INTERVENTION AND THE PUBLICIPRIVATE DISTINCTION IN WORLD POLITICS: A NORMATIVE NQmY

Catherine Yen-Ping Lu

A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Graduate Department of Political Science University of Toronto

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Normative Inquiry. Doctor of Philosophy. Department of Political Science. University of

Toronto. 2000.

Abstract.

How ought one to conceive of state pnvacy in international society, specifically understood as the fkeedom of states Eom external intervention in their domestic affairs? This question lies at the hem of contemporary normative debates about 'humanitarian intervention' in world politics. The formulation ofstate sovereignty as pnvacy reveals the significance of the publiclprivate distinction in disciplining these debates. This work seeks to examine realist, cornrnunitarian, and cosmopolitan conceptions of the pubIic/private constmct in international relations, with a view to constructing a morally defensible

interpretation of the public and private Iives of states in international society. My examination reveals the inconsistency, inadequacy and incompleteness of realist and cornmunitarian accounts of state privacy in international society.

The atomistic realist conception of privacy as the absence of extemal intervention is

misleading as it obscures the social foundations of state pnvacy in international society. At

the same the, organic cornmunitarian justifications of privacy are morally problematic to

the extent that they rely on idealizations of intrastate politics, placing individual members in

positions of vulnerabiiity within states. Both realists and cornmunitarians rely on a false

dichotomy between international and domestic normative and political structures that renders

the suffering of victims of intrastate violence to be pnvate national tragedies rather than

public international injustices. A cosmopolitan perspective, by recognizing the mutual

hterco~ectednessof public and pnvate spheres, acknowledges that cases of intrastate

violence are not isolated expressions of parhia.national deviance. ii Cosmopolitanism as an ethical perspective entails recognition of common human vulnerabilities derived fkom our mortal coil, and of common human potentialities derived fiom our capacity for reasoned agency. The public interest, in serving the one and many faces of humanity, translates into domestic and international moral obligations to protect individual personal privacy claims to bodily integrity and decisional agency. States' rights to sovcrcignîy as privacf have moral validity only whcn their cxcrcisc is consistcnt with sovereign humanitaian obligations to citizens and non-citizens. A cosmopolitan ethical perspective thus obliges public and pnvate, domestic and international, actors to confront the tragedy of intrastate violence with moral imagination and innovation rather than with moral indifference or despair. Acknowledgernents.

God keep me fiom mer completing anything. This whole book is but a dratighr - nay, but the draught of a draught. Oh, Time, Strength. Cash, and Patience! Herman Melville, bfobo-~ickl

In the years that I have taken to complete this degree, I have incurred many debts, personal, intellectual and institutional, which 1 would like now to acknowledge. David Welch has been a steadfast supporter since the beginning of my doctoral experience in 1994. One could not have asked For a more caring, encouraging and diligent supe~sorwho is also an exemplary scholar and teacher. 1 would also like to thank Joseph Carens, CO-supervisorwith David, who persevered through drafts of drafts, and expressed his confidence in my work by playing the bad cop well. Much of this work has been improved by their sympathetic and critical cornrnents. This project was inspired by a comment that Melissa Williams noted on one of my dissertation proposals, in which 1compared the family and the state as private spheres. I have also benefited from her presence on my doctoral committee, and am thankful for her careful comments on my work, as well as her help on the feminist literature on privacy. Frances Harbour gave me a needed nudge in the direction of looking at intervention when she suggested that I submit a proposa1 on 'humanitarian intervention' for an International Ethics panel at the International Studies Association meeting in Toronto in 1997. 1 am gratefid to both Melissa and Fran for their professional contributions, as well as their persona1 support. For rny intellectual education and introduction to political philosophy, 1 was fortunate to have had such senous, engaging and encouraging teachea as Ian Slater and Samuel LaSelva. In my doctoral experience, Edward Andrew contributed informally and positively to my education and work; 1thank him especially for introducing me to Aeschylus' Enmenides, and for his engaging comments made in his capacity as a reader for the doctoral defence. 1 am also thankful to Susan Solomon, whose course on "leaving home" stimulated my thinking on the problematic nature of home and belonging, and directed me specifically to the contemporary Russian case. As well, I am gratefûl to Ronnie Beiner for his contributions as a reader for the doctoral defence, Robert Goodin for his professional support of my work, and Robert Jackson at the University of British Columbia for introducing me to questions of justice in international relations. 1would also like to thank Linda B. Miller for her helpful comments on this work, made in her capacity as extemal examiner for the doctoral defence. The University of Toronto Department of Political Science provided a stimulating intellectual environment, and I thank Robert Matthews, Robert Vipond, Janice Stein as well as the administrative staff for their institutional support. 1 would also like to acknowledge the financial support of the Department, the School of Graduate Studies, the Ontario Graduate Scholarship Fund, and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. My doctoral experience benefited greatly fkom fellow students pursuing similar stmggles. 1especially want to thank Simon Kow for illiirninating conversations on political philosophy and literature, especially on Hobbes and Shakespeare, which worked in various

-- - -- ' Herman Melville, Moby-Dick (Toronto: Bantam, 198 1), p. 139. iv ways to stimulate my work and intellectual development. In addition, I would like to thank Steven Bernstein, Joshua Goldstein, Maureen Hiebert, Jonathan Krueger, Laurel Weldon, and Lhda White for their enduring support. I am also indebted to Don Munton, who made informal contributions to my research and sustained me personally through most of this challenging effort and, without whom, I may never have senously contemplated graduate work or an academic career. As well1 would like to thank Clare Bouey, Lisa Evanoff, Malina Kordic, Michael Liu, Shelley MacLarty, Jean Marr, Jess Munton, Sarah Munton, Honghua Yao, Elizabeth Whelan, and the late Peter Whelan for their invaluable personal support. 1 would like to acknowledge that Chapter 4 of this work is a slightly revised version of an article, 'nie Oce and MqFaces of Cosmopolitanism," published in Ihs Journal of Political PhiZosophy (June 2000), for which Blackwell Publishers Ltd. holds the copyright. Finally, I would like to acknowledge my enormous debt to my parents and my brother; the lessons I have learned fiom their personal exarnples have enriched my work, and they continue to provide an endless source of inspiration and provocation for a student of the moral life. Table of contents.

Introduction. Bridging the divides Moral vision in international reIations intervention and the publidprivate distinction The plan of the dissertation

Chapter 1. Public and private: towards conceptual clarüication 'Public' and 'primte' in international relations The 'public' in international society The private lives of states Caveats Distinction and dichotomization Description and prescription intrinsic and instrumental value Conclusion

Chapter 2. Realisrn and the tyranny of the private Introduction Private states, atomistic world The social construction of necessity National interest and the public interest Conclusion

Chapter 3. Sovereignty as privacy Introduction The state as a private home Communal membership and belonging The dark side of family and state privacy Michael Walzer's account of communal privacy The sovereign individual and the sovereign comunity Intervention and the use of force Area of disanalogy Conclusion

Chapter 4. The one and many faces of cosrnopolitanisrn Cosmopolitanism and its critics The penls of utopian idealism The cold and Lonely road of rationalisrn The logic of impenalism Re-imagining cosmopolitanim The hgility of being human Justice for the one and the many Ethical tolerance, active not passive Conclusion Chapter 5. Intrastate violence and the cosmopolitan challenge Introduction Persona1 and political privacy Public and private accountability Cosmopolitan intimations in international law Private agency and accountabiliq 'Humanitarian intervention': a cosmopolitan critique Just and unjust interventions Cosmopolitan humanitarianism: political not metaphysical Cosmopolitan tolerance and war ConcIusion

Conclusion. Such a long and crooked journey Introduction Injustice and the genesis of intrastate violence Giving victims their due The crooked timber of justice and reconciliation Conclusion

Bibliograp hy Where the word of a king is, there is power; and who may Say to him, What doest thou?

Jacques-Bénigne oss su et'

.. . there is a large and important sense in which traditional politicai philosophy, concentrating as it does upon domestic politics, is relevant for the student of international relations.

Kenneth Waltz'

' Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet, Politique tirée des propres paroles de 1 'Ecrirure sainte (Geneva, 1967; fust published, 1709), p. 92; quoted in Daniel Gordon, Citizens Without Sovereign9: Equality and Sociabili~in French Thought. 1670-1 789 (Princeton: Pnaceton University Press, 1994), p. 9.

Kenneth N. Waltz, Mun. the Stute and Wm:a theoretical analysis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959). Introduction.

In a world that has seemed to tum largely at the will of leviathan states, international relations theory haç been preoccupied with the problem of war between them, acutely mare of the devastating consequences to human life and society such violent clashes leave in their wake. The eyes of contemporary global media, however, have increasingly focused on scenes of human cruelty, misery and suffenng spawned by a different arena of conflict, not between states, but within them. On any given day in many parts of the world, various kinds of intrastate crises and conflicts, Eom state collapse and communal war to oppressive govemment and genocide, constitute grave threats to the security, agency and welfare of a significant portion of humanity. In recent international political discourse this set of

problems has reinvigorated debate about the moral legitimacy of intervention, or non- consensual action by outsiders in a state's intemal affain.

The twin pillars of international order and justice are state sovereignty and

nonintervention. Conventional depictions of intervention in the international relations

literature reflect its posited antagonism with state sovereignty. Hedley Bull, for example,

defined intervention as "dictatorial or coercive interference, by an outside party or parties, in

the sphere of jufsdiction of a sovereign state, or more broadly of an independent political

c~mmunity."~More recently, Oliver Rarnsbotham and Tom Woodhouse characterize the

classical view of intervention as "the abrogation of sovereignty" or 'khen one or more

extemal powers exercise sovereign functions within the domestic jurisdiction of a state?

3 Hedley Bull, ed. Intervention in World Politics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 19861, p. 1.

4 Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhoux, Humanitarian Intervention in Contemporary Conflict: A reconcepnializarion (Oxford: BlackweI1, 1996), p. 40, Because intervention seems to challenge the normative foundations of international society, it has generally met with moral disapproval by the society of states until very recently. At the end of the Cold War, international political attention turned more readily towards the plight of victims caught in intrastate crises and conflicts, but international responses to such situations in the last decade have yielded mixed moral outcornes, moving us from

'Wounded enthusiasm" for international intervention to "unwmanted disillusionment" with it.' Although the political penduium has swung towards active intemational engagement with the problem of intrastate violence again, di fferent normative perspectives in international relations continue to contest the moral legitimacy of intervention in theory and practice.

These contestations ultimately reflect divergent views of the noms of sovereignty and nonintervention, based on distinct conceptions of moral identity, agency and responsibility in the international realm. Do outsiders - be they individuals, groups, states and the international community - have moral nghts and obligations to prevent or alleviate human suffering emanating from intrastate violence? How do we determine the circumstances under which intervention is morally j usti fied? If states are sovereign, are they not protected from any unwelcome interventions in their intemal affairs? Resolving the issue of how to think about intervention as a moral problem in world politics is an inescapable n priori task that shapes subsequent discussions about the logistical and strategic aspects of intervention. To undentand intervention as a moral problem, however, we will need to re- assess how we think about morality at the international or global level. 1s justice relevant or possible at ail in international afEairs? Whose justice ought to be the concem of states and international society? Why be moral in the international realm? By embarking on an inquiry

' Richard FaUr, 'The Complexities of Humanitanan intervention: A New World Order Challenge", Michigan Journal of lntemationtzl Law 17 (1996):491-513 at p. 5 t 3. 4 into the ethics of intervention, we encounter old and new themes in normative international relations theory.

To begin our exploration of intervention as a moral problem in world politics we should first acknowledge that the issue of intervention appears not only in an international setting as a unique problem for the world of states, but it arises in many diverse contexts.

Consider the following situations. While shopping in a local grocery store we may witness an angry parent cursing and repeatedly slapping a distraught toddler. Or we may notice arnong brochures sold at our local health food store, literature disseminated by a community religious group casting homosexuals as devils who need to be exteminated. Finally, we may learn through the media that governrnent forces ofa distant country are systematically killing or purging members of a minority group in a political dispute. Al1 these situations elicit similar moral questions: Do any of the concerns raised by these examples (child abuse, hate literature, and state-sponsored purging of an intemal minonty group) support a moral right or obligation of outsiders to intervene (in a private farnily, an autonomous religious group, and a sovereign state)? How should we assess the moral claims to fieedom from intrusion that

Families, religious groups, and states make? What theoretical concepts can we employ to structure or discipline moral debates about intervention in these areas? The common moral questions elicited by these examples suggest that intervention as a concept crosses the domesticlinternational divide; a normative inquiry into intervention in world politics rnay thus benefit from the insights of moral and political theonsts about intervention in domestic contexts.

This observation faces deep resistance f?om conventional international relations theory, which assumes a fundamental divide between political theones about interstate relations and theories about individual relations within the bounds of a single political comrnunity. Martin Wight has distinguished the fields of political theory and international theory, noting that if "political theory is the tradition of speculation about the state, then international theory rnay be supposed to be a tradition of speculation about the society of states, or the farnily of nations, or the international community.'" At first glance this characterization of the distinction seems rather innocuous. However, Wight subsequently makes clearer the deeper qualitative divide he envisages between international and political theory, predicated ultimately on profound di fferences between domestic and international politics:

the language of political theory and law is ... the language appropriate to man's control of his social life. Political theory and law are maps of experience or systems of action within the realm of normal relationships and calculable results. They are the theory of the good life. International theory is the theory of survivai. ...[ T]he stuff of international theory ... is constantly bunting the bounds of the language in which we try to handle it. For it al1 involves the ultimate experience of life and death, national existence and national e~tinction.~

Wight ct-iticizes the tradition of political theory, not for being inattentive to international issues, but for being ultimately incapable of addressing them. This inability stems fkom what he perceives to be the radical differences separating international fiom domestic life: whereas the international arena is marked by a divided humanity, lack of central and ultimate authority, and a constant preoccupation with national survivai, the domestic arena is typically characterited by national unity, centrality of authority, and the effective pursuit of social goals beyond immediate survival, such as welfare and justice.

Of course, the label of incornpetence attached to political theory in the study of international relations has served as a compelfing excuse for the "moral idenonty of

6 Martin Wight, "Why is there no international theory?' in Diplornatic Investigations: Essuys in the Ttreory of International Politics Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight eds. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1966)- p. 18.

' ibid., p. 33. Kenneth Waltz has similarly argued, bbNationalpolitics is the realm of authority, of administration, and of law. Internationai politics is the realm of power, of struggle, and of accommodation." See Waltz, Theory of international Politics (Toronto: McGraw-HiLi, 1979), p. 113. 6 international politics."8 The discipline of International Relations has tended to discourage the normative study of international issues, as well as analyses that draw cornparisons between domestic (national) and international politics.9 Skepticism about the normative dimension of international relations, however, has been especially pemicious, for its effect has been to render problematic moral study in general. This is evident in discussions about the morality of 'humanitarian intervention.' For example, Stanley Hohann has asserted that one "formidable argument" against legitirnizing humanitarian intervention is that in "the real world, ... moral arguments tend to become used as [political] instruments of battle in a decentralized system of se~f-hel~."'~This seems to imply that in a centralized system of authority, moral arguments are never used as instruments for justifj4ng self-serving policies or conduct. If we view intrastate politics realistically, we must recognizr the self-serving nature of many moral arguments, yet we do not conclude from this that we should give up the idea of moral argument in domestic politics. Sirnilady R.J. Vincent has noted that those

"who argue against the Iegitimacy of humanitarian intervention are inclined to observe that it is a doctrine used by the great against the small, that it smacks of imperialism, [and] that it disguises ignoble motives."" One is inclined to ask those who find these objections cogent if

there exists any general nom or principle which cannot be similarly compted.

These arguments seem to cast doubt on the use of rules and principles in general to

order human relations. Thus Adam Roberts speculates that it "may be just as well that there

' Stanley Hohann, Duties Beyond Borders: On the Lhi~and Possibilities of Ethical International Politics (Syracuse, NY:Syracuse University Press, 1981), p. 23.

9 See, for example. Moorhead Wrigh~"Central but ambiguous: States and international theory" R&av of InternationalStudies, 10 (1984):233-7.

IO Stanley HoffmaM, 'The Problem of Intervention" in Bull, Intervention in World Politics. pp. 7-28 at p. 27.

" RJ. Vincent, "Grotius, Human Rights. and Intervention" in Hugo gr oh*^ and International Relations Hedlcy Bull, Benedict Kingsbury and Adam Roberts eds. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), pp. 241-256 at p. 25 1, 7 is no general doctrine of humanitarian intervention," since such a doctrine "must invite accusations of double standards, and must depend ... on the 'empire of circumstance'.""

Roberts, however, defends the idea of intervention when there is a threat to international peace and security, implying that the application of that principle would escape these considerations. Again, the application of any principle, including the one Roberts endorses, might invite accusations of moral selectivity, and depends on the 'empire of circumstance' for its realization. Clearly one cannot maintain a radical skepticism about moral arguments in international relations, without holding an equally skeptical view of moral discourse in domestic politics.

While the dichotomous characterization of ethics and politics has made it di fficult to theonze about international relations in ethical terms, recent yean have witnessed a revival of normative international theory, that aspect of the study of International Relations explicitly concerned with moral goods, noms, values, foundations and reasoning in an international

~ontext.'~A normative study of the kind 1 am proposing rejects the assertion that international issues lie beyond the pale of normative theorization. Skepticism about the pertinence of moral inquiry in the international realrn stems From a skepticism about the saiience of normative motivations, arguments and conduct in international relations. Yet ironically, even the assertion that morality has nothing to do with international politics is itself a normative argument. 1want to claim that political philosophy's concern with the mord life does not serve as a credible reason for confining its purview to issues that arise

" Adam Roberts, "Humanitarianwar: dtary intervention and human rights" International Affairs 69,3 (1993):$29-449 ai pp. 448-9.

13 Steve Smith discusses the normative siience of international theory in Smith, 'The Self-Images of a Disciphe: A Genealogy of International Relations Theory" in Inmnational Relations 7'heory Today Ken Booth and Steve Smith eds. (University Park, Penasylvania: The Pninsylvania State University Press, 1995), pp. 1-37 at p. 3. 8 within the locus of a single political community." On the contrary, in the modem world, the task of political philosophy - to illuminate the 'good' or 'moral' life - is incomplete if it cm only meet issues that arise at the global level with silence. It is time then to expose the normative structure of international politics and society to the kind of critical scrutiny that political theorists dedicate to domestic politics and society.

11. MORAL VISION IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

A normative inquiry presupposes the significance of moral reasoning, motivation and agency in human affairs. How does moral perspective contribute to the drama of human affairs? Shakespeare offen an answer in his tragedy, King Lear, in which a vain father and an arrogant king allows himself to be deceived into folly by flattery from his two older daughters. Seeing the evil that Lear has done in spurning his youngest and truest daughter,

Cordelia, the king's faithful servant, Kent, cautions his irascible master, "See better, Lear.""

At the play's end with Cordelia dead in his ms,Lear's last words before dying are a haunting echo of Kent's earlier plea: "Do you see this? Look on her. Look, her lips, / Look there, look there."lb Shakespeare presents Lear's moral transformation as a joumey from defective vision or blindness to sight. We find in Ralph Ellison's Invisible Man a sirnilar view of the role of normative vision or orientation in structuring how individuals conceive of the self, the other, and their moral relationship in the world. Individuals' ethical orientations or perspectives constitute "inner eyes, those eyes with which they look through their physical eyes upon reality.""

1.8 Mora1 questions are not Iimited to relations between human beings, but also pertain to human relations with the non-human world of living things.

" William Shakespeare, The Tragedy of King Lear (Scarborough, Ontario: The New Amencan Library of Canada, 1963), 1.1.160.

I6 Ibid., 5.3.312-313. 9 These literary uses of the metaphor of sight to characterize moral vision and transformation find resonance in political philosophy. Plato, in the allegory of the cave, maintains that the process of ethical enlightenment involves a tuming around of the instrument with which each may leam to comprehend the good, which he likens to an eye tuming ''toward the Light Crom the dark."" To Plato, moral education is not so much about

"putting sight into blind eyes," as it is about reorienting the moral eye in accordance with some vision of the good.19 Sheldon Wolin has also used the language of vision, perspective, and sight to capture the enterprise of political philosophy. He argues that each political

"theorist has viewed the problem [of political philosophy] fiom a different perspective, a particular angle of vision. This suggests that political philosophy constitutes a form of

'seeing' political phenornena and that the way in which the phenomena will be visualized

depends in large measure on where the viewer '~tands."''~ Thus, a vision of politics offers

not only a representation of political phenomena as they exist, but through imagination,

reveals a theorist's undentanding of political phenomena as they may exist, and contains

normative assertions of political phenomena as they should exist.

Moral visions thus shape the reality we see, and depending on the construction of those

inner eyes, they darken or illuminate different aspects of a world that admittedly may not be

largely in our own making. This perspectival approach to characterizhg the function of

17 Ralph Ellison, Invisible Mun (New York: Vintage, 1989), p. 3.

lS Plato, The Republic of Plaro AUan Bloom haus. (New York: Basic Books, 199 1. second edition), p. 197, 518c. For the allegory of the cave, see Book VII, 514a-5 19a.

'' Ibid., 518c. Of course, we need not adopt Plato's conception of the good to appreciate tbis depiction of moral understanding.

" Sheldon S. Wolin, Politics and Virion: Continuity and Innovation in Western Politiccd Thought (Toronto: Littie, Brown and Company, 1960), p. 17. 10 morality in human affain "emphasizes the cognitive and the perceptual,"" and thus highlights individual will, intentionality and agency. At the same tirne, in entailing a relational view of self and other in the world, a perspectival approach does not presuppose an autonomous self divorced fiom al1 social contexts. As Kristen Renwick Monroe has argued,

[a perspectival approach] builds on the long tradition in Western philosophy that posits an autonomous and intentional self residing behind the mind, but it avoids the metaphysical abstraction of a self that operates outside any human context. By focusing on an individuai's perspective on self in relation to others, we automatically include in our purview the world in which an individual is already engaged, thus linking the individual to culture and cultural influences."

A perspectival approach, in acknowledging the role of human moral agency, relinquishes views that assume individual conduct to be completely determined by social structures, but in highlighting the relational and contextual nature of identity, it also rejects views that presuppose an autonomous pre-social self. Thus while individuals are not sole authon of their world, their moral visions shape how they make sense of that world, and how they act in

How are moral perspectives related to moral theories? A normative theory cm be understood as an interpretation of the moral goods and values, noms and niles, foundations and aspirations that can be derived from the standpoint of a given perspective. A theory may involve a combination of ethical perspectives, but it does so at the risk of creating interna1 inconsistencies that might threaten the moral cogency and coherence of the theory itself. Of course, perspectival plurality exists within individuals and within societies as well as between them. Martin Wight, for exarnple, admitted that although 'Realist, Rationalist and

Revolutionist' patterns of international thought are analytically distinct, "when 1 scrutinize

" KNten Renwick Monroe, The Hemof Altmism: Perceptions of a Commun Humanify (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 19961, p. 227.

-37 ibid., p. 224. 11 my own psyche 1seem to find al1 these three ways of thought within me."" These 'ways of thought' or, one might Say, ways of seeing, may sometimes formulate congruent realities and yield common ethical positions, yet no natural harmony of moral visions can be expected, as they always stand in potential tension.

I will be concemed in this dissertation with three kinds of moral perspectives that enjoy some prominence in normative international theory - realist, cornmunitarian and cosmopolitan. In exarnining the construction of these perspectives, especially their competing normative visions of the state and international society, we cm see better the nature of the moral opportunities, limits and challenges each provides in Our quest to formulate a coherent understanding of intervention as a moral problem in world politics.

Recent and future events wiil likely continue to demonstrate an urgent and consistent need to rnake sense of intervention as a moral problem in world politics. The need for our inquiry is prompted not oniy by the many empirical situations which give rise to the issue of intervention in our every day world, but also by the observation that, as Hedley Bull has put it, "no serious student of the subject cmfail to feel that intervention is sometimes j~stifiable."~' How do we assess the moral cogency of justifications for and against intervention in the context of an international society of sovereign states? Cornelia Navari has observed that implicit "in the very idea of intervention is an outsider's entrance into a

a Martin Wight, *'An anatomy of intematiorial thought" Review of International Studier 13 (1987):221-227 at p. 227.

" Bull, Intervention in World Politics, p. 2. 12 political spa~e."~Yet it is not so much the state as political space that makes intervention morally problematic; it is, rather, the idea of the state as private space.

In the Westphalian mode1 of intentate relations, the posited sovereignty of states functions like privacy to give states a nght to be fiee fiom interference by outside parties - especially other states, but also non-citizens, non-govermnental organizations, and even the international cornmunity - in their own interna1 affairs. Intervention as a moral problem in the world of states thus entails an image ofsovereignty as privacy. Just as in domestic discourse, "the basic element in a violation of privacy is intru~ion,"'~in international discourse, the basic element in a violation of sovereignty is intervention: the need for sovereignty is a need for protection against intervention. The duty of nonintervention has thus traditionally been viewed, in classical international law, as a natural corollary to the pnnciple of state sovereignty.

In the domestic realrn, intrusion by the state and society into the private affairs of individuals and certain social groups, such as the family, is also an issue that requires moral assessment and justification. The gowing concem in western countries with domestic violence in the last twenty-five years, for exarnple, has brought the issue of state intervention in the family to the forefront of social policy agendas. Debates recur over a tension between the desire to curb domestic abuse and the worry govemments have about passing tougher farnily-violence laws "if they are seen to intervene too deeply in farnily lives.'"' This inquiry into the legitirnacy of intervention will involve comparing claims to sovereignty made by

Cornelia Navari, "intewentioa, Non-Intervention and the Construction of the State" in Poiitical nieory, International Relations and the Ethics of/ntentention lan Forbes and Mark Ho- eds- (New York: St, Martin's Press, 1993), pp. 43-60 at p. 43.

'' Graham AIIen and Graham Crow, Horne and Famify: Creuting the Domestic Sphere (London: MacMillan Press, 1989), p. 7.

" Brian La@. "AIberta pressed to speed up laws on family vioknce", Globe and Mail, Aug 20,1997, A7. 13 States in the international realm, with sirnilar normative claims to pnvacy traditionally accorded to families in the domestic realm.

The cornparison between state sovereignty and family pnvacy entails the application of a stmcture of concepts, including privacy, that has so far largely eluded normative scholarship in international relations. This dissertation proposes to understand and assess contemporary normative debates about intervention in world politics through a central theoretical constnict: the public/private distinction. Normative international relations theories rely on unstated and largely unexplored understandings of the public/pnvate distinction. Central to disciplining the moral debate about 'humanitarian intervention' in world politics, the public/private distinction provides us with a conceptual key with which to explore the moral visions of realism, communitarianism and cosmopo litanism. While the

distinction structures these perspectives' views of al1 issues of international morality, 1 will

explore its impact only on their normative assessments of international intervention in

response to intrastate violence.

The concept of intervention encompasses any unsolicited action by an outside party in

the intemal affin or jurisdiction of a distinct unit; it thuç assumes some distinction between

private and public domains. Different conceptions of public and pnvate as organizing

categories, and contrasting understandings of their distinction and relationship, yield

disparate conceptions of sovereignty, leading to different assessrnents of intervention as a

moral problem in international politics. In stmct~nghow we conceive of the boundaries

that shape individual and collective identity, agency and responsibility, the public/private

construct in international relations is inûinsic to how we conceive of other highlighted

distinctions in the discipline, between the national and the international, citizen and non- 14 citizen, the particular and the universal. By studying the public/private distinction we are embarking on an intellectual joumey into the very heart of the "dividing dis~ipline."'~

This examination will reveal the inconsistency, inadequacy, and incompleteness of realist and communitarian conceptions of the publidpnvate distinction. Their consequent misconceptions of state sovereignty as a normative nght diminish the moral cogency of their views of the legitimacy of intervention in world politics. Realist and communitarian approaches to the ethical evaluation of intervention entai1 convoluted and indirect theoretical moves in order to reach morally defensible conclusions. Ultimately 1endorse a cosmopolitan conception of the public/private distinction which alone offers a monlly compelling interpretation of state sovereignty and intervention in international society.

International relations theorists might argue that it is impossible to construct a conception of state privacy in international society because the very idea of an 'international society' itself is highly contested in international relations theory. Realists, for example, tend not to use the phrase 'international society,' preferring the tem, 'states system.'

'International society' has been CO-optedby statist cornmunitarian theorists, also knolvn as

'the English school,' to refer to a society of states with shared moral understandings about their rights and obligations at the international level. While realist and communitarian theorists tend to privilege the state as an actor in the international domain, cosmopolitan theorists assert the notion of comrnon humanity which leads to the potential inclusion of al1 individuals in any conception of international society. Indeed cosmopolitan theorists prefer the terni 'international community', which includes the society of states, as well as a nascent international civil society composed of non-governmental organizations, individuals, religious groups and so on. In some ways, the publidprivate conçtnict is at the heart of this

'' Hoisti, K.J. The DiMùing Dkctjdine: Hegemony and Diversity in lntemational nteory (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1985). 15 contention about international society. For the way we conceive of the distinction captures the way we view the nature of international society as a 'public reaim,' including who we consider to be public and private agents at the international level, as well as what is public or private about them. The search for a morally tenable conception of the public/private constnict in international relations will therefore affect our moral assessrnent of the divergent images of international society advanced by competing normative perspectives.

The changes effected by adoptinç a cosmopolitan ethical perspective are akin to the

Copemican revolution in astronomy, for some long-held normative positions in international relations will lose their moral cogency in light of this shifi. Just as Copemicus's heliocentric theory of planetary motion overthrew Ptolemy's geocentric cosmology, a cosmopolitan conception of international moral order overthrows realist and cornmunitarian constructions of that order. A cosmopolitan view involves a reconceptualization of intervention as a moral problem in world politics. Of course, many cornplex mon1 issues remain to be considered once one accepts the moral legitimacy of international intervention in contexts of intrastate violence. In this work, I intend to accomplish only two goals. First, 1seek to show how the public/private distinction disciplines contemporary moral debates about intervention in world politics. Second, 1 assert that a cosmopolitan ethical perspective provides the most morally viable construction of the public and private lives of states in international society; consequently, it offers the best normative account of intervention in international society.

IV. THE PLAN OF TKE DISSERTATION

1begin with an exploration of the rich Iiterature in social and political thought on the public/private distinction, whkh fùnctions to structure the agency, interests, and obligations of diverse actors in any given society. in Chapter 1,1 will consider the applicability of a publidprivate construct in the realm of international relations, and highlight two distinct 16 approaches - atomistic and organic - to understanding publicness and privateness. This analysis leads to my main theme, which is to constmct a morally coherent and defensible account of the distinction that can generate a morally viable understanding of the public and pnvate lives of states in international society. Mer highlighting ways to understand and misunderstand 'public' and 'pnvate', their distinction as well as their relationship, 1 move to examine normative arguments about intervention from three ethical perspectives - realist, cornmunitarian and cosmopolitan.

Chapter 2 is devoted to an examination of the realist perspective, which has dominated the study, and some would say practice, of international relations for much of the twentieth century. The distinct ethical issues which realism brings to normative debates about intervention focus on the problem of the tyranny of the private in international relations. Due to the dominance of private or self-interested motivation and judgement in international relations, realists argue that there is Iittle space for morality, understood as a public or shared system of normative rules. Realist assessments of intervention, humanitarian or otherwise, thus tend to be largely negative; they argue that intervention is, at best, imprudent if it requires compromising a state's self- or national interest, and at worst, a mask for the self-interested pursuits of great powers. Realism's moral skepticism stems from its impoverished atomistic views of private and public. Ironically, although the private dominates a realist vision of world politics, contemporary realism is incapable of sustaining any nonnative conception of state privacy, upon which a coherent normative argument for or against intervention would depend.

In Chapter 3,1 turn rny attention to the cornmunitarian perspective, which enjoys prominence in the normative structure of classical international law and society. I will examine the work of statist cornmunitarians, also known as international society theonsts, and non-statist cornmunitarians, most prominently Michael Walzer. Both are concemed to 17 validate the moral worth of state or communal sovereignty as privacy, and to uphold the nonintervention nom between comnunities in international society and law. Far fiom realism's portrayal of states' privateness as a barrier to international morality, then, communitarianism seeks to defend a conception of state privacy as a key component of international morality. I argue that the morally problematic features of a communitarian conception of state privacy bear strong resemblances to the problems associated with a certain conception of farnily privacy. Using feminist critiques of the public/private constnict

1reject cornmunitarian conceptions of state privacy as morally inconsistent or incomplete, absent certain fundamental moral considerations that cannot be intemally generated by a communitarian approach.

Those moral considerations can be traced to a cosmopolitan ethical orientation.

Chapter 4 begins an exploration of cosmopolitanism by addressing first sorne comrnon realist and cornmunitarian objections to cosmopolitanism as an ethical perspective, specifically its utopianism, excessive rationalism, and impenalist proclivities. In response, I consider a non- idealist, non-alienating, and non-absolutist account of a cosmopolitan ethical perspective which also eschews the opposite vices of misanthropy, determinism, and passitivity. Such an account entails a recognition of the public and private faces of humanity in its cornrnonality and diversity. Human beings are united by a comrnon human condition marked by vulnerability to suffering. In this sense, hurnanity is one. Yet human individuais are also unique centres of consciousness, purpose and agency. In this sense, humanity is many. Any defensible moral theory must do justice to humanity as one and many.

in Chapter 5 1examine the implications of a cosmopolitan conception of the public/private constnict for understanding the moral nature and value of state sovereignty as pnvacy in international society. A cosrnopolitan ethical perspective posits the mutual interrelatedness of public and pnvate spheres, as opposed to their dichotomization or 18 conflation. State privacy has instrumental rather than intrinsic moral value insofar as its protection serves cosmopolitan ethical commitments to the one and many faces of humanity.

From a normative point of view, the legitimacy of privacy claims of the state to territorial integrity and political autonomy is inextricably linked to its respect for the persona1 privacy claims of individual members in terms of their bodily integrity and decisional agency.

Cosmopolitan humanitarianism's dedication to preventing and alleviating hurnan suffering is inspired by an acknowledgement of the natural equality of hurnan vuinerability. A cosmopolitan vision opens moral space for intervention by shifting the moral burden of proof in cases of intrastate violence, from those who seek to intervene to those who daim a normative right to be free From intervention. At the sme time it offers normative guidance for responding to intrastate humanitarian crises and confiicts based on duties of humanity, justice and tolerance.

In the Conclusion 1 raise Mernormative issues that political theorists and international relations scholars ought to investigate given an acknowledgement of my central assertion that cases of intrastate violence are public international issues, rather than solely private national tragedies. A cosmopolitan concem to redress human cruelty and suffering fiom intrastate violence does not yield automatic conclusions about how best to address them, given their complex causes. This work only shows that a cosmopolitan ethical perspective obliges both public and pnvate, domestic and international actors to confront the tragedy of intrastate violence with moral imagination and innovation rather than with moral indifference or resignation. Before 1built a wall I'd ask to know

Wh~tI was walling in or walling out,

And to whom 1 was like to give offense.

Something there is that doesn't love a wall,

That wants it dom. . . .

Robert Frost'

The public and the private worlds are inseparably connected.. . The tyrannies and servilities of the one are the tyrannies and servilities of the other.

Virginia WoolF

I Robert Frost, "Mending Wall" in Edward Comery Lathem ed. The Poetry of Robert Frost (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winçton, 1969).

Virginia WooK To the Lighthouse (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1927).

19 Chapter 1.

Public and Private: Towards Conceptual Clarification

1. 'PUBLIC' AND 'PEUVATE' IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

What normative vision of international relations lies behind the traditionally negative moral view of intervention as a practice in the world ofstates, and how çan we accoiint for its normative reassessment in contemporary times? The concept of intervention paradigmatically entails the situation of an outsider acting within an insider's presemed dornain, or an intrusion

From a public into a pnvate realm. The very intelligibility of the concept of intervention thus relies on a structure that distinguishes between an intemal and extemal context, insiders and outsiders, private and public. The legitimacy of intervention depends in part on the normative nature of the boundaries separating these categones, affecting issues such as whether we consider the treatment of a state's citizens to be an exclusive concem of that state, or as a legitimate concem of other states and the wider international society as well. At the conceptual level, an inquiry into the morality of intervention needs to focus on the construction of these boundaries, from which the normative meaning of intervention and its controversy ultimately derive. Indeed, the legitimacy of intervention in a state's domestic jurisdiction depends on how the normative fiamework of international society distinguishes between and relates diverse moral obligations, such as those states may have towards their own citizens, and those they may have towards the citizens of other states. A normative study of intervention thus rnust interrogate the structure as well as substance of moral obligations at the international level.

What concepts can we employ to illuminate the normative structure of international society? Ideas Iike 'the national interest', 'state sovereignty', and 'human rights,' are prominent players in normative political debates at the international level, but it is the construction of the 'internationaVdomestic distinction' that rnediates their roles in shaping the agency, interests and obligations of states. The normative controversy over intervention reveals the contested nature of this distinction, as proponents and critics of intervention disagree over the charactenzation of controversial state actions as 'international' or 'domestic'

affairs, even befarz they engaga in any substantive clebatz about tliz actions themsrivzs.

Debates about the moral legitimacy of 'humanitarian' intervention involve a dispute, then, not

only over the substance of moral claims relating to individuals and non-state groups, but also

over their location in a world that is largely structured by temtonally exclusive and politically

independent states claiming ultimate political and legal, if not moral, authority over their own

citizens and society.' Despite its centrality in disciplining moral debate about intervention,

however, the nature of the internationaVdomestic construct has been more often assumed than

examined or defended in such debate.

How might we better understand the functions of the intemational/domestic constnict in

international normative discoune? I suggest that the concepts of 'public,' 'pnvate,' and the

'public/private distinction' can be used to clariQ competing conceptions of the

intemationaVdornestic constnict that informs international normative order, upon which

evaluations of the legitimacy of intervention depend. Different conceptions of 'public' and

'pnvate', their distinction as well as their relationship, lead to different understandings of

intervention as a moral problem in world politics. Using these concepts we can rephrase the

normative issues raised by the issue of intervention in the following manner: 1s the treatment

of individual human beings a private concem of the state in which they are citizens, or is it a

The European Court of Human Righh, with jurisdiction over 40 couniries or 800 million people, as well as the European Court of Justice, with jurisdiction over 376 million citizens of the European Union, constitute a signrficant albeit exceptional departure fkom this nom. legitimate public concem for the wider socieîy of states? What moral obligations do states have towards their own publics, and do states have any moral obligations that extend beyond their partial publics, for exarnple, to other citizens, other states, the international society of states, or the wider international community? Do states have any public (international) moral obligations? If so, what is their relationship with a state's pnvate (national) obligations? Do statcs havc any right to prh-acy in international societyl

Answenng these questions requires us to examine the construction of the public/private distinction at the international Ievel, which informs what state leaders consider they may legitimately say and do intemally and extemally, what responses to their domestic and international actions they expect from other states or the international community, and how they assess the legitimacy of the actions of others, such as intervention.' There is little dispute that states have some public or extemal accountability at the international level for their actions towards other states. For example, international society's prohibition of aggression against

another state justifies the use of force by other states and the international community to

counter aggression. Since under the legalist paradigm, aggression constitutes "the only crime

that states can commit against other states," it alone warrants punishment by other states and

the international cornrn~nity.~

The extemal or international accountability ofstates for the treatment of their own

citizens, however, is greatly contested in international society. Can states commit crimes, not

against other states, but against humanity, or more specifically, against their own citizens?

' As Stanley Benn and Geraid Gaus have argued, "because. in western culture at any rate, we apprehend a great deal of our social worId by distinguishing things that are pubiic and things that are private, how those concepts are structured necessady informs not ody what we ourselves say and do but ais0 what responses to our actions we expect From others, how we assess their actions, and so on." See their article, 'The hblic and the Private: Concepts and Action" in S J. Benn and G.F. Gaus, editors, Public and Private in Social Lqe (Canberra, Australia: Croorn Heim, 1953), p. 6.

Michael Waizer, Juçt and Llnjust Wurs: A moral argument ~virhhistorical ifiusnations(United States, Basic Books, 1992, second edition), pp. 51-73. 23

And shoidd they be held accountable for them at the international level? The possibility of such accountability depends on how the moral rights and obligations of individuals, groups, and states are reconciled at the international level. In an international society where the treatment of citizens is considered to be a solely private concem of each state, then a state would not expect any extemal responses or criticisms by outsiders on this subject, and it would look on my negntive rrxtions 3s undue illegitimate interference in its (legitimntely) intemal affairs. When former Russian President Boris Yeltsin demanded that the West stop criticizing his country over its military conduct in Chechnya, he relied on the idea that the situation in

Chechnya constituted a domestic or pnvate (Russian) affair, a characterization that entails a certain construction of the intemationaVdomestic or public/private distinction, that places such conduct beyond the legitimate pwiew of international concem and interventionl

How scholars and practitioners think about almost any normative issue in world politics, fiom global economic justice to humanitarian intervention, involves some conception of a public/private construct that functions to structure agency, interests and obligations at the international level. While some conception of this construct is implicit in normative arguments about the legitimacy of intervention, these debates in world politics have yet to benefit from the rich and diverse intellectual study of the distinction in western political and social thought.

The few discussions of the publidprivate distinction that have appeared in the field of international relations have been initiated by scholars with predominantly feminist concems.

They have pointed to the gendered construction of the distinction in international relations that has similar negative effects on women as the pubIic/pnvate distinction within western societies. HiIary Charlesworth observes that "international law and its institutions have been

6 See Erik Eckholm, "Russian Leader CompIains of Lack of Respect from U.S-" New York Times, December 10, 1999. 24 designed in a gendered way, mediated by public/private dichotomies.'" Her work focuses on the public/private distinction in international law and the effects of its construction on women's lives, especially their oppression and rnarginalization. Sunilarly, Kristen Walker argues that the public/private distinction is gendered at the domestic and the international levels, and that the "distinction, if it is to be retained, must be depnved of its current gendered nature.'" Thus

Wdker is similmly concemec! with the impact of the public!privatc distinction in intcmational relations on women: "Before wornen can emerge as distinct subjects of international law, this dichotomy needs to be broken down at al1 levels, so that women are no longer relegated to the domestic junsdiction of states under international law."" Celina Romany also criticizes the publidpnvate distinction's role in the global subjection of women, focusing her analysis on

"why gender issues are deemed private within international society" and especially human rights law.lo

While 1 am sympathetic to these arguments, it seems to me that more basic conceptual

problems exist in the prevailing construction of the public/private distinction in international

relations, which have even more pervasive impacts than these ferninist analyses suggest.

Indeed, the publidprivate distinction in international relations currently relegates not only

women, but practically al1 human beings, to 'the domestic jurisdiction of'states under

' Hilary Charlesworth, "WorldsApart: Public/Private Distinctions in International Law" in Muguet Thornton (ed.) Public and Private: Feminist Legal Debates (Australia: Odord University Press, f 9951, pp. 243-260 at p. 246.

3 Kristen Waker, "An Exploration of Article 2(7) of the United Nations Charter as an Ernbodiment of the Public/Private Distinction in international Law" lnternutional Lmv and Politics 26( 1994): 173- 199, at p. 187.

'O Celina Romany, "Women as Aliens: A Feminist Critique of the Public/Private Distinction Ui International Human Rights Law" Harvard Human Rights Journal 6(1993):87-125 at p. 96. international law.'" Although we owe some of the most insightful critiques of the publiclprivate distinction to feminist political theory, the construct has deeper, greater and more general normative significance in international relations than a gender analysis has so fa allowed.

hdeed, while I seek primarily to make a contribution in the field of international ethics, this cxptoration of the public:privatc constnict also qeaks ta a iôntror;ersy in feminist theorizing about the distinction." Ferninists of al1 philosophical persuasions agree on the indefensibility of traditional, especially patriarchal, conceptions of the pubIic/private distinction." Yet while feminist theorists have made cogent critiques of the distinction, they disagree over how to reconceive it, and even over whether such a distinction should have any

use at all. In attempting to formulate a morally coherent and defensible account of the distinction for international relations, 1 intend to defend its nomative utility against those who deny its relevance.

'Public,' 'private,' and 'the pubIic/pnvate distinction' are fairly farniliar, if contested,

concepts in modem western political philosophy, and especially prominent in liberal theory.

" Again, with the exception of European citizens, most people in the world do not yet have direct access to transnational legal institutions.

" The litenture in feminist political theory on the publidprivate distinction is extensive and varied. See Jean Bethke Elshtain, Ptiblic Man, Private Woman: FVomen in Social and Political Thought (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993, second edition); Caîharine A. MacKimon, Torvarci a Feminist Theory of the State (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989); Susan Moller Okin, Women in Western Political Thought (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); and Carole Pateman, "Feminist Critiques of the PubliclPrivate Dichotomy" in The Disorder of Women: Democracy, Feminism and Political Theory (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989). For a clear and insightful assessrnent of feminist critiques of the distinction, see Ruth Gavison, "Feminirm and the Public/Private Distinction" Stanford Law Rwîew 45, 1 (Nov 1992): 1-45. For a recent critique of radical feminist interpretations of international Iaw, with special focus on the publidprivate distinction, see Fernando R Teson, A Philasophy of lnrernational Law (Boulder, CoIorado: Westview Press, 1998), pp. 157- 187. On feminist critiques and reconceptualizations of privacy, see Anita L. Allen, UneqAccess: Privacy for Wonren in a Free Society (Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1988); Patricia Sohg, Privacy and the Politics of Intimate Lije (Ithaca, NY: Corneil University Press, 1996); and Judith Wagner DeCew, In Pursuit of Pnvacy (Ithaca, NY: Corneu University Press, 1997).

l3 0ki.1, Women in Western Political Thought. pp. 3 13-4. The ongins of the distinction can be traced to Roman law, which used it to distinguish between issues that pertained to the condition of the Roman commonwealth, and those that related to the interests of individuals." From its inception the distinction has marked the division between other-regarding and self-regardhg spheres, interests and activities. Clearly, the need for such a constmct arises in the context of a society of interacting agents. Solitary individuals, in Lliz absence of social inkraction, would hardly have need of a publiciprivare distinction.

The function of the distinction as a descriptive organizing construct allows us to distinguish between various social relations, such as the following: societylindividual, civil societylfarnily, state/farnily, statekivil society, state/market, and we may add international societylstate, or intemationaUdomestic.

Senses of 'publicness' and 'privateness' generated by the distinction, according to

Stanley Benn and Gerald Gaus, are complex-stmctured concepts, with a multiplicity of dimensions that serve to delineate noms relating to access, agency and interest in any given so~iety.'~Just as within states, the public/private distinction serves to structure these dimensions between individuals, within civil society, and the state, in international relations, the distinction functions similarly to organize relations between ciiizens, states and international society. From a normative perspective, the distinction functions to make transparent the order and relation between moral goods in any moral vision. Goods such as

keedom, equality, security, humanity, and comrnunity are reconciled and valued in radically different ways when mediated through different conceptions of the public/private distinction.

It is therefore somewhat misleadhg to mark each nomative perspective by its dominant good,

'" Jeff Weintraub, 'nie Theory and Politics of the Publiflrivate Distinction" in Jeff Alan Weinaub and Krishan Kumar (editors), Public and Private in Thought and Practice: Perspecn'ves on a Grand Dichotonty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), p. 12, footnote 24: "Public law is that which regards the condition of the Roman commonwealth, private, that which pertains to the interests of single individuds,"

1s Benn and Gaus, 'The Public and the Pnvate: Concepts and Action" in Public and matein Social Lfe, p. 5. 27 for doing so leads to the false impression that theoretical traditions are distinguished by whiclt goods they value, rather than by how they value them.

Different ways of distinguishing and relating 'public' and 'private' categones at the international level infonn different normative visions of international society's "institutions, practices, activities and aspirations."16 The construction of the distinction affects our ideas about international rdaiions as an area ofpractice and study, including who or what counts as actors and what is significant about them, what powers, rights or claims they have in relation to each other, and what characterizes the context in which they relate. For example, di fferent understandings of the distinction lead to disparate accounts of the contrast between international and dornestic politics, and between citizens and non-citizens. Furthemore, the construction of the distinction reveals how international society conceives of the appropriate scope of international concem and intervention. and of individual states' rights to self- regulation.

The neglect of the vocabulary of 'public' and 'private' in international relations theory may seem surprising, given the salience of boundaries in most normative controversies at the international level. The use of this group of concepts to interrogate the normative structure of international society, however, faces two kinds of distinct challenges that might explain its relative obscurity in international normative discourse. One line of argument questions whether it is possible to make the public/private constnict relevant to the international domain.

The other type of argument raises the issue of whether it is desirable to do so.

Fint, the relative absence of the distinction in international discourse may be attnbuted to the dominance of the realist perspective in the last half cenhiry. Realists are inclhed to argue that since there is technically no international or world govemment, there is no 'public' 2 8 or state-like agent or power at the global level, therefore the life of states in the international realm is characterized wholly by self-help. From a methodological perspective, contemporary realists are thus skeptical of attempts to explain or und5rstand international politics by importing domestic concepts and analogies. From a normative perspective, realists might wonder about the applicability of a concept such as 'the public interest' to the international realm; indeed, ihey rnainly tend to view 'nationd interest' as the sole source of my moral obligations states may have intemationally.

1 will examine realist assumptions about the public/private constnict in the next chapter,

but it is worth noting that the main irony of the realist position is that it rejects the relevance of

the distinction at the same time as it relies on a certain conception of it, in the form of an

intemationaVdomestic dichotomy, which ultimately cannot be sustained by a realist conceptual

fiamework. This problem becomes starkly apparent in realist attempts to use the concept of

the 'national interest' to evaluate the morality of humanitarian intervention. Diverse

interpretations of national interest lead to sornetimes radically divergent evaluations, revealing

the problern of an incoherent understanding of the internationaVnationa1 distinction in

contemporary realist theory.

Those who emphasize the cultural diversity ofthe world might also challenge the

possibility of using the publiclprivate construct to make sense of the normative foundations of

international society. The cultural pluraiism of the world, these cntics might argue, yields

radically different and irreconcilable ways of negotiating public and pnvate between cultures.

Given the lack of a universal cultural framework that can fix one conception of the distinction

on al1 societies, is it possible to talk about a publiclprivate distinction at the international Ievel,

or is an anarchy of such distinctions more likely?

'"id* 29

Different societies evidently rnay hold distinct conceptions of the publiclprivate construct in the ordenng of their intemal social relations. 1would argue, however, that a common political culture arnong states does exist at the international level, which relies on a distinct public/private constmct, informing the shape and meaning of the pnnciples of state sovereignty and nonintervention that are universally embedded in the normative structure of

internîtionnl society through such instruments 3s the United Xations Charter. Hoavever a state

configures the publidprivate relationship intemally, al1 states rely on a certain conception of

this construct at the international level to order their moral standing, agency, interests and

obligations within international society. This is not to Say that one conception of the

public/private constmct is wholly accepted by al1 states or the larger international cornmunity;

indeed, we are living in a moment when the established understanding of the distinction is

undergoing severe contests fiom within the world of states, as well as from non-state acton.

Another cultural critique leads us into the second line of argument which questions

whether the public/private construct is a desirable addition to normative political discome at

the international level. In this vein, some critics might observe that the distinction is based on

a group of concepts that are parochial to western civilization. 'Public' and 'private' may

appeal to shared moral understandings in western and especially liberal societies, but they are

not cultural universals. These concepts will not find resonance within many non-western

societies; their use rnay therefore obscure rather than clarify the normative world order. In

answer to this objection, we might take heed of Martin Krygier's wamings to avoid

"conceptual imperialism, a common disease among philosophers, and equally to avoid

conceptuai parochialism, which, like malaria, often afflicts anthropologists who have spent the in the field."" Using the language of public and private to examine the normative structure of international society does not entail an unreflective endorsement of westem or iiberal constructions of the distinction. indeed, contestation about the distinction abounds within westem and liberal societies, in practice and in theory.

It must be acknowledged, however, that the current normative map of the world has its oriyins irt western Iiistorical devzlopmznts. l'lie Wzstplialian nionirnt, whiçh estabiishrd the principle of state sovereignty and the duty of non-intervention in the normative foundation of international society, began as a parochial European order, which has expanded to encornpass the globe only in the twentieth century.ls Given this history Western political and philosophical concepts are likely to be prominent, even if contested, in the normative structure of international society. The publiclprivate constmct provides us with a powerful conceptual tool with which to make sense of this structure, without necessitating an allegiance to any one conception of it. The long history of these concepts also allows us to make critical cornparisons between their evolution at domestic and international levels.

Another critique against the utility of the public/private constmct might focus on the unsettled and mutable qualities of the distinction that drive the deep contestations over its meaning, significance and potential for transformation in westem domestic political discourse.

According to Ieff Weintraub, the distinction '5s not unitary, but protean. It comprises, not a single paired opposition, but a complex family of them, neither rnutually reducible nor wholly unrelated."19 This comment suggests that there is not a single use of the public/private

" Martin Kiygier, *'PubIicness, Prïvateness and 'Primitive Law"' in Benn and Gaus eds., Public and Private in Social Lfe, p. 337.

IS See Torbjern L. Knutsen, 'me Westphaliaa Moment: The Classicai Situation in international Relations Analysis", unpublished paper; and Hedley Buli, The Expansion of lnremational Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 19 84).

I9 Weintraub, 'The Theory and Politics of the PublidPnvate Distinction," p. 2. 31 distinction but a complex of meanings that generate publiclpnvate distinctions. Unfortunately, although these distinctions are widely employed domesticaily - in ordinary language, journalistic reporting, domestic political debates, and scholarly discourse - inattention to their variations ofien results in theoretical confusion and error. Critics may be nght to wony that importing the distinction will only confuse the moral landscape of international relations.

Tlic utility of the distinction, I bcliew, lics in its ability to hclp us to schcmatizc a diversity of agents, interests and obligations at the international level. Studying the distinction enables theorists to grasp and explore a complex normative structure that disciplines contemporary debates in international ethics, including those relating to the issue of humanitarian intervention. The distinction's continuing controversy in political and social theory attests to its vitality and richness; it is important enough to be contested. In fact. international relations theory has its own version of this battle in the form of disputes about the intemationaVdomestic distinction, which are becoming more salient in an age of increasing sociability between States themselves as well as between non-state actors in economic, social and political terms. It is time to bring these strands of contestation together, so that normative international theory can benefit fiom as well as contribute to the study of the public/pnvate constmct in contemporary political and social theory.

II. THE 'PUBLIC' IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY

How ought we to think about 'publicness' in international society? Who or what constitutes 'the public' at the international level? What is 'public' about them? 1s there such a thing as a 'public interest' in international relations? If so, how should we conceive it? As we will see in the course of our examination, cornpethg moral perspectives offer different answers to these questions about the 'public' in international society. 32

Historically, western political theory has designated the state as the quintessentially public actor, leading to one characterization of the publiclpnvate distinction as politicahon- political. In a descriptive sense, the po IiticaVnon-political distinction cm re fer to a difference between state and non-state, or governrnentai and non-governmental, actors, spheres and relations. This descriptive use of the distinction to mark a difference between the state and non-state actors has been addopted unproblematically at the international Ievcl. International law, for example, classifies states as public entities par excellence, just as they comprise the public realm in relation to individuals and domestic civil society. h international legal terms, the public/pnvate distinction so conceived has been translated into a distinction between public and private international law; the former relates to law that govems the political relations between states, while the latter relates to foreign transactions of non-state entities. such as individuals and corporations.'

What does it mean for the state to be a public actor at the international level? One way to understand the 'publicness' of the state in international society is in terms of its visibility in the international domain. Indeed, the public/private construct functions domestically as well to mark a division between that which is open, visible, or accessible and that which is closed, hidden, or inaccessible. That which "appears in public cm be seen and heard by everybody."" in contrast, when something is pnvate, we mean that it is hidden fiom the view or scrutiny of outsiders. In this sense, the private is connected with privacy, and the public with publicity.

In international relations and law, states enjoy the greatest visibility as the designated public actoa in world politics; indeed, states or nations are intrinsic to the characterization of the domain beyond states as an international realm, and have defined and dominated

For some controveny ~nouridingthis depictioa of international law, see Mark W.Janis, An htroduction to International Law, 2" ed (Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1993), p. 2.

'' Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago:University of Chicago Press, L958), 50. International Relations as a discipline and field of inquiry." This visibility affords states an international presence, status and agency, as well as some foms of accountability at the

international level. Despite a wide range of disparities in econornic, political and social conditions, al1 states are seen as equally sovereign in the eyes of international law. This formal equality and independence mean theoretically that each state is master of its own destiny, even those "quasi-statcs" that lack interna1 rcsourccs or capabilitics :o cstablish deficm sovcrcipntj-.

Indeed, as Robert Jackson has noted, de jure sovereignty "has given Third World states global

institutional standing, influence, and s~pport"?~that they might not otherwise have been able to command. The formal equal independence of states recognized under international law may

thus act as a corrective for the deep inequalities that persist in international social life, giving

weaker states mernbership, visibility and voice in the political, economic and social structures

of international society.

If it is states alone, and more specifically, their political representatives, that constitute

members of the international 'public', it is also their relations and interests that constitute

proper subjects of international political concem, debate, and intervention. Since individuals

and non-state groups are not members of the international 'public' so construed, their relations

and interests have only indirect standing in international society, pnmdy through their

affiliation with a national govenunent or state. Non-state agents and interests rnay gain

visibility only through states, just as planets have no interna1 light, but must rely on a star for

their illumination.

As LJ. Holsti has noted, %ere was no question that the field of inquiry involved oniy the actions and interactions of srares, no matter who the3 spokesmen .. . States and the states system -.. reniained the centerpieces of the study of international politics kom the seventeenth century until the 1970s. See HoIsti, The Dividing Dkcipline: Hegemony and diversity in international theory (Boston: Ailen & Unwin, 198 51, p. 23.

Ro ben Jackson, QuasiSrores: Sovereignry, International Refationr and the ïhird Worid (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 114. 34

Yet the relevant collectivity whose voices, interests and concems would constitute 'the public' at the international level is far fiom settled. Normative visions differ over who or what may constitute 'the public' in the domain of international relations. Statist cornmunitarians might perceive the relevant cornmunity to consist of the politically organized collectivity of states that comprise international society. Meamvhile, cosmopolitan theorists articulate an altanative understanding of tlie relevant collectivity iii dvancing daims clerived from Lhe largely unorganized social collectivity of individuah and gooups that comprise humanity, or the even larger and disparate collage of living things that comprise the globe's ecology." We should remember that disputes about the relevant collectivity, and what is public about it, have shaped the evolution of 'the public' at the domestic level as well. Our understanding of the domestic cornmon has historically suffered from partial views about who and what matters in the collective. In domestic and international domains, unequal distributions of social, economic, and political stanis and power within and between societies al1 conspire to create partial publics, and partial states.

The dispute over who or what constitutes the relevant public in intemational society engages the normative dimension of a state's publicness. In its historical evolution, the modem state acquired the status of a public actor because of its "claim to be responsible for the general interests and affairs of a politically organized collectivity .. . as opposed to 'pnvate' - that is, merely particular - interests.'" Hendrik Spruyt offers an interesting account of the evolution of the state from private to public status in medieval Europe, which involved a

" See David Held Dernocracy and the GIobal Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopoiitan Goventance (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999, for a cosmopolitan mode1 of democracy.

Weintraub, 'The Theory and Politics of the PubiicPrivate Distinction," p. 5. qualitative change in the identity of the state leader, the king, fiom a private to public actor.16

The purview of the political after this transformation derives fiom the fùnction of the state as

the bearer of responsibility for the generai public interest, and the collective or cornmon good,

rnost prorninently security and justice. It is this ethical mandate which legitimizes the use of

coercion by the state, and distinguishes it fiom "robber bands."" In theory then, the state as a

public actor mpresents a fasion of the potiticd and the ethical, with a mmdatc to scwc thc

public interest.

Yet how are we to conceive of 'the public interest' in the international domain?

Realists, as we have noted, might be skeptical of the very idea of an international public

interest; in the absence of a global Leviathan, the public interest in the international arena can

only be the national interest of our own temtorially-bound political cornmunity. Even

perspectives that admit the utility of thinking about an international 'public interest, ' however,

still disagree over how to conceive it. Stanley Benn and Gerald Gaus, in a superb essay,

identiw two divergent approaches to modelling the relationship be~eenindividuals and

society at the domestic level, that lead to two different conceptualizations of the public

interest." They cal1 these models the individualist and the organic models. 1 will refer to them

as atomistic and organic models."

'6 Hendrik Spmyt, The Sovereign State and Its Cornpetitors: An Anoiysis of System Change (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994): "Through the subtle transition fiom royal domain, which was simply the persona1 holdings of the king, to the public real.the quaIity and functions of the king had changed. The private domah became the public state. .. . Salisbury could, therefore, already plausibly argue in the tweüth cenniry that the hg'is, and acts as, a persona publica. And in that capacity he is expected to consider al1 issues with regard to the well-being of the res publica, and not with regard to his privata voluntas."' (pp. 165-6)

'' J.R. Lucas writes, "States without justice are but robber bands edarged". Lucas, On Jwtice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), p. 1.

" Benn and Gaus, 'The Liberal Conception of the Public and the Private," in Public and Private in Social Lge, pp. 3 1-66.

" The 'individuaiist' label is somewhat misleadhg since both models have a concem for the individual; they only merin how they conceive of the individual in society. The 'Uidividuaiist' Iabel would dso cause confusion An atomistic interpretation of the public/pnvate constmct sees individuals, or the basic units of society, as private self-directed units, with intemally generated interests and goals.

The self is ontologically independent and distinct fiom the other. The image of social reality under an atomistic view is that of self-directing actors interacting rationally, that is, based on their self-interest, with the patterns of their interaction curbed only by the restrictions irnposed by an administrative state which stands aprt €rom and above civil society. The ontologcal priority of the individual translates into the ethical priority of the individual's interests and claims. Atomistic moral visions must take into account and accommodate the self-directed

nature of individuals in society. Liberal conceptions of the relationship between the free

market and the regdatory state, as well as between voluntary civil society and the coercive

administrative state, for example, fit into this model of the publidprivate construct.

In contrast to the atomistic model which takes a self-directing individual as its basic

and n priori starting point, an organic model sees individuals in society as members ofa

greater whole From which individuals derive their interests, goals and direction. The self and

the other are interdependent and mutually constituted. An organic image of social reality is

that of a collective body consisting of "mutually connected and dependent parts constituted to

share a common life."'O The ontological priority of the social group translates into its ethical

priority. An organic moral vision thus pnvileges the collective or comrnon good of the social

group as a whole. A classical republican conception of citizenship and political community,

charactenzed by collective action in concert, and exemplified by the ancient Greek polis, fits

into this approach to conceiving the publicjpnvate distinction.

when we explore how these models have guided nonnative international relations theories, which tend to use the state nther than the individual as the basic unit of international sociai Me.

'O Benn and Gaus, 'The Liberal Conception of the Public and the Private," p. 49. These divergent approaches to understanding the relationship between individuals and society lead to different accounts of the public interest in domestic society. An atomistic view of the public/pnvate constnict, for example, would support a Benthamite conception of the public interest as the aggregation of private interests: the whole is composed of the sum of the many particulars, and is reducible to them." In contrast, an organic approach sees the public interest 3s s common good derived from a whole thnt is sornething more and qualitativcly different from the surn of al1 the parts; the whole is not reducible to its parts. Rousseau's general will, for example, is distinct from and antithetical to the sum of particular or private wills of citi~ens.~'

These different conceptions of the public interest, when directed to the international realm, affect our assessrnent of the possibility and nature of international morality. When E.H.

Carr argued, for exarnple, that international morality was necessady impoverished because in the international system, "the principle that the good of' the whole takes precedence over the good of the part, which is a postulate of any hlly integrated community, is not generally a~cepted,"~~he is clearly using an organic conception of the public interest as his reference point. His argument is a simplification of sorts, but it shows the importance of the publidpnvate constnict, which relates domestic public interest to international public interest,

in any conception of international morality.

His comment also leads us to suspect the publicness of the state in international society,

especially in the actual performance of existing states. By designating states as public entities

Jeremy Bentham. Inrroduction fo the PRncipZes of Mmls and Legirlution, J.H. Bum and H.LA. Hart eds. (London: Athlone Press, 1970), Ch. 1, section 4.

" See Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Ine Social Contract in The Social Contraa and Discourses, G.D.H.Cole trans. (London: J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1988), Book II, chapter 3, p. 203.

33 Edward Hallett Cm, The Twmty Years' Criru 1919-1939: An Introduction fo the Siudy of htemational Relations (New York: Harper & Row, 1946, second edition), p. 162, 38 we may acknowledge the ideal of serving the public interest or the common good, however conceived, to which the political realm should continually aspire. Yet the question of whether any particular govemment fulfills the state's mandate to advance the public interest is not answered by the mere designation of the state as a public actor. hdeed, whether the state is a monarchy or a democracy, its leaders and its people rnay fail to meet their responsibility of scrving thc public intcrcst in the domestic Gr hiemational rzalm, through error, malice, ar lack of virtue. If we confuse the descriptive categonzation of the state as a public entity with the normative assessment that any and every state manifests the public interest, we are in danger of obscuring issues that arise when states or regimes fa11 short of these idcals, such as how the political realm may lessen the likelihood of such failure, or be held accountable in such an eventuality.

III. THE PRIVATE LlVES OF STATES

States are public acton in a few different senses that have implications for their standing, agency and obligations in international society. Their interactions with other states are public in the sense of being visible and open to international scrutiny, debate, and sometimes intervention. States are also public in a normative sense of representing, safeguarding and promoting the public interest dornestically and intemationally, although how we conceive of the public interest at both levels is hotly contested by competing normative visions of politics. The adoption of the public status of the state at the international level is thus not as unproblematic as has been assumed by the rules of international law and sociability.

Furthemore, even if a state can claim, through participatory dernocratic institutions, to comprise a public dl-inclusive sphere at the domestic level, no existing state can claim to be

'public' in this sense at the global level. In relation to its own citizens and society, the state 39 may comprise a public realm, but in relation to other states and entities in international society, the state seems at times to constitute a private sphere.

nie unquestioned designation orstates as public actors in world politics can lead us to overlook their private lives. One way to understand the privateness of the state in international society is to focus on aspects of states that are considered to be invisible, or inaccessible to intemationcl scmtiny md regulation. If the public and the political refer to the common visible world and the comrnon good, the private and non-political, in contrast, consist substantively of that which is particular to memben and beyond the legitirnate purview of the collective. The realm of the household or domesticity, for example, typically epitomizes the private sphere, considered to be essentially non-political or concemed prirnarily with its own particular welfue and survival. At the same time that the Westphalian international order privileges the visibility of states at the international level, it also allows certain aspects of states, specifically

their intemal affairs, to enjoy great invisibility at the international level. In international

society, the pnvacy of the state is institutionalized through the construction of state

sovereignty, which functions like privacy to shield certain issues, activities and units fiom

extemal scnitiny, regulation and intervention. The public, in this context, is anything that

inîrudes.

For example, if a govemment considers an issue such as human rights to be a sovereign

matter, it will regard extemal criticism by other govemments or non-govemmentd

organizations of its human rights abuses as illegitimate interference in its intemal or private

affairs. Wenhui Zhong makes this point in relation to the Chinese govemment's position on

human rights: "According to the official Chinese position, international debates on the human

rights situation in China cm .. . easily become debates on sovereignty. Therefore, criticising human rights abuses in China is often regarded as interference in China's intemal affakm3'

Designating an issue as a 'pnvate' or 'sovereign' concern in this way gives it an automatic immunity fkom external or public intervention. The designation of an issue as a pnvate or sovereign concem cuts off substantive discussion with outsiders about the issue; this explains why debate at the international level about the nature and function of sovereignty as pnvacy

Iippem to rake prccedence over my international dcbatc about the natürc and substa'cc of human rights.

The invisibility of the pnvate creates an arena for freedom that is distinct From the

freedom afforded by the visibility of the public sphere. Indeed, the atomistic and organic conceptions of the public/private constnict yield different understandings of the nature and

location of freedom. Under an organic view, participation in a common life is inherent in the

individual subject. Freedom for individuals thus lies in this ability to partake in this collective

deliberation and decision-making that characterize republican notions of citizenship in a

political community. Freedom under this view is located in the public realm of membership

and belonging. Similarly, Hannah Arendt has argued that "Freedom is exclusively located in

the political realm"35 in the life of the polis, which she contrasts to life in the household, a

thoroughly private and non-political realm of inequality, of slavery and mastery, of silence and

of the provision of the most basic human needs. The private realm may be necessary, but it is

the public realm that is fiee.

In contrast, under an atomistic view, because self-direction is inherent in the individual

subject, its Eeedom lies in being able to think, feel, identiQ, create and express its own

projects without extemal interference or coercion by others, especially the state. Freedom is

Y Wenhui Zhong' "China's Human Rights Development in the 1990s" The Journal of Contemporury China 8 (1995):79-97at p. 85.

'' Arendt, Ine Hman Condition, p. 3 1. located in a private sphere that is off-limits to outsiders and extemal control or regulation.

Hobbes articulates this notion of freedom when he defines liberty as the absence of extemal impediments, which depends on "the silence of the Law."36 When we designate a space, unit or activity as 'pnvate' we mean that it is free frorn intrusion. Similarly, when we Say that something is a private matter, we are indicating to other people that they do not have a right to intcrferr in the matter. Western tibenl capitalkt socictics typically undrrstand families and markets to be private, charactenzing them as spheres that enjoy a large degree of Freedom £tom state intervention. As Judith Wagner DeCew has noted at the domestic level, the publidprivate distinction is used "to reflect differences between the appropriate scope of governrnent, as opposed to self-regulation by individuals."" When we conceive of the publidprivate distinction as an intervention/freedorn distinction, locating fkeedom in the pnvate sphere, the image of the public that cornes to the fore is one of a coercive "apparatus of rule which stands above the society and govems it through the enactment and administration of la~s,"'~rather than the organic view of the public as a site of active citizenship and collective self- determination.

Despite the contradictions between atomistic and organic conceptions of publicness and privateness, Benn and Gaus cal1 both models liberal. Indeed, 1 noted earlier that the publidprivate distinction is a foundational constmct of liberal philosophy and societies.

Liberalism's preoccupation with the moral significance of fieedom explains the cornmitment of self-avowed liberal societies to finding "an equilibrium of the public and private spheres of

It is important to note that Hobbes did not consider liberty, so conceived, to be n moral entitlement or claim. The morally neutml definition of fieedom as being able to do as one pleases without extemal restnint mut be disthguished fiom the understanding of fieedom, privacy or sovereignty as moral rights and claims. See Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Markham, Ontario: Penguin, 1986), Chapter 2 1, p. 271.

'' DeCew, In Pursuif of Privacy, p. 10.

38 Weintmub, 'The Theory and Politics of t&e PublicRrivate Distinction," p. 11. 32 life."39 The centrality of the public/private distinction in disciplining normative debates in international relations reveals the salience of liberalism's promises, problems and controversies in the moral foundations of international society. For just as the "political agenda of liberal societies is permeated by issues of the bounds of the public and the private,'"" these issues, expressed in the fom of contestation over the nature and bounds of the international and the domestic, also penpade he political agenda of international society. How :ve conceive of the public/private distinction in international relations clearly has direct bearing on the shape and nature of freedom that individuals and states may Iegitimately enjoy, as the distinction fimctions to separate realms of coercion and regulation from reahs of bee and voluntary association.

Yet as Jeff Weintraub has pointed out, it is strange to attach the liberal label to the organic mode1 that draws fiom theorists whose works are considered to be critical of liberalism." 1 think Benn and Gaus might have meant that both models of publicness and pnvateness are concemed broadly with the issue of human freedom, which of course is the main motivation behind liberal attempts to find a public/pnvate equilibrium. The contestation between atomistic and organic approaches to constructing the publidpnvate distinction affects our interpretations of the meaning and significance of individual and social fieedom. The issue of human fieedom, however, is bigger than liberalism, and the need to reconcile public and pnvate is not just a liberal problern. Indeed in contemporary international society, it seems that most states, liberal and non-liberal, are concemed with preserving various aspects of their own beedom in international society.

39 Benn and Gaus, 'The Liberal Conception of the Public and the Rivate," p. 3 1.

Ibid,

" Weintraub, 'The Theory and Politics of the PublidPrivate DDimnction," p. 4. My analysis suggests that states enjoy both public and pnvate Beedom denved from the tems of their rnembership in the society of states. Furtherrnore, in the Westphalian international political and legal order, intervention and freedom are polarized opposites; international society and law pnze the freedom of states as a moral good while casting intervention as a general moral vice. Recent humanitarian claims at the international level, however, challenge the privacy of states as a moral good.

The moral value of individual and family privacy in domestic society has also been a subject of debate. Feminist theorists have argued that the construction of domesticity as a private or invisible sphere in western political theory and practice has historically served ro justiQ the exclusion of wornen From direct and equal participation in civil and political society.'? These spheres traditionally have recognized only men, whose visibility allowed them to claim "equality and agency in the modem world, as independent actors in civil society and as citizens in the political cornrnunity.'"' The public/private distinction thus establishes patterns of recognition and non-recognition that create insiders and outsiders, defined by their inclusion or exclusion fiom spheres of social interaction. Whereas visibility entails rnembership and inclusion, invisibility, by contrast, signifies exclusion, if not alienation. At the international level, the majority of human beings in the world, relegated to the private domestic jurisdiction of states, remain invisible and hence, largely irrelevant, to international life. In the Westphalian world view, states and their representatives are the insiden, the rest of humanity the outsiders. Privacy for states thus does not necessarily translate into privacy for

individuals and groups within states, just as traditional conceptions of family pnvacy have not

'" See Elshtain, Public Man, Privote Woman, pp. 14-16; and Pateman, "Feminist Critiques of the PubliciPrivate Dichotomy," pp. 12 1-122.

" Weinùaub, ''The Theory and Politics of the PubiiJPrivate Distinction," p. 3 1. 44 always translated into desirable foms of pnvacy for individuals, and especially women, within families.

The resonance of feminist critiques of pnvacy in dornestic relations with critiques of sovereignty as pnvacy in international relations leads us to re-examine the moral basis for the prevailing Westphalian interpretation of the publidprivate constnict. A normatively coherent

3nd defensible xcount of intenmtion depends on this mon1 foundation xhich cstabliçhcs thc legitimacy of states' public and pnvate lives in international society.

IV. CAVEATS

This discussion so far may allow one to agree with Jeff Weintraub that the public/private construct "can neither be conveniently simplified nor usefully avoided," in international as well as dornestic political theory." In subsequent chapters 1 will explore how some prominent ethical perspectives understand the public/private construct at the international level, and the attendant implications for their understanding of intervention as a moral problem in world politics. Before embarking on this exploration of ethics, intervention and pubIic/private constnict in international relations, it may be helpfùl to highlight some caveats.

Distinction and dichotomy

To distinguish between 'public' and 'private' is to mark a difference between them.

How are we to understand this difference in empincal and normative terms? Most obviously, when we distinguish between public and private agents, spheres, interests, activities, or obligations, we are rejecting theû confiation or complete identification. In positing a distinction behveen 'public' and 'pnvate', however, we must be careful not to assume a natural or unproblematic dichotomy between them. Yet the dominant trend in international relations

.- - - CI iôid., p. 38. theory has been to assume a stark contrast between international and national spheres, interests, and obligations.

Excessive dichotomization of the intemationalldomestic distinction, evident in Martin

Wight's work, for example, has led to a mistaken understanding of the problems of politics in domestic and international settings. Indeed, Wight's aim in positing such a radical divide between international and domestic realms seerns to be to accentuate the unsettlcd, conflictual, and dangerous nature of international politics. Yet the gulf he envisions disappears when we discard excessively idealistic assumptions about the nature of domesiic politics, and acknowledge that even stable polities face enduring interna1 divisions, debates and conflicts.

In reality, then, the arena of domestic politics is hardly the settled realm of certainty and

'calculable results' envisioned by Wight." The clahthat 'man's control of his social life' has been achieved by the institution of the modem state ignores the endunng contests over its empirical and normative dominance. For example, as Hedley Bull has noted, the "temtonal integrity of states, new and old, is now more threatened by separatist violence within their

frontiers than by violence fiom o~tside.'~~The unsettled, dynamic, and hence problematic nature of ordering social relations pertains to the domestic reaim, as well as to the international domain.

Empirically, dichotomization of 'pnvate' and 'public' leads to a denial of the complexity of units, relations and activities covered by these categories. The uniformity of the

'private' or 'domestic' realrn implied by a simple dichotomous view of the distinction hides the

IS Martin Wight, "Why is there no international Theory?' in Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight, Diplornatic Invesngations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press), p. 33.

" Hediey Bull. nie Anarchical Society: A Siudy of Order in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), p. 197. 46 intemal complexity of most states, characterized by ethnic, religious, economic, social and normative, if not political, plurality. These non-geographical and non-state foci of identification comprise sources of difference and affïnity between people, creating patterns of cornmunity that evade the internationaVdomestic divide. A dichotomous conception of the distinction also seems too simple when we think about the complexity of the 'public' or international stage, which admits mmy kinds cf actors, including not only sovercign states, but also a host of regional and international organizations such as the Organization for Ahican

Unity, the United Nations, and the International Monetary Fund, as well as a plethora of non- state entities ranging from multinational corporations, global religious institutions, and intemational dnig cartels, to humanitarian agencies such as the Red Cross, environmental groups such as the World Wildlife Fwd, and individuals with an international presence such as

Nelson Mandela.

Part of the complexity sacrificed by dichotomization consists of the denial that actors typically have both public and private faces. For example, an organization such as Médecins

Sans Frontières may be a private, or non-govemmental, organization, but with a self-defined mandate that is highly public in a normative sense. Many organizations in domestic as well as world politics, that are private in the sense of being non-state or non-political entities, rnay also be dedicated to the advancement of the comrnon good. Public and private actors rnay both have responsibilities to contribute to the collective good, albeit in distinct ways. A dichotomous conception of the public/private divide thus fails to acknowledge the complex realities of both domestic and international life, including an intricate web, and sometimes tangle, of sources of moral legitimacy, authonty, and accountability feeding normative distinctions and debates that exist at both domestic and international levels. Dichotornization of the pubIic/private constnict thus not only misdescnbes the nature of domestic and international politics, it also offers an inadequate account of the moral landscapes of national and international relations. Furthemore, dichotomization tends to pose the normative relationship between public and pnvate in competitive tenns, contraçting their moral value.

hdeed, it is cornmon to depict the moral value of 'public' and 'pnvate' as a zero-surn game. Norberto Bobbio, for exarnple, notes that ''wwhen a positive evaluative meaning is zttributed to one, the cecorx! xquires ô negative evalu~tiverneuiing md vice rersa."" This zero-sum view of the moral relationship between public and private pits them in an opposing and dichotomous ethical relationship. The more positive the moral evaluation we ascribe to the public, under this view. the more negative Our moral assessrnents of the private must be. The ethical contrast between public and private is most apparent in the charactenzation of private interest as exclusively sel'regarding and of the public interest as exclusively other-regarding.

In a modem liberal capitalist Framework, for exarnple, the market is distinctly non-political or pnvate when we conceive of it as "a legitimate field for competitive and self-interested individualism"" or "instnimental calculation of individual advantage.'"' In direct contrast, the state is quintessentially public in its dedication to a public interest or cornmon good that is understood to be antithetical to individual or particula.advantage. The public/private construct, so conceived, constitutes a politicaVethical divide which is like the division between night and day; the public and political comprises a common world of action in concert to serve the collective good, the non-political denotes a private world that caters to individual or particular necessities and advantage.

" Norberto Bobbio, Dmocracy and Dictatorship: The Nature und Limits of State Power. trans. Peter Kennedy (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, l989), p. 10,

Weintraub, 'The Theory and Politics of the PublidRivate Distinction," p. 38.

49 ibid., p. 36. 48

Yet the opposite is also tme; in exalting the public, we may obscure the moral potential of the private.' Whether we endorse a view of the pnmacy of the public over the private, or vice versa, such cornpetitive constructions of the distinction miss the possibility of the ethical mutuality of public and pnvate, international and domestic, or the extent to which the moral worth or potential of one may depend on that of the other. Rejecting dichotomous views of the distinction challenges us to reconccive the relationship betwcen public and pnvatc, lcading us to a view of their mutual interconnectedness. The publidpnvate distinction, so conceived, is less a 'grand dichotomy' than a grand relationship which, properly conceived, allows us to recognize and reconcile the public and private faces of individuals, collectivities, and humanity.

Description and prescription

While excessive dichotomization of the publidprivate construct obscures the empirical

and normative complexity of international relations, inattention to the logical distinction

between descriptive and prescriptive uses of the distinction yields theoretical confusion. As

Ruth Gavison clearly admonishes, the ''ternis 'private' and 'public' .. . typically have both

descriptive and normative meanings which, if not carefully distinguished, can lead to confusion

or equivocati~n."~'We can detect a blending of normative description and argument in popular

usages of the public/private construct. Consider statements such as, 'This letter is private,' or

'This problem is an interna1 affar.' As Benn and Gaus point out about the £ktexample,

declaring that a letter in one's possession is private implies a normative argument that it ought

50 Hanaah Arendt, for example, etevates the pubtic at the expense of the private, and in doing so, misses the darker side ofthe public and the moral potential of the private. Arendt draws her views of public and pnvate from her interpretation of Aristode and the ancient Greek polis. For a compelling alternative account, see Judith A. Swanson, The Public and the Privute in ArrStotle S Political Philosophy (Ithaca: CorneU University Press, 1992).

'' Gavison, "Feminism and the PublidPrivate Distinction," p. 4. 49 not to be read by others without permission: "'Smith's letter is private (so don? read it)' invokes norms of privacy regarding letters and also prescribes a consequent forbearance.""

Similarly, 'China's treatment of student demonstrators is an interna1 or domestic matter (so don? interfere)' invokes norms of sovereignty regarding the treatment of dissident citizens and also prescnbes a consequent forbearance on the part of outsiders, especially other govemments and state-centric international institutions.

LVhereas the norms of privacy regarding letten may be located in a particular culture or society, the norms of sovereignty regarding the treatment of citizens are located in international society as much as in domestic society. Indeed, the prescription not to interfere with a state's domestic matters, however that is understood, is aimed directly at other states and the international community in general, and only indirectly at a state's intemal audience.

Furthemore, the rhetorical force of employing the terms 'private' and 'intemal' or 'domestic' clearly lies not in their descriptive hinction, but in their normative and prescriptive implications.

Acknowledging the difference between normative description and argument allows us to describe something as 'private' or 'public' ('domestic' or 'international'), without committing us automatically to certain nomative conclusions. For exarnple, a person can commit an action in a private setting, hidden from the view of others, without being able to

assert automatically that the action ought to rernain private, or beyond the purview of social

concem or public authorities. Given the varied ways in which we employ the terms 'public'

and 'private', we need to beware of uses that combine normative description and prescription.

R.J. Vincent has noted that much confusion arises in normative debates about

intervention fkom blending 'Yhe use of the word intervention as a description of an event in

" Benn and Gaus, 'The Public and the Private: Concepts and Action," p. 12. 50 international relations and its use as a normative expression by international lawyer~."~~To avoid such conflation, definitions of concepts such as 'public' and 'private,' 'intervention,'

'privacy' and 'sovereignty,' should aim for neutrality in terms of moral value. As Anita Allen has put it in relation to defining pnvacy, "privacy is a descriptive, neutral concept denoting conditions that are neither always [morally] desirable and praiseworthy, nor always undesirable and unpraiseworthy."" Similarly we can understand state sovereignty as denoting conditions of temtorial integrity and political decisional autonomy, but exclude fiom the definition of sovereignty evaluations of its moral value. Normative arguments for or against the protection of individual privacy or state sovereignty, then, cannot end with the mere designation of spheres as 'private' or 'public,' of actors as 'sovereign,' or of activities as 'interventionary.'

Intrinsic and Instrumental Value

Our conceptions of the public/private distinction as a normative construct rely in part on how we understand the nature of the actor or activities to which the constnict applies. To argue that some state action ought to be fkee from external interference, for example, one must defend some conception of state sovereignty as pnvacy, which presupposes a moral theory of statehood, just as the idea of individual privacy presupposes some moral theory of penonhood.

Competing moral theories of statehood differ in the kinds of moral value they attribute to the state or political community. For example, does the concept of the sovereign state have some intrinsic moral worth? Or, is the state primarily an instrumental constnict, and does its sovereignty have moral value only as a nom that protects certain moral interests and goals?

R I. Vincent, Nonintervention and International Order (Rinceton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1974)' pp. 11-12,

" Allen, Uneasy A ccess, p. 3. 51

In international relations the state has historically assumed an unassailable moral right to be "the master of what goes on inside its temtory."" Classical international relations theory has tended to hold the state and a certain conception of its sovereignty as so inextricably linked that no entity could be considered a state that did not possess this kind of sovereignty; the

'state' and 'sovereignty' were largely synonym~us.~~Sovereignty undestood as "a kind of

~inconditinnaland absolute jorisdiction"" has thur been i~trinsicto the concept of st~teh~od.

Consequently, the ethical primacy of such sovereignty has been a normative given in the moral landscape of international politics until very recentiy. Such a view, however, makes intervention inherently morally problematic, since "intervention, defined as an act aimed at influencing the domestic affairs of a state," directly contravenes state sovereignty.jS In an international society of srates where such sovereignty is elevated to the status of an intrinsic and inviolable feature of statehood, it would be difficult to justify its violation.

The desire to preserve sovereignty's intrinsic moral value accounts for the convoluted battles in the international relations Iiterature over the definition of intervention, the basic logic of which was to bypass direct questioning of sovereignty's value by denying that justifiable foms of intervention constituted intervention. Endowing sovereignty with intrinsically positive moral worth tends to lead to a concomitant vilification of intervention, creating the

-- 55 Stanley Hoffmann, 'The Problern of Intervention," in Hedey Bull ed., intervention in CVorld PoIitics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, I986), p. 11.

56 See Bernard Crick, "Sovereignty," International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences 15 (I968), p. 77. Asserting "the state is sovereign .. . is usually a tautology, just as the expression 'sovereign state' cmbe a neoplasm. For the concept of 'the state' came into use at about the same time as the concept of sovereignty, and it served the same purpose and had substantially the same meaning,"

57 Joel Feinberg, "Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Pnvacy: Moral Ideals in the Constitution?" The iVotre Dame Law Revie,v 58 (1983):445-492 at p. 448.

'' HofnnaM, 'The Problem of Intervention," p. 11. 52 awkward need to assert that "intervention by right is not interventi~n."'~Adopting an intrinsic account of sovereignty's value tends to close off the possibility of justikng intervention for any reason, as it preempts the ability to question sovereignty's moral value.

In contrast, a functionalist or instrumental view of sovereignty clears the path towards the possibility of assessing sovereignty's normative worth. Anita Allen addresses the question of insûinsic ccrsus instmrncntal -.duc in hcr account of individÿal privacj;." If wc apply lier insights about privacy, we might argue that the norm of state sovereignty cannot have intrinsic moral worth, since the sovereignty of States makes sometimes a positive and sometimes a negative contribution to human affairs, from a moral point of view. If we take an instrumentalist view, however, we need to clariQ whose and what types of moral interests and goals state sovereignty is designed to serve, and the relationship between these and other moral interests and goals. In cases where protection of the sovereignty norm would undemine these or other more significant moral goods, its violation may be justi fied. Understanding sovereignty as an instrumental nom allows us, then, not to deny that intervention contravenes sovereignty, but to justiS that violation. We cm then argue about whether a certain action in the context of a specific situation constitutes justified and unjustified intervention, instead of arguing about whether it is or is not intervention.

These debates reveal the central points of contention between competing moral visions of world politics, and will affect our assessrnent of the legitimacy of intervention in contexts of

intrastate violence.

59 Vincent, Nonintervention and International Order, p. 12.

60 Allen, Uneasy Access, pp. 35-53. V. CONCLUSION

Understanding intervention as a moral problem in domestic and international relations requires an exarnination of the publidprivate constmct, which disciplines the public and private lives of various kinds of units, including individuds, families and states. In the next two chapters, we will examine realist and cornunitarian constructions of the public and the pnvate in international relations. It will become clear that both perspectives want to endorse states' claims to privacy vis-à-vis international society. Yet although both are concemed to preserve state pnvacy as a moral good, they rely on models of the public/private distinction that fail to give us a morally compelling account of sovereignty as privacy. Consequently, both offer morally flawed assessments of intervention as a moral problem in situations of intrastate violence. The rest of this work will then be devoted to an exarnination of a cosmopolitan conception of the public/pnvate constmct in international relations, which alone cmprovide a morally tenable vision of state privacy and intervention in world politics. in an unorganized realrn each unit's incentive is to put itself in a position to be able to take care of itself since no one else can be counted on to do so. The international imperative is "take care of yoursel f '!

So close behind sorne prornontory lie

The huge Leviathans to attend their prey,

And give no chance, but swallow in the fsr,

Whic h through their gaping jaws mistake the way.

John ~ryden'

------' Kenneth N. Wal~Ttieory of international Politics (Toronto, Ontario: McGraw-Hi11 Publishing Company, 1979), p. 107.

John Dryden, Annus Mirabil&; quoted in Hennan Melville, Moby-Dick (Toronto: Bantam Book, 1981), p. 4, Chapter 2.

Realism and the tyranny of the private

1. INTRODUCTION

The realist vision of world politics has enjoyed great intellectual prominence in the discipline of International Relations. How does this perspective perceive the nature of the international domain and its players? What is its understanding of the public/private constnict that underlies the international system? What contributions cmit make to a normative inquiry into the problem of intervention?

Before tackling these questions it is important to note that realism is intemally varied, with its proponents as well as its cntics engaged in a perpetual debate over the substance, meaning and cogency of its fundamental precepts. Modem realism was bom arnidst the nibble of two World Wars, and like an orphaned child of war who grows to matunty in relation to an unrecoverable past, it is a perspective that has had to invent its own history and original founders.' The search by contemporary realists for their roots - in Thucydides,

Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Rousseau - has led to diverse interpretations of the precise nature of realism's vision of world politics.' Interestingly, these efforts have perhaps been more revealing of the views of modem realists than of the past thinken on whose works they draw their insights. in this discussion 1will focus my critique on Kenneth Waltz's neorealism, articulated mainly in Theory of International Politics, which has dominated American

See, for example, Michael W. Doyle, "Thucydidean Reahm," Reviov of lntemational Studies 16 (1990):223-237,who asks, 'Tf thinking Iike a Realist is thinking üke Thucydides, which Realism cm best sustain a clah to Thucydides'? What sort of a Realist was Thucydides?" (p. 224.)

See Benjamin Frankel ed., The Roou of Realism (Portland, Oregon: Frank Cass, 1996). 56 contemporary realist scholmhip. I will also employ Hobbes as a foi1 to Waltz, in order to point the way toward a more compelling normative vision of realism.

Many realists, including Waltz, are likely to object to the characterization of their views as constituting a normative vision of world politics, for they tend not to see the enterprise of theorizing about international politics as a normative endeavour. Realists tend to 5e moral skeptics who daim tu premise their malyses md prescriptions on how things arc in the world, rather than on how one might think or wish they oright to be. Machiavelli articulated this view in his farnous tract, The Prince:

.. . my intention being to write sornething of use to those who undentand, it appears to me more proper to go to the real tnith of the matter than to its imagination; and many have imagined republics and principalities which have never been seen or known to exist in reality; for how we live is so far removed fiom how we ought to live, that he who abandons what is done for what ought to be done, will rather lem to bring about his own min than his preservation.'

Against the idealism of political philosophers who presuppose the sigificance of human moral agency and vision, "realism is founded on a pessimism regarding moral progress and human po~sibilities."~To realists, whatever visions of justice or the good Iife one imagines may govem international relations in theory, they can only remain unfulfilled strivings in an international arena governed by certain imrnutable laws of political necessity founded on the elemental goal of national self-preservation in an anarchic international system.

Given that international politics can only ever be a repetitive and incessant struggle

for poaer between States striving to maximize their own national interests,' a significant

Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince in The Prince and The Dircourses (New York: &dom House, 1950), Chapter 15, p. 56-

Robert C. Gilpb, 'The Richness of the Tradition of Political ReaIism" in Robert O. Keohane (ed), Neorealism and ILS Cntics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986) p. 304.

' See Hans 1. Morgenthau, In Defnse of the National Interest: a critical examinarion of Americunforeign policy (Washington, DC: University Press of Amenca, 1982). 57 strand of realism questions the very relevance of moral motivation, reasoning and inquiry in the international domain. Realists, however, are not mere observers of the international scene; they do not only describe how states conduct themselves in international affairs, they also engage in debates about how states ought to act. As Sheldon Wolin has observed, even

Machiavelli's vision of politics entails a combination of imagination and representation.' A xrilist prescription, such ris the common one that a state must ûlwriys act in its national interest if it is to survive, constitutes a normative argument or imperative that advances a narrowly conceived national interest as the sole motivation of state conduct, and political necessity as its ultimate justification or apology.

The dominance of realist political discourse in the study of International Relations is evident in the persistent use of the concept of national interest by scholan and practitioners to detemine foreign policy, especially in the United States. As David Welch has figuratively observed, "It is di fficult to find two consecutive pages of prominent journals suc h as Foreign

A'airs, Foreign Policy, and - of course - The National Interest where the tem does not appear.'" Meanwhile, former statesmen such as Henry Kissinger continue to pay homage to realist rhetoric; in a Washington Post article about the 1999 NATO intervention in Kosovo, for example, he asserts that a viable American and NATO foreign policy must be anchored

"in a clear definition of the national interest."1° Yet even if one accepts the realist insistence on using the national interest as an inescapable guide for foreign policy, one can still

Machiavelli, The Prince, Chapter 26, pp. 94-98. See also Sheldon S. WoIin, Politics and Vision: Conrinuity and lnnovation in Western Political Thought (Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1960).

David A- Wekh, "Moraiity and 'The National interest'," in Ethics in International Afairs: ïïzeory and Cares, Andrew Va& ed. (Lanham, Md,: Rowrnan & Littlefield, 2000), pp. 7-8,

'O Henry Kissinger, '&NoU.S. Ground Forces for Kosovo: Leadership doem't mean that we must do everything ourselves," The Wilrington Post, Feb. 22, 1999, p. A 15. 58 legitimately question how a realist perspective fixes the scope and content of a state's interest,

The issue of humanitarian intervention creates discornfort for the realist perspective precisely because it challenges the narrow interpretation of national interest that many realists have assumed as a fixed and mchanging given. In opening debate about how to conceive of the mtional Interest, the problern of humuiitanan intentention also challenges oth,Pr core realist tenets, such as the ethical primacy of state interests over non-state interests and clairns, as well as the assumption of a positive connection between intentate peace and 'hurnan security.'" Undentanding and assessing a realist view of humanitarian intervention entails an evaluation of the theoretical and practical cogency of realist interpretations of national interest, political necessity, and morality in international relations. This involves an examination of how realism conceives of the nature of the state, as well as its distinction

Frorn and relationship with others in the international reah. In other words, one must examine how a realist perspective conceives of the public/private constmct at the international Ievei.

II. PRIVATE STATES, ATOMISTIC WORLD

Realists typically characterize the arena of international politics as a Hobbesian state of nature, where States, with no political supenor above them and no cornrnon morality between hem, act according to the pruiciple of self-help and pursue their own interests, the most fundamentai of which is survival. For Hobbes the state of nature in which individuals without a cornmon superior engage in a zero-sum struggle for suMval arises as a logicai conclusion of his assertion that self-interest, defined by each individual as the satisfaction of 5 9 his or her own particular appetites and the avoidance of his or her particular aversions, is the spring of al1 human behaviour. Hobbes's great work, Leviathan, begins with an account of the human physical body as the source of al1 human experience and thoughts." The physical separateness of human beings as individuals is significant in Hobbes's philosophy because it is there that he locates the original source of al1 human motivations and behaviours, appetites md wersions. Given Hobbes's account of human motivations, efforts to achiere human solidarity, or to motivate individuals to act in concert for a common purpose, are fnught with complications, for "men have no pleasure, (but on the contrary a great deal of gnefe) in keeping Company, where there is no power able to over-awe them dl."" Humans are essentially pnvate beings, thus they do not naturally seek society, but have to be enticed or terrorized into society, through positive and negative incentives that affect their self-interest, the most fundamental being their own physical survival.

Modem realists have transferred this account of individuals and human motivation to the dominant actors in the international reah, encouraged perhaps by Hobbes's characterization of states as artificiai penons." Kenneth Waltz thus sees the self-interest of states as a key element of realism:

The der's, and later the state's, interest provides the spkgof action; the necessities of policy arise from the uruegulated cornpetition of states; calculation based on these necessities can discover the policies that will best serve a state's interests; success is the ultimate test of policy, and success is defuied as preserving and strengthening the state."

" On minimalist and maximaList conceptions of security, see Peter J. Stoett, Hiiman and Global Seniri-: An Erploration of Tem (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999), pp. 14-23.

" Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Markham, Ontario: Penguh Books Canada Limited, 1986), Chapter 1.

:' ibid., Chapter 13, p. 185.

'' ibid., introduction, p. 8 1.

'* Waltz, Theory of lnternationai Politics. p. 1 17. Walîz does not merely assert that self-interest is one element of state motivation, it is the spring of al1 state behaviour. States have at bottom only private, or exclusively particular, identities, interests and aims. A contemporary realist conception of the national interest is thus quite narrow: realism's dominance in Lntemational Relations can be seen in "the prevalent tendency to interpret al1 state behavior as narrowly self-interested."16 According to a realist perspective, then, although states may comprise the public realrn in domestic relations, in international relations, states are fùndamentally private actors, atomistic and self- regarding, without any shared identities and interests greater than themselves. Furthemore, realists often conceive the national interest to be dichotomously opposed to the interests of othen, a typical outcome of an atomistic conception of the public/private constmct.

Waltz employs analogies with rnicroeconomic theory to depict the international context and its players. "Intemational-political systems, like economic markets," he writes,

"are formed by the coacting of self-regarding units."" Just as a liberal market-model of society conceives of "individuals pursuing their self-interest more or less emciently and rationally,"" a neorealist image of international society sees the sarne kind of social reality between states. The market image of the international system assumes the preferences of actors as given, as social constructivists have pointed out.'' For our purposes, however, it is not just the fact that the liberal market mode1 assumes actors' preferences that is problematic;

Ib Welch, "Moraiity and 'The National Interest"', p. 11.

" Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 91. l8 Jeff Weintraub, 'The Theory and Poiitics of the Pubiic/Private Distinction" in Jeff Alan Weintraub and Krishan Ku- (editors), Public and Privare in Thought and Practice: Perspectives on a Grand Dichoromy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), p. 8. l9 Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is what States make of it: the social construction of power poiitics," International Organtkation, 46(1992):39 1-425; and Finuemore, National Interests in International Society. 61 more substantively, the problem is that it privileges a specific account of actors' preferences, as being driven by private or exclusive aspects of actors' identities, interests and ends: "The market arises out of the activities of separate units - persons and fims - whose aims and efforts are directed not toward creating an order but rather toward fulfilling their own intemally defined interests by whatever means they can muster. The individual unit acts for itself."" The ssumption of ii ndicd sepmtion be~eense!f muid other is clex units hwe only particular and exclusive 'intemally de fined interests', and lack any intemally de fined or intemalized common or shed interests or noms. This market mode1 of systems and units when transferred to the realm of politics confirms Waltz's image of the international domain as one tyrannized by atomistic private interests and judgement.

Paradoxically, although realists identiQ national survival as a universal interest, in that it accounts for al1 state behaviour, it is not universal in a public or cornmon sense, in that the interest each state has in its own preservation is not shared by other states. In the following passage, Waltz confirms that a realist perspective views states as quintessentially private rather than public acton in world politics, and asserts that this atomism means that states have no shared or public interest in preseMng each other:

Nationally, private force used against a government threatens the political system. Force used by a state - a public body - is, From the international perspective, the private use of force; but there is no govemment to overthrow and no govemmental apparatus to capture. Short of a drive toward world hegemony, the private use of force does not threaten the system of international politics, only some of its members."

What is universal, then, is private interest and judgement. It is this belief in the absolute privateness of the state, resulting in the complete lack of any foundation for a common life

'O Waln, Theory of International Politics, p. 90.

" ibid., p. 1 12. 62 between states in the international reah, that underpins the realist construction of the public context in which states relate.

Waltz and other structural realists attempt to argue that the fault lies not in the nature of states, but in their stars, as it were; states are not innately selfish, but their self-centredness is imposed by their extemal environment, which is defined by the absence of common identities, interests, power. authority and noms. In this vein Waltz asserts that intemationally, "decisions are made at the bottom level. there being scarceiy any other.""

Given this absence, international politics can only be the by-product of clashes behveen mutually exclusive private actors and interests. Even where opportunities for mutual gain might lead to the development of cornrnon interests and cooperation between statcs, Waltz daims that the structure of anarchy kgments whatever cornmonality may exist, compelling states "to ask not 'Will both of us gain?' but 'Who will gain more?"'" Indeed Waltz's realism cannot comprehend an organic conception of the public international realm as an organized society, "consisting of mutually co~ectedand dependent parts constituted to share a cornrnon life."" As Leo McCarthy has noted, "Realism denies the existence of an international society, where 'society' is understood to imply states CO-existingin mutually recognised interdependence, according to cornrnon and binding niles and with a significant degree of shared moral and cultural ~nderstanding."'~

-- -.? Ibid., p. 1 17, itdics mine.

'5 ibid., p. 105.

Staniey Benn and Gerald Gaus, 'The Liberal Conception of the Public and the Private," in S.I. Benn and G.F. Gaus, editors, Public and Private in Social Lfe (Canberra, Australia: Croom Helm, 1W), p. 49.

'S Leo McCarthy, "International Anarchy, ReaIism and Non-Intervention" in Ean Forbes and Mark Hoffman eds. Political Tlreom international Relations. and the Ethies of Intervention (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1993), p. 76. 63 It is important to remember, however, that a realist image of the international realm stems fiom its atomistic understanding of the nature of states, just as Hobbes's state of nature finds its origin in his atomistic conception of the individual human being. States are fated to

CO-existin mutual insecurity in an unintended system, according to universally pnvate, as in particular and exclusive, interests and judgement, because of their essentially atomistic nature, which produces their anarchic envir~nment.'~It Is thir exclusively atomistic interpretation of the ontology of states that accounts for the realist tendency to assume a restrictive conception of national interest. In the realist alphabet, 'A' is for 'atomism', rather than 'anarchy.'

Realism's atomistic conception of the state affects its interpretation of sovereignty, a state's primary extemal attribute. Waltz is careful to caution that sovereignty does not give states the practical ability to do as they please. Rather, the amibute of sovereignty means that a state "decides for itself how it will cope with its interna1 and extemal problems, including whether or not to seek assistance from others and in doing so to limit its fieedom by making commitments to them. States develop their own strategies, chart their own courses, make their own decisions about how to meet whatever needs they expenence and whatever desires they deve~op."'~As self-directing actoa in international society, states possess decisional agency. Waltz clearly views such sovereignty as an integral aspect of a state's identity and interest. National sumival not only means temtoriai integrity but also political independence.

in this light, it was realIy atomism rather than anarchy that Hedley Buil chailenged in his classic work, nte Anarchical Society: a smdy of order in worldpoiitics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977).

'' Wale, Theory of international Politics, p. 96. 61 Although realists do not tend to evaluate state sovereignty in normative terms, Waltz clearly favours a system of sovereign states over a world governrnent, the tyranny of the private over the potentially devastating tyranny of the public.28 Indeed, while he mostly laments anarchy as a necessary feature of interstate relations, he also celebrates its virtues, which seem to lie in the fieedom it affords states in international society. Although fiom a realist point of view security is the central prcoccupation of statcs, Waltz obscwcs that statcs,

"like people, are insecure in proportion to the extent of their freedom. If fieedom is wanted, insecurity must be accepted." One virtue of anarchy is the freedom it affords al1 from the will of others, for in anarchy, "people or states are fiee to leave one another a10ne."'~ With this argument, Waltz seems to be making a normative claim that an atomistic world order is more desirable fiom a moral point of view than a more integrated one that might impose burdens on states and inhibit the state's privacy understood in terms of nationai decisional autonomy .

Realism's atomistic interpretation of sovereignty is akin to Catharine MacKimon's critical characterization of privacy as "that which is inaccessible to, unaccountable to, unconstructed by, anything beyond itself By definition, it is not part of or conditioned by anything systematic outside it."" Yet realism's atomistic conception of the social context in which states relate to each other makes the maintenance of state sovereignty as a normative right to decisional autonomy highly problematic. For given the problem of the tyranny of

' ibid., pp. 1 1 1-1 12. Waltz's critique of world governent is not that it would be universal, but that it, too, would be driven by its own parricdar organizrttional interests, which it would pume at the expense of the interests and fieedom of states.

" Catharine MacKinnon, Towards u Feminicr Theory of the State (Harvard University Press, l989), p. 190. MacKinnon daims to be critiquing the hiberal concept of privacy, but her critique reaiiy pertainç ody to a certain atomistic conception of privacy, which many Liierals would reject. 65 private judgement and the consequent absence of meaningful moral discourse at the international level, it would seem theoretically impossible for realists to constmct any normative understanding of state sovereignty as pnvacy. Thus, although the absence of any common public interest between states means that "there can be no intervention which is expressive of the comrnon purposes of international society,"" realists also cannot rnake any meaningful normatiw xguments aglinst intervention, humanitarizn or othen~ise.

As Hobbes realized the idea of a moral entitlement to anything cannot have validity in the state of nature: "It is consequent also to the same condition, that there be no Propnety, no

Dominion, no Mine and Thine distinct; but onely that to be every mans that he cm get; and for so long, as he cm keep it."" Leo McCarthy thus concludes, "No sort of interventionary activity is [morally] problematic frorn a Hobbesian viewpoint, because there cmbe no binding principles in states' relations with each ~ther."~'In this vein Hans Morgenthau similarly argued that, "it is futile to search for an abstract pnnciple which would ailow us to distinguish in a concrete case between legitimate and illegitimate intervention."-" ironically then, although realists assert that pnvate judgement prevails in the international domain, there is no possibility to safeguard state pnvacy in a normative sense of denoting either decisional autonomy or an inviolable sphere of territory or action from which a state may justifiably exclude othen. States may be wholly pnvate actors at the international level, but

" McCarthy, "Internationai Anarchy, Realism and Non-Intervention," p. 76.

32 Hobbes, Leviathun, Chapter 13, p. 188.

" McCarthy, "International Anarchy, Reaiism and Non-intervention," p. 80. While this is an accurate depiction of the neorealkt viewpomt, it is not necessariiy Hobbes's viewpoint since his recognition of lawfid leagues between nations makes it conceivable that nomof sovereignty and non-intervention, derived from the interests of member states, may become binding on them. See footnote 6 1.

Ham J. Morgenthau, Tointervene or Not to [ntervene," Foreign Affairs 45 (L967):425436 at p. 430. precisely because of this, they cannot make any rneaningfil moral claim to sovereignty as privacy.

Hobbes recognized this in his assertion that in the state of nature, "every man has a

Right to every thing; even to one anothers body."" By 'right,' Hobbes means only the natural ability people have to secure anything that helps them to maintain their owvn lives. He does not see riehts as moral daims' but as liberties (conceived in a non-moral sense as the mere ability to do something due to the absence of extemal impediments), that "each man hath, to use his own power, as he will himselfe, for the preservation of his own Nature; that is to Say, of his own Life; and consequently, of doing any thing, which in his owvn Judgement, and Reason, hee shall conceive to be the aptest means there~nto."'~To Hobbes, without society, people have this natural 'nght,' but it is precisely because they ail fairly equally possess this natural 'nght' or ability that people have no security over their possessions, including their own lives. Similady, by having such a 'right' to everything, no state has security over anything, not its own govenunent, population, temtory or other resources. In the absence of international society, states may not be owned by a world Leviathan, but states also may not be secure in owning themselves. Logically then, if states exist in a Hobbesian state of nature, it is not possible to maintain a rneaningful distinction between public and private spheres, international and domestic realms, as most realists have assurned. Hobbes solves the problem of sovereignty only internally, but he does not offer states any guarantee of extemai sovereignty. The intemal sovereignty of states is thus perpetually contingent on a state's power or ability to maintain its independence fiom other states that have no obligation at the international level to recognize its intemal sovereignty.

- - -- " Hobbes, Leviathan, Chapter 14, p. 190.

36 Ibid., p. 189. This logical consequence of an atomistic conception of international society has been lost on some contemporary realists. Part of Kissinger's critique of Amencan involvement in the Kosovo conflict, for example, relies on the concept of sovereignty as a normative right.

In a disapproving tone he writes that the Kosovo agreement reached "under the threat of

NATO bombardment .. . involves nearly unprecedented international intercession.

Yug~slavia.a rovereign st~te,is being sked to cede control md in time sovereignty of 3 province containing its national shrines to foreign rnilitary force." '' Kissinger rnay be right in his critique of the agreement, but in a world resembling a Hobbesian state of nature, no normative argument for the protection of Yugoslav sovereignty can have much validity.

This limitation of neorealism highlights the social or public nature of nghts as moral claims, even of such rights as privacy and sovereignty, for the very idea of a moral, as opposed to natunl, right to privacy or sovereignty cm be established only Within the embrace of community As Robert Post has noted about pnvacy in a domestic context, "privacy is for us a living reality only because we enjoy a certain kind of communal exi~tence."'~Neorealists, by denying the social foundations necessary for a normative conception of sovereignty, cmot make a coherent moral defense of sovereignty as privacy.

Without it, intervention as a moral problem ceases to exist. Deprived of the power of words, only the sword is available to realists to protect states and people from extemal intrusion.

Practically, then, only the most powerful actors in the system, the great powers, can enjoy any security in the maintenance of their privacy in terms of decisional autonomy. The logic

37 Kissinger. "NoU.S. Ground Forces for Kosovo."

" Robert C. Post, 'The Social Foudations of Privacy: Community and Self in the Common Law Tort" Califantia Law Review 77,5(1989):957-1010 at p. 959,

'' ibid., p. 1010. 68 of a neorealist view of international morality thus does not provide any standpoint frorn which to mount a moral critique of the actions of powerful states, even when they intervene in the intemal affairs of weaker states, for humanitarian or any other purposes. In such a world justice quickly becomes the interest of the stronger party?

The paradox is that in the absence of society in the fom of shared noms, there cm be no nomative right to privncy; in the absence of international societ,~,îhere cmbe no normative right to sovereignty, upon which a coherent normative account of intervention depends. This paradox points to the mutual interconnectedness of private and public, domestic and international, rather than their dichotomous separation as neorealists imagine.

Ironically, in positing the radical dichotomization of private and public, modem realism cm provide no coherent argument in favour of their distinction. Thus, intervention as a moral problem, in so far as it implies the existence of such an argument, rludes contemporary realist understanding.

III. THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF NECESSITY

One prominent strand of realism holds that the absence or irrelevance of stringent cornmon noms at the international level is a regrettable but inevitable feature of international life. This is because the ontological atornism of the state translates not only into the political fragmentation of international society, but aiso into a moral atornisrn between states. indeed, the dominance of private judgement in Hobbes's state of nature seerns to render problematic the very idea of a public interest or morality. Hobbes argued that given a state of nature where individuals were moved only by self-interest in the form of particular appetites and

" See Plato, neRepublic ofPlato. tram. Man Bloom, (New York: Basic Books, 199L, second edition) for Thrasymachus's articulation of this view of justice, and Socrates's rebuttai. 69 aversions, and were without a common superior, morality as a public or shared system of normative rules could not be established:

... these words of Good, Evill, and Contemptible, are ever used with relation to the person that useth hem: There being nothhg simply and absolutely so; nor any cornmon Rule of Good and Evill, to be taken nom the nature of the objects themselves; but fiom the Person of the man (where there is no Comrnon-wealth) ..."

The problem for any conception of international justice and morality is the problem of the tyranny of the private. While the idea of morality is possible in the context of domestic society, according to modem realists, only due to the presence of a coercive power, conventional morality is unintelligible in an anarchical international realm, for "[to] this warre of every man against every man, this also is consequent; that nothing cm be Unjust.

The notions of Right and Wrong, Justice and Injustice have there no place?" Steven Forde thus observes that while many realists want to maintain a distinction between international and domestic morality, the "most thoroughgoing realist maintains that ... morality is a fiaud or an illusion in al1 areas of human life.'" Thus realists cannot argue for a qualitative difference between public and private morality, but at best only a quantitative difference in terms of how much right behaviour can be enforced under each condition. One should note here neorealism's impoverished conception of morality, which equates coerced action with moral action. To neorealists this is the only kind of 'morality' possible, a rnorality of fact rather than intention, because die atomistic depiction of states deprives them of the capacity

for moral agency. On this interpretation, the dominance of private judgement means that no notion of public interest or morality is conceivable at the international level.

" Hobbes, Leviathan, Chapter 6, p. 120.

** ibid., Chapter 13, p. 188.

" Steven Forde, "Classical Realism" in Terry Nardin and David R Mapel (eds), Traditions of international Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 64. 70 This moral absence in relations between states leads realists to depict the international realm as a domain of amoral necessity. As Benjamin Frankel has observed: "There is no debate arnong realists .. . that, at a minimum, states are womed about their security and that they act vigilantly to enhance that security in an environment which offers them no clioice but to do so.'* It was in this vein that Hans Morgenthau argued, for example, that although

"lying is immoral" in individual relations, 'kwhen you are dealing in the context of foreig policy, lying is inevit~ble.'~'The dominance of necessity, fated by international conditions, absolves states of moral responsibilities, 46 just as it dissolves ordinary moral duties of individuals in society. For exarnple, one may not think that the three million children who die annually fiom diarrhoeal infection, caused by poor sanitaiion and the lack of clean drinking waterT4'deserve in any sense their impovenshed and penlous conditions; rather one thinks of heir plight as bad luck, a piece of mis fortune. One might also think that it was sheer luck to be bom in, or to have emigrated to, richer climes. Thus, we tolerate the mon1 inferiority of international to domestic conditions out of a view of its necessity rather than a belief in its justice.

The idea that justice and morality can be bounded, or excluded from certain realms of public and private life due to necessity, has a long history. The ancient Greeks, as Bernard

Williams has shown, believed that chance and necessity govemed certain types of social relations, precluding considerations of justice. Thus, being a slave was the paradigm, not of

Frankel, Roofs of Realism, p. ix, itaiics mine.

'' Hans J. Morgenthau, Humun Righ and Foreign Policy (New York: Couacil on Religion and International Affairs, 1979), p. 11 (emphasis mine).

a For a similar point, see Forde, "Classicai Reaiism," p. 63.

" This statistic was retrieved fiom a huid appeal letter by UNICEF Canada, December 1999. 7 1 injustice, but of bad luck. It is not that the Greeks denied the misery of slaves, or thought that it was just for some to be slaves. They sirnply viewed necessity and luck to "take tlze place of considerations of justice."* Yet 1 am reminded of The Mission, a film in which a papal delegate, Altimirano, rnust corne to terms with his own role in the slaughter of Guarani

Indians and European Jesuits at a mission in Paraguay that occurs in the context of eighteenth-centiiry religious and political battles between Spain and P~rtugal.'~-4 subordinate attempts to appease him, saying that the destruction was inevitable and necessary, for "'theworld is thus." The film closes with Altimirano's response: "No, thus have we made the world." Characterizing the international domain as a realrn of necessity obscures the highly normative and intersubjective nature of its construction, just as viewing slavery as an institution of'necessity hides its injustice. The idea of necessity assumes an unchanging permanence to existing noms and interests, and thus does not help us to explain or understand changes, in practice and in theory, that have occurred in Our understandings of the national interest, state sovereignty, and hurnanity, nor does it prompt us to explore how and why our interpretations may change in the funire.jO

While neorealists such as Waltz acknowledge only rnutually exclusive sources of national interest, social constructivists point to the public sources of states' identities,

interests and conduct. What realists miss in denying the public face of states is the public or social construction of their private interests. As Martha Finnemore has put it in a perceptive

Bernard Williams, Shame and Necessiy (Berkeley, California: University of CaMomia Press, 1993), p. 128.

Roland loflé, director, île Mission, Robert Bolt, screenplay (Warner Brothers. Goldcrest and Kingmere, 1986).

See also Martha Finnemore's lucid constructivist account of the use of nomto understand international politics: "a nomapproach addresses an issue obscured by approaches that treat uiterest exogenously: it focuses attention on the ways in which interests change." Marh Finnemore, "Constnicthg Norms of Humanitarian Intervention" in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed. The Culture of National Secur@: Nomand Menti& in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), p 157. study of national interests in international society, "hterests are not 'out there' waiting to be discovered; they are constnicted through social interaction.'"' The work of social constructivists in the study of international relations opens the door to a more expansive view of states ' identities, interests and motivations b y recognizing the embeddedness of states in an international web of social noms. If we accept the constructivist insight that state interests "ue sh~pedby internationally shed noms md values that structiize and give rneaning to international political life,"" then we only ignore the tools, process and purposes of that construction to the detriment of our undentanding of states and international society.

At one level Waltz seems to acknowledge the socially constmcted nature of state interests; he sides with Rousseau in asserting that the "context of action must always be

~onsidered."'~Indeed, he argues that it is precisely because states exist in a certain social context, that is, in the presence of other similarly motivated actors and in the absence of an overarching coercive power, that its stntegies for sumival are dependent on the strategies of others. What social constructivists challenge is the necessity of Waltz's particular construction of the international context, a necessity dnven primarily by fixed and partial images of private and public, of states and their interaction.

International politics will certainly remain impoverished if states and other acton at the global level corne to the public realm with only nmowly-constnied private interests, seeking only to saiisQ exclusively singular interests by any means necessary. Indeed it was

5 1 Martha Finnemore, National interesfi in International Society (Ithaca, NY: Cornefl University Press, 1996), p- 2.

Waliz, Theory of international Politics, p. 47. In his better work, Mnn, the State and War: a thearetical analysa (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), Waltz explicitly makes this point, miring, "the intemationai political environment has much to do wiîh the ways in which states behave." (p. 123.) precisely the econornic mode1 of politics that Hannah Arendt viewed as a threat to the ancient

Greek idea of public life, a quintessentially common political life that distinguished Greeks fkom barbarians, and participation in which marked the attainment of a mily human existence.'' The logic of the economic domain that Waltz employs as an analogy for the international realm accords with Arendt's category of 'society', which was a "curiously hybrid realm where privr?te hterests assume public sign~ruficanince."~' Arendt deplored the rise of the social or econornic view of humanity, and the privatized vision of politics that dominated the public realm in its wake. Her condernnation can be aptly applied to the realist depiction of an international realm dominated by pnvate interest and judgement:

[in such an instance] men have become entirely pnvate, that is, ihey have been deprived of seeing and hearing others, of being seen and being heard by them. They are al1 imprisoned in the subjectivity of their own singular experience, which does not cease to be singular if the same experience is multiplied innumerable times. The end of the comrnon world has corne when it is seen only under one aspect and is perniitted to present itself in only one per~pective.'~

Whereas realists view the public realm as a battleground for essentially private interests,

Arendt envisions the public realrn as a space devoted to the comrnon good, a realm of public concems that are qualitatively different fiom those that aise in the private realm. Whereas

Arendt "ûied hardest to renew Our access to politics as a positive gratification, a 'public happiness',"" Waltz and realists in general conceive of politics as an inherently and inescapably burdensome stmggle to maintain sumival at a minimum, and pnvate gratification and happiness at a maximum. In some ways, however, Arendt and Waltz have stnkingly

"L See Hannah Arend~The Human Condition (Chicago: University ofChicago Press, 195S), pp. 50-67.

56 ibid., p. 58, italics mine.

Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, "Justice: on relating private and public," PoIitical Theory 9,3 (198 l):327-352 at p. 334. 74 sirnila.views of the public/pnvate distinction. For both hold a dichotomous view of the construct, and both exalt images of the public, while morally debasing the pnvate. Adhering to this ethical contrast between public and private means that both miss the transformative potential generated by the mutual intercomection of private and public.

Hama Pitkin seeks to validate Arendt's conception of public life, arguing that it is only with a public life in an Arendtian sense that we have ''the possibility of a shared, collective, deliberate, active intervention in our fate, in what would othenvise be the by- product of private decisions." As opposed to the unintended and seemingly undernanding system produced by Waltz's image of international politics, this vision of public life affords us the opportunity and challenge "jointly, as a comrnunity, [to] exercise the human capacity

'to think what we are doing.'"'' Attempts to achieve a public life in this sense at the international level may be especially difficult, yet the efforts to survive in a Waltzian dog- eat-dog world would certainly be no less taxing.

Waltz and most realists deny the possibility of any sense of public interest developing between states, mainly because they deny the transformative potential afforded by a mutually interconnected view of the public/private relationship. Recognizing ihis transformative potential does not rely on a denial of self-interest as a human motivation. Rather, it relies on an image of the mutual implication of pnvate and public as opposed to their radical dichotomization and contrast. States rnay initially enter into the public international realm with self-defined needs and interests. Through interaction, or a dynamic interplay of private and public, however, states' interests and motivations rnay change even as they contribute to changing the nature of the public normative context in which they hdexpression. As Pitkin ha so eloquently put it in relation to individuals in society, Drawn into public Iife by personal need, fear, ambition or interest, we are there forced to acknowledge the power of others and appeai to their standards, even as we try to get them to acknowledge our power and standards. We are forced to find or create a common language of purposes and aspirations, not rnerely to clothe Our private outlook in public disguise, but to become aware ourselves of its public meaning. ... In the process, we leam to think about the standards themselves, about our stake in the existence of standards, of justice, of our cornmunity, even of our opponents and enernies in the cornmunity; so that aftemards we are changed?

Of course, this transfomative vision of public life only admits the possibility of developing an international 'public interest' and morality, rather than determining its inevitability or even the desirability of its actual development. The denial of the very possibility stems fkom a blindness to the agency of states to effect transformations of private interests through public interaction. It is ultimately this morally stunted view of states' privateness, rather than the

' fact' of anarchy, that fates neorealisrn to perpetuate a morally limited world. With a more expansive view of states, one that includes the public sources of their identities and interests, agency and motivation, we give nse to the possibility of a radically different vision of international politics for humankind.

It is important to note that in asserting that the pnvate nature of states makes untenable, rather than merely difficult, the creation of public or comrnon identities, interests, noms and ends, Waltz departs significantly from Hobbes, whose political philosophy offers a rigorous system of public morality, albeit one that is ultimately denved fiom the self- interests of atomistic individuals. Although Hobbes likened the realm of international politics to a state of nature, wherein "Kings, and Persons of Soveraigne authority, because of their Independency, are in continudl jealousies, and in the state and posture of Gladiators ...

" ibid., p. 344.

59 ibid, p. 347. 76 which is a posture of ~ar,'~Hobbes also afmed the possibility and efficacy of leagues of commonwealths founded on the interests of states (in peace and justice), just as commonwealths themselves are founded on the particular interests of individuals:

For a League being a connexion of men by Covenants, if there be no power given to any one Man or Assembly, (as in the condition of meer Nature) to compell them to performance, is so long onely valid, as there ariseth no just cause of distrust: and therefore Leagues between Common-wealths, over whom there is no humane Power established. to keep them al1 in awe. are not onely lawfull [because they are allowed by the cornrnonwealth], but also profitable for the time they last.''

The realist challenge that international politics is dominated by self-interested states rnay thus not be as catastrophic for international rnorality as it may seem. Indeed for Hobbes, self- interest in individual survival is precisely what leads to the creation of the Leviathan, or a moral order, between individuals. If the establishment of a world-Leviathan, or a global moral order, is not as likely between states, it is not because of the necessities imposed by anarchy, but precisely because it is unnecessary to establish such an order, since "that misery, which accompanies the Liberty of particular men'"' is rnitigated in a condition of interstate anarchy. Hobbes's conceptions of the state and its domestic sovereign authority depend on the transfomative potential between private and public. Despite his atomistic conception of individuals, his political philosophy allows us to envision the establishment of a comrnonwealth and public authonty. Waltz's political vision, blind to the mutual interconnections between public and pnvate, misses their transformative potential; hence, for

Waltz, atomistic states are fated to live in a morally barren world.

60 Hobbes, Chapter 13, pp. 187-88.

'' lbid., Chapter 22, p. 286.

62 Ibid,, Chapter 13, p. 188. 77 IV. NATIONAL INTEREST AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST

To recover a more viable interpretation of realisrn as a normative perspective, a realist rnight return to Hobbes, who based his system of public morality at the domestic level on individuals' interest in self-preservation. A Hobbesian realist might constnict rules of international morality based on the rnutual advantage of states, with national survival as the most bvic interest tlxt mmust be served by my legitirnste system of nomritive niles betwxn states. International standards of right and wrong, just and unjust, would be grounded in the self-interests of states, the main actors in world politics. The motivation to be just has to appeal to the national interest, and the international public interest cannot require states to act at the expense of their national private interest.

One normative position that flows From this characterization of international morality is that the moral duty of each state to look to its own survival constitutes a limiting factor on what the public interest cmdemand of states in the way of sacrifice. No state can have a moral obligation to act in accordance with a conception of the public interest that would require it to forfeit its own survival, or the survival of its people. Safeguarding the national interest in swival leads to a morality of prudence that eschews confrontational actions that might threaten a state's self-preservation. Given the controversial nature of interventions in the intemal affairs of other states, a morality of prudence is likely to counsel state leaders against embarking on such dangerous enterprises. Yet as David Welch has pointed out, "the survival of the state is almost never at stake in international poli tic^.'*^ Where the survival of a state is not jeopardized, it is difficult to see how prudence would constitute a determinate p~cipleto guide state policies regarding intervention. For example, even despite ill-

Welch, "Monlity and 'The National Interest'," p. 8. 78 conceived, not to mention illegitimate, interventions, such as the one in Vietnam, the United

States has not perished as a state.

Realists might use the idea of the national interest to place limits on what may be risked in terms of military losses. Thus, Kissinger draws the line at using Amencan ground forces in Koso~o.~Yet losing some soldien in a military enterprise cannot be equated with the death of the intervening state. This is not to argue that one should be morally indifferent to risking the lives of one's soldiers, but it seems misleading to equate the national interest with the safety of one's military forces, for if that were the case, it would be difficult to justiQ the use of military force for any purpose, including the maintenance of international peace and security. The rhetonc of the national interest thus obscures important normative debates about how national military forces may be legitimately and effectively employed in response to intrastate humanitarian crises and conflic ts in other co~ntries.~~

One can also understand Waltz's normative evaluation of an anarchical international system as entailing a conception of international morality based on a narrowly conceived national interest. Waltz's account of the virtues of anarchy constitutes a normative endorsement of the pursuit by states of their narrowly conceived national interests, since he argues that such conduct leads to an outcome that is favourable to states' interests in self- preservation, in particular, their independence. Sirnilarly, George Keman has argued that if states act only out of narrowly self-interested concems, they are unlikely to engage in grand impenalistic projects or interventions that threaten the independence of other political

i dlIeave aside now the practical issues that might have prevented NATO's use of ground forces in Kosovo.

65 Wekh sirnilarly observes, 'The phrase 'the national interest' masks exactiy which values leaders are attempting to promote, and which they are willing to sadce." "Morahty and 'The National interest," p. 9. 79 cornmunities." Yet the idea that a system of states acting on a narrow interpretation of national interest may yield a morally defensible or desirable international order would seem to share afinities with the harmony of interests thesis, fonvarded by nineteenth-century liberal idealists, that realists have sought to ~ntique.~'

E.H.Cm's indictment of the harmony of interests thesis is considered a classic realist critique of idealicm. His arguments, however, could be interpreted 3s a moral critique of a realist, rather than idealist, view of politics. He rightly found fault with the illusion that

"nations in serving themselves sente h~rnanity,~'~~which involved the assumption of an unproblematic harmony of the general with particular interests. He recognized cleariy that the cornrnon public interest might entai1 a sacrifice of some particular or pnvate ambitions, and that denial of this reality was "fatal to any effective conception of international rn~rality.'"~Rather than endorsing a self-interest-driven politics, he sought to expose its moral failings, for by attacking the harmony of interests thesis, he was removing the cloak that gave realist self-interest-driven politics an illusion of respectability. Seen in this light. his ethical critique is first aimed at those who pursued narrow national interests at the expense of, or with indifference to, the general interest, and second, at those who naively identified "the good of the whole international cornrnunity with the good of that part of it in

b6 See for exmple, George F. Ke~ao,"Morality and Foreign Policy," Foreign rlffairs 64 ( l985):2OS-2 18.

As Jeff Weintraub has noted, b'classical liberal economists held that in a properly structured market, the outcome of the pursuit by each private agent of his private interest would be to the public advantage, even though no individual in the market had either motive or duty to pursue it directly." See Weintraub, 'The Theory and Politics of the Publiflrivate Distinction," p. 10. Realists have consistently criticized liberal idealists For assuming such a hmony in domestic and international relations. As Waiiz put it, "Early Iibenls and utilitarians assumed an objective harmony of interests in society. The same assurnption is applied to international reIations," rnistakedy, in Waltz's view. See Waltz, Man. the State and War, p. 97.

" Edward Hailett Cm,The Twenty Years ' Crisis 1919-1939: An introduction to the Study of international Relations (New York: Harper & Row, 1946, second edîtion), p. 45.

* Ibid., p. 167. 80 which we are particularly intere~ted."'~If it were idealism that Carr was attacking, it was a rather strange brand, for the 'idealists' he attacked were not those who acted altniistically to serve humanity, forfeiting their self-interests, but those who served themselves while claiming to serve al1 of hurnankind.

Carr, unlike Waltz, does not claim that the idea of a public, general or common interest at the international level is inconceivable. His arguments actually raise the question of what might constitute the general interest at the international level, which he thought states and 'liberal idealists' wrongly neglected to the detriment of international rnorality. Although

Waltz claims that no such general interest can exist in an anarchical system, his normative arguments in favour of anarchy actually reveal a certain conception of the international public interest as consisting of two elernents: states' interests in prese~ngtheir political and territorial independence, and in maintainhg international peace or stability. It is clear fiom the preceding discussion that Waltzian realism cmprovide no coherent argument to support a normative right of states to their continued independence. Mat positive contributions can anarchy, or an atomistic international system, make to the public interest understood as the preservation of international peace and stability?

In his earlier work Waltz found in international anarchy the permissive cause of war," but in nieoty of International Politics, he also notes its potential to contribute positively to the maintenance of world peace. The condition of international anarchy, it seems, does not necessarily facilitate the scourge of hurnankind, but may be its saviour. Under the condition of anarchy, he argues, the "constant possibility that force will be used Limits manipulations, moderates demands, and serves as an incentive for the settlement of disputes. One who

'O ibid., p. 167.

'' See Waltz, Mm, the State and War. 81 knows that pressing too hard may lead to war has strong reason to consider whether possible gains are worth the nsks entailed? Of course, in a world with a considerably unequal distribution of military capabilities, the constant reliance on the threat or use of force to discipline relations between states obviously favours the more powemil, having an immoderate effect on their demands, while effectively silencing the (right and just) claims of weaker states. To Waltz. however. since states can have no clairns ofjustice or right against other states, this defect of anarchy is negligible, and the 'virtues' of anarchy in contributing to some national freedom and international stability stand.

Waltz does acknowledge the inequalities in power between states, but again makes it a public virtue for its contribution to international peace and stability. in his discussion of

"the virtues of inequality" '' he thus retracts his previous enthusiasm for the virtues of anarchy, for here he concedes that too much anarchy, or equal freedom, in the form of a large nurnber of states al1 fairly equal in power and thus equally capable of making credible threats to use force, would actually lead to instability. This is why Waltz, in the end, only endorses asyrnetncal anarchy, in the form of a bipolar international system. In doing so, however, his argument loses the entire normative appeal that he exploited in discussing the virtues of anarchy, which lies in its implication of equal freedom.

Waltz's arguments in praise of anarchy's contribution to the international public interest, understood as peace between states, are clearly flawed, yet it is difficult to reject the realist preoccupation with international peace and security as an integral cornponent of that interest. Realists typically charactenze war between states as the greatest evil. Always

" Waitz, neory of internationul Politics, p. 113-4.

ïbid., pp. 13 1-2. 82 rnindful of the potentially devastating costs of war on human life and society, realists would rather states keep to themselves than embark on external actions, however noble the reasons, that might jeopardize the security of al1 states and citizens." Even if we accepf this realist account of the international public interest as peace between states, however, it is unclear

how that is related to the security and welfare of individual human beings. Contemporary realism tends to assume a positive connection between intentate and human security. Yet

Rudolf Rummel has found that 150 million people have been killed by their own governments, compared to 35 million killed in al1 civil and international wars of the

twentieth century." Geoffiey Best may be nght that "even a bloody government can be

better than no government,"'6 but for millions ofperished men and women, this has not been

the case. The realist assertion that an international order of atomistic states, concemed solely

with their own self-interests, makes a positive contribution to the public interest in human

security is difficult to sustain. Without a positive connection between interstate and human

security, a realist conceptualization of the international public interest as peace between states

seems morally inadequate.

For Hobbes, the preservation of the state and the maintenance of individual lives are

inextricably linked. The state exists for the protection of individuals' physical integrity; a

state that no longer serves this interest for an individual is owed no obligations by that

individual. Even Kissinger seems to appreciate an interpretation of the public interest based

AS Waltz observes, 'mat in war there is no victory but only varying degrees of defeat is a proposition that has gained increasing acceptance in the twentieth century." See Man, the State and War, p. 1.

'' Cited in Pierre Hassner, "Frorn war and peace to violence and intervention" in Jonathan Moore ed. Hard Choices: Moral Dilemmas in Humanitarian Intemention (New York: Rowman & Littie field Publishers, 1 998), p. 19.

'' Geofiey Best, "Justice, international relations and human rights," International Afluirs 7 I,4 ( 1995):775- 799 at 778. 8 3 on human rather than statist terms; for example, he supported the Dayton agreement to end the Bosnian war, endorshg the justification of "easing human s~ffering."~~Yet realism's state-centric view of international relations tends to discount the voices, interests and claims of non-state entities, be they individuals or groups. This ineans that whatever disasters people must suffer in one state, and no matter the degree of responsibility for that disaster by the rulins body or govemment or other intemal factors, a realist perspective can give little weight in principle to humanitarian considerations in the calculation of how other states should constnict their foreign policies towards that state and its govemment. Indeed, it is hard to see how a realism concemed to legitimize states' preoccupations with a narrowly interpreted national interest can endone a goal such as alleviating the suffering of citizens in other countries.

It is tnie that some have frarned arguments in favour of recent 'humanitarian interventions' in terrns that appeal to the national interest. For example, Robert Kaplan argued that the United States should intervene in Kosovo for a variety of self-interested reasons, including to avoid a larger, more catastrophic war in the region Iater, to protect the

Middle East oil supply, to maintain a close comection with European allies, and to improve the skills, experience and solidarity of NATO and Amencan military forces." Yet if the concept of the national interest is so elastic as to be able to explain and justi@ a wide spectnim of state conduct and poiicy prescriptions, fiom why states should intervene to why they should not, fiom why they fight to why they cooperate, it is hardly a useful, sufficient, or meaningfil concept for explainhg or justimg any state conduct. Thus when Morgenthau asserts that al1 countries '%ll continue to be guided in their decisions to intervene and their

Kissinger, "No US. Ground Forces for Kosovo."

See Robert A. Kaplan, "Why the Balkans Demand Amorality," The Washington Post, Wb. 28,1999, B2. 54 choice of means of intervention by what they regard as their respective national interests,"" the indisputability of his staternent is outweighed by its ûiviality, for he merely begs the question of how states ought to conceive of their national interests. In this vein, Welch has argued that the concept of the national interest is pemicious and superflu ou^.^^ The idea of the national interest may be usefbl for its rhetoncal appeal, and may serve to promote a s~bstantiveconception of international morality, but it cannot geneerate a morally compelling account of the public interest in international relations on its own; it can serve as a pretty

Frame, but not as a morally substantive picture of international morality.

V. CONCLUSION

A realist ethical perspective, as articulated by contemporary realists, generates a series of contradictions. Although realists assume a stark dichotomy behveen pnvate (national) interest and public {international) interest in international relations, they cm offer no viable way to distinguish between them. Although the privateness of the state dominates a realist vision of world politics, contemporary realism is incapable of sustaining any normative conception of state sovereignty as pnvacy, upon which a consistent normative argument for or against intervention would depend. Although realist objections to intervention, humanitarian or otherwise, stem fiom the fear of legitimizing impenalistic interventions by powerful states, realists can offer no coherent principled argument to oppose them. Given these inconsistencies, it is difficult to Luid a coherent and compelling realist account of intervention as a moral problem in world poiitics.

Morgenthau, 'To Intervene or Not to intemene," p. 430.

Welch, "Moraiity and 'The Nationai interest'," pp. 8-9. 85 A realist interpretation of the national interest is clearly misguided, confushg and morally insubstantial. Despite this, what can explain the enduring normative appeal of the idea of the national interest? A realist rnight think that it confims a realist image of individuais, including state leaders, as atomistically self-interested actors. Because of this,

"Tens of thousands of words and a shelf of books .. . about our moral interest .. , do not add iip to one sentence of national interest."" Yet this realist explanation of the power of the concept may ultimately be misguided, for the normative appeal of the national interest may lie beyond the scope of a realist perspective. As Welch has observed, the idea of the national interest has historically been wedded to notions of the public interest of a bounded political community; it denotes "a common good, sornething that benefits a collectivity as a whole even though it might not benefit any particular mernber."g2The power of the national interest as an idea stems from its status as a moral interest, rather than as an amoral interest. The evaluation of the national interest as a moral interest relies on an organic interpretation of the relevant political cornmunity for its rhetorical and normative appeal, rather than the atomistic interpretation offered by contemporary realists. Such an organic account and its implications for intervention as a moral problem are more fully explicated by a study of the next perspective in question, cornmunitarianism.

-- SI Kaplan, 'Why the Balkans Dernand Amorality."

" Welch, "Moraiity and 'The National Intnest'," p. 7. Only domastic tyranîs arc sak, for ii is not our purpose in international society (nor, Mill argues, is it possible) to establish liberal or democratic cornrnunities, but only independent ones.

Michael Walzer'

The domestic life of domestic tyrants is one of the things which it

is the most imperative on the law to interfere with.

John Stuart Mill'

MichaeI Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: a moral argument with historical illustrations (United States: Basic Books, 1992, second edition).

John Stuart MIU, Principles of Political Economy [and Chapters on Socialid (Oxford: Odord University Press, 1994). Chapter 3.

Sovereignty as privacy

1. INTRODUCTION

Realists see states as atomistic actors fated to CO-existin a domain of amoral necessity or moral egoism, with little scope for intemal or extemal moral agency, aspirations or accountability. While the tyranny of the private state constitutes the fundamental problem of international morality from a realist perspective, communit~anismis concemed to attribute positive moral value to the state's privateness vis-à-vis international society. Statist cornmunitarians, or international society theorists, generally seek to endoae an international order resting on the principles of state sovereignty and nonintervention in a state's domestic affairs. Such communitarianism has enjoyed prominence in classical international law and the rules of international sociability between states. Non-statist communitarians also want to defend the internal and external autonomy of cornrnunities, but typicaily make a distinction between states and nations, and expand their concem beyond intemationally recognized states to include the self-determination claims of sub-state national groups. Common to both statist and non-statist communitarians is the concem to advance a distinction between the internal and the extemal life of a state or, more broadly, nation or political comrnunity.

This distinction undergirds a central freedom that states may claim in international society - their freedom fiom extemal intrusion into their domestic affairs. Because international society and law accord positive moral value to this kind of fieedorn,

'intervention' is a term "hught with connotations of illegality and i~nmorality."~Hedley

' Lori Fider Damrosch, "Politics Across Borders: Nonintervention and nonforcible infIuence over domestic affairs" The Amerimn Journal of intemational Law VoI. 83 (1989):l-50 at p. 12. 88 Bull has asserted that intervention, or "dictatorial or coercive interference, by an outside party or parties, in the sphere ofjurisdiction of a sovereign state, or more broadly of an independent political community ... is generaily believed to be legally and rnorally wrong: sovereign states or independent political communities are thoupht to have the right to have their spheres of jurisdiction respected, and dictatorial interference abndges that right.'" The publiciprivate construct in intemaiionai relations serves to demarcatr a distinction Detwren the public and pnvate lives of states or, more generally, political communities, a central purpose of which is to afford states and their citizens an arena of freedom from extemal interference.

The nom of sovereignty functions like the idea of pnvacy to shield the intemal or self-regarding domain of the relevant unit from non-consensual extemal intrusion. Michael

Walzer's interpretation of communal integrity and freedom is also suggestive of a cornparison between sovereignty and pnvacy. In his discussion of the Melian dialogue, for example, Walzer characterizes the Melian argument against the irnpenalist Athenian generals as a moral claim for the "right to be let al~ne."~This choice of words echoes the depiction of pnvacy by US. Supreme Court Justices Warren and Brandeis in 1890 as ''the right to be lefi alone? Anita Allen has characterized pnvacy as denoting limited accessibility or inaccessibility, as well as freedom from coercive outside interference.' The notion of

Hedley Buii ed., Intervention in Wortd Politics (Odord: CIarendon Press, l986), pp. 1-2.

Walzer, Jusr and Unjust Wars, p. 5.

Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, 'The Right to Privacy" (189O), reprinted in Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy: An Anthology Ferdinand David Schoem ed. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1984), Chapter 4.

7 Anita Allen, UneqAccess= Privacyfor Women in a Free Sociev (Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1988). 89 sovereignty shares with the idea of privacy these characteristics of restricted accessibility, and freedom from unsolicited extemal intervention. How does a cornmunitarian perspective understand the normative basis or justification for state privacy in international society? That is, what is state privacy good for? Any justification of state privacy ultimately must rest on a normative theory of statehood, just as any notion of individual privacy relies on a moral thcory of pcrsonhood. Cornmunitanan assessmmts of intcrvzntion as ii moral problrm in world politics thus tum on their visions of political cornmunity.

II. THE STATE AS A PMVATE HOME

While the depiction of sovereignty as privacy implies an analogy between the state and the individual, one can think of another collective unit - the farnily - that has enjoyed a similar moral claim to privacy. International relations theorists have tended to leave unexamined a more cornpelling and pervasive domestic analogy, between the family and the state. hdeed, familial ternis and syrnbols abound in the domain of the political, national and international. It is common in some parts of the world for people to refer to their native country as the 'motherland' or 'fatherland,'; the founders of republics as 'fathen'; and fellow citizens, revolutionaries andor ethnic compatriots as 'brothers' and 'sisters'. Historically, colonialists have likened indigenous peoples to children who needed the paternal guidance of colonial masten to direct their entry into civilization. Likening political communities to farnily homes draws on elusive concepts that seem to convey a bundle of unspecified but intuitively understood meanings. What exactly does the use of the language of home and family life convey about the idea of political community? 90 One function of the metaphor is to capture the exclusive and private nature of political cornrnunities. If "being in a private place is a central part of what it means to be 'at home',"' it is also a central, if neglected, feature of the sovereign state. Contemporary western societies typically envision the home as "a secure space where a person is not answerable to outsiders ..., captureci in the characterisation of the home as a 'castIe'." A home of one's own is "valud iis a place in wliicli the nitnibers of a fmily çai lire in private, üway Erom the scmtiny of others, and exercise control over outsiders' involvement in domestic affairs.'"

International relations scholars might recognize in this depiction of a private farnily home the prevailing image of the sovereign state. As collective units the state and the farnily share a similar conceptual history as 'private spheres,' with rights to privacy understood in terms of communal integrity and freedorn fiom external interference.'' Arguments about intervention in international relations thus share normative affinities with debates in western liberal societies about public intervention in the family.

While comparing the fmily and the state in this way seems obvious, the comparison is also perplexing, because in domestic politics and theory, and especially in liberal theory, the state is known as the quintessentially public actor or realm, while the farnily is cast as the paradigrnatically private sphere. The image of the state as a public actor has been adopted

Graham Allan and Grahrrm Crow, Home and Fanr ily: Creating the Domesrie Sphere (London: MacMillan Press Ltd., 1989), p. 4.

Ibid., pp. 6 and 4.

'O Of course, explorhg this analogy does not involve any attempt to equate or identiQ political relations with personal familial relations. Gordon Schochet help Mycemincis us of the difference be tween an identification and an andogous comparison: "an identification requires a total tramference of rneaning fiom one entity to the institution for waich it is being used as a symbol. A comparison or sirnile, on the other han& Ieaves open the questions of the ways in which the two entities or institutions are aiike and different. It alIows, and even invites, debate about how weU and how much a particular symbolic explmation fits." See Gordon J. Schochet, Patriarchalim in Political nought: The Authoritan Family and Political Specrrlation and Attitudes Especially in Seventeenth-Century England (Great Britain: Basil Blackwell, 1979, p. 146. 91 seemingly unproblernatically in the international realrn. The family/state analogy exposes a different face of the state. As Hilary Charlesworth has noted, the state conceived as a private sphere appears in a distinction drawn in the realm of public international law, found in

Article 2(7) of the Charter of the United Nations, which distinguishes between matters of international (public) concern and issues belonging to a national or domestic (and private) jurisdiction: *-Nothhgcontained in the present Charter shali authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction ofany states or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter.""

While the state, in relation to its own citizens and society, may comprise the public realm, an emblem of the universal, in relation to other states and international society, it constitutes a private realm, a repository of al1 that is particular to its members.

The family/state malogy has enjoyed prominence in the historical development of the concept of the state and its sovereignty. Wnting in the sixteenth century Jean 3odin asserted,

"the well-ordered family is a tme image of the commonwealth, and domestic comparable with sovereign authority."" Both families and states involve an authonty structure which

imposes distinct rîghts and obligations on its members that non-members do not share. The historical and philosophical developrnent of the state and sovereign authority in the West owes much to the models provided by the family and parental authority. Explonng this historical connection between conceptions of the political authority of sovereigns and mainly patemal authority in the household cm provide insight into the conventional interpretation of

statehood and sovereign authority.

" Quoted in Hilary Chariesworth, "Wodds Apart: Public/Pnvate Distùlctions in IntemationaI Law" in Public and Priiate: Feminist Legal Debares Margaret Thornton ed. (Australia: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 244.

" Jean Bodin, Sir Books of the Commonwealth M.I. Tooley ûans. (Oxford: Basil Blackweil, 1955). p. 6. 92 Perhaps the most well-hown articulation of paternal political thought can be found in

Robert Filmer's Patriarcha. written tellingly at a time and in a society where the patnarchal image of political authority was coming under increasing attack. Filmer's work represents an entire tradition of political thought that denved political obligation frorn a conception of familial obligation." Identifying political power with paiernal power, Filmer argued that "al1 the duties oia King are summed up in an universal Fatheriy care of his people."!' As Gordon

Schochet has noted in his study of patriarchal political thought in seventeenth century

England, "the simple requirement to 'Honour thy father and thy mother' was expanded to include Loyalty and obedience to the king and al1 magistrates, as well as to masters, teachers, and ministerç."" Kings were the metaphoncal fathers of their subjects; the nature of public political power and authority, and private patemal power and authority were inextncably linked.

Filmer believed that al1 human relationships were subject to the law of God, which ultimately and alone pmvided the original bais for the legitimacy of both monarchical and patemal rule. Thus Filmer assumed that fathers and kings were bound by the Iaw of God and nature to seek the preservation of their families or kingdoms. Clearly, Filmer's moral image of God informed his idealized conceptions of earthly political and persona1 rule. In arguing

"for the s~penorityof Princes above laws," he placed any hopes for remedies against the abuse of royal authority in the realm of the divine. Similarly, he put the subject of how a

IJ See Schochet, Patriarchalism in Political Thought, for an in-depth treatment of the history, development and main themes of patriarchaI conceptions of political obiigation.

" Robert Filmer, Pan-iarcha: A Defince of the Narural Power of Kings against the Unnaturai Libeny of the People in fatriarcha and Other Political Works of Sir Robert Filmer Petet Laslett ed. (Oxford: Basil BIackweU, 1949), p. 63. l5 Schochet, Pnrriorchalism in Political Tiiought. p. 6. 93 patriarch managed relations within his own household beyond the scope of political regulation: "The Father of a family governs by no other law than by his own will, not by the laws or wills of his sons or servants. There is no nation that allows children any action or remedy for being unjustly g~verned."'~Bodin also conceived of patemal authority in absolutist terms: not only should each household have only "one head, one master, one seigneur," but parents sliould also bave ''thai powzr of life and deah over their children which belongs to them under the law of God and of nature."" Neither Filmer nor Bodin conceived of families or States to be private in a morally atomistic sense, since both were ultimately bound by the law of God. Yet their theories of patemal rule clearly entailed a public authority structure that refrained f?om interfenng within the private domain of the patnarchal household. Similady, Bodin's theory of sovereign rule also entailed international

forbearance fkom interfenng in the private domain of a sovereign prince.

Contemporary western liberal societies continue to consider the realm of the family as a paradigmatically private sphere: "Family life has been singled out in the modem world as that realm in which the particular concems, interests and needs of individuals are dominant and fiom which political and other public matters are largely excluded. The family has often

been conceived as a pnvate refuge ftom the exacting demands of civil society and the res pz~blicn."'gThe farnily constitutes a "haven in a heartless ~orld,"'~a primary source of

'' Bodin, Sir Books of the Commonwealth. pp. 10 and 12. Bodin notes criticaiiy 'Lhat the patemal power of life and death was graduaiiy restricted by the ambition of the magistrates, who wished to extend their onm juriçdiction over ail such matters." (p. 13)

'' Stanley 1. Benn and Gedd F. Gaus, 'The Liberai Conception of the Public and the Frivate, in Public and Private in Social Life (London, Croom Heim, 1983), p. 54

l9 Christopher Lasch, Haven in n HenrtIess World: The Family Besieged (New York: Basic Books, hc., 1977). 94 personal and collective identity and lklfillment, and home is "the only setthg where intimacy cm flourish, providing meaning, coherence, and stability in persona1 life."" The moral evaluation of the Family and home as deserving of the statu of a 'pnvate sphere' relies on an ideal image of the domestic realm as a source of protection for individuals from the often harsh and cold dealings of the outside world. Familial relationships, under this view, contrast witli iliose found in &lieworld of commerce ÿnd poliiics; whik the bond bstween hily members develops out of love, mutual affection and natural empathy, relationships between individuals in society are marked at best, by the cold virtue of justice, mutual disinterest and cooperation, and at worst, by domination and exploitation, mutual distrust and conflict.

Bodin's advocacy of an absolutist conception of parental power and authonty within the household clearly relies on an idealization of family and home life, for he held "that the natural affection of parents for their children is incompatible with cmelty and abuse of power.'"l The home, ideally conceived, merits noninterference because it is the harbour for social relationships that are qualitatively different fiorn those that can be attained in the wider public context. Because familial relations are typically guided by positive mutual care and concem, their qualitative superiority renden public regulation and interference in the farnily home unnecessary and undesirable.

Communal membership and belonging

Somewhat ironically, these positive images and functions amibuted to the pnvate familial comrnunity also inform cornmunitarian interpretations of public national and

'O Elizabeth Pleck, Domertic Tyranny: The Making of Social Policy Againsr Family Yiotencefiom Colonial Thes to the Present (New York: Oxford University Press, 19871, p. 8. Pleck's book challenges this ideal Mage of family Me.

'' Bodin, Si.Booh of the Commonwealth, p. 14. 95 political communities. As Krishan Kumar has observed, one's country, "when conceived as the homeland, is explicitly modeled on an idealized version of the private realrn of the household or family."" Hilary Pilhgton observes that the persistence of the ideal of

'homeland' in contemporary political discourse suggests "that an important element of the modern world outlook is the linking of individual identity to a tenitorially bounded collective irlentiiy via u pzrceiveil bioloyical comzctedness."" The concept or the 'nation-stare' nas historically evoked an image of the state as a private home that houses a nation resembling a traditional family. The Ianguage of family and home in depictions of political community serves to convey a sense of connectedness between members that non-members do not share.

Identibng the source of that connection in a set of objective features is characteristic of primordial notions of national identity. Such conceptions, however, tend to naturalize the nation, obscunng its deeply contested and political nature.

A primordial nationalist discourse, for example, assumes an automatic connection between memben of the Russian nation or people, yet the reality and significance of this connection, and hence of a primordial notion of Russian national identity, have been severely challenged following the demise of the Soviet Union. For ethnic Russians who lived in some of the former Soviet republics other than Russia, retuming to their 'national homeland' has been "an experience fiaught with confrontation and contestation rather than a smooth journey

" Knahan Kurnar, "Home: the promise and predicament of private Iife at the end of the twentieth cenniry" in Public and Private in Thought and Practice: Perspectives on a Grand Dîchotomy, Jeff Alan Weintnub and &khan Kumar eds. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), p. 208.

Hiiary Pikington, "Going Home? The implications of Forced Migration for Nationai Identity Fomiation in post-Soviet Russia" in The New Migration in Europe: socinl consmctions and social realirrés, Khalid Koser and Helma Lutz eds. @iew York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), p. 88. See S. Grosby, "Territoriality: The Transcendental, bordidFeature of Modem Societies. " Nations and Nationalism 1,2 (1995):143-162. 96 'h~rne.'"'~ Indeed, many Russians who became forced migrants due to the political prevalence of primordial notions of national identity and citizenship in sorne Soviet successor states retumed to Russia feeling more like foreigners entering a hostile land than compatriots going home." Not only did they identify more with the republics that denied their claims to membership and belonging, but they also felt a disconnection with the local Russians in

Russia. As Pikington has Wuid, ethnically Russian migrants "tlaiméd iliat ih~ywere labelled as outsiders by locals [in Russia] who referred to them as: 'newcomers' or

'strangers'. .., 'immigrants' .. . , 'refugees' or, according to the republic from which they came, 'Kazakhs', 'Kirghiz', and so on." The senses of national identity put forward by

Russian-speaking retumees and locals in Russia thus challenge a primordial conception of the nation "as 'a homogeneous cultural unit' formed on a cornrnon temtory and linked by blood ties."I6

Yael Tarnir has concluded more generally that "al1 attempts to single out a particular set of objective features - be it a cornrnon history, collective destiny, language, religion, territory, clirnate, race, ethnicity - as necessary and sufficient for the definition of a nation have ended in ~ailure."~Similarly, as contemporary debates about the hnily show, the definition of the family - including the issue of who can claim to be a member, as well as the types of social groupings that can cal1 themselves families - has always been political, and

'' Pikgton, "Going Home," p. 97.

See Lowe11 Barrington, 'The Domestic and International Coasequences of Citizenship in the Soviet Successor States," Ezirope Asia Sriinies 47,s (1995):73 1-763. Barrington examines the political implications of citizenship policies in the successor states. For example, "In Estonia and Latvia, citizenship has been very dificult for the mrijonty of Russian-speakers to receive. The Russian citizenship policy, however, is very inclusive, allowing permanent residenîs of the former Soviet Union to becorne Russian citizens with littie effort. Thus, the policies have increased the 'Russianness' of ethnic Russians in Estonia and Latvia" (p. 73 1.)

'6 Pilkington, "Going Home," pp. 95 and 102.

' Yael Tamir, Liberal Nafionalh (Princeton, N.J.: Rinceton University Press, 1993), p. 65. 97 contested. Histoncally in many societies, public laws and social mores prevented children bom out of wedlock nom the nght of family membership, not to mention its pnvileges, despite their biological tie. The contemporary world of blended families and saine-sex couples and parents challenges the use of biology or nature as a sufficient or necessary criterion for defining the family. An enlightened cornmunitarian perspective thus, rightly, nioves the çoiicrpt of comniuiity, hiliai and nalionai, hmthe ralm of objrctivity to subjectivity.

Yet while cornunitarians want to avoid primordial notions of national or political community, they are at the same time reluctant to embrace constnictivist accounts. The latter, in inspiring a view of nations and states as "imagined communitie~,"'~might imply the existence of pre-social individuals who imagine and construct the community, rather than the existence of an ontologically prior social context that shapes its members' imaginations of comrnunity. Indeed, contemporary communitarianism developed as a response to a prevailing strand of liberalism that exalted an atomistic account of individual identity and agency at the expense of notions of collective identity, solidarity and belonging.

Cornmunitarians seek to challenge the thin instrumental notion of political comrnunity generated by an atomistic account of individuals as disembedded selves, capable of being divorced £?omal1 social roles and attachrnent~.~Although cornmunitarians want to avoid

" Benedict Anderson, Imgined Communitia: refecrions on the origin and spread of nutionalism (London: Verso, t 99 1, revised edition).

" See, for example, Michael Sandei, Liberalkm and the Limih of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982). He ako uses the family as an ideal mode1 of community to which political communities shoutd aspire: "In a more or less ideal family situation, where relations are governed in large part by spontaneous affection ... individual rights and fair decision procedum are seldom invoked, not because injustice is rampant but because their appeal is pre-empted by a spirit of generosity in which 1am rarely inclined to daim my fair share." (p. 33) For a summary and critique of cornmunitarian objections to individual privacy rights, see Jean L. Cohen, "Rethinking Privacy: Autonomy, Identity, and the Abortion Controversy" in Weintraub and Kumar, Public And Private In Thought And Practice. pp. 146-1 50, 95 conceiving of families, nations or states as 'natural' communities (which they clearly are not), in also wanting to reject their depiction as 'imagined' communities (which too easily makes them derivative of individual imaginations, and possibly imaginary), cornmunitarians seek to put forward a view of social groups as intersubjectively felt communities, collective imaginings with weight. A cornrnunity may not be as tangible as an individual biological organism, ydit is not as intangible as a mentai fiction; rather, a communiry has a presence, personality and life of its own, that is irreducible to its individual members.

A cornmunitarian conception of a farnily or a nation is thus marked by the organic quality of the relationship between its members; that is, the members of an authentic fmily or nation must adopt a view of themselves as parts of a greater whole. Alasdair Macintyre has described this orientation as distinctive of a morality of patriotism: "For precisely the same reasons that a family whose members al1 came to regard membership in rhat farnily as governed only by reciprocal self-interest would no longer be a family in the traditional sense, so a nation whose members took up a similar attitude would no longer be a nati~n."'~The public, in an organic communitarian sense, cannot be just an arbitrary aggregation of individuals, but must be composed of individuals who identiQ themselves as members loyal to a collective project called the 'nation' or the 'political community.' This shared sense of identification and belonging is intrinsic to a communitarian conception of community, so that the authenticity of a collective without this comrnon consciousness becomes suspect.

Although Yael Tamir hdsthe notion of national authenticity highly pr~blematic,~'she too

'O Alasdair Machtyre, "1s Patriotism a Virtue?" in neorking Citkmhip, Ronald Beiner ed. (Albany, New York: State University of New York, 1995), pp. 209-228 at p. 225. " Tamir, Liberal Nationalistn, pp. 48-53. 99 asserts that a nation is defined by "connectedness, the belief that we al1 belong to a group whose existence we consider ~aluable."~"

Cornmunitarians tend to attribute intrinsic moral worth to having a community of one's own, the preservation of which justifies special obligations between members, and requires respect for communal integrity and autonomy by non-members." These claims require an image of communities with ciear boundaries, something which, in cornmunitarian philosophy, is provided by the concept of connectedness. Yet while connectedness might very well provide the basis for an intersubjective collective reality, it is not likely to be capable of supporting an image of cornmunity that could be the bais of a collective moral nght to nonintervention. For as the Russian exampie shows, the feeling of connectedness in reality is likely to be subjected to continual contestation, problematizing the very boundary between insiden and outsiders that defines the distinctiveness of nations and upon which claims to collective self-detennination and nonintervention depend.

Even leaving aside the highly problematic nature of the concepts of connectedness, home and belonging in individual lives and collective imaginations, the intrinsic moral value of having a cornmunity of one's own is also debatable. Such an argument does allow us to reject on moral grounds impenalistic and paternalistic political and social arrangements between communities, and to affirm normative rights of cultural groups to self-determination and nonintervention. Concems about hnperialism, patemalism and self-determination are not just cornmunitarian concerns, but also inform much of liberal thinking. Theorists such as

'' Ibid., p. 98. Seton-Watson ais0 defines a nation as "a community of people, whose members are bound together by a sense of soiidarity, a cornmon culture, a national consciousness." H. Seton-Watson, Nations and States (London: Methuen, 1977), p. 1.

" See Simon Caney, "lndividuais, Nations and Obligations," in National Righrs. International Obligatiom, Simon Caney, David George, and Peter Jones, eds. (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1996), pp. 1 19-138, for a perceptive analysis and critique of intrinsic defences of speciai obligations towards one's feUow nationals. 1O0 Yael Tarnir and Michael Waizer have attempted to fuse cornmunitarian and liberal theoretical approaches by arguing that membership in a community one can call one's own is ultimately an expression of individual agency, autonomy and self-fulfillment. Yet there is a difference between the idea of membership in a comrnunity one can call one's own, and membership in a community one has chosen. Individuals belong to many comrnunities that undeniably are thcir om, but arc not self-chosen. As Judith Stiklar has noted, 44\'ery ofien we bave no choice at al1 whether we belong to a group or not. .. . Now you have a choice to be either loyal or disloyal to these groups, but you do not have the choice of being ~~either."~'One's fmily, racial or ethnic group, may be indisputably one's own, but rnembership and belonging in these cornrnunities clearly do not entail individual agency. Nor does membership in them necessady contribute to individual self-fulfillment. A person who is a member of an abusive lamily or relationship, or a nation responsible for mass atrocities, For example, may undeniably belong to the farnily or nation, yet that belonging cm be a source of pain and low sel f-esteem nther than self- fulfillment.'5

Tamir's concem for individual agency leads her to attach moral value only to self- chosen communities. Thus she argues that "the right to national self-determination should be seen as an individual right, contingent on a willed decision of individuals to affiliate themselves with a particular national group and to give public expression to this affiliation."

Yet if national affiliation and identity are solely self-chosen by individuals, there rnay be many more conceptions of comrnunity in individual imaginations than currently exist in the world, or are dreamt of in a cornmunitarian vision of nationhood and nationality. The

'' Judith N. Shklar, "ObIigation, Loyalty, Exile," Politicnl Tlremy 21,2 (1993): 18 1-197 at p. 185.

" Even more problematic, individuais may feel positively fultilled through nich memberships, yet their sense of fientmay have no moral value. See Caney, "Individuais, Nations and Obligations." 10 1 limitations of that vision are evident in Tamir's critique of exclusionary citizenship laws in some Soviet successor states. She argues, "Estonia and Latvia must face the fact that the injustices inflicted on them have turned them into binational states, and there is no way of tuming the dock ba~k."'~The idea of 'binational states,' however, does not capture the

"cultural hybndity of Russian-speaking forced migrants,"37 which indicates a blended rather than dual national identity. Wilc cornmunitarians tend to ernpliasize tliitt çonuiiunitizs suçh as nations are not reducible to their individual members, one who takes seriously individuals' capacity for self-direction would be attuned to the reality that individuals are not likely to be reducible to one conception of community, such as a nation. As Shklar has argued, individual "righrs create a culture that is a threat to the clubby life of traditional groups. It allows us to move about as we please, socially, intellectually, geographically, and personally.

And one cannot have it both ~ays."'~The complex reality of individuals and nations means that the categories of memben and non-members, which are essential to notions of collective self-determination and nonintervention, are more problematic in moral and practical ways than a comrnunit~anview might suggest.

Since cornmunitarians, including 'international society' theorists, tend to simpliQ and idealize communal membership and belonging at individual and collective Ievels, they argue that the balance of the public and private lives of political communities in international society must include the cornmon recognition of their normative nght to self-determination and nonintervention in their intemal affairs. An ideal cornmunitarian image of world order

" Tamir, Liberal Nationalim, pp. 73 and 159.

J7 Pilkington, "Going Home," p. 102.

" Judith N. Shklar, 'The Work of Michael Walzer" in Political Thought and Political Thinkers, S tdey Hoffmann ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), p. 384. L 02 consists of a plurality of communities, organically understood, that recognizes reciprocal claims between themselves to self-determination and nonintervention in their domestic arrangements. States, rather than cultural nations, are currently the subject of these rights and duties, not only in the public arena of formal international law, but also in the informa1 public domain of international relations. This latter public realrn cm be understood as "a sphere of

nuid and p~iyiii~ipii~~~soçiability."'" As Jaff Wrintraub explains, Ihe Function of the public as sociability "is not so much to express or generate solidarity as, ideally, to 'rnake diversity agreeable' - or, at lest, manageable.'"

International society attempts to manage great political, social and economic diversity not only through universal law, but also through more localized codes and conventions that define the virtue of international civility. Although these codes Vary, the prevailing terms of

international sociability inciude the provision that a state's intemal affairs are shielded from scmtiny and intervention by other states.'' For example, the Canadian government does not

expect the United States government to make any official observations or statements about

how it is responding to Quebec sovereigntist demands for secession. The prevailing wisdom

39 leff Weinaub, ''The Theory and Politics of the PublicRrivate Distinction," in Weintraub and Kumar, Public And Private In Thoughf And Pracrice. p. 7.

* ibid., pp. 17- 18.

" Amcle 18 of the Charter of the ûrgnnization of American States reads as follows: "No State or gmup of States has the right to intemene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the interna1 or extemal affairs of any other State, The foregoing principle prohiiits not only armed force but also any other form of interference or atternpted threat against the personaiity of the State or aga& its political, economic and cultural elements." Sirnilar articles can be found in the Charters of the League of Arab States, and the Organization of Afncan Unity. In controst, States involved in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe "have 'categorïcally and irrevocably' declared that hurnan cights questions are maners of direct and legitunate concem to all pdcipating mes and do not belong to the interna1 &airs of the state concerned." See Me~oT. Kamminga, Inter-State Accountability for Violarions of Hurnan Rights (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992)' p. 78 and pp. 193-194. 1O3 in international society is that "Good fences make good neighbor~.'"~Sovereignty as privacy in domestic and international legal and social institutional arrangements thus functions to project, on the one hand, a vision of the pnvate national reah as an autonomous and distinct collective reality, and, on the other, a vision of the international public realm as one of tolerant communal diversity.

The dark side of family and state privacy

In recent decades the designation of the realm of domesticity as a pnvate sphere has been deeply contested, most prominently by feminists, who point to the double-edged nature of family privacy, which "cm signiQ deprivation as well as advantage? While the nom of privacy has aspired to protect farnily relations from conformist public pressures and totalitarian public policies, the designation has also had the effect of rendenng the domestic realm non-political, unworthy of public attention and regdation. One issue that has made the privacy of the family morally problematic, and brought public intervention in the family to the fore of social policy agendas in western countries, is domestic violence. The conventionally organic images of the family and home life make it difficult to conceive of family homes as dangerous situations thernselves from which individuals may need protection. Families may be places where people develop and maintain their most intense

'' Robert Frost, "Mending Waii," in ne Poetry of Robert Frosr. Edward Connery Lathern ed. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969). Frost's poem recounts a the every spring when he and a ncighbour go to work together repairing a Stone walI that sepamtes their property. The neighbour states this proverb to account for their good relations, but the poem intends us to understand this advice in an ironical sense, since Frost leads us to believe that they are good neighbours not because the fence is maintained but because they share an activity together in rnaintaining it,

'' Aiian and Crow, Horne and Family: Creating the Domestic Sphere, p. 5. bonds of intimacy and community with others, yet research shows that "more than anywhere else in society, the family is the site of murder, child abuse and assault.'"

Feminist scholars have critiqued the construction of families as private spheres for its effect has been to hide some of the most depraved acts of inhumanity and injustice From public view: "by classimng institutions like the family as 'private' .. . the publidprivate distinction often serxs to shield abuse and domination within these relationships fian political scrutiny or legal redres~.'"~The invisibility accorded intemal family relations by the legal and social rights of families to privacy has historically translated into an immunity From public moral standards and accountability. Judith DeCew notes, for example, that the old rape shield laws in the United States deprived women of the legal ability to charge their husbands with rape, since mariage was assumed to confer consensual sex automatically between husband and wife? Feminists who recognized the disproportionately adverse impact of this invisibility on women have thus been united in critiquing conceptions of family pnvacy which support the exclusion of family issues, especially those relating to women's oppression, From the political agenda.'"

Quoted in Family Violence in a Patriurchal Cufture: A Challenge ro Our Way of Living (Ottawa: Church Council on Justice and Corrections, Canadian CounciI on Social Development, 1988), p. 9.

45 Weintraub, "The Theory and Politics of the Public/Prîvate Distinction," p. 29.

Judith Wagner DeCew, In Purstrit of Privacy: lmv, ehics. and the rise of technology (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997), p. 177.

" See, for example, Carole Pateman, "Feminist Critiques of the PubliciPrivate Dichotomy," in The Dkorder of Women (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1989)' pp. 118-140. Although feminists have been at the forefiont of exposing the issue of domestic violence to public scrutiny, it is important to note that the victirnization of fernales does not exhaust the specmof fdyviolence. Feminist accounts of dornestic violence have been problematic especially in the area of child abuse. See Marie Ashe and Naorni R, Cahn, "Child Abuse: A Problem for Feminist Theory" in The Public Nature ofPrivate Violence, Martha Albertson Fineman and Roxaaae Mykitiuk eds. (New York: Routledge, 1994)- pp. 166-194. The authors write, "feminists have not found it politicaily desirable to emphasize the 'badness' of some mothers. Femiaist theory has, however, been senously limited by its failure to engage with the reality of the 'bad mother."' (p. 189) 1O5 Efforts to make domestic violence a public and political issue rather than a private problem of particula. families have met with resistance mainly because of what one scholar,

Elizabeth Pleck, has called "the Family Ideal," encompassing "ideas about family privacy, conjugal and parental rights, and family ~tability.'"~Indeed, not long ago in western social history, domestic abuse was largely considered "a private family matter to be worked out nithin the fami~y.'"~If onc doubts the strcngth of thc 'family idcal,' it is sobering to remember that in the western world, organizations for animal protection, such as the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (SPCA), were formed before counterparts dealing with child protection. Pleck is most likely right to argue that this was not so much an indication that society cared less about children than mimals. but that child rescue faced special normative barriers because it "involved interference in the fundamental unit of the farni~~,"'~conceived as a private sphere with rights to autonomy and irnmunity From extemal interference.

Just as those who study domestic violence find the ' family ideal' a consistent barrier to social reform, recent international attempts to deal with intrastate violence have come face to face with the 'state ideal,' involving a set of ideas about state privacy, sovereign rights, and national integrity. Cornparhg the history of western experiences in reform against domestic violence and recent international efforts to deai with intrastate violence, it becomes clear that both have faced similar normative barrien due to the conception of families and

48 Pieck, Domestic Tyranny, p. 7.

" Captain Robert L. Snow, Family Abuse: Tough Solutions fo Stop the Violence (New York: Plenum Trade, 1997), p. 283. Snow, who has worked as a police oEcer in the United States since the 1960s. is perhaps more keeniy aware than most people of how the idea of the family and home as a pnvate sphere has been used by 'domestic tyrants' against police officers and other agents of state intervention in situations of fdyvioIence.

" Pleck, Domestic Tycznny, p. 79. 1 O6 states as private spheres. Indeed, as Craig Calhoun has observed, "suggesting that international recognition [of new states] should be linked to democratic institutions or ... condemning domestic human rights abuses are as problematic within [a certain conception of the] division of public and private as attempts to intervene in families on behalf of the rights of children or spouses have been."s'

nit: historic reluctance ofstatzs and international organizations such as the United

Nations to intervene in issues considered to belong to the domestic jurisdiction of states parallels the pst reluctance of domestic law, the police and court systems in western societies to intervene in what were perceived to be 'private' farnily disputes. In the late

1800s courts in Canada ruled, with relation to spousal assault, that it was better "to draw the curtain, shut out the public gaze and leave the partnen to forgive and f~rget."~~Just as the doctrine of nonintervention served to hide inhumanity, cruelty and injustice within families

&om public scrutiny and redress, the sarne doctrine underpinning the Cold War international order barred states and other international actors fiom intervening, forcibly or non- forcib 1y, to alleviate human suffering even on a massive scale, especially when such suffering was confined within state boundaries and resulted From the exercise of sovereign power. The dominant interpretation of international law maintained the invisibility of the suffering of victirns of intrastate ~iolence.~'As Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse have observed, humanitarian issues and concerns were unmentionable in the relations between states:

" Craig Calhoun, bbNationalismand the Public Sphere," in Weintraub and Kumar, Public and Private in Thozrght and Practice, p. 99,

Ontario Medical Association, Reports on wi/e msault (Ottawa: National Clevinghouse on Family Violence, 1991), p. 1.

" See, for example, J.L. Brierly, "Maners of Domestic Iurisdiction," British Yearbook of International Law 6 (1925):8-19. A general conclusion on state reaction to massive human rights violations during the cold war era would have to be that the normal response was to do nothing. Not only were instances of forcible intervention rare, but even formal protest and the initiation of collective measures through recognized human rights procedures were seldom, and even then, only reluctantly invoked.j4

Michael Akehurst similarly records that in the Cold War era, most states condemned

'humanitanan intervention' as illegal. Even states that intervened against a governent responsible for mmatrocities chose to justiQ their interventions on non-hcmmitxim gro~nds.~'In international law and society, sovereign leaders possessed something like the ring of Gyges; when turned outward in the glare of international politics, their actions were public and visible, but when tumed inward in their domestic jurisdictions, their conduct became private and hence, invisible? State leaders could thus enjoy the reputation of being vanguards of the public interest or the comrnon good in international society while, in their interna1 relations, being "indecent without shame, cruel without shuddering. and murderous without apprehension of fear of exposure or punishment."57 Domestic tyrants could feel at home in the world of public states and private humanity.

It is, of course, not only those who commit active brutality who use the rhetoric of sovereignty as privacy to claim an unassailable moral right to be free from intervention.

'" Oliver Ramsbothm and Tom Woodhouse, Humunitarian Intervention in Contemporary Conflict: I1 Reconcepnral&ztion (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), p. 56.

55 Michael Akehurst, "Humanitarian intervention," in Bull, Inmention in Workl Politics, pp. 95-99. Akehurst notes, for example, that india initially justified its military intervention in Pakistan in 1971 on humanitarian grounds, but subsequently changed its expianation in the Offrcial Records of the United Nations Security Council. (p. 96)

'' PIato, The Republic of Plato. AIIan BIoom trans.(New York: Basic Books, 1991, second edition), pp. 37-38, (II, 359c-360d). See also Herodotus, History, 1, 8-13. Herodotus' version of this story is even more symboticaily fitting for our purposes. In bis account, it is the public figure of Lydia, the king, who gives Gyges the ring. Gyges then uses it to murder the king and tztke bis place. Metaphorically, we can say that a public order, in granting the power of invisibility without condition to mernbers of society, undermines justice, which culminates in the death or usurpation of the public.

Phiiip P. Hallie, The Puradox of Cmelty (Mddietown, Connecticut: WesIeyan University Press, t969), p. 108. 108

More disturbingly perhaps, potentiai intervenors - those who have the capacity to intervene effectively to halt grave acts of inhurnanity - also use the rhetonc of sovereignty and nonintervention to avoid moral responsibility. Major-General Romeo Dallaire, Commander of the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), encountered this use of sovereignty as a normative argument against intervention in the days preceding the Rwandan genocide of

1994: "The RTLM [a radio station in Rwanda] was inciting people to kill, it was explaining how to kill, telling people who to kill, including whites, including me. .. When you have an

instrument of propaganda inciting people to crimes against humanity, the international cornmunity could have targeted it. I had responses that, given the sovereignty of the country

involved, we c~uldn't."~~When a state's intemal sovereignty is constnied as an absolute

nght, the tragedy of intrastate violence tends to be viewed by outsiders largely as an interna1 problem. Not only must those suffenng from various kinds of intrastate crises and conflicts -

from state collapse and communal war to tyrannical govemment and genocide - suffer alone,

they must bear the responsibility for addressing their own suffering in the context of an

international society of distinct and autonomous political communities that have no moral obligation to help them. A cornmunitarian vision of organic self-determining communities

thus easily collapses into a realist vision of atomistic self-helping ones.

The interpretation of sovereignty as a moral nght intnnsic to statehood leads to a

vilification of intervention. As R.J. Vincent has observed, "If the members of international

society are taken to be sovereign States acknowledging each other's nghts to rule in their own

domains, then it follows that intervention - the attempt to subject another state to one's will-

Quoted in Scott Straus, "Daliaire relates horror of genocide," The Globe and Mail, Feb 26, 1998, A14. 1O9 is illepitirnate as an infkaction of sovereignty: if sovereignty, then noninter~ention."~~In this formulation a descriptive account of intervention as an infiaction of sovereignty is inextricably linked to a normative assessment of intervention as an illegitimate act. The logical link between the definitions of sovereignty and nonintervention, however, cannot serve as a normative justification for the positive moral value of sovereignty as privacy, and the concomitant negatioe mon! wlue of intemection as an abrogation of that privacy.

Clearly, the moral legitimacy of intervention partly depends on the moral rneaning and significance assigned to a unit's interna1 freedom. The moral evaluation of nonintervention depends on a cornpanion moral assessment of sovereignty as pnvacy. Yet international society theorists have tended not to examine the normative bais of such a right. Bull, for example, assumes that states by definition have a moral entitlement to nonintervention, since a state's intemal sovereignty "nleans supremacy over al1 other authorities within that temtory and population.'"

The status of sovereignty as an intrinsic moral right of statehood undermined

Dallaire's normative arguments for increased UN intervention in Rwanda. It has an identical function in historia Michael Bliss's condemnation of NATO's military intervention in the

Kosovo conflict in 1999:

Canadian aircrafi have bombed targets in Yugoslavia Our country has committed acts of war against a sovereign European nation. We and our NATO allies are

" RJ. Vincent, Htrman Righu and lntentational Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986). p. 113. Stadey Hoffinann also writes, "International society, for some centuries now, has been founded on the principle of sovereignty; in other words, the state is supposed to be the master of what goes on inside its territory, and international relations are relations bemteen sovereign states, each one of which has cemin rights and obligations derived fiom the very fact of statehood. Kone accepts the principle ofsovereignty as the corner-stone of international society, ihis means .. . that intervention, defied as an act aimed at hfluencing the domestic affairs of a state, is quite clearly ilIegitimate." See Hoffinann, 'The Problem of Intervention," in Buii, intervention in World Politics. p. 1 1.

* Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Socieryr a snidy of order in worldpolitia (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), p. 8, italics mine, attacking a country that has not attacked us or any other country. .. . NATO is making war on a sovereign country to try to enforce its view of how that country's interna1 flairs should be a~anged.~'

According to Bliss, Canada has comrnitted a crime in making war on Yugoslavia, but

Yugoslavia has not comrnitted any intemationally-recognized public wrong since it has not attacked any other country. The logic of Bliss's moral objection to NATO's actions relies on a view of rovereip-ty as conferring on st~tesm massailable mord right to priuiicy, or freedom fiom intervention, in the sphere of its own intemal affain. The confusion behind this flawed argument lies in conflating descriptive and normative uses of sovereignty.

Untangling these logically distinct uses of the tem 'sovereignty' leads to the possibility of acknowledging a sphere, unit or actor as sovereign. or distinct From a larger sphere, unit or actor, without automatically entailing a normative conclusion that it cm make a compelling moral claim to be free fiom intervention. For exmple, today in western societies, the fact that spousal assault or child abuse occurs inside a private home does not generally count as a justification for keeping the abuse private, out ofreach of public concem and intervention. Similarly, abuse of sovereign power, because it occurs within a sovereign

(private) state, does not automatically make it only a private concem for the sovereign state or its citizens. One should not confuse the description of the state as a distinct domain vis-a- vis international society with the normative judgement that acts which occur within such a context are beyond the purview of public international concem and intervention. Labelling a temtory, actor, or act 'sovereign' is thus no substitute for a moral argument for why it should not be interfered with. Yet the depiction of sovereignty as an uitrinsic feature of statehood tends toward the confiation of sovereignty as a descriptive category of distinction and as a

6' Michael Bliss, "Ashamed to be a Canadian," National Post, March 26, 1999, A18. Il f normative justification for freedom fiom intervention. The dark consequence of this conflation has been the historical inattention of international society and law to contexts of

intrastate violence, which remained private tragedies, much like domestic familial violence

within western societies until recent decades.

III. MICHAEL WALZER'S ACCOUNT OF COMMUNAL PRIVACY

Michael Walzer offers in Jiîst and Uhjust Wars a normative theory of intervention that opens moral space for international intervention in contexts of intrastate violence, yet it

fails to the extent that it pnvileges an organic conception of political comrnunity, entailing

ironically an atomistic account of state privacy in international society.

The sovereign individual and the sovereign comrnunity

Waizer uses an "individuaVcommunity analogy" to develop his account of a state's

right to self-determination, understood not as a substantive vision of political Eeedom, but

simply as Freedom fiom extemal intervention. Drawing on John Stuart Mill's arguments,

Walzer asserts that "the memben .. . of a single political community, are entitled collectively

to determine their own affair~.'"~This right of cornmunities to self-determination "denves its

moral and political force from the rights of contemporary men and women to live as

members of a historical comrnunity and to express their inhented culture through political

forms worked out among themsel~es."~The right of individuals as members of a political

cornmunity to exercise coIlective self-rule logically entails a mle of nonintervention by non-

members.

62 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, p. 87.

63 Michael Waizer, 'The Moral Standing of States: A Response to Four Critics," Philosophy and Public Affairs 9,3 (1980):209-229 at p. 21 1. 112 Although the ideas of communal self-determination and nonintervention seem pre- eminently organic and cornmunitarian, it is the idea of the sovereign individual, denved from an atomistic conception of individuals as self-directing beings, that provides the mode1 for

Walzer's conception of the sovereign cornrnunity." Just as the recognition of individual privacy affords individuals a sphere in which they may exercise their agency without extemal scmtiny or intervention, the recognition of state sovereignty, according to Walzer, establishes

"an arena within which keedom can be fought for and (sometimes) won. It is this arena and the activities that go on within it that we want to protect, and we protect them, much as we protect individual integrity, by marking out boundaries that carmot be crossed, rights that cannot be violated. As with individuals, so with sovereign States: there are things that we cannot do to them, even for their own ostensible good.'"' Walzer's conception of state sovereignty as privacy draws on a liberal interpretation of pnvacy as conferring on individuals an inviolable sphere for self-regarding activi ty. Adapting this conception of individual privacy to the state supports an interpretation of the sovereign state as an inviolable arena for collective self-detemination, entailing such rights as political autonomy and territorial integrity. Although this construction of pnvacy relies on the normative appeal of an atomistic view of individual keedom as self-direction, its application to the state ultimately serves an organic interpretation of freedom as collective self-rule, and carries the potential to subvert individual claims to such pnvacy.

This irony is not particular to Walzer's work, but is generally evident in cornmunitarian philosophy. In Rousseau's work, for example, it is precisely his organic

" On the sovereign individuai, see John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in On Liberty with The Subjection of Women and Chaprers on Socialirm (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 1-1 16.

Waizer, Jmand Unjust Wars, p. 87. Il3 vision of domestic politics that accounts for his largely atomistic account of international politics.' Michael Sandel and Alasdair MacIntyre critique the liberal view of morality for its individualism: as an end-in-itself the liberal self is "installed as sovereign, cast as the author of the only moral meanings there are.'*' Yet cornmunitarians tend to gant this authorship and sovereignty to the bounded political community, positing that "it is an essential characteristic of the morality which each of us acquires that it is leamd hm, in and through the way of life of some particular comm~nity.'*~Thus individual moral development is contingent on membership and participation in a collective life. The view of bounded political cornmunities as ultimate sources of morality and sole guardians of the public good ironically translates into a devaluation of individualist claims to priva~y.~~

Indeed, although Walzer's justification for state pnvacy and hence, the rule of nonintervention behveen States, relies heavily on an atomistically liberal conception of individual pnvacy, he argues that the communal nght to privacy applies to liberal and illiberal regimes alike: "domestic tyrants are safe, for it is not our purpose in international

çociety (nor, Mill argues, is it possible) to establish liberal or democratic cornmunities, but only independent ones." It is the individuaVcomrnunity analogy that provides the basis for this assertion: "The members of a political community must seek their own freedom, just as the individual must cultivate his own virtue. They cannot be set free, as he cannot be made

a See Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Project of Perpemal Peace, Edith M. Nuttaii trans. (London: Richard Cobden- Sanderson, 1927). b7 Michael Sandel, "The procedural repub tic and the uuencumbered self," Political Theory 12 (1984):8 1-96 at p. 87.

Macintyre, "1s Patriotism a Virtue?" p. 2 15.

* See, for example, Michael S. Sandel, ''Mord Argument and Liberal Tolention: Abortion and Homosermality," California Law Rdew 77,3 (1 989):52 1-538. 114 virtuous, by any extemal force." Waizer seems to value individual rights to autonomy, and to adopt an instrumental view of political comrnunity in arguing that it is individual rights that

"are violated when communal integrity is denied, even if the denial is benevolent in intention.*"O Yet respect for communal integrity and autonomy does not always translate into a respect for individual integrity and Ereedorn. The conception of pnvacy as decisional autonorny bccomcs cçpccially problcmatic =ben translated to a collective, for tl~question arises as to whose decisional autonomy ought to be respected. It is not clear how communal privacy can consistently claim any moral force if it fails to respect the mode1 of individual privacy upon which it is based, and from which it draws its normative appeal. Walzer's desire to defend communal integrity and self-determination sometimes makes him lose sight of their instrumental, rather than intrinsic, moral significance. His arguments in support of a mle of nonintervention are morally sustainable and consistent only if the exercise of communal agency is consistent with respect for the bodily integrity and decisional agency of its individual ~nernbers.~'

Walzer's endorsement of the nonintervention principle between states is guided by a concem to support communal autonomy, neutrality in zones of conflict, and international social pluralism. Yet as feminist theorists have asserted, the policy of nonintervention in families has sometimes produced negative moral consequences. In patriarchal societies, for example, it is assumed that fathen or husbands are the heads of households and the decision-

'O Water, Jusr and (Iniust Wars, pp. 94 and 87.

'' This is not to Say that any claims individuals make can or mut always ovemde those of the collective, yet even when a collective's interests take moral precedence, it in no way demonstrates a moral primacy of the collective over the individual. As Simane Weil puts it, "it may happen that the obligation towards a collectivity which is in danger reaches the point of entailing a total sadce. But it does not follow fiom this that collectivities are superior to human beings. It sometimes happens, too, that the obligation to go to the help of a human being in distress &es a total sacrifice necessary, without that imp1ying any supenonty on the part of 115 makers for the farnily. Respecting family privacy in such societies can lead to an implicit endorsement of patriarchal conceptions of authority in the household, and to a denial of the claims to decisional agency of other individuals within the household. Similarly, the society of states recognizes govemments as the officia1 decision-makers of political comrnunities.

Respecting state privacy, however, can lead to a denial of the decisional agency of its members. In the realrn of domesticity in western societies, the policy of wnintervention served to perpetuate patiarchal and abusive structures of authority within fiunilies, and internationally, the rule of nonintervention has also served the interests of illiberal, patemalistic, tyrannical and abusive regimes. A policy of nonintervention, in the farnily or in the state, cm hardly be considered synonymous with neutrality.

Walzer is careful not to confine decisional autonomy to governments. He departs fkom 'international society' theorists in asserting that the "real subject of [his] argument is not the state at al1 but the polirical community that (usually) underlies it." The legitimacy of any state depends on "the 'fit' of government and comrnunity, that is, the degree to which the govemment actually represents the political life of its people? While international society theonsts have generally privileged the state in their account of international order and morality, Walzer pnvileges the histoncal cornmunities of men and women whose claims cm sometimes tmmp the claims of the state, especially when that state can no longer be seen as an authentic expression of the political community that underlies it.

Walzer also relaxes the legalist paradigm of nonintervention, asserting that states can in certain circurnstances justifiably intervene in the intemal affairs of other states. The moral the individuai so helped" See Weil, The Need for Roots: prelude to a dedaration of duties torvard manlinri, (New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd, 1987), p. 8.

" Waizer, 'The Mora1 Standing of States," p. 2 14. 116 basis for such intervention, in cases of secession and counter-intervention, and in response to acts that shock the conscience of hurnankind, however, lies in the ideal of the autonomous self-determinhg community itself." Even interventions to halt gross human rights violations are justified because such interventions do not threaten communal integrity or autonomy, since "when a governrnent tums savagely upon its own people, we must doubt the very existence of a politid community to :\'hich the idea of self-determination mi&! ripply." intervention is thus justified because it is not really intervention, since there is no authentic political community whose autonomy cm be violated, where gross human rights violations, such as "enslavement or massacre of political opponents, national minorities, and religious sects" are cornmitted." Justifiable interventions, according to Walzer, should "be as much like nonintervention as possible," so as to conform to the principal rule of international morality, which is "always [to] act so as to recogtlize und uphofd communcl1 utrt~non~."'

Justimng intervention and nonintervention on the basis of preserving communal autonomy Ieads Walzer to the thomy subject of evaluating the authenticity of communal identities and boundaries. As Walzer concedes, "it isn't always clear when a cornrnunity is in fact self-detemining, when it qualifies, so to speak, for nonintervention." The case of secession is difficult because "evidence must be provided that a community actually exists whose members are cornmitted to independence and ready and able to determine the conditions of their own exi~tence."~~The problems with identimg inauthentic political cornmunities or a lack of 'fit' between a political community and its government also partly

" Waber, Just and U+t Wars, chapter 6.

" Ibid, p. 101.

Ïs Ibid., pp. 104 and 90.

hid., pp. 89 and 93. Il7 explain why Walzer legitimizes 'humanitarian intervention' only in the most egregious cases of mass atrocity." It would seem more direct, however, to argue that intervention is justified, not because practices such as enslavement or massacre reveal the lack of an authentic political community, which is notoriously difficult to determine, but because such practices are rnorally intolerable aff5onts to common human interests in individual integrity, agency and dignity.

Walzer seems to imply this line of argument in his assertion that a government

"engaged in massive violations of human rights" cannot appropriately appeal to the principle of communal self-detemination. "That appeal," according to Walzer, "has to do with the

Ereedorn of the community taken as a whole; it has no force when what is at stake is the bare survival or the minimum liberty of(some substantial number of) its rnernber~."'~If gross human rights violations invalidate a government's claim to self-determination, the moral barrier against intervention is also thereby negated. Consequently, in such situations, the moral burden of proof must clearly shifi, fkom extemal actors who might intervene, to the intemal actors who must provide reasons other than self-determination (cvhich has no force) to defend their claims to nonintervention. It is not alivays the case, then, as Walzer claims at the beginning of his discussion of intervention, that the "burden of proof falls on any political leader who tries to shape the domestic arrangements or alter the conditions of life in a foreign

COU~Q."~~

Another reason is chat Waker equates intervention with the use of military force, a conflation E examine below.

Walzer, Just and ünjust Wurs, p. 10 1.

bid., p. 87. Of course, intervenors would still have to justlfy their chosen means of intervention. 11s Walzer's reliance on the sovereign individuaYcommunity analogy indicates an insular atomistic view of political communities that overlooks their interconnections and embeddedness in wider social, political and normative frameworks. Statist cornmunitarian theorists actually do acknowledge the presence of an international society which validates constitutive and regdative noms and mles that endow the state with moral standing, rights and obligations in an intcmational context. Under +~sview, statcs ars not wholly atomistic entities reluctantly CO-existingin an unintended system, as realists contend, but members of a wider normative order with some common interests, values, rules and institution^.'^ Non- statist cornmunitarians such as Yael Tamir similarly recognize the contextual nature of nationalist moral claims: "The right to national self-determination can be fully realised only if the national group is recognised by both members and non-memben as an autonomous source of human action and creativity, and if this recognition is followed by poiitical arrangements enabling members of the nation to develop their national Iife with as little extemal interference as possible.'"' International society theorists commonly acknow ledge that states as memben of international society derive their rights and duties in their external relations from that membership. Yet they have tended to overlook the fact that the intemal sovereign rights and duties of states with respect to their own populations are also shaped not only by intemal political debates and processes between the state and civil society, but by extemal political debates and processes between the state and international society that inform the scope and nature of state privacy as a moral clah in international society.

As Bull has descnbed it, "A sociery of stater (or intemationai society) exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common vaIues, fonn a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of desin their reIations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions." See Buii, Anarchical Society, p. 13. 119 Acknowledging the mutual interconnection between international and dornestic spheres, and the social foundations of state pnvacy, challenges the utility of the concept of nonintervention. in this vein, Frances Olsen has critiqued 'Yhe myth of state intervention in the family," arguing that the "terrns 'intervention' and 'nonintervention' obscure rather than clariw substantive issues of ethics and social policy with respect to families."

Walzer does acknowledge that political communities are not like eggs neatly separated by an egg-box called international society." He concedes that in most cases of intrastate violence, "history presents a tangle of parties and factions, each claiming to speak for an entire community, fighting with one another, drawing outside powers into the struggle in secret, or at least unacknowledged, ways." Yet in subscnbing to the myth of the sovereign community, he aims to uphold a mythcal ideal of separation between international and domestic structures of power, noms and authonty. Thus he argues that in situations of intrastate violence such as a civil war, the role of the international cornmunity is to aim at

"holding the circle, preserving the balance, restoring some degree of integrity to the local

~truggle."~This is a strange prescription if we think of civil war through the fmilylstate analogy, since it seems to suggest that extemal parties ought to let membea use force to determine the terms of their relationship. In the narne of preserving the sovereign community, Walzer seems to be arguing that intrastate violence should be considered a private communal matter to be worked out within the community, much as family violence

Frances E. Olsen, 'The Myth of State Intervention in the Family," Journal of Law Reform 18,J (1985):835- 864 at p. 837.

On the egg-box conception of international society, see RJ. Vincent, Human Rights and International Relations, pp. 123- 125.

Waizer, Just and Unjust Wars, pp. 96 and 97. t 20 used to be considered "a private family matter to be worked out within the family.'"' He may very well be nght that the use of force by third parties is likely to have a counterproductive effect on the distressed inhabitants of a divided state. Yet restoring integrity to the local strugg le clearly requires more of outsiders than adopting a strict polic y of nonintervention, or a policy of countenntervention to preserve the military balance of local forces. Restoring the physical integrity and moral agency of those in the local smiggle, which is essentiîl for my kind of self-determination, individual or collective, would actually require the international community to work towards a cessation of the violence.

Ultimately, Walzer's reliance on the sovereign individuaVcommunity analogy tends toward a naturalization and simplification of the political community, obscuring the pmblematic nature of transfemng a conception of individual pnvacy to a collective unit such as the state. A family/state analogy is better able to illuminate the mon1 issues associated with state privacy.' With such an analogy in mind, Mill himselfmight also have reached different conclusions about nonintervention in a state's interna1 affairs, since it was he who wrote in relation to farnily violence, "The domestic life of domestic tyrants is one of the things which it is the most imperative on the law to interfere with.""

" Snow, Family Abuse, p. 283.

in a later work, Waîzer indeed draws on the farnily/state analogy to support the right ofmernben of one state to divorce. He writes, ''The argument [against legitimizing the break-up of states] is very rnuch like that of a Puritan minister in the 164Os, defending the union of husband and wife against the new doctrine of divorce... The problem, then as now, is that justice, whatever it requires, doesn't seern to permit the kinds of coercion that would be necessary to 'hold their noses together.' So we have to think about divorce, despite its difficulties." See Michael Waizer, Thick and fiin: rbforal Argument nt Horne and Abroad (Noire Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, t994), p. 67.

'7 John Stuart Mill, Principles of Political Economy. Mill actually justifies foreign rule as a fom of tutelage for 'barbarians, ' aithough ''the universal mies of morality between man and man" must apply to civilized and barbarous peoples alike. See Mill, "A Few Words on Non-Intervention" in Essays on Eqtiality, Law, and Education (Toronto: Universisr of Toronto Press and Routledge Kegan Paul, 1984), p. 1 19. We can be rid of nineteenth-century civilizationd prejudices and discard the categorization of whole societies as 'barbarian,' but Mill's justification for intervention against barbarkm cm surely be applied to scenes of barbarity within the contemporary 'civirized' worId, 121

Intervention and the use of force

Walzer's preoccupation with protecting an image of the sovereign community lies behind his seeming endorsement of the peculiar argument that "the citizens of a sovereign state have a right, insofar as they are to be coerced and ravaged at all, to suffer only at one another's hand~"~~rather than at the hands of foreigners. The unjustified use of force by a state against its own population, however, seems no less wicked than the unjusrifieci use of force in other people's countries. In both cases, it is the unjustifiability of the use of force, rather than the interventionary nature of the latter case, that warrants condemnation. This is not to argue that the grievousness of the unjustified use of force by Foreign powers is somehow lessened since it is comparable to the unjustified use of force within a state; it is to argue that the latter deserves the sarne moral reproach as the former.

Furthemore, if it is the use of force itself that is morally problematic, the use of force by national liberation movements must be seen as part of the moral problem. Walzer, however, like many who opposed the US.military intervention in Vietnam, tends to romanticize intrastate violence in the context of a national liberation struggle. An authentic political community, he argues, is one that can pass the test of self-help, defined in terms of its capacity to wage "a large-scale military stmggle for independence." At the same time he asserts that a "legitimate governent is one that cm fight its own intemal ~ars."'~It is not clear, however, why the preponderant military strength of a nationalist movement would necessarily add to its moral claim to self-detexmination or political independence, any more than why a state's preponderant rnilitary control would justify its suppression of a nationalist

" Walzer, Jttst and Llnjusr Wars, p. 86.

89 Ibid., pp. 90 and 10 1. 122 movement. For example, would Quebec have a greater moral clah to secession if the

Quebec nationalist movement were to mount a large-scale military struggle against the

Canadian federal govemmeent? Or would the Canadian federal government have a greater moral claim to keeping Quebec within Canada because it is able to control secessionist forces through military means? A negative response to both of these questions shows the moral flaws in Walzcr's arguments, and leads to a recognition ihat force cannot detemiine tlie rightness of any moral claim, within or between nations and states. In fact, those who resort to the use of force, whether they be states or national liberation movements, tend to undermine significantly the force of their moral claims.

It becomes apparent in Walzer's later replies to criticisms of Jzist and Unjtist CYars that the kind of freedom for political cornmunities that he endorses is not so much freedom from intervention as kedom fiom military coercion. In a footnote, he admits that in supporting a rule of nonintervention, he does not "mean to mle out every effort by one state to influence another or every use of diplornatic and economic press~re.'~Similarly, the high threshold Walzer places on the level of human rights violations necessary to justify intervention stem clearly not so much from the unjustifiability of intervention for humanitarian concems as from the unjustifiability of the use of force as a means to carry out such intervention^.^' It is important to remember then that Walzer's hst and Unjist Wars is primarily about the just and unjust use of force, which is important to, but not exhaustive of, the Iarger topic of just and unjust interventions.

Walzer, ''The Moral Standing of States," p. 223, foomote 26.

9' Walzer, Jiut and Unjust kVurs. pp. 101-108. As Charles Beitz has noted of Waizer's argument "it is the miiitary character rather than intervention itseif that is problematic" and 'the argument against military force has nothing to do with communal integrity." Charles R Beitz, "Nonintervention and Communal ùitegnty," Philosophy and Public Affairs 9,4 (1980):385-391 at p. 389. 123 Walzer has continued to confiate the issues of intervention and the use of force in his later writings. He begins an article on 'humanitarian intervention' with the well-known question: "To intervene or not?" then indicates his real concern, noting that "the use of force in other people's countries should always generate hesitation and anxiety.'"- Walzer's restrictive interpretation of intervention conforms with most theoretical and pnctical definitions of intcncntion in thc international idations litcraturc."' One should be carcful, however, not to conflate these issues. The interventionary aspect of an activity, the fact that it is done 'in other people's countries,' is distinguishable frorn the activity itself - in this case, the use of force.

Forcehl measures should generate 'hesitation and anxiety' whenever they are considered, such as in domestic relationships, by parents in the disciplining of children, in national politics, by nationalkt movements or by the state against civil unrest, as well as in international politics, by states or the international community against another state or political community to effect a change in its intemal affairs. In al1 these cases and levels, the proverbial moral issues related to the use of force apply. 1s the use of Force prudent, proportional and likely to be effective in terms of a defined goal? The use of force is contentious for the sarne categories of reasons in al1 these cases, even though only the last is an incontrovertible case of intrusion by an outside party. The concems of prudence. proportionaiity and utility are intrinsic to the moral problem of the use of force in general,

'' Michael Walzer, ''The Politics of Rescue," Dissent (1995):35-41 at p. 35.

93 For exampie, Hediey Buii indudes coercion into his dennition of intervention. See Bull, Intervention in World Poiitics, p. 3. Adam Roberts ais0 defiaes humanitarian intervention as "miiitary intervention in a state, without the approva1 of its authorities, and with the purpose of preventing widespread sufferîng or death among the inhabitants." See Roberts, "Humanitanan war: rniiitary intervention and human nghts," International Affuirs 69,3 (1993):429. 124 whether it be for humanitarian purposes or not, and whether it be interventionary in nature or not, and can be distinguished from the moral issues that are inû-insic to the problem of intervention, rnilitary or otherwise. Thirking of intervention in only rnilitary terms invariably leads to a consideration of the moral issues related to the use of force in general, rather than the moral issues connected to the issue of intervention.

Thc question Walzcr sccks to ansscr is 'io use force or not?' and not 'to intervene or not?' The conflation of these two issues in international theory and practice has meant that governments have been able to claim a much stronger social convention against al1 types of intervention than is supported even in international law. Indeed, state oficials cornrnonly consider any type of unsolicited comment on, or interference in, the intemal junsdiction

(political, economic and cultural) of one state by another state or outside party to be unjustifiable violations, in varying degrees of subtlety, of a state's sovereignty and the rule of nonintervention. It is, however, a mistake to advance a general doctrine against intervention, because of the problems associated with a specific and extreme type of intervention. Many situations may justiQ some kind of interventionary response, while ruling out rnilitary intervention. Crucial opportunities to engage in preventive and non-military actions, before a crisis explodes or escalates to the level of mass atrocity, are missed when the concept of intervention and the use of force are conflated.

W. AREA OF DISANALOGY

While the family/state analogy provides a compelling way to anaiyze intervention as a moral problern in domestic and international politics, there is one main area of disanalogy that is worth exploring. 125 The main area of disanalogy is between the state as a public enforcer in relation to the fmily, and the various actors that comprise international society as a public sphere in relation to each state. Most states have ovenvhelming coercive capacity, and tightly structured legal and political systems, giving them more effective control over citizens and families, than international society as a public domain, with diffise military capabilities and looser lrgal and political institutions, Ilas over mernber States - not îo nienlion global non- state actors. Because of the relatively underdeveloped state of international rnechanisms for the use of force, it is unlikely that agents of international society will be able to intervene in cases of intrastate violence as easily as agents of the state (police, social workers, etc.) cm in the case of family violence.

Yet one should be carefûl not to exaggerate the significance of this difference in coercive capacity. It does not seem that the coercive power of the state cm alone or even significantly account for the changes in noms that have occurred in western societies about the proper scope and lirnits of parental authority, and the legitimacy of public intervention in farnilies, in the last three centuries. indeed, in the twentieth century, even when state power was quite capable of forcibly intervening in families, the normative interpretation of farnily privacy supported a public and social policy of nonintervention in intrahilia1 relations.

The question of intervention is thus not detexmined solely by capabilities, but more fundamentally by normative understandings of the publidprivate distinction. In world politics, similarly, the battle over ideas and attitudes about the moral basis, scope and limits of sovereign authority is at least as important as the battle over material resources and capabilities. Even if international society acquired the capacity to intemene effectively in intrastate relations, without an altered normative understanding of state sovereigaty as 126 privacy, it is unlikely that a change in coercive capacity aione will alter the nom of nonintervention.

The preoccupation with military capabilities also privileges the state as an actor in world politics, for it is states that currently possess the most organized concentration of military force. The focus on states, however, reafirrns the subordinate status of' other actors, such as the individual men and wornen whosz victimization ultimately provides i11~ justification for 'humanitarian intervention,' as well as those non-govenunental organizations and international institutions that may possess greater capacities and legitimacy to engage in more effective types of intervention to address humanitarian concems. Just as there are other options besides calling the police in response to familial violence and abuse of parental authority, there are options other than military force as well for confi-onting intrastate violence and abuse of sovereign authonty which we may attack with more imagination given a sonder understanding of the moral bais for intervention. Cleariy, however, in the case of family violence, as well as state terror and violence, one will not be predisposed to legitimizing other kinds of intervention or thinking about how to intervene if one accepts the view that a family or state, by virtue of its private or sovereign status, is acting within its rights.

International intervention to address intrastate violence at this time perhaps more closely resembles intervention by non-state penons in cases of child rnaltreatment. in both cases, 'îvhere [social respect for] privacy is high, the degree of social control will be low.'"

In both contexts, the absence of a common overarchïng authority to fix a common definition of maltreatment means that pludistic standards can vie for legitimacy. That is, the

9J Phillip W.Davis, "Stranger intervention into chiid punishment in public places," Social Problems 38,2 ( 199 1):227-246. intervenor often has a different standard than the allegedly abusive party. Thus Bull argues that the lack of international consensus on the basic concept of 'human rights' makes it a shifty and unreliable source for justification of inter~ention.~'It is interesting to note, however, that substantive debate in international politics about human rights is seldom heard when sovereignty as privacy is understood as an alienable right of statehood. Domestically, for example, 3 parent fxcd with a stlanger intervention rnight bc morc likclj: tu sry*,'Mind your own business,' than argue that her actions were j~stified.~~Similarly, States, when faced with international criticism over human rights, have seldom attempted to argue that their treatment of their citizens conforms with a certain interpretation of human rights, or cm be justified by other moral considerations. Rather than making these types of arguments, the ments of which can be debated, abusive parents and sovereigns oRen appeal to the rhetoric of privacy or sovereignty, asserting not so much that they are justified in their conduct, as that the intervenor has no right to interfere in a private affair.

As asserted earlier, the latter type of argument is not enough. It may be undisputed that an act occurred in a sovereign jurisdiction ofa state, or that those acted upon belong normally to the domestic jurisdiction of the state. Whether the act should be a private or public concem, however, depends on substantive normative arguments that involve more than a determination of whether the act was cornmitted in a private or public sphere or relationship. It seems to me a good idea to encourage more open and direct international

'' Bull, Intervention in World Politics, p. 193.

% in one incident chronicled by Capt Snow, an abusive father and husband is quoted as saying to police, "It ain't none of your dmedbusiness what's going on in here. You don? see anyone complaining, do you? This is my houe!" See Snow, Fantily Abuse, p. 189. 128 debate and discussion about human rights. To argue, however, that sovereignty as privacy confers an automatic or inviolable nght of nonintervention cmonly pre-empt that debate.

Ordinary people, without state agents readily available, lack formal protocols, mandated authority, and institutional resources to intervene in cases of child maltreatment."

States and other actors in international society have also lacked these procedures, nieciianisms, and toois to inteniene in cases of sovereign abuse of its own cirizens. in the case of child abuse, a stranger who witnesses perceived abuse cm in extreme cases notib the public authorities, and involve the state in a process of intervention in the family in question.

In the international arena the United Nations is attempting to fulfill this role, but in a context of less developed protocols, more limited or contested authority, and very scarce resources.

Again, these deficiencies are unlikely to be ameliorated if the erroneous view continues to hold sway that the mere status of statehood corifers on sovereigns an absolute moral right to control their domestic arrangements.

Given existing deficiencies, international intervention for the purposes of any humanitarian standard will likely be uneven. This lack ofconsistency cmlead to the problem of selective morality or double standards. 1 would regard this mainly as a problern of transitional international morality that will lessen as an alternative normative conception of state privacy becomes entrenched in the moral foundations of international society.

Hoivever, it seems quite plausible that even similar cases of abuse of sovereign power cm be

legitirnately treated in various ways, or involve different degrees or levels of international

intervention, due to the different domestic and international institutional resources and

options available in any given case. Being morally consistent in international as well as

97 Davis, "Stmger intervention into child punishment in public places," pp. 227-246. 129 domestic relations does not necessitate a rigid uniformity in the application of any general standard.

The difference between families and states as collective units, and the differences between the societies in which they are embedded, do not detract fiom the general utility of the family/state analogy. The use of this analogy has illuminated the moral problem of intervention as an intrusion of tlie privacy ohcolleciive unit. it ieads to an exmination of the normative value of state pnvacy, compelling the question: what is sovereignty as pnvacy for? For state sovereignty to constitute a normative argument against intervention, we have to examine the particular moral goods, goals and interests that it is intended to uphold or foster, and weigh them against the normative arguments favouring intervention. Thus in the case of the state in international society, just as in the case of the farnily in domestic society, there may exist morally compelling reasons for intervention which outweigh or transcend the moral considerations favouring nonintervention in any given situation.

V. CONCLUSION

The idea of the private farnily and home, however natural and etemal it may seem, has not always been with us. Witold Rybczynski has observed that the idea of a household inaccessible to non-family members was unintelligible in medieval times: ''The medieval home was a public, not a pnvate place. ... In addition to the immediate family [the household] included ernployees, servants, apprentices, fiends, and proteges - households of up to twenty-five persons were not uncommon. Since al1 these people lived in one or at most two rooms, pnvacy was ~nknown."~~The idea of home as a private place had to await a transformation of the medieval mind, fiom a preoccupation with "'the external world, and

- '"itold Rybczynski, Home: A Shon Hiitory of un idea (Toronto: Penguin Books), pp. 26-28. 130 one's place in it" to an awareness of "the intemal world of the individual, of the self, and of the family.'"' Some societies have histoncally lacked "any articulated distinction between public and private spheres and con~erns,"'~and even within one society, views of the distinction may change, just as the idea of family privacy has varied between and within societies over time.

Li international socicty dic httcrprctation of sovcrcipty as pricacy by jchol~s practitioners is currently undergoing a significant normative shift. Ln some ways, this shift does not constitute a dramatic discontinuity in the moral foundation of world order, as theorists of international society have histoncally admitted normative exceptions and lirnits, in theory and practice, to the intemal liberty ofstates conceived as a moral good. It is important to remember that the Westphalian conception of sovereignty developed in a context of universals: princes advanced claims for more autonomy For States in an environment of common religious and cultural links. Bodin, a proponent of 'absolute' state sovereignty, clearly viewed state sovereignty in a greater moral and religious context. While he defined sovereignty as "that absolute and perpetual power vested in a commonwealth," he stressed that if "we insist however that absolute power means exemption korn al1 law whatsoever, there is no prince in the world who can be regarded as sovereign, since al1 the princes of the earth are subject to the laws of God and nature, and even to certain human laws cornmon to a11 nation^."'^'

IM) Barrington ~Moore,Privacy: Studies in Social and Cultural History (London: M.E. Sharpe, 1984), p. 13.

'O' Bodin, Sir Books of the CommonweuZth, pp. 25 and 28. Later, when discussing property rights, Bodin asserts that princes who take the property of others err, for doing so is "the Iaw of the jungle, an act of force and violence, For as we have show above, absolute power only impiies freedom in reIation to positive laws, and not in relation to the law of God." (p. 35.) 13 1 Vattel similarly championed state sovereignty in its role as a protector of international pluralism, yet he also justified intervention in cases of "intolerable persecution and evident tyranny."to2As Andrew Hurrell has noted, the protection of the autonomy of any particular cornmunity has been constantly balanced against "the protection of certain minimum standards of human rights and by the need to uphold the overall structure of coexisten~e."~~~

At tliz gznzsis of the concept OC the statz and sovereigly iis privacy, the Creedom Crom intervention that states could enjoy as a moral daim in international society and law was not thought to be morally absolute, theoretically or practically.

The argument of this chapter is not that states cm make no moral claims to sovereignty as privacy. Indeed, the idea of the abuse of authority (sovereign or parental) implies the possibility of legitimate authority. Intervention to stop the abuse of authot-ity clearly does not undermine in any way the legitimate use of that authority, nor does it necessarily challenge the legitimacy of those in the particular state or family who are vested to exercise that authority. Furthemore, intervention against abusive govemments does not undermine the concept of the state as a sovereign institution, but serves to reinforce the moral foundations of the state and sovereign authority. Sirnilarly, intervention in abusive farnilies does not necessarily undermine the family as a social institution; rather, it may be required to reinforce a certain public conception of that institution, which the abusive farnily is seen to violate.

Cornmunitarian defences of state privacy in international society are, at best, moraily incomplete and, at worst, morally untenable. The world of public states and private hurnanity

"'~ndrew HurrelI, "Vattel: Pluraiism and Its Lirnits," in Chsicul Theories of lntemational Relations, Ian Clark and Iver Neumann eds. (New York, St. Martin's Press, 1996), p. 244.

'O3 Ibid. 132 is changing. The perspective that cm account for this normative shift - cosmopolitanism - with attendant implications for the meaning, evaluation and significance of intervention as a moral problem in world politics, will be the subject of the rest of this work.

International society theorists have been concemed that by acknowledging the cosmopolitan basis of an ethical world order, one undermines the very foundations ofa society oisrates. Hedley Buil put it radier provocativeiy: "Carrieci ro its logicai extreme, the doctrine of human rights and duties under international law is subversive of the whole principle that rnankind should be organised as a society of sovereign states."'" Indeed, if we think about the Fate of the family as a social institution in the West, the rise of liberalism in western domestic polities has led to the social demise of patnarchal families. Yet while the patriarchal conception of patemal authority within the family has fallen into disrepute in liberal times, the family as a pnvate social unit rernains, and certain foms of family have gained a legitimacy that was denied to them in a patriarchal fnmework. Thus just as families as collective social units have changed, but also survived the decline of absolutist conceptions of paternal authority in the household, states as collective political units may also survive the decline of absolutist conceptions of intemal sovereign authority. A society of states, then, rnay also change and remain.

Bull, AtzarchicuZ Sociew p. 152. The wish to be a citizen of the universe, whose sole allegiance is to the hurnan race, and whose only passport his natural curiosity, is an illusion which neither ou enemies nor our fiiends will allow us to cherish. Both demand that we present a clear identity card.

Nathan Shaham'

What a piece of work is a man, how noble in reason, how infinite in faculties, in form and moving how express and admirable, in action how like an angel, in apprehension how like a god: the beauty of the world, the paragon of animals; and yet to me what is this quintessence of dust?

William Shakespeare'

Nathan Shaham, The RosendorfQtiartet, Dalya Bilu tram. (New York: Grove Press, 1988), p. 329.

William Shakespeare, The Trugedy of Humlet (Scarborough, Ontario: The New American Library, 1963), 2.2.312-3 17. Chapter 4.

The one and many faces of cosrnopolitanism

I. COSMOPOLITANISM AND ITS CRITICS

In both ancient and modem worlds cosmopolitan ideas have developed alongside, if

not directly in response to, the posited social, political, economic and ethical imperatives of a divided world. Consequently the salience of such ideas may be measured more by the level of contestation than of acceptance. Despite its long history, an uncontentious account of the

implications of a cosrnopolitanism ethical perspective still eludes political and moral

theorists. Part of the difficulty of understanding the precise nature of cosmopolitanism, as well as its relationship with other perspectives, lies in the myriad ways it has been

undentood, or perhaps more accurately, rnis~uzderstood.A plethora of images, rnany

inconsistent if not altogether contradictory, confiont students of cosmopolitanism. Critics

target its various alleged manifestations - as political visions,' ethical commitments,' and

economic agendas5- without being entirely clear about how these disparate expressions or

cosmopolitanism cohere under a single paradigm.

' See Derek Heater, IVorld Citizenship and Government: Cosmopolitan Ideas in the History of Wesrern Political Thorrght (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996) for a comprehensive histoncal account of political cosmopolitanism, which advocates a global system of government entailing individual wortd citizenship.

' For a populi^ example, see Martha Nussbaum, "Patriotism and Cosmopoiitanism'' The Boston Revimv 19,s (1994), pp. 3-9. Reprinted in Nussbaum, For Love of Cotrnfqr debating the limits ofpan-iorism, Joshua Cohen ed. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1996).

' For a Rawlsian view of international distributive justice, see Charles R Beig Political Theoy and hternational Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), pp. 125-176; for a rights-based view, see Henry Shue, Basic Righ~:Subsistence, Afluence, and US.Foreign Policy (Princeton: Pnnceton University Press, 1996,~~edition). In contradiction or confusion, economic comopoiitanism is somebmes considered synonymous with economic globalization, and a neo-liberal economic agenda, My aim in this chapter is to clai@ our understanding of cosmopolitanism as a coherent ethical perspective, which will aid our development in the next chapter of a cosmopolitan account of the publiclpnvate construct, state privacy, and intervention in international relations. A cosmopolitan ethic is commonly understood to refer to a universalistic rnorality that eschews parochial, especially national, limitations or prejudices.'

Morc positivcly, a cosrnopolitan cthical pcrspcctirc cntails the ail~owledgementaf some notion of comrnon humanity that translates ethically into an idea of shared or comrnon moral duties toward others by virtue of this humanity.' H.C. Baldry refen to it as an "attitude of mind" centered on the notion of human unity.' Martha Nussbaum defines a cosmopolitan as someone "whose primary allegiance is to the community of human beings in the entire world?' The universality and generality" of a cosmopolitan ethical orientation ultimately have their roots in a universalist conception of the right and the good. As Nussbaum states elsewhere in the sarne article, the cosmopolitan stance asks us "to give our first allegiance to what is morally good - and that which, being good, 1 cmcomrnend as such to ail human beings."" Cosmopolitanism so conceived as ethical universalism presents a clear and

This defuiition cornes from the O-~$ordEnglish Dictiunary.

' While 1 will be focusing on the western tradition of comopolitan thought, cosmopolitan themes may dso be found in the philosophic and mon1 Lives of other civilizations. For a discussion of the concept of hurnanity in pre-Confician as weIl as Confucian philosophy, see Wing-Tsit Chan (tmlator and compiler), ri Source Book in Chinese PItilosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), pp. 348. For a vivid picture of cosmopolitanism with a Chinese face, see Yi& Tuan, Cosmos and Hearth: a cosmopolite 's viavpoint (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota press, l996), pp. 15-7 1. a H.C.Baldry, The Unity of Mankind in Greek Thoughr (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965), p. 122.

Nussbaum, "Patriotisrn and Comopoiitanism," nie Boston Revïew, p. 3.

'O See Thomas Pogge, "Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty," Ethics, 103 (1992), pp. 48-75.

" Nussbaum, "Patriotism and Cosrnopolitanism," p. 3. 136 provocative challenge to the ethical particularism of national and other more parochial sources claiming our moral allegiance.

Critics fmd radically diverse faults with the cosmopolitan perspective. As part of our goal to understand cosmopolitanism, it may be fniitful to examine the points of contention between it and competing perspectives. 1 will be especially concemed with the challenges posea by reaiist anci cornmunitarian perspectives. Reaiists regard cosmopolitan daims as too optimistic for a divided hurnanity, while communitarians generally find them too threatening to key moral goods, such as communal autonomy and plurality. A cosmopolitan perspective is thus at best utopian, and at worst, dangerous, for imperfect and diverse humanity. It assumes too much of the natural bond between human beings, tips the moral balance too much in favour of cold universal reason at the expense of more partial sentiment, and cares too little about the boundaries that preserve individual, but especially collective, integrity.

ïhese critiques reveal distinct but related negative images of cosmopolitanism as idealism, rationalism, and impenalism. For cosmopoiitanisrn to daim any moral force, it must refute these portrayals. Let us begin, then, with a view of cosmopolitanism through the eyes of its critics.

The perils of utopian idealism

International realists have charactenzed the defining divide in twentieth-century intemational relations as m.antithesis between idealism and realisrn." E.H. Cam focuses on this dichotomy in his classic work, The Twenty Yeurs ' Crisis, asserting that the contest between idealism and realism represents the enduring and intractable conflicts between free-

" Edward Haiiett Cam, The Twenry Years ' Crisis 19 19- 1939: An Introduction to the Study of lnreniational Relations (New York: Harper & Row, 1946,2* edition). 137 will and detexminisrn, theory and practice, and ethics and politics. As we have noted earlier,

"realism is founded on a pessimism regarding mord progress and human possibilities;"" in contrast, idealism is sustained by a naïve optimism that involves undue faith in the inevitability of moral progress and human perfectibility. Realist critiques of cosmopolitanism have consistently been bound up in this posited dichotomy. They consistently portray cosmopolitan ideas as belonging in the reaim ofidraiism, from politicai visions of world govemment, collective security and global distributive justice to the ethical arguments appealing to a notion of comrnon humanity that underlies them.

The universalist implications of the idea of cornmon humanity, expressed in such phrases as "al1 men are brothers,"" seem utopian in a world marked by Fragmentation, discord, and conflict. Far fiom a unity or community of hurnankind, realists such as Gilpin see "a world of scarce resources and conflict over the distribution of those resources," where

"human beings confront one another ultimately as members of [non-universal] group~."'~The moral cornrnunity of hurnankind, posited by Nussbaurn and other cosmopolitan theorists, does not accord with the reality of the human condition. Because we live in a broken rather than united world, arnongst self-interested rather than altruistic groups, no harmony or reconciliation of universd and particular, public and private, or international and national, interests can be assurned, or perhaps, even attained.

l3 Robert C. Gilpin, 'The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism," in Neorealism and Its Cricies, Robert O. Keohane ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, I986), p. 304.

Martin Wight, lntemational Theory: The ïïzree Traditions. ed. Gabriele Wight and Brian Porter (London: Leicester University Press, I996), p. 45. l5 Gilpin, "The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realisrn," p. 305. 138 Realists have targeted idealisrn not only because of its intellectual failings, but also because, as Gilpin has stated, "a moral cornmitment lies at the heart of realism."16 Realists believe that idealizing humanity and the hurnan condition, resulting in utopian views of the nature of politics and the possibility of its transcendance with a more harmonious ethic, will only undermine international and human security. The realist in Hedley Bull asserts that in positing 3 cornmunir). of hummkind thnt is "destined to siveep the system of states into limbo," cosmopolitan ideals threaten international order and stability. In their "aim at uniting and integrating the family of nations" such ideals "in practice divide it more deeply than ever before."" Idealistic cosmopolitanism thus produces no ideal, but its antithesis. Its denial of the facis of human existence makes cosmopolitanism a misleading cornpass for action.

Realists thus fear that adopting a cosmopolitan ethical orientation would lead many individuals, and states, to min.

That idealism and realism are polar opposites is clear; what requires further examination in the realist critique is the posited connection between idealisrn and cosmopolitanisrn. 1s the idealistic foundation targeted by realists intnnsic to cosmopolitanism as an ethical perspective? As we shall see, a realist view of the human condition can lead us toward rather than away kom embracing cosmopolitanism as a moral orientation. We can agree with realists that moral theories relying on a misplaced faith in human perfectibility or moral progress or a natural harmony of interests are superficial and practically untenable, without agreeing that a cosmopolitan moral perspective necessarily suffers nom these failings.

" Hediey Bu& "Martin Wight and the theory of international relations" British Journal of International Strrdies, 2 (1976):lOl-116 at pp. 105 and 109. 139 We should acknowledge, of course, that some historical conceptions of cosmopolitanism have indeed been guilty of utopianism.18 Idealistic cosmopolitanism is intncately associated with expressions of the cosmopolitan ideal in European Enlightenrnent thought, which stressed the significance of human reason in the advancement of civilization.

A belief in the "unity and immutability of reason," that it was "the same for al1 thinking subjects, al1 nations, al1 epochs, and al1 cul~~er"~~gave the eighthteenth centun] a cornplacent attitude about the inevitability of moral and intellectual progress guided by reason.

According to Enlightenrnent rationalists, Reason's "province was to lay dom certain definite, incontrovertible principles, and then, in the light of those same principles, to deduce conclusions equally definite and incontrovertible."" Carr mocked this Enlightenrnent faith in universal reason, especially in the dornain of international relations: "Reason could dernonstrate the absurdity of the international anarchy; and with increasing knowledge, enough people would be rationally convinced of its absurdity to put an end to it."" Critiques of cosmopolitanism as idealism thus share key points of affinity with critiques of cosmopolitanism as rationalism, to which we now turn.

" See Thomas I. Schlereth, The Cosmopolitan Ideai in Enlightenmenr Thoughc irrforrn mdfunction in the idem of Franklin, Hume and Voltaire (1694- 1790) (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, L 977); and Daniel Gordon, 'The Origins of a Polarity: cosmopolitanism versus citizenship in early modern Europe," unpublished paper deiivered at the annual meeting of the Conference for the Study of Poiitical Thought, Madison, Wisconsin, November 1998.

'' Emt Cassirer Zïte Philosophy of the Enfightenment tram. Fritz CA.Koelln md James P. Pettegrove (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), p. 6.

Paul Hazard, The European Mind [ZdBO-l7 151 (Cleveland, Ohio: The World Publishing Company. 1963), p. 119.

" Cm, rire Twenty Years ' CNk, p. 26. 140 The cold and lonely road of rationalism

Along with their disparagement of cosmopolitanism's misguided faith in human unity, cntics also decry its adherence to a concomitant ideal of universal human reason. For cosmopolitan rationality, with its abstract and impartialist airs, is either illusory or cold and alienating if realized.

The critique of the posited impartiality of cosmopolitan rationality has spccial forcc when we consider the cultural plurality, as well as the economic disparity, in the world. The impartialist daims ofcosmopolitanism have, since ancient times, clashed with criticsy portrayals of cosmopolitanism as paternalistic and elitist, an ethic formulated by a small privileged group of intellectuals." Its universalist and impartialist pretensions obscure the fact that cosmopolitans of the past spoke only to the experience of a minonty of people in the world, or even in their own society. Indeed cosmopolitan thinken of the eighteenth century were known ~nconsciously[to] measure mankind by criteria of their own rati~nality"~in their development of a cosmopolitan ideal. As Sheidon Hackney has asked, "cm any conception of universal reason escape being culture bound?""

Since people cannot escape from involvement in particular families, cultures and societies, cntics of the abstraction of cosmopolitan rationality also focus on its psychological tenability. As Nussbaurn has put it in descnbing this line of criticism, "cosmopolitanism seems to have a hard tirne gripping the imaginati~n."~Hurnanity is too large and abstract a category with which to evoke the passions of moral commitment, obligation, and Ioyalty.

Schiereth, The Cosmupolitun Ideut, p. 14.

Ibid,, 57.

'' Sheldon Hackney, b'PIuralism in One Country," Boston Raiov 19,s (1994), p. 32.

25 Nussbaum, "Paîriotism and Cosmopolitaniçm," p. 6. 141 Reason may posit a community of hurnankind, but most people live in much more parochial cornmunities, bounded by kin, culture, and state. The human being is an abstraction compared to my brother, my cultural community, or rny co~ntry.'~As Walzer has put it, "our common humanity will never make us members of a single universal tribe. The crucial cornrnonality of the humaq race is particularism: we participate, al1 of us, in thick cultures that are our own.'" Cosmopolitmism does not ûdequately iiccommodatc îhc human nccd to belong to cornmunities of meaning and purpose." As the world becomes more vast, impersonal and anonymous, people will seek more bounded, intimate and intelligible cornmunities." Furthemore, as Gilpin has argued, "Homo sapiens is a tribal species, and loyaity to the tribe for most of us ranks above al1 loyalties other than that of the farr~il~."'~

This critique thus challenges the view that a common moral identity can develop out of more intense interaction between individuals and cultures. Historically, at least, cosmopolitan daims have lost to those embodied by more parochial sources of identification; thus, the posited cornrnunity of humankind has been eclipsed by the nse, in ancient Greece, of the polis and in Enlightenment Europe, of the nation-state.

Not only are critics skeptical about the empincal feasibility of cosmopolitan rationality, they also question its moral desirability. Cornmunitarians tend to argue not only that loyalty to our particular 'tribe' does rank above al1 other loyalties, but that it ozcght to be

'' See Michael SandeI, 'The procedural repubiic and the unencumbered self," Pofitical Theoty 12 (1984), pp. 8 1-96.

" MichaeI Waizer, Thick and Thin: Moral Argument ut Home and Abroad, (Notre Dame, indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994), p. 83.

' Michael Lemer, "Empires of Reason," Boston Reviov 19,5 (1994), p. 22.

"> Arthur Schlesinger Jr., "Our Country, Right or Wrong," Boston Review 19,s (1994), p. 21. 142 privileged, because membership and participation in Our 'tribe' is the very source of moral life as most of us know it. The highly particularistic sources of identity must have more weight in the creation of the self, including the moral self, than the category of common humanity. According to Macintyre, cornmunitarian morality posits that membership in a bounded political cornrnunity is "a prerequisite for morality," and that if "it is the case that 1 aii charac:cristically brought into bcing and naintaincd as a mon1 agcnt only through the particular kinds of moral sustenance afforded by my community, then it is clear that deprived of this community, 1 am unlikely to flourish as a moral agent."" Loyalty to one's particular political comrnunity, rather than to some abstract community of humankind, should thus be every individual's highest moral obligation.

Ultimately these critics worry about whether cosmopolitanism cm give more particularistic attachrnents and loyalties their due. Max Boehm defined cosmopolitanism as

"a mental attitude prompting the individual to substitute for his attachments to his more

immediate homeland an analogous relationship toward the whole world, which he cornes to regard as a greater and higher father~and."~'Martin Wight similarly faults cosmopolitanism

for "proclaiming a world society of individuals, which ovemides nations or states, dirninishing or dismissing this middle link.'"' Implicit in their characterizations of cosmopolitanism is the assumption of a dichotomy between the one and the many, the

'O Gilpin, "The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism," p. 305.

" Alasciair Machtyre, "Is Patriotisrn a Virtue?" in 7'heorizing Citizemhip, Ronald Beiner ed. (Albany, New York: State University ofNew York, 1995), pp. 209-228 at p. 218. SimiIarIy, "1 €id my justification for allegiance to these rules of morahty in my particular community: deprived of the life of that community, I would have no reason to be mord." (p. 2 17)

'' Max Boehm, "Cosmopolitanism,**Encyclopedia of rhe Social Sciences 4 (New York: Madlan, 1932), pp. 457-61 at p. 458, italics mine.

I3 Wight, Internntional Theory. p. 45, italics mine. universal and the particular, humanity and cornrnunity, reason and sentiment, obligation and loyalty. While idealistic cosmopolitanism cm be faulted for assuming an unproblematic harmony between these, the critique against rationalistic cosmopolitanism is that given a recognition of their incompatibility, a cosmopolitan ethic errs in granting priority to the one over the many, to abstract universal obligations at the expense of concrete particular Ioyalties and aff~fiations.

The idea that a cosmopoIitan perspective necessady denigrates or dismisses more particulaistic ethics is indeed encouraged by some conceptions of cosmopolitanism. This impression has grown partly due to a literal reading of the provocative expressions of cosmopolitan sentiments by those such as the Cynic Diogenes, who claimed to be a

''wanderer" with "no city, no home, no fatherland."" Amanda Anderson notes the popular

use of cosmopolitanism "to denote cultivated detachment from restrictive forms of

identity."'' Jeremy Waldron has mistakenly embraced this notion of rootlessness instead of challenging its appropriateness as a description of the cosmopolitan identit~.'~The phrase

"rootless cosmopolitan," however wom, reveals what critics perceive to be a deficiency of

the cosmopolitan self.37 A cosmopolitan, by being able to be many things, "we fear, is really

'* Baldry, The UrtiryofiWmkinci, p. 108.

'5 Amanda Anderson, "Cosmopolitanism, univenaIism, and the divided legacies of modemity," in Cosrnopolitics: thinLing and feeling beyond the nation, Pheng Chezth and Bruce Robbins eds. (Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 1998), pp. 265-259 at p. 266.

" See Jeremy Waldron, "Minoxity Cultures and the Cosnopolitan Alternative," University of Michignn Journal of Law Refonn 25,314 ( l992):75 1-793. For example, in defence of the cosmopolitan self, WaIdron argues that "being withotrt mots in a particular communiry is not necessady the same as being isolrited or tkiendless" (p. 768; emphasis mine).

'7 Günter Grass tells us that the political right used this term in the 1930s "to sbptize Ge- lettist inteiIectuals, many of whom were Jewish." See his "Short Speech by a Rootless Cosmopotitan" Dissent (1990), p- 458. Ironicdy Voltaire criticized Jews for seeming "to remain singularly uncosmopolitan in their relations with other peoples." (SchIereth, The Cosrnopolitan Ideal, p. 82; emphasis mine). 14 no one, a man without allegiance9'- "He is not, in positive ternis, afi-rend to all, but merely not a ~tran~er."'~The cosmopolitan is fated to a world of supeficiality, far fkom the real world of blood and belonging.

Ln fact: critics argue, the ethical implications entailed by a cosmopolitan perspective are largely hypocritical. Boehm put the point cogently:

.. .on the whde the actual obligations whicli cosniopolitanism lays upon its iidiérents are comparatively negligible - the more so because in practise it seldom goes beyond demonstration, sentimentality, propaganda and sectarian fanaticism. Hence it often exists among persons whom fortune has relieved fiom the irnmediate stmggle for existence and from pressing social responsibility and who can afford to indulge their fads and enthusia~rns.'~

Cosmopolitanism may be an ambitious ethical perspective, yet ironically, perhaps precisely because of its worldly aspirations, it has virtually no real world application.

The inevitable dichotomy and ethical contrast between the universal and the particular, however, is more of€en assumed than explained or examined. Understanding the normative relationship between them is crucial to a morally viable and coherent conception of cosmopolitanism. For now, however, let us continue with the cntics' line of argument.

The Iogic of imperialism

Cosmopolitan views of human unity and rationality, unable to account for deep difference," tend toward a monistic vision of humanity. Indeed, Enlightenrnent rationalisrn canied a revolutionary impulse in its critique of tradition, for according to Reason, the

'korld was full of errors, errors bom of human self-illusion and encouraged by irresponsible

" John Bryant, "Nowhere a Süanger': Melville and Comopolitanism," Nineteenth-Century Fiction 39.3 (1984). pp. 275-29 1 at pp. 278 and 280.

39 Boehm, "Cosmopolitanism," p. 458.

" Lloyd Rudolph. The Occidental Tagore." Boston Rmkv 19.5 (1994), p. 2 1. 145 authority.. . The fist thing then [Reason] had to do was to effect an enormous clearance, to get rid of that gigantic mass of errer?' The cosmopolitan penchant for monism leads to the third cntical image of cosmopolitanism.

By imagining hurnankind to be "a unity, united by the faculty of reason, capable of pursuing the same ends through the same channels,'"' cosmopolitanism naturall y fosters aspirations for a universal itatz and attempis at world conquest. "Scratch a cosrniipoiitim iuid you'll find an imperialist just below the surface," as Ronald Beiner has put it in describing this line of c~iticism.'~We can trace in Wight's understanding of cosmopolitanism the essential continuity of the seerningly diverse critiques of cosmopolitanism as idealism, rationalism and impenalism. According to Wight, cosmopolitanisrn begins with an ideal of human unity, but because not al1 men are brothers, nor al1 women sisters, they will have io be forced to be so. Because humankind is not a unity, a cosmopolitan ethical perspective begets a politics that must rely on coercion to bnng about its vision of human harmony. The idealism of cosmopolitanism thus ends with a nightmarish quest for hegemony; in assurning the best of humanity, cosmopolitanisrn becomes its worst enemy.

Wight prefers a society of states, with al1 its failings, to a cosrnopolitan revolution that will destroy not only that socieîy but the order and stability that it provided to international as well as domestic scenes. His discornfort with cosmopolitanism ultimately reflects a deeper and larger concem about the effect of radical normative change on the lives of ordinary men and women. While we can agree with Wight that taking cosmopolitanism

" Hazard, The European Mnd, p. 120.

" Martin Wight, "An anatomy of international thought" Review of lnternationol Snidies 13 (1987). p. 226.

" RonaId Beiner, "1989: Nationalism, Internationaiism, and the Nairn-Hobsbawm Debate," Archives européennes de sociologie 40, 1 (1999), pp. 171-184 at p. 178. 146 senously might entail a revolution in perspective afiecting al1 realms of human conduct, we need not assume that such a revolution will necessarily occur suddenly or violently. hdeed we can think of some 'revolutionary' changes in ethics, politics, and econornics that have occurred in human histories that did not entail massive violent upheaval and wholesale destruction of previous social, political or economic structures. We cm condemn, in agreement lvith Wight, methods of change th3t inflict unnecessr; and excessive hardships on people here and now, without going so far as to deny the moral shortcomings of existing arrangements, and the need for their arneliontion.

While the conservative critique of cosmopolitanism focuses on its revolutionary propensities that threaten to subvert established modes and orders, radicals view cosmopolitanism as an ethical doctrine that too easily plays into the hands of the powerful, be they states, cultures or multinational corporations, providing an ideological basis for the maintenance or enhancement of their dominance. Sun Yat-sen, China's first modem revolutionary, for exarnple, saw cosmopolitanism as impenalism, Erom a nther different perspective than Wight: "Cosmopolitanism .. . is the same thing as China's theory of world empire two thousand yean ago. .. . China once wanted to be sovereign lord of the earth and to stand above every other nation, so she espoused cosm~politanism.~" In this vein Carr argued that international 'order' and 'international solidarity' "will always be slogans of those who feei strong enough to impose t'hem on other~.'"~Emmanuel Wallerstein has thus commented that connopolitan ideals "cm be used just as easily to sustain privilege as to

Quoted in Cm, The Twenty Years ' Crisis, p. 85. Yi-Fu Tuan tek us that the Chinese have historically "equated their own culture with universal culture (civilization)." See Tuan, Cosmos and Hearth, p. 64.

J5 Cm, The Twenty Years' Cnkir, p. 87. 147 undermine it,'"' rendering it useless to those who seek to draw from it a consistent political agenda for change.

Given this ambiguity cosmopolitanism can daim no clear moral superiority over other more parochial ethical doctrines. Thus Michael Walzer has argued that "penrerted cosmopolitans" have been responsible for as many cnmes of the twentieth century as

"pcwcrtcd patri~ts.'"~WC caïot dcny the cogency of 'bis intique wlm we consider tliosc religious, political and economic ideologies in hurnan history that have attempted to univenalize their doctrines through violent or coercive means in the narne of some grand universal aim, be it spiritual salvation, civilkation, Creedom, Free trade or even justice.'" militant cosmopolitanism might indeed breed global slavery rather than Freedom. The image of cosmopolitanism as impenalism leads us to address the issue of the role and use of coercion in the advancement of ethical goals. Do cosmopolitan truths justib the use of coercion? If not, can they ever be effectual? Ifjustice without force is a myth, what is the ethical value of justice with, or perhaps, ihrotrgh force?

Indeed, this image casts grave doubts on the tenability of cosmopolitanism as an ethicai perspective. To address this critique, we might ask whether the universalism entailed by a cosmopolitan ethical perspective need be absolutist. Cosmopolitanism, as a viable ethical perspective, depends on a distinction between universalisms that are absolutist and those that are not. Walzer's critique of cosmopolitanism inadvertently leads us to acknowledge that it is not only universal perspectives like cosmopolitanism that cm suffer

- -- . - * Emmanuel Wallerstein, 'Weither Patriotism, Nor Cosmopolitanism," Boston Rwiav 19,s (1994), p. 15.

" Michael Waizer, "Spheres of Affection," Boston Review 19,s (1994), p. 29.

" See ïsaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Libery (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989). 148 fiom absolutism; parochial doctrines like ones that espouse the inherent superiority of a certain racial or national group, for example, have also been known to breed imperialistic and totalitarian enterprises.

II. RE-IMAGINING COSMOPOLITANISM

Given the seriousness of the cntics' charges one might be tempted to pronounce cosmopolitanism dead as an ethical perspective. Can cosmopolitanism as a moral orientation escape utopian idealism, rootless rationality, and brutish imperialism? Are cosmopolitan projects doomed to bring disaster onto humanity? To salvage cosmopolitanisrn as a moral perspective, we need to illuminate different images of humanity.

The fragility of being human

Critics have asserted that the cosmopolitan idea of humankind as one family or

community is utopian. Yet this idealistic reading ofphrases like 'al1 men are brothers' is a

surprising interpretation, given universal experiences of sibling and familial discord. Indeed,

much of literature ancient and modem, not to mention post-modem, find within the subject of

the family al1 the conflict and failings of human relations outside the fmily. The stories of

Cain and Abel, King Lear and his daughters, and Dostoyevsky's brothers Kararnazov, to note

some well-known examples, al1 depict family relationships in less-than-ideal and certainly

not harxnonious terms. The mere assertion that al1 hurnan beings comprise a unity like a

family would not seem then to lead to any automatic conclusions about the hannony of

hurnan relations, unless one holds excessively idealistic assumptions about families and other

group relations. Yet a cosrnopolitan view of human unity need not be utopian.

The idea of comrnon or shared humanity entails common circumstances that make the

idea of a human condition intelligible. In the works of Homer, these common circumstances 149 defined who was human and who was not. As Baldry notes, "Homer's normal word for a human being was not anthropos, but 'mortal', brotos or thretos? a condition that sepanted humanity from the gods. Human beings, children of one of the lesser gods, were far from being the "paragon of animals" and closer to being the "quintessence of d~st."'~Not surprisingly the earliest cosmopolitans were medical writen such as Hippocrates, habitually exposed in ilieir work tu iliz pliysical and mental frailtics of &lieIiunian body iuid niind. Tiie unity of humankind consists in this comrnon human condition: a wretched, feeble and pitiable existence, marked by uncertainty, insecurity and eventually death. Thucydides* description of the plague's effects in Athens in the second year of the Peloponnesian War also shows an awareness of this natural equality of human vulnerabi~ity.~'In modem times,

Albert Camus has offered us a similar view of humanity, united in Our common capacity to suffer? The idealistic cosmopolitanism of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Europe thus cornpetes with a more ancient cosmopolitanism based on saddcr ûuths about the huma. condition.

A keen awareness of the fragility of being human is not an exclusive preserve of realists. It is precisely this view of the human condition that underlies Judith Shklar's

liberalisrn of fear." Her assertion that cruelty is the pnmary human vice evokes not the

Baldry, Tlle Lfniw of Mankind, p. 12.

" Shakespeare, aml let. 2.2.3 12-3 17.

'' Thucydides, Histo y of the Peloponnesian War tnns. Rex Wamer (Markham, Ontario: Penguin, 195J), pp. 151-156.

" Albert Camus, The Plague trans. Stuart Gilbert (Markham, Ontario: Penguin, 1986). It is a fate, of course, that is not distinctly human, for our vulnerability to decay and death connects us with ail living things. Remembering that a cosmopolite in classic times was a 'citizen of the universe ' reminds us that cosmopolitanism as an ethical perspective likely entails morai obligations towards al1 living things, including animals and the natural environment,

" AIthough Shklar does not cal1 henelf a cosmopolitan theorist, her sympathy for a cosmopoiitan ethical 150 idealistic image of humanity as a harmonious unity, but forces us to pay attention to human conflict, insecurity and suffering. Quintessentially cosmopolitan in her moral outlook, since

"putting cruelty first" appeals to a universai human capacity to inflict and suffer hm,

Shklar's morals are nevertheless wholly free of idealist assumptions. For Shklar does not begin with a utopian vision of what cm be achieved given a belief in the perfectibility of human nature or the inzviiabiliiy OC moral progess; instrad she begins "with what is ro be avoided."'" Far fiom holding an optimistic view of hurnan possibilities, Shklar's libenlism of fear becomes "more a recipe for survival than a project for the perftectibility of rnanki~zd."'~Shklar's work is valuable to the debate in international relations theory between idealism and realism precisely because her arguments constantly expose the falseness and inadequacy of this posited dichotomy in characterizing the nature of the distinctions behveen various ethical perspectives.

While putting cruelty fint for its amont against our comrnon humanity may be distinctively cosmopolitan, al1 ethical perspectives can condemn cruelty, or the act of taking delight in, or being indifferent to, the unjustified pain and suffenng of others. Thus realists should want to avoid it because, given the fear and mistrust it inspires, cruelty breeds

insecurity, and cornmunitarians would condemn it for inhibiting mutual caring and

fellowship. For liberals, as Shklar has pointed out, ct-uelty "is often utterly intolerable .. . perspective is apparent in her works, and is especially evident in her telling characterization of her disagreements with Michael Walzer as "a dialogue between an exile and a citizen." See Judith N. Shklar, 'The Work of Michael Walzer," in Political 7%oughtand Political Thinkers. Stanley Hoffmann ed. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1998), p. 377. In her critique of an interpretivist approach to social criticism, Shklar writes, "Surely 'we' ... want not oniy to Say that Shakespeare and Kant wrote a great tex& but we also want to Say, as ordinary men and women, 'this is unjust' and this is 'fair,' not just for you and me but for ali humanity." (p, 379)

Y Judith N. Shkiar, Ordinary Vices (Cambridge, Mass: Hantard University Press, l984), p. 5.

55 Ibid., p. 4, italics mine. 151 because fear destroys freed~rn,"'~and not, as John Kekes has speculated, because cruelty is the opposite of benevo~ence.~'Different ethical approaches may value differently moral goods such as freedom, humanity, cornmunity and security, but in acknowledging that al1 these goods can be destroyed by cruelty and fear, ethical perspectives may be united in their condernnation of cnielty. The moral cornmitment that Gilpin asserts lies at the heart of realism is thus not incompatible, bui has dzep resernbiances, with the mord cornmiunent ar the heart of cosmopolitanism. Focusing on cnielty rather than insecurity, however, reminds us that our cornmitment is a moral one, and makes us less inclined to solve the problem of insecurity through means that are themselves morally questionable.

Recognizing the significance of cruelty as a moral vice, public and private, not only forces us to see humans as potential victims and sufferers, it also requires us to confront the unpleasant reality of humans as agents responsible for such vice and malice. Thus Shklar wams that putting cruelty first "dooms one to a life of skepticism, indecision, disgust, and oAen misanthropy.'"' Indeed the loathing of human cruelty itself can generate a misanthropy that motivates the worst cruelties cornmitted by humankind. Realists, "overwheimed Iike

Harnlet by the density of e~il,"~~perhaps have more oRen fallen prey to this danger. Realist pessimism tinged with misanthropy accounts for the moral failings of classical and contemporary realism. Crushed by the ubiquity of cruelty and consumed by misanthropy, some realists are led to reject al1 morality as a sham, and to advocate a politics of power. Yet

56 ibid., p. 2.

John Kekes, "Cruelty and Liberahan," Ethics 106 (1996), pp. 834-844.

" Shklar, "Putting Cruelty Fkt," in Ordinary Vices, p. 8.

59 Ibid., p. 13. 152 Shklar shows us that our sunival, individual and collective, depends on our resolve to avoid misanthropy and confiont the worst of human vices without moral despair or resignation.

Cosmopolitanism's moral condernnation of cruelty translates at a minimum into a moral obligation to uphold the pnnciple of humanity, to do our best "to prevent and alleviate human suffering wherever it may be found.'- Cosmopolitanisrn requires us to pay attention to the cries of victims in the flash, a difficult mk@en iiow suffering usualiy takes place,

"while someone else is eating or opening a window or just walking dully along?"

Individuals and societies attempt to manage persona1 and public responsibility For suffering by making a distinction between misfortune and injustice." At the international level, until very recently, the suffering of individuals and some groups - whether the cause be famine, civil war or pestilence - tended to be discounted as misfortunes, for international society could only admit clairns of justice and injustice bemeen States. The normal mode1 of justice in international as in domestic society, however, can be a temble burden to anyone whose suffering cannot be acknowledged or redressed within its bounds. Shklar's appeal to "take the victim's view'" is thus at least potentially cosmopolitan in enabling us to recognize the suffering of the exile, refhgee, enemy and stranger.

" The principle of humanity, so describeci, is found in The Fundamentd Principles of the Internotional Red Cross and Red Crescent ~bfovement(proclairned by the XXth International Conference of the Red Cross, Geneva, 1965).

61 W.H.Auden, "Musée des Beaux Ans," in Selected Poem (New York: Vintage International, 1989), p. 79.

" See Judith N. Shklar, The Faces of injustice (New Haven: Yak University Press, 1990). a ibid., p. 126. 153 Justice for the one and the many

Focusing on cruelty, especially the physical kind, also challenges the critics' image of cosrnopolitanism as rationalism in putting our sentient aspect to the fore, the feeling rather

than thinking human being. As Shklar has observed, "Putting cruelty first .. . is too deep a threat to reason for most philosophers to contemplate it at ail.'* This is because the fear engandcred by cmelty 'breducesus to mere reactivc units of sensation.'*6i Yet it is a view af humans as more than sentient beings that inspires a moral condernnation of cruelty.

Of coune, common sentient vulnerability does not completely define the human condition. For the ancient Greeks to be human was not to be a god; however, it was also not to be a beast. While the Beeting and uncertain nature of the human condition distinguishes humans kom the gods, articulate reasoned speech and ski11 separates hurnans From the rest of the animal w~rld.~~Human beings are imaginative expressive actors who do not merely act according to instinct, but possess the Freedorn to act according to values, meanings and

interpretations of tangible and intangible worlds which they themselves have a role in shaping and developing. Thus hurnans are part authon of themselves and their world. It is this rational capacity of hurnans that is threatened by cruelty, for in causing pain and fear, cruelty is "language-destroying,'" unmaking the self and the world it has created. Cruelty therefore has diverse implications, afTecting not only physical security, but also human

agency and autonomy.

Shklar, "Putting Cruelty First," p. 8.

Shklar, Ordinay Vices, p. 5.

" BaIdry, The Uniîy of Mankind, p. 15.

67 Elaine Scany, The Body in Pain: the Making and Unmaking of the World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 19. 154 The cosmopolitan image of humanity is thus more complex than its critics have allowed, and involves an irreducible duality. On the one hand, cosmopolitanism is founded on the recognition of a cornmon human condition marked by vulnenbility to suffenng. In this sense, hurnanity is one. On the other hand, the unity implied by this comrnon condition does not entail homogeneity or sameness, for to be human is also to be distinctively individual or particular. In this scnsc, humanitj- is mmy. From a iosmopolitan perspzitivc, hurnan beings are one and many thing~.~~

Critics of cosmopolitan rootlessness imply that this multiplicity of identities constitutes no real identity at all. The cnticism betrays a rather singular conception of human rootedness and belonging, and discornfort with the duality of hurnan existence and the potential conflicts it may engender. A cosmopolitan perspective, however, does not assert that individuals should aim to be rootless; rather it portrays individuals as possessing multiple ro~ts.'~Rather than being alienated or solitary, a cosmopolitan self acknowiedges its solidarity with a multiplicity of others. From this plurality we derive various sources of obligation and loyalty, affinity and difference. To those who want to assert the moral primacy of an unprobiematic allegiance to a single community, such as one's country, the cosmopolitan identity must be disconcerting, for multiple roots translate into divided loyalties. Thus to a cosmopolitan such as Shklar, betrayal cannot be the primary vice, for given the plural nature of human rootedness and belonging, disloyalty or betrayal may be

" See Samuel V. Laselva, The One and the Many: Pluralisn~,Expressivism, and the Canadian Political Nationality," in The iMoral Foundations of Canadiun Federalism: Parahes. khievements. and Tragedies of Nation hood (Montreal & Kingston: iMcGill-Queen's University Press, 1 W6), pp. 155- 170.

Simone Weil argued that each human being not oniy needs to be rooted, but "needs to have multiple roots." See Weil, The Need for Roots: Prelude to a dedaration of duties rowards mankind (London: Routledge & Kegan Pa4 1987), p. 41. 155 regrettable but is necessarily c~mmon.'~In misportraying a cosmopolitan as a person

'without allepiance,' cntics evade the cosmopolitan challenge of conceiving of the self as one and many things, a divided but single whole. A person without roots or allegiances is certainly doomed to superficiality, but a cosmopolitan, with multiple roots and bound by diverse compelling obligations, almost certainly is not.

Witli tiiis awareness, individual intzgity and communal authrnticity cannot rnean an unambivalent attachent to a singular conception of the self or community; rather what may be required is a recognition of their inherent complexity and a permanent state of imer doubt and contestation rather than harmony. The desire to reduce this conflict, and to solidify loyalty to one cause or group, leads to attempts to reduce the multiple sources of the self and of societies; historically and in our own tirne, this has resulted in the forced uprooting of entire groups and the whittling down of complex individual personalities into thin shadows.

Thus one of the first casualties of war is the ability to acknowledge the plural roots and divided loyalties of selves and of communities. One can be identified as an ethnic Albanian or a Serb, a Tutsi or a Hutu, but not as a Tutsi and a teacher and a mother of four, or a Serb and a pacifist who is married to a Croat. Inhurnanity consists not only in denying the fact that one's victims are human beings, but also in severhg the multitude of roots that embed them in a particular but common set of human relationships, producing an unaccommodated humanity deprîved of narnes, nationality, citizenship, religion, ethnicity, ethical convictions, political, economic, or social position?

"> Shklar, 'The Ambiguities of Betrayd," in Ordinary Vices, pp. 138- 19 1.

" See Kristen Renwick Monroe, "Review Essay: the Psychology of Genocide," Ethics & Internatiunul A.irs Vol. 9 (1999, pp. 215-239, for a view of the crucial part piayed by dehumanization in genocide. tndeed, whiIe some genocides occur in a context of 'ethnic' conflict, identifying others by their ethnicity still places them in the realm of human identities and relationships. Genocidal kiiiing seems to involve even discarcihg this identification, and is made easier when victims are likened to non-human objects, üke busàes that have to be 156 Far fiom denying human diversity, then, a cosmopolitan perspective makes us only too keenly aware of it, at al1 levels, within individuals and between them, as well as within communities and between them. A cosmopolitan understanding of the dual nature of human rootedness and belonging paradoxically allows us to recognize not only human plurality, but also the bonds of affinity between individuals and groups that are diverse in other respects.

Critics stiil worry that despite its acknowledgement of our more parochial selves, cosmopolitanism's cornmitment to universal justice necessitates a denigration of particular attachments. The idea that our more parochial loyalties constitute sources of monlity should lead us to examine the ways in which they are morally relevant. How would a cosmopolitan ethic address the common sentiment that we do owe more to our farnily memben, friends, and fellow citizens than to othen, and that the world would be a lesser place if we al1 lost this special sense of loyalty towards our own, however that is defined?

The quarrel between loyalty and obligation is not new. The hvo concepts are qualitatively different when we define obligation as "rule-governed conduct" emanating hm principles of justice, and loyalty as an emotional "attachrnent to a social gro~p."~This distinction between loyalty and obligation, however, does not entai1 their mutual exclusivity. hdeed, group loyalty and the feeling of belonging engendered by it cm serve as powerfùl motivations for people to hilfill their public or private moral obligations. Shklar argues, however, that the unavoidably exclusive nature of this kind of loyalty makes problematic those obligations we may have beyond our circles of loyalty and belonging. This is a great defect of basing moral obligation on centers of loyalty so conceived, since sociologically,

cleared, or bad weeds bat need uprooting, as bappened in the Rwandan genocide of 1994. See Gerard Prunier, The Rwanda Crîrk: Histoty of a Genocide (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), pp. 137-142.

" Judith Shklar, "Obligation, Loyalty, Exile," PoIitical Theory 21,2 (1993), pp. 181-197 at p. 184. 157 cruelty, inhumanity, and injustice are more easily perpetrated against 'others', who cannot claim our emotional loyalty, and who would thus by definition fa11 outside of our universes of obligation."

While affective loyalty may establish a bond between some derived fiom common group membership and fellowship, it is qualitatively different fkom the bond created by moral obligation and justice, which connects us not oniy to those with whom we share a sense of loyalty and belonging, but more importantly, to those with whom we do not. While we rnay feel that we owe more than justice requires to those with whom we have special attachments, we must, in the interest of justice, hlfill moral obligations sometimes at the expense of such attachments. Thus the bond of loyalty may reinforce the bond of justice, but should not replace it.

Richard Rorty has provocatively challenged this distinction between loyalty and obligation by characterizhg justice "as a larger loyalty." Rorty thinks it would be more usefûl to describe conflicts between loyalty and justice as "conflicts between loyalties to smaller groups and loyalty to larger groups," with justice as merely "the name for Our largest current loyalty."" A cosmopolitan conception of justice requires us to expand our circles of loyalty to inciude the human species or al1 living things, while a cornmunitarian conception of justice may only require the expansion ofour circles of loyalty to include one's fellow citizens. Ironically, although Rorty intends to challenge proponents of Kantian reason and

See William Giunson, "Hiroshima, the Holocaust and the Politics of Exclusion," Amerïcan Sociological Review 60 ( 1995), pp. 1-20.

'.'Richard Rorty, '(Justiceas a Larger Loyalty," in CosmopoIitics: Thinking and Feeling beyond the Nation, Comopolitics: Thinking and Feeling beyond the Nation, Pheng Cheah and Bruce Robbins eds, (Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 1998), pp. 47-57 at p. 47. justice, it is not only his understanding of justice that is problematic here, but his understandhg of loyalty.

Consider the case of conscientious objecton, such as those Americans who protested against the Vietnam War. If we follow Rorty, Amencan protestors were faced with conflicting loyalties between a smaller loyalty for their own country and fellow citizens, and a lugtr loyalty tiiat included tlie Vietnaniesz. And yrt, this characterization would be unsatisfactory to those who saw their protest as an expression of their loyalty, not to the

Vietnamese people or governrnent, whom they could hardly know, but to their own country.

If we cast the debate about the Vietnam war in terms of loyalty, it was not a confiict of loyalties between a smaller and a larger group, but a contest between two competing visions of what it rneant to be loyal to one's smaller particular group. Rorty's argument does not capture a concept like the 'loyal opposition,' and yet some of the rnost loyal chancters in literature exhibit this quality. King Lear's servant Kent, for exarnple, expresses his undying loyalty to the king by warning him of his folly. It is clear that Kent's primary motive in arguing with the irascible king is his loyalty to Lear's particular well-being, and not for any larger group."

Similarly, even if we concede the claim fiom the "morality of patriotism" that individuals have a moral obligztion to be loyal to their particular political cornrnunity, we are still left with the question of how loyalty is best expressed. Machtyre cautions near the beginning of his essay on patriotism that the concept "is not to be confused with a mindless loyalty to one's own particula. nation which has no regard at al1 for the charactenstics of that

" In a particuiarly poignant passage, Kent declares his reason for disobeying his master: "My Me 1 never held but as a padowage against theenemies; nor fear to lose it/iriy safety being motive," William Shakespeare, The Tragedy of King Leur (Ontario: The New American Library of Canada, 19 87), 1.1.1 57-1 59, 159 particular nati~n."'~Yet if patriots must view the nation as the very source of morality, then they leave nations judges of the moral desirability of their own charactenstics. If one accepts this view, paû-iotism would corne close to being a mindless loyalty to one's own particular nation, since the individual who belongs to a nation cannot have any other standpoint from which to evaluate her national charactenstics. Loyalty as a moral virtue is more than mere

~lbadiancaor ''lliz Iiabii of identifying oneszlf wi th a single nation or oher unit, placing it beyond good and eviLWn If being moral is to be loyal to ou.particular attachrnents, as the morality of patriotism asserts, and if being loyal to them is to be moral, then we must fùlfill

Our moral obligations, not only in the interest ofjustice, but also in the interest of our loyalty to our particular groups. Ifjustice were a kind of loyalty, it would not necessarily be a larger one, but a moral one."

While the irreconcilability of some demands for loyalty with moral obligation may be morally unproblematic, a similar irreconcilability between particular and universal obligations would be deeply trouble~orne.'~The dichotomization of loyalty and obligation tends to lead to a dichotomous view of particular and universal obligations. How should we conceive of their relationship? Danish director Kaspar Rostrup's film Mernories of a

~arriage"ooffers a compelling view of their moral reconciliation. The film recounts the joys

76 Machtyre, "1s patriotisrn a virtue'?" p. 2 10.

George Onvell, "Notes on Nationalid in Decline of the English Murder and Other Essays (Markham, Ontario: Penguin, 1988), pp. 155- 179 at p. 156.

78 Of course, Rorty's misguided understanding of cosmopolitan justice as loyalty to a larger group reveals the problematic nature of characterizing cosmopolitanism as a mord allegiance to "the human race" as "the community that is, most fundamentally, the source of aur moral obligations." See Nussbaum, "Patriotism and CosmopoLitanism," p. 4.

This is not to suggest that such conflicts are cornpIeteIy unproblematic, since they involve considerable emotional and psychologicd turmoil.

Kaspar Rostrup, director, Mernories of a Marriage (Nordisk FiIm, The Danish Film Institute, 1989), based 160 and sorrows in the life of an ordinary working class couple, Karl and Regitze Aage. in one scene Karl returns home to find that his young son has been unjustly punished at school by a teacher. Karl views it as a misfortune, saying, "That's too bad," and "What's done is done."

Regitze, unwilling to put up with the injustice, storms off to the bus stop, comrnitted to making her protest alone. As she is getting ready to leave, her son pleads with her not to go, arguing, 'That'!! only make things wone." When she has lefi the boy laments to his father,

"1 think she's mad too." The father then replies, "Your Mum is absolutely right. She's not doing this for your sake alone, get it? She's thinking about al1 the other kids he rnight sorne day beat up." Angry at his own cowardice, he leaves the house to join his wife.

In this case the particular affection a mother has for her son rnakes Regitze's outrage undentandable. We feel the father is a bit too humble for not wanting to protest officially against the ill-treatment of his own son. If Regitze went to protest only out of persona1 fidelity to her son, we would admire her matemal pnde and loyalty, but it would be difficult to see her action as cause for moral praise. However, Karl's explmation of Regitze's action shows how our particular attachments gain moral significance or worth when they are a window to our moral responsibilities, universal and particular.

In this case personal fidelity and family loyalty as well as parental obligation may al1 sustain a universal moral obligation to protest against injustice, but in some cases, these may al1 conflict. Kristin Renwick Monroe gives us tragic examples of conflicts behveen obligations in

on a novel by Martha Christensen. 161 her narratives of people who rescued Jews during the Holo~aust.~~Many rescuen exposed not only thernselves, but also their own families, to grave danger by hiding Jews in their homes. Monroe gives us compelling evidence that rescuers consistently, if not altogether consciously, gave priority to strangers' lives even at the expense of the safety of their own children. Rescuers knew of the dangers but did not do a cost-benefit analysis; rather, compcllcd by moral obligations dcrivcd hmthcir pcrccptions of a sharcd humanity, rescuers acted to help those in the direst need. As Bethe, a rescuer in Berlin who had three small children, put it:

"We knew what could happen. If they had caught us, we would have been taken away. The children would have been taken away. We absolutely knew this. But when they're standing at the door, and their life is threatened, what should you do in this situation? You could never do that [tum them a~ay]."~~

The supererogation of the rescuers, their sacrifice of their basic interests and needs for the basic moral claims of others, rnay be morally praiseworthy, but this extreme form of altruism would be a problematic basis for a theory of moral obligation. This is not mainly because such a theory would be unappealing to self-regarding human beings and therefore ineffective, as realists have argued, but because supererogation, in necessitating the possible sacrifice of one's very survival, cannot be morally required. It cannot thus serve as the central virtue underlying any theory of moral obligation."

To identiQ this central hue,we might note that while conflicts between loyalty and obligation may be unavoidable in the most well-ordered of societies, and perhaps, an

Monme, ne Hean ofAltruirm, pp. 9 1-120. See also Philip P. Hallie, Lest Innocent Blood Be Shed: the story of the village of Chambon and how goodness happeneci there (New York: HarperPerennial, 1994). a Quoted in Monroe, The Hean of Altruism p. 156.

" Of course, just because rescuen had the right to refuse help to imperiiled Jews does not mean that they wodd have done right by refUsing such he1p. 162 occasional feature of any enduring human relationship, the exceptional conflict befiveen obligations ultimately retlects the extreme injustice of a regime. The fact that rescuers had to nsk hmto themselves and their families in order to do nght by imperilled Jews is indicative of a context of extrerne injustice in which no available choice cm be morally unproblernati~.~~Simone Weil therefore identified the paramount importance of 'order,' or

"a texture of social relationsliips such that no one is compeiied to vioiare imperative obligations in order to carry out other ones."" We might cal1 this tight ordering jlcsrice. A world in which our universal and particular obligations were in perpetual conflict would not only be a deeply tragic world, but a grossly unjust one.

A cosmopolitan acknowledgement of our universal and particular obligations makes intelligible cries of injustice, inhumanity and intolerance beyond Our own spheres of affection, and requires those of us who are more fortunate to do what we cm to combat them.

Myopic cornunitarians or realists who are blind to our humanity, in its commonality as well as its diversity, are more likely to see misfortune instead of injustice beyond the gates of their own conununity, and in their resigned acceptance of a world of suffering, are more likely to commit passive injustice. From a cosmopolitan view, the fact that our obligations do conflict greatly at the international level should indicate to us the moral untenability of the existing state of global arrangements. While social and political psychologists may want to focus on illuminating the logic of altniistic behaviour, political theorists should perhaps concentrate on

85 indeed, in contexts of extreme injustice, rights as choices may have hale moral meaning. Consider the choice a Nazi oficer gives a Polish Jewish mother to Save either her son or daughter, in Sophie S Choice. Sophie hm a right to choose, but the moral perversity of this choice is apparent given that no choice she makes cm be rightt See Alan J. Pakula, director, Sophie f Choice (ITC Entertainment, 1982), based on a novel of the same name by William Styron.

*' Weil, The Needfor Roots, pp. 9-10. 163 resolving contexts of injustice which make not only altmism, but supererogation, necessary.

For it is not altruisrn, but justice, that is wanting in the ~orld.'~

Ethical tolerance, active not passive

The cornplex understanding of hurnanity, comrnunity and the self at the heart of a cosmopolitan ethical perspective, its twin focus on the one and the many, removes it further and hrther away From ideological absolutism and the critical image of cosrnopolitanism as imperialism. Absolutism as an ideal involves the assumption that human diversity and difference inevitably lead to conflict. An absolutist seeks to eliminate conflict by reducing this pluralism. Yet no ethical perspective can avoid some form of despotism ifit does not acknowledge the essential duality of the human condition. The noblest of motives may be corrupted by ideological absolutism, which has always excused cruelty and every other kind of injustice, public and private, against its enemies - the defective, the infidel, the heretic or dissident, the moderate and the tolerant.

The critique of cosmopolitanism as impenalism, however, seems puuling if we

remernber the use of the word 'cosmopolitan' in ordinary discourse to describe peaceful

social plriraky rather than homogeneity. A cosmopolitan city, afier all, is a place where

people and cultures fiom many or al1 parts of the world CO-habitin more or kss peaceful co-

existen~e.~'Cosmopolitanism so conceived is antithetical to absolutist universalism and

"implies toleran~e."~~~ndeed, as 1have suggested, a cosmopolitan ethical perspective sees

" This is a paraphrase of Mary Wollstonemft, who wrote, "It is justice, not charity, that is wanting in the world," See Wollstonecraft, A Vindication of the Righrr of Women (New York: Norton, 1967, originally published in 1792).

" This definition can be found in the WordEnglish Dictionary.

Tuan, Cosmos and Hearth, p. 3 1. 164 human pluralism as a source of reconciliation as well as conflict. Diversity alone therefore cannot account for human conflict; as John Locke put it with respect to the religious wars plaguing the Christian world, "it is not the diversity of opinions but the refusal of toleration to those that are of different opinions that has produced al1 the bustles and war~."~~

Toleration as an ethical virtue requires us to forbear from the use of violence and coercion to promote our view of the nght, the good, or the huth. Force is a. counterproductive method because the virtues that comprise the right and the good depend on the exercise of mon1 will, intention and agency, which render them intelligible. Someone who is coerced to do the nght thing cm be called cornpliant but not just or virtuous. A penon who is forced to subscribe to a belief may be a confomist, but not a true believer.

Coercion, then, corrupts the very accessibility of the right, the good, and the truth.

Some have sought another route to tolerance and the mitigation of human conflict, by positing a profound skepticism of al1 human knowledge, and asserting the relativity of al1 conceptions of truth, the right and the good. Moral relativism is of course, the medicine realists have prescribed for taming cosmopolitanisrn's missionary and coercive proclivities.

If we give up the idea of univenal huth or morality, realists argue, we may be less inclined to kill each other over conflicting conceptions ofit. Yet there is a difference between arguing that tmth and morality are not promoted well through coercion, and arguing that coercion is unjustified because there is no universal tmth or morality. The latter argument breeds relativism, which is antithetical to tolerance. As Samuel LaSelva has cogently argued, "What relativism produces is not tolerance but an abdication of responsibility for basic human

89 John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toieration in The Second Trearise of Civil Government and A Letter Concerning Toierution (Oxford: Basil Blackweli, 1W6), p. 163. 165 values," for ultirnately, "relativism is incapable of sustaining any values at ail?' Both ideological absolutism and relativism undermine tolerance, the foundation of peaceful co- existence. This is because relativisrn tends to breed passive indifference and unbridled licence, but not active tolerance.

It is important to note a cornrnon confusion between tolerance and passitivity. A cosmopolitanism that promoted passive indifference to the right, the good or the mith would hardly deserve the name of an ethical perspective. The importance of tolerance as a virtue to a cosmopolitan moral orientation, however, reveals the active and interventionary nature of this perspective, necessitated by its perception of a shared moral obligation to resist injustice.

Because injustice and cruelty occur in every sphere of human relations and in al1 societies and cultures, a cosmopolitan ethic entails interventionary action to resist them in public as well as private Me, at domestic and international levels. Yet a cosmopolitan approach also recognizes the inherent limits of coercion as a means to promote its ethicai ideals."

Cosmopolitanism's recognition of a shared moral obligation to combat cnielty and injustice commits us not only to refrain from doing injustice ourselves. Indeed, the world would still be a morally defective place if people rnerely avoided cornmitting active injustice.

A cosmopolitan ethic requires us to attach moral blame to "passive injustice," which is "the refusa1 of both officiais and of private citizens to prevent [or stop] acts of wrongdoing when they could and should do so," or "a failure to mitigate suffering that could have been alleviated.'"' Shklar's concern for victims led her to highlight this Ciceronian insight, for

Samuel V. LaSeha, 'Traditions of Tolerance: Relativisa Coercion, and Tmth in the political philosophy of W.J. S tankiewicz," in Holding One 3 Time in Thought: The Political Philosophy of KJ. Stankiewicz, ed. Bogdan Czaykowski and Samuel V. LaSeIva (Vancouver, SC.: Ronsdale Press, 1997), pp. 133 and 134.

'' Ibid., p. 135.

Shkiar, The Faces of injustice, pp. 5 and 70. 166 victims often cry 'Injustice!' not only against those directly responsible for it, but also against those who stood by and did nothing to stop it. We see the sinister force of passive injustice at work in the fictional scene descnbed earlier involving the Aage farnily. in defence of his passitivity about his son's ill-treaûnent at school, Karl points out to Regitze that he was not the one who slapped his son. While tme, we understand Regitze's moral reproach of his behaviviour sincc his failure to stand up to injustice or attinexpt to makc thc guilty account for it, makes him morally culpable. The example also shows how even the bonds engendered by farnily love and loyalty do not prevent us from cornminhg passive injustice. Indeed, a sense of loyalty cmassuage Our sense of injustice, so that loyalty cm overcome even active injustice, to the detriment of justice, indicating the larger role that affective loyalty may play in contnbuting to the wide acceptance of passive inju~tice.~'

Regitze's character exhibits a quintessentially cosmopolitan ethical perspective in her passionate resistance of both active and passive injustice, although she is far fiom the superficial worldly cosmopolitan individual descnbed by Waldr~n.~'She is not a woman of the world, she has not traveled much or expenenced many cultures, she is a woman of limited means, but she does not forget to do the little good that lies within her powers. While we can see a cosmopolitan stance in Regitze's moral attitude, we are also given a mirror of our less courageous selves in the character of Karl Aage, whose reluctance to help others arises, not out of malice, but mostly out of fear, cowardice, or nanow-mindedness. As Shklar has

93 Shklar, "Obligation, Loyalty, Exile," p. 19 1. For example, many chiidren who suffer at the hands of cruel and abusive parents nevertheless still feel an overwhelming seme of Ioyalty towards them. We are more inclined to suffer internai rather than extemal injustice, perhaps not because the injustice committed against us by our own is Iess moraily blameworthy, but because acknowledging the injustice entaik a greater psychological and emotional cost.

See WaIdron, "Minority Cuitures and the Cosmopolitan Aitemative." 167 warned, "we commit and permit a mass of injustice because we are lazy or lack courage or b~th.'*>~Contrary to Boehm and other cntics, cosmopolitanism, nghtly conceived, is neither lazy nor cowardly; rather, in requiring us to acknowledge the humanity of others, to intervene against active and passive injustice, and to forbear fiom using coercion to promote ethical ideals, cosmopolitanism makes difficult but possible demands on us all.

III. CONCLUSION

A cosmopolitan ethical perspective as I have construed it cmbe distinguished fiom a comrnon conception of cosmopolitanism in international relations. In terms of political order, cosrnopolitanism has been typically associated with visions of world govemrnent, and a concomitant idea of universal world ~itizenship.''~So constnied, cosmopolitanism appears to clash with a world organized into ten5torially distinct and politically independent states, as well as subvert the more bounded notion of national citizenship.

We might, however, be cautious about drawing any automatic linkages behveen a vision of political order in the form of a universal world govemment - a state writ large to encompass the entire earth and its population - and a vision of moral order guided by the principles of humanity, justice, and tolerance. For nothing in the idea of a world state cm guarantee cosmopolitan morality as 1 have outlined k9' Linking a cosmopolitan ethical perspective with a world govemment agenda also misidentifies the bamier to the realization

" Shklar, The Faces of Injustice, p. 30.

% See Heater, Worid Citkenship and Government.

* As Chris Brown has put it, "sornethùig Weris needed if an essentially empirical account of an increasingly unified world is to accompanied by an essentialiy nonnative account of the emergence of a world comxnunity." 1ody disagree with Brown's contention that "the creation of 'one-world' is a necessary [albeit insufficient] condition for the emergence of a world community." See Chris Brown, "International Political Theory and the Idea of Worfd Community," in international Relations Theov Today, Ken Booth and Steve Smith eds, (University Park, Perinsy lvania: Pennsylvania State University Press), pp. 93-94, 168 of a cosmopolitan moral order. A world govemment or universal state would certainly elirninate the political, if not cultural, plurality that is a hallmark of a society of states, but this change would not necessxily lead to the validation of cosmopolitan morality. The barrier to its realization, then, lies not in the size of the state that claims our moral allegiance

(parochial or universal in scope), but in how we characterize the normative agency and structure of the state, whatwer its scope or domain. This mems thzt we cmot dismiss a cosmopolitan ethical perspective as an irrelevant, misguided or unrealizable dream in a world lacking a central and universal political authority; rather we need to explore how the noms generated by such a perspective would re-shape our understandings of the moral status, rights and obligations of existing agents and structures of domestic and international societies."

A cosmopolitan ethical perspective allows us to recognize that as individuals and as members of groups, we are al1 "involved in a multiple scheme of relationship~"~which are diverse yet share a common moral core. Cosmopolitanism encourages a moral allegiance, not to an abstract community of humankind, but to the humanity in al1 those with whom we associate who can claim to be human, fkiend, stranger or foe. So construed, cosmopolitanism comprises a core normative orientation upon which the ethical quality of our various commihiients depend. Whether we seek to build a stable world order, strong communities, or robust individuals, a cosmopolitan ethical perspective of the kind 1have consû-ucted in this

Cosmopoiitanism is also typically understood to entail global distributive justice. Unfortunately, 1 cannot pursue this theme in this work, aithough I would Iike to note that it is most ciear in the economic realm that a cosmopolitan normative orientation does not automaticdly accompany the globakation of economic processes and institutions. This means that a cosmopolitan ethical perspective, rather than being a hanhiden to globalization processes, may in fact be harnessed to critique them. For a ment cosmopoIitan argument for global redistribution, see Martha Nussbaum, "Duties of Justice, Duties of Matenal Aid: Cicero's ProbIematic Legacy," Ttte Journal of Political Philosophy (forthcoming June 2000). 169 chapter is vital for their realization. Cosmopolitanism thus constitutes an ethical primer coat of sorts; it is not the be-al1 and end-dl of moral life, but without it, our most noble and well- meaning moral masterpieces will peel and crurnble.

Contrary to the images of cosmopolitanism put fonnrard by its critics, we cm conceive of a cosmopolitanism that is non-idealist, non-alienating, and non-coercive, which nevertheless also eschews the opposite vices of cynical rnisanthropy, ~nreflectiveobedience, and indifferent passivity. A cosmopolitan ethical perspective, rightly understood, is realistic in its recognition ofa common human condition marked by fiailty and fallibility, faithful not only to the one but also to the many, and tolerant in its non-violent promotion of ethical understanding. It provides us with a morally cornpelling view of how our many worlds may meet, as they inevitably will, on terms of humanity, justice, and tolerance, which are the foundations of perpetual peace and fnendship, rather thm on terms of cruelty, inequity, and violence, the foundations of perpetual war and animosity.

Cosmopolitanism requires us to practise the virtues of hurnanity, justice and tolerance, not only arnong our fellow citizens, compatriots, or believers, within our own families or circle of friends, but also arnong strangen, enemies, infidels - those who typically

FaIl outside of our matrices of habitua1 loyalty and belonging. Cosmopolitanism does not require us to deny our particular loyalties and affiliations, but nourishes a sympathetic if critical approach towards them. It does not entail the abolition of the society of States, only that such a society should recognize, endone and uphold cosmopolitanism's ethical commitments to hurnanity, justice and tolerance. Although we live in a world full of pluraiism, this diversity paradoxically is the stuff of which not only the borders, but also the bridges, between individuals and collectivities are made. These borders and bridges are 170 neither fixed nor natural, but have evolved and are evolving as human beings, at a material and a mental level, continue to interact with each other.'* A cosmopolitan ethic guides us in this evolution, leading us to seek a balance between the bonds and boundaries of our public and private universes of obligation, respecting both our comrnon humanity and the rich variety of differences that animate human life.

As Amanda Anderson has put ito"cosmopolitanism endones reflective distance From one's cultural affiliations, a broad understanding of other cultures and customs, and a belief in universal h~manity."'~'A cosmopolitan recognition of the one and many faces of humanity allows us to appreciate the value of both universal and particular mon1 obiigations, rather than posing their dichotomization and exalting one at the expense of the other. For without a universal face, our ethics will remain vulnerable to the question, 'Justice For whom'? And without particular ones, the duty to fulfill our moral obligations, universal or particular, will be defeated by the perennial question asked by Karl Aage and most of us who lack the moral courage to combat injustice, 'Why me?' The critics of cosmopolitanism are thus misguided in their singular conceptualizations of cosmopolitanism, which miss its ecleciic and syncretic nature.

Cntics might respond that cosmopolitanism is not so much eclectic and syncretic as confùsed and schizophrenic, for inherent tensions exist between the pnnciples of humanity, justice and tolerance, which may occasion hard trade-offs between them rather than

harmonious accommodation. Yet while critics might argue that cosmopolitanism cannot

have it dl, its defenders might argue that one cannot have any one without the others. From a

'O0 Ibid., p. 47. Thucydides clearly perceived the cleavages of his day as social constnictions and not as "part of the nature of things," in his recognition that early Greeks were like barbarians in his tirne.

Io' Anderson, "Cosmopolitanism, univenalism, and the divided legacies of modernity," p. 267. i 171

cosmopolitan view, a justice that is intolerant or inhumane constitutes a defective form of justice. Similarly, a hurnanitarianism uninformed by tolerance breeds the wont form of

tyrannical universalism, while one ignorant of justice risks becoming a naïve pawn of the

unjust. Finally, tolerance of the inhumane or unjust leads to licentiousness and the forfeiture

of any moral life. These ethical commitments must be pursued together rather than as ends-

in-thernsdves, br their moral wrth relies on their mutual intcrconnection.

None of this means to deny the moral complexities that confront us al1 in Our attempts

to reconcile and fulfill ou.international, domestic, and persona1 responsibilities. On the

contrary, it is only with a cosmopolitan appreciation of the one and many faces of humanity

that Our moral difficulties become most apparent. Cosmopolitanism does not ignore the need

for hard choices but accentuates just how hard they should be. In enabling us to feel the real

weight of hard moral choices and tragedies that inevitably arise in contexts of pervasive

injustice and widespread misery, a cosmopolitan ethical perspective should lead to greater

efforts to prevent the perpetuation of such contexts in which only hard choices remain. The

responsibility to engage in these efforts rests on us ail, and especially on those "whom

fortune has relieved from the immediate stniggle for existence."'"

Despite the long history of cosrnopolitanism, its implications for Our understanding of

the individual self, for political community, and for world order have so far received only a

faint, wavering light. Baldry observed that cosmopolitan ideas in ancient Greece "had no

more than a reforming effect on human relations." indeed, the world of the ordinary Greek

person in the late fifth century B.C. was still dominated by cleavages between rival city-

states, and assumptions about the naturd superiority of men over women, free men over

'O' Boehm, "Cosmopolitanism,"p. 458- slaves, high over low, and Greeks over barbarians. This might allay the fean of some critics of cosmopolitanism, but its modem proponents should find this sobenng. Although we live in an era of increasing globalization, most of us today are still like "the most enlightened of the [ancient] Greeks," far "from full understanding of its [moral] implications."'" So long as the age-old scourges of inhurnanity, injustice and intolerance have their say in the world,

pervasive, feature of our moral Iife in a brave new millenniurn.

'" Baidry, The Unity of Mankind, pp. 203 and 39. It has been quite rightiy said diat suffering, iiite

light, knows no national boundaries.

Comelio Sommargua'

About suffering they were never wmng,

The Old Masters: how well they understood

Its human position; how it takes place

While someone else is eating or opening a

window or just wallcing dully along.. .

W.H. ~uden'

' Corneiio Sommaruga, President of the international Cormnittee of ttie Red Cross, "Foreword," in Hard Choices: moral dilemmm in humanitarian intervention Jonathan Moore, ed. (New York: Rowman and LittIefield, 1998), p. ix.

WH.Auden, "Musée des Beaux Arts" in Selected Poem (New York: Vintage Internationd, 1989), p. 79. Chapter 5.

Intrastate Violence and the Cosmopolitan Challenge

1. INTRODUCTION

The New Zeaiand film, Once Were Warriors, recounts the private cycle of violence plaguing one family, and the social and extemal circumstances that contribute to itr perpetuation.' In one scene during a party involving several other drunken fYiends, the couple have an argument that tums into a physical fight in which the husband dominates. The fi-iends respond by fleeing the house en masse, leaving the couple to themselves, while the children are left to witness the violence and deal with the afiermath. No one, individually or collectively, takes it upon themselves to break up the fight, or stop the assault, and no one calls the authorities. Nor do any of the fkiends retum the next day to inquire about the welfare of the family, or to offer any kind of support or assistance. The private torments of one family rnixed with social indifierence and even endorsement lead tragically to the violation and death of an innocent.

International society has too often acted like the drunken fiends who desert the scene when violence breaks out. Historically, unsolicited international intervention by states or the

üN in scenes of intrastate violence has received no endorsement from the society of states because it was seen to challenge the very foundations of that society. Political heads of states, regional and international organizations gave little serious thought to the subject of inatate violence, preferring to cling to the mantra of nonintervention, which like al1 clichés,

Lee Tamahori, director, Once Were Wamiors, Riwia Brown, screenplay (Commuaicado with the New Zealand Film Commission, 1994), based on a novel of the same name by Man DufK reduced their state of consciousness. As George Orwell has pointed out, "this reduced state of consciousness, if not indispensable, is at any rate favourable to political conformity.'"

Scenes of human cruelty and suffering in the post-Cold War world seem as ubiquitous as they are distressing. In contemporary international political discourse the various calamities that culminate in intrastate violence have reinvigorated debate about 'humanitarian intervention,' popularly conceived to encompass a spect.of actions pursued by extemal parties seeking to relieve human suffering in contexts of intrastate violen~e.~A cosmopolitan ethical perspective inspires this re-evaluation of 'humanitarian intervention,' as well as

United Nations Secretary-General Kofi han's recent announcement to member States that

"strictly traditional notions of sovereignty cm no longer do justice to the aspirations of peoples everyw here to attain their fundamental freed~ms."~His statement may sound rhetorical, but contemporary events such as the military intervention by the North Atlantic

Treaty Organization (NATO)in the Kosovo conflict, as well as the United Nations-endorsed intervention in East Timor, reveal an urgent need to examine contemporary re-interpretations of the definition and moral legitimacy of intervention in world politics.

Given that a cosmopolitan vision of humanitarianimi and intervention underlies these developments, it is not surprishg that the standard criticisms against 'humanitarian intervention' invoke the cntical images of cosmopolitanism as idealism, rationalism, and

George Onvell, "Politics and the Englüh Language" in Inside the Whale and Other Essoys (Markhm Ontario: Penguin, 1988, originally published in Horizon, no. 76, April 1946), p. 153.

The definition of 'humanitarian intervention' is quite controvenial, depending on the narrowoess or breadth of one's interpretation of the terms, 'actions,' 'parties,' 'suffering,' and 'violence.' As wiiI be evident in the course of this discussion, 1 have dificulties with some contemporary uses of the term, therefore my use of it should be considered reluctant and tentative. Heoce the quotation marks.

Quoted in Paul Knox, 'W's actioos don't match words on human rights," The Globe und Mail. September 21, 1999, A19. imperialism. John Stedrnan, for exarnple, regards cosmopolitan activism as a misguided idealism that lacks "a sufficient sense of the dilemmas, risks and costs of intervention."' He criticizes proponents of 'humanitarian intervention' for being overly optimistic about the effect of international intervention on the resolution of civil connicts, wming that contemporary civil wan "should not be expected to be more amenable to negotiation; they will remain arnong the most difficult conflicts to settle p~litically."~Others see cosmopolitan humanitarianism as a rational but inadequate response to humanity's heart of darkness.

Popular international media often portray conflicts in the Balkans, for exarnple, as "just hopeless, a collection of tribes impewious to reason, whose ancient hatred for each other is bound to break out fiom time to time in mass murder.'" Other critics of 'humanitarian intervention' equate cosmopolitan humanitarianism with Western imperialism, reviving fears of CO lonial domination, exploitation and mismanagement.

Yet cosmopolitan humanitarianism need not involve a flight of fancy from realistic pessimism to undue optimism about the resolvability of intrastate violence, nor does a cosmopolitan ethical perspective entai1 adhering to a naïve optimism about the triurnph of reason over violence. indeed, expressions of cosrnopolitanism today arise more as responses to revealed scenes of human cruelty and rnisery, rather than as utopian projects founded on an undue faith in human reason and moral possibilities. Without a cosmopolitan perspective, however, intrastate violence not only remains dificuit to resolve, but is also largely

' John Stephen Stedman, 'The New interventionists," Foreign Affairs, 72, 1 (1993):l-16 at p. 2.

Ibid., p. 8.

Anthony Lewis, 'War Crimes" in ïîie Biack Book of Bosnia: the consequences of appearement Nader Mousavizadeh ed. (United States: Basic Books, 1996), p. 58. Lewis' review article critiques this view, which semed as a convenient excuse for international maction in the Bosnian connict. 177 unscrutinized by any extemal standards, allowing the least scrupul~usintemal and extemal actors with vested interests to infiuence events with impunity.'* Lacking public international concern and intervention, the difficulties inherent in the resotution of intrastate violence remain the exclusively private burdens of the intemal population, just as lacking public political concem and intervention, fmily violence remains the hidden unmitigated tragedies of individuai men, women and chiidren. Ultimateiy, rhose who argue that extemal actors and institutions have no responsibility to act to prevent or alleviate the suffering endemic to intrastate contexts of violence do not resolve the 'dilemas, risks and costs of intervention,' they merely nvoid them.

Contestation conceming the Iegitimacy of 'humanitarian intervention' exposes a clash between cosmopolitanism and competing ethicai perspectives over the publiclprivate constnict and the moral nature of states' daims to privacy in international society. Realists and cornmunitarians, for distinct reasons, rely on a dichotomous conception of the public/private or intemationaUdomestic construct to assert that cases of intrastate violence and the human suffering they spawn are essentially private problems to be worked out by the affected individuals and states or political cornmunities. Both perspectives have thus contributed to making the world safe for domestic tyrants. Even Michael Walzer's formulation ofjust military interventions, for example, is only permissive: "states can be

'O For a devastahg account of the French role in the Rwandan genocide of 1994, see Gérard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: Hkrory of a Genocide (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), pp. 99-108. For ideological reasons of its own, France gave unquestionhg support to the Habyuimna govement, despite its poor record of human rights and treatment of Tutsi refugees. Prunier observes, "This blind cornmitment was to have catastrophic consequences because, as the situation radicaliseci, the Rwandese [sic] leadership kept believing that no marter what it did, French support would aIways be forthcoming. And it had no vaIid reasons for believing otherwise" (p. 107). 178 invaded and wars justly begun .. . to rescue peoples threatened with massacre."" States have rights to intemene, but they may also claim rights not to intervene in situations that shock the conscience of humankind. Of course, for moral and prudential reasons, it may be clear at times that rnilitary intervention would be a counterproductive course of action even in cases of impending massacre. Yet the assertion that states have rights not to intervene in such situations would sszm to militate asainst a cosmopolitan conception ofmoniiry that obiiges the international cornmunity to respond in some way to tragic scenes of intrastate violence.

ûpponents of the contemporary shi ft toward a cosmopolitan legitimation of international intervention in cases of intrastate violence would like to retain a rigidly dichotomous view of public and pnvate spheres at the international level. Stedman, For example, wams of the unique nature of intrastate conflicts: "Civil wars and ethnic rivalries have histones and dynamics ail their own that dirninish the effects of precedents elsewhere."" Elsewhere, however, he seems to acknowledge the broader context of such conflicts. For example, he points out that the post-Cold War world no longer needs to fear

superpower interventions equipping rival factions for ideological reasons. However, he

argues, "such factions have already proven adept at maintaining access to weaponry, as

bordering states often have incentive for continuing to arm waning sides."" Here is clear

acknowledgement, then, that although each case of intrastate violence may be unique, their

histories and dynarnics are not 'al1 their own.'

" Michael Waizer, Just and Unjust Wars: a moral argument with hktoricol illtrsmtions, Znd edition (New York: Basic Books, 1992), p. 108.

" Stedman, 'The New hterventionists," p. 10, italics mine. Empincally, a dichotomous conception of the public/pnvate distinction has been harder to sustain as scholars and practitioners of international politics increasingly acknowledge the "existing pattern of interstate influence and interpenetration."'" As

Rarnsbotham and Woodhouse have observed, contemporary conflicts that give rise to cosrnopolitan humanitarian clairns and debates about intervention do not conform to the neat intemationaiidornestic dichotomy posited by realist and cornmunitanan images of internationa1 relations. Conflicts that invite considerations of international intervention more typically traverse this divide, resulting in what Ramsbotharn and Woodhouse have called

"international-social conflicts" (ISCs), "communal conflicts which become crises of the state," and "thereby automatically [involve] the wider society of states.""

Normatively, the emergence of social constnictivist theory in international relations has begun to highlight the social foundation of international noms such as state sovereignty and nonintervention." States enjoy a certain kind of intemal sovereignty because of international acceptance of its practice, just as in4ividuals in western societies enjoy a certain kind of privacy because of societal acceptance of its boundaries. A cosmopolitan conception of the public/private construct acknowledges the interconnectedness of international and domestic spheres; consequentiy, cases of intrastate violence are not isolated expressions of national deviance, just as farnily violence does not occur in a social, political and economic vacuum. The mutual interplay of intemal and external factors in intrastate violent conflicts

'' .Jan Nederveen Pieterse, "Sociology of Humanitanan Intervention: Bosnia, Rivanda and Somalia Compared," International P o2iticul Science Review (1997) 18, 1: 7 1-93 at p. 8 1.

'"Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse, Humunitarian Intervention in Contemporary Conflct: a reconcephfufization(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), p. 87. l6 See Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber editon, Srare Sovereignry us Social Comrnict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). ultimately demonstrates the limited utility of casting the debate in ternis of ivhether or not to intervene. For once we admit that domestic and international, private and public, structures of noms, power and authority are mutually intercomected rather than mutually exclusive, the issue becomes not whether, but how to intervene,17

A more conscious acknowledgement of the international dimensions of intrastate conflict leads to a recognition of the need to examine further how extemal factors contribute to the perpetuation of contexts of intrastate violence, and how they might be harnessed instead to contribute to their prevention and resolution. Walzer considers intervention justifiable in cases of extremely bad government, but his adherence to an intemationaVdomestic dichotomy does not allow him to see the embeddedness of the 'bad' der, state or governrnent in a wider international normative, legal and political context that has been largely unresponsive to intrastate violence. Recognition of the mutual intercomection of the intemational and the domestic allows us to move beyond blaming

'bad' states or governrnents, and to investigate moral deficiencies in the international normative framework that might protect or even create and promote them. A cosmopolitan moral perspective, in positing the intercomection of public and private, rejects the claim that cases of intrastate violent conflict are irrelevant to international society; rather, it holds such conflicts and the human suffenng they spawn to be legitimate concems of individual men and women everywhere, communities in al1 parts of the world, and the society of states as a whole.

" This is a paraphrase of Susan Moiier O@ Justice, Gender and the Family (New York: Basic Books, 1989), who, in arguing that the state aiready does Muence the stntcnire of the famiiy, wrote, 'The issue is not whether, but how the state intervenes." (p. 132). Ramsbotham and Woodhouse reach the same concIusion, see Humanitarian lnrervention in Contemporary ConfTict, p. 137. t 8 1

II. PERSONAL AND POLITICAL PRIVACY

What conception of state pnvacy, if any, can be salvaged £ioma cosmopolitan moral perspective? My argument so fat has been that both atomistic and organic accounts of state pnvacy at the international level as articulated by realist and cornmunitarian theorists are equally unsatisfactory. Feminist theorists have also had problems with the public/private constructs generated by both atomistic and organic tiameworks, particularly as they are applied to family-state relations. According to ferninist theorists, the atomistic conception of keedom as the absence of external (especially state) intervention is especially misleading as it obscures the public construction of any conception of individual or family privacy. The interpretation of the individual or farnily as a pnvate entity or sphere beyond state intervention denies the extent to which the definition of an inviolable individual or fmilial sphere is itself socially constructed and supported through law. Individual and farnily pnvacy, as well as concepts such as pnvate property, cm only exist in the embrace of cornmunity noms. In this vein, a traditional liberal conception of the 'private sphere' as a pre-political realm of relations between consenting £iee and equal adults is conceptually flawed. Libenl and realist atomistic conceptions of the publidptivate constmct are incoherent and cannot sustain a social nght of individuals, families or states to pnvacy in their respective societies.

At the sarne time, ferninist theorists note that organic conceptions of the publidprivate constmct have failed women histoncally, because of restrictive and gendered notions of citizenship that relegated women to the private sphere of the household and denied thern fieedom to participate in the common political life of the community. This also had the effect of depriving women's issues and concems within the family of public concem and 182 political remedy. An organic conception of the family, in tending towards its idealization, hides issues of power and control within family relationships that have left individual members in positions of vulnerability within the family. Anita Allen has written that the notion of family privacy is problematic, and potentially dangerous. She asks, "Who is entitled to exercise that right? Who is the spokesperson for the family's interest? What if

îàmily members disagree about the desirability of govenunental intervention? Of private third-party inv~lvement?"'~These questions, slightly changed, are equally pertinent in the case of state privacy in international society. Again, statist and non-statist cornmunitarian, as well as republican conceptions of the public/private construct appear to take us no closer to a morally viable conception of hilyor state p~ivacy.'~

'ïhe dual role of privacy as a vehicle for oppression as well as liberty in domestic relations has led political theonsts to re-examine the question of how to conceive of the moral value of privacy in domestic society." Due to the moral inadequacy of both atornistic and organic accounts of pnvacy, some feminists argue that no coherent and morally viable distinction can be made between public and private. In this vein, Catharine MacKinnon has called for the abolition of the distinction as a normative consaict because it underpins the

'' Anita L. AlIen, Uneasy Access: Privacyfor Womm in a Free Socieq (Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1988), pp. 116-7.

'' Annabelle Lever observes that "feminist criticisms of the public/private distinction are as much directed at republican or participatory democrats, who celebnte political engagement and participation, and who exhort us to focus on the common good, as they are at Iiierals and democrats whose predominant concern is with the evils of govemment, or with the need to preserve the family as 'a haven in a heartless world'." See Lever, "Feminism, Democracy and the Publifivate Distinction: An Effort to Untie Some Knots," paper prepared for the Atlanta, Georpia, American Political Science Association Meetings, 1999, p. 10-1 1,

See, for example, Pahicia Boling, Privacy und the Politics of lntimate Life (Ithaca, NY: Comell University Press, 1996). 183 morally banhpt notion of pnvacy." Similarly, Frances Olsen has argued that given the mutual intercomection of the pnvate family and the public state, the idea of state intervention in the family as a moral problem is a myth that obscures substantive debates about ethics and social policy." As Annabelle Lever has described this line of thought, "once one gants the daim that the personal is political, it is hard to see what the public/private distinction couici be referring to, or wiiat couid possibly 'ae the point anci justification of privacy rights."" Ruth Gavison, however, argues that jettisoning the publidprivate distinction altogether would lead to a total denial of the values of privacy and intimacy, which most people, including women, would find problernatic." Clearly, although feminists have been united in condernning traditional patnarchal liberal and republican conceptions of the publidprivate constmct, they disagree over how to reconceive it, or whether it has any use at dl.

These controversies can be translated with equal force to the issue of state privacy in international society. If international and domestic noms and structures are mutually intercomected, some might argue that it is difficult to articulate a coherent conception of the publidprivate construct at the international level. Is there no meaningful way to conceive of such a distinction that can support some conception of state pnvacy vis-à-vis international

'' See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the Stare (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1989).

= See Frances E. Olsen. ''The Myth of Stace Intervention in the Family," Journal of Lmv Reform 18.4 (1985):835-864.

Annabelle Lever, "Feminism, Democracy and the Publifivate Distinction."

" Ruth Gavisop bbFeminumand the PublidPrivate Distinction," Stanfird Lmv Review 45,1(1992): 1-45 at p. 36, society? To salvage any morally defensible interpretation of state privacy, we must return to conceptions of individual and family privacy.

What is privacy for? What mord interests does it protect? Feminist theorists have argued that pnvacy justifications modelled on the paradigm of private property, or the idea of the family as a natural entity, have served to maintain both the exclusion of women fiom pubiic He and their entrapment in imposed gender roles wirhin farniiie~.~'According to Jean

Cohen, privacy should be reconceived as a social right of individuals to protection of the

'Temtories of the self," which include "decisional autonomy, bodily integrity, inviolate personality."" To function in society as a penon capable of persona1 or political freedom, individuals require personal privacy nghts that "protect the constitutive minimal preconditions for having an identity of one's own." Through such rights, "oneis able to maintain a sense of selfhood, ofagency, and of persona1 identity."" Personal privacy rights are crucial to individual identity, agency, and therefore accountability. Respect for these claims allows individuals to have not only private lives but also public ones. As Gofhann has observed, bodily integrity and decisional agency are intrinsic to selfhood, the basis on which individual penons distinguish themselves f?om others, as well as interact and connect with them." Elaine Scarry has argued that torture, or a willfûl attack on bodily integrity and

- In the terms of ou.discussion, the pnvate property mode1 relies on an atomîstic vie~of the publidpnvate construct, whereas the 'entity privacy' mode1 relies on an organic account. See Jean L. Cohen, "Rethinking Privacy: Autonomy, Identity, and the Abortion Controversy" in Public and Private in Thought and Practjce: Perspectives on a Grand Dichotomy, Jeff Alan Wehtraub and Krishan Kurnar eds. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997)' pp. 133-165 at pp. 141-143.

'' Cohen, "Rethinking Privacy," p. 162. The concept of "territories of the self' cornes from EMng Gofhann, "Territories of the Self," in Relations in Public (New York: Harper, 1971), pp. 28-41.

Cohen, "Rethinking Privacy," pp. 153 and 158.

" Goffmann,'Territories of the Self." p. 38. 185 decisional agency, unmakes not only the private individual self but also the public social wodd of which the individual was a part."> Personal pnvacy so construed affords individuals the capacity to enjoy both fÏeedom as self-direction and lreedom as relationship with others, that is, both atomistic and organic conceptions of freedom. This means that both liberals and cornmunitarians should be concemed to guarantee public protection of personal privacy daims.

So understood, personal pnvacy claims underlie the cosmopolitan notion of common humanity, and shape the comrnon moral duties we owe others by virtue of their humanity.

Cosmopolitan humanitarianism's dedication to preventing and alleviating human suffering is inspired by an acknowledgement of the natural equality of human vulnerability. Denied security From this vulnerability, individuals lose their selves. Judith Shklar's condemnation of cruelty clearly also denves from a concem for the integrity and agency of the person.

Ultimately, cruelty destroys more than bodily integrity; by reducing individuals "to mere reactive units of sensation," it undermines individual psrsonhood and agency.'"obbes, in acknowledging the physical and mental atomism of individuals in his political philosophy, asserted that public power could not demand an obligation on the part of its subjects to submit to violations of bodily integrity:

Ehine Scarry, The Body in Pain: the muking and unmaking of the world (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), pp. 45-51.

'O Judith N. ShkIar, Ordinay Vices (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984), p. 5. .. . there [are] some Rights, which no man can be understood by any words, or other signes, to have abandoned, or transferred. As first a man cannot lay down the right of resisting them, that assault hirn by force, to take away his life; because he cmotbe understood to ayme thereby, at any Good to himselfe. The sarne may be sayd of Wounds, and Chayns, and Imprisonment .. . 3 1

To Hobbes, persons have no obligations to submit to another's violence that threatens their bodily integrity, whether that other agent be public or private. His political philosophy sought ultimatcly to guarantec pcrsons secuiï~with respect to tkir natual wliizrabilities, which is a key precondition for agency.

Far fiom being a parochial liberal preoccupation, most societies assume individual agency, not necessady in the form of rights, but in the form of laws that delineate publicly- recognized wrongs for which individuals cm be held accountable. The concepts of

individual accountability and punishment for wrongfùl acts assume individuals' capacity for decisional agency. The public interest, conceived atomistically or organically, in

international as in domestic society, is thus interconnected with the interest of individuals in personal privacy, undentood as individual bodily integrity and decisional agency. Public

protection of penonal pnvacy serves the one and many faces of humanity, recognizing the

natural equality of human vulnerability, as well as individual self-direction and difference,

upon which collective self-direction is founded. Realist and cornmunitarian interpretations of

the moral sipificame of state privacy in international society fail to the extent that they

allow for violations of individuals' penonal pnvacy claims.

Respect for personal privacy claims not only protects individuals with respect to their

natural vuinerabilities, but also places limits on disparities in people's social vulnerabilities.

It is clear especially to historically oppressed groups such as the poor, women and minorities

Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Markham: Penguin, 1986), Part 1, Chapter 14, p. 192. 187 that society creates difient levels of social vulnerability between individuals and groups.

The difference between nahiral and social vulnerability is that the latter is entirely socially constructed. For example, children rnay be naturally vulnerable physically and mentally because of immature biological development, but they rnay also be placed in a position of social vulnerability when they are denied persona1 privacy rights, or when parents are considered to have absoiute controi over their welfare. Similady, what made black slaves vulnerable in American society was not their imate or biological capacities, but social, political and legal rules that placed them in absolute subjection to their owners. Public noms can thus create and sustain differentiated and unequal social vulnerabilities that rnay at the extreme deprive some members of security with respect to their natural vulnerabilities.

Justice in public and private contexts requires equal protection for individuals' equal natural vulnerabilities to violations of bodi ly integrity and decisional agency.

If the state is to be understood as a public actor that serves the public interest, atomistically or organically construed, then the moral value of any privacy claims a state cm make would depend on their complementarity with the persona1 privacy claims of its members. From a cosmopolitan perspective, no individual or collective power, private or public, rnay legitimately assert any moral authority to violate persona1 privacy claims, although it rnay possess the capability. States' rights to sovereignty as privacy have moral value only when their exercise is consistent with sovereign humanitarian obligations to citizens and non-citizens. Although States may have rights to interna1 and external sovereignty, they rnay not always use them within the bounds of legitimate sovereign 188 authority, which, from a cosmopolitan point of view, must include duties to respect common human vulnerabilities and potentialities in members and non-members alike.

intervention to combat violations of these duties serves to preserve the moral boundaries that are essential to right sovereign authority. When personal privacy is violated, the consent of sovereign authorities no longer constitutes a normative barrier to the delivery of assistance to the victims. The moral burden ofjustification shifls fiom those who seek to intervene, to those who claim to have a right to be fkee fiom intervention." Thus, the normative worth of sovereign consent is lost when sovereign conduct violates the obligations to protect penonal privacy claims upon which iis own authority is based, in the same way that parental consent loses its relevance when the issue is the protection of children being abused by their parents, or spousal consent becomes a non-moral concern in atternpts to give assistance to an abused spouse. Clearly, the protection of individuals' personal privacy claims demands intervention and nonintervention on different occasions. If the moral

Function of privacy is not just to pose a banier to extemal intrusion, but to protect the bodily integrity and decisional agency of its subjects, then public, extemal or international intervention may be required to protect such interests. Nonintervention in the face of violations of bodily integrity or decisional agency would hardly contribute to the cause of private or public freedom.

So far, however, we have been taiking about individuals' access to persona1 and political freedom, and how international society rnay contribute to the protection of these individual fieedoms. How might this conception of personal privacy translate into a

>' The lack ofsovereign consent may cenainly present problems of pncticaiity and efficiency, which are no doubt greafer for intervenors entering a hostile environment, 189 conception of state privacy? The most obvious state privacy rights that can be derived fkom the ideas of bodily integrity and decisional agency are territorial integrity and political decisional agency. International society's recognition of these rights gants states public and private identity, agency and accountability at the international level. Both realists and cornmunitarians are concemed to guarantee public international protection of these privacy claims of states, which can serve as a bulwark against wars of aggression, as well as imperialistic, colonial and paternalistic intrusions. Yet the protection or defence of states' pnvacy claims will be served at times by intervention, rather than nonintervention. The moral equation would not necessarily be "if sovereignty, then non-intervention,'"' but may at times be 'if sovereignty, then intervention.' Ironically, in exalting an atomistic conception of state privacy solely as Freedorn From external intrusion, realists and cornmunitarians posit a dichotomous relationship between sovereignty and intervention that undermines their

concems to protect state identity and agency in international society.

A cosmopolitan perspective can accommodate conceptions of state privacy as

territorial integrity and political decisional agency, but assesses their moral value in terms of

their relation to cosmopolitan ethical cornmitrnents to humanity, justice and tolerance. How

does this condition affect a cosrnopolitan assessment of state privacy claims?

Clearly a state's right to temtonal integrity cannot mean that it cmdo whatever it

wants on or with its own temtory, just as a person's right to bodily integrity does not mean

that one cm "claim an absolute right to do with one's body as one pleases."'" A state's right

to temtorial integrity also does not mean that any existing state's temtorial configuration is

" RJ. Vincent, Human Rights and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 113, " Cohen, "Rethinking Privacy," p. 160. 190 inviolable and unalterable. A cosmopolitan recognition of individual agency means that state borden are open to revisions, thus boundary changes are valid so long as they are negotiated in the spirit of fairness and mutual acknowledgement of the potentially dire consequences of non-peaceful resolution. The international community can encourage the developrnent of internal processes and mechanisms for peaceful and fair boundary changes, recognizing that extemally imposed alterations are unlikely to enjoy internal legitimacy or contribute to a stable resolution.

Nor does a state's right to political decisional agency mean that it can decide to do anything it wants with respect to extemal or internal affairs, and do it with impunity.

Extemal actors may hold state officials accountable for government-sponsored violence against its own or others' citizens, although the actual removal of such officials fiom their domestic office can only be effected through domestic political processes. For example,

Spanish courts might legitimately hold Augusto Pinochet accountable for state-sponsored wrongs committed during his 17-year nile in Chile, but it is up to Chilean citizens to decide whether Pinochet may remain a Chilean senator for Me. How would a cosmopolitan answer

the moral objection that such interventions by the international comrnunity or its various

mernbers constitute an infringement on sovereign rights?

Such an objection misconstnies the relationship between rights and the right or the

good. Conceptually, a theory of rights must be spatial: rights create arenas of moral

opportunity and responsibility for individuals and States or define legitimate spheres of

action. But they do not fil1 that space with any moral content. Exercising a right and doing

the right thing are thus two completely different thiûgs. Having a right to do something does

not preclude moral judgements about how one exercises one's rights, but is the basis on which one's accountability for one's actions can be e~tablished.'~As argued by James

Mayall, sovereignty is the bais of the agency of states without which there cm be no way of subjecting state actions to normative n rite na.'^ [t is only because states have rights to sovereignty as privacy that they can be held morally accountable for their actions, including their violations of the persona1 privacy clairns of their own or others' citizens.

Acknowledging sovereign rights to territorial integrity and decisional agency can thus only be a starting point rather than the end point in discussions of international morality. Iust as individual or family rights to privacy are not the be-al1 and end-al1 of monlity in domestic society, state rights to privacy in terms of temtonal integrity and political decisional agency also are not the be-a11 and end-al1 of morality in international society. In this light, the conventional moral objection that non-consensual intervention violates sovereign rights is clearly inadequate or incomplete as an assessrnent of the morality of intervention.

III. PUBLIC AND PWATE ACCOUNTABILITY

Cosmopolitan intimations in international law

The accountability of states for violations or failures to protect their own citizens with respect to their natural vulnerabilities is required by a cosmopolitan conception of international moral order. International law has histoncally supported a statist cornmunitarian vision of international society, admitting only states as members with moral status and authority, agency and accountability at the international level. [t is states that fom

" See my "Images of Justice: justice as a bond, a boundary and a balance," ?Ire Journal of Political P hilosophy 6, 1 (1998):1-26 at p. 23.

36 James Mayali ed, ne Community of States (London: Men & Unwin, l982), p. 5. 1 have punued this he of argument in "Images of Justice," p. 22, the basic subjects of moral concem in such a society, thus it is states' integrity, rights, and responsibilities that determine the contours of international moraiity. Individuals enjoy standing only through citizenship: "Citizens of states are memben of international society only indirectly through their national governrnents; they are not memben on their own.""

This conception of international law actually differs fkom an older 'law of nations' which admitted individual ~lairns.:~Under Jeremy Bentham's reconceptualization of 'international law,' however, individuals could no longer daim to be subjects in their own right: "Hence, it was thought to be antithetical for there to be international legal rights that individuals could assert against states, especially against their own g~venunents."'~While positivist legal theorists intent on preserving an absolutist conception of state sovereignty as an intrinsic feature of statehood interpret international law to admit excIusively states and sovereign clairns, contemporary international law has actually been rather ambiguous about the relative invisibili ty of humanitarian claims. Menno T. Karnrninga notes, for example, that Article

2(7) of the United Nations Charter, which prohibits U.N. intervention in matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of states, leaves unspecified the meaning of 'intervention' and 'domestic jurisdiction.'"

'' Robert K. Jackson, 'The Political Theory of International Society" in International Relations Theory Today Ken Booth and Steve Smith eds. (University Park, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania University Press, 1995), p. 110- II.

"Positivist legai theory had taken the law of nations of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, a law comrnon to individuais as well as to states, and transfomed it into rwo international law disciplines, one 'public,' the other 'private."' Mark bis, An Innoducriun to International Lmv, 2" ed. (Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1993), p. 234.

a Menno T. Kdga,lnterSIate Accountabiliryfor Yiolatiunr of Human Rights (Philadelphia: University of Peansylvania Press, 1992), pp. 67-8. With the development of international human rights law, international law now addresses not only relations between states, or sovereigns, but also sovereigns' treatment of the citizens of other states, as well as their own citizens: "individuals, regardless of strict positivist doctrine, are now to be properly considered subjects not only of pnvate, but also of public international law.'"' Under a cosmopolitan view, it is states, rather than individuals, that are not 'members on their own,' for a state's moral standing and agency rest not only on its unique representation of a particular constituency of memben, but also on its contribution to a universai public interest in the preservation of individuals' persona1 privacy daims understood as bodily integrity and decisional agency. States, as representatives of a particular group of people, have responsibilities to safeguard their particular welfare, but states are also agents of the cornmon good at the international level, and therefore, have common responsibilities towards non-citizens as well.

Ramsbotham and Woodhouse note three international expressions of humanitarian concem since 1945: "(i) the international humanitarian law of medconflict, (ii) the cluster of enterprises referred to as 'international humanitarian assistance', and (iii) what some cal1

'international human rights law'.'" The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg established a new category of international crime, "crimes against humanity," which pertained to the harm suffered by civilians, before or during a war, 'îwhether or not in

" Bentham's conception of international law, iatmduced in 1789, was restricted in its subject to the rights and obligations of states inter se, whereas BIackstone's oIder conception of the Law of nations embnced ail nonmunicipal sources of iaw that related to various subjects, including states and individuah. "A source-based defrnition of 'internationaf law' .. . might admit a rule relating to a government's mistreatment of its own citizens into the ambit of the discipline, but a subject-based -.. dehnition might deny such coverage." In contemporary developments, we see a waning of the positivist IegaI subject-based interpretation of international law, and a remto a source-based interpretation. See lanis, An Introduction to International Lmv, p. 233.

Rarnsbothm and Woodhouse, Humanitarian intervention in Contemporary Confict, p. 9. violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated.'"' The Universal Declaration of Human Rights sets forth nghts to "life, liberty, and the security of the person," to "equal protection of the law," to fair trials, and to "freedom of thought, conscience and religion.'"

These rights can be seen as expressions of individual pnvacy concems, and the Declaration holds that states serve a public interest in respecting and protecting these rights of its memben. Since the basis of personal privacy nghts is a concem for naturd vulnerabilities that al1 hurnans equally share, however, it is not clear why states as agents of the public good have obligations to respect and protect these claims only for their own members.

States adopted the international humanitarian law of armed conflict in 1949 primarily to control state conduct in intentate wars, while leaving states a relatively free mon1 hand in controllhg intemal discord. The Geneva conventions thus draw sharp distinctions between

'international armed conflicts' and other violent situations. Recent legal arguments have directly challenged the moral coherence and sustainability of this posited distinction between international and intemal medconflicts. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former

Yugoslavia, for exarnple, stated: "elernentary considerations of hurnanity and cornmon sense make it preposterous that the use by States ofweapons prohibited in armed confiicts between themselves be allowed when States try to put down rebellion by their own nationals on their own temtory.'"' The recognition of cosmopolitan mordity in the international sphere is thus beginning to have an impact on domestic spheres of sovereign authority. The arrest and

Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Ais, art. 6; quoted in Janis, An Introduction to Intenational Law. p. 246.

" United Nations Genen1 Assembly res. 217A (IIi), UN Doc. At810 (Decernber 10, 1948).

Quoted in Kenneth W. Abbott, "International Relations Theory, international Law, and the Regime Governing Atrocihes in internai Conflicts," neAmerican Journaf of International Lmv 93 (1999):361-379 at p. 363, footnote 13. 195 detention of the former Chilean sovereign, Augusto Pinochet, in Britain has also generated legal arguments and precedents that were unthinkable in a world of public states and private humanity. Domestic tyrants may still have the capacity to practise tyranny in the confines of their home state, but more and more, domestic tyrants can no longer feel at home in the world.

Cosrnopolitan intimations in international law in the last fifty years, however, can be a cruel hope, spelling linle actual relief or protection to individuals. The recent events in East

Timor reveal the tragedy of hope that is O ffered, seized, then unsupported. In East Timor, the

United Nations organized elections for the local population to detemine its future, with the assurance that the results would be respected by the Indonesian governrnent. Wamings emerged before the election that violence would empt if a majority voted for independence, yet hardly any provisions were made by the United Nations to guarantee the security of the

East Tirnorese population. An international organization that encourages an oppressed people to leave its oppressor without guaranteeing protection is like a state that encourages abused spouses to leave their abusers, but which does not offer anything in the way of protection or support. This actually Ieaves the abused parties in situations of greater vulnerability, for the moment of greatest danger for victirns of both Ends of 'domestic' violence is not at the point of their victimization, but at the point of their re~istance.~~

Indeed, research on famiIy violence shows that abused spouses (mainly women) are at most risk for their safety in the period just after they have left their abusive spouses, rather than whiie they are in the abusive relationship. Private agency and accountability

States might claim to be private actors in international society, and therefore not responsible for serving the public good. This view might stem fiom a public/pnvate distinction that posits an ethical conhast between public and private standards of accountability. The classical liberal model of the statelmarket distinction, for example, holds that the market is a private unregulated sphere where individuals can legitimately pursue self- advantage without regard for the public interest. This model of privateness is banknipt if we consider that even claims to pnvate property cm be subject to public noms guiding its proper use. States and sovereign leaders may have rights to temtorial integrity and decisional agency, but their privacy nghts do not allow them to do as they please. internally or extemally, without public international, if not domestic, accountability.

Indeed, under a cosmopolitan view, it is not just state leaders who have moral agency and responsibility at the international level - we al1 do, in our various individual and collective capacities. The duty to respect and defend individual persona1 pnvacy claims, in terrns of bodily integrity and decisional agency, is one of those duties that each of us as individuals cm demand from others, and owe to them. Despite the universality of this moral obligation, our capacities and the ways in which we fùlfill this obligation will differ. By admitting the agency and accountability of pnvate actors, a cosmopolitan view of

international cornrnunity includes religious groupa and institutions, professional associations, corporations, and a plethora of other non-govermental organizations that operate on the

global scene. Like the medieval conception of political community, a cosmopolitan

conception of international community cm admit diverse entities, both govemmental and

non-governmental, public and private, but none is granted agency without accountability. The emergence of international non-governmentd huma.nghts and humanitarian organizations with self-chosen mandates to protect penonal privacy daims that underlie cosmopolitan humanitariankm has contnbuted to the steady erosion of the mutual pacts between states to tum a blind eye to intrastate violence. Such organizations, often started by private individuals and groups of individuals, enjoy increasing visibility, legitimacy and agency in the nascent reah of international civil society. Their activities and concems advance a cosmopolitan account of the publidprivate distinction in international society, unsettling the prevailing rules of sociability and privacy hitherto set by states at the international level.

Such developments have become more possible in an era ofprogress in mass media and communications technology. Indeed, modem media play a crucial role in deterrnining areas of light and areas of darkness in the world. Hardships and injustices suffered alone become shared by an international audience when exposed by the media. The "CNN effect," or "phenornenon," as it has been dubbed, describes the activities of the media who, in offering mass publics information on a wide range of extemal conditions and events, not only contribute to international social awareness, but may also sometimes galvanize potential intervenors into action." The media, however, are not omnipotent. For example, while the media concentrated its spotlight on the plight of Kosovan and the NATO military campaign, they shed only a dim light on similarly destitute human beings in Sierra Leone who had to

face theu hardships largely alone and in private. Not only does contemporary media have lirnited vision, but they may also suffer from distorted vision. The media does not offer

- - " Romeo A. Dallaire, 'The changing role of UN peacekeeping forces: the relaîionship between UN peacekeepers and NGOs in Rwanda," in After Rwanda: The Coordination of United Nations Humanitarian Assistance. Ibn Whitman and David Popock eds. (New York: St. Martin's Press, I996), p. 207. 198 neutral information so much as interpretations of reality that rnay be heavily prejudiced, intentionally or unintentionally, by a variety of political, economic and social interests. The eye of the media rnay thus be an inconsistent and unreliable guardian of international morality and justice.

The potential for media bias illuminates the problem of accountability, not of public actors, but of private agents in international society. Even humanitarian organizations can suffer from moral selectivity, and rnay serve other interests than their professed humanitarian aims. As a global civil society continues to develop, private or non-state global organizations rnay enjoy greater agency at the international level, but their invisibility or exclusion from the political and legal structures of international society prompts the question of how they themselves rnay be held accountabie for their conduct. Given the considerable budgets available to the humanitarian and human rights communities, intemal and extemal processes of accountability require fiirther development.''

Few would think that states or inter-governrnental organizations should be responsible for policing the conduct of non-govemmental organizations, given the conflicts of interest that would inevitably surface. This observation leads us to consider the ethical value of the private as activities that are not directly regulated by states and international govemmental institutions. Indeed, our discussion so far rnight have led us to conclude that the idea of a private sphere, autonomous fiom public rules and authonties, has Little moral value. Our moral evaluation of the private rnay be more positive, however, when we conceive it to af3ord protection fiom the glare of 'Big Brother.' Indeed, George Orwell's

" For budget figures, see Adam Roberts, Humanitariun Action in Wac Aid protection and impaniality in a policy vacuum (Oxford: Oxford University Press for The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1996), pp 17-18; on accountability heworks, see pp. 60-61. classic exposes the moral bankniptcy of a totalizing public that respects no sense of privatene~s..'~

Activities that are not directly regulated by states or inter-govemmental institutions at the international level have proved to be an important source of the moral renewal and transformation of international society. This is because pnvate agents, free 6om dominant norms expressed in intemationai iaw and mies oîsociabiiity, may subscribe to different ethical standards, norms and perspectives. It is therefore a mistake to assume that private actors necessarily operate with no moral standards (or immoral ones) just because they are not directly accountable under public international law. The ethical diversity emanating from these private sources of morality cm play a vital role in moral learning and transformation at al1 Ievels of human interaction.' Cultivating moral conversation and contestation is important to the good life, in domestic as well as international contexts, for just as biodiversity may Save us from physical extinction, ethical diversity may Save us from moral min. The development of a relatively free international civil society may thus serve the long- term interests of individuals, cornmunities and the society of states. Indeed, in our recent history, while public states generally clung to the mantra of nonintervention, remaining blind to the reality of human suffering spawned by intrastate violence, private non-state actors motivated by a cosmopolitan moral orientation have worked individually and collectively to

49 George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four (Markham, Ontario: Penguin, 1954).

" This argument follows Judith A. Swanson's interpretation of Arbtotle's understanding of the ethical value of the private: "insofar as [AnstotIe] suggests that private activity m the fom of, Say, Enendship or philosophy can aansfom common opinion into right opinion, he believes that the private serves the public. His account suggests, moreover, that human beings carry virtue eamed in private into the public, whereas the human propensity to cherish what is one's own and desirable protects the private fiom being corrupted by opinions Iearned in public." Swanson, The Public and the Private in .4ristotie S Political Philosophy (Ithaca: Corneil University Press, 1992), p. 3. 200 fil1 the moral void." Their very pnvateness allowed them to traverse the official normative matrix of public states and private humanity imposed, until recently, by an anti-cosmopolitan society of states.

IV. bHUMANITARIANINTERVENTION': A COSMOPOLITAN CRITIQUE

dust and Unjust intewentions

Contemporary conceptions of 'humanitarian intervention' entai1 a cosmopolitan ethical orientation in their embrace of the cosmopolitan challenge to redress the suffenng of victims of intrastate violence. Recent reconceptualizations of the concept have sought to challenge the conventionally restrictive interpretation that identified intervention with the use of force, which had the effect of severely constraining the moral Iegitimacy of al1 types of intententionary activity in response to intnstate violence." In a thorough and methodical reconceptualization, Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse redefine 'humanitarian intervention' as "cross-border action by the international comrnunity in response to hurnan suffering," made up of forcible and non-forcible actions." By untangling the issues of military force and coercion Erom the issue of intervention, their reconceptualization allows us to conceive of a broad range of cross-border actions that might be called on to serve humanitarian interests. Whereas traditional normative debates about 'humanitarian intervention' focused solely on the justifiability of the non-consensuai use or threat of force

" Médecins Sans Frontières, for example, was created in 1971 from the experîence of docton providing medical relief in Biah during the 1967-70 war. See Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, Humanitarian Intervention in Contempora~Conflict, p. 1 18-9.

52 Roberts, for example, defines 'humanitarian intervention' as '2nilrtary intervention in a state without the approvai of its authorities, and with the purpose of preventing widespread suffering or death arnong the inhabitants." Roberts, Humanitarian Action in War, p. 19.

" Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, Humanitanan Inrervendon in Contemporary Conflict, p. 113. 20 1 by states, contemporary reconceptualizations enable us to think innovatively about different types of acton and activities - political, social, religious, professional, economic, as well as military - and how they may contribute to resolving contexts of intrastate ~iolence.~''

Military intervention by states and humanitarian assistance provided by non-governmental agencies may be considered as distinct but potentially complementary options in a comprehensive specmm of conceivable responses to human suffenng tiom intrastate crises and conflicts.

One virtue of the reconceptualization is that it allows consideration of the utility of other kinds of less morally contentious activities than the use of force that could constitute legitimate or justifiable intervention even when practised without the consent of the target state's authorities. Mile 1 am sympathetic with the intent behind this reconceptualization, 1 think it downplays the significance of the cosmopolitan challenge to prevailing conceptions of international monlity and politics. This is evident in the use of the term 'humanitarian intervention' itself.

The question of how to use the term arises when we consider that the reconceptualization offered by Ramsbotham and Woodhouse seems to encourage its use to characterize potentially widely diverse types of activities, so long as they serve a humanitarian purpose. Confusion inevitably aises, however, when one term is used to refer to different things or activities. This confusion was evident during the 1999 NATO intervention in Kosovo, when various commentators noted with irony the use of the term

'h~manitarianintervention' to descnbe a bombing campaign. The root of the confusion lies

" See Bhikhu Parekh, "Rethinking Hwnanitarian Intervention," International Political Science Rwimv 18, 1 (1997):49-69 at pp. 67-68. 202 in the failure to distinguish between three distinct uses of the term: to convey the purpose of an action, the substance of an action, as well as an evaluation of an action. NATO called its military campaign in the former Yugoslavia a 'humanitarian intervention' in the purposive sense of the term - to convey the idea that NATO was intervening to achieve a humanitarian objective, maidy the protection of ethnic Albanians from state-sponsored violence.

Cnticisms of this use of the term stem i?om those who implicitly adhere to one of the other usages of the term.

A humanitarian intervention in the purposive sense is not necessarily hurnanitarian in the substantive sense, which usually refen to "organized refitgee, hunger and relief efforts designed to bring immediate aid to those who are suffering."" The International Cornmittee of the Red Cross is the typical and intemationally accredited humanitarian intervenor, providing medical attention and nouishrnent to the wounded and distressed, and generally tending to the matenal needs of people caught in situations of violent conflict. NATO's military strikes clearly did not constitute humanitarian action so understood.

Other critiques of the use of the term 'humanitarian intervention' to descnbe NATO's intervention in Yugoslavia draw on an evaluative sense of the term, implying a set of cnteria with which to assess the authenticity of NATO's humanitarian daims. The evaluative use of the term requires judgement not ody of the professed purpose of the intervention, but also other features of the intervention, such as the authority of intervenors to act, the methods they employ, and the consequences of the intervention. If we use the term 'humanitarian intervention' in this sense, no intervention cm be calied 'humanitarian' until its conclusion.

Whether NATO's intervention is 'humanit&an' will be open to debate, the same way that

" Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, Humanitarian Action in War, p. 12. politicians, soldiers, scholars and wider publics debate whether any specific war was just or unj ust .

In fact, the fimework principles offered by Ramsbotham and Woodhouse consti~te evaluative criteria with which to assess not only the humanitarian nature of an intervention. but also its essential rightness, sirnilar to the way that just war critena ailow us to assess the justness of a war.'" Ln this sense, the fi-mework pnnciples do much more than delineate

'hurnanitarian intervention'; they cmbe seen to form the legitimation principles of any justifiable intervention. Indeed, it is difficult to think of any kind of intervention, even a superpower intervention for reasons of international peace and security, that can claim moral legitimacy if it contravenes the cosmopolitan pnnciples underlying 'humanitarian intervention.' To cal1 an intervention 'humanitarian' in this evaluative sense amounts to saying that it is 'right' or 'just.' Yet a significant problem of making 'humanitarian' coterminous with 'right' and 'just' in recent conceptualizations of 'hurnanitarian intervention' is the air of legitimacy it [ends to al1 displays of humanitarian assistance, understood in the narrow descriptive sense. Yet even the provision of humanitarian relief may be conducted in ways that are unjust, even if not unhmanitarian.j7

Potentially al1 types of cross-border action may be subjected to such evaluation; when

they satisfi cosmopolitan moral cnteria, they cm be considered just or right interventions.

Ramsbotham and Woodhouse argue that if intervenors do not act in accordance with their

56 Ibid., p. 226. To be 'humanitarian', an intervention mut have humanitarian cause, end, approach, means and outcorne.

For some of the morally problematic coasequences of humanitarian action in interna1 conflicts, see Adam Roberts, Httmanitut+un Action in War,pp. 33-34. 204 fiamework principles, "they should not cal1 their intervention 'hu~nanitarian'."~~Yet there is more at stake here than the applicability of a merely descriptive label. For an intervention that contravenes the fiarnetvork principles not ody loses an adjective, but a judgement: if an intervention fails to qualiQ as 'humanitarian,' it also, in consequence, loses most if not al1 claims to moral rightness and legitimacy. The reconceptualization they offer is not merely a redefinition, rhen, but an argument, not so much about what constitutes 'humanitarian intervention' as about what constitutes right orjzist intervention.

To avoid confusion as well as manipulation, we should reject the purposive use of the term 'humanitarian intervention' to cover any type of cross-border action that intervenors claim serves a humanitarian purpose. Although intervenon will need to justify their actions with reference to the defence or promotion of humanitarian interests, they should be encouraged to descnbe their actions according to the substantive nature of the actions themselves. Different types of activities may then retain their descriptive labels; thus intervention consisting of the application of military force should be called 'military intervention,' intervention involving economic measures should be called 'economic intervention,' while the term 'humanitarian intervention' or 'assistance' may be retained specifically to descnbe actions that contribute to the immediate relief of physical suffering, such as the provision of food, water, shelter and medical assistance.

Whether any of these types of intervention constitute just or right interventions will depend on a thorough moral evaluation not only of the professed purpose of the intervention, but also its approach, means and outcome. The reconceptualization of 'humanitarian

58 Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, Humaniturian Intervention in Contemporary Conflict, p. 23 1. intervention' offered by Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, as well as others," provides a standard based on cosmopolitan morality by which al1 interventionary activities may be judged, whether conducted by a superpower, the UN, NATO, or multilateral or unilatemal efforts? Indeed, the increasing salience of the term 'humanitarian intervention' arnong practitionen and students of international politics does serve to make explicit a conscious

ceorientation of the nioral foundations of international society, Erom m exclusive ana nmow concern for peace and security between States, to a more inclusive moral agenda that places a

broader conception of humanitarian interests and concems at the centre of moral

conversations and conduct at the international level.

Cosmopolitan Humanitarianism: Political Not Metaphysical

The guiding moral aim of 'humanitarian intervention' is '70 prevent and alleviate

human suffering wherever it may be found,'"' or to "remedy mass and flagrant violations of

the human rights of foreign nationals by their own g~vemments."~'In scope, a cosmopolitan

'' L. Minear and T. Weiss, Humanirarian Action in Times of War (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Riemer, 1993).

"O When public institutions fail at the international level, members of the international comrnunity must often do more in their private capacities to uphold cosmopolitan ethical commitments. Thus, President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania justified his country's intervention in Uganda in 1978-79 by saying that "in the absence of a collective willingness by the OAU [Organization of African Unity] to condemn or punish a dersuch as [di Amin, 'then each country has to look after itself."' (Quoted in Ramsbotharn and Woodhouse, Humanitarian /ntervention in Contemporas, Confficr, p. 6.) Until public international instihitions such as the United Nations constnrct and adhere to a cosmopolitan framework for addressing cases of inmstate violence, unilateral actions such as the Tamanian intervention in Uganda, and more recently, the NATO intervention in the Kosovo confiicr, cm be expected and legitimated frorn a cosmopolitan point of view. Consider that domestically, although the state possesses the monopoIy on Iegihte coercion, private individuals cm commit justifiable coercion and even homicide. Of course, the legitimacy of individual or private actions needs aIways to be judged by public institutions, thus unilateral or private actions like the NATO intervention in the former Yugoslavia also need to be submitted to public international judgement.

" The principle of humanity, so descriied, is found in The Fundamental Principles of the Internotional Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (proclaimed by the XXth International Conference of the Red Cross, Geneva, 1965). See Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, Humanitarian Intervention in Contemporary Conflict, pp. 14-16.

" Jack Donneily, Universal Humon Righu in Theory and Practice (New York: ComeU University Press, view of humanitarian obligations to protect people with respect to their natural vulnerabilities must be universal; the pnnciple of humanity applies without discrimination to al1 who cm claim to be hurnan. Contemporary humanitarianism is cosmopolitan in its acknowledgement of the universal and equal natural vulnerability to loss of persona1 privacy, and thus entails concomitant principles of impartiality and universality." Cosmopolitanism and hurnanitarianism are clearly not synonyrnous, piven that historically, humanitarian action could be quite non-cosmopolitan. For example, the 'humanitanan interventions' practised by

19" century Europe were non-cosmopolitan in that the only 'humanity' considered worthy of protection was limited to Christians: "there were no instances of European powers considering intervention to protect non-Chnstians.'" More recently, non-cosmopolitan humanitarian intervention was exemplified by the evacuation of foreign nationals by French and Belgian soldiers in the eady days of the Rwandan genocide of 1994."

Non-cosmopolitan humanitarian intervention could enjoy some legitimacy in an international society in which states admit some humanitarian responsibilities, albeit toward their own citizens ~nly.'~Cosmopolitan humanitarianism, however, poses distinct challenges

'' See Rarnsbotham and Woodhouse, Humanitarian Intervention in Contentporary Conflict, pp. 14-18 and p. 30.

Martha Finnemore, "Constmc~gNoms of Humanitarian intervention" in The Culture of National Strcurity: Noms and Identiry in World Politics, Peter .J. Katzenstein, ed, (New York: CoIurnbia University Press, I996), p. 163.

See Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, pp. 234-236, for the tragic choices made by French and BeIgian soldiers, who were ordered '20 evacuate al1 foreign nationais who wanted to leave but no Rwandese [sic]. They were not to intervene in the local politicai or security situation" (p. 235).

66 AS Michael Akehurst has noted, even the Iegitimacy of non-cosmopolita. hmtarian intervention, focused on the protection of nationak in other countries, has been greatly contested by a large number of states. See Akehurst, "Humanitarian Intervention," in Intervention in World Politics, Hedley Buii ed, (Oxford: Chrendon Press, 1986), pp. 99-104. to international society so conceived, since it involves the extension of the scope of states' humanitarian obligations to non-citizens as well. Under a cosmopolitan view, an intervention to rescue one's own nationals while leaving a local population to face mass slaughter or genocide, for exarnple, would not constitute just intervention, since it would fail the

"principle of humanitarian approach" which requires the intervention to be "impartially conducted.'"' Such interventions are not so much unjustifiable as woefully inadequate. The logic of cosmopolitan hurnanitarianism works against discriminatory protection based on nationality, as we witnessed in East Timor recently, when the staff of the United Nations mission in Dili retùsed to evacuate their post for fear that their departure would seal the deaths of about 2,000 local East Timorese who had found sanctuary in the üN comp~und.~~

The undisputedly political and normative nature of cosmopolitan humanitarianism faces stiff resistance fiom an international political discoune that has traditionally assumed a stark dichotomy between ethics and politics. Sorne cnticisms of 'humanitarian intervention' have drawn on this dichotorny, by asserting a standard of purity in motive and action that interventions must meet in order to be legitimate or authentically humanitarian. Cases of intervention on purely humanitarian grounds, however, are rare if not non-existent. Michael

Walzer has found "only mixed cases where the hurnanitarian motive is one among ~everal.'"~

This finding seems to tallit the moral authenticity of 'humanitarian intervention,' thereby calling into question its moral legitimacy. Clearly this is the case if the other motives are

67 Ramsbothrim and Woodhouse, Humanitarian Intervention in Contemporary Conflict, p. 226.

" See Marcus Gee, "Former diplomat has han& full in Dili," nie Globe and Mail, September 18, 1999, p. A18. A UN officer, Canadian Colin Stewart, expIained why he pushed for a delay in the evacuation of the UN compound: "At that moment, we thought we were condemning them [threatened East Timorese] to death. We were tem3ly ahid that aii these people we had Lved side by side with were going to be daughtered."

Walzer, Jiut and Urtjust Wars, p. 10 1. 208 morally questionable. The Amencan imperialist intervention and occupation of Cuba in

1898, as Walzer has pointed out, rnight have suffered fkom some morally undesirable intentions." Yet if humanitarian interests and goals are deeply complementary to other cherished moral interests and goals, such as peace and security, or communal integrity and autonomy, the mixture of these types of motives for intervention may not be morally problematic at all.

Moral purists also posit that legitimate humanitarian action should be non-political or

'beyond politics. ' Yet observers of recent interventions have noted that cosmopoli tan humanitarianism often yields political consequences, affecting the duration and outcome of conflict and the political fortunes of the actors. Purity of motive does not translate into purity of moral consequences. That humanitarian action has yiy political effects at al1 makes it morally impure and problematic, according to those who adhere to a dichotomous view of ethics and politics. Traditional humanitarian actors have also subscribed to this understanding in their endorsement of the principle of neutrality, which is deeply entrenched in the operational ethic of the International Cornmittee of the Red Cross and other humanitarian protocols: "In order to continue to enjoy the confidence of all, the Red Cross may not take sides in hostilities or engage at any tirne in controversies of a political, racial, religious or ideological nature."" As Rarnsbotharn and Woodhouse have pointed out, however, "the whole idea of separating 'humanitarian' from 'po litical action is both conceptually and practically ambivalent."" Moral suspicions of 'impure' humanitariankm

'O ibid., p. 102-104.

" Quoted in Roberts, Humanirarian Action in War, p. 5 1.

" Ramsbotharn and Woodhouse, Humanirarian Intervention in Contemporav Conjlict, p. 17. 209 stem fkom a misunderstanding of the relationship between ethics and politics. Realists have been prominent in portraying this relationship as a profound dichotomy, asserting a stark difference between public alûuism and private self-interest. Under this view, each is mutually exclusive and defined by its opposite; thus the political is not ethical, and the ethical is, or should be, non-political.

To assert thar action cm only be considered ethical when it has no political effects, however, is to deny the deeply political nature of ethical claims, judgement and action. For in offering a view of moral human conduct, any normative perspective contains arguments about the nature and purposes of power, and implicitly criticisms of how power - individual, social, political and economic - is exercised. Cosmopolitan humanitarianisrn is thus deeply political becailse it is a moral pnnciple, and not in spite of it. The mere fact that humanitarian actions have political implications should thus do nothing to undermine their moral legitimacy.

Acknowledgement of the political nature of humanitarian action should spur humanitarian actors as well as their critics to study, fiom a normative perspective, the

political consequences of humanitarian action. Increasingly, observen have begun to highlight some of the negative moral and political consequences. As Michael Ignatieff has

noted, "Outside humanitarian intervention may ... be helping, not to contain war, but to keep

it g~ing."~~in the aftennath of the Rwandan genocide, for exarnple, international and

humanitarian organizations poured aid Uito the refugee camps in ZaKe, where former

genociduires "controlled the refûgee population through misuse of the aid distribution system

" Michael Ignatieff, The Warrîor's Honoc Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience (Viking Press, 1997), p. 158. and vio~ence."~~International humanitarian aid nourished and refreshed the perpetrators of the genocide, allowing them to re-group and carry on destabilizing activities against the new

Rwandan government, resulting in a situation of insecurity that pervades al1 of central PLfnca today." The morality of humanitarian action and its consequences, however, seems to change according to context; thus, while the consequence of prolonging contemporary intrasrare wars nas 'Deen vieweti as a negative morai side-effecr of humanitarian action, there are cases in which this consequence might be considered morally positive. Outside intervention that kept the war going against Nazi Germany, for example, is less morally controversial than that which perpetuates a senseless, aggressive or unjust war. Mon1 judgements about the legitimacy of humanitanan actions and their political consequences are thus intncately connected with the perceived legitimacy of the wars being fought.

These observations suggest that the moral utility of humanitarian action needs to be assessed in relation to a more comprehensive moral standard than the measure of relieving irnmediate suffenng. Humanitarian organizations dedicated to providing relief to suffering victims are reluctant to engage in making such assessments. Thus Comelio Sommmga,

President of ICRC, stated in his address to the U.N.General Assembly in 1992:

.. . hurnanitarian endeavour and political action must go their separate ways if the neutrality and impartiality of humanitarian work is not to be jeopardised .. . it is dangerous to link hurnanitarian activities aimed at meeting the needs of victims of a conflict with political measures designed to bring about the settlement of the dispute between the partie^.'^

" Fiona Terry, 'The humanitarian impulse: imperatives vemconsequences," paper prepared for the Washington, DC international Studies Association meetings, 1999, p. 6.

'' The French section of Médecins Sans Frontières and the International Rescue Cornmittee (IRC) did withdraw Çrom the Rwandan refugee camps in protest, but only after "the critical needs of the populations were met" See Terry, 'The humanitarian impulse," p. 10.

76 Quoted in Roberts, Humanitarian Action in War, p. 55. While this reluctance to engage the political aspect of their actions is undentandable from moral and strategic points of view, it leaves humanitarian actors vulnerable to politicization, corruption and manipulation. Moral assessments of the political context of humanitarian action are inescapable if humanitarian action is to be properly understood as a Fundamental component, rather than the absolute be-al1 and end-all, of cosmopolitan morality.

Cosmopolitan tolerance and war

Militaiy intervention also entails rnany hard choices." hdeed, a cosmopolitan ethical perspective Faces its greatest challenges in the context of war, when cornmon humanitarian interests tend to be nullified by war's divisive and simplimng zero-sum logic that casts al1 actors as 'for us' or 'against us', winners or losers, victirns or aggressor~.~~A cosmopolitan ethical approach might begin by noting the intrinsic cruelty of ~ar.'~War is a journey into the heart of an irnpenetrable darkness of human suffenng; images of death and destruction,

" See .i. Bryan Hehir, "Military intervention and national sovereignty: recasting the reIationshipWin Hurd Choices. Jonathan Moore, ed., pp. 29-54.

AS Pat Barker's fictional British oficer, Billy Pnor, put it in his diary while fighting in France at the close of the First World War, more meaningful than words Iike patriotism, honour and courage are the little "words that trip through sentences unregarded: us, hem, we, they, here, there. These are the words of power, and long after weTregone, they'll lie about in the Ianguage, like unexploded grenades in these fields, and any of them'll take your hand off." See Barker, The Ghosr Rond (London: Penguin, 1995), p. 257.

" Shakespeare depicts this cruelty well in the following dialogue between two Trajan warriors: "Troihs: Let's leave the hennit pity with our mother, And when we have ou.mors buckled on, The venomed vengeance ride upon our swords, Spur them to ruthhl [woeful] work, rein them fiom ruth [pity]. Hector: Fie, savage, fie! Troilus: Hector, then 'tis wars." William Shakespeare, The History of Troilus and Cressida (Scarborough, Ontario: The New American Library of Canada Lirnited 1963) 53,4549. Hector's fate at the end of the play serves to confiTroilus' view of war's unmitigated savagery. Indeed, contrary to Ignatieff, Shakepeare mounts a stinging attack on the concept of 'warrior's honour' in Troilus and Crexsida. We expect only honourable fighting between great wwarriors and distinguished societies, but the ciramatic conclusion of the play, in which AchiUes kills an unarmed and unshielded Hector, proves the inconstancy of even the most honourable of warriors fiom the most civilized of societies. chaos and confusion, inhumanity and injustice form the ghastly portrait of humans at war.

Cosmopolitanism's moral condemnation of cnielty thus translates into a general moral obligation to prevent and halt the ascendance of a state of war. The daim is not that war is always avoidable, but that we should seek to avoid it because the moral arbitrariness endemic to a state of war militates against the protection ofpersonal pnvacy claims that underlie cosmopolitan morality.

International interventions must be careful not to perpetuate or widen the circle of suffiring and injustice. This is why military intervention has so many setbacks, For in war, there will inevitably be unforeseen miscalculations and unpredictable consequences. Modem warfare, with the technology to min others without seeing their Bces, also possesses the greatest potential for cruelty. As Hallie has commented, "There is a curious innocence to some kinds of victimization, a disregard of the effects on the victim, a concentration on one's own motives, that announces the separation, the abyss that cm exist beiween the victim and his vi~tirnizer."'~This kind of 'innocent' cruelty was apparent in U.N. efforts in Somalia afier 1993, and the NATO miiitary intervention in the former Yugoslavia. The following address by the New York Times ' Thomas Friedman to Serbs during NATO's intervention provides an indicative example: "Every week you ravage Kosovo is another decade we will set your country back by pulvenzing you. You want 1950? We can do 1950. You want

1389? We can do 1389 t~o."~'Remembering that "a man cm be cruel without having

'O Philip P. Hallie, The Parador of Cmehy (Middetown, Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press, 1969). p. 108.

" Quoted in Rick Salutin, "Moral arrogance at hill rhrottle in most Kosovo coverage," The Globe and Mail, 8 July 1999, p. Cl. cruelty as his main or even his subsidiary airn,"" military and other intervenors should be ever vigilant that their actions do not produce excessive cruelty, for the arrogance of power will only fuel the sense of injustice and the potential for Merviolence.

While fiom a realist and cornmunitarian perspective, the potential sacrifice of one's own soldiers, sons or daughten makes military intervention a problematic endeavour, kom a cosmopolitan point of view, the worth of al1 lives makes the use of force an especially burdensome strategy. Once the necessity to use force has been achowledged, however, a just military strategy would entai1 doing one's best to minimize hmto civilians and other innocents not engaged in battle, which invariably entails risking the lives of one's own soldiers. Indeed, the just war tradition. with a history almost as long as wan have been fought, involves respect for humanitarian interests in minimizing cruelty, suffering and vi~tirnhood.~'E.H. Carr characterized the widely-accepted rules of war to entail an

"obligation not to inflict iinnecessary death or suffenng on other human beings.""

A cosmopolitan commitment to tolerance in the promotion of ethical understanding also limits the utility of forceful measures. Although rnilitary intervention may be necessary to prevent or halt large-scale violations of individual bodily integrity and decisional agency, force cannot produce ethical understanding, only behavioural cornpliance. Its use, therefore, cannot effect a moral order, only some degree of safety, or Eeedom f?om violence. Indeed force may only be able to achieve a temporary cessation of violence, and to establish a

'' Hallie, The Paradox of Cmelty, p. 13.

" The idea of 'just war' can be mced at least as far back as ancient Greece. Aristotle, for example, used the phrase 'just war' to describe hostilities between Hellenes and non-Heuenes. See Fredenck H. Russeii, The Just War in the hiidde Ages (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973, p. 293.

Edward Haiiett Cm, The nveny Years' C'is.1919-1939 (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1946, 2d edition), p. 154. context of safety and security, a necessary but insufficient precondition for moral reconstmction. Quick military intementions are thus unlikely to resolve the complex political, social, economic and ethical crises that precipitate humanitarian emergencies, just as police intervention alone, even repeated interventions, cm do little to alter the pattern of family violence." The establishment of moral order, as well as enduring social stability, will require more than the establishment of peace through coercion. This task is a difficult one not only in international relations, but also in family and national relations.

V. CONCLUSION

Contemporary reconceptualizations of 'humanitarian intervention' illuminate changes in the moral foundations of international society as it embraces a more explicitly cosmopolitan moral agenda. Humanitarian activity may at times have served as "an alibi for the larger failure of the great powers to put a stop to the fighting in the first place,"'' but more accurately, the work of non-governmental humanitarian acton has served as an impetus for international political involvement in confiicts which might not have received my such attention otherwise. Cosmopolitan morality, attuned to human kailty and fallibility, respecthl of personal and political pnvacy, and committed to toleration in its pursuit of moral progress, avoids endorsing a naïve or arrogant "hurnanitarianism unshaken by skepticism and unmindful of its own limitation^."^^ Yet it also avoids perfectionkm which

" indeed the purpose of using public intervention in response to family violence as ;in analogy of international intervention in response to intrastate violence is not to make the latter seem easier to resolve, but to show that the etiiicd and pnctical diff~cultiesinvolved pertain, in varying degrees, to both cases of 'domestic' violence.

Ignatieff, The Wumior S Honor, p. 159. Of course, we should not assume that the great powers would act with greater resolve to put a stop to such fightmg in the absence of such humanitarian activities, for such an assumption wouId not be borne out by the great powers' moralfy dismal cold wa.record of intervention,

8' ShkIar, Ordinoty Vices, p. 37. 215 inhibits action and serves only to perpetuate cruelty, injustice and intolerance. As Judith

Shklar has noted, "Nothing but cruelty cornes fiom those who seek perfection and forget the little good that lies directly within their power~."'~Any morally defensible perspective or policy must eschew these diverse but equally dangerous temptations.

Cosmopolitanism entails public and pnvate recognition of common human vulnerabilities denved tiom Our mortal coil, and of common human potentialities derived from our capacity for reasoned agency. Intervention, understood as "an interposition by an outside party with a view to effecting sorne alteration in the onginal situation,'"' is not itself problematic when it is part of a response to protect individuals' persona1 privacy daims, upon which any morally defensible public order, domestic or international, rests. While it is true that there "is no simple equation behveen universalist conceptions [of'morality like cosmopolitanism] and the advocacy offorcible interventi~n,'~adopting a cosrnopolitan ethical perspective clearly does entail an interventionary, if tolerant, disposition. The indi fference and licentiousness of international society with respect to the tragedy of intrastate violence are greater moral hazards under a cosmopolitan view as they serve to encourage every kind of public and pnvate human vice.

'* Ibid., p. 39.

" Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, Humanitmian Intervention in Contmporary Confrict, p. 113.

90 ibid., p. 48, italics mine. And if you wrong us, shall we not revenge?

William shakespearel

For al1 those bom beneath an angry star,

Lest we forget how fragile we are.

i William Shakespeare, Merchant of Venice (Toronto: The New American Lhrary of Canada, 1965), 3. L -63.

' Sting, "Fragde," in Nothing Like the Sun (A&M. 1987). Conclusion.

Such a long and crooked journey

1. INTRODUCTION

1 have sought in this work to contribute to the normative study of international relations by highiightins the role of the pubiiciprivate consnuct in smicninng the moral world at the international level, and more specifically, interpretations of intervention as a moral problem in world politics by competing ethical perspectives. A cosmopolitan moral vision requires us to pay attention to victims of intrastate violence, and to domestic and international agents and structures of victimization. Until very recently, the society ofstates tended to regard any suffering of individuals or groups - especially fî-om intrastate conflict and violence - as misfortunes. The prevailing view of scholars and practitioners of international politics used to be that the suffering of victims of intrastate violence could not be appropriately or adequately addressed by international law or the society of states.

To realists, any international attempts to achieve a kind of justice for victims of

inbastate violence are dangerous in an anarchical context where the primary preoccupation of states must be self-preservation, and the maintenance of international peace and security.

Realists feu that placing humanitarian concems before security considerations will destroy

the fragile fabnc of international peaceful CO-existenceand lead to even greater suffering.

They assert that the standard of international peace and security should prevail over human

suffering in detemgextemal responses to intrastate violence: "peace-enforcement in

civil wars requires a clear, compelling case for reasons of international security;

humanitarian concerns are not en~u~h."~The intemationaYdomestic dichotomy is clear: the

3 Stqhen John Stedman, 'The New hterventionists," Forei' Affuirs, 72, 1 (1993): 1-16 at p. 14. 218 suffering of individuals and groups within other political cornmunities must regrettably remain their own private concem; only when such suffering threatens international security can the matter warrant public international concern and intervention. Realists are right to remind us of the potentially devastating costs of pursuing justice for victims of intrastate violence in a world of states that are jealous of their intemal sovereignty. Yet realists are too quick to presurne a positive connection between the preservation of the state and the preservation of individuals within them, between interstate peace and human security. The normative appeal of the redist preoccupation with interstate security is undermined by the empirical disjuncture behveen interstate and human security.

Statist cornmunitarian theorists admit the validity of claims of justice and injustice in international society, but tend to limit them to states. The normative claims of individuals and non-state groups, under this view, would undermine the moral personality and agency of the state, which are summed up by the twin principles of sovereignty and nonintervention.

The flip-side of a cornmunitarian image of states as insular self-directing entities is that intrastate violence tends to be viewed as an intemal problem, effectively securing for domestic tyrants an arena in which they may victimize with impunity. In reality, of course, intrastate conflicts do not conform to the intemational/domestic dichotomy posited by realists and cornmunitarians, but typically traverse this divide. Acknowledging the interconnection of public and pnvate, international and domestic, allows us to achowledge that cases of intrastate violence do not develop in a moral, political or economic vacuum. With a cosmopolitan re-orientation, international society is compelled to confiont the tragedy of intrastate violence. 219 II. INJUSTICE AND THE GENESIS OF INTRASTATE VIOLENCE

Contemporary scholars have identified the thernes of victimhood and injustice as central to ciramas of intrastate violence. As Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse have observed in their study of civil or intemational-social wars, 'Wothing is more characteristic of [such conflicts] than mutual perceptions of injustice and victimization. .. . Past outrage, resentment, unrequited desue for revenge and a deep sense of injustice swell the stream of public memory, ready to break out again and Fuel Future confîict if the circurnstances ari~e.'~

More than power, more than security even, it seems, people - individually and collectively - seek justice, or at least they seek not to be victirns of injustice. Even Hobbes recognized that most people "choose rather to hazard their life, than not to be revenged."' The sense of injustice is an underexplored theme in the literature on the causes of violence and war, domestic and international. Clashes of interests and disparities in power between individuais and groups are commonplace, within families, social groups, States and international society.

These factors alone carmot account for the outbreak and perpetuation of violence at any level of hurnan interaction.

Melvin Lemer has characterized the sense of injustice as "a reaction to a perceived discrepancy between entitlements and benefits.'" David Welch calls the drive to correct this perceived discrepancy ''the justice motive."' Rousseau acknowledged this motive as a cause of interstate war in his clah that princes took up arms '70 maintain their own rights wti~

Oliver Rarnsbotham and Tom Woodhouse, Humunitmian Intervention in Contemporap Conflict (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1996), pp. 100-10 1 (italics mine).

Thomas Hobbes, Leviathun (Markham, Ontario: Penguin, 1986), Chapter 15, pp. 210-21 1.

6 Melvin J. Lerner, "The Justice Motive in Human Relations," in The Justice Motive in Social Behavior: Adapting to Times of Scarcity and Change, Melvin J. Lemer and Sally CILemr eds. (New York: Plenum Press, 198l), pp. 12-13. Quoted in David A. WeIch, Justice and the Genesis of Wur (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 19.

' Welch, Jusrice and the Genesis of War, p. 19. We might call this the 'injustice' motive, since it is the sthg of injustice and the desire to avoid, rectify or eliminate it that motivates the actor. 220 assailed."' Plato acknowledges the power of the justice motive within individuals in The

Reptiblic:

. .. what about when a man believes he's being done injustice? Doesn't his spirit in this case boil and become harsh and form an alliance for battle with what seems just; and, even if it suffers in hunger, cold and everythmg of the sort, doesn't it stand fimi and conquer, and not cease kom its noble efforts before it has succeeded, or death intervenes, or before it becomes gentle, havùig been called in by the speech within him like a dog by a herdsman?'

People will expend scarce and valuable resources and energy in order not to be victims of injustice. As Welch explains, the sense of injustice "triggers a unique emotional response. It engages powerfbl passions that have the effect of increasing the stridency of demands, amplifying intransigence, reducing sensitivity to threats and value trade-offs, increasing the willingness to mn nsks, and increasing the Iikelihood of violent behavior."'* This response to perceived injustice may be an indication of the centrality of our moral personality to Our sense of self; just as the threat of extreme physical danger can trigger powerfbl mental, emotional and physical reserves in ordinary humans to defend physical integrity, it seerns that the sting of injustice can cal1 up similar resources to preserve the moral integrity and dignity of the selE While Welch focuses his study of the justice motive on the outbreak of five interstate wars, there is good reason to consider its prominence in the genesis of intrastate violence and war.

Aeschylus also perceived that the psychology of victimhood inspired by the sense of injustice lies at the heart of the darkness of intrastate conflict and violence. His dramatic trilogy, the Oresteia, reveals a domestic cycle of betrayal, violence and revenge that serves as

JeamJacques Rousseau, Project of Perperual Peace, Edith M. Nuttall trans. (London: Richard Cobden- Sandersoa, 1927), p. 57.

9 PIato, The Repribiic of PIafo, Allan Bloom tram. (New York: Basic Books, 1991, second edition), Book N, uoc, p. 120.

'O Welch, Jurrice and the Generir of War,p. 20. a window to the political horror of civil war in the kingdom of Argos. The story of the fa11 of the house of Atreus is as complicated as the tragic stones of Rwanda and the former

Yugoslavia in recent times. Estrangement, betrayal and vengeance, caught in a minous entanglement with love, 10 yalty, and justice, undennine the mortal players in both 'domestic' tragedies. In the final play of Aeschylus' trilogy, 7he Eumenides, Orestes has fled from

Areos- to the doors of Phoebus at Delphi, seeking refuge from the Furies [Eumenides), or the spirits of retribution, who are hounding him for the "unendurable wrong"" he committed in murdering his own mother, Clytaemestra, an act he justifies as fit vengeance for the betrayal and murder of his father, Agamemnon. Unable to assuage the Furies at Delphi, a site tainted by the god Apollo's complicity in the murder of Clytaemestra, Orestes flees to Athens to seek judgement before the doon of Athena. nze Eumenides thus directly confronts the theme of how to effect persona1 and political transformation, Frorn a context of victimization, injustice and violence, to a state of peace, justice and reconciliation. This, ultimately, is the task of any interventionary effort in contexts of intrastate violence.

Despite the centrality of the concept of victimhood to domestic and international politics, it has received Iittle scmtiny: "Victirnhood may have become an inescapable category of political thought, but it remains an intractable notion."" Judith Shklar warns that it is difficult to know "how to think about victimhood. Almost everything one might say would be unfair, self-se~ng,undignified, untrue, self-deluding, contradictory, or dangerous."" On the surface, the attendance to victims' suffering and the pursuit to rectify

' ' Aeschy lus, The Eumenides in Oresteia: Agamemnon. nie Libation Bearers. The Eumenides, Richmond Lattimore trans. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1953), fine 146.

" Judith N. Shklar, Tutting Cruelty First," m ûrdinary Vices (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984), p. 17.

13 Ibid., pp. 22-23. 222 injustice might seem to be uncontroversial fiom any moral point of view. Yet as the contemporary practice of international intervention in intrastate violence starkly reveals, such actions are fiaught with ethical difficulty.

The irony of taking the victim's viewl% that the reaction against injustice can produce other victims in its wake, for the sense of injustice, equipped with inexorable passion, may overflow the bounds of justice. As Bruno Bettelheim has observed, "the victim often reacts in ways as undesirable as the action of the aggressor."15 This dynamic has been evident recently in Kosovo, where some retuming ethnic Albanians, victims of ethnic purging campaigns, have perpetrated vengeance against ethnic Serbs. In Rwanda too, the

Tutsi-dominated Rwandan Patriotic Front has been criticized for gross miscaniages of justice against the Hutu population responsible for the 1994 genocide.16 The entanglement of justice and injustice in these çcenarios return us to Aeschylus. How can we, at persona1 and political, domestic and international levels, assuage those who have suffered an 'unendurable wrong'? What would peace require? What would justice entail? Key to resolving contexts of violence, domestic and international, is extinguishing the sense of injustice that precipitates violent conduct. Under this view, peace, justice and reconciliation are inextricably interconnected goals. Whether international interventions are motivated by concerns of security, communal integrity? hurnanitarianism or justice, they must confront the ghosts of the victims that roam amongst the living, seeking blood for blood.

- 14 Sbkiar, Faces of Injustice, p. 126. l5 Bruno Bettelheim, 7Ee Infonned Heaw Autonomy in a Mus Age (Glencoe, niinois: The Free Ress, 1960). l6 See Gerard Runier, neRwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995). Prunier writes. "in the absence of both cash and justice, death has remained the order of the day in Rwanda," (p. 3 62) III. GIVING VICTIMS THEIR DUE

Recent international military, legal and humanitarian interventions reveal cosmopolitan intimations and conflicts in international society and law. Intenrentions in the former Yugoslavia and in East Timor, for example, have aimed first and foremost to meet the security and humanitarian needs of victims of intrastate violence. Beyond imrnediate physical security and humanitarianism, however, victims and their societies need justice and reconciliation. Giving victims their due thus involves assigning blame and responsibility for the harms committed against them. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former

Yugoslavia is an example of an international attempt to help victims of intrastate violence achieve some justice. Since this tribunal as well as the one for Rwanda were created by the

United Nations Secunty Council under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, their establishment represents the recognition of a notion of justice as an integral component of the maintenance of international peace and security. Societies that have expenenced a descent into large-scale violence also require public and political reconciliation to be able to have a chance at recovery. South Afnca's Truth and Reconciliation Commission aimed to achieve not only political reconciliation but also persona1 healing. These recent events and processes raise interesting normative questions for international and domestic political theory.

One large question is how the twin themes ofjustice and reconciliation connect in normative terms. This question can also be cast in terms of how to undestand the nature of justice, and of reconciliation. The importance of a proper understanding of these concepts and their relationship cannot be overstated. Misunderstanding them can have detrimental effects on even well-intentioned attempts to deal with the aftermath of intrastate (as well as international) violence and war. The result is often a perpetuation of grievances and resentments that will serve only too well to pave the road to mistrust and future victimization 224 and violence. Effective paths toward peace and security, domestic and international, is dependent on a proper understanding of justice and reconciliation.

Normatively, it is cornrnonly claimed that to achieve peace and security, societies must sometirnes sacrifice tmth and justice in pursuing reconciliation, and vice versa. This line of argument reveals a dichotomous conception of the relationship between justice and reconciliation. Such a view leads us to have ambivalent moral understandings of both justice and reconciliation. On the one hand, the pursuit ofjustice is seen as a divisive quest that hinden the process of re-building social peace and order. On the other hand, the path of reconciliation is sometimes viewed as a less-than-ideal endeavour, as it involves compromising claims of justice. In pursuing either justice or reconciliation then, we are left with the equally untenable moral tasks of requiring people to accept either the impossibility of reconciliation, or the necessity of an unjust settlement. Some critics of the South Afican

Tmth and Reconciliation Commission, for example, claim that its efforts at reconciliation compromise the possibility of achieving justice for victims of apartheid, while other critics argue that telling the tmth about al1 parties and seehgjustice for al1 would make reconciliation impossible.

Are justice and reconciliation fated to be unreconciled normative strivings? I suspect that only a ngidly legalistic conception of justice, or a self-abnegating notion of reconciliation, would support such a dichotomy between justice and reconciliation. Some

rights-centred liberal conceptions of justice as well as cornmunitarian critiques of them in contemporary political philosophy assume this conception.'7 Some realist and international

society theorists also tend to endorse this dichotomy by depicting justice as a revolutionary or

destabilizing force in world politics. The problem of relating justice and reconciliation points

" Sec my "Images of Justice: justice as a bond, a boundary and a balance," The Journal of Political Philosophy 6, 1 (1998):l-26. to the tension between two visions of justice, the backward-looking justice of the Furies, and

the fonvard-looking justice of Athena. Hobbes appreciated the value of a forward-looking justice in his declaration of the seventh Law of Nature: "in Revenges, (that is, retribution of

Evil for Evil), Men [shotrld] look not at the greutnese of the evill past, but the gmtnesse of

the good to follow. "'"et as Aeschylus shows, forward-looking conciliatory justice cm

only establish social peace after hearing and answenng the claims of backward-looking

retributive justice. Despite the tensions that exist between these two views of justice, neither

can hope to break the cycle of violence without the other.

If retributive justice is an integral component of any effective attempt to achieve

social peace, both international and domestic responses to intrastate violence must grapple

with the issue of how to give victims of past wrongs their due. Justice for victims entails

holding perpetrators morally accountable for their actions. This simple logic of moral

accountability, however, confionts a complex reality in the context of intrastate violence,

where the distinction between victims and perpetrators may be hard to draw, between groups

or individuals. Are those who commit acts of violence in response to a pnor injustice

committed against them perpetrators or victims? How does moral accountability work when

perpetrators cmclaim to be victims? These are especially problematic questions given

conventional images of victirnhood.

Powerlessness is the defining feature of victims, who are deprived of their sense of

self and agency, and have little control over their own fates. To victirnize, "perpetrators must

render their victims passive, stripping them not only of their right but of their dignity."'9 By

18 Hobbes, Leviathan, Chapter 15, p. 210.

19 Sharon Lamb, The Trouble with Blame: Victimr, Perpetrutors, and Responsibiliry (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996), p. 54. Lamb's subject is fdyviolence, specificaily wife battering and child sexual abuse. 226 virtue of their powerlessness, victirns are also largely blameless. The problem is that the

tendency to conceive of victims as helpless and, therefore, blameless, difises the blame and

responsibility of perpetrators who themselves can clairn to be subjects of past victimization.

In confemng a sense of moral blarnelessness or innocence on its subject, the status of

victirnhood cm therefore sente as an escape route from moral accountability. Robert Nisbet

has complained about the tendency to cast crirninals as victims "of circumstances, of poverty, of broken farnily, in su,of society. .. . Rights, duties, responsibilities, restraints, consciences, moral codes, al1 of these are visibly softening and decaying under the influence

of victimology - no longer a specialty of cnrninology but a gigantic malaise of Western

~ociety.'"~Perhaps it would be best to cease using the terminology of victimhood where it is

open to such abuse. Discarding the concept of victirnhood, however, offen leads to a denial of human suffering, to a blindness to injustice and cruelty, and to an abdication of moral

responsibility. Disabling the concept of victimhood may thus be counterproductive, leading

to the argument that there are no real victims.

What needs to be discarded is not the concept of victimhood, but a certain idealized

conception of it. Media portrayals of victims oflen ernphasize their powerlessness, loss and

confusion, rather than their senses of injustice and capacities for resistance and vengeance.

Images of victirnhood typically consist of distraught and powerless women and children who

need to be comforted, rather than driven young men and women who form resistance groups

such as the Kosovo Liberation Amy. Authentic victims, according to this saintly

conception, would "plead for pity" rather than "display defiance in the face of ~ruelty"~'We

might cal1 this the problem of 'dirty victims.' This rnorally simple image and the expectation

'O Robert Nisbet, "Victimology,"in Prejudices: A Philosophical DDictionary (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, l98S), pp. 304,306.

" Shkiar, Ordinary Vices, p. 10. of victims as wholly innocent, passive and helpless, clash with the moral complexity of victims in the flesh.

Adhenng to an idealized conception of victimhood rnakes the concept inaccessible to most human victims, who, although they may not be saints, nevertheless conform io the basic definition of a victim as a person who suffers an injury in moral and physical integrity and dignity. If we want to retain the concept of victimhood for human beings, we must recognize that victims may be difficult, disagreeable, misguided, stubbom, political people, who nevertheless have suffered injury. Victimization involves a denial of a person's dignity and agency, and yet a focus on the status of victimhood tends to accentuate a victim's powerlessness rather than alleviate it. In order not to perpetuate the powerlessness that is symptomatic of victimization, we need to give up the passive or agency-deprived view of victims. Helping victims must involve restoring not only their physical well-being, but primarily their sense of agency. Doing this, however, opens the issue of victim responsibility.

This topic is an underexplored theme in contemporary western societies, where the enlightened view holds that victims are generally not to blame for their victimization. OF course, at the point of their victirnization, victims are "captured and isolated fiom help or escape.'"22Yet psychologist Sharon Lamb argues that we do justice to victims not by denying their agency while holding unrealistic assumptions about the agency of perpetraton, but by recognizing the agency of both. Doing so, however, requires us to hold consistent views about the responsibility of both victims and perpetraton. She concludes, 'To enhance

77 Philip P. HaUie, The Paradox of Cmelty (Middletown, Connecticut: Wesleyan Uaiversity Press, 1969), p. 22, 22s the blarning of perpetrators and make them more accountable for their acts, we also need to look closely at victim re~~onsibility."~~

To give victirns their due, we need to give up the zero-sum logic of assigning blame and responsibility, or the automatic assumption that perpetrators have less responsibility br their conduct if victims admit some responsibility for their actions. We need not deny that people are victims, only challenge the view that the status of victirnhood relieves people of accountability for their actions or reactions to wrongs, perceived or actual, that are comrnitted against them. For example, we can acknowledge that ethnic Albanians were victims of great brutalities, without condoning revenge attacks on ethnic Serbs as morally excusable reactions. The pervasive perceptions of victimization are not so much the problem in contexts of intrastate violence, then, as what people conclude about what the status of victimhood confers in terms of moral entitlements to react in certain ways.

Outsiders sometimes implicitly accept the agency-deprived view of victims w hen they emphasize the historical cycles of violence that have plagued some societies. History is oflen offered as an explanation, and can end up sounding like an excuse or apology for contemporary scenes of brutality and atrocity. Yet as Lamb has put it, "Whatever one's history, there are some things you just do not do. One of them is hmother people or put their lives at nsk." This pertains to sexual offenders who were molested as children, as well as to previously oppressed ethnic minonties, and other victims of cruelty and injustice.

Holding victims accountable for their actions and reactions to actual and perceived injustice is one way of restoring their senses of moral agency and dignity. Lamb suggests, for example, that we should not seek to extinguish completely a victim's natural sense of self- blame, for doing so would "reinforce the passitivity that was inherent in the experience of

Lamb, The Trouble With Bfame, p. 185. 229 victimization." Crucial to victims' abilities to regain agency and dignity is "being held respowible for things that have happened" to them? Those who seek to throw off the mantle of victimhood thus cannot re-clairn agency without acknowledging accountability.

IV. THE CROOKED TIMBER OF JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION

The complexity of the victim-perpetrator relationship in contexts of intrastate violence chaiienges conventionai interpretations of justice and punishent. The international criminal tribunals for Rwanda and for the former Yugoslavia (ICTR and ICTY) are committed to holding perpetrators accountable for their crimes. They face a dauntin; task of uncovering the truth about tens of thousands of crimes. Criminal trials render individuated justice based on a victidperpetrator and guilt/innocence distinction. The Funes assert these distinctions, saying to Orestes, "If a man 1 can spread his hands and show they are clean, / no wrath of ours shall lurk for him."25 Yet as the previous discussion has suggested, individuals may be both victims and perpetrators, making the line between guilt and innocence difficult to draw, and the question of punishment highly problematic.

Hobbes argued that punishment should have no other design than the "correction of the offender, or direction of othedd6 Without respect to example and the profit to corne, he argued, retribution would constitute a form of vain-glory, become cruelty and inspire violence. Both the ICTY and the ICTR seem more focused on the deterrent kction of law and punishment, rather than on their potential to 'correct' offenders. In The Eumenides, the triumph of Athena's justice allows Orestes to return to Argos. The verdicts and punishrnents of criminal trials leave little room for the possibility of offender rehabilitation. in the case of

" ibid., pp. 126, 1S 1 and 54.

'I Aeschy lus, Eumenides, hes 3 12-3 14.

'' Hobbes, Leviathan, Chapter 15, p. 2 10. 230 Rwanda, the domestic court system has also had to deal with the problem of large numbers of alleged perpetrators of the 1994 genocide, with little cash or political will to hold fair trials for al1 of them. One must question whether executing the convicted, or even locking them up, will serve to rehabilitate Rwandan society, or will only sow the seeds of future violence.

Furthemore, while a criminal trial process may be effective in establishing the moral accountability of those who gave the orders and committed the dirty deeds, it has greater difficulty assigning blame to those who created the political, normative and social conditions that made genocide and ethnic purging politically, morally and socially possible, but who may not have actually participated in the actual violence. The most morally culpable actors may thus escape justice and punishment. In Aeschylus' Eumenides, although the god Apollo is clearly complicit in the murder of Clytemnestra, Athena's court can only try the mortal

Orestes. Perhaps we need to acknowledge that while individual cnminal accountability is important, it carmot give the final word on responsibility for any case of intrastate violence.

This acknowledgement would allow us to move beyond blaming those who cornrnitted acts of violence and to focus on their embeddedness within a political, legal, normative and social framework that fostered violence. This fiamework includes the international dimension that, until recently, has been largely unresponsive to the problem of intrastate violence. OP coune, this line of argument does not detract Eom the moral culpability of individuals, but it does reveal the inadequacy of the kind of moral accounting that cmbe achieved through criminal

îrials.

In an attempt to meet this objection, ICTY officials have concentrated their efforts on prosecuthg those who had command responsibility for the most senous crimes."

" David Rohde, "WhereNeighbors Attacked Neighbors, Justice 1s Far From Easy," NovYork Times, Sune 23, 1999. 23 t Meanwhile, as events on the ground have indicated, people who have been victimized seek persona1 justice for their persona1 pain and suffering, something that an impersonal

perpetrator-centred trial process may be ill-suited to deliver. This raises the problem of a potential disjuncture between the public and private faces ofjustice. Public processes like criminal trials and truth commissions wager that "social and political frameworks can make a difference to how individuals emerge fiom devastating atrocitie~."~~Not surprisingly, the

recumng image of a11 such attempts to deal with the aftermath of intrastate violence is one of

crookedness or disjointedness, of things not quite fitting together in a smooth, straight,

orderly fashion.

Another area of crookedness has been revealed by South Africa's Truth and

Reconciliation Commission. Led by the chatismatic Archbishop Desmond Tutu, the

commission aimed to achieve political reconciliation as well as facilitate persona1 healing. In

the South Afncan case, it is clear that although political will has been able to effect an

impressive level of public political reconciliation, the rnajority of victims and perpetrators of

apartheid have yet to feel personally reconciled to their past. This gap between processes of

public and private reconciliation means that underlying the officia1 story of South Afnca's

political transformation, are more crooked, less neat persona1 stories that may not and may

never arrive at such a transfomative note. Political reconciliation may be vital for any

chance at personal reconciliation, but it is not sufficient to effect the latter. The problem is

that the potential gap between personal and political justice and reconciliation means that the

sense of injustice, and the potential for the re-ignition of violence, can have a long shelf life.

Martha Minow, Benveen Vengeance and Forgbeness: Fucing Himry afier Genocide and Mm Violence (Boston: Beacon Press, 1998), p. 147. 232 What might facilitate personal reconciliation? Aeschylus recognized the poignant yeaming of victims to find a "place free of al1 grief and pain."29 Only a god perhaps can offer such a place; there may never be emotional or moral closure for some vi~tirns.~~

Although Athena initially relies on the threat of Zeus's thunderbolts to achieve reconciliation, she successfully persuades the Furies to relinquish their claim to Orestes only by offering them the status of a goddess in the city, a place of honour and power to shape the future.31 In Athena's arguments, we find ingedients such as reparation, recognition, and empowement, to facilitate the turning of victims' attention from the past to the future. In many contemporary contexts, however, these ingredients are in short supply. José Zalaquett has observed in his capacity as a rnember of the Chilean Commission for Truth and

Reconciliation that, "Most of [the relatives of the victims] stressed that in the end, what really mattered to them was that the tmth be revealed, that the rnemory of their loved ones not be denigrated or forgotten, and that such things never happen again."32 Although noiie of these accomplishrnents may free victims completely fiom pain, or nulliQ past wrongs, they go a long way towards mitigating the pain of such wrongs. Perhaps the transition From an unendurable to an endurable wrong is the only kind of peace and reconciliation that victims can hope to achieve. The interconnectedness of the persona1 and the political means that the disparity between them in terms of justice or reconciliation must be a public, political, domestic and international, concem.

Aeschylus, Eumenider, line 892.

See Mioow, Between Vengeance and Forgivenas.

3 1 Aeschylus, Eumenides, Lines 824-890.

" José Zaiaquett, "Balancing Ethicai Imperatives and Political Constraints: The Dilemma of New Democracies &&onthg Past Human Fti&ts Violations," Hasrings LmJournal 43 (1992):1425- 1438 at p. 1437. 333 As recent events have shown, international actors, institutions and law can contribute to the ability of victims of intrastate violence to achieve reparation, recognition and empowerment. Although Pinochet has been allowed to return to Chile on humanitarian grounds, it is clear that his arrest and detention in Britain during the last sixteen months has challenged the compromise between justice and reconciliation stnick in Chile ten years aga."

For the victims of his 17-year rule, the domestic political deal achieved peaceful political transition without persona1 or public justice or recoticiliation. The recent international attempts to hold Pinochet responsible for crimes committed under his rule have contributed to assuaging victims' senses of injustice. As Viviana Diaz, president of Farnily Members of the Disappeared, put it, "Pinochet lefl Chile as the king of the world, and he returns a criminal condemned rnorally by the ~orld."~'While this moral evaluation is still highiy contentious within Chile, its very controversy may generate a more truthhil accounting of

Pinochet's legacy than has so far been achieved.

Aeschylus represents healing as a straightening out of those whose lives have been bent by victimhood and s~ffenn~.~'Yet crookedness may be a revealing and integral part of the human condition. In the case of Chile, it is the disjuncture between international and domestic moral accountings of Pinochet's nile that has served to expose the debate within

Chilean society over Pinochet's legacy. Recognition of the gaps, disjunctures, and crookedness - in one word, imperfections - in ourselves, our mords, our institutions and our societies may lead us to appreciate the virtues of humanity and forgiveness in our pursuits of peace, justice and reconciliation. At the same time, awareness of human imperfection should

For example, while Pinochet was in Britain, "more than 50 of his former associates were arrested and detained in Chile on human rights charges." Jimmy Langman, "Chilean Iawyers seek end to ex-dictator's immunity," The Globe and Mail, March 3,2000, A8.

" CLiRord Krauss, îïze New York limes, March 3,2000. '' Aeschylus, Eumenides, iine 897. 234 spur us to practise moral vigilance, for by virtue of our moral imperfection, the sense of injustice, like the plague or the Furies, "never dies or disappean for good" but "cm lie dormant for years and yean" until one day, "for the bane and enlightening of' men," it may rouse up its rats again and send them forth to die in a happy world?

V. CONCLUSION

fndividuais, families and societies that experience pervasive or sustained violence are broken worlds that will require much internai moral courage and external support to have a chance at breaking the cycle of violence. The task of achieving peace, justice and reconciliation in the aftermath of intrastate violence is really a singular, albeit cornplex, task.

In addition, the various pursuits of these goals at the personal, national and international levels are al1 interconnected as well. Such efforts require a long-term cornmimient by outsiders to support those who are up to the task." Michael Walzer has wondered aloud whether the international community is ready to commit the resources required by such a process. International intervention, he writes, 'Y0 be effective, is likely to require a much more sustained challenge to conventional sovereignty: a long-terni military presence, social reconstruction, what used to be called 'politicai tnisteeship'. .. and along the way, making al1 this possible, the large scale and reiterated use of force. 1s anyone ready for thi~?"~'

Increasingly the answer seems to be, 'Maybe.' Exploration of the moral problems of victimhood and injustice, justice and reconciliation, punishrnent and forgiveness, are as crucial to the effectiveness of public and private, domestic and international efforts to halt

36 Albert Camus, The Plague. Stuart Gilbert tram. (Ontario: Penguin, 1986), p. 252.

37 On the dficulties, see, for exarnpIe, Alan Freeman, "Serbs in denial over Kosovo genocide," 77re Globe and Mail, 24 August 1999, A I S. Similady, in the aftennath of the genocide in Rwanda m 1994, most Hutus "stiU either deny the genocide ever happened or even insist that they, the Hutu were its victims. The RPF b1a.d denial of any guilt only reuiforces the Hutu potentia.1 for self-delusion-" See Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, p. 389. 235 cycles of intrastate violence as a sustained codtment of political will and material resources. A cosrnopolitan moral vision, by illuminating the suffering of victirns of intrastate violence, obliges us to begin the long and crooked joumey.

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