ISLAMIC RESURGENCE AND THE STABILITY OF MALAY NON-ELITE SUPPORT
by
GEOFFREY B. ROBINSON
B.A. McGill University, 1978
A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS
in
THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES
(Department of Political Science)
We accept this thesis as conforming
to the required standard
THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA
August 1982
Geoffrey B. Robinson In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission.
Department of POLITICAL SCIENCE
The University of British Columbia 1956 Main Mall Vancouver, Canada V6T 1Y3
Date AUGUST 26, 1982. Abstract
This study analyzes the political implications of the Islamic resurgence in Malaysia. Based on a theoretical interest in the relationship between non-elite support and political stability, it examines the impact of Islam on the government's ability to maintain the support of the Malay population. Contrary to much of the existing literature on the subject, it argues that the Islamic resurgence, at present, does not pose a serious threat to the stability of Malay non- elite support for the political leadership. It further argues that the maintenance of Malay support has, so far, been achieved without jeopardizing the stability and legitimacy of the political system as a whole.
The absence of political destabilization under the influence of the Islamic resurgence is explained, in this study, by reference to two related sets of factors: (1) Societal Conditions; and (2) State
Policy. It is suggested that the Islamic resurgence expresses social, economic, political, and religious differences, both between Malays and non-Malays, and within the Malay community. At present, the intra-
Malay cleavages form a multipolar rather than a bipolar pattern, and it is argued that this configuration tends to limit the chances for the emergence of a strong, coherent Islamic opposition movement.
Under the conditions of an external threat to Islam, the pattern could
ii be expected to become less fragmented and more polarized, thereby affording a greater opportunity for the growth of such a movement.
State policies have been effective at undercutting the appeal of anti-government Islamic groups and parties - especially where these policies have reinforced the societal limitations on the emergence of an Islamic opposition.
iii Acknowledgements
My foremost debt of gratitude is to my thesis committee, and
especially to Diane Mauzy and Stephen Milne, for providing the inspira•
tion, constructive advice and meticulous criticism without which this
study could never have been completed. I also owe a special debt to
Professors Milton Bamett (Cornell University) and Colin Abraham
(Universiti Sains Malaysia), who first inspired me to study Malaysia, and to Professor Alexander Woodside., who changed my understanding of
Southeast Asia, and of history, for the better.
I am indebted to the University of British Columbia, the Faculty of Graduate Studies, and the Department of Political Science, for providing me with the funds necessary to survive while doing my research.
I would also like to acknowledge my gratitude to colleagues and professors in the Department, for offering valuable criticisms of earlier drafts of this thesis, and for providing the rigorous academic environment which made it both a more challenging, and a more satisfying thesis to write.
To Nancy Wong and Petula Muller I extend my sincere thanks and appreciation for exercising administrative authority on my behalf, for providing invaluable stylistic advice, typing indecipherable foot• notes, and not least for accommodating my occasional eccentricities.
My thanks also go to Mrs. Grace Cross for typing this thesis under the pressure of an almost impossible deadline.
Finally, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my family and to my friends in Malaysia and at home, who already know why they matter.
iv TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER I Introduction
CHAPTER II Islamic Resurgence in Malaysia - Theory
CHAPTER III Intra-Malay and Intra-Islamic Cleavages
CHAPTER IV Islam and State Policy ..
CHAPTER V Summary and Conclusions..
TABLES AND APPENDIX
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
v LIST OF TABLES
Page
TABLE 1: Breakdown of Seats Held by Parties in Parliament after the Elections of 1974, 1978 and 1982. 131
TABLE 2: Percentage of Valid Vote and Seats Won, and Number of Seats Contested by Major Parties in Parliamentary Elections of 1978 and 1982: Peninsular Malaysia. 132
TABLE 3: Parliamentary Seats Contested and Won by Major Parties in 1978 and 1982 Elections: Peninsular Malaysia, Sabah and Sarawak. 133
TABLE 4: Comparison of Seats Won by Major Parties in the State Elections in Peninsular Malaysia, 1978 and 1982 -- by State. 134
TABLE 5: Comparison of Parliamentary Seats Won in Penin• sular Malaysia Elections, 1978 and 1982 -- by State. 135
TABLE 6: Percentage of Valid Vote Won by PAS in 1978 and 1982 Parliamentary Contests. 136
TABLE 7: The Percentage of the Popular Vote Polled by PAS in Kedah Parliamentary and State Elections in 1978 and 1982. 136
TABLE 8: The Seats Won and Contested, and the Percentage of Parliamentary Popular Vote Polled by PAS in the Four Northern States, (Compared to the Party's Performance Nationally). 137
vi LIST OF TABLES (Cont'd)
Page
TABLE 9: Breakdown by State of PAS' Percentage of the Total Valid Parliamentary Vote for the 1982 Elections in Peninsular Malaysia. 138
TABLE 10: Percentage of Valid Vote Polled by Major Political Parties and Independent Candidates, on a State Basis, in the 1978 and 1982 Parliamentary Elections -- Peninsular Malaysia. 139
vii CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION
One consequence of the Iranian revolution has been the sudden proliferation of scholarly studies on the subject of 'Islamic Resur• gence'. * Much of this work has focussed on the negative political implications of the resurgence, and in particular on its potential for weakening the legitimacy and disrupting the political stability of modernizing 'secular' regimes. Malaysia, a secular state with a large 2 non-Muslim population, and notable for its impressive rates of economic growth, and its record of political stability, has not been spared 3 pessimistic predictions by some political analysts. While students of
Malaysian politics have scrupulously avoided facile comparisons with the
Iranian case, most have concluded that the Islamic resurgence poses a strong potential threat to the legitimacy and stability of the system.
This study seeks to challenge these conclusions, and to argue instead that, in spite of - and perhaps because of - the resurgence, Malaysian
Islamic movements, organizations and political parties do not constitute a viable and coherent political opposition to the present system, or to its leaders. It further argues that government strategies for coping with the Islamic challenge are effective both at undermining the development of such an Islamic opposition, and at limiting the destabi• lizing effects of the activities and demands of the more 'extremist^
Muslim groups. In reaching their more pessimistic conclusions, scholars have 2
generally followed one of two related lines of argument.'' Some have stressed the danger of heightened ethnic antagonism which could result from the revitalization of what is effectively the religion of the Malays.
Others have emphasized the issues of intra-Malay cleavages and Islamic opposition, and the deleterious effect which these might have on the government's ability to maintain "stable non-elite support" among Malays.
While it is accepted that the Islamic resurgence in Malaysia is a manifestation of both inter-ethnic (Malay vs. non-Malay) and intra-ethnic
(intra-Malay) divisions, it is, nonetheless, argued here that, when viewed within the broader context of Islam in Malaysian politics, it is the differences within the Malay-Muslim community which appear most salient.
Moreover, on the issue of Islam, the actions of the political elite, in recent years, strongly suggest that it is not so much the problem of ethnic antagonism, but rather of a strong Malay-Muslim opposition which is of most immediate concern to the government. Despite these facts, there is, to date, very little evidence to suggest that the Malaysian political system, or its leaders, are in serious jeopardy due to a decline in non-elite support.
Quite the contrary, recent federal and state elections (April
22, 1982) returned the ruling National Front (NF) to power with an over• whelming majority in seats and popular vote (see Table #1). Moreover the
NF limited the major Islamic opposition party (PAS) to 16.25% of the total valid vote in Parliamentary contests, and eroded its over-all support in the predominantly Malay northern states of Kelantan, Trengganu, Kedah, and Perlis (see Table #8 and Table #9). These results were achieved 3
despite "an economically unsatisfactory climate", and in the wake of a crackdown on the civil service, and several state subsidized enterprises; policies not calculated to win the favour of Malay voters. In light of these results, a major objective of this study is to explain the absence of a serious weakening of Malay non-elite support for the National Front, under the influence of the ongoing Islamic resurgence. In order to answer this immediate question, it is necessary to examine in greater 7 detail one aspect of Mauzy's 'consociational model' of Malaysian politics; the issue of "stable non-elite support".
Mauzy writes that while "over-arching elite cooperation is necessary in order to form a consociational-type system, stable non-elite support is necessary for the successful functioning of that system'.
These two components are not only of roughly equal importance, they are also closely related in their effect on the functioning of consociationalism.
The political elites must have security, which the stable support of their followers ensures, in order to make compromises. At a minimum, the non-elites must ^ not work against the agreements reached by the elites.
Thus, although UMNO leaders frequently phrase their objections to the
Islamic opposition in terms of the need for Malay unity, it is clear that
the party is primarily concerned with preventing any sizeable loss of
Malay support which would thereby weaken its claim to primacy in the
National Front coalition and which would make more difficult the politics
of elite cooperation. It is the steady dwindling of non-elite support which is frequently cited as a major reason for the breakdown of political
order in May, 1969;"^ Similarly, many political analysts see the whittling away of Malay support through Islamic outbidding as the chief 4
danger to the present system. Mauzy, for instance, argues that outbidding from the Malay side is "Umno's more important concern, because although the party wants ethnic accommodation, it will probably not sacrifice its dominance, which depends on a solid Malay base, for the sake of compromise with the non-Malays"."'"'''
The factors which may affect the stability of non-elite support may usefully be grouped under two headings: (1) Societal conditions; (2)
State policy. The factors in both categories can be either conducive of detrimental to the maintenance of non-elite support. Interestingly, however there is a tendency in the literature on the Islamic resurgence in
Malaysia to stress the detrimental societal conditions. The natural
corollary to such an emphasis is the argument, also frequently made, that
the only resistance to the tide of Islamic opposition is coming through
the actions of the state. Those authors who are more pessimistic
(Lyon and Kessler for example), contend that it is not only societal
conditions which encourage Islamic opposition in Malaysia, but that
government policy itself is exacerbating those condtions and therefore
hastening the crisis of legitimacy. Few, if any, authors have argued
that societal conditions serve to limit the threat of Islamic
opposition, while state policy plays an essentially complementary role.
Part of the purpose of this study is to redress this imbalance, by
drawing attention to those societal conditions which, on the issue of
Islam, are conducive to stable Malay non-elite support for the government,
and by demonstrating the extent to which the success of government policy 5
is directly dependent upon these conditions. A general conclusion to be
reached is that the role of state policy in preventing the growth of a
strong Islamic opposition has been somewhat over-emphasized, and the
societal limitations on such a development equally under-emphasized.
This is not to argue that state policy is, in an absolute sense, less
important than societal factors, but rather that because the effectiveness
of the former is, in many ways, dependent upon the latter, the relative
importance of state policy and societal factors for stable non-elite
support is more roughly equal than most of the existing literature
implies.
Societal Conditions
Mauzy, following Lijphart, lists six societal conditions which 12
are held to be favorable to consociationalism. Of these six, only three
(small country size, segmental isolation, and prior traditions of elite
accommodation) appear to be significantly operative in the Malaysian
context. Of these three only one (segmental isolation) has any immediate
relevance to the question of non-elite support. According to Milne and
Mauzy, segmental isolation has, under the influence of the New Economic 13
Policy (NEP), become less pronounced. The weakening of segmental isola•
tion, because it allows the elites of each ethnic group diminishing degrees of autonomy, is generally interpreted as being unfavorable to consocia- 14 tionalism. It is also frequently argued that increasing contact between races (i.e. declining segmental isolation) encourages the erection of 6
boundaries of ethnic group solidarity, which, although they may!have a positive effect on the maintenance of non-elite support in the short run, ultimately lead to racially competitive situations and therefore to difficulties for the consociational style of politics, in the longer term.
Of more immediate relevance to this study, however, are those societal conditions which may jeopardize stable non-elite support among
Malays, and in that way disrupt the consociational system. These factors include: (1) a decline in deference and/or unquestioning loyalty to persons in authority, under the impact of outbidding and modernization;"*"^
(ii) the reaction among intellectuals, students and the urban middle-class, to the alleged corruption, immorality and inappropriateness of western- derived development goals and methods of government, and their possible frustration due to lack of access to elite positions commensurate with their training;"^ (iii) the widening of the gap between elites and non- elites within Malay society, including the gap between rich and poor and 17 between urban and rural dwellers. It is commonly argued that Islam has the potential to intensify the salience of all of these issues and to mobilize Malays politically in 18 support of them. And indeed there are examples of Islam providing the symbolic and organizational base for the expression of these kinds of 19 political disaffection. Yet perhaps more striking has been the weakness and isolation of such challenges. Thus far Islam has not succeeded in mobilizing or bringing political coherence to those societal factors which are a potential threat to the government's base of non-elite support. A partial explanation of this ineffectiveness can be found in the abundant 7
literature on the political significance of ethnic cleavages in Malaysian society.
Nagata has challenged some well-established perceptions of the 20 role of ethnicity in politics. The attributes of ethnicity (for example; race, language, religion), she argues, are not primordial 'givens'.
Rather, ethnic boundaries are flexible and ever-changing; the shifting ethnic definition and selective use of attributes for self-definition occurring in response to external social, economic and political pressures.
The components of ethnicity which are often assumed to be 'givens', then, are better understood as charters or symbols of ethnic identity, more or less consciously selected by members of a social group to 'shore-up' the boundaries of that group. Moreover, she argues, individuals within a society will "identify differently according to the exigencies of the 22 situation". Thus, whereas in the larger context of Malaysian society in the 1960's, Malays may have distinguished themselves through their language (Malay) or custom (adat), within a community where all were Malay speakers or adat followers, other distinguishing traits would be employed 23 to demarcate social boundaries.
In Malaysia, such charters are more likely to be framed in the idiom of ethnicity than the idiom of class, even where 'objectively' class distinctions do exist. Syed Husin Ali, and J.T. Purcal among others concur with Nagata's dictum that "most Malays show little awareness of 24 class distinctions in the western sense of the term". Interestingly, in situations where the population is almost totally Malay, and where the visibility of intra-ethnic inequality or exploitation is most pronounced, 8
Malays of different social (sometimes class) groups will use sub-ethnic epithets to "minimize the divisive implications of intra-ethnic exploita- 25 tion". In Kelantan, where the near absence of non-Malays makes it impossible to express class-based sentiments in ethnic terms (i.e. Malays vs. non-Malays), Kessler argues that intra-Malay cleavages have tradi- 26 tionally been expressed in the idiom of religion.
The argument in this study is that Islam has become a marker of intra-Malay differentiation, which expresses perceived social boundaries, but which does not jeopardize the unity and identity of the larger Malay community vis a vis Malaysian society as a whole. Nagata refers to this tension between Malay unity and Intra-Malay divisions in terms of the need: to express status distinctions in the form of ethnic (here religious) differences, thus avoiding the knotty question of intra-ethnic subordination and inequality. Thus the unity of the ethnic group, and its status-honour system is preserved.27 For Malays, both kinds of distinctions are relevant, but the trend, since 2 8
1971, toward Malay hegemony and political security, has made somewhat less urgent the need to defend the boundaries of 'Malayness' except perhaps at election time. M. Banton writes of the luxury of an ethnic group's internal division as follows: ...different ethnic groups can afford to divide internally because the over-riding opposition between groups will bring members back into solidarity in any conflict touching their collective interests.29 Under a serious threat to Malay rights, privileges or political power, internal divisions will most likely be minimized and the emotive power 9
of Islam will play an important role in forging this unity. Yet even during such times of crisis, differences can be expressed, and for the larger ethnic group, most safely expressed through the idiom of Islam or some other attribute which is unique to the Malay community. The present
Islamic resurgence reflects and further contributes to differences within the Malay-Muslim community, but these differences describe a multipolar or fragmented configuration, rather than a bipolar one of government versus opposition. The reasons for, and the precise character of this multipolarity will be discussed in detail in Chapter III, but for now it is worth noting that it is this configuration, perhaps more than any other single factor, which inhibits the formation of a coherent and viable
Islamic-based opposition.
In addition to these sociological explanations for the failure of Islamic groups to mobilize a strong challenge to the Malay elite, there are two more explicitly political issues which bear on the subject.
R. K. Vasil, in Politics in a Plural Society, has examined the problems 30 involved in forming an opposition front based on a non-communal ideology.
Some of the problems involved in forming an opposition comprised of
Malays and non-Malays are different from those likely to be encountered by an Islamic-based opposition. Most notably, a Malay Islamic movement can tap the more powerful and politically salient emotive bases of race and religion. The ideas of class and non-communalism, employed by the parties
studied by Vasil simply do not have the same political appeal in the
Malaysian context. Nonetheless, Vasil's findings do shed an informative
light on the problems inherent in forming any opposition front in the 10
Malaysian political system. In particular, Vasil noted the tendency for these movements to fragment over one or all of the following issues: differences in the background and political orientation of the different
leaders involved; differences in bases of support, and in the policy
options appropriate to winning each base; differences within each of the
component groups; matters of organizational/institutional coordination and
use of resources. With regard to the potential for an Islamic opposition,
then, it would be useful to ask the following questions. First, how
compatible, politically, are the various Islamic organizations in the
country - their social origins, social bases, their goals, styles and
political-religious orientations - and how is this likely to affect their
capacity for coherent and collective political action? Second, how consis•
tent with the various demands, symbols and interests of the different
Islamic organizations, are the other salient issues in Malay politics?
For instance, is it reasonable to expect Islamic organizations to form
the basis of political mobilization for land-hungry peasants? With the
sociological interpretation of the function of Islam in Malay society as
a backdrop, these two questions will be the more immediate focus of this
study, and particularly of Chapter III.
State Policy
Mauzy's model of Malaysian politics highlights four government
strategies for retaining and increasing popular support: (1) the co-optation
of opposition parties into the ruling National Front coalition: (2) the
limitation of open political discussion to minimize the opportunity for 11
outbidding by the opposition; (3) the reliance on government economic
"effectiveness" to combat the problem of loss of legitimacy due to #(2);
(4) the government's "determined and unrelenting" expounding of its message of the need for ethnic harmony, cooperation and unity, as embodied 31
in the National Front coalition. The strategies presently employed by
the leadership to combat the Islamic 'challenge' fall roughly into these
four categories, which, for the sake of simplicity can be listed as
follows: (1) co-optative; (2) coercive; (3) diversive; (4) informative-
promotional .
What is most notable in the government's approach to Islam is its
increasing reliance on co-optative, diversive and informative, as opposed
to coercive tactics. This reflects the high degree of autonomy and
flexibility, (vis a vis the other ethnic groups and their elites) available 32
to Malay political elites in dealing with the problem. In other
respects, the government strategy on the issue of Islamic resurgence is
not markedly different from the approach outlined by Mauzy. Given this
consistency in strategy, from issue to issue, a question which might well
be asked is, to what extent is the absence of a serious weakening of
Malay non-elite support a function of the conscious policies of the
government, as opposed to being a consequence of social structural and
political limitations on the coherence and salience of an Islamic-based
opposition movement? Structure of the Study
The remainder of this study is divided into four chapters. Chapter II 12
provides a discussion and a general critique of the existing literature on the subject of Islamic resurgence. In addition to introducing the main concepts and arguments relevant to the study of Islam and politics in Malaysia, it attempts to identify the assumptions which have led many authors to predict a weakening of Malay support for the government.
Chapter III examines in some detail the divisions which exist within
Malaysian Islam, and suggests that these divisions reflect deeper social and political cleavages. This chapter also discusses the compatibility of Islam with other salient political issues in the Malay community, and concludes that, in the absence of a serious threat to the Malay community as a whole, the chances for the emergence of a united Islamic opposition front are very slim. The fourth chapter begins with a brief history of
Mosque-State relations in Malaysia, then goes on to describe and analyse the strategies employed by the government to cope with the challenge of the Islamic resurgence. The conclusion from this chapter is that state policy with regard to Islam is only effective when it complements the social structural limitations on the formation of an Islamic opposition.
The final chapter will briefly summarize the major findings of the study, and will suggest their significance for the theoretical considerations raised in this introductory chapter. 13
FOOTNOTES
Chapter I
1. The terms Islamic resurgence, Islamic fundamentalism, Islamic revival and Islamic revitalization are used more or less synonymously in the literature. The first is used here simply as a matter of preference. It should be noted that the Islamic resurgence of the late 1970's is not the first of its kind, either in Malaysia or elsewhere.
2. Gordon P. Means, "Public Policy Toward Religion in Malaysia," Pacific Affairs 51(3) (Fall 1978), pp. 386-405. Means, p. 402, provides the following breakdown of religious groups in Malaysia:
Muslims 46.9% Buddhist/Confucian/Taoist 32.1% Hindu 8.8% Christian 3.9% Animist 4.5% Other and Unknown 3.8% It should be noted here that the focus of this study is Peninsular Malaysia.
3. See, for example, Gordon P. Means, "Public Policy Toward Religion in Malaysia"; Judith A. Nagata, "Religious Ideology and Social Change: The Islamic Revival in Malaysia," Pacific Affairs, 53(3) (Fall 1980) pp. 405-439; N. J. Funston, "Malaysia", Chapter 9 in The Politics of Islamic Reassertion, Mohammed Ayoob (ed.) (London: Croom Helm, 1981), pp. 165-189; Fred R. von der Mehden, "The Islamic Resurgence in Malaysia," in Islam and Development, J. L. Esposito (ed.) (Syracuse University Press, 1980), pp. 163-180; Margo L. Lyon, "The Dakwah Movement in Malaysia," Review of Indonesian and Malayan Affairs 12(2) (December 1979), pp. 34-45; Clive S. Kessler, "Malaysia: Islamic Revival and Political Disaffection in a Divided Society," Southeast Asia Chronicle, no. 75 (October 1980), pp. 3-10; Denzil Peiris, "The Green Revolution," Far Eastern Economic Review, 9 February 1979, pp. 26-27. The focus on the politically destabilizing effects of Islam, found in these works has probably come as a result of extra• polation from the case of Iran. Von der Mehden, ("The Islamic Resurgence in Malaysia") provides a brief analysis of the differences between the Malaysian and the Iranian cases, but the theoretical focus remains in most works on the issue of Islamic resurgence. Another reason for the emphasis on the politically destabilizing effects of Islam lies in the character of the religion itself. G. H. Jansen, Militant Islam, (New York: Harper § Row, 1979), writes that: "Islam is not a religion in the common, distorted meaning of the word, confining itself to the private life of man. It is a complete way of life, catering for all the fields of human existence", p. 17. The 14
political concern of Islam is quite explicit, and in its most overt expression this concern takes the form of jihad: "the duty of believers to struggle to bring into being, and maintain a perfect community, a just society, by armed insurrection, j ihad of the sword...or by the j ihad of the heart, tongue and hand", Thomas Hodgkin, "The Revolutionary Tradition in Islam," Race and Class XXI (3) (1979)'p. 234. Jansen, Militant Islam, .p.142), writes that: "It wouldbe positively un-Islamic for the professional men of religion in Islam not to take an interest and an active part in politics, for that would mean that they are indifferent to the fate of the umma..." For Malaysia's economic performance, see Far Eastern Economic Review, 10 April 1981, pp. 70-75.
4. There are numerous definitions of legitimacy which vary only slightly. Mauzy's definition is one of the most succinct; "...the acknowledge• ment of the right of a government to govern, or of a political system to exist." Diane K. Mauzy, Consociationalism and Coalition Politics in Malaysia, (Ph.D. thesis, University of British Columbia, 1978), p. 15.
5. Those who emphasize inter-ethnic relations include Gordon P. Means, "Public Policy Toward Religion in Malaysia"; Judith A. Nagata, "Religious Ideology and Social Change..."; N. J. Funston, "Malaysia", Chapter 9 in M. Ayoob (ed.), The Politics of Islamic Reassertion; F. von der Mehden, "The Islamic Resurgence in Malaysia". Those stressing intra-Malay divisons include Clive S. Kessler. "Malaysia; Islamic Revival and Political Disaffection..."; Margo L. Lyon, "The Dakwah Movement in Malaysia; Denzil Peiris, "The Green Revolution". Both schools of thought are discussed more thoroughly in Chapter II.
6. Far Eastern Economic Review, 26 March 1982, p. 10.
7. Mauzy's consociational 'model' which is an adaptation of Liphart's theories of consociational politics is thoroughly developed and discussed in Diane K. Mauzy, Consociationalism, especially Chapters 1 and 6.
8. Diane K. Mauzy, Consociationalism, p. 374.
9. Ibid., p. 376.
10. Goh Cheng Teik, The May Thirteenth Incident and Democracy in Malaysia, (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1971), pp. 9-18. For a good summary and analysis of the 1969 crisis see Diane K. Mauzy, Consociationalism, pp. 138-44, 378, 303. Also see The May 13th Tragedy,Report by the National Operations Council, Kuala Lumpur, October 9, 1969.
11. Diane K. Mauzy, Consociationalism, p. 417. 15
12. Ibid., p. 26.
13. R. S. Milne and Diane K. Mauzy, Politics and Government in Malaysia, (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1980), p. 348.
14. Diane K. Mauzy, Consociationalism, pp. 305-06.
15. Ibid., p. 407. Also, on this subject Musa is quoted as saying "The development policies and programs especially in the education field have liberated the masses from the chains of unquestioned loyalty.", ibid., p. 415, fn. For other analyses of the question of deference and loyalty in Malay culture see Syed Hussein Alatas, "Fedualism in Malay Society:A study in Historical Continuity", Civilisations XVIII (4) pp. 579-91; Chandra Muzaffar, Protector? An Analysis of the Concept and Practice of Loyalty in Leader-Led Relationships Within Malay Society (Pulau Pinang: Aliran Press, 1979); and Syed Husin Ali, Malay Peasant Society and Leadership (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1975).
16. This frustration and anti-westernism is not due only to Islam. It is also based on an intellectual rejection of western methods which have either proven wanting, or which are associated with an unpopular political regime. A similar reaction has occurred in Indonesia.
17. Numerous studies deal with the issue of 'class' distinctions. It is generally argued that while 'objective' class distinctions do exist within Malay society, no 'subjective' class consciousness has emerged. There are varying opinions on whether this pattern makes class an important issue to study. See Judith A. Nagata, Pluralism in Malaysia: Myth and Reality, Vol. 7, Contributions to Asian Studies (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1975), esp. contributions by J. A. Nagata, pp. 113-36, and J. T. Purcal, pp. 65-78.
18. Chandra Muzaffar, (Protector?, p. 140.), writes: "The educated unemployed,the occupationally stagnant and others who, for a variety of reasons, are dissatisfied with the present order of things could well join forces with existing Islamic Youth Groups and coalesce into a powerful movement under an Islamic banner." In the theoretical literature on Islamic resurgence, a similar argument is frequently made; see Chapters 2 and 3.
19. Kelantan is the obvious example, but it is not easily generalizable to apply to Malaysia as a whole. For a further discussion of the importance of Islam in the victory of PAS in 1959 in Kelantan, see Clive S. Kessler, Islam and Politics in a Malay State: Kelantan 1838-1969 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978). Also see further discussion in Chapters 3 and 4, below.
20. Judith A. Nagata, Malaysian Mosaic: Perspectives From a Polyethnic Society (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1979), passim. Nagata is critical of 16
that school of thought which she calls the 'primordialists', p. 189.
21. Judith A. Nagata, Pluralism in Malaysia, Introduction, p. 3, and Malaysian Mosaic, p. 201,
22. Ibid., p. 3. Interestingly, Nagata notes elsewhere that religion is one of the least obviously 'primordial' of all the so-called primordial characteristics, Malaysian Mosaic, p. 194.
23. Nagata notes that Malaysia's orang asli, tend to employ social markers which are relevant to internal competition, rather than to the zero- sum competition within the Malaysian state context, Pluralism in Malaysia, Introduction, p. 4.
24. Judith A. Nagata, "Perceptions of Social Inequality in Malaysia", in Pluralism in Malaysia, p. 126.
25. Ibid., p. 127.
26. Glive S. Kessler, Religion and Politics in a Malay State, Chapter 12. For more theorectical insights into the relationship between class and ethnicity, see Malcolm Cross, "On Conflict, Race Relations and the Theory of the Plural Society," Race XII (4) (April 1971) pp. 477- 92. A Sivanandam, "Race, Class and Power: An Outline for Study," Race XIV (4) (April 1973) pp. 384-92. On ethnicity and class in Malaysia, see Michael Stenson, "Class and Race in West Malaysia," Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 8 (2) (1976), pp. 45-54.
27. Judith A. Nagata, "Perceptions of Social Inequality", p. 129.
28. R. S. Milne, Politics of Ethnically Bipolar States: Guyana, Malaysia, Fiji (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1981), pp. 207-08.
29. Michael Banton, Race Relations (London:Travistock Publications,1 1967), p. 288, cited by Diane K. Mauzy, Consociationalism, p. 11, fn. 25.
30. R. K. Vasil, Politics in a Plural Society: A Study of Non-Communal Political Parties in West Malaysia (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1971), esp. pp. 183-221.
31. Diane K, Mauzy, Consociationalism, pp. 16, 417-18, and passim.
32. The autonomy of Malay political elites in this regard does not imply that non-Malays and non Malay elites are unconcerned about .the process, of 'Islamization' of the country, but rather that they are unable and unwilling to express their fears openly and succinctly. It is not clear that non-Malay reticence will continue as the UMNO elites move in the direction of an Islamic state and/or non-zero sum Islamic policies, but it is still too early to anticipate the long term move• ments of Malay or non-Malay political elites. 17
CHAPTER II: ISLAMIC RESURGENCE IN MALAYSIA - THEORY
Although the small existing literature on the Islamic resurgence in Malaysia does not deal exclusively with the question of its implications for the political system, most authors do engage in some 'political analysis'. Their arguments can fruitfully be grouped into two categories.
First, there are those arguments which stress the relationship between the
Islamic resurgence and inter-ethnic relations.''' The social, economic and political origins of the movement are viewed primarily in terms of on-going tensions between Malays and non-Malays, and it is the potential for causing
an increase in ethnic antagonism and political destabilization, which is
seen as the most salient political implication of the Islamic resurgence.
The second category comprises those arguments which focus on divisions 2 within the Malay community. The political significance of the Islamic resurgence, for these authors, lies in its potential for undermining the
legitimacy of the secular Malay elites, (UMNO) and thereby threatening
the stability of the system.
Before proceeding with the criticism of these two schools of thought,
one point should be made absolutely clear. The line between the two types
of cleavage (intra-ethnic and inter-ethnic) must not be too harshly drawn.
It is entirely possible that divisions within the Malay community, for
example, have arisen as a consequence of a challenge from without, which has triggered a debate over the best way to achieve Malay unity or
development. Indeed, many religious schisms have resolved around precisely
these issues of how best to protect, unify and promote the faith. Moreover, 18 a large number of such schisms, especially in the Islamic world, have 3 come about under a challenge from without. The great Middle-Eastern reformers, Al-Afghani, Abduh and Rida, for example, were particularly concerned about the viability of Islamic thinking and society, in the face of western positive science and technological superiority. In Indonesia,
Reform Islam came as a response, in part, to the direct challenge posed by Christian missionary activity. In both cases, the external challenge
led to innovation, but it also led to divisions within the Islamic community. In the discussion which follows, then, it is important to bear in mind that the distinction between intra- and inter-ethnic (religious) cleavages is made to indicate differences in emphasis in the two schools of thought, not to suggest that they are treated by these schools as mutually exclusive. Nonetheless, this chapter suggests that both approaches have important weaknesses; the first - which stresses inter-ethnic cleavages - because it over-emphasizes the homogeneity of Malay society and the unity of Malaysian Islam, and the second - which stresses intra-ethnic cleavages - because it characterizes Malay society and Malaysian Islam as politically polarized (government versus opposition).
The arguments in both categories, although following different lines of reasoning, tend to support the same conclusion; that the Islamic resurgence in Malaysia poses a strong potential threat to the legitimacy and stability of the consociational political system. In addition to the evidence from the recent elections, indicators from the non-electoral sphere suggest that this conclusion is somewhat off the mark. Malays continue to show a strong latent respect for elites, and according to Nagata, assign 19
a particularly high status to Malays who have achieved success in the 4
fields of education and business. This is a promising sign for the
new, more technocratic, Mahathir-Musa UMNO leadership. Incidents such
as land-grabbing, rioting or striking do not yet appear to be rooted
in a general sense of class antagonism."' They seem, rather, to be
examples of isolated responses to local or personal injustices. Even within the UMNO leadership, norms of deference and loyalty have not been seriously challenged. The elections for vice- and deputy-presidents of the party, at the 1981 annual assembly, once again provided evidence of the need to play by these rules, in order to get ahead. Datuk Musa
Hitam managed to defeat Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah in the contest for the deputy presidency, and he was no doubt aided in this by having been subtly endorsed by president-designate Datuk Seri Dr. Mahathir Mohamad
Iskandar, and by having gained the reputation as a man who would not
"jump the queue" on his way to the top.^ In short, support for UMNO among Malays, and the autonomy of Malay elites within the National Front, seems to be as great now as at any time since Merdeka.
The criticism which follows then, seeks to locate the deficiencies in those arguments which predict de-legitimation, ethnic antagonism and destabilization as a consequence of Islamic resurgence in Malaysia.
The argument to be made is that the more pessimistic conclusions derive from a less than complete understanding of either or both of the following: (1) the character and complexity of intra-Malay and intra-
Islamic cleavages; (2) the flexibility of the state in coping with the political challenge from diverse Islamic groups and organizations, 20
without seriously alienating secular Malay and non-Malay support.
Islamic Resurgence and Communal Tensions
The literature which emphasizes the inter-ethnic significance of
the Islamic resurgence appears to be strongly influenced by earlier studies
concerning the relationship between religion and politics in Malaysia.
In keeping with the traditional emphasis on the political salience of
ethnic cleavages in Malaysia, both stress the overlap of Muslim and Malay
identity, and the implications which this has for ethnic relations. Means,
for instance, writes that religious issues are "a byproduct of this more 7 basic (ethnic) political conflict". Moreover, he argues that Islam has
encouraged political mobilization and modernization among Malays, and has thereby begun to break down the parochial loyalties within Malay society.
The chief danger, according to Means, lies in the possibility that the g
government's pro-Islamic policies will alienate the non-Muslim community.
A similar emphasis on the salience of Islam as a charter of Malay
ethnic solidarity is found in more recent works on Islamic resurgence.
Funston (1981), for instance, draws attention to the strong historical
tendency in Malaysia toward the use of Islamic symbols in efforts to
establish Malay hegemony and unity. The most important cause of the present
resurgence, for Funston, was the May 13th tragedy, because that event boosted Malay communalism and encouraged a more activist government role in Islamic affairs, as part of the larger effort to shore up Malay unity 9
and hegemony. Accordingly the most important political implication of
the resurgence, in Funston's view, is the "heightening of communalism among 21
Malaysia's racially divided population".
Nagata (1980), also emphasizes the salience of Islam as a charter of ethnic identity, but she sees this as a fairly recent phenomenon:
Whereas the earlier issues focussed on the Malay language and Malay rights, mobilization is now achieved through religion. The slogan bahasa jiwa bangsa (language is the soul of the people), has become bangsa dan agama (religion and race).H
The shift to religion as charter, she argues, is the result of the erosion, with modernization and the circumscription of politics since 1971, of the earlier elements of Malayness - language and adat - thus leaving Islam 12 as the "one effective distinguishing feature". Modernization, or more particularly the NEP, has had the effect of "reducing the economic and occupational gap between Malays and non-Malays (and) has also displaced 13 some of the distinctiveness of the old social boundaries..." . Moreover, government language and education policies have encouraged the widespread use of the Malay language by non-Malays, thereby eroding its distinctive• ness as a symbol of Malay identity. In brief, Nagata claims that the significance of the Islamic resurgence lies in the fact that the distinc• tion between Muslim and non-Muslim is essentially a new "code" to describe the Malay - non-Malay social boundary. The political consequence of the religious resurgence, she concludes, is that "ethnic/religious polarization 14 appears to be sharpening", as intra-Malay solidarity is promoted. Von der Mehden, like Funston and Nagata, stresses the close relation- 15 ship between religion and ethnicity, but he is more firm in the belief that the Islamic resurgence is essentially an "acceleration of an old trend"; specifically, the use of religious symbols, and "Islamic rhetoric" 22
as vehicles for Malay social and political demands. Although he lists three different types of Malaysian dakwah groups and briefly mentions factional splits over Islamic issues in UMNO and PAS, it seems clear from his discussion generally that he does not regard intra-Islamic (or
intra-Malay) difference to be of primary significance. For instance, he writes, rather undifferentiatingly of:
a ritualistic and somewhat traditional attitude toward Islam which is to be found in the Malay community, which when combined with the integrated social concept of the Malay Muslim has helped to develop a somewhat ^ homogenous religious pattern among the Malay Muslims.
Thus, despite his awareness of differences within Malaysian Islam, von der Mehden sees the significance of the Islamic resurgence primarily
in ethnic terms. On the issue of khalwat, and the movement to make the
ruling applicable to non-Muslims, he writes that, "this effort is looked
upon by many non-Muslims as a sign of increased Islamic chauvinism and 18
a danger to the previous politics of accommodation". While it may come
as no surprise that non-Muslims should react in this way, von der Mehden
provides no evidence whatsoever that this is in fact the case. Nor does
he satisfactorily establish that the khalwat issue, or the desecration of
Hindu shrines, constitute the most significant aspect of the phenomenon
of Islamic resurgence in Malaysia. But it is on these issues that he
concentrates in drawing the conclusion that the political significance of 19
the resurgence is that the "politics of accommodation may be sorely tried".
The actions and demands of extremists groups, to be sure, do cause some
problems for the government in this regard, but these groups constitute
only a small fragment of the larger movement known as the Islamic resurgence. 23
Thus, while as far as this fragment is concerned, inter-ethnic considera• tions are highly salient, it is misleading to characterize 'the Islamic resurgence', as a whole, as a movement which is likely to disrupt the politics of accommodation between ethnic groups.
More generally, the most serious criticism which can be made of
Funston (1981), Nagata (1980) and von der Mehden is that they fail to provide convincing evidence that the Islamic resurgence will indeed result in heightened ethnic polarization, or that it has made more difficult the politics of accommodation. It is true of course that their analyses have a ring of credibility, and that is probably because they are founded on some well established assumptions about the nature of Malaysian politics and religion. One of the most persistent of these has entailed the portrayal of Islam and 'Malayness' as overlapping or reinforcing ethnic attributes. Although, in theory, this need not imply that Islam can play no other role, it has, in fact, meant that the function of Islam in expressing intra-Malay (ideological, class, sub-ethnic etc.) distinctions has been relatively underplayed. The three authors discussed above appear to have accepted, for the most part, this important assumption about the political significance of Islam in Malaysia. While it is not suggested here that this assumption is necessarily wrong, evidence presented in later chapters should indicate that it may have encouraged these authors to place rather too much emphasis on the salience of Islam as a charter of ethnic solidarity, and not enough on its function as a marker of intra- ethnic cleavages. The need for a more balanced perspective becomes particularly obvious when it is recognized that the Islamic resurgence is 24
by no means a unitary phenomenon; different components of the movement both express different social and political, and even religious values, and have different social and political implications.
A second assumption which underpins the arguments of these authors
is that Islamic outbidding is inherently more difficult to accommodate - without alienating non-Muslims - than are other kinds of racial appeals.
It is this assumption, it seems, which leads them to predict that inter-
ethnic bargaining and accommodation will become increasingly difficult, as Islamic demands increase. In fact, however, to the extent that non-
Muslims are concerned about the resurgence, they appear to be responding by showing greater support for the parties of moderation in the National
Front. In the recent election, the MCA made substantial gains, increasing
its total of Parliamentary seats by seven over its previous seventeen.
At the same time, the DAP had its total reduced from sixteen to nine 20
Parliamentary seats. Of course, it is entirely possible (indeed probable) that this breakthrough for the NF non-Malay parties is sympto• matic of Chinese communal fears, especially in view of the fact that it was the need for Chinese unity and the protection of the Chinese position which formed the basis of the 1982 MCA/Gerakan campaign. Yet even if this
is the case, and the Chinese community is genuinely worried by the Islamic
resurgence, it is significant that their political response implies the movement of non-Malay non-elite support to the NF, thereby enhancing rather
than weakening the possibilities for inter-ethnic elite accommodation,
at least in the short run.
The situation would clearly be very different if the Malay party in 25
the multi-racial alliance were perceived to be extremist on the issue of
Islamic resurgence. In that scenario, non-Malay communal fears would
likely be focussed in support of an opposition party, such as DAP, thereby making more difficult the politics of ethnic accommodation. One of the main objectives of the government, therefore, has been to draw a strong
line of distinction between the moderation of the NF (and UMNO), and the
extremism of most other Malay Muslim groups (e.g. PAS). Yet, while in
1982 a vote for the NF was apparently still a vote for "moderation, 21
stability and ethnic accommodation", non-Malay perceptions of the NF may well be changing in response to an apparently growing commitment to
a more Islamic government, among UMNO elites.
Whereas until very recently, government strategies for coping with
Islamic outbidding concentrated on granting concessions to Muslims which
did not seriously infringe on the rights or interests of non-Muslims,
the trend now appears to be somewhat more in the direction of zero-sum political choices. The use of government tax revenue to pay for
increasingly extravagant Islamic public works projects (e.g. mosques), the creation of an Islamic Bank which is expected to provide interest-free loans
to Muslims, and the recruitment of leaders who favour the idea of an Islamic
••(e.g. former ABIM president Anwar Ibrahim) are all policies in this vein, which have begun to raise non-Muslim fears. The important political question is whether this trend toward zero-sum political choices, and non-
Malay alienation can be controlled under pressure from Islamic outbidders.
In this regard, the government's task is made more difficult by the strong emotional appeal of Islamic symbols to the Malay peasantry, and by the legitimacy (religious and political) which is attributed to political 26
appeals phrased in an Islamic idiom. Nonetheless, the argument and evidence of Chapter IV suggest that the government has, so far, been success• ful in controlling the trend toward Islamic extremism, and that while the new administration appears to be more strongly pro-Islamic, it is premature to predict a serious breakdown of inter-ethnic accommodation as a political
consequence of this change.
Islamic Resurgence and Intra-Ethnic Cleavages
Closer to the mainstream of general literature on the political 23
significance of Islamic resurgence, are those authors who stress the utility of Islamic ideology, symbols and organizations for waging battle
against the incumbent Malay political elite and the socio-political
status quo. These authors draw attention to the way in which the Islamic
resurgence in Malaysia is both symptomatic of existing intra-Malay
cleavages, and is contributing to the formation and hardening of new
divisions. A decade ago" Baker suggested that religious values in Malaysia
had begun to emerge as a reaction and an alternative to increasing 24 bureaucratization and the values of the then existing political elite. More recently, Kassim has written that:
The long term implications of the dakwah movement are grave for the UMNO leadership, as renewed faith in the religion inevitably leads its adherents to question the basic fundamentals of the state structure.25
Lyon, Kessler (1980), and Peiris are closer to the position of
Esposito and Hudson, in their emphasis on the role of Islam as an instrument
of political counter-elites. Hudson writes: 27
Opposition movements, with little hope of achieving power, without mobilizing popular pressure against the regime, look therefore to Islamic ideology as an instrument rather than as an end in itself for settling...basic political problems.26
Peiris echoes Hudson when he argues that Malaysia's Islamic revival is not an attempt to restore the faith, but rather is a "political tool with which new social classes want to expand their own opportunities to acquire 27 more of man's worldly goods". Peiris is undoubtedly partially correct; there certainly are counter-elites who 'use' religion for other less religious ends. That alone, however, is not a satisfactory characteriza• tion of the diverse movement of Islamic resurgence.
Lyon, on the other hand, acknowledges that the dakwah phenomenon in 2 8 Malaysia is part of "an increasing concern with religion". However, she contends that it is, more importantly, an expression of a "struggle 29 taking place within the Malay community". It is clear that this struggle
is a political one, between government and anti-government forces, over
the "basic questions of just where control of religion lies, and just what 30
the boundaries of that religion are vis a* vis the state". This intra-
Malay confrontation, Lyon argues, is the result of a number of "basic
contradictions" in Malaysian "state structure" and society, which have 31
arisen since 1969. It is no doubt true that tensions exist within
Malaysian and Malay society, but it is perhaps an oversimplification to
characterize them in terms of a government versus non-government polari•
zation. Symptomatic of Lyon's tendency to make large claims on small
evidence is her discussion of the relationship between Islam and class 28
differences. "Islamic principles", she writes "are being used to articu• late economic grievances but in such a way as to cut across racial lines".'
This kind of oversimplification is evidenced again in her prediction of the political consequences of Islamic resurgence:
...should such groups become the basis of political mobilization and therefore broaden the base of politi• cal opposition to the National Front, the ruling group could easily fail to get the Parliamentary majority they need in any election.33
Kessler's treatment of intra-Malay cleavages and their relationship to Islam is somewhat more subtle. In its simplest form, his argument is that Malaysia's Islamic resurgence is the religious expression of Malay political and social disaffection.
On the one hand a genuinely religious movement, (dakwah) also constitutes, on the other, a critique of the bureau• cratic state, its economic policies and its deracinating cultural effects.34
Whereas once this disaffection formed the basis of PAS support, he argues,
the reorganization of public political life after 1969, and the co-optaion
of PAS into the National Front, forced dissatisfied Malays to seek new
"para-political" outlets for their grievances. Many former PAS supporters
have, according to Kessler, "opted out of politics, preferring involvement
in the many sects and associations and the broad intellectual stream of
religious revivalism".
In addition to the limitations place on open political activity,
Kessler isolates the post-1969 modernization strategy of the government
as a source of Malay disaffection. Malays in various sectors of the
economy and society, he argues, have been adversely affected by these 29
policies. In rural areas, for instance, development programs have often served to undermine traditional Malay local leaders (penghulu and ketua kampong for example), and Malay culture, or have widened the gap between rich and poor Malays. The processes of urbanization, westernization and the experience of education abroad, have proven traumatic for many young
Malays, but at the same time have given them improved access to the ideas
and the organizations of Islam. Moreover, given the limits placed on
student political activity, Islamic groups have provided, in Kessler's view a 'necessary' outlet for the expression of discontent, much as
organizations such as the Malay Language Society did in the 1960's.
Finally, Kessler argues that the development, under the NEP, of a class
of state-subsidized Malay entrepreneurs, has cut into the territory 36
of the small independent Malay businessman.
Though it is based'on evidence from Kelantan only, Kessler' s reasoning
seems quite-sound, particularly with regard to the motivations of the
educated, urban and professional sectors, from whose ranks are drawn the
vast majority of urban dakwah activists and followers. Kessler's study,
then, lends some support to the idea that the Islamic resurgence reflects
cleavages within the Malay community. On the other hand, there does not
appear to be much recent evidence to support the argument that dakwah,
or for that matter PAS, represents the interests of the Malay urban and
rural poor. In fact, dakwah organizations associated with workers and
peasants have been notably absent, and PAS, outside of Kelantan, has not
demonstrated any great interest in, nor gained much support through 37 appeals to the economic grievances of the Malay peasantry. Kessler is 30
perhaps too anxious to generalize from the Kelantan experience, which he has studied so thoroughly, and as a result portrays the Islamic resurgence in Malaysia as a potential popular united front of opposition 38 to the government. In this sense, like Lyon, he minimizes the likely differences within such an Islamic front, and consequently over-estimates the extent of government versus anti-government polarization, and the potential threat to the status quo posed by the latter.
Lyon and Kessler both, are essentially in agreement with the argument of Hudson, which is based on the analysis of Islamic resurgence
in several modernizing states; With its potentially intense and pervasive ideolo• gical power... and given the fact that Islamic opposition is generally compatible with other kinds of opposition, it is possible that it could serve as the catalyst for serious challenges to these regimes. (Emphasis added)39
It is outside the scope of this study to assess the general validity of
Hudson's argument, but it is possible to demonstrate that, for the Malaysian
case, it has serious weaknesses. Simply stated these are: first, that
although Islam is 'pervasive' in the Malay community, it is by no means
uniform or homogenous, either in the intensity with which it is believed, 40
or in its organizational and ideological manifestations. The differences
between the sub-communities of Malaysian Islam, which will be examined in
the next chapter, impose serious barriers to anything like an Islamic
united front. Secondly, there is very little evidence indeed to suggest
that, in Malaysia, an Islamic opposition is compatible with most other
kinds of opposition. While this is most obviously true in the case of
non-Malay parties, like DAP, it is also true of different Malay-Muslim
groups and organizations. The political demands of these groups are as 31
often made in competition with other Malay groups as they are in direct confrontation with the government. The result of this competition is a
"struggle between established leaders and opposition groups, and among various opposition groups, to represent the purest, truest, and often the 41 most extreme form of Islam". It is misleading, then, to speak of an
"Islamic opposition" as a singular, homogenous entity, 'compatible' with other forms of opposition. Under present circumstances, in Malaysia,
compatibility does not exist within the Islamic community, let alone between it and other kinds of opposition.
To the extent that an Islamic challenge does exist, the literature which stresses intra-Malay cleavages does not provide any systematic treatment of the government's attempts to cope with it. Only Lyon provides a check-list of government strategies, both coercive and co- optative, but even these are not analysed within the framework of the
Malaysian consociational style of governance. Consequently, it is difficult to judge the potential for success or failure of these strategies.
By viewing them in semi-isolation Lyon unintentionally obscures the strong
similarities between the strategies presently used to cope with the
Islamic challenge, and the well-established and highly successful practices used by the National Front in other issue-areas. Instead, she stresses the discontinuity in government policy, and the presumed deleterious effect which it will have on Malay political support for incumbent elites.
Lyon writes, for example that: the dilemma for the government would seem to be how to respond to the demands for a greater role for Islam in 32
the state without undermining the structure of the state and therefore its basis of support.42
Her estimation of the government':s ability to respond successfully is quite
low, as evidenced by her prediction that it is only necessary for Islamic
groups to become 'politically mobilized' before the ruling elite will lose 43
its stable non-elite support. Kessler is somewhat more cautious in his predictions of the dwindling of Malay support, but like Lyon (and
Funston), he implies that it is the government's own policies which are
the chief cause of Malay-Muslim disaffection, and which are likely to
encourage the growth of a strong Islamic opposition. In Kessler's view
then, a continuation of National Front politics and strategies for coping
with the Islamic challenge (i.e. those used up until 1980), is likely to
exacerbate the problem. Chapter IV of this study will suggest that
Kessler, Lyon and Funston seriously underestimate the flexibility and
viability of government strategies in this regard, both as they pertain
to the maintenance of stable Malay non-elite support, and to the avoidance
of non-Malay alienation from the National Front.
Summary
The arguments and criticisms presented in this chapter can be
summarized in the following four points. (1) The arguments which emphasize
the relationship between the Islamic resurgence and inter-ethnic cleavages
obscure important intra-Malay and intra-Islamic cleavages, by focussing
somewhat too heavily on the overlap betwen ethnic (Malay) and religious
(Muslim) identities. (2) Some elements within the larger movement
represent and express chauvinistic Malay sentiments, but it is misleading
to characterize the whole movement primarily in terms of inter-ethnic 33
divisions. (3) The religious diversity which exists within the Malay
Muslim community probably reflects political and social, as well as strictly religious divisions among Malays, but the configuration of these divisions is considerably more complex, and less polarized than most
authors suggest. (4) Both schools of thought examined here underestimate the effectiveness of government strategies for coping with the Islamic resurgence. Those authors who emphasize the dangers of ethnic polari•
zation appear to assume that religiously-based outbidding is necessarily more difficult to accommodate. Those who portray the danger to the political system primarily as a matter of an Islamic challenge to the
incumbent Malay elites, while they agree that Islamic outbidding is
difficult to accommodate, imply that government strategy may in fact be
exacerbating political and religious disaffection. Neither school of
thought carefully analyses the relationship between the strategies of the
government and the complexity and character of intra-Islamic cleavages. 34
FOOTNOTES
Chapter II
1. Gordon P. Means. "Public Policy Toward Religion in Malaysia", Pacific Affairs 51(3) (Fall, 1978), pp. 386-405; Judith A. Nagata, "Religious Ideology and Social Change: The Islamic Revival in Malaysia," Pacific Affairs 53(3) Fall, 1980) pp. 405-39; N. J. Funston, "Malaysia", Chapter 9 in The Politics of Islamic Reassertion, Mohammed Ayoob (ed.), (London: Croom Helm, 1981), pp. 165-89; F. von der Mehden, "The Islamic Resurgence in Malaysia" in J. L. Esposito (ed.), Islam and Development, (Syracuse University Press, 1980), pp. 163-80.
2. Margo L. Lyon, "The Dakwah Movement in Malaysia" Review of Indonesian and Malayan Affairs 12(2) (December 1979), pp. 34-45; Clive S. Kessler, "Malaysia: Islamic Revival and Political Disaffec• tion in a Divided Society" Southeast Asia Chronicle, no. 75 (October 1980) pp. 3-10; Denzil Peiris, "The Green Revolution" Far Eastern Economic Review, 9 February 1979, pp. 26-27.
3. Constantine Zurayk, "Tensions in Islamic Civilization," Washington, Georgetown University, 1978. See also Clifford Geertz, Islam Observed: Religious Development in Morocco and Indonesia (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971), and idem, The Religion of Java (Illinois: Glencoe, 1960).
4. Judith A. Nagata, "Perceptions of Social Inequality in Malaysia", pp. 122-27.
5. Judith A. Nagata, Malaysian Mosaic, p. 176. It is difficult to make a case for the class consciousness of the peasantry on the basis of, say, the 1980 Alor Setar riot. Moreover, it should be noted occasional violent outbursts, incidents of landgrabbing, and the emergence of cult movements, are all more traditional responses to social and economic difficulties •-- they do not reflect a new awareness of class interests.
6. Far Eastern Economic Review, 3 July 1981, pp. 14-16.
7. Gordon P. Means, "Public Policy Toward Religion in Malaysia," p. 402.
8. Gordon P. Means, "The Role of Islam in the Political Development of Malaysia", Comparative Politics, 1 (2) (January 1969), pp. 282-83.
9. N. J. Funston, "Malaysia", in The Politics of Islamic Reassertion, M. Ayoob (ed.), pp. 171-72. 35
10. Ibid., 184.
11. Judith A. Nagata, "Religious Ideology and Social Change: The Islamic Revival in Malaysia," p. 409. In Malaysian Mosaic,p.48, Nagata refers to the Islamic resurgence as "an affirmation of Malay political and ethnic identity".
12. Ibid., p. 409.
13. Ibid., p. 412. Also see W. A. Halim bin Othman, "Ethnogenesis: A Case Study of the Malays of Peninsular Malaysia", (Ph.D. thesis, University of Bristol, 1979). Othman argues that Malays are par• ticularly sensitive to external social and political stimuli, which are very often perceived as 'threats' to the Malay identity.
14. Judith A. Nagata, "Religious Ideology...", pp. 435-36.
15. Fred R. von der Mehden, "The Islamic Resurgence in Malaysia," in J. L . Esposito (ed.), Islam and Development, p. 164. von der Mehden writes: "Within Malay society there is an integrated perception of religion, traditional values, and village and family life. It is difficult for the Malay to disentangle Islam from this whole."
16. Ibid., p. 170.
17. Ibid., p. 164.
18. Ibid., p. 171.
19. Ibid., p. 180.
20. See Table 3.
21. R. S. Milne and Diane K. Mauzy, Politics and Government in Malaysia, p. 401.
22. See chapter IV for a fuller treatment of state strategies toward Islam. See p. 83, Chapter IV. for a discussion of the legitimacy of Islamic opposition.
23. Within the growing body of works on the subject of Islamic resurgence and politics, the following represent,more or less, the main theoretical thrust: Mohammed Ayoob, (ed.), The Politics of Islamic Reassertion, esp. Introduction, "The Myth of the Monolith"; Conclusion "The Discernable Patterns", (London: Croom Helm, 1981). John L. Esposito (ed.), Islam and Development (Syracuse University Press, 1980), esp. Michael C. Hudson, "Islam and Political Development", pp. 1-25; and J. T. Cummings, et. al., "Islam and Modern Economic Change", pp. 25-48. 36
24. David J. Baker, Local Muslim Organizations and National Politics in Malaysia (Ph.D. thesis, University of California, Berkeley, 1973).
25. Ismail Kassim, Race, Politics and Moderation: A Study of the Malaysian Electoral Process (Singapore: Times Books International, 1979), p. 119.
26. Michael C. Hudson, "Islam and Political Development", p. 18.
27. Denzil Peiris, "The Green Revolution", Far Eastern Economic Review, 9 February 1979, p. 27.
28. Margo L. Lyon, "Dakwah Movement in Malaysia," p. 35..
29. Ibid., p. 35.
30. Ibid., p. 35.
31. Ibid., pp. 39-42. These "contradictions" include (1) Islam vs. the secular state; (2) Federal vs_. state jurisdiction over Islam; (3) racial-religious tensions; (4) class differences within the Malay community. For further discussion on the relationship between federal and state governments in religious matters, and on the constitutional position of the Rulers vis st vis Islam,
see Chapters III & IV, esp. 55-56, 79-80,; 82, 89, .92.
32. Ibid., p. 42-43.
33. Ibid., p. 44.
34. Clive S. Kessler, "Malaysia: Islamic Revivalism and Political Disaccection..." Southeast Asia Chronicle no. 75 (October 1980), p. 3.
35. Ibid., p. 8.
36. Ibid., passim. Kessler does not note that the NEP had also 'created' many small businessmen.
37. The social bases of the various Islamic parties and groups are discussed in more detail in Chapter III.
38. In his Religion and Politics in a Malay State, p. 35, Kessler argues for instance that PAS "...expressed class antagonisms between Malays rather than ethnic antagonism between Malays and Chinese." The situation in Kelantan was unique in a number of ways. Perhaps most importantly, there existed a strong polari• zation within the Malay community, which Kessler says reflected 37
class antagonisms. Others have identified the split as one between an elite and a counter-elite. Either way, it was the polarization which was so significant and so unique.
39. Michael C. Hudson, "Islam and Political Development", p. 22.
40. Judith A. Nagata, Malaysian Mosaic, passim; Also Afifuddin bin Haji Omar, Peasants Institutions and Development in Malaysia: The Political Economy of Development in the Muda Region (Ph.D. thesis, Cornell University, 1978). Also see discussion of social heterogeneity in Kedah, chapter III.
41. Michael C. Hudson, "Islam and Political Development", pp. 15-16.
42. Margo L. Lyon, "The Dakwah Movement in Malaysia", p. 45.
43. See p. 28, fn. 33. 38
CHAPTER III: INTRA-MALAY AND INTRA-ISLAMIC CLEAVAGES
Religious schisms usually involve strong and open differences on matters of doctrine. It is rare, however, for such differences to be
the sole, or even the primary cause of a schism. At the heart of internal
religious conflict there is often a debate over the approach which will
best promote the unity and vitality of the faith. These debates are
inherently political, because they reflect the competing opinions of
individuals or social groups who, by virtue of their position in social
and political structures, have different statuses, goals, interests,
values and degrees of access to political power, and, moreover, because
their outcome affects the distribution of values and political power in
the society. Religious schisms frequently reflect even more explicit
political differences. Geertz, writing about Javenese Islam, has argued
that divisions between santri (both moderen and kolot), abangan, and the
priyayi, faithfully reflect lines of competition for political power.^
Nagata, in a recent paper on Islam in rural Malaysia, writes:
In Malay communities maintenance of legitimacy is often a consideration in the adoption and interpretation of doctrinal issues, and as such, another aspect of power and authority in local level religious life.^
Religious schisms, then, are rarely religious only, in the western
sense of the term. Alignment with one or another theological position
may reflect "exogenous" factors such as "political tendencies, social
pressures, financial situation, age and attitude of the bearer of the 3 message". The present Islamic resurgence has contributed to divisions 39
within Malaysian Islam, but it will be argued in this chapter that these
divisions are not strictly theological in origin (although they are
partly that), but rather are the expression of other social and political
divisions within the Malay community. It is for this reason that it is
misleading to speak of Malaysian Islam today primarily as a charter of
ethnic unity. Moreover, the configuration of intra-Islamic cleavages
which is described below belies the argument that there exists a polari•
zation between government and anti-government forces within the Islamic
community in Malaysia.
Kaum Muda and Kaum Tua
The split, in the 1920's and 1930's, between the Kaum Muda (Young
Faction) and the Kaum Tua (Old Faction), was not simply a division between
competing views of Islamic orthodoxy. It reflected and gave expression
to important political and social differences within Malay society. Due
to their different socio-political positions (and the varied religious
and intellectual exposure which accompanied these), members of the two
'factions'saw the future of Malay Islam and Malay society in quite dif•
ferent terms. The distinction between Tua and Muda was symptomatic of
an important heterogeneity of values in Malay society. On the one hand,
those who had an essentially conservative (status quo) orientation would
tend to support the Tua side, while, on the other, those who sought to
challenge the political and religious status quo, on the grounds that it 4 had weakened Malay society, would be supporters of the Kaum Muda. 40
More explicitly, the division paralleled the distinction between members of the religio-political elite (and their followers), and members of a Malay counter-elite, a group with different social origins, intellectual attitudes, and access to political power. Roff writes that the schism was the result of the Kaum Muda challenge to the "very basis of customary authority", which consisted of a "powerful and pervasive" alliance between the traditional political elite and orthodox Islam.^
The leaders of Kaum Muda were from a different socio-economic group than the majority of Malays - primarily urban intellectual and professionals - and most were not Malays from Peninsular Malaya. At the local, rural level, Nagata notes, these foreign-born and urban-educated men "raised questions as to the legitimacy of the local religious elites and attacked the orthodoxy of many of their teachings".^ In sum, Roff writes that:
It was the innovatory and potentially disruptive character of this teaching that brought the reformists, known pejora• tively as the Kuam Muda into conflict with other groups in Malay society - the official religious hierarchy, the tradi• tional Malay elite, and the rural ulama, collectively the Old Faction or Kaum Tua .7
The Kaum Muda - Kaum Tua conflict percolated to the kampong (village) level where it became entangled with other socio-economic issues. In the kampong to be Kaum Muda was "to espouse modernism in any form and go against tradition; to be Kaum Tua was to be in favour of all that was g familiar, unchanging and secure". Means argues that the emergence of such division's at the local level came as a consequence of the increasing divergence in religious knowledge between some religious leaders and the majority of followers, and also as a result of a growing awareness of the 41
contradictions between Malay adat and "true" Islam which came with the influence of Middle-Eastern Islamic reformism. The Kaum Muda - Kaum Tua
conflict, he writes, was the beginning of tensions between "the folk 9 religion of the Malay kampong and the demands of orthodox Islam".
Today, Malay folk religion is once again under attack, and Nagata notes that its status "seems to be less dependent on an inherent ideolo•
gical or theological tension between Islamic and non-Islamic traditions, than on conditions in the wider social environment".'''^ The nature of this tension between folk religion and "orthodox" Islam emanating from the urban centres is one of the important themes of this chapter. It would be a mistake, however, to limit the discussion of Malaysian Islam
to this one axis of division, because the present configuration of the
religion today is not so clearly bipolar as the earlier Kaum Muda - Kaum
Tua split seems to have been. It is no longer appropriate (if it ever was) to draw a line between the traditional political-religious elite
and their followers on the one hand, and the modern, urban challengers, on
the other. The present pattern is considerably more complex. For
instance, in rural areas, Islamic leaders may be.either modern or tradi•
tional but still be distinguishable from leaders whose appeal and 11
philosophy is more adat-oriented. In other words, religious orthodoxy
may come in modern and traditional forms. In urban areas, differences
in social origins, theological orientation and political goals exist
between groups which are collectively called 'fundamentalist'. In the
contact between urban and rural Islam there are wide variations in the 42
degree of receptivity and compatibility between groups. Finally, groups representing almost all degrees of orthodoxy, modernity and tradition, may be divided according to their attitudes and political position relative to state and federal governments. For example, at least since
the 1950's, many local religious leaders have resented and resisted the
incursions of the government in areas of their traditional political
and doctrinal jurisdiction. Thus state (secular) and religious elites 12
no longer comprise a coherent ruling elite. This, in rather simplified
form, is the basis of the present "multipolar" configuration of Malaysian
Islam. And it is this multipolarity which has so far made, and will
continue to make extremely unlikely, a united, coherent Islamic opposition
to the government and the political status quo. In order to more fully
grasp the divisions which exist within Malaysian Islam, it is necessary
to examine in detail (i) the socio-political bases and origins, and (ii)
the ideology and goals of the most prominent Islamic organizations and
movements. Special attention will be paid to PAS: the three most
influential urban dakwah organizations (ABIM, Jema'at Tabligh, and
Par'ul Arqam); and the group of smaller groups known collectively as
'extremists' and 'deviationists'.
13
PAS - Socio-political Origins
Malay political opposition, bu the time of Merdeka, drew its
support and leadership from three major groups: (1) Radical nationalists,
with social and even secularist leanings; (2) Islamic reformers, like
Dr. Burhanuddin, especially from the urban middle-class religious 43
intelligentsia; (3) Conservative Muslim teachers and scholars, members of the state Islamic bureaucracies, disaffected UMNO sub-elites, and 14 their respective followers. The three streams of Malay political opposition found an institutional base in PAS, which having been created by UMNO as the Pan Malayan Union of the Religiously Learned, in 1951, was, in 1955, registered as an independent political party.
Of the three components of PAS it was the third group (the rural ulama etc.) which took the longest to join the opposition. By 1947, the
left-wing Malay Nationalist Party (MNP) had allied with the Pan Malayan
Supreme Islamic Council (MATA), which represented Islamic reformism and which, one year later formed the reformist Hizbul Muslimin, (Islamic
Party).^ Together, the left-wing and Islamic reformist elements were,
in the late 1940's, a force powerful enough for the British to consider
it expedient to ban most associated organizations.^ At the same time,
the colonial government was endeavoring to cement its ties with the
traditional leaders of Islam - the Rulers and the rural ulama - who were under serious attack from reformist groups. The British preferred to
negotiate independence with the representatives of a more conservative
and 'apolitical' interpretation of Islam - that is a Kaum Tua interpre•
tation - and UMNO filled the bill. Significantly, together with the 1
Sultans, UMNO was also the preferred choice of the majority of ordinary
Malays.
While the chief foci of early Malay political opposition were
Islamic reformism and radical Malay nationalism, by the late 1950's the 44
more conservative Islamic community had joined the anti-UMNO camp,
appalled by the collaborationist (pro-kafir) stance of UMNO in the
independence negotiations. "The dislike of Islamic reformism amongst
Islamic conservatives was certainly exceeded by their dislike of the kafir non-Malays, whom UMNO then appeared to be most earnestly soliciting.'
PAS - Social Base
Despite the diversity which characterized the early PAS leadership,
its primary constituency in the post Merdeka period has been the more
traditional rural religious leaders (ulama, imam, bilal, haj i, tok guru),
and their Malay peasant followers. Kessler has found that PAS leaders
tend to be of humble birth (i.e. not aristocratic), and are more likely
to have received a religious or Malay vernacular education than their 18
counterparts in UMNO. PAS' political strength has been traditionally
concentrated in those areas with large rural Malay majorities (the four
northern states of Kelantan, Trengganu, Kedah and Perlis), and for
obvious reasons, it has had least success in ethnically mixed and pre- 19
dominantly non-Malay constituencies.
In spite of reports that social mobilization and modernization
have begun to disrupt traditional social patterns of deference and
loyalty in rural areas, the ability of rural PAS leaders to mobilize
large followings does not, at first glance, appear to have been weakened.
In the 1978 and 1982 elections the small number of federal seats won
each time by PAS (5) masked a fairly impressive achievement in terms of 45
the percentage of valid vote polled (see Table #2). Even more impressive has been PAS' performance in the four northern states, where in 1978 it polled 40.29%, and in 1982 38.21%, of the popular vote in Parliamentary
contests (see Table #8). In state elections, in 1982, PAS staged some•
thing of a comeback, winning 10 of 36 seats in Kelantan (having won only
2 of 36 in 1978), and 5 of 28 seats in Trengganu (having won none in
1978) (see Table #4). In both states PAS increased its share of the
popular vote in Parliamentary elections by about 3% (see Table #11),
indicating that in the most heavily rural and Malay constituencies, PAS
has not lost its appeal.
All of the electoral evidence is not so promising for PAS. For
instance in Kedah, where PAS has historically threatened UMNO hegemony,
the 1982 results showed a serious decline both in popular vote polled, 20
and seats won by PAS. In 1978, in Kedah, PAS polled 39.7% of the
federal vote and won 2 of 13 Parliamentary and 7 of 26 state seats. In
1982 the equivalent statistics were 30.98%, 1 of 13, and 2 of 26. In
terms of national averages PAS fared somewhat worse in 1982 than in 1978,
polling only 16.25% of the total valid vote, with 82 candidates, as
compared with 17.48% in 1978 with 87 candidates. In more than half of
the states PAS gained a smaller percentage of the popular vote than it
had in the previous election (see Table #10). Although the most serious
setback occurred in Kedah, PAS suffered heavily in the ethnically mixed
and urban areas of Penang (10.8% with 6 candidates in 1978 - 2.5% with
2 candidates in 1982), the Federal Territory (6.5% with 2 candidates in 46
1978 - 2.8% with 2 candidates in 1982), and Selangor (9.9% with 8
candidates in 1978 - 5.4% with 8 candidates in 1982). The weakening of PAS support in these areas suggests that PAS is not benefiting
from the urban dakwah phenomenon, but may be staying aloft due to the intensification of Islamic belief in some rural areas, (although not in
Kedah). Finally, it should be noted that the good showing of PAS in
Trengganu and Kelantan is really a return to normal after the serious weakening of PAS credibility in 1978. Significantly, in 1978, a number of former PAS seats were actually won by Berjasa rather than UMNO, and 21 many PAS losses were by very small margins. PAS strength in the North• east, then, should not be too readily attributed to the Islamic resurgence.
In short, despite evidence that PAS is holding its own in some states, the Islamic resurgence does not yet appear to have been a tremendous boon to the electoral success of the party.
The reasons for this remain somewhat obscure, but some studies have suggested that it is under the pressure of the Islamic resurgence, and the new Islamic leaders which it has generated, that the legitimacy of traditional religious leaders associated with PAS, has begun to be 22 challenged. The challenge has come from a number of quarters; from government appointed ulama and missionaries, from representatives of the urban dakwah organizations, and from the more 'extremist' or semi-Islamic religious leaders. On this score Nagata writes that religious leaders in rural areas "may be apprehensive of undesirable competition and confrontation in religious matters - more kafir mengafir - which could 47
show the rural PAS leaders up to disadvantage".^ Elsewhere she notes that "government dakwah representatives are equally unacceptable to PAS 24
sympathisers". Regardless of the issue, the mission, or the source of the challenge, traditional local elites are not keen on being dis• placed by new leaders. The consequence, in rural areas, has been the emergence, or perhaps more accurately the intensification, of religious tension within the kampong religious community. As Jansen writes,
"the tussle is not so much over the place of Islam in a Muslim society but more over what sort of Islam it should be, and who should be the 25 mediators and interpreters of Islam to the rest of society" (emphasis added). Unlike earlier divisions, however, the threat to the legitimacy and autonomy of the traditional local leaders comes today, not just from the Islamic reformists (Kaum Muda), but from government appointed ulama, 2 6 and from various 'extremist' charismatic leaders. The threat, then, is not only greater, it is also more diverse than it once was. It is this diversity in the challenge which makes more difficult, for tradi• tional religious leaders, the task of maintaining their religious and political legitimacy. It is this diversity, moreover, which limits the likelihood of a religiously-based,, government versus non-government polarization in the countryside which would be of benefit to the electoral prospects of PAS. The present PAS versus UMNO political/ electoral polarization is not deepened or intensified by a corresponding religio-political polarization. 48
Extremists and Deviationists - Socio-political Origins and Base
Under attack from both the government and the new urban dakwah organizations, have been the so-called 'extremist' or 'deviant' rural
Islamic movements. Nagata writes;
Through historical connexions with a long Sufi tradition...some of the more charismatic ulama have generated their own idiosyncratic cults and religious movements, or tarikat, usually of only local importance, with intensely personal followings in just one or two villages.27
She fails to mention, however, that the leaders of the most active and the most extreme of these movements are very frequently of foreign birth,
(from Pakistan, Southern Thailand, Kampuchea and Indonesia for example).
This pattern suggests, first, the importance of social dislocation and change as a factor in generating support for these movements, and second, the reverence which is generally shown, in rural Malay society, for men with a claim of close connections (through birth or education) to descendents of the Prophet, and for men with exceptional magical or r- spiritual powers. It is in both of these respects that it is appropriate to refer to these religious movements as "the rural and traditional 2 8 variant of the modern dakwah teachings of the urban educated sector". The recently active Organization of Warriors for Allah (P.A.S. not PAS), for instance, is believed to have links with the Red Sash invulnerablity 29 cult, which represents an old Malay tradition of resistance to outside authority, and which is generally mobilized in times of social and political upheaval and uncertainty. Stockwell writes that; 49
Cult movements were essentially village phenomena which erupted at particular times of political and social unrest, when the wider framework of the state - its social hierarchy and administrative system - failed to safeguard kampong life.30
Such times have included, most notably, the immediate post-war period, the Malayan Union period and the 1969 crisis.
In addition to being a sociological manifestation of unrest, cult movements in Malaysia have historically proven to be useful, and often necessary, in the mobilization of political support, most often in opposition to established authority. Significantly, it has often been the men of Javanese and other foreign origins, who have most successfully 31 mobilized such opposition. In the immediate post-war period (1945-48), for example, the predominantly foreign-born Islamic reformist leaders,
made use of un-reformed Islam, with its animist additions of magic and invulnerability, for the purpose of undermining the loyalty of the kampong to those Malay leaders who had become identified with the administration of British Malaya.32
The similarities between the present rural religious cults and those of the 1940's are indeed striking. In addition to their resistance to established authority, both are notable for their heavy reliance on myths of invulnerability, the spiritual powers of their leaders, and the use of violence to achieve their ends. The followers of a religious group known as Crypto, for example, apparently believe that membership 33 in the group ensures immortality. The Army of Allah (Tentera Sabilluhlah) was thought to be responsible for the series of Hindu shrine desecrations 34 in 1978-79. The wounding of several men and women in the violent attack on the police station at Batu Pahat, in November 1980, was conducted by the followers of a Cham Muslim refugee who claimed to be the imam mahdi 50
(future Prophet). Observers of the slaughter reported that the members of the group appeared to be in an entranced state, and to be unconcerned 35 for their own safety. In general, however, it is the use of violence in achieving their ends which justifies the use of the term extremist to describe most of these groups.
Numerous other religious movements of this kind have surfaced in recent years. In some cases they have clearly been influenced by the broader stream of Islamic resurgence, as in the case of the cult leader who called himself the Ayatollah of Malaysia. The tradition of the rejection of established authority found in Mahdism (a millenarian tradi• tion within Islam based upon the expected coming of a new Prophet), has also gained a measure of popularity and credibility as a result of the 36 resurgence of Islam. But despite the encouraging effect of the resurgence on the growth of these cults they, like the earlier movements, have only local followings and a largely local significance. They can, however, pose a serious challenge to the legitimacy of the more orthodox 37 religious leaders at the local level. In this sense, the emergence of an extremist rural variant of dakwah may be weakening the social- religious base of PAS support. Early in 1982, the New Straits Times reported that citizens of Jelutong had formed a Village Action Committee to combat the disintegrative effects of "deviationist teachings". One villager is quoted as saying: We are very concerned about the serious implications of these teachings. They have caused children to go against their fathers. Families seem to have split.38 51
Extremist groups, then, may be encouraging the disintegration of traditional patterns of loyalty in religious communities. Further evidence to this effect can be found in the dwindling numbers of tradi• tional pondoks, long recognized as the social and organizational base of PAS support, particularly in the four northern states. Afifuddin estimates that, in the north of Kedah where once there were about 80 39 pondoks, there now remain no more than.40. Nagata reports that pondoks are now infrequently taken over by the sons of gurus,and that "on the admission of the gurus themselves" "the total institution of the old 40 pondok is dying". There are no doubt many other factors influencing this decline, including the growing demand for (and supply of) secular and academic education, for example. However, the presence of charis• matic religious leaders, claiming legitimacy on the basis of spiritual and magical powers, and through more appealing variations of Islamic teachings, must be of concern to the more orthodox rural ulama. What• ever the sociological and political origins of these alternate philosophies and movements, it is clear that they can result in increased competition between local leaders for the local following. Nagata describes the significance of the competition for a following in these terms: While purely doctrinal questions are important, these sometimes take a subordinate position to the maintenance of the leader-follower relationship as such, and in this sense the guru as broker is the voice of his con• stituents as well as the authoritarian bearer or interpreter of a tradition or orthodoxy.41 Thus, in the rural areas, the Islamic resurgence and the rural 52
variant of dakwah, is more likely to increase religio-political competi•
tion than to encourage the unification of the Malay Muslim community
behind an organization like PAS. Under these conditions a coherent
Islamic opposition to the government is unlikely to develop. Moreover,
as the number of different groups competing for the rural constituency
grows, the chances for unity diminish.
Islam in Malaysia may best be portrayed as a series of small communities and movements, each with its own established (but potentially conflicting and competing) patterns of guru-disciple legitimacy.42
As noted at the outset, however, divisions within the Malay-Muslim
community are likely to be minimized at a time of crisis. For example,
if Islam or the Malay community as a whole were represented as being in
serious danger (as in 1969), one would not expect intra-Islamic or 43 personal differences to stand in the way of political unity.
Urban Dakwah - Socio-political Origins and Bases
In the Malaysian context Islamic resurgence is most commonly
referred to as the "dakwah movement". Although dakwah is an Arabic word
which describes the task of propagating the faith (literally 'invitation'
or 'call'), in Malaysia it is broadly used to connote the intellectual-
cultural phenomenon of a stricter, more self-conscious adherence to
Islamic principles among Malays, and is also more narrowly used in reference
to the organizations involved in carrying out missionary work among believers and non-believers alike.^ In both senses, dakwah in Malaysia
is primarily an urban middle-class phenomenon. 53
Like earlier movements to reform Islam, the present revitaliza- tion has occurred in response to external social, political and economic pressures and from "a sense of social and cultural crisis, in which • patterns of authority sanctioned by religious practice no longer seem 45 valid'.'. More specifically in the post-Merdeka period the perceived challenge has come in the form of a western derived pattern of moderni• zation. Members of the young, educated urban middle class have been critical of this strategy and have, in recent years, rallied around
Islam as the major symbolic and organizational focus of their discontent over the alleged "materialism, corruption and cultural westernization 46 of the ruling elites". The urban dakwah movements,of the 1970's and 1980's have their 47 roots in the student political organizations of the 1960's. In particular, they have developed out of the Malay Language Society (of which Anwar Ibrahim was once the president) and The National Association of Muslim Students. Both of these organizations provided a forum for young intellectuals who felt that the government was not dealing satis• factorily with the problem of Malay backwardness, and was not paying sufficient attention to Malaysia's role in world (Islamic) affairs. Acutely concerned that their English-medium colonial education made them ill-fitted to help forge a new ppst-colonial Malaysia, the students developed an esprit de corps based on Islam, a commitment to upholding the Malay character of the country, and a conviction that Malay economic problems were the major economic problems facing the nation.^ ABIM (Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia - Malaysian Islamic Youth' 54
Movement) was formed by a group of University of Malaya student leaders in 1971, for three stated reasons. First, to provide a forum for graduating students to continue their dakwah activites. Second, to fill the organizational gap for Islamic youth throughout Malaysia.
Third, "to generate an Islamic movement as the path to Islamic revival 49 in Malaysia". A number of social mechanisms have combined to increase the strength of this move toward Islamic revival among Malaysia's urban youth. Perhaps the most obvious has been the renewed confidence in Islam which has come with the world-wide resurgence in recent years.
Other international influences have been the plight of Muslim minorities in southern Thailand and the Philippines; and the links with Indonesia, whence came the model of dakwah organizations as para-political channels.5
Related to the international resurgence of Islam is the experience of young Malays travelling abroad to obtain their tertiary education.
For many, this provides their first exposure to a concerned, active and intellectual Islamic community. Fellow students at foreign universities, especially those from Libya, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, actively propagate a more completely Islamic lifestyle amongst their peers, and encourage a sense of Islamic community through such organizations as the Federation of Students of Islamic Studies (FOSIS) in Great Britain.51 As a result: ...serious doubts have been raised in many minds about the west and its teachings, and these misgivings have undoubtedly been reinforced by...the ascendance of the Muslim world in general.^2
The acceptance of a more rigorously religious lifestyle by Malay students may come, in part, as a consequence of unpleasant or traumatic cultural 55 experiences while studying or travelling abroad. At the very least, there may be, in such a setting, strong pressures encouraging a young
Malay to consolidate an "identity as 'Muslim', a status with more impact 53 and universalistic significance than that of Malay alone".
With the large number of Malays who have returned from abroad to teach or to form various religious associations, even Malays who choose to remain at home for their education are receiving a religious exposure strongly influenced by the fundamentalist-rationalist Islam from abroad.
Moreover, under government programs, the Malay percentage of enrolment in tertiary institutes of education has increased from 40% in 1970 to about 67% in 1980. There has also been an absolute increase in the total number of Malay students, a good number of which have enrolled in the 54 faculty of Islamic Studies at Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia (UKM)
This expansion of tertiary education for Malays has, according to Funston,
"created a much larger pool for organizations like PKPIM" (National
Association of Muslim Students) and ABIM.^
Like the Malay youth who travel abroad those who, under the auspices of the NEP, are moving from the kampong to the urban centres, often find the change in lifestyle traumatic.^ Over the last decade the percentage of Malays in urban areas has increased from 14% to 21% of the Malay population, so that Malays now constitute one third of all urban dwellers, 57 and about 50% of all professional and technical workers. Many of these apparently find solace in the simplicity, and especially the community of Islam. One of the more'important aspects of the culture shock suffered by recently transplanted Malays is, the increasing 56
consciousness of ethnicity. Chandra Muzaffar writes;
In a society where ethnic consciousness is pervasive, Malays who have just become part of a largely non- Malay milieu, are bound to develop an awareness of their ethnic background, which may not have been there when they were amongst their own ethnic kind in the rural areas... Islam provides a useful channel for the expression of this awareness.^
Thus there seems to be some truth to the contention that Islam is employed as a "charter" by which polarization between Malays and non-Malays is expressed. However, the salience of this connection varies from one dakwah group to the next, and with the issue at hand. The ideas and goals expressed by some important urban dakwah groups (like ABIM), for instance, indicate that it is as much the secularist-materialist elements in Malay society itself as it is the Chinese which are the chief concern. These seemingly divergent trends may, in fact, be part of the same phenomenon - the debate over the question of how best to achieve ethnic/religious solidarity. It is significant, however, that this debate entails the expression of both intra-Islamic and inter-ethnic differences.
Although primarily urban-based, the major dakwah organizations have begun to extend their evangelistic activities to rural areas. This has effectively compounded the challenge to traditional religious elites.
Their resentment has been reflected in their coolness, and sometimes their overt antipathy toward the urban missionaries. Despite its reputed association with PAS, for example, ABIM is "often unpopular in rural areas 59 and has not made "a lasting impression on kampong religious culture".
The use, by the urban groups of Arab-style dress is considered to be 57
presumptuous by the older religious men, and it is resented because it
"detracts from the status and distinction of those who have earned the qualification, and from the latter's authority in the village hierarchy"Moreover, the young evangelists are generally regarded, by rural standards "as insufficiently trained in Islam, too inexperienced to lead the prayer or deliver the sermon, and too lacking in wisdom to dispense advice'.'.^ Ironically, they are also considered to be 'too western'.
It ought to be noted of course that the relationship between traditional religious elites and urban missionaries is not always an antagonistic one. Despite the basic problem of age, the educational and occupational status of the urban representatives entitles them to respect within the village system of values. Moreover, groups like ABIM with substantial financial resources and autonomy, are often seen as valuable allies by rural religious leaders whose own resources are limited, or subject to stringent political controls. Some rural religious teachers for instance have entered into partnership with urban groups, in estab• lishing joint religious schools as ah alternative to the educational pro• grams offered by the Ministry of Education. Furthermore ABIM members, at least since 1978, have been actively involved in campaigning on behalf of PAS. In the 1978 elections "at least three ABIM members ran as PAS candidates, although they took the precaution of resigning from ABIM 6 2 first"; resignation was legally necessary because, officially, ABIM is designated as a non-political body, and its members are therefore forbidden to take part in political activities. Again in 1982, former 58
ABIM leaders like Ustaz Fadzil Noor, and Ustaz Nakhaire Ahmad, ran on a
PAS ticket, and ABIM lent its tacit support to the party during the campaign. Finally, the recent trend toward cooperation between fundamen• talist youth and the rural traditionalist Nahdatul Ulama (NU), provides some reason to believe that a similar reconciliation is possible in 63 the Malaysian context.
Such a reconciliation, however, would depend, as it seems to have done in Indonesia, on the emergence of Islam as the primary focus of, and channel for anti-government sentiment. So far, Islam has not assumed that role in Malaysia. Strong differences in the respective political, social and economic goals of these groups (to be discussed shortly) „ would, in any event, make such a rapprochement an extremely precarious arrangement. In the meantime, differences in the social origins and social bases of the two groups limit the opportunities for genuine cooperation as opposed to short-term and politically opportunistic arrangements. Although it has some ' grassroots support, ABIM prefers to gain followers through PAS channels, before possibly assuming an independent political role. For its part, PAS seems content to take advantage of the financial resources of the urban dakwah groups, and of the urban Malay vote which they hope to win with the aid of ABIM campaigners. In the short term, then, differences exist but are not emphasized. In the longer term, if ABIM as an organization assumes a more explicitly political role, competition between PAS and ABIM will probably intensify, rather than diminish, as ABIM tries to establish a following in traditionally PAS areas, and as fundamental differences 59
in goals, interests and style become more apparent. The pattern of this competition, however, will depend significantly on the outcome of the
Old Guard versus Young Turk leadership struggle within PAS, and the extent to which ABIM members actually begin to assume leadership positions within the party. These questions are discussed in greater detail in the following section.
PAS - Goals and Ideology
The official ideology of PAS, since 1955, has been consistently 64 theocratic. One of the party's major themes has been that Islam should guide, not just morality and worship, but also the political and economic affairs of the state.^ In practical terms, however, the goals and orientation of the party have often tended more toward Malay nationalism, as reflected in the slogan 'Bangsa, Ugama, Tanah Ayer' (Race, Religion, 6 6
Native Land). Particularly after the election of Datuk Mohd. Asri bin
Haji Muda as party president in 1964, PAS began to appeal more heavily to Malay chauvinism. With UMNO 'concessions' to non-Malays through the
1960's, PAS gained credibility and support as a defender of Malay rights and culture. Interestingly, then, under conditions which are viewed as threatening to Malay religion and ethnicity, an Islamic party like
PAS could conceivably be a focus for religious/political discontent.
The ambivalence over the party's ideology has been, in part, a matter of political opportunism, but it has also reflected an on-going tension within the party leadership. During the recent election campaign,
UMNO Minister, Sanusi Junid expressed the problem as follows: 60
There is a leadership crisis in PAS; the traditionalists versus the intellectuals. As a result there are no co• ordinated efforts. Statements made by leaders contradict each other.68
From its inception PAS has comprised elements of Islamic reformism, traditionalism, and Malay chauvinism, and these various components have emerged, from time to time, generally in the form of factional leader• ship struggles. For instance, the decision by PAS to join the National
Front, in 1973, triggered a struggle between older collaborationist nationalist leaders, who were aligned behind party president Datuk Mohd.
Asri bin Haji Muda, on the one hand, and the younger more intellectual 69 and vaguely socialist Young Turks, who later aligned behind Ustaz
Fadzil Noor and Ustaz Khaidir Khatib, on the other.
More recently the split within the party has become more pro• nounced. In late 1977 the attempt by Asri loyalists (the Group of Twenty) to topple the Kelantan Mentri Besar, and the ensuing crisis sparked recriminations from the Young Turks, who threatened to form a new party, and many of whom joined Berjasa. This group was further angered by
Asri's appointment of an old friend, Ustaz Abu Bakar Onn, to the position 70 of PAS Secretary General. In the years following the disastrous 1978 elections, Fadzil Noor and his faction were vocal in expressing their 71 opinion that Asri was responsible for PAS' poor showing.
In the period preceding the 1982 elections, the split resurfaced once again, but this time disguised, somewhat, in the idiom of Islam.
The young faction publicly espouse a rationalist and non-communal vision of a Malaysian Darul Islam, a gradualist approach te its attainment and 72 an Islamic-socialist economic system. In this way they distinguish themselves from the old guard, who, after their three-year fling with 61
the National Front, and the exposure of PAS corruption and economic mis• management in Kelantan, are no longer regarded as 'exemplary Islamic men', but as rather opportunistic Malay chauvinists. The younger group makes especially good mileage on their criticism of Asri for intimating that
PAS would cooperate with virtually any party for reasons of political 73 expediency.
Some observers have predicted that PAS support in urban areas, particularly among the young professionals and intelligentsia, would grow significantly under the influence of the new, more credible, group of Islamic leaders. As previously noted, however,the appeal of PAS in urban areas appears to be weakening. To a large extent, this may be the result of the disenchantment of the younger group with the stiff resistance to a turnover in leadership which is being mounted by the old guard. In the period prior to the recent elections numerous PAS branches disbanded, hundreds of PAS members publicly switched their allegiance to UMNO, and many more branches and members threatened to 74 do the same. Their immediate grievance was the last minute change
in the Kelantan PAS nomination list, by Asri and his allies, Nik Aziz and Wan Ismail. The earlier list, engineered by PAS Deputy Commissioner
Encik Mustapha Ali, had included a very high percentage of 'new faces' 75 and reportedly none of the original Group of Twenty. Not only did
Asri and his allies remove a large number of the new faces from the
list, they managed to place a promising Young Turk sympathiser, Yusof^
Rawa, in the Kedah constituency of Kubang Pasu, where no PAS candidate 62
could be expected to win, in view of the fact that the UMNO candidate 76 was Prime Minister Mahathir.
The manner in which this on-going factional struggle is ultimately
resolved will, to a great extent, determine the political future of PAS.
If the Young Turks prevail, PAS may capture the urban dakwah constituency, 77
and even a good part of the traditional rural base. If, on the other
hand the old guard remain in control, the new wave of Islamic resurgence
in urban, and possibly rural areas, may outpace PAS and become the solid
base of a more explicitly political ABIM. The more likely outcome,
however, is the continuation of internal PAS divisions and the persistence
of the intra-Islamic competition for Malay urban and rural constituencies.
It must always be borne in mind, however, that the likelihood
of a unified Islamic opposition depends heavily, and perhaps ultimately,
on the attitude of the various religious leaders toward such a unification.
In the case of rural religious elites for example, their opinion on this
score would depend on the extent to which such cooperation would permit 78
the maintenance of existing patterns of authority and on their percep•
tion of their own social and political best interests.
Historically, the strength and political orientation of the rural
ulama has depended, in part, on their relationship with the state and central governments, especially in matters pertaining to the administra- 79
tion of Islam. In Kelantan, for instance, the intrusion of the central
government and its agents into the countryside, had the effect of weakening the imam as a local leader. In addition, the centralization of
religious administration under the Majlis Ugama (State Religious Council), 63
deprived the imam of their ability to collect zakat and fitrah, thereby lessening their prestige and wealth. Control of the Majlis by the
Kelantanese aristocracy, and its political institution, UMNO, especially resented by local religious leaders. Their resentment provided an impor• tant base for mobilizing PAS support in the highly successful election of 1959.
Generally speaking, rural Islamic elites have shared this resentment at the steady intrusion of bureaucracy into their traditional realm of authority, and have sought to resist this intrusion through PAS, and sometimes through the Rulers. Pondok teachers are threatened by the Ministry of Education efforts, since 1977, to centralize all religious education and to "control traditional religious private teachers through 80 a system of licensing (tauliah). Imam suffer a loss of independence and wealth as a result of the system of centralized zakat and fitrah collection. All local religious elites suffer a loss of autonomy through the interference, by the National Council of Religious Affairs, in the jurisdiction of the State Religious Councils, and in the centralized issuing of fatwah.
For the majority of rural PAS ulama, a shift in the control of
Islamic administration to UMNO elites, or even attempts by the Ruler and the federal government to bring them under tighter control, will always be viewed as a serious and unwarranted threat to their own positions. Where this is taking place, the rural ulama are likely to become more active and intense critics of the government. But for this to be transformed into a populist challenge to government elites, the goals and strategies of this group must be compatible with those of 64
other important political and social groups, as they apparently were in Kelantan in 1959. Kessler argues that the success of PAS in that year was a function of:
the ability of Islamic teachers and radical nationalists, working upon the distinctive tensions within Kelantanese society, to reach the peasantry through traditional rural leaders threatened by the new political regime and its dominant party.81
This study suggests that these conditions do not at present prevail in most of the Malay rural areas, and that cooperation, on a national level between different Islamic-based social and political groups may be more difficult than it was in Kelantan in the 1950's and
1960's. In part, this is because divisions between the different states, and loyalty to state Rulers, encourage a kind of political parochialism, even within a national party, such as PAS. Perhaps of equal importance in limiting the chances of national-level cooperation between different
Islamic groups is the fact that other Islamic groups and leaders are generally regarded by the rural PAS elite as threats on a par with the challenge of government intervention. A further reason is related to the conflicting real economic interests of different groups such as the peasantry, on the one hand and the landowning PAS elite on the other.
These conflicts, which may stand in the way of an effective strategy of rural political mobilization, will be more thoroughly discussed in the second half of this chapter.
Extremists - Ideology and Goals
Apart from their potential for weakening the political and 65
religious legitimacy of the more conservative rural ulama, the main
political significance of the 'extremist' groups lies in their potential
for exacerbating ethnic tensions at the local level. Although these
fanatical groups comprise only a very small fraction of the Malay popu•
lation, their intensely chauvinistic orientation, the extraordinary
dedication of their members, and their propensity to operate outside of
the institutionally proscribed limits of political competition, make
them a threat to racial harmony. The P.A.S., for example, aims at the
violent overthrow of the government and the establishment of Darul
Islam, with no rights for non-Muslims. Glearly, non-Muslims cannot
help but feel threatened by the existence of such groups.
Somewhat surprisingly, in spite of incidents like Batu Pahat,
Kerling and others, there does not appear to be a strong overt general
reaction to the Islamic resurgence phenomenon amongst non-Malays.
Although this does not indicate that non-Malays are unconcerned by
Islamic extremism, it does serve to minimize the possibilities for this
extremism to escalate into open, violent ethnic confrontations. The
staunchest critics, in fact, appear to be Malays themselves, from within
and without the government. ABIM and government spokesmen alike refer to the teachings of these groups as dakwah songsang (false dakwah), and 82
criticise their emphasis on 'un-Islamic' practices and beliefs. Older
leaders cannot always afford to be so critical of the syncretic Islam of these movements, because their own brand of Islam is often infused with
Malay adat as opposed to 'orthodox' Islamic traditions, and indeed there is some evidence of links between P.A.S. and PAS. Nonetheless, the 66
strategies and objectives of PAS are necessarily very different from those of the extremists. PAS is committed to working within the political system, to the accommodation of other ethnic groups within a framework of Malay dominance, and to essentially moderate economic and social policies.
The greater danger to racial harmony is the possibility that
PAS leaders, faced with the choice of adapting or losing support may choose to adapt in the direction of Islamic extremism. There is already some speculation that PAS has benefitted electorally from its alleged association with the P.A.S. in Kedah. The other side of that political coin is that by dissociating itself from such groups, PAS may lose much needed support. For many rural Malays there may seem to be nothing wrong with an organization which seeks to establish an Islamic state, as does the P.A.S. Indeed it is central to Islamic doctrine that Muslims should strive to create such a state. Moreover, Islam harbours a distinctly democratic tradition, in the sense that, in principle, all members of the umma are morally equal before God - and this is a tradition which, in principle, sanctions the overthrow by the community 83 of an unjust government or ruler. For these reasons PAS elites may find it hard not to support the extremist groups in the future, and this shift would bear with it the danger that extreme racialist appeals would once again find a foothold in the political system, and thereby jeopar• dize the ethnic balance. 67
ABIM - Ideology and Goals
By far the largest and most influential urban dakwah organiza• tion is the Angkatan Belia Islam (Islamic Youth Movement) or ABIM.
Philosophically ABIM projects a somewhat rationalist and intellectual approach to Islam, which reflects the English-educated and urban back• ground of its founding leaders. ABIM also emphasizes the importance of understanding Islamic principles as a guide to a "self-sufficient way of 84 life that holds the key to all of man's problems" - al-din. As such
ABIM spokesmen are equally critical of the excessive ritualism of
'syncretic Islam' and the secularism and decadence of urban Malay society.
Both of these phenomena, it is argued, stem from the stagnation of
Malay society and Islam which took place under the oppressive influence of British colonialism, and of the collaborating aristocracy. Signifi• cantly, in view of these opinions, though not surprisingly, ABIM has not spoken out strongly against the Rulers, nor advocated republicanism.
It seems clear that this reticence is enforced by considerations of
'realpolitik'; the Rulers continue to be highly respected symbols and leaders in the Islamic community, and in some states actually act as an effective barrier to excessive federal and state government intrusion into Islamic affairs.
Although it is the most political of all the urban dakwah groups,
ABIM has avoided such overt political involvement, concentrating instead on education and social development programs. Through its various publications (Risalah and Perspectives for example), seminar series,
lecture tours, group discussions and even training camps for Islamic 68
leadership, ABIM spreads its message which is oriented more toward the encouragement of Islamic thinking than toward the legal or practical 85 details of Islamic behavior. Nevertheless, it is clear that the ultimate aim of ABIM's activities is to foster a receptive environment for the emergence of an Islamic State.
It is in the ABIM conception of Darul Islam Malaysia that it is possible to find evidence of a critique of the present political elite and political system, which is similar to the views of the younger sub-elite within PAS. ABIM's official line on the Islamic state is that it must be social-reformist and non-communal. Anwar Ibrahim, former
ABIM president, expressed the commitment to justice (keadilan) and ethnic harmony in the following terms': Islamic leadership will be based on moral and humani• tarian leadership, and one that implements Islamic Laws, a just and equitable economy which will be planned care• fully. Islamic leadership is not chauvinistic.86 We think that Islam should be used as a means to solving the evils in society - corruption, exploitation of the poor and so on... To be fundamentalist doesn't mean to be antagonistic. We integrate well and present Islam in a rational manner. We are co-existing. ...Our theme is the relevance of Islam in a multi-racial society in Malaysia. We do not have double standards.87
There are some who would question: Anwar's last claim, because although ABIM presents an image of enlightened liberalism to sophistica• ted urban audiences, its less public discussions have been known to become quite chauvinistic. It is not clear which is the 'real' ABIM orientation. In fact, there is no reason to believe that it must be either one or the other; the approach changes depending on what is 69
politically appropriate. In its balance between a rationalist Islamic critique of the present political system, and an underlying current of
Malay chauvinism, ABIM comes close to the philosophy and approach of the PAS 'Young Turk' sub-elite. There would appear to be some basis here for cooperation between the two groups, and indeed there is substantial evidence that such cooperation already exists. Those ABIM members who have campaigned for or have become PAS candidates have been sympathetic to and have collaborated almost exclusively with members of the Young Turk faction.
The co-optation of Anwar Ibrahim into the ruling National Front coalition suggests that at least some ABIM leaders have political ambitions, andperhaps more importantly, that these ambitions might be satisfied within the existing political system, and even within the ruling party, UMNO (NF). The political ambition of ABIM leaders together with the political frustration of PAS sub-elites, although it may create a coherent political alliance cannot, therefore, guarantee an effective Islamic opposition. In the case of the sub-elites in PAS, a government strategy of co-optation would be consistent with the ambitions of this group, and would likely remove this group as a threat to government hegemony. The danger in such a strategy lies in the very real possibility that extensive co-optation would exacerbate strains and divisions over the issue of Islam, within UMNO and the National Front.
Jemaat Tabligh - Ideology and Goals
Although originally an organization of Indian Muslims, a large 70
proportion of Jemaat Tabligh's membership is drawn from the ranks of 88 the "young middle class and highly educated professional Malays".
Unlike ABIM, Tabligh has no coherent set of economic or political goals.
Its main aim is to cultivate the inner spiritual development of its members, but it is at the same time the most aggressively evangelistic 89 of the urban dakwah groups. This aggressiveness extends to rural areas, where Tabligh is the most warmly received of all the urban
. . . +. 90 missionary organizations.
There are a number of reasons for this acceptance, including the widely held belief that Tabligh's methods are closest to those of the
Prophet. Perhaps more important is Tabligh's lack of explicit political ambition and economic idelolgy, and its deliberately low emphasis on leaders within the movement. All of these factors reduce the potential threat to the legitimacy and authority of the local ulama,and thus mini• mize the tension between the latter and the new missionaries.
Darul Arqam - Ideology and Goals
Like Jemaat Tabligh and ABIM, Darul Arqam is primarily a movement of the young urban middle class, but it is much less likely to become involved in a political Islamic movement than ABIM, and at the same time expresses a more explicit economic ideology than Tabligh. Darul Arqam is said to be "essentially non-political", and is pre-occupied with
"literal and rather rigid interpretations of codes of dress, food and 91 other items of personal behavior". The most distinctive aspect of
Arqam' s approach is its attempt to develop an .["autonomous economic system 71
based on petty manufacturing enterprises, agricultural products and a 92 network of small Malay traders". The main objective is to establish a purely Islamic community, free from the appurtenances of western materialism (T.V. chairs, tables), and from dependence upon the secular government and non-Malays.
Relations between Darul Arqam and the rural communities in which they have attempted to establish Islamic micro-communities, are often quite strained,. In addition to the usual problem of communication between urban educated youth and older traditional villagers, it is the methods and the strict limitations on personal behavior which many villagers find odious, and inappropriate to rural living. In the case of Darul Arqam then, it appears to be largely the preferences of villagers which limits its success in rural areas. Local religious leaders, interested in maintaining their own credibility are unlikely to seek cooperation with Darul Arqam if its practices are offensive 93 to the community. Even in urban areas "its emphasis on all things
"Arab", in eating and dress styles and matters of daily hygiene...makes
Darul Arqam seem rather intimidating to many outsiders... and an obstacle to Muslims who feel personally insecure through limitations in 94 their own knowledge of the faith".
In sum, though they draw their respective members and leaders from substantially the same social group, the three most prominent urban dakwah organizations adhere to different ideologies, and pursue unique and often incompatible goals. Despite the tendency to view 72 these groups as a unit or a type, there^ does not appear to be a firm basis for their cooperation as a unified political entity. Moreover, with the possible exception of Jemaat Tabligh, the urban-based groups have had limited success in propagating their message in rural areas, largely because of the incompatibility of their goals and strategies, with the values and political interests of the rural population, or because their presence poses a threat to the authority of the local 95 ulama.
More generally, this outline of the most prominent Islamic organizations, movements and parties, suggests that it is a mistake at this point to characterize the political significance of Islamic resur• gence in Malaysia exclusively in terms of a government versus non-government polarization within the Malay community, or in terms of Malay versus non-
Malay ethnic antagonism. Certainly these divisions are part of the total phenomenon of the Islamic resurgence, but they are only a part.
If the Islamic resurgence is examined in terms of its various institu• tional and ideological manifestations - their origins and their relation• ships to other groups, including pre-resurgence ones - what emerges is a picture of Malaysian Islam best characterized as multi-polar.
Different organizations, movements, parties and even factions have, at this stage, little inclination to form a coherent Islamic opposition.
Moreover, the pattern of possible future alliances is hard to predict, because they will most certainly vary with political circumstances.
The fragmented or multipolar configuration of Islam in Malaysia is to a great extent a reflection of important social and political 73
differences within the Malay community (urban versus rural, syncretism versus orthodoxy for example), but it is also a consequence of the variable religio-political responses to social change which have emerged 96 from distinguishable social groups (the urban middle-class for example).
However, as noted earlier, it is frequently argued that Islam has the symbolic and organizational capacity to transcend such differences and to merge with most other kinds of opposition, to challenge the status 97 quo. It remains, therefore, to discuss whether Islam in Malaysia is likely to play this role. As a focus for this discussion it would be best to examine a political issue which is regarded as having serious implications for the disruption of Malay non-elite support for the poli• tical elite. Some of these issues, like the reaction among intellectuals and the urban middle-class, to the alleged corruption and immorality of the present government, have been touched upon in the foregoing discussion. But one of the most important political problems for the political elite is the gap between rich and poor Malays, and the effect that a strong consciousness of this gap may have on the Malay tradition of unquestioning loyalty and deference to the ruling group. The next section focusses, therefore, on the salience of Islam for the issue of economic grievances of poor Malays in a predominantly rural Malay area -
Kedah.
Islam and Inequality in Kedah
In principle, Islam harbours a tradition of economic egalitarianism and social justice. In the economic field, Jansen writes that Islamic ideology differes from capitalism in three important respects; "(1) it 74
fights against the accumulation of wealth and the retaining of it in the hands of a minority. (2) Islamic legislation conserves the funds 98 of nations and individuals. (3) charity is a part of worship".'
The institutions of zakat and fitrah, it is said, were originally intended to ensure the social and economic security of all members of the umma, and in particular the "rendering of zakat to poor Muslims is 99 a divinely revealed requirement", one of the five pillars of Islam.
Quranic injunctions are frequently cited in support of these principles.
On the subject of charity, the following verse is especially popularr Hast thou not seen him who cries lies to the doom? That is he who repulses the orphan, and urges not the feeding of the needy. So woe to those that pray and are heedless of their prayers, to those that make display and refuse charity.
The restriction on the charging of interest (riba) was originally intended to limit the possibility of exploitation through usury, and on that subject the Quran is also eloquent: Those who devour usury shall not rise again, except as he rises who Satan of the touch prostrates; that is because they say 'trafficking is like usury'. God has permitted trafficking and forbidden usury, but freewill offerings He augments with interest. Finally, as earlier noted, conditions of injustice and inequality, in theory, justify rebellion against the established (and responsible) authority.
Islam, then, even in its Sunni variant, contains the philosophi• cal or idological basis for a political movement aimed at relieving a situation of socio-economic inequality or injustice. Indeed, it has 75
certainly been used to those ends in the not too distant past, even within Malaysia. In Kelantan during the 1950's, Kessler argues, Islam served as the rallying symbol of a broadly-based popular movement;
Rather than being a manifestation of religious fanaticism, Malay racialism and peasant traditionalism, the PMIP (PAS) served as a religiously informed move• ment for the defense of peasant interests.102
.It is interesting to consider the likelihood of its playing this role again, and outside of Kelantan with its unique political-religious v • . 103 history.
The four northern states of Malaysia represent a vital political constituency for the Malay political elite. An important part of the government's strategy in securing non-elite support from this region has been the promotion of rural development and land settlement schemes.
The Muda Irrigation Scheme was a program in this vein. In 1970, the
Muda Agricultural Development Authority (MADA) stated that the true meaning of this development lay in "the higher incomes and better 104 standards of living for the on-farm population". Yet, while the expected increases in agricultural productivity and yield were achieved,
Lim Teck Gee (1981) has estimated the incidence of poverty among the
Muda padi-farming peasantry to be close to 85%.105 Further statistics, concerning real incomes, production costs, tenancy patterns, levels of landlessness and underemployment, credit availability, and farm size, point to a similar trend of increasing poverty in the Muda region^
What is relevant here is simply the fact of widespread and growing poverty in the area, and the indications that peasants increa- 76
singly regard the central government, rather than landlords or middle• men, as responsible for the economic (and even the climactic!) hard• ships which they suffer. Under these conditions it would seem reasonable to predict that political opposition to the government, on the basis of economic grievances, would be phrased in an Islamic idiom, and led by the major opposition party in the region, PAS. On these grounds, moreover, one might expect to find an increase in PAS support in the region as peasants became more conscious of their relative deprivation, 107 through the process of social mobilization.
In fact, electoral data (see Tables #4, #5, #7, #10) indicate that support for PAS has weakened over the last decade, and especially in the last election, which reduced PAS' percentage of the total valid vote in Kedah Parliamentary contests, from 39.6% in 1978 to 30.98% in 1982.
There are a number of common explanations for the failure of PAS to make a strong showing in Kedah. the government claims that it is the result of the effectiveness and fairness of development programs and agricultural subsidies. To a certain extent this is true. The government has effectively become the new patron, so that although peasants may regard the government as chiefly responsible for their hardships, they are also aware that it is through government channels that the most 108 effective redress is likely to be had. There are reports, for example, of pro-PAS villages becoming frustrated with their lack of access to government aid and loans, and seeking to rectify the situation by changing political allegiance to UMNO. Other explanations include the role of of the Sultan (only recently) in limiting the autonomy and finances of 77
PAS leaders, divisions within the PAS leadership, and the important psychological advantage which attaches to those candidates already in positions of authority and prestige (Dr. Mahathir for example).
Less frequently noted have been the deeper social structural factors which may limit PAS success and anti-UMNO outbreaks. One such 109 factor is the internal heterogeneity of Malay society in the region.
The simplification of ethnic categories for administrative and political purposes has encouraged scholars and politicians alike to speak of the essential homogeneity of the society, but a brief glimpse at Kedah's social history indicates that this is a misleading characterization.
At least since the late 19th century Kedah has received immigrants in large numbers from Aceh, Java, Bugis, Kelantan and Pattani, to name only the most prominent sources.11^ Among these, the Acehnese, Pattani and Kelantanese Muslims are most noteworthy for having migrated to Kedah as families and religious communities following a religious leader, rather than as individuals seeking their fortune. It was primarily these 'Malays' who established rice-farming communities around a pondok, headed by a religious leader/teacher.11"'' The close association of the pondok with rice-growing settlements is best explained by the suitability of this kind of agriculture to the subsistence needs of a closely-knit
and inward-looking religious community. It is these communities,
labelled 'clustered kampongs' by Afiffudin, which have traditionally 112
formed the social base of PAS support in Kedah.
In addition to these clustered kampongs, Afiffudin has identi•
fied 'linear' and 'scattered' types, both of which are more recently 78
settled. Most importantly, the residents of these more recent
settlements display social, religious and political characteristics quite distinct from those living in the clustered kampongs. For instance, they tend to belong to different Malay sub-ethnic groups than the earlier settlers; to be more individualistic than those in the clustered kampongs; to display a more puritan work ethic, and concern for progress and advancement; to have a religious orientation which is reformist; to have had greater access to secular and English education; and to show somewhat less concern for age and kinship ties in judgements of status 44 and leadership ability. The residents of the linear and scattered kampongs, in short, appear to share characteristics with the 'modernist' farmers and businessmen of Java, who also turned to a more rationalist
'this-worldly' interpretation of Islam, in their attempt to come to terms with social change, and participation in a highly commercialized 115 economy.
Briefly then, it is possible to detect at least two distinct sub-communities within the larger Kedah Malay society. What is signi• ficant here is the possible connection between these social divisions and political party affiliation. Afifuddin reports that "in the entire mid-section of the Muda scheme, most of the kampongs take the linear form". It is interesting, therefore, that all of PAS' presently held state seats (Langgar Limbong and Bukit Raya), and Parliamentary seats (Kota Setar), lie within the central section of the Muda area.
Although any suggestion that it is the residents of linear kampongs who are now the major PAS base must be largely speculative, it does seem clear that the traditional pondok bases of support are dwindling. If 79 PAS has not already begun to appeal to the Muslims of the linear
settlements, it must make that effort now, or be relegated to the 117
political wilderness in Kedah. To sum up, the heterogeneity of
Kedah's Malay population, and the changing balance of its component
units, has traditionally limited the appeal of PAS, and promises, in
the near future to remove it as a political contender, unless it makes
more serious overtures to the 'reformist' Muslims of the linear and
scattered kampongs.
Another factor which inevitably bears on the success of PAS, is
its political strategy at election time. In this regard, Milne and
Mauzy noted of the 1978 PAS campaign, that, despite the political opportunity offered by certain Malay grievances against the implementation of the NEP, the party shunned economic issues, dismissing them . as less important than purifying Islamic practices and preparing Muslims for the after-life.
The underplaying of issues of economics and poverty does not appear to have been an effective political strategy, to a large extent because
Kedah's farmers still "hanker after the goods of urban life, in an 119 inevitable bid to catch up". There are, however, some strong reasons for this de-emphasis. Mansor Haji Othman has found that of a sample of one hundred Kedah farmers, owning more than 30 relongs (21.3 acres), 120
46% were PAS members. In other words, the Kedah rural landed elite is comprised almost equally of UMNO and PAS members. What makes this information of particular interest is the fact that, in Kedah, it was the pondok teachers who, through the collection of zakat and the use of the labour of pondok students, became a landed gentry of sorts with close ties to the Sultan. Thus, it is likely that it is the most 80
important PAS leaders, and not simply PAS members, who belong to the rural landed elite. If the introduction of land reform measures by
UMNO is a political impossibility, because of the importance of the landed elite in the party's strategy of rural mobilization and electoral support, then the proposal of such measures by PAS is equally an impossibility. In fact, 100% of Othman's sample were opposed to land reform of any kind. It should be added, however, on the issue of land reform, that while inaction by both parties may be a function of stiff resistance from a landed elite, it is clear that on other issues, the objective class status of local leaders is of immediate relevance. In short the class status of PAS or UMNO leaders does not necessarily interfere with their ability to gain followers (indeed it may enhance it), but it may well limit the possibilities for the meshing of the
Islamic appeal with the economic grievances of the peasantry, and, there• fore, for the emergence of a strong Islamic popular movement against the government. Moreover, the internal heterogeneity of Kedah's (and perhaps Malaysia's) Malay community makes unlikely, in any event, the development of a mass peasant consciousness of relative deprivation. 81
FOOTNOTES
Chapter III
1. Clifford Geertz, Religion of Java, p. 213.
2. Judith A. Nagata, "Islamic Revival and the Problem of Legitimacy Among Rural Religious Elites in Malaysia," Man 17 (1) (March 1982), p. 45.
3. Judith A. Nagata, "The Impact of the Islamic Revival (Dakwah) on the Rural Religious Culture of Malaysia". Paper presented at the CCSEAS-ISEAS Joint International Conference on "Village Level Modernization..." Singapore, June 21-24, 1982, p. 19.
4. William R. Roff, The Origins of Malay Nationalism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), pp. 78-79.
5. Ibid., p. 77. Roff writes of the "concentration of doctrinal and administrative religious authority in the hands of a hierarchy of officials directly dependent upon the Sultans for their position and power." For more on the history of mosque-state relations, see Chapter 4, this paper.
6. Judith A. Nagata, "The Impact of the Islamic Revival (Dakwah) on the Rural Religious Culture of Malaysia," p. 43.
7. William R. Roff, The Origins of Malay Nationalism, p. 67.
8. Ibid., p. 87.
9. Gordon P. Means, "The Role of Islam in the Political Development of Malaysia," pp. 270-72.
10. Judith A. Nagata, "The Impact of the Islamic Revival...", p. 1.
11. Ibid., p. 6. Also see, Clifford Geertz, Religion of Java, for a good discussion of the modern (moderen) and traditional (kolot) variations of Islamic orthodoxy, and their distinction from the abangan religious philosophy or aliran.
12. See pp. 62-63 below for examples of government intrusion into the jurisdictions of traditional religious elites. It is not implied here that there is no overlap between secular and religious elites within the ruling group, but rather that a good proportion of religious elites, (notably those associated with PAS) can no longer be considered to be part of a single and coherent ruling elite to the same extent that this may have been possible prior to the Kaum Muda-Kaum Tua split. See below Chapter 4, Mosque- State Relations: History. 82
13. For more detailed accounts of PAS history see: Y. Mansoor Marican, "Malay Nationalism and the Islamic Party of Malaya," Islamic Studies, No. 16 (1977), pp. 291-301; N. J. Funston, "The Origin of Parti Islam Se Malaysia," Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 7 (1) (March 1976), pp. 58-73; K. J. Ratnam and R.S. Milne, The Malayan Parliamentary Election of 1964 (Singapore: University of Malaya Press, 1967), passim.
14. Clive S. Kessler, "Islamic Revivalism and Political Disaffection...." p. 6; and Marican, "Malay Nationalism...", p. 299.
15. N. J. Funston, "The Origin of Parti Islam Se Malaysia", p. 66.
16. The British banned the MNP Youth wing, API, and in August 1948, arrested without trial 7 Hizbul Muslimin leaders, thus effectively putting an end to the H.M. and MATA. See N. J. Funston, "Malaysia" in M. Ayoob (ed.), The Politics of Islamic Reassertion, p. 168.
17. N. J. Funston, "The Origins of Parti Islam Se Malaysia:, p. 69.
18. Clive S. Kessler, "Islamic Revivalism and Political Disaffection...", p. 6.
19. For an idea of PAS' weakness in these areas, see I. Kassim, Race, Politics and Moderation, p. 95. He indicates that in 1978, PAS contested 30 state and 18 Parliamentary seats in mixed (no absolute Malay or Chinese majority) and Chinese majority areas, and won none of them. Also see Diane K. Mauzy, "A Vote for Continuity: The 1978 General Elections in Malaysia", Asian Survey XIX (3)(March 1979), pp. 281-96.
20. See Tables 7, 9, and 10 for the statistics on PAS in Kedah which appear here. Kedah may be a special case because of the serious leadership divisions within PAS, between the Old guard and the Young Turks. See pp. 55-57 on internal PAS divisions.
21. R. S. Milne and Diane K. Mauzy, Politics and Government in Malaysia, pp. 389-90. The breakdown for the Kelantan state elections was as follows: Berjasa 11, NF 23, PAS 2.
22. Judith A. Nagata, "Islamic Revival and the Problem of Legitimacy...", passim.
23. Idem, "The Impact of the Religious Revival...", p. 17.
24. Ibid., p. 13.
25. G. H. Jansen, Militant Islam (New York: Harper and Row, 1979), p. 166. 83
26. Judith A. Nagata, "Islamic Revival and the Problem of Legitimacy... pp. 52-53.
27. Ibid., p. 48.
28. Judith A. Nagata, "Religious Ideology and Social Change ", p. 417
29. This has been suggested by a number of Malay political leaders, and also in the New Straits Times, 19 March 1980.
30. A. J. Stockwell, British Policy and Malay Politics during the Malayan Union Experiment; 1945-48. The Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, Monograph No. 8 (Kuala Lumpur: 1979), p. 156 Also see Syed Husin Ali, Malay Peasant Society and Leadership, p. 114; and N. J. Funston, "Malaysia" in M. Ayoob (ed.), The Politics of Islamic Reassertion, p. 172. . .
31.. A. J. Stockwell, pp. 146-62.
32. Ibid., p. 158.
33. Far Eastern Economic Review, 2 April 1982, p. 24.
34. Far Eastern Economic Review, 9 February 1979. These comprised about two dozen attacks and several deaths. Von der Mehden, "Islamic Resurgence in Malaysia", attributes them to Pakistani and Indian fanatics, pp. 171-72. •
35. Asiaweek, 7 November 1980, reports that 8 of the attackers were killed and 23 victims wounded at Batu Pahat. The Qadianis of .. Johore also claim their leader to be Mahdi, Judith A. Nagata, "Religious Ideology and Social Change...", p. 417. Other cult• like movements include Mufaradiyah which has a strong Sufi influence: Matahari, which teaches that it is possible to dispense with normal Islamic rituals like praying.
36. On the idea of the Imam Mahdi, and other aspects of Islam's revolutionary and millenarian traditions, see Thomas Hodgkin, "The Revolutionary Tradition in Islam", Race and Class XXI (3) (Summer 1979), pp.' 221-38.
37. Judith A. Nagata, "The Impact of the Islamic Revival...", pp. 1-6, discusses the kinds of roles and practices which are often expected of religious leaders, by their followers.
38. New Straits Times, 13 January 1982.
39. Afifuddin bin Haji Omar; Diane K. Mauzy interview, May 1980. 84
40. Judith A. Nagata, "Islamic Revival and the Problem of Legitimacy...", p. 52.
41. Ibid., p. 56.
42. Ibid., p. 56.
43 See pp. 7-9 above..
44 Clive S. Kessler, "Islamic Revivalism and Political Disaffection ...", p. 3; von der Mehden, "Islamic Resurgence in Malaysia", p. 170, stresses the stricter adherence to Islamic law and to the goal of Darul Islam.
45. Ruth T. McVey, "Islam Explained", Review article, Pacific Affairs 54 (2) (Summer 1981), p. 278.
46. Ibid., p. 283,
47. This discussion is based primarily on Funston's treatment of the roots of the urban dakwah movement. N. J. Funston, "Malaysia", in M. Ayoob (ed.), The Politics of Islamic'Reassertion, pp. 157-.70. ~~
48. Ibid., p. 170.
49. Ibid., p. 157. Some of the first student leaders had close connections with the Malay Language Society.
50. Clive S. Kessler, "Islamic Revivalism and Political Disaffection...", p. 4.
51. Fred R. von der Mehden, "Islamic Resurgence in Malaysia", pp. 168-69
52. J. A. Nagata, "Religious Ideology and Social Change...", p. 411.
53. Idem, "Islamic Revival and the Problem of Legitimacy...", p. 49.
54. Far Eastern Economic Review,10 April 1981.
55. N. J. Funston, "Malaysia" in M. Ayoob, (ed.), The Politics of Islamic Reassertion, p. 171.
56. V. S. Naipaul, Among the Believers (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1981). The chapter on Malaysia, which consists largely of conversations with urban dakwah followers, gives a good sense of this.
57. Far Eastern Economic Review, 10 April 1981, p. 75. 85
58. Chandra Muzaffar, The Universalism of Islam (Penang: Aliran, 1979), cited in Fred R. von der Mehden, "Islamic Resurgence in Malaysia", pp. 168-69.
59. Judith A. Nagata, "The Impact of the Religious Revival...", pp. 14-15.
60. Idem, "Islamic Revival and the Problem of Legitimacy...", p. 53.
61. Ibid., p. 53.
62. Judith A. Nagata, "Religious Ideology and Social Change...", p. 427.
63. Ruth T. McVey,"Islam Explained", p. 285. For a fuller discus• sion of the link between the N.U. and the youth, see M. K. Hassan, Muslim Intellectual Responses to New Order Modernization (Jakarta: Dewan Bahasa, 1980).
64. That is, committed to the formation of an Islamic State- Darul Islam.
65. N. J. Funston, "Malaysia", in M. Ayoob (ed.), The Politics of Islamic Reassertion, p. 169.
66. Diane K. Mauzy, Consociationalism, p. 223.
67. Ibid., pp. 138-40.
68. New Straits Times, 7 April 1982.
69. Diane K. Mauzy, Consociationalism, pp. 262-64.
70. Ibid., 6 April 1982.
71. Ibid., 7 April 1982.
72. N. J. Funston, Malay Politics in Malaysia: A Study of UMNO and PAS, (Kuala Lumpur: Heinemann, 1980), pp. 149-52.
73. Asri, in fact, had referred, in 1982 to the possibility of collaborating electorally with DAP. New Straits Times,
1 April 1982.
74. New Straits Times, 9 April 1982.
75. Ibid., 2, 6,.7, April 1982. 86
76. Ibid., 7 April 1982.
77. There is the possibility that a new 'non-traditional' Islamic sector will emerge to become the PAS base under a more reformist leadership. See discussion of the heterogeneity of Kedah Malay society, later in this chapter. At present the struggle between the -'Ol'd Guard1 and the 'Young Turks' is unresolved in Perlis and Kedah. However, the 'Young Turks' are dominant in Trengganu, and the 'Old Guard' remains dominant in Kelantan, Diane K. Mauzy, personal communication.
78. For a fuller discussion of rural authority structures and the question of leader-follower relationships, see Judith A. Nagata, "Islamic Revival and the Problem of Legitimacy Among Rural Religious Elites in Malaysia", pp. 43-47; and Syed Husin Ali, Malay Peasant Society and Leadership (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1975), passim.
79. This discussion is based primarily on Kessler's account in Islam and Politics'in a Malay State.
80. Judith A. Nagata, "Religious Ideology and Social Change...", p. 430.
81. Clive S. Kessler, Islam and Politics in a Malay State, p. 126.
82. Judith A. Nagata, "Islamic Revival and the Problem of Legitimacy...", p. 51.
83. Chandra Muzaffar, Protector? p. 73, p. 136.
84. N. J. Funston, "Malaysia", in M. Ayoob (ed.), The Politics of Islamic Reassertion, p. 175.
85. Anonymous, "Islamic Revivalism and the Political Process in Malaysia" -- unpublished paper in D. K. Mauzy collection, p. 425.
86. Fred R. von der Mehden, "Islamic Resurgence in Malaysia," p. 74.
87. Far Eastern Economic Review, 28 November 1980, p. 36.
88. Judith A. Nagata, "Islamic Revival and the Problem of Legitimacy", p. 51.
89. Anonymous, "Islamic Revivalism...".
90. Judith A. Nagata, "Islamic Revival and the Problem of Legiti• macy. ..", p. 55. 87
Idem, "The Impact of the Islamic Revival...", p. 8.
Idem, "Islamic Revival and the Problem of Legitimacy...", p. 50.
Idem, "The Impact of the Islamic Revival...", p. 12.
Ibid., p. 9.
The problem of incompatibility of goals is perhaps even more obvious in relations between the Islamic groups and parties on the one hand, and the PSRM (Partai Sosialis Rakyat Malaysia) on the other. For a brief outline of the origins and ideas of the Malay-dominated PSRM, see R. S. Milne and Diane K. Mauzy, Politics and Government in Malaysia, p. 146. For a discussion of its predecessor, the Partai Rakyat (P.R.), see K.J. Ratnam and R. S. Milne The Malayan Parliamentary Election of 1964 (Singapore: University of Malaya Press, 1967), passim.
For an interesting discussion of variations in cultural and religious responses to change, particularly as it relates to the question of aliran, see Clifford Geertz, The Religion of Java, Chapter 13; and Islam Observed, passim.
This capacity to mobilize is most in evidence under conditions of a threat to Islam. See Chapter 1, fn. 2.
G. H. Jansen, Militant Islam, p. 180.
J. T. Cummings, et al., "Islam and Modern Economic Change", pp. 26-27.
Ibid., p. 38.
Ibid., p. 32 .
Clive S. Kessler, Islam and Politics in a Malay State, p. 35.
Kelantan in the 1950's was unique in the sense that there.was a strong polarization within the Malay community, which enhanced the possibilities for cooperation between different social groups. This kind of polarization does not obtain in Kedah, least of all the polarization between the peasantry and the ruling class. For Kelantan, see Kessler, Islam and Politics, pp. 63-70 and 94-127.
S. Jegarthesen, "Land Tenure in Muda: Income Distribution and Reform" MADA Monograph No. 29, 1976. 88
Lim Teck Ghee, "Muda: The Green Revolution Reassessed", Seminar at Cornell University, (December, 1980) .
There is a large body of literature dealing both with the Muda area and West Malaysian agriculture generally. This is a small sample of this literature. Afiffudin bin Haji Omar, Peasants, Institutions and Development in Malaysia.; Rsdolphe deKoninck, "Integration of the Peasantry; Examples from Malaysia and Indonesia", Pacific Affairs 52 (3) (Fall, 1979), pp. 265-91; T. B. Wilson, The Economics of Padi Production in Northern Malaya^ Part I, Department of Agriculture, Bulletin No. 103, K.L. 1959; Ingrid Palmer, The New Rice in Asia, U.N.R.I.S.D. No. 76.6, 1976; D. S. Gibbons, et al., Agricultural Modernization, Poverty and Inequality, (West Mead: Saxon House, 1980) . Most of this literature supports the conclusions made here regarding increasing rural poverty. For a synthesis of these arguments and findings, see Geoffrey B. Robinson, "Islamic Resurgence and Political Change in Malaysia" Unpublished Paper, University of British Columbia, 1982. pp. 25-30.
See James C. Scott, The Moral Economy of the Peasant (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976), for an introduction to the Moral Economy School of peasant rebellion. See Karl W. Deutsch, Jr., "Social Mobilization and Political Development" in Claude E. Welch, Jr., Political Modernization (second edn») (Belmont.^California: Duxbury Press, 1971), pp. 153-76, for formative theoretical statements on the concept of "social mobilization".
For a discussion of patron-client politics, and their changing patterns, see James C. Scott, "The Erosion of Patron-Client Bonds and Social Change in Southeast Asia", Journal of Asian Studies XXXII, (1) (November, 1972).
Judith A. Nagata, Malaysia Mosaic, passim.
Ibid.
Afifuddin bin Haji Omar, Peasants, Institutions and Develop- in Malaysia.
Idem, "A Study on Leadership Patterns, Activities and Behaviour Among Leaders of F.A.'s within the Muda Scheme," MADA Monograph, No. 17, July, 1972.
Ibid., p. 5. 89
114. Ibid., passim
115. James L. Peacock, Muslim Puritans: Reformist Psychology in Southeast Asian Islam (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 175-86. Peacock finds a similar 'reformist' ethic in Kedah's Muslim population. Geertz, Religion of Java, refers to "the economic advantages of a religious ethic emphasizing thrift, hard work, and individual effort...", p. 134.
116. Afifuddin bin Haji- Omar, "A Study on Leadership Patterns...", p. 32.
117. Even in PAS 'strongholds' such as Bukit Raya, PAS does not have a clear majority of Malay support. In fact, PAS apparently won Bukit Raya in 1982 (after losing narrowly to NF in a recent by-election) because of strong Chinese support, and in spite of a nearly even split in the Malay vote between UMNO and PAS. Diane K. Mauzy, personal communication, August 1982.
118. R. S. Milne and Diane K. Mauzy, Politics and Government in Malaysia. A similar reticence on economic issues was evident in the 1982 elections, and in the intervening years.
119. Judith A. Nagata, "The Impact of the Islamic Revival...", p. 15. Nagata is here relating the views of former ABIM president Anwar Ibrahim.
120. Mansur Haji Othman, "Ownership of Padi Land and Politics in Kedah" (in Malay) (M.S.S. Thesis, Universiti Sains Malaysia, November 1978). 90
CHAPTER IV: ISLAM AND STATE POLICY
The strategies employed by the Malaysian government to limit the erosion of Malay non-elite support under the influence of the
Islamic resurgence can be subsumed under four categories: (1) Co-optative;
(2) Coercive; (3) Diversive; (4) Informative-promotional. The main arguments in this chapter are, first, that the constellation of state strategies demonstrates a considerable flexibility on the part of the
National Front, in the sense that it is able to employ an essentially inclusionary/co-optative approach, rather than one more heavily balanced toward exclusion/coercion. Secondly, contrary to the assumption that the' •.: outbidding of Islamic groups is inherently more difficult to accommodate, the government has so far been able to make important concessions to the demands of these groups, without seriously alienating non-Malays. With a few important exceptions, such as the National
Islamic Bank, the government has 5 until very recently, avoided zero-sum political choices. Thirdly, state policies toward Islam have been especially effective at undercutting the Islamic challenge where they have been consistent with, and have therefore reinforced the social structural limitations on the growth of a united Islamic-based political opposition. Finally, the danger in the government's inclusionary approach is that it may exacerbate divisions over the question of Islam, within the National Front and especially within UMNO. Before proceeding with the analysis of present government strategies, it will be instruc- 91
tive to look briefly at the history of relations between Islam and the state in Malay(si)a.
Islam and the State; History
Prior to the arrival of the British, the political significance of Islam in the Malay Peninsula lay mainly in its value for legitimating
'royal authority', and providing a symbol of unity for citizens of
Malay states.''" However, as in the realm of political organization, so also in that of religious belief and practice "the pre-colonial Malay state... lacked the resources necessary for centralization of authority".
Furthermore, no recognizeable class of ulama, or religious legal officials existed except at the local level. The expansion, in the late 19th century, of British political authority into the area, sig• nificantly altered the relationship between Islam and the state.
Although the Pangkor Engagement of 1874 established the principle of British non-interference in matters of Malay custom and religion,
Roff and Yegar both agree that the observance of this principle was limited to those areas which least affected colonial administration; 3 generally matters of ceremony and ritual. Thus, not only was the authority of the Rulers limited to subjects of religion and custom, it was further circumscribed to the degree that outside of these spheres the Rulers retained little more than a symbolic significance.
Nonetheless, it was a symbolism which was taken seriously by most Malays, and it encouraged the development of a closer connection between the
Malay identity, the Sultan, and the religion of Islam; an association 92
which persists for many Malays to this day.
A second, and-'equally significant consequence of-British, colonialism was the growth, in most states, of centralized systems of religious administration, and religious legal enforcement. In part, this was done by the Rulers to establish their authority in the one realm still open to them, and in part it was done to compete with the western bureaucratic and legal systems which were progressively establishing control over Malay society.^ Kessler writes that in Kelantan,
...the Islamic administration, expanded by leading religious officials connected to the aristocracy, was becoming a counterweight to a secular state apparatus increasingly alien in content, personnel and 'ideology'.6
Although it was Islam which was expanded, it was western systems and methods which provided the model to emulate, and western sources of political power which permitted the Rulers to establish the new religious bureaucracies. Referring to the policy of preservation of the Malay elites and the non-interference in religion, Roff writes:
...the preservation and reinforcement of the tradi• tional bases of authority and social organization implicit in this policy, together with greatly improved means of communication and backed by the effective sanctions now open to British-supported Sultans, com• bined to produce an authoritarian form of religious administration much beyond anything known in the penin• sula before.^
By the 1920's most states had a central religious authority like
Kelantan's Majlis Agama Islam dan Isti'adat Melayu (Council of Religion and Malay Custom), or at least a Religious Committee on the State Council.
In both cases it was generally the Ruler who controlled appointments, 93
and delegated authority to the hierarchy of religous officials. Under this system, Sharia law was, for the first time, systematically organized and enforced by Islamic courts presided over by appointed kathis. And the alliance which these represented, between the "forces of the traditional elite and 'orthodox' Islam was powerful and pervasive, g not least in the eyes of the Malay peasant". In short, under the
British, Islam acted as a conservative and stabilizing force which, generally speaking, had the effect of keeping rural Malay society static and hierarchical, insulated from the modernist influences from the Middle-East, and the social strains which might have'inspired .9 nationalist passions.
The emergence of the Kaum Muda in the 1920's and 1930's did not result in a break in the allegiance of the majority of Malays to the traditional elite, and to the Sultans in particular. Malay politics remained elitist and essentially conservative until the interlude of
Japanese rule and until the resented Malayan Union Scheme (a British proposal) ignited mass-based Malay nationalism. Even then, however, it was the party of the traditional Malay aristocracy which mobilized the Malays, and their appeals were primarily traditional chauvinistic appeals to protect the Malay race and community.
Nonetheless, after the war, the British began to show more concern about the political potential of Islam, and responded by taking a more direct role in Islamic administration. In 1948, the government estab• lished State Departments of Religious Affairs, which were ostensibly intended to permit greater communication between the government and 94
prominent Islamic leaders, politicians and organizations. More to the point, British policy by this time reflected UMNO Malay interests, and it is clear that these included a desire to draw the potentially dis• ruptive Islamic opposition groups more closely under government control.
The leader of UMNO at that time, Dato Onn bin Jaafar, for example, was referring to the Islamic reformists (the Hizbul Muslimin) in his famous warning; "Hubaya - hub aya! B ah aya turun dari gunong", which translates roughly as "Watch out! the danger descends from the mountain", where the Hizbul Muslimin had their headquarters. "^
Through the 1950's both UMNO and the parties of the opposition resorted increasingly to religious appeals in their attempts to gain the mass Malay constituency. Although the government for the most part remained outside of religious issues until Merdeka (1957), state governments were actively defining, enforcing and promoting Islamic principles and laws through the 1950 's.^ With Merdeka, the central
government immediately became involved in Islamic affairs, because of the singular'importance of winning rural Malay support for maintaining political power and legitimacy, and because of the strong threat posed to that support by the rural ulama' of PAS, and their followers. In
1959, for instance, PAS won 41 of 53 state seats and 13 of 16 Parlia- 12 mentary seats in the states of Kelantan and Trengganu. The government response to the challenge consisted primarily of efforts to limit and control religious instruction and behavior, and to pose as the patron of the faith: by funding the construction of mosques, sponsoring national and international Islamic conferences, and Quran-reading contests, and, 13 in general, by devoting about 10% of the national budget to Islam. The constitution, promulgated at the time of Merdeka, provides 95
that Islam shall be the 'official religion' of the Federation, but
significantly not the 'state religion'. Non-Muslims are prohibited
from proselytizing among Muslims, but Muslims are free to engage in
missionary activity among members of all religions. Islam is offi•
cially included in the definition of a Malay, so that being a Muslim
is a necessary, though not a sufficient condition for receiving the 14
special privileges accorded to Malays. Finally, the constitution places limits on the questioning of Islamic orthodoxy, either in a public forum, or through religious instruction.
While these provisions were intended to protect and promote
Islam, Means has argued that the real effect was to place the religion in a rigid legal mould, and under the control of traditional conservative elites, thereby sapping official Islam of its vitality and adaptability. The consequence was that modernists and more ortho• dox leaders alike were able to challenge the Islamic dedication of the government. Together with the competition for the Malay vote, this resulted in a situation of persistent outbidding by opposition parties like PAS, which, in turn, forced UMNO to make concessions in the hope of placating or co-opting critics of the government. This essentially
'reactive' strategy created serious difficulties for the Alliance, because it allowed outbidding to intensify to the point where it began to weaken non-elite support and to heighten ethnic antagonism. The crisis of 1969 convinced the Alliance elites that a more positive and aggressive strategy was needed; a strategy which would remove the causes of ethnic antagonism, and which, in the meantime, would place limits on 96
the politics of outbidding.
As earlier noted, however, consititutional and legal amendments
made since 1971, although they have effectively put an end to extreme
ethnic outbidding, have at the same time deflected Malay opposition
challenges into the idiom of Islam.^ Moreover, as Chandra Muzaffar
notes, the introduction of Islam into the political realm has provided
a greater degree of legitimacy to Malay opposition criticism.
This is especially so since Islam, as a social philo• sophy, legitimizes such a challenge, particularly when a leadership has deviated from justice... It is Islam in politics then that has transformed the environment and atmosphere in which unquestioning loyalty is being preserved and perpetuated.17
After 1969, the change in government policy toward a more
concertedly pro-Malay position, further encouraged the growth of 18
Islam as a focus and idiom of political competition. For instance,
the government took steps to expand the religious bureaucracy under
the Prime Minister's Department; it entered into a coalition with PAS,
thereby indicating in part, a stronger government commitment to Islam;
and it expanded Malay opportunities for tertiary education, especially
for rural Malays, thereby creating a larger base for urban dakwah movements. Today the government continues with this essentially
inclusionary/co-optative strategy, in its bid to undercut the appeal of the Islamic opposition.
(1) Co-optative Strategies
The strategy of co-opting opposition parties into the ruling 97
coalition is a major part of the consociational style of the National
Front. It has proven to be an effective method of gaining larger-than- minimal alliances, and of securing large electoral majorities, both of which are essential to the maintenance of government legitimacy and to
the viability of the consociational system itself. The co-optation of the major Islamic opposition party, PAS, has been an option intermittently
entertained by the Alliance/National Front elites for at least two decades.
It was only under the rather exceptional circumstance of the early 1970's 19 that both UMNO and PAS leaders finally agreed to such an alliance. From the point of view of both parties, but expecially PAS, the coalition was not an unmitigated success. PAS is only now beginning to recover from a serious loss of credibility suffered during the years of participation in the National Front.
In recent months the UMNO leadership has once again begun to extend to PAS the offer of coalition. There seems little chance that the PAS
leadership will accept, particularly in view of the party's moderate come• back, in Kelantan and Trengganu, in the 1982 elections. Asri's cautious replies to the Prime Minister's overtures in the pre-election period should probably be interpreted as efforts to project an image of PAS' reasonable- 20 ness and its genuine concern for Malay-Muslim unity. Moreover he must tread lightly on the issue of coalition because it is one which is sharply debated within his own party. Asri was criticized by PAS 21 branches in Kubang Pasu for not accepting the NF offer, for example.
At the same time, acceptance of the offer would have brought a storm 98 of condemnation from those intent on removing Asri from the leadership.
On the government side, Dr. Mahathir's offers appeared to be a tactic aimed primarily at exposing PAS' adversarial attitudes, and
its alleged efforts to show disunity in the Malay community. Although
Dr. Mahathir, personally, puts a high premium on Malay unity, it is unlikely that UMNO, in fact, wants to see the PAS old guard once again within the National Front. The more genuine efforts at co- optation have taken place amongst the younger more intellectual elements within PAS. Indeed, in the pre-election period UMNO leaders seemed genuinely concerned that the urban Islamic resurgence might provide a boost to PAS prospects in urban areas. During the campaign,
UMNO appealed both to PAS leaders and members not to let the young 22 intellectuals run for office on a PAS ticket.
The most noticeable and significant UMNO acquisition is the charismatic former president of ABIM, Anwar Ibrahim. Anwar publicly announced that he had chosen to join UMNO because he was convinced that the new administration was genuinely committed to Islam and to 23 bringing development and security to Malaysian society. It is not yet clear whether this was the real reason for Anwar's move.
What is certain is that UMNO has increased its Islamic credibility enormously. On the day following the move, about 400 PAS members in Pasir Mas, Kelantan reportedly switched allegiance to the National 24 " Front Islamic party, Berjasa. Anwar's own electoral victory over 25
PAS incumbent Zabidi bin Haji Ali, was overwhelming. Moreover, the inclusion of Anwar in the government line-up is consistent with the 99
new UMNO emphasis on the development of a young, educated, techno•
cratic political elite, the nomination lists for the 1982 elections
showed the highest turnover of candidates within the National Front 26
in the history of Malaysia. Finally, the government is hoping
that the co-optation of Anwar will create something of a precedent,
by which it can hope to discourage young intellectual Islamic leaders
from joining the opposition. During the recent campaign, for example,
Datuk Sanusi Junid argued that PAS candidates Ustaz Nahkaie Ahmad and
Ustaz Fadzil Noor (former ABIM vice-president), should not run because
it would hurt Islamic unity, and because, "as close associates of former ABIM leader, Encik Anwar Ibrahim, both... should give their 27 support to UMNO".
The government's co-optative strategy also involves the effort to gain the direct support of present and potential PAS followers, and all of those caught up in the Islamic resurgence. This strategy
implies the 'co-optation' or undercutting of opposition demands and proposals, through the aggressive expansion of the government's Islamic programs. Former Prime Minister Tun Hussein Onn explained the logic be hind this strategy as follows: You may wonder why we spend so much money on Islam. You may think it is a waste of money. If we don't, Parti Islam (PAS) will get at us. The party will and . does claim that we are not religious, and (that) the people wi 11 lose faith.28
The programs include: increased government spending on mosque- building, which UMNO representatives frequently compare to the paltry sums spent by PAS in Kelantan; an increase in Islamic radio and 100
television programming, and greater restrictions on broadcasts which may give offence to Muslims; public declarations of support for
principles of Islamic morality, such as khalwat, while at the same
time stressing that these ought not to be binding on non-Muslims;
legislation which prohibits the serving of alcohol at government
functions, and a general crackdown on the corrupting elements of
western culture, such as alcohol, drugs, pornography, rock music and beauty contests; regular Quran-reading-contests and, beginning in
December 1978, annual 'Dakwah Months' designed in the then Prime
Minister's words, "to give the (dakwah) movement some order and good 29 sense"; investment laws sensitive to Islamic restrictions on interest, and the recent decision to establish an Islamic Bank in 30
1983; an increase in the number of students sent abroad to study,
and the sponsorship (by Perak) of a student's hostel in Cairo; plans
to build a M$ 12 million Islamic complex in Ipoh; an expansion and
intensification of trade, investment and friendship ties, with Muslim
states, including for example the Prime Minister's recent tours to
Oman, united Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, and the granting of
diplomatic status to the PLO in Kuala Lumpur; the standardization of
legislation on various aspects of Islamic practice, including most
recently, Muslim Marriage and Family laws; the construction of a
complex in K.L. to house the new headquarters of the Pilgrim Manage•
ment and Fund Board (Luth), which aids Malaysian Muslims in making
the haj; the decision to set up an Islamic University with instruction 101
in Arabic and English, shortly after a government decision to reject 31 the proposed Chinese-language Merdeka University; the administration of fines to shopkeepers serving Malays during Puasa; and the suspension of meals at national primary schools during Puasa, despite the presence 32 of non-Malays.
With the exception of the last three mentioned, and possibly the
Islamic Bank decision, government programs do not seriously challenge the religio-political status quo, in the direction of Darul Islam, nor are they seriously offensive to non-Muslims. Their value to the government lies in providing concrete and symbolic evidence of the government's pro-Islamic character. This evidence is useful both in refuting the accusations of Islamic critics, and in convincing ordinary
Muslims that the government is genuinely devoted to the faith. None• theless, more recent policy decisions indicate that the government may now be more committed to altering the Islamic status quo, than it
once was. Although it is too early to predict the full consequences
of this trend, it can be speculated that it will enhance the government's
Islamic legitimacy, but at the same time alienate many non-Malay
government supporters.
Yet another component of the co-optative strategy is the effort
to control Islam by increasing the direct involvement of the central
government in (i) the propagation, and (ii) the administration of
religion. The expansion of a national Islamic institutional infrastruc•
ture, accordingly, has been in two directions; (i) dakwah and education,
and (ii) administration and legal affairs. The federal government's \
102
ability to deal with religious opposition has always been complicated
by the fact that, constitutionally, religion is under state jurisdic•
tion. In response to this problem, the government established, in
1968, the Malaysian National Islamic Council, as an advisory body
attached to the Prime Minister's Department. Through the 1970's, the
role of the Council was expanded to include Islamic instruction, the publication . of Islamic materials, control over an Islamic Research
Centre, and the direction of the Islamic Missionary Fund. Renamed the
Malaysian Council for Islamic Affairs, in 1974, this body's major
function today is to coordinate the activities of, and liaise with
State Religious Councils, and Departments of Religious Affairs, and
it is generally regarded as an instrument to limit the autonomy of 33
state religious officials.
A separate body, the Islamic Council of the Federal Territory,
is empowered to issue fatwa (Islamic legal judgements), which State Re•
ligious Councils are urged to follow, and Mentris Besar (legally, not permitted to meddle with the religious prerogatives of the Rulers), 34 have begun to meet, to discuss and coordinate religious policy.
Yet despite these efforts to establish central institutional control of Islam, State Religious Councils and Rulers continue to exercise a good measure of autonomy in matters of Islamic law and administration.
Within the state religious bureaucracies, for instance, the Council of Ulama controls the collection and distribution of zakat and fitrah, and can therefore affect the strength of pondoks, and can control what is taught in religious schools. Moreover, because it is the 103
Ruler who appoints this Council, it is he who has effective control
over a large part of Islamic administration at the state level. The
Sultans of Kedah and Pahang, for instance, are known to take their
religious prerogatives very seriously, and frequently refuse to co•
operate with federal and state governments on matters pertaining to
Islam. More recently, however, the Sultan of Kedah has begun to
work more closely with both governments, apparently in recognition of
the need to combat Islamic extremism and the use of Islam for
politically disruptive purposes (e.g. Alor Setar riots, 1980). The
cooperation of the Rulers and the government on the issue of Islam, where and when it occurs, does serve to limit the activities of the
Islamic opposition.
Similarly, on the question of dakwah, state governments and
the Rulers have begun to cooperate more fully with the federal govern• ment in limiting the appeal and autonomy of the propagators of dakwah
songsang. The main institutional efforts at undercutting dakwah
extremism however have originated at the national level. For instance,
nearly every government department has a dakwah section, which is
designed to observe and direct the dakwah activities within its 35
jurisdiction. The federal government is also involved, both directly
and indirectly in a large number of dakwah organizations. The oldest,
Pertubohari Kebajikan Islam Malaysia (Perkim), founded by the Tunku
in 1960, concentrates on the conversion of non-Muslims. By 1977
Perkim claimed to have converted about 30,000, although it did admit 36
that the incidence of recidivism could be as high as 60%.
The greater part of the government's dakwah effort is directed
toward Malay Muslims. Yayasan Dakwah Islamiah (YDIM) and the Dakwah 104
Training Institute (sponsored by the P.M.'s Department), are the most important of the government's institutional developments in this 37 regard. Although the stated aim of the government's organizations and programs is to combat 'false dakwah' and to raise the level of correct Islamic teachings, most observers recognize that it is some• thing more than that. One author writes that government missionaries: seldom showed a critical attitude toward government policies. Rather they generally raised aspects of Islam that supported the position of the government, or touched on Islam in a general manner, such as emphasizing that it endorses progress,... A few govern• ment missionaries were considered unsuitable or too radical, and were eventually shifted to other positions or forbidden to teach.38
That government dakwah programs have a political flavour should, of course, come as no surprise, but it is worth noting that the labels
'un-Islamic' and 'false dakwah' can be as much code words for 'anti- government' or 'anti-status quo', as they are objective assessments of degrees of Islamic orthodoxy.
To sum up, the government, in its effort to undercut the appeal of an Islamic opposition, employs a co-optative strategy which has three components: (1) the co-optation of key Islamic leaders in the hope of gaining the support of their followers, and also of establishing credibility as a government committed to Islam; (2) the sponsorship of highly visible pro-Islamic programs to undercut the criticism and the appeal of other Islamic groups, in a way which is appealing to the large majority of Malays; (3) the development of an institutional infrastructure designed both to direct and control the administration of Islam and to limit the autonomy of non-government Islamic 105
organizations. These three components of the co-optative strategy have been effectively and astutely implemented. However, the success of the strategy is to a large extent a function of the character of Malay
Islam and Malaysian politics. The strategy of elite co-optation, for
instance, is effective only as long as the key leaders' of the Islamic
'opposition' are willing to be co-opted. If their principles are
genuinely Islamic and their political orientation is sincerely anti-
status quo, the policy of co-optation is less likely to be effective.
In this regard, the co-optation of Anwar Ibrahim should not be under•
stood simply as a preview of the path to be followed by all young
Muslim intellectuals, because not all of these are necessarily as
politically ambitious as Anwar. Ustaz Nahkaie Ahmad and Ustaz Fadzil
Noor, for example, have resisted the temptation to change sides, despite
the frustration that their faction suffers under the older PAS leader•
ship. Nonetheless, the co-optation of younger sub- and counter-elites
will be an effective strategy for removing the challenge of those
individuals who are more immediately concerned with gaining access to
the benefits of political office - and a good number of the urban
educated Islamic activists certainly fall within this category. The
danger in this strategy is that, once within the government coalition,
these individuals will be hard to control. This is a concern which
has been expressed about Anwar Ibrahim, who already has a sizeable
personal following, a position as Deputy Minister in charge of Islamic
affairs in the Prime Minister's department, and who is expected to make 39
a strong bid for the presidency of UMNO Youth in September. The tac•
tic of programmatic co-optation is effective because, for the large 106
majority of Malay Muslims, the observable acitvities of the government
may seem more genuinely Islamic than the pronouncements of the so-
called Islamic parties. Moreover, the experience of the Jemaat Tabligh
in rural areas, and the nature of requests and complaints emanating
from the countryside, indicate that rural Malays are not so intent as
urban middle class Malays,on foresaking material progress and comfort
for the sake of Islamic purity. UMNO (and the National Front) more
or less guarantees material progress or at least security, and at the
same time is visibly active in promoting Islam. That is a balance which has an obvious appeal for the vast majority of Malays.
Finally, the development of institutions to establish government
control over Islam is effective for two reasons. First, as State
Religious Councils come increasingly under the control of state secular elites, the political content of local religious education is more carefully monitored, and correct political and religious opinions 40 become a condition of government approval to operate. Control of finances also implies political control: Ulama who also run religious schools (pondok or madrasah) are becoming increasingly dependent for financial support on the (Federal) Ministry of Education and/or State Religious Councils, which simultaneously increases their economic dependence and vulnerability. It also reduces their willingness to welcome members of dakwah organizations which the government regards as poten• tially subversive.41
Similar constraints operate to enhance the effectiveness and appeal of government dakwah organizations. Joining a non-government dakwah group bears an explicit political meaning, which potential recruits 107
may want to avoid, and operating a non-government group implies certain economic costs which may outweigh the benefits of independence.
The second reason for the effectiveness of the government's institutional efforts at co-optation and control, is that the state governments and the Rulers have an equal stake with the federal govern• ment in stability and the maintenance of the religio-political status quo. The legitimacy of both governments and the Rulers could be challenged by proponents of an extreme version of Darul Islam, which advocated the removal of the vestiges of traditional and/or secular authority. Even if PAS were to once again establish control of Kelantan or Trengganu, the compatibility of state and federal objectives vis a vis Islam would dissolve, as would the effectiveness of the central government's more moderate and co-optative approach to limiting Islamic opposition. Generally speaking, the effectiveness of the present institutional strategy is almost guaranteed by the absence of any coherent Islamic opposition or unified anti-government dakwah movement.
Attacks on false dakwah can be tolerated and even welcomed by non• government groups, which also feel that dakwah needs greater coherence and control. The creation of national dakwah organizations, therefore, has not been an affront to all existing dakwah organizations, nor has it led to a polarization between government and non-government dakwah forces.
(2) Coercive Strategies
In addition to the government's concern that independent dakwah 108
groups and PAS may interfere with UMNO's legitimacy and the achievement of development goals, there is a strong concern that the more 'extremist'
groups could pose a threat to national security. It is generally
accepted in government circles that, in order to prevent these groups
from someday becoming a real threat, coercive tactics are a necessity.
Sanusi Junid, for instance has said:
To secure Islamic growth from being desecrated by unscrupulous elements, various preventive and punitive measures have to be taken... Those who have committed a breach of the faith, will have to be deprived of the privileges accorded to them as Muslims.42
Toward the end of 1980, and shortly after the Batu Pahat incident, the
then Minister of Home Affairs, Tan Sri Ghazali^" Shafie confirmed that "mu
Police Special Branch (S.B.) effort once devoted to insurgent activity 43
has been shifted to Islamic extremists". In the aftermath of the
Alor Setar riot, in January 1980, Ghazali was sharply critical of
opportunistic political groups (a reference to PAS and P.A.S.) and charged that "the staging of demonstrations is not a democratic prac- 44
tice."
The chief instruments of censorship and coercion available to
the government are; the Internal Security Act, which allows the arrest
and detention without trial of persons suspected of engaging in
activities threatening to national security; the Universities Act which
prohibits political activity by students and faculty; the Societies Act
(administered by the Registrar of Societies in the Home Affairs
ministry), which allows the government to grant or rescind licenses
with little explanation, although it does make clear the limitations 109
imposed by the license involved. Mauzy argues that these kinds of restrictions "have helped provide some autonomy for the accommodating 45 elites, by shedding the democratic excesses of the old system".
Yet, if it has provided some autonomy for elites it may have contributed to other problems within their respective ethnic consti• tuencies. Kessler has argued that the circumscription of open political debate has not put an end to Malay political disaffection, but rather, has displaced it from formal to para-political channels of articulation.
Critics of the government, he writes, "have opted out of politics, preferring association in the many sects and associations and the broad 46 intellectual stream of Islamic revivalism". While Kessler has perhaps overstated the extent to which criticism is outside of formal political channels, it is true that under the present restrictions,
Islam has become an important channel for the articulation of Malay disaffection. Coercive techniques, then, have provided some autonomy for political elites, but they have not succeeded in silencing Malay critics.
In general, however, the government has used coercive methods only sparingly against the religious opposition, and when it has done so, it has frequently been at the insistence of the public or of local politicians that something be done to curb the activities of the more dangerous groups. In fact, in response to pressure of this kind in
Parliament, the Deputy Home Affairs Minister sounded a note of moderation, 47 whicsayinhg threatethat thn e nationagovernmenl securityt must mak, before a ecarefu takinl g surveany ydrasti of thc e actiongroups. no
Even when action is taken, it is in circumstances where few can question the need for coercive techniques. When the government arrests without trial the members of a cult which vows to kill non-Muslims, which desecrates Hindu shrines, or which murders innocent citizens, it can usually count on the acquiescence of the majority of the population.
Used under such circumstances, where the action of the government is more or less in harmonty with the opinion of other political leaders and the public, it is an effective strategy, and moreover may encourage a realignment of some Islamic groups behind the government, in the name of Islamic discipline and moderation.
(3) Diversive Strategies
Although UMNO recognizes the political salience of Islam, and has had some success in using it to advantage, a more effective and long-standing strategy for maintaining Malay support has been heavy government sponsorship of rural development programs:
One of UMNO's instincts is to seek solutions to ideological problems in development projects and to woo votes by the very material lures that dakwah protagonists reject....48
While it is beyond the scope of this study to examine Malaysian rural development policy in detail, it can be stated unequivocally that one of the main aims of that policy has been to raise the standards ;of living of the rural Malay populace, in order to ensure their stable support for the UMNO political elite. The strategy has not been a complete success - PAS still wins a substantial number of Malay votes - but the Ill
general trend appears to be toward the solidification of UMNO support.
As noted earlier, one plausible explanation for this trend is that
UMNO/NF has effectively displaced the local elites in the role of
patron. Rural Malays, although they may frequently be unhappy with the
new patron, are at the same time dependent on 'him'. The new patron,
moreover, spares no effort in emphasising this dependence, and the
importance of patron-client bonds of loyalty and deference.
Under the Third Malaysia Plan the government spent about M$ 24.9
billion on development of which M$ 7.4 billion was specifically allo•
cated to agriculture and land development. Under the Fourth Malaysia
Plan, the equivalent allocations are M$ 42.8 billion and M$ 12.0 49
billion. Regular expenditures on irrigation, resettlement and
extension programs encourage Malays to view the government as patron.
But perhaps of even greater importance are those expenditures which
come in the form of special projects, subsidies and grants, which are
distributed in times of serious hardship, or at election time.
During the 1978 election campaign, in Kedah, the National Front
referred quite openly to the material benefits which would accrue to
those' voting for the governing coalition. Prime Minister Datuk Hussein
Onn announced a M$ 400 million investment in the Muda area, and added that much more aid would come provided the NF were elected; half a million chickens were sent to families in Baling where serious food shortages were reported; Dr. Mahathir promised to raise the price of padi for producers while keeping the cost for consumers constant; and the
Mentri Besar, Datuk Syed Nahar stated that only a strong NF-run state 112 government would be able to administer effectively the M$1.2 billion
Third Malaysia Plan allocation to the state.
In the recent (1980) by-election in Bukit Raya (Kedah), the NF promised the constituency M$ 30 million in aid and development projects
(about M$ 30,000/voter) if the NF candidate were elected.51 Datuk
Michael Chen was brought in to campaign for the NF and it is thought that he managed to swing the Chinese vote away from the PAS incumbent by stressing the prospects for business under the new government development schemes. In Trengganu, shortly before the 1982 election day (April 22), an UMNO Division Head, and also a Deputy Minister in the P.M.'s Department, Datuk Abdullah Abdul Rahman, publicly announced 52
(threatened) that people would face hardship if they voted for PAS.
In addition to promises, the government occasionally has an opportunity to demonstrate its magnanimity, just before election time.
The four-month drought in the rice-bowl areas of the north-east and 53 the north-west provided such an opportunity early in 1982. The government recognized that the loss of the main-season crop would cause farmers considerable hardship, and that farmers in the major irrigation scheme areas (Muda and Kemubu), would hold the government responsible for the absence of irrigation water, and for the suffering which would ensue. With the election approaching, the decision was taken to release the available water from the reservoirs, to allow planting to continue, as scheduled. As a result, the main-season crop was expected to be only slightly smaller than average, but it "may have been rescued at 54 the expense of the off-season yield". Nonetheless, by the time the 113
election took place, the memory of the government's power to deal with the crisis, was probably more vividly in the minds of most padi farmers than.the crisis itself.
Once again, the effectiveness of the government strategy is greatly enhanced by its consistency with the structural political factors
discussed earlier. UMNO's emphasis on issues of material progress and
development is a good strategy only where the opposition is unwilling
or unable to confront the government on these issues. PAS seems neither willing nor able to challenge the government on its economic performance, despite the fact that real grievances do exist and serious
criticism can be made. Moreover, the government has begun to phrase
the need for material progress and development in Islamic terms, thereby
further weakening the PAS position.
(4) Informative-Promotional Strategies
As part of its strategy for limiting outbidding and securing
stable non-elite support, the government has been "determined and un- 55
relenting in expounding its message to the people". On the issue of
Islam, the government has been no less determined, though the message
has been somewhat different from the one outlined by Mauzy in 1978.
While the ruling coalition continues to stress ethnic harmony, tolerance,
and economic development as the way to achieve greater equality between
ethnic groups, the message has more recently begun to emphasize three
themes: (i) UMNO's genuine dedication to the promotion and preservation
of Islam, and the dubiousness of similar claims made by opposition groups; 114
(ii) the importance of Islamic/Malay unity and UMNO's commitment to that cause; (iii) the compatibility of the government's economic development strategy with the prime tenets of Islam.
The material patronage of Islam, discussed earlier, has, not surprisingly, been complemented by a concerted government propagative effort to convince Malays of the NF's Islamic character, and to instil
'correct' Islamic values in the population. Recently Datuk Sanusi
Junid, for example, referred to UMNO as the world's third-largest
Islamic party, and to PAS as "a splinter party".^ UMNO, he continued 57
"upholds and protects Islam from being profaned by certain quarters".
To strengthen the Islamic credentials of the party and the government,
Ministers and Muslim propagandists are sent throughout Malaysia and abroad to address audiences on sub j ects pertaining to Islam.
State and central governments took advantage of the Prophet's birthday to stage enormous rallies, processions and celebrations during which government representatives spread the message of the close 5 8 relationship between the state and Islam. On a more didactic note, the King used the occasion to criticize Malays for their backward and unethical attitudes. The theme of the celebrations "Disciplined Living
Ensures the Greatness of a People", was touched upon by the King, who said that Malay Muslims "are indisciplined and no longer obey the 59 commands of Allah, their parents, teachers, society and the nation".
The Prime Minister spoke in a similar vein, saying that Malay Muslims must change their attitudes of dependence and indifference, and should not be afraid to strive for achievement.^ 115
Government spokesmen are even more outspoken on the subject of
the non-Islamic character of Islamic opposition groups. Tun Hussein
Onn, after the Batu Pahat incident, lamented that "Islam had been mis•
interpreted and exploited by ill-informed, misguided and unscrupulous
61
people". More recently, Dr. Mahathir challenged the Islamic character
of PAS: ...PAS does very little that is Islamic apart from shouting slogans, even when they go and pray, they pray because of political effect. I know PAS members who go from mosque to mosque every Friday to pray but before he was a member of Parliament and State Assembly he never did that... Is he praying to God or is he praying for the vote?... If you question UMNO as being irreligious, I can question PAS as being even worse.62
Another frequent claim of government leaders is that UMNO is the
only party with a genuine concern for Islamic unity. PAS, with its
"politics of negativism", and its penchant for forming "unholy alliances"
with the DAP at election time, is said to be disrupting that unity for
its own opportunistic ends. In a recent press conference, Dr. Mahathir
referred to these divisive tendencies, as follows: I know...that they are doing things like organizing boycotts which are not Islamic - like not wanting to be buried in the Muslim cemetery where UMNO members are buried. That is not Islamic. Preaching divisiveness in Islam - that is not Islamic.63
Shortly before election day (1982), Deputy Prime Minister, Datuk Musa made a speech, parts of which appeared in the New Straits Times under
the banner, "Ever Onwards for Islamic Unity:. In this speech, Datuk
Musa expressed the party's pride at being the leadership of an Islamic nation, and went on to say that "Islamic Unity is the main factor for us 116
to move forward to attain success in all levels of development".
Naturally, PAS claims that UMNO is responsible for Islamic
disunity. It is true that UMNO spends some time in separating PAS
leaders from followers, in drawing attention to factional stuggles in
PAS' leadership, and has used vote splitting tactics to draw the vote
away from PAS on at least one occasion.^5 But divisions within Islam,
as we have seen, have deeper causes than these, and the character is
such that the theme of Islamic unity has worked primarily to the advan•
tage of the government rather than PAS, or any other organization which
differentiates itself from the party of religious moderation. Groups which emphasize their own uniqueness or exclusivity cannot make a
credible appeal on the basis of Islamic unity. UMNO, on the other hand, with a reputation for moderation and coalition, can make such an appeal, and can thereby gain the cooperation or support of a wide variety of
Islamic groups.
Apart from its concern over unity, one of the major objectives of the UMNO leadership is to provide evidence of the compatibility of
Islam with the programs of modernization and development which are at the heart of their strategy for maintaining non-elite support. Parti• cularly in the post-1971 era, with its emphasis on the economic modernization of the Malays, the government has expressed concern that
'deviationist' teachings will convince Malays to forsake the benefits of this world, for those of the next. The government has, therefore, sought to channel the emotive power of religion for "pragmatic social and political objectives".^ MADA, for instance, uses mosque lectures 117
and UMNO imams to promote prompt loan repayment among Muda area farmers,
and some 400 mosques are used as distribution centres for literature 6 7
on agricultural extension. In a campaign speech, Datuk Musa argued
that: The factor that dominates our successes is that Islam is a religion that is suited to the modern world and a religion that caters for the needs of man in the complete sense - spiritual and material well-being.68
The issue of spiritual and material needs is a common subject
of debate within Malaysia's Islamic community. Anwar Ibrahim cited
UMNO's commitment to a balance between the two as a major reason for
his decision to join the party. Although such statements were originally
received with considerable skepticism, recent statements by the Prime
Minister indicate that Anwar's principles have a reasonably firm base
of support within UMNO, and that his commitment to the party may in
fact be gunuine. When asked if he felt capable of containing Anwar's
eagerness for an Islamic state, the Prime Minister replied:
I don't see any need to worry. If he sticks to proper Islamic interpretation, then there is no need to worry about what he wishes to do. In fact, it is because we are doing what he would like to do that he has joined UMNO... Of course, a lot of people equate Islam with some ex• tremist demands. That is not Islam... As far as I can make out, he has not demanded something impossible of :the government. He thinks there should be an Islamic Bank and there is no difference of opinion between him and me. I don't think there is need to worry about riding a tiger....69
Thus, although there is a trend within. UMNO in the direction of pragmatism, efficiency and technocracy, it is complemented by an increasing emphasis on the spiritual prerequisites of national development and progress; and Islam is seen as providing that spiritual base. According to 118
Dr Mahathir:
Islam should be a very strong stabilising factor. It will anchor us solidly to the ground. If we follow the teachings of Islam properly, it will make us a very disciplined and a very learned nation. It will make us powerful.... 70
Despite this renewed commitment, however, the government's propagandative techniques will only be successful to the extent that they are complemented by material evidence of the government's patronage of Islam. Further• more, for those whose interpretation of Islam is more extreme (less liberal) than that of the ruling elites, or for those groups which are more sincerely critical of the government per se, neither material nor symbolic expressions of government commitment to Islam will deter their criticism. Yet it is precisely the absence of any stable and coherent Islamic opposition group of this kind, which makes the present government strategies so effective. If the basic social and political conditions which have limited the growth of such an opposition were to change, then the effectiveness of the strategies of the ruling elites would weaken appreciably.
To sum up, the government has employed a variety of strategies to limit the erosion of support among Malays, under the influence of the Islamic resurgence. The constellation of strategies - co-optative, coercive, diversive, and informative-promotional - reflects:an essen• tially inclusionary and accommodative approach to the problem. This has been a feasible and effective strategy primarily because it has been consistent with and has reinforced social and political disctinctions within Malaysian Islam and society. For instance, the strategy of counter-elite and sub-elite co-optation has been effective because it is 119
consistent with the real political goal of some Islamic leaders, who
therefore accept the offer of coalition. The government's pro-Islamic
programs work because the vast majority of Malays are more easily
convinced by the material evidence of the government's commitment to
Islam than they are by the slogans of other groups. Institutional con•
trols impose economic and political costs on those engaged in anti-
government religious activity, and weaken the chances of cooperation
among non-government groups. Diversive and informative strategies work
in complementary fashion to satisfy both the material and spiritual
demands of all but the most extreme religious and political groups,
and the latter are effectively controlled by limited recourse to coer•
cive techniques. In short, government strategies for coping with the threat of Islamic opposition have been effective to the extent that they have taken account of, and have reinforced the socio-religious limitations on the emergence of such an opposition. Finally, despite
Dr. Mahathir's optimism that 'there is no need to worry about riding a tiger', the most serious threat to political stability in Malaysia probably exists in the potential for the exacerbation of internal
UMNO (and NF) divisions, which may result from the government's inclusionary or co-optative approach to the Islamic challenge. This danger has arisen as a result of very recent changes in the government's approach to Islam, rather than as a consequence of government policies over the last decade. The suggestion of danger made here, then, does not lend support to the arguments of Kessler and Lyon, but rather demarcates the limits on on the effectiveness of state strategies toward Islam. 120
FOOTNOTES er IV
Gordon P. Means, "The Role of Islam...", p. 268.
William R. Roff, The Origins of Malay Nationalism, p. 67.
Ibid., p. 70. Also Moshe Yegar, Islam and Islamic Institutions in British Malaya: 1874-1941, (Jerusalem: The Magnes Press, 1979).
Gordon P. Means, "Public Policy Toward Religion in Malaysia", Pacific Affairs 51(3) (Fall 1978), p. 386. Also N. J. Funston, "Malaysia" in M. Ayoob, (ed.), The Politics of Islamic Reassertion, p. 168.
William R. Roff, The Origins of Malay Nationalism, p. 73. Religious legal and administrative centralization was also encouraged by the British.
Clive S. Kessler, Islam and Politics, p. 53. '
William R. Roff, The Origins of Malay Nationalism, p. 72. Also see Kessler, Islam and Politics, pp. 53-55.
Ibid., p. 74.
Gordon P. Means, "Public Policy Toward Religion in Malaysia", p. 386.
Y. Mansoor Marican, "Malay Nationalism and the Islamic Party of Malaysia", p. 295.
Gordon P. Means, "The Role of Islam...", p. 279.
Ibid., p. 279.
Fred R. von der Mehden, "Islamic Resurgence in Malaysia", pp. 174- 76.
The state was officially declared a secular state with freedom of religion, despite Islam's 'official' status. See Hashim M. Suffian, "The Relationship Between Islam and the State in Malaya" Intisari 1(1), pp. 7-22. A Malay is defined as "one who professes the Muslim religion, habitually speaks the Malay language and conforms to Malay customs".
Gordon P. Means, "Public Policy Toward Religion in Malaysia", p. 396.
For a full discussion of the constitutional amendments, see R. S. Milne and Diane K. Mauzy, Politics and Government in Malaysia, pp. 93-95. 121
17. Chandra Muzaffar, Protector?, pp. 137-38.
18. N. J. Funston, "Malaysia" in M. Ayoob, (ed.), The Politics of Islamic Reassertion, p. 172.
19. See Diane K. Mauzy, Consociationalism, pp. 221-35, for a full discussion of the background and conditions of coalition.
20. Asri replied that PAS would gladly support or join the government if the latter brought its policies in line with Islam. New Straits Times, 1 April 1982. Asri may also want to keep the door open to guard against a challenge to his leadership, as in 1973.
21. New Straits Times, 1 April 1982. Kubang Pasu was, perhaps, a special case because the UMNO candidate was Dr. Mahathir.
22. Ibid., 1 April 1982.
23. Ibid., April, 5, 9, 1982.
24. Inid., 5 April 1982.
25. The breakdown of the vote in the parliamentary constituency of Permatang Pauh was:
1982 1978
Total Valid Vote 25,171 21,388
NF ...... (Anwar) 18,849 (Ariffin bin Haj Daud) 10,264 PAS (Zabidi) 4,497 (Zabidi) 11,124
DAP (Tan) 1,825
New Straits Times, 24 April 1982.
26. The NF line-up included more than 45% new faces, New Straits Times,
5 April 1982.
27. Ibid., 1 April 1982.
28. Far Eastern Economic Review, 9 February 1979, p. 23.
29. Ibid., p. 23. 30. The government has recently announced some plans for an Islamic banking system, complete with interest-free loans. There is still considerable confusion about the details of the Islamic Bank, its mandate and its sphere of operation. For more details see Asiaweek, 30 July 1982, pp. 41-42; and New Straits Times, 6 July 1982. 122
31. Far Eastern Economic Review, 12 March 1982.
32. New Straits Times, 24 & 30 June 1982.
33. N. J. Funston, "Malaysia", in M. Ayoob (ed.), The Politics of Islamic Reassertion, p. 180.
34. Diane K. Mauzy; Personal communication, August 1982.
35. Margo L. Lyon, "The Dakwah Movement...", p. 38. Lyon notes that those dakwah sections in the Ministries of education and defence are the most active.
36. Ibid., p. 35.
37. Judith A. Nagata, "Religious Ideology and Social Change..." p. 430.
38. N. J. Funston, "Malaysia", in M. Ayoob (ed.), The Politics of Islamic Reassertion, p. 181. fn. 20.
39. Asiaweek, 30 July 1982, p. 14.
40. Judith A. Nagata, "Islamic Revival and the Problem of Legitimacy...", p. 32.
41. Idem,"The Impact of the Islamic Revival...", p. 17.
42. New Straits Times, 4 January 1982, p. 4.
43. Far Eastern Economic Review, 28 November 1981.
44. Asiaweek, 15 February 1980, p. 25.
45. Diane K, Mauzy, Consociationalism, pp. 398-399. It should be noted that the government has indicated that it is prepared to rescind most of the conditions of the recent (1981) Amendment to the Societies Act, which was aimed at ABIM and Aliran. ABIM is no longer considered to be a dangerous organi• zation; the co-optative approach, therefore is considered to be appropriate. Diane K. Mauzy and R. S. Milne, personal communication, August 1982. Also see Far Eastern Economic Review, 12 March 1982, pp. 14-15.
46. Clive S. Kessler, "Islamic Revival and Political Disaffection...", p. 8.
47. New Straits Times, 4 January 1982. 123
48. Judith A. Nagata, "Religious Ideology and Social Change...", p. 429.
49. Far Eastern Economic Review, 10 April 1981, pp. 70-75. Allocations do not necessarily match actual expenditures - the latter often amount to as little as hai'f of the former.
50. Ismail Kassim, Race, Politics and Moderation, pp. 61-62.
51. New Straits Times, 7 April 1980.
52. Ibid., 5 April 1982.
53. For details, see Far Eastern Economic Review, 19 March 1982.
54. Ibid., p. 78. In fact, it has turned out that the off-season crop will not be seriously affected; such a happy ending could not have been easily predicted at the time the decision was made.
55. Diane K. Mauzy, Consociationalism, p. 417.
56. New Straits Times, 4 January 1982.
57. Ibid., 4 January 1982.
58. Ibid., January 8, 9, 10, 1982.
59. Ibid., 9 January 1982.
60. Ibid., 15 January 1982.
61. Far Eastern Economic Review, 28 November 1980.
62. New Straits Times, 17 July 1982. p. 2. From a press conference given by the Prime Minister on the anniversary of the new administration.
63. Ibid., 17 July 1982.
64. Ibid., 7 April 1982. p. 7.
65. The most notable example of this strategy was the UMNO-Berjasa electoral alliance in the 1978 Kelantan State Assembly elections; Berjasa, an Islamic party, drew a substantial proportion of the vote away from PAS. see Ismail Kassim, Race, Politics and Moderation, pp. 24-27; and Diane K. Mauzy, Consociationalism , pp. 367-73.
66. Gordon P. Means, "Public Policy Toward Religion in Malaysia", p. 397. 124
67. Afifuddin bin Haji Omar, Institutions, Peasants and Development in Malaysia, p. 251.
68. New Straits Times, 7 April 1982.
69. Ibid., 17 July 1982.
70. Ibid., 17 July 1982, p. 2. 125
CHAPTER V: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This study has attempted to assess the implications for the
Malaysian political system of the on-going Islamic resurgence.
Contrary to prevailing opinion on the subject, it has been argued that the Islamic resurgence does not pose a serious threat to the stability
and legitimacy of the political system, or to its leaders. The major
elements of this argument can be highlighted by summarizing and
discussing the findings of each chapter.
In the first chapter, the issue of stable non-elite support,
an intrinsic part of Mauzy's consociational model of Malaysian politics, was introduced as a theoretical focus. The importance of non-elite
support was discussed, and the factors which may affect its stability
(in the Malay community) were examined and classified as either (i)
Societal Conditions, or (ii) State Policy. It was noted that, despite the resurgence, Islam has not, so far succeeded in mobilizing or bringing political coherence to those factors which are viewed as a potential threat to the government's stable non-elite support. The
reason for this, it was argued, lies in the internal heterogeneity of
Malaysian Islam, which in itself reflects important social, economic and political divisions within Malay society. Moreover, it was
stressed that the pattern of intra-Islamic and intra-Malay cleavages
is not bipolar - between government and opposition - but rather is
fragmented or multipolar, which tends to limit the mobilization of a 126
political opposition. Finally, on the basis of insights from the
literature on the politics and sociology of ethnicity in Malaysia,
it was suggested that Islam has become a charter of intra-Malay, as well as inter-ethnic differentiation, through which Malays can
express internal social and political distinctions, without jeopar• dizing the security or hegemony of the larger (Malay) ethnic group.
In Chapter II, the two major schools of thought on Malaysia's
Islamic resurgence were outlined and criticized. It was suggested that those authors who emphasize the significance of Islam as a charter of ethnic identity, tend to understate the importance of
intra-Malay and intra-Islamic divisions. Those who stress the rela• tionship between Islamic resurgence and intra-Malay cleavages, tend to over-state the extent of polarization within the Malay community.
It was argued that, when the phenomenon of Islamic resurgence is viewed in its relationship to the pre-existing, and often 'non- resurgent', elements within Malaysian Islam, what emerges is a picture of immense diversity and complexity. Islam appears in many forms and with many roles; as a symbol of Malay ethnicity, but also as a charter of intra-Malay differentiation. Both schools of thought manage, in different ways, to obscure this complexity, and in both cases the result is an over-estimation of the potential danger to the political system. Secondly, neither school carefully analyzes the influence of intra-Malay and intra-Islamic diversity in determining the effective• ness of state policy toward Islam. 127
The third chapter examined in some detail, (i) the social
origins and bases, and (ii) the ideologies and goals, of the most pro•
minent Islamic groups and parties - PAS, ABIM, Darul Arqam, Jemaat
Tabligh and various 'extremist' organizations. Following Vasil, two
questions were asked at the outset which this chapter sought to
answer. The first question was; how compatible, politically, are the
various Islamic organizations in the country - their social origins,
social bases, their goals, styles, and political-religious orienta•
tions - and how is this likely to affect their capacity for coherent
and collective political action? In answer to this question it was
demonstrated that strong differences of this kind do exist between the various groups, and that these differences can, and do, limit the chance, and indeed the motivation, for a united Islamic opposition movement. It was argued that differences within Malaysian Islam reflect social, economic and political divisions within Malay society, but that these divisions are neither bipolar nor static. Thus, Islam is not simply representing 'objective' class divisions, but more fluid divisions, based on social values, political objectives and economic interests. Some of the more important divisions were: (1) differences in the goals and ideologies of the various dakwah groups on the one hand, and those of the majority of traditional rural ulama and their followers, on the other; (2) conflicts arising over the competition for a constituency of followers, or the leadership of an organization, in both urban and rural settings; (3) divisions based on conflicting 128
economic interests of two or more social groups within the Malay
community - eg. peasants vs. landowners; (4) divisions in social
origins and value systems of Malays in different rural commnuities -
eg. linear and clustered kampongs; (5) ideological differences within
the urban dakwah movement, particularly between those with an arti•
culated political commitment, and those with a more religious and
inwardlooking philosophy; (6) differences between groups primarily
critical of the Malay community (its decadence or corruption for
example), and those with a more overtly chauvinistic attitude; (7)
ambivalence or flexibility within the ideology and goals of a single
movement, depending on the social and political environment. These
cleavages cross-cut in ways which inhibit the polarization of Islam
on a government versus opposition axis, although they do not entirely
rule out the possibility of a united Islamic opposition under condi•
tions of a serious external threat to the religion or the Malay
community.
In answer to the second question - how consistent with the
various demands, symbols and interests of the different Islamic organi•
zations, are the other salient issues in Malay politics? - the last
half of Chapter III discussed the compatibility of Islam with the
economic grievances of the Kedah peasantry. Again, despite the fact
that Islam provides the philosophical and ideological justification
for such an alliance, it was discovered that the internal hetero• geneity of Malay society (in Kedah), makes the emergence of a populist- 129
type Islamic opposition movement, a highly unlikely possibility.
The fourth chapter analyzed the state strategies for coping with the Islamic challenge - co-optative, coercive, diversive, and informa• tive promotional. With regard to state policy, the following question was posed at the outset: To what extent is the absence of a serious weakening of Malay non-elite support a function of the conscious policies of the government, as opposed to being a consequence of social structural and (exogenous) political limitations on the coherence and salience of an Islamic-based opposition movement? Chapter IV showed that the policies of the government do have some considerable impact in limiting the threat of Islamic opposition. It also revealed, however, that the success of government strategies is largely contin• gent upon the extent to which they work in complementary fashion with the social structural limitations on such a threat. In the event of a change in those social conditions, the government strategies will need to change or they will cease to be effective.
Indeed, a change in these conditions, either in the direction of a greater polarization within the Malay community, or between Malays and non-Malays, could significantly alter the significance of Islam, and the Islamic resurgence, for the Malaysian political system. For instance, by moving too aggressively toward something resembling
Darul Islam, the government would run the risk of alienating non-Malays, or perhaps of accentuating splits within the Malay community in the direction of polarization. -Somewhat ironically, then, it may be the 130
government's response to the perceived challenge of the Islamic
resurgence, which will ultimately provide the most serious test to
Malaysia's political stability. 131
TABLE 1
Breakdown of Seats Held by Parties in Parliament after Elections;
1974, 1978, 1982;
1974 1978 1982
NF 135 131 132
PAS n.a.a 5 5
DAP 9 16 9
Independent 0 1 8
Pekemas 1 -
SNAP 9 n.a.b n.a.
SAPO 0 1-
TOTALS: 154 154 154
Sources for Tables: All tables compiled on the basis of; Diane. K. Mauzy, "A Vote for Continuity: The 1978 General Elections in Malaysia", Asian Survey,XIX (3) (March 1979);Ismail Kassim, Race, Politics and Moderation, A Study of the Malaysian Electoral Process,(Singapore Times Books International 1979);New Straits Times, 8, 22, 23, 24 April 1982. Newspaper reports for the 1982 elections were incomplete in some respects. These were, therefore, supplemented by more recent and accurate sources; in particular Diane K. Mauzy and R. S. Milne. a PAS was a member of the National Front at the time of the 1974 election. b SNAP was a member of the National Front at the time of the 1978 and 1982 elections. 132
TABLE 2
Percentage of Valid Vote and Seats Won, and Number of Seats Contested by Major Parties in Parliamentary Elections in 1978 and 1982: Peninsular Malaysia
1978 1982
% total % valid seats % total % valid seats seats votea contested seats voteb Contested
NF 82.4 57.2 113 90.3 61.1 114
DAP 13.2 21.6 51 5.3 21.5 63
PAS 4.4 17.5 87 4.4 16.3 82
OTHER 0 3.7 33 0 1.1 61
TOTALS 100.03 100.0% 284 100.0% 100.0% 340
a The total valid vote in Peninsular Malaysia (1978) was 3,027,603.
b According to available sources the total valid vote in Peninsular Malaysia was 3,534,803.. This figure is somewhat smaller than the actual number of votes because complete figures are not available.
( All subsequent calculations are based on this figure. 133
TABLE 3
Parliamentary Seats Contested and Won by Major Parties in 1978 and 1982 Elections: Peninsular Malaysia, Sabah and Sarawak
1978 1982 Won Contested Won Contested
NF Total 131 153 132 154 National Front Parties: Peninsular Malaysia
UMNO 69 74 70 73 MCA 17 27 24 28 MIC 3 4 4 4 Berj asa •0 2 Gerakan 4 6 5 7 Dir NF 1 1 0 0 PPP 0 1 0 0 Sabah and Sarawak PBB
SNAP 9 9 6 9 SUPP 6 7 5 7 Berj aya 8 9 10 11 USNO 5 6 0 5 NF Ind 1 2 0 0
Opposition Parties: All Malaysia
DAP 16 .52. 63 PAS 5 87 82 Ind 1 18 60 SAPO 1 1 1 134 TABLE 4
Comparison of Seats Won by Major Parties in the State Elections in Peninsular Malaysia, 1978 and 1982 -- by State
1978 1982
Total seats NF PAS DAP 'IND NF PAS DAP -IND by sti
Perak 32 1 9 0 38 0 4 0 42 Negri Sembilan 21 0 3 0 22 0 2 0 24a Malacca 16 0 4 0 18 0 2 0 20
Selangor 29 0 3 1 31 0 1 1 33b Johore 31 0 1 0 32 0 0 0 32 Pahang 32 0 0 0 31 0 1 0 32 Penang 20 1 5 1 25 0 2 0 27
Trengganu 28 0 0 0 23 5 0 0 28 Perlis 12 0 0 0 11 1 0 0 12 Kedah 19 7 0 0 24 2 0 0 26
Kelantan (34) 2 0 0 26 10 0 0 36c
Totals by Party 274b 11 25 2 280a 18 12 1 312
a 1982 elections for the Negri Sembilan state seat of Gemencheh were post• poned because of the death of Datuk Mohd. Talib (NF-UMNO). Source: The Sunday Star, 24 April 1982. The by-election was held on 22 May 1982, and was won by Waad Haji Mansor (NF-UMNO) Source: New Sunday Times, 23 May 1982. b In 1978, all of the candidates in one Selangor constituency were dis• qualified, necessitating a later by-election for that seat which was eventually won by a NF candidate. c State elections in Kelantan were held prior to the national elections in 1978. Figures in parentheses show aggregate seats won by NF and Berjasa, which later joined NF. Berjasa won 10 of NF's 34 seats. 135
TABLE 5
Comparison of Parliamentary Seats Won by Major Parties in Peninsular Malaysia Elections, 1978 and 1982 -- by State
-1978 1982
Totals by -NF PAS DAP .IND NF PAS DAP IND State
Perak 17 0 4 0 21 0 0 0 21
Negri Sembilan 5 . 0 1 0 6 0 0 0 6
Malacca 3 0 1 0 3 0 1 0 4
Selangor 10 0 1 0 11 0 0 0 11
Johore 15 0 1 0 16 0 0 0 16
Pahang 8 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 8
Penang 4 1 4 0 7 0 2 0 9
Trengganu 7 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 7
Perlis 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2
Kedah 11 2 0 0 12 1 0 0 13
Kelantan 10 2 0 0 8 4 0 0 12
Federal Territory 2 0 3 0 2 0 3 0 5
Totals 94 5 15a 0 103 5 6b 0 114
a DAP also won one seat in Sabah in 1978, bringing its national total to 16. b DAP also won two seats in Sarawak and one in Sabah in 1982, bringing its national total to 9. 136
TABLE 6
Percentage of Valid Vote Won by PAS in 1978 and 1982 Parliamentary Contests
Total Pop Total PAS PAS Vote as % of No. of Seats Vote Vote Total Pop Vote ^Contested
1978 3,027,603 529,329 17.48% 87
1982a 3,534,803 574,309 16.25% 82
Source: Compiled from New Straits Times, 24 April 1982. Some adjustments and corrections have been made on the basis of statistics provided by Diane K. Mauzy, August 1982.
TABLE 7
The Percentage of the Popular Vote Polled by PAS in Kedah Parliamentary and State Elections in 1978 and 1982
Parliament State
1978 39.69% 39.50%
1982 30.98% 32.40%a
Statistics for 1982 popular vote in Kedah are incomplete. Returns for 8 state seats are not available. Figures for Parliamentary popular vote provided by Diane K. Mauzy, August 1982 (Also see Table 9). 137
TABLE 8
The Seats Won and Contested, and the Percentage of Parliamentary Popular Vote Polled, by PAS in the Four Northern States, (Compared to the Party's Performance Nationally), in the 1978 and 1982 Elections
n i • ^ Percentage of Parliament State .. . , _. , . Valid Parliamen- Won Contested Won Contested tary Vote
1978 4(5)a 33 (87) 9 (11) 95 (203) 40.29% (17.48%)
1982 5(5) 34 (82) 18 (18) 99 (223) 38.21% (16.25%)
a Figures in parentheses show the national PAS totals of seats won and contested, and Parliamentary popular vote polled. b Sources: New Straits Times, 8, 22, 24 April 1982, and Diane K. Mauzy statistics. 138
TABLE 9
Breakdown by State, of PAS' Percentage of the Total Valid Parliamentary Vote, for the 1982 Elections in Peninsular Malaysia PAS Vote as % PAS Total Vote Total Vote of Total
Perak^ 68,511 580,423 11.80 Negri Sembilan 8,751 195,345 4.48 Malacca 20,105 162,970 12.37 Selangor 21,824 401,111 5.44 Johore 18,224 354,962 5.13 Pahang 46,951 233,297 20.12 Penang 8,612 344,346 2.50 Trengganu 76,991 186,147 41.36 Perlis 18,860 58,932 32.0 Kedah 125,872 406,315 30.98 Kelantan 151,629 325,830 46.54 Federal Territory 7,979 285,125 2.80
Totals 574,309 3,534,803 16.25%
a indicates that the data for one constituency in the state are not available. b indicates that the data for two constituencies in the state are not available. Although some statistics are missing, the percentages are derived from the same base of data and so are internally valid. Also the sample is large enough to give reasonably accurate figures (Also see Table #10) TABLE 10
Percentage of Valid Vote Polled by Major Political Parties and Independent Candidates on a State Basis
in the 1978 and 1982 Parliamentary Elections - Peninsular Malaysia
NF % PAS % DAP % Independent % OTHERS %
State 1978 .1982 1978 1982 1978 1982 1978 1982 1978 1982
Perak 53, .5 61, .2 9 .6 11 .8 36.5 26.5 - -
Negri Sembilan 57: ,6 67, .3 7 .9 .4 .5 29.4 27.4 5.1 -
Malacca 55, .7 66, ,4 11 .8 12, .4 32.5 21.2 - -
Selangor 57, .6 62. ,7 9 .9 5, .4 30.1 27.5 4.4 1.5
Johore 77, .3 74. ,6 7 .6 5, .1 15.1 20.1 - -
Pahang 66, .8 60. ,4 18 .5 20, .1 8.8 17.2 2.4 2.3 3.5
Penang 47, ,1 56. ,2 10 .8 2, .5 27.3 36.0 6.6 8.2 4.7
Trengganu 58. ,4 57. ,5 38 .0 41, ,4 - - - 3.6
Perlis 60. ,8 67. ,8 33 .5 32. ,0 - - 5.7 -
Kedah 57. ,1 61. 5 39 .7 31, ,0 - 4.7 2.4 -
Kelantan 56. ,4 53. ,2 43 .6 46, ,5 - - - -
Federal Territory 25. ,0 49. 9 6, .5 2. ,8 55.0 46.8 2.8 10.7 140
Malaysian Political Parties
Appendix -
--Peninsular Malaysia --
UMNO United Malays National Organization. Formed at Kampong Bahru, Kuala Lumpur, in 1946 by Malay associations gathered in protest against the proposed Malayan Union. Headed at the outset by Dato Onn bin Ja'afar, the father of Tun Hussein Onn. The unexpected success of UMNO-MCA cooperation in Kuala Lumpur in 1952 led to the formation of an UMNO- MCA alliance. UMNO has been the leading vote winner in every national election to date. The principal member of both the Alliance and the National Front, UMNO remains the largest and most significant political organization in Malaysia.
MCA Malaysian Chinese Association. Founded in 1949 to do welfare work among rural Chinese uprooted by the Emergency and to preserve the political and social rights of the Chinese. Has been associated with UMNO in a political alliance since the early 1950's. Originally the party of Baba Chinese businessmen, MCA has for 30 years been identified as the representative of economically privileged Chinese. Its links with UMNO have been both a political asset and a political liability.
MIC Malaysian Indian Congress. Founded in 1946 to represent Indian interests. It was relatively insignificant as a political force until it joined the Alliance and became the official spokesman for Indian interests in government. Its political leverage is slight since there are no constituencies in Malaysia where "Indians' form a majority.
DAP Democratic Action Party. Formed in 1966 by Malaysian citizens who were previously members of the Singapore-based People's Action Party's Malaya branch. Its approach is non-communal, although it is regarded primarily .as a party of the Chinese. Its platform is "socialist" with an emphasis on more equitable distribution of income and official recognition and use of Malay, Chinese, Indian and English. Because of its origins in the People's Action Party, it has been accused of having foreign ties. Currently led by Lim Kit-Slang.
Gerakan Gerakan Ra'ayat Malaysia (Malaysian People's Movement). A non-communal but basically Chinese party based in Penang. Formed in 1968, it did well in the 1969 election by making an election pact with DAP to avoid splitting the support of dissatisfied Chinese and other voters. Joined the National Front in 1972. 141
PAS Partai Islam Sa-Tanah Melayu (Pan-Malayan Islamic Party -- PMIP). Usually referred to as PAS. Originated as an ulama organization which collaborated with UMNO but withdrew in protest against UMNO compromises with the MCA. Based originally in Perak and Penang it later controlled Kelantan from 1959-78 and Trengganu from 1959 to 1964 and made inroads into UMNO territory in Perlis and Kedah in 1969. Originally "a religiously informed popular movement for the defense of peasant interests", it suffered a loss of voter appeal as a result of association with UMNO in the National Front from 1973 to 1977. Still won 17 percent of the vote in West Malaysia in 1978.
PPP People's Progressive Party. Began in 1953 as the Perak Progressive Party. Renamed after the 1955 election. Power base in the Kinta Valley of Perak. A member of the National Front since 1972, it has declined from four seats in Parliament in 1969 to none since 1978.
PEKEMAS Social Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Masharakat -- PEKEMAS). A Kuala Lumpur-based splinter faction of Gerakan established in 1972 under the leadership of Syed Hussein Alatas. "Essentially a party of noncommunal intellectuals, it has acted as a moral gadfly, pointing out the debilitating aspects of corruption and other acts of misrule." It won a single parliamentary seat in 1974.
Partai Marhaen Best rendered as the "peasants' party", it was formed in 1972 by dissident Malay intellectuals. Vaguely leftist in orientation, it enjoyed some minimal support on university campuses.
-- Sabah --
Berj aya Bersatu Ra'ayat Jelata Sabah (United Peoples of Sabah). Berjaya also means "victory" in Malay. A splinter of USNO established in July 1975 by Kadazans and others dissatisfied with the corrupt and dictatorial rule of Tun Mustapha Sabah's chief Minister. A member- of the National Front since 1975. Berjaya won control of Sabah's state government in elections in April 1976. It is currently led by Datuk Harris Salleh.
USNO United Sabah National Organization. Modelled on UMNO and led by Tun Mustapha from its founding in 1963. An ardent defender of Malay political enculturation, the party lost the backing of UMNO in 1975 because of Tun Mustapha independence and abuse of power in Sabah. As members of the national Front, USNO and Berjaya are bound to 142
cooperate in national elections. Nevertheless, in 1978 both parties backed "independent" candidates in constituencies reserved for the other, and Berjaya kept control of the state government.
-- Sarawak --
PBB Partai Pesaka Bumiputera Bersatu. The offspring of a 1973 merger between the Partai Bumiputera (a union of Sarawakian Islamic groups) and PESAKA (an Iban challenger to SNAP). Leader of the Sarawak Alliance government, which is modelled on the original UMNO-MCA alliance. The party is headed by -F_aji Abdul Rahman Yaakub.
SUPP Sarawak United People's Party. A multi-racial, but mainly Chinese party formed in 1959. Although originally leftist, moderates came to dominate the party in the mid-1960's. Prior to 1963, its main platform plank was independence for Sarawak or an independent union of Sabah, Sarawak and Brunei. In recent years, SUPP has been a regu• lar coalition partner in the Sarawak Alliance and a National Front member.
SNAP Sarawak National Party. Originally the party of Ibans from the Second Division, SNAP opposed federation with Malaysia until 1962 when it changed its position. SNAP was ascendant in the Sarawak Alliance until 1966 when its opposition to the introduction of Malay as the national language of Sarawak led the government in Kuala Lumpur to remove SNAP'S leader as chief minister. SNAP then broke away from the Alliance. SNAP won pluralities in state elections in 1970 and 1974 but was unable to establish a governing coalition. It finally entered the National Front in 1977. 143
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Bell, C.L.G. and P.B.R. Hazel1. "Measuring the Effects of an Agricultural Investment Project on its Surrounding Region" American Journal of Agricultural Economics (February 1980). Reprint.
Cham, B.N. "Class and Communal Conflict in Malaysia". Journal of Contemporary Asia. 5 (4), pp. 446-61.
Cross, Malcolm. "On Conflict, Race Relations and the Theory of the Plural Society". Race, XII (4) (April 1971), pp. 477-92.
Cummings, J.T., ert al. "Islam and Modern Economic Change" in Esposito (ed.). Islam and Development. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1980.
Deutsch, Karl W. "Social Mobilization and Political Development" in Claude E. Welch, Jr. (ed.), Political Modernization. 2nd. ed. Belmont Calif:Duxbury Press, 1971.
Frankel, F. et^ al_. "The Political Challenge of the Green Revolution; Shifting Patterns of Political Peasant Participation in India and Pakistan". Princeton University Policy Memorandum No. 38, 1972.
Funston, N.J. "The Origin of Parti Islam se Malaysia". Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 7(1) (March 1976), pp. 58-73.
"Malaysia", Chapter 9 in The Politics of Islamic Reassertion. Mohammed Ayoob (ed.), London: Croom Helm, 1981, pp. 165-89. 147
Geertz, Clifford. "The Integrative Revolution; Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States", in Claude E. Welch Jr. (ed.), Political Modernization, (2nd ed.). Belmont Calif:- Duxbury Press, 1971.
Hashim M. Suffian. "The Relationship between Islam and the State in Malaya" Intisari, 1(1), pp. 7-22.
Hodgkin, Thomas. "The Revolutionary Tradition in Islam". Race and Class, XXI (3) (Summer, 1979), pp. 221-38.
Hudson, Michael C. "Islam and Political Development" in John L. - Esposito (ed.) Islam and Development. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1980.
Jegarthesen, S. "The Economics of Rice Double-cropping in the Muda Irrigation Scheme" in Barnett and Southworth (eds.), Experience in Farm Mechanization in Southeast Asia. Agricultural Development Council Inc., 1974.
Kessler, Clive S. "Islam Society and Political Behaviour: Some Comparative Implications of the Malay Case", British Journal of Sociology, 23 (1) (1972), pp. 33-50.
- . "Malaysia; Islamic Revivalism and Political Disaffection in a Divided Society". Southeast Asia Chronicle no. 75 (October 1980), pp. 3-11. de Koninck. R. "Integration of the Peasantry; Examples from Malaysia and Indonesia". Pacific Affairs 52 (2) (Fall 1972), pp. 265-91.
Lyon, Margo L. "The Dakwah Movement in Malaysia". Review of Indonesian and Malayan Affairs, 13 (2) (December 1979). pp. 34-45.
MADA Publications. "Short Term Credit Scheme for the Muda Project; An Analysis of its Operational Problems", Alor Star, (1972).
. "The Muda Irrigation Scheme" Project Manager's Office, (May 1970).
Marican, Y. Mansoor. "Malay Nationalism and the Islamic Party of Malaya", Islamic Studies, 16 (1977), pp. 291-301.
Mauzy, Diane K. "A Vote for Continuity: The 1978 General Elections in Malaysia", Asian Survey, XIX (3) (March 1979), pp. 281-296.
McVey, Ruth T. "Islam Explained" Review Article. Pacific Affairs, 54 (2) (Summer 1981), pp. 260-87. 148
Means, Gordon P. "The Role of Islam in the Political Development of Malaysia", Comparative Politics, 1 (2) (January 1969), •pp. 264-84.
. '"Special Rights' as a Strategy for Development", Comparative Politics. 5 (1) (October 1972), pp. 29-62.
. "Public Policy toward Religion in Malaysia", Pacific Affairs, 51 (3) (Fall 1978), pp. 386-404.
Nagata, Judith A. "Perceptions of Social Inequality in Malaysia", Pluralism in Malaysia; Myth and Reality. Judith A. Nagata (ed.), Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1975, pp. 113-36.
. "Religious Ideology and Social Change; the Islamic Revival in Malaysia". Pacific Affairs, 53 (3) (Fall 1980), pp. 405-39.
"Islamic Revival and the Problem of Legitimacy among Rural Religious Elites in Malaysia" in MAN, 17 (1) (March 1982), pp. 42-57.
Purcal, J.T. "Rural (Economic Development and its Impact on Economic and Social Integration in West Malaysia", in Judith A. Nagata (ed.), Pluralism in Malaysia: Myth and Reality. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1975, pp. 65-78.
Ratnam, K.J. "Religion and Politics in Malaya", in Robert 0. Tilman (ed.), Man, State and Society in Contemporary Southeast Asia. Praeger: New York, 1969, pp. 351-61.
Richards,W. "The Underdevelopment of West Malaysia; A Survey" Review of Indonesian and Malayan Affairs, 7 (1) (January 1973), pp. 19-37.
Rogers, M.L. "The Politicization of Malay Villages", Comparative Politics, 7 (2) (January 1975), pp. 205-25.
Safie bin Ibrahim. "The Islamic Elements in Malay Politics in Pre- independent Malaya 1937-48", Islamic Culture, LII (2) (April, 1978), pp. 185-95.
Said, Edward W. "Hiding Islam", Harpers, (January 1981), pp. 25-32.
Scott, James C. "The Erosion of Patron-Client Bonds and Social Change in Southeast Asia", Journal of Asian Studies, XXXII (1) (November 1972), pp. 5-37. 149
Shabbir, Cheema G. "Rural Organizations and Participation in Malaysia". W.C.A.R.R.D. Meeting Papers, Rome, F.A.O. Access #38274, (July 1979).
Shari, Ishak. "Some Comments on the Eradication of Poverty Under the Third Malaysia Plan" Southeast Asian Affairs, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1977, pp. 173-81.
Sivanandan, A. "Race, Class and Power: An Outline for Study" RACE, XIV (4) (April 1973), pp. 384-92.
Southeast Asia Chronicle. Special Malaysia Issue, No. 72. "What Price Success", 1980.
Stenson, Michael. "Class and Race in West Malaysia" Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, 8 (2) (1976), pp. 45-54.
Tan Tin Yean. "Income Inequality and Employment in Peninsular Malaysia". Nanyang Occasional Paper #27, 1978.
Von der Mehden, Fred R. "Islamic Resurgence in Malaysia", in John L. Esposito (ed.), Islam and Development. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1980, pp. 163-80.
Wertheim, W.F. Evolution and Revolution: The Rising Waves of Emancipation. Penguin Press, 1974.
Winzeler, Robert L. "The Social Organization of Islam in Kelantan", in William R. Roff, (ed) Kelantan; Religion, Society, and Politics in a Malay State. London: Oxford University Press, 1974, pp. 259-71.
Zurayk, Constantine K. "Tensions in Islamic Civilization", Papers in Contemporary Arab Studies, no. 3. Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, 1978. 150
THESES, DISSERTATIONS AND ACADEMIC EXERCISES
Afifuddin bin Haji Omar. Peasants, Institutions and Development in Malaysia; the Political-Economy of Development in the Muda Region. Ph.D. Thesis, Cornell, 1978.
Ah-Bang, Leo. Elite Cohesion in Malaysia: A Study of Alliance Leadership. Ph.D. Thesis, Department of Political Science, University of Singapore, July 1972.
Ahmat, Sharom. Transitions and Change in a Malay State; A Study of the Economic and Political Development of Kedah 1879-1923. Ph.D. Thesis, University of London, 1969.
Baker, David John. Local Muslim Organizations and National Politics in Malaysia. Ph.D. Thesis, University of California, Berkeley, 1973.
Doering, O.C. Malaysian Rice Policy and the Muda River Project. Ph.D. Thesis, Cornell, 1973.
Marican, Y. Mansoor. The Political Accommodation of Primordial Parties: DMK (India) and PAS (Malaysia). Ph.D. Thesis, Department of Political Science, U.B.C., 1976.
Mauzy, Diane K. Consociationalism and Coalition Politics in Malaysia. Ph.D. Thesis, Department of Political Science, U.B.C., 1978.
Othman, Mansur Haji. "Hakmilik Tanah Padi Dan Politik Di Kedah". /Ownership of Padi Land and Politics in KedahJ. Unpublished M.S.S. Thesis, Universiti Sains Malaysia, Penang, 1978.
Thambipillai, Pushpathavi. Political Participation in Rural Malaysia, M.S.S. Thesis, Universiti Sains Malaysia, Penang, 1975.
Wan Abdul Halim bin Othman. "Ethnogenesis; A Case Study of the Malays in Peninsular Malaysia". Ph.D. Thesis, University of Bristol, 1979.
Yeoh Chee Koon. "Traditionalism and the Malays of West Malaysia". Academic Exercise, Singapore, 1973. 151
UNPUBLISHED PAPERS
Anonymous, (D.K. Mauzy Collection). "Islamic Revivalism and the Political Process in Malaysia", Unpublished Paper.
King, Dwight Y. '.'Indonesia's New Order ASA Bureaucratic Polity. A Neo-Patrimonial Regime or a Bureaucratic Authoritarian Regime: What Differences Does it Make?", Paper for Association for Asian Studies Annual Meeting, Los Angeles, April 1979.
Lim Teck Ghee, et.. al. "Land Tenure in the Muda Irrigation Area; A Preliminary Report", Universiti Sains Malaysia.
Lim Teck Ghee, "Muda; The Green Revolution Reassessed", Seminar at Cornell University, December 1980.
Nagata, Judith.' "The Impact of the Islamic Revival (Dakwah) on the Rural Religious Culture of Malaysia", Paper presented at the CCSEAS-ISEAS Joint International Conference on "Village-Level Modernization; Liveli• hoods, Resources and Cultural Continuity" Singapore, June 21-24 1982.
Robinson, Geoffrey, B. "No Harvest Without a Thorn; the Muda Irrigation Scheme", Unpublished Paper, Cornell University, 1981.
"Islamic Resurgence and Political Change in Malaysia", Unpublished Paper, University of British Columbia, 1982. 152
NEWSPAPERS
Christian Science Monitor, December 14, 1978.
Globe and Mail, March 20, 1980.
New Straits Times. April 7, 9, 1980; May 5, 1980. January - April, 1982.
New Sunday Times.
The Star. March 3, 1980; April 7, 1980; May 6, 8, 9, 1980.
The Sunday Star.
Straits Times. March 18, 19, 21, 22, 1980; April 3, 7, 1980.
PERIODICALS
Asiaweek. "Islam's Rising Cry" (August 24, 1979).
. "Cracks in the Bowl" (September, 1980).
. Also February 15; April 18; October 17; October 31; November 7; November 21; December 12; 1980; and July 30, 1982. Far Eastern Economic Review. "A Loud Yes (with a warning)" July 21, 1978), pp. 10-14.
._ "Pilgrim's Progress, Asian Style".
(November 17, 1978), pp. 32-5.
. "The Green Revolution". (February 9, 1979), pp. 27-7.
. "Bitter Harvest in the Rice Bowl". (February 8, 1980) ••. •-'.') p. 20. . "Mending Cracks in a Rice Bowl". (February 22, 1980),
pp. 28-30. j . "Of Rice and Anxious Men". (February 22, 1980), pp. 41-4.
. "Keeping Islam in Balance". (November 28, 1980), pp. 34-6.
. "Half-way to Maturity". (April 10, 1981), pp. 70-7.
. "The Old Guard Changes". (July 3, 1981), pp. 14-16. 153
. "Mahathir Picks his Men". (July 24, 1981), pp. 8-9.
. "Malaysia Feels the Pinch". (August 14, 1981). pp. 44-5.
. "Malaysia, '81". (August 28, 1981), pp. 37-70.
. "The Muslims Move In". (October 9, 1981), pp. 23-9.
. "Malaysia's Labour Pains" (October 23, 1981), pp. 83-4.
Interview with Dr. Mahathir. (October 30, 1981), pp. 32-5.
"Malaysia to Set Up an Islamic University". (March 12, 1982), p. 10.
. "A Little Give a Little Take". (March 12, 1982), pp. 14-15
. "Pointers to a Poll". (March 19, 1982), pp. 12-13.
. "Mahathir's Date with a Mandate". (March 26, 1982), pp. 10
. "Mahathir's Prize Catch". (April 2, 1982), pp. 23-4.
"Clocking in for a New Era; "The Front will Win but it is the Margin that Counts"; "The New Malay Dilemma", (April 9, 1982), pp. 15-21.
. "Mahathir's Soft Shoe Shuffle". (May 7, 1982), pp. 10-11.
. "An Eastern Awakening". (July 2, 1982), pp. 85-7.
"Hoping for a Leap from Feudal to Industrial Age". (July 2, 1982), pp. 88-92.