Tall Afar Operation
Vol. 1, No. 6 Published by Multi-National Force - Iraq September 21, 2005 Securing a city, securing a nation ... Top Stories Quality medical care returns to Fallujah, Page 2 First GMLRS fired in com- bat in Tall Afar battle, Page 4 Operation Flea Flicker sweeps Zafaraniya, Page 9 File photo by U.S. Air Force Master Sgt. Dave Ahlschwede Hundreds of thousands of Iraqis celebrate holy day in Karbala under the protection of Iraqi Security Forces, uniting and defying al-Zarqawi threats. Iraqis, 3rd ACR set up Forward TOC in Tall Afar, Page 9 Tall Afar operation Iraqi police train at Mosul transitions to reconstruction Public Safety Academy, Page 10 operating in Tall Afar in support of Iraqi By Multi-National Corps Public Affairs Locals celebrate Baghdad Government efforts to bring safety and bridge opening, Page 13 TALL AFAR — Operation Restoring security to the citizens of the city. Rights wrapped up decisive combat opera- The Iraqi-led operations included more Economic hopes soar with tions in Tall Afar and transitioned to the than 11,200 Soldiers from the 3rd Iraqi rebuilding phase of the operation so its Army Division, Ministry of Interior forces new airfield tower, Page 14 citizens can continue with the democratic and the U.S. Army’s 3rd Armored Cavalry process in a safe and secure environment. Regiment. The operation resulted in the Iraqi battalion secures streets “Acting on my orders, Iraqi forces com- death of more than 150 terrorists, deten- near Al Suwayrah, Page 18 menced an operation to remove all tion of 427 terrorists, and discovery of 53 remaining terrorist elements from the city weapons caches. -
Toward a Mine-Free World Iraq
Landmine Monitor Report 2006: Toward a Mine-Free World Iraq Key developments since May 2005: Iraqi officials have continued to express strong interest in joining the Mine Ban Treaty. Opposition forces have continued to use improvised explosive devices in great numbers, as well as antivehicle mines. Coalition forces have discovered many caches of antipersonnel mines. Reduced international funding for Iraq (down by half from 2004) plus deteriorating security significantly hindered mine action in all but the northern regions; some contracts and operations ended early. The National Mine Action Authority reported a sharp drop in mine clearance in 2005. The authority’s second director general in two years was replaced in October 2005. The Iraq Landmine Impact Survey completed surveying 13 of Iraq’s 18 governorates in April 2006, but suspended survey in Tikrit and Diyala due to lack of security. As of May 2006, the survey had recorded 565 casualties in two years (over 20 percent were children) and 7,631 less recent casualties. In 2005, there were at least 358 casualties, an increase from 2004, and likely an underestimate as there is no effective casualty surveillance in Iraq. Mine Ban Policy The Republic of Iraq has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. Since 2004, government representatives have indicated on many occasions that Iraq is favorably inclined toward the Mine Ban Treaty and is studying the issue of accession.[1] In early 2006, the Office of the Prime Minister provided the Iraq Campaign to Ban Landmines with an unofficial draft law regarding -
Iroquois Warriors in Iraq
Iroquois Warriors in Iraq Steven E. Clay Combat Studies Institute Press Fort Leavenworth, Kansas Cover: Iraqi Major Ali, a company commander with 1st Battalion, 1st Brigade, 3d Iraqi Army Division, shares a successful moment with US Army MAJ Mark Brooks, a senior advisor to the battalion. Photograph from the cover of The Advisor, 16 July 2005, credited to US Army SGT Lorie Jewell. Iroquois Warriors in Iraq Steven E. Clay Combat Studies Institute Press Fort Leavenworth, Kansas Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Clay, Steven E., 1957- Iroquois warriors in Iraq / Steven E. Clay. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Iraq War, 2003- 2. United States. Dept. of the Army. Division (Training), 98th. I. Title. DS79.76.C587 2007 956.7044’3420973--dc22 2007016154 CSI Press publications cover a variety of military history topics. The views expressed in this CSI Press publication are those of the author(s) and not necessarily those of the Department of the Army or the Department of Defense. A full list of CSI Press publications, many of them available for downloading, can be found at http://www.cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources.csi/csi.asp. The seal of the Combat Studies Institute authenticates this document as an official publication of the CSI. It is prohibited to use the CSI official seal on any republication of this material without the expressed written permission of the Director of CSI. This is the Official US Government edition of this publication and is herein identified to certify its authenticity. Use of the 0-16-078425-5 ISBN prefix is for US Government Printing Office Official Editions only. -
The Syrian Army Doctrinal Order of Battle
5IF4ZSJBO"SNZ %PDUSJOBM0SEFSPG#BUUMF "3&1035#:KPTFQIIPMMJEBZ */45*565&'035)&456%:0'8"3 GFCSVBSZ All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. ©2013 by Institute for the Study of War. Cover Image: Syrian tanks take part in the Kuwaiti National Day military parade, Feb. 26, 2011. DoD photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Chad J. McNeeley/Released The Syrian Army Doctrinal Order of Battle Joseph Holliday February 2013 A Report by the Institute for the Study of War ORDER OF BATTLE Symbol Echelon/Arabic Command/Arabic # of Personnel Component Units Total # (Equipment) XXX Corps/Falaq General/Awal 50,000 3-4 Divisions 3 XX Division/Firqa General/Awal 5,000-15,000 5-6 Brigades/Regiments 14 Brigade/Liwa Maj Gen/Liwa 2,500-3,500 5-6 Battalions >40 X Mechanized Brigade 3 Mech Battalions 105 IFVs 41 Tanks 1 Armored Battalion 3,500 Soldiers Artillery/ADA/Engineers Armored Brigade 3 Armored Battalions X 105 Tanks 1 Mech Battalion 31 IFVs 2,500 Soldiers Artillery/ADA/Engineers Regiment/Fawj Brig Gen/Amid 1,500 3 Battalions >20 III Special Forces Regiment 3 Infantry Battalions 1,500 Soldiers III Artillery Regiment 3 Artillery Battalions 45 Howitzers 1,500 Soldiers II Battalion/Katiba Colonel/Aqeed 300-500 4-5 Companies I Company/Suriya Captain/Naqeeb 60-80 SOURCE NOTE: The above table is based primarily on interviews with an exiled former Syrian Army General Officer on March 20 and April 19, 2012, as well as the appendices in Human Rights Watch’s December 2011 report “By All Means Necessary.” THE SYRIAN ARMY: DOCTRINAL ORDER OF BAttLE | JOSEPH HOLLIDAY | FEBRUARY 2013 Introduction urrent estimates of Syrian opposition strength have generated confidence that the CAssad regime will be defeated militarily. -
The Halabja Genocide Table of Contents
THE HALABJA GENOCIDE TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION 1: Pre‐Attack Prologue Section Summary Item 1 ………………………………… Memo: Authorization to Stockpile and Utilize Chemical Weapons Item 2 …………………………………………………. Memo: Instructions to Avoid Using Chemical Weapons Item 3 ……………………………………. Memo: Circulation of Rumors About a Halabja Chemical Attack SECTION 2: The Attack Prologue Section Summary Item 4 ……………………………………………………………… Memo: Instructions on How to Attack Halabja Item 5 ………………………………………………………………………….... Memo: Results of the Halabja Battle Item 6 ……………………………………………………………………………. Memo: Instructions for the 1st Corps Item 7 ……………............................................... Memo: Instructions for the 1st Corps (Complete) Item 8 ………………………………………………………… Memo: Instructions to Use "Special Ammunition" Item 9 …………………………… Telegram: Informant Intelligence on Enemy Intentions and Casualties Item 10 ………………………………… Memo: Troop Morale and Halabja Battle Successes and Failures Item 11 ……………………………………………. Memo: Approval Received to Use "Special Ammunition" Item 12 ……………………………………………. Memo: Approval Received to Use "Special Ammunition" Item 13 …………………………………………….. Memo: Approval Received to Use "Special Ammunition" Item 14 ………………………………………………….. Memo: Suggested Targets for "Special Ammunition" Item 15 ……………………………………………. Memo: Suggested Targets for Conventional Ammunition Item 16 ……………………………………………………… Memo: Informant Intelligence on Enemy Positions THE HALABJA GENOCIDE TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION 3: Post‐ Attack Prologue Section Summary Item 17 ………………………………………………….... Memo: -
May 26, 1988 Transcript of an Armed Forces General Command Meeting on the Iran-Iraq War and Al-Faw
Digital Archive digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org International History Declassified May 26, 1988 Transcript of an Armed Forces General Command meeting on the Iran-Iraq War and Al-Faw Citation: “Transcript of an Armed Forces General Command meeting on the Iran-Iraq War and Al-Faw,” May 26, 1988, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Conflict Records Research Center, National Defense University, SH-PDWN-D-000-730 http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/110089 Summary: This file contains records of meetings involving Saddam Hussein and various advisers during the Iran- Iraq War. They discuss military and diplomatic aspects of the war, the morale of the soldiers, and Iranian attempts to seize the Fao peninsula. They also discuss the Kurds and Iraqi battle preparations. Original Language: Arabic Contents: English Translation “Transcript of an Armed Forces General Command Meeting on the Iran-Iraq War and Al-Faw” Document Date: 26 May 1988 CRRC Record Number: SH-PDWN-D-000-730 SH-PDWN-D-000-730 Key: Translator comments, clarifications, and additions are italicized in brackets. Classification markings, parentheses, and ellipses are from the original Arabic document. Page 2 PDF 24: 1988 1: 5/26/1988 2: 5/26/1988 3: 5/26/1988 Page 3 PDF Folder Number 24 Page 4 PDF Presented to the Supreme Supervision Committee on 09/07/94 [Signed] Staff Lt. General Dhia‘a Tawfiq Ibrahim 09/07/94 2 SH-PDWN-D-000-730 Page 5 PDF Top Secret Meetings of the General Command of the Armed Forces And Speeches of the Leader Mr. President, may God bless him and take care of him At The General Command of the Armed Forces The Fifth Committee 1. -
The Iran-Iraq
X. THE COMBINATION OF IRAQI OFFENSIVES AND WESTERN INTERVENTION FORCE IRAN TO ACCEPT A CEASE-FIRE: SEPTEMBER 1987 TO MARCH 1989 10.0 The War Enters Its Final Phase Nothing seemed less inevitable at the beginning of 1988 than an Iraqi victory. Iraq had fought good defensive battles at Basra and against most of Iran's later Karbala offensives, but Iran had scarcely abandoned its calls for final offensives and was calling for still more volunteers. Iran had retained the initiative in most of the battles in 1987, and Iraq usually had showed only limited capability to counterattack. Appearances, however, were deceiving. The course of the war was to change radically in the spring of 1988, and to result in a series of Iraqi victories that ended in forcing Iran to reject the same kind of terms for a ceasefire that it had rejected in 1982. Three sets of factors shaped this new phase of the war. The first was a series of important changes in Iraq's armed forces and methods of warfare. The second was a change in Iran's ability to continue fighting because of the cumulative political and military impact of Iran's losses and mismanagement of the war. The third, less tangible, factor was the Western presence in the Gulf and Iran's growing diplomatic isolation. 10.1 Iraq Prepares for Offensive Operations For all their shortcomings and mistakes in previous years, Iraq's forces had steadily improved in experience and professionalism. They suffered from little of the turbulence and internal political conflict that weakened Iranian forces and kept the Pasdaran and Iranian regular forces from benefiting from their experience.