Islamic Resurgence and the Stability of Malay Non-Elite Support
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ISLAMIC RESURGENCE AND THE STABILITY OF MALAY NON-ELITE SUPPORT by GEOFFREY B. ROBINSON B.A. McGill University, 1978 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES (Department of Political Science) We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA August 1982 Geoffrey B. Robinson In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. Department of POLITICAL SCIENCE The University of British Columbia 1956 Main Mall Vancouver, Canada V6T 1Y3 Date AUGUST 26, 1982. Abstract This study analyzes the political implications of the Islamic resurgence in Malaysia. Based on a theoretical interest in the relationship between non-elite support and political stability, it examines the impact of Islam on the government's ability to maintain the support of the Malay population. Contrary to much of the existing literature on the subject, it argues that the Islamic resurgence, at present, does not pose a serious threat to the stability of Malay non- elite support for the political leadership. It further argues that the maintenance of Malay support has, so far, been achieved without jeopardizing the stability and legitimacy of the political system as a whole. The absence of political destabilization under the influence of the Islamic resurgence is explained, in this study, by reference to two related sets of factors: (1) Societal Conditions; and (2) State Policy. It is suggested that the Islamic resurgence expresses social, economic, political, and religious differences, both between Malays and non-Malays, and within the Malay community. At present, the intra- Malay cleavages form a multipolar rather than a bipolar pattern, and it is argued that this configuration tends to limit the chances for the emergence of a strong, coherent Islamic opposition movement. Under the conditions of an external threat to Islam, the pattern could ii be expected to become less fragmented and more polarized, thereby affording a greater opportunity for the growth of such a movement. State policies have been effective at undercutting the appeal of anti-government Islamic groups and parties - especially where these policies have reinforced the societal limitations on the emergence of an Islamic opposition. iii Acknowledgements My foremost debt of gratitude is to my thesis committee, and especially to Diane Mauzy and Stephen Milne, for providing the inspira• tion, constructive advice and meticulous criticism without which this study could never have been completed. I also owe a special debt to Professors Milton Bamett (Cornell University) and Colin Abraham (Universiti Sains Malaysia), who first inspired me to study Malaysia, and to Professor Alexander Woodside., who changed my understanding of Southeast Asia, and of history, for the better. I am indebted to the University of British Columbia, the Faculty of Graduate Studies, and the Department of Political Science, for providing me with the funds necessary to survive while doing my research. I would also like to acknowledge my gratitude to colleagues and professors in the Department, for offering valuable criticisms of earlier drafts of this thesis, and for providing the rigorous academic environment which made it both a more challenging, and a more satisfying thesis to write. To Nancy Wong and Petula Muller I extend my sincere thanks and appreciation for exercising administrative authority on my behalf, for providing invaluable stylistic advice, typing indecipherable foot• notes, and not least for accommodating my occasional eccentricities. My thanks also go to Mrs. Grace Cross for typing this thesis under the pressure of an almost impossible deadline. Finally, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my family and to my friends in Malaysia and at home, who already know why they matter. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER I Introduction CHAPTER II Islamic Resurgence in Malaysia - Theory CHAPTER III Intra-Malay and Intra-Islamic Cleavages CHAPTER IV Islam and State Policy .. CHAPTER V Summary and Conclusions.. TABLES AND APPENDIX SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY v LIST OF TABLES Page TABLE 1: Breakdown of Seats Held by Parties in Parliament after the Elections of 1974, 1978 and 1982. 131 TABLE 2: Percentage of Valid Vote and Seats Won, and Number of Seats Contested by Major Parties in Parliamentary Elections of 1978 and 1982: Peninsular Malaysia. 132 TABLE 3: Parliamentary Seats Contested and Won by Major Parties in 1978 and 1982 Elections: Peninsular Malaysia, Sabah and Sarawak. 133 TABLE 4: Comparison of Seats Won by Major Parties in the State Elections in Peninsular Malaysia, 1978 and 1982 -- by State. 134 TABLE 5: Comparison of Parliamentary Seats Won in Penin• sular Malaysia Elections, 1978 and 1982 -- by State. 135 TABLE 6: Percentage of Valid Vote Won by PAS in 1978 and 1982 Parliamentary Contests. 136 TABLE 7: The Percentage of the Popular Vote Polled by PAS in Kedah Parliamentary and State Elections in 1978 and 1982. 136 TABLE 8: The Seats Won and Contested, and the Percentage of Parliamentary Popular Vote Polled by PAS in the Four Northern States, (Compared to the Party's Performance Nationally). 137 vi LIST OF TABLES (Cont'd) Page TABLE 9: Breakdown by State of PAS' Percentage of the Total Valid Parliamentary Vote for the 1982 Elections in Peninsular Malaysia. 138 TABLE 10: Percentage of Valid Vote Polled by Major Political Parties and Independent Candidates, on a State Basis, in the 1978 and 1982 Parliamentary Elections -- Peninsular Malaysia. 139 vii CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION One consequence of the Iranian revolution has been the sudden proliferation of scholarly studies on the subject of 'Islamic Resur• gence'. * Much of this work has focussed on the negative political implications of the resurgence, and in particular on its potential for weakening the legitimacy and disrupting the political stability of modernizing 'secular' regimes. Malaysia, a secular state with a large 2 non-Muslim population, and notable for its impressive rates of economic growth, and its record of political stability, has not been spared 3 pessimistic predictions by some political analysts. While students of Malaysian politics have scrupulously avoided facile comparisons with the Iranian case, most have concluded that the Islamic resurgence poses a strong potential threat to the legitimacy and stability of the system. This study seeks to challenge these conclusions, and to argue instead that, in spite of - and perhaps because of - the resurgence, Malaysian Islamic movements, organizations and political parties do not constitute a viable and coherent political opposition to the present system, or to its leaders. It further argues that government strategies for coping with the Islamic challenge are effective both at undermining the development of such an Islamic opposition, and at limiting the destabi• lizing effects of the activities and demands of the more 'extremist^ Muslim groups. In reaching their more pessimistic conclusions, scholars have 2 generally followed one of two related lines of argument.'' Some have stressed the danger of heightened ethnic antagonism which could result from the revitalization of what is effectively the religion of the Malays. Others have emphasized the issues of intra-Malay cleavages and Islamic opposition, and the deleterious effect which these might have on the government's ability to maintain "stable non-elite support" among Malays. While it is accepted that the Islamic resurgence in Malaysia is a manifestation of both inter-ethnic (Malay vs. non-Malay) and intra-ethnic (intra-Malay) divisions, it is, nonetheless, argued here that, when viewed within the broader context of Islam in Malaysian politics, it is the differences within the Malay-Muslim community which appear most salient. Moreover, on the issue of Islam, the actions of the political elite, in recent years, strongly suggest that it is not so much the problem of ethnic antagonism, but rather of a strong Malay-Muslim opposition which is of most immediate concern to the government. Despite these facts, there is, to date, very little evidence to suggest that the Malaysian political system, or its leaders, are in serious jeopardy due to a decline in non-elite support. Quite the contrary, recent federal and state elections (April 22, 1982) returned the ruling National Front (NF) to power with an over• whelming majority in seats and popular vote (see Table #1). Moreover the NF limited the major Islamic opposition party (PAS) to 16.25% of the total valid vote in Parliamentary contests, and eroded its over-all support in the predominantly Malay northern states of Kelantan, Trengganu, Kedah, and Perlis (see Table #8 and Table #9). These results were achieved 3 despite "an economically unsatisfactory climate", and in the wake of a crackdown on the civil service, and several state subsidized enterprises; policies not calculated to win the favour of Malay voters. In light of these results, a major objective of this study is to explain the absence of a serious weakening of Malay non-elite support for the National Front, under the influence of the ongoing Islamic resurgence. In order to answer this immediate question, it is necessary to examine in greater 7 detail one aspect of Mauzy's 'consociational model' of Malaysian politics; the issue of "stable non-elite support". Mauzy writes that while "over-arching elite cooperation is necessary in order to form a consociational-type system, stable non-elite support is necessary for the successful functioning of that system'. These two components are not only of roughly equal importance, they are also closely related in their effect on the functioning of consociationalism.