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ANALYSIS OF NEW DOT-COM BUBBLE IN U.S.
STOCK MARKET FOR PERIOD 1995 - 2012

By
Renate Shafrila Dwima Pranandya
ID No. 014200900131

A Thesis presented to the
Faculty of Economics President University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for
Bachelor Degree in Economics Major in Management

March 2013

THESIS ADVISER
RECOMMENDATION LETTER

This thesis entitled “Analysis of New Dot-com Bubble in U.S. Stock Market for Period 1995 – 2012” prepared and submitted by Renate

Shafrila Dwima Pranandya in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Bachelor of Science in the Faculty of Economics has been reviewed and found to have satisfied the requirements for a thesis fit to be examined. I therefore recommend this thesis for Oral Defense.

Cikarang, Indonesia, March 20, 2013

  • Recommended by,
  • Acknowledged by,

Ir. Farida Komalasari, M.Si.

Student Advisor

Irfan Habsjah, MBA, CMA

Head of Management Study Program

i

DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY

I declare that this thesis, entitled “Analysis of New Dot-com Bubble in

U.S. Stock Market for Period 1995 – 2012” is, to the best of my

knowledge and belief, an original piece of work that has not been submitted, either in whole or in part, to another university to obtain a degree.

Cikarang, Indonesia, March 20, 2013

Renate Shafrila Dwima Pranandya

ii

PANEL OF EXAMINERS
APPROVAL SHEET

The Panel of Examiners declare that the thesis entitled “Analysis of New

Dot-com Bubble in U.S. Stock Market for Period 1995 – 2012” that

was submitted by Renate Shafrila Dwima Pranandya majoring in Management from the Faculty of Economics was assessed and approved to have passed the Oral Examinations on March 4, 2013.

Misbahul Munir, MBA, Ak, CPMA

Chair - Panel of Examiners Drs. Bruno Rumyaru, MA
Examiner 1

Ir. Iman Heru Wijayanto, MBA
Examiner 2

iii

ABSTRACT

The development of technology nowadays has made people overvalue technology companies and it could create a new dot-com bubble. This thesis provides an analysis of new dot-com bubble in U.S. Stock market that focus in the technology industry, especially within internet sector. The analysis aims to clarify the speculations of a new-dot com bubble in U.S. stock market.

In this thesis, the researcher compared the criteria of first dot-com bubble with the current condition to indicate the possibility of new dot-com bubble. The researcher also compares the development in fundamentals based on today and previous bubble. Data analysis used to see the possibility of the new dot-com bubble is fundamental analysis. There are several kinds of ratios from fundamental analysis that applied to conclude on the current market situation as well as the trends in the internet sector compared to the general market. The ratio chosen in this thesis are Price Earnings ratio (P/E ratio), Price Earnings Growth ratio (PEG ratio), Free Cash Flow Yield, and Financial Leverage Ratio. S&P 500 index is chosen as a representative for U.S. Stock Market. Nasdaq Composite, Nasdaq Computer Index, Intr@ctive Week Internet Index and Nasdaq Internet Index are four indices representing the internet sector in the U.S.

The comparisons of ratio values between these four indices to the general market indicate high interest in internet sector. The result shows Internet sector are in mania phase at this time. Moreover, the result also show U.S. Stock Market is not in a new dot-com bubble and there are tendencies pointing towards for making of a bubble.

Keywords: Dot-com Bubble, Free Cash Flow Yield, Financial Leverage ratio, Fundamental Analysis, P/E ratio, PEG ratio, Technology

iv

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Thanks to God Almighty for the completion of this bachelor’s thesis. Only due

to His blessings and power that work within me I could finish my thesis. I deeply thank with the people behind my life for inspiring, guiding and accompanying me through thick and thin. It is a pleasant moment to express my heartfelt gratitude to all.

I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my adviser Mr. Iman Heru
Wijayanto and Mrs. Farida Komalasari for their patience, invaluable advice and suggestions.

I am desirous to individually thank all of my friends but as the list might be long and for fear I might omit someone, I will merely and frankly say: Thank you to you all for your love, support, care and trust.

Finally, I would like to thank my wonderful father, mother and sister for their infinite support throughout everything.

March, 2013
Renate Shafrila Dwima Pranandya

v

TABLE OF CONTENTS

THESIS ADVISER RECOMMENDATION LETTER .......................................... i

DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY ................................................................... ii

PANEL OF EXAMINERS APPROVAL SHEET................................................. iii

ABSTRACT............................................................................................................ iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENT....................................................................................... v TABLE OF CONTENTS ....................................................................................... vi LIST OF TABLES.................................................................................................. ix LIST OF FIGURES................................................................................................. x LIST OF ACRONYMS .......................................................................................... xi CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION.................................................................... 1 - 11

1.1. Background of the Study................................................................................ 1 1.2. Problem Identification.................................................................................... 4 1.3. Statement of the Problem ............................................................................... 4 1.4. Research Objectives....................................................................................... 5 1.5. Significance of the Study ............................................................................... 5 1.6. Theoretical Framework .................................................................................. 5 1.7. Assumptions and Hypothesis.......................................................................... 6 1.8. Scope and Limitation of the Study.................................................................. 6 1.9. Research Outline............................................................................................ 7 1.10. Definition of Terms........................................................................................ 8

CHAPTER II – LITERATURE REVIEW.................................................... 12 - 36

2.1. Market Efficiency ........................................................................................ 12 2.2. Behavioral Finance ...................................................................................... 14

vi

2.2.1. Herd Behavior.............................................................................................. 16 2.3. Initial Public Offering .................................................................................. 18 2.3.1. Motives for Going Public............................................................................. 18 2.3.2. Private versus Publicly Held ........................................................................ 19 2.3.3. Timing ......................................................................................................... 20 2.3.4. Mispricing.................................................................................................... 21 2.3.5. Findings....................................................................................................... 22 2.4. The Stock Market......................................................................................... 22 2.4.1. The Markets................................................................................................. 23 a. b.
The Primary Market ..................................................................................... 24 The Secondary Market ................................................................................. 24
2.5. The Information Technology Market............................................................ 25 2.6. Main Stages in a Bubble............................................................................... 26 2.6.1. Stealth Phase................................................................................................ 27 2.6.2. Awareness Phase.......................................................................................... 27 2.6.3. Mania Phase................................................................................................. 28 2.6.4. Blow Off Phase............................................................................................ 28 2.7. Standard & Poor’s........................................................................................ 29 2.7.1. Standard & Poor’s 500 Index ....................................................................... 29 2.8. Nasdaq......................................................................................................... 30 2.8.1. Nasdaq Composite Index.............................................................................. 31 2.9. American Stock Exchange ........................................................................... 31 2.9.1. Nasdaq Computer......................................................................................... 32 2.9.2. Inter@ctive Week Index .............................................................................. 33 2.9.3. Nasdaq Internet Index .................................................................................. 33 2.10. Criteria of Dot-com Bubble.......................................................................... 34

CHAPTER III - METHODOLOGY.............................................................. 37 - 45

3.1. Research Method ......................................................................................... 37 3.2. Research Instrument..................................................................................... 38 3.3. Sampling Designs ........................................................................................ 38 3.4. Data Analysis............................................................................................... 39 3.4.1. Fundamental Analysis.................................................................................. 39

  • a.
  • Earnings per Share ....................................................................................... 40

vii

b. c. d. e.
Price Earnings Ratio..................................................................................... 41 Price Earnings Growth Ratio........................................................................ 42 Free Cash Flow Yield................................................................................... 43 Financial Leverage....................................................................................... 44

CHAPTER IV – ANALYSIS OF DATA AND INTERPRETATION OF

RESULT.......................................................................................................... 46 - 59 4.1. Fundamental Analysis.................................................................................. 46 4.1.1. Index Price Level ......................................................................................... 47 4.1.2. Price versus Earnings .................................................................................. 47 4.1.3. Price Earnings Ratio..................................................................................... 49 a. b. c. d. e.
Price Earnings of All Indices........................................................................ 50 S&P 500 versus Nasdaq Composite ............................................................. 51 S&P 500 versus Nasdaq Computer Index ..................................................... 52 S&P 500 versus AMEX ............................................................................... 53 S&P 500 versus QNET ................................................................................ 54
4.1.4. Price Earnings Growth ................................................................................. 55 4.1.5. Free Cash Flow Yield................................................................................... 57 4.1.6. Financial Leverage Ratio.............................................................................. 58

CHAPTER V – CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION ................... 60 - 62

5.1. Conclusion................................................................................................... 60 5.2. Recommendation ......................................................................................... 62

LIST OF REFERENCES ...................................................................................... 64 APPENDICES ....................................................................................................... 71

viii

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1 – Top 10 Largest Companies by Market Cap on S&P 500........................... 30 Table 2 – Price Index Changes percentage (2009-2012)........................................... 47 Table 3 – PEG ratio for all Indices in 2012 .............................................................. 57 Table 4 - Average Financial Leverage year 2002-2012 ............................................ 59

ix

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1 - The Peak of the Dot-com Bubble............................................................... 2 Figure 2 – Number of Website year 1990 - 2008........................................................ 3 Figure 3 – Theoretical Framework............................................................................. 5 Figure 4 – Main Stages in a Bubble ......................................................................... 26 Figure 5 – Nasdaq Composite Price Index (1995-2005) ........................................... 34 Figure 6 – Nasdaq Composite: Price Vs Earnings (1995-2015)................................ 35 Figure 7 – Difference in Price versus Earnings of Nasdaq Composite ...................... 36 Figure 8 – Price Earnings of Nasdaq Composite (1995-2005).................................. 36 Figure 9 – Research Framework .............................................................................. 37 Figure 10 – Price Index from 1995-2011.................................................................. 46 Figure 11 – QNET Difference in Price versus Earnings ........................................... 47 Figure 12 – AMEX Difference in Price versus Earnings .......................................... 48 Figure 13 – Nasdaq Computer Difference in Price versus Earnings.......................... 48 Figure 14 – Nasdaq Composite Difference in Price vs Earnings............................... 49 Figure 15 – Price Earnings of All indices................................................................. 50 Figure 16 – Price Earnings for S&P 500 versus Nasdaq Composite ........................ 52 Figure 17 – Price Earnings for S&P 500 versus Nasdaq Computer........................... 53 Figure 18 - Price Earnings for S&P 500 versus AMEX............................................ 54 Figure 19 - Price Earnings for S&P 500 versus QNET............................................. 55 Figure 20 – PEG for all Indices................................................................................ 56 Figure 21 - Free Cash Flow Yield for all Indices...................................................... 58 Figure 22 - Financial Leverage for all Indices.......................................................... 59

x

LIST OF ACRONYMS

AMEX CFO CSE
American Stock Exchange Chief Financial Officer

Common Shareholders’ Equity

Dow Jones Industrial Average Earnings per Share
DJIA EPS GDP GICS IPO
Gross Domestic Product Global Industry Classification Standards Initial Public Offering

  • ICB
  • Industry Classification Benchmark

Information Technology Mergers and Acquisitions National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation New York Stock Exchange Over the Counter
IT M&A NASDAQ NYSE OTC

  • P/E
  • Price Earnings

PEG QNET S&P
Price Earnings Growth Nasdaq Internet

Standard and Poor’s

  • U.S.
  • United States

  • VC
  • Venture Capital

xi

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

1.1. Background of the Study

In the ‘90s, the first dot-com bubble (internet bubble) burst. It was a speculative

bubble within the Internet related services, well known as the “dot-com”. It all

started on the second half of the 1990s was raised a new kind of economy, where in stock market happened high grow rates under the influence of venture capital and the IPO-funded companies in the internet sector. High volume stock speculation was driven by the fact that this was a fresh industry with high potential, but then also one where companies were difficult to value. Investors

were looking for ‘hot’ stocks triggered high demand for tech stocks in general, as

well as causing the overvaluation of many companies in this field. Stocks price were going higher, higher and higher. At that time people did not follow Warren Buffett. He noted in a letter that technology investors have overstayed the party. He said many of investors had been hypnotized by the staggering ascent of tech stocks and ignored everything else. People was seen him as the old man and his value investment style seen as old style. They ignored the fundamental rules of investing in stock market, such as analyzing P/E ratios, studying market trends, and reviewing business plans. Alan Greenspan stated irrational exuberance as a warning that the market might be overvalued. At its peak, even companies which had never made any revenue were pushed onto the stock exchange and were

1

trading at extremely high values when one looked at the bottom lines of these companies—which were extremely negative in most cases. In March 2000, the technology stock index Nasdaq had reach its peak at over 5,000 points and become the climax of dot-com bubble. Many of internet companies packed up and leaving investors with significant losses.

Figure 1 - The Peak of the Dot-com Bubble

Source: Darren Jamieson, justsearchdigital.co.uk, 2007

The dot-com bubble was inflated by unfettered enthusiasm about the success of internet-based companies, as well as by eager speculation by venture capital firms, which saw a chance to generate profits based primarily on prospects and valuation rather than on true profitability. After the bubble burst almost 5000 of these dotcom companies either disappeared or were absorbed. Only the one which were truly profitable outside the financial markets survived such as Amazon, Yahoo, and Ebay (Colombo, bubblebubble.com).

2

In the past few decades, rapid technology innovations have greatly increased.
It makes fast enlargement in implementation of information technology into

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    To Tweet or Not to Tweet: Is Twitter a Help or Hindrance to Your Family Law Practice? LEI National CLE Conference Vail, Colorado January 9, 2010 Melissa F. Brown1 2 Melissa F. Brown, LLC 145 King Street, Suite 405 Charleston, SC 29401 843.722.8900 (office) 843.722.8922 (fax) www.melissa-brown.com www.scdivorcelaw.com www.twitter.com/ComplexDivorce Helping Individuals Cross Thresholds to New Lives 1 Substantial research and writing provided by Ashley Simons, law clerk and second year law student at the Charleston School of Law and Katie Perkins, associate at Melissa F. Brown, LLC. 2 This article is offered only for general informational and educational purposes. It is not offered as and does not constitute legal advice or legal opinions. Although we intend to keep this information current, we do not promise or guarantee that the information is correct, complete, or up-to-date. You should not act or rely upon the information in this article without seeking the advice of an attorney. 1. Lawyers are typically unskilled marketers. Judd Kessler, Esq., CEO of Abacus Data Systems, describes the seven most common marketing mistakes made by attorneys: wasting money on ineffective advertising, failing to address the needs of prospects, missing referral opportunities, ignoring the sources of clients’ dissatisfaction, failing to nurture and educate clients, not branding services correctly, and not cross or up-selling clients.3 Twitter is a marketing tool that solves some of these challenges. It is free; enables attorneys to provide beneficial information to prospective clients; provides simple ability to respond to potential contacts; and provides an outlet to educate the public and potential clients about your area of law.
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