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The Precipitants of the Tehran Hostage Crisis Roham Alvandi

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The Precipitants of the Tehran Hostage Crisis Roham Alvandi The Fletcher School Online Journal for issues related to Southwest Asia and Islamic Civilization Fall 2003, Article 3 The Precipitants of the Tehran Hostage Crisis Roham Alvandi The Tehran hostage crisis lasted for almost 15 and others, particularly in the early days 1 months. It began on November 4, 1979, when of the revolution.” Iranian revolutionaries captured the U.S. embassy In this paper I will explore the precipitants of in Tehran and its staff, holding 52 of them the Tehran hostage crisis and delve into President hostage. It ended on January 20, 1981, when the Khatami’s assertion that the United States bore captive Americans departed Iran from Tehran’s some responsibility for the crisis. Utilizing an Mehrabad airport. The television images of analytical model developed by Glen Snyder and Iranian revolutionaries leading blindfolded Paul Diesing, I contend that the general diplomats down the steps of the U.S. embassy precipitant for the Tehran hostage crisis was the chancery are emblazoned on the minds of an interference of the United States in the internal entire generation of Americans and therefore, the affairs of Iran from 1953 onwards and that the hostage crisis continues to cast a shadow over specific precipitants were the outreach of the Iranian‐American relations. Carter administration to members of the In his landmark interview with CNN’s Provisional Government of the Islamic Republic Christian Amanpour on January 7, 1998, Iran’s of Iran (PGI) and the admission of the exiled Shah popularly‐elected President, Mohammad to the United States. I will begin by examining Khatami, was asked whether the hostage crisis, how and why the Tehran hostage crisis began. “falls into the category of early revolutionary This will involve a discussion of what Snyder and excesses?” Amanpour extended to President Diesing term the precipitant and challenge of a Khatami the opportunity to apologize for the crisis: hostage crisis and heal a wound in the American national psyche. Khatami’s response reflected the “Typically, the immediate cause of the Iranian perception of the causes of the hostage crisis is an attempt by one state to coerce crisis: another by an explicit or implicit threat of force. The first act of severe coercion “The feelings of our people were may be called the challenge; technically seriously hurt by U.S. policies. And as it starts the crisis by posing a distinct you said, in the heat of the possibility of war. A challenge is revolutionary fervor, things happen stimulated or motivated by a which cannot be fully contained or precipitant, of which there are two judged according to usual norms. This broad types, external and internal. In was the crying out of the people against the external type, a state perceives an humiliations and inequities imposed intolerable situation developing in its upon them by the policies of the U.S. environment as a result of action by © Al Nakhlah – The Fletcher School –Tufts University 160 Packard Avenue – Medford, MA 02155-7082 USA – Tel: +1.617.627.3700 2 Al Nakhlah another state or states. It may be Although Iran had long suffered from intolerable for a variety of reasons: it is foreign interference in its domestic affairs, threatening to the state’s external or particularly by Britain and Russia, the United internal security, it threatens the state’s States did not become significantly involved in economic viability or affronts its Iran until the conclusion of the Second World national dignity and prestige. We may War. In 1953, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency call this the general precipitant, which (CIA) in cooperation with the British Secret provokes the challenge. There is usually Intelligence Service (MI6) orchestrated a coup also a specific precipitant, a particular d’etat against the democratically‐elected and especially provocative act by the government of Iran, led by Prime Minister opponent that is seen as the “last Mohammad Mossadegh. The Mossadegh straw,” or perhaps as the pretext for the government passed legislation in the Iranian 2 challenge.” Majlis (parliament) in May 1951 nationalizing the There is little controversy over the challenge British‐owned Iranian oil industry. Premier in this crisis. On November 5, 1979, one day after Mossadegh enjoyed wide popular support in Iran the U.S. embassy was seized by Iranian and was warmly received by U.S. President Harry revolutionaries, Ahmad Khomeini, the son and Truman in Washington in October 1951. spokesperson of Ayatollah Khomeini, warned the The British attempted to oust the Mossadegh Prime Minister of the PGI, Mehdi Bazargan, that if government without success and were forced to he opposed the seizure of the embassy he would leave Iran in November 1952 when diplomatic be opposing the Iranian people. Two days later relations were severed by Mossadegh. The British the Bazargan government tendered its resignation made plans to invade Iran, but they were opposed to Ayatollah Khomeini. The refusal by Ayatollah by Truman in September 1951. However in 1953, Khomeini as the highest Iranian authority to the newly elected administration of U.S. President allow the PGI to liberate the U.S. embassy Dwight Eisenhower was more sympathetic to constituted a failure on the part of Iran to fulfill its British claims that the ‘instability’ caused by obligations towards the United States under Mossadegh left Iran open to a Communist Article 22 of the 1961 Vienna Convention on takeover. On August 19 and 20, a joint operation Diplomatic Relations, which reads: “The receiving by the CIA and MI6, code‐named Operation Ajax, State is under a special duty to take all was carried out. A military coup, in cooperation appropriate steps to protect the premises of the with the Shah’s court and elements of the Iranian mission against any intrusion or damage and to armed forces, ousted the elected Mossadegh prevent any disturbance of the peace of the government and the Shah was installed as the 3 4 mission or impairment of its dignity.” This absolute ruler of Iran. A first hand account of refusal endangered American lives and property Operation Ajax written by Kermit Roosevelt, the and therefore brought Iran and the United States CIA officer in charge of the operation, was 5 into conflict. published in 1979. However a discussion of the precipitant for Over the next 26 years the United State built this challenge is more controversial. In the a client state in Iran, including significant following section I will argue that interference by cooperation between the CIA and Iran’s National the United States in the internal affairs of Iran Intelligence and Security Organization, known by from 1953 to 1979 constituted the general its Persian acronym SAVAK. SAVAK was used by precipitant for the crisis, and the decision by the the Shah over the next two decades to suppress 6 Carter administration to establish links with any opposition to his rule. The Anglo‐American member of the PGI while also admitting the Shah coup against Mossadegh and the American to the United States was the specific precipitant or support for the Shah generated immense anger ‘last straw’ that led to the challenge. and mistrust by Iranians towards the United States. In the words of Mike Metrinko, an © Al Nakhlah – The Fletcher School –Tufts University Fall 2003, Article 3 3 American diplomat and hostage in Tehran, “in petroleum and as a geographic barrier between Washington there was a failure to understand the the Soviet Union and the Persian Gulf. The U.S. vast degree of suppressed hatred that had been adopted this policy of rapprochement despite caused by our bringing about the collapse of the awareness amongst Carter’s advisors of the Mossadegh government. That was Iran’s chance suspicions that Iranian revolutionaries harbored to become democratic. We screwed it up, and we regarding American intentions. Vance writes, “In 7 bragged about it.” These feelings of anger and the fall of 1979, the Iranian revolution was far mistrust created by American interference in from over...Every faction seeking to dominate the Iran’s domestic affairs constituted the general revolution harbored paranoid fears of residual precipitant of the Tehran hostage crisis. “pro‐Shah” forces in the country and suspected With the overthrow of the Shah’s regime in that the United States would try, as it had in 1953, 10 1979, the revolutionaries had every expectation to restore the Shah to his throne.” Carter’s that foreign powers would again intervene to National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, divert the course of Iranian history. Snyder and writes of a “common anxiety of the Shah’s Diesing write, “Quite obviously, a crisis always successors that the former monarch might 11 involves “severe conflict.” There is, first, a deep somehow stage a comeback”. conflict of interests between the parties. However, According to Vance, in August 1979 the conflict of interest in itself is not sufficient to bring United States “exchanged intelligence with one or about a crisis. One of the parties must initiate two members of the Bazargan government. This some form of conflict behavior in an attempt to was done discreetly, since any contact with resolve the underlying conflict of interests in its American intelligence officers could endanger our 8 12 favor.” The perception of Iranian revolutionaries Iranian interlocutors.” These briefings began on at that time was that the victory of the Iranian August 5, 1979 in Stockholm when CIA Officer Revolution would not be tolerated by the United George Cave met with the Deputy Prime Minister States, which sought to protect its client state in of the PGI, Amir Abbas Entezam. On August 21 Iran. When the United States attempted to reach and October 15, 1979, CIA officers flew into out to members of the PGI many of the Tehran to brief Bazargan, Amir Entezam and 13 revolutionaries felt that this was an attempt by the Iranian Foreign Minister Ibrahim Yazdi.
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