--O/lb LT9900030
WORKING MATERIAL
CIVIL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AT THE IGNALINA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
26-28 OCTOBER, 1998
CIVIL SECURITY DEPARTMENT MINISTRY OF DEFENCE REPUBLIC OF LITHUANIA
NEXT PAQE(S) //VIS -LT-~OiO toft BLANK 30-17 Contents Page
Workshop Programme 4 Workshop Participants 7
NATO SCEPC Functions and Tasks 19 E.G.SOMER, NATO/CEPD
Emergency Predparedness at Ignalina NPP 26 A.KAIRYS, Ignalina NPP, Lithuania
Activity and Functions of VATESI 38 (State Nuclear Safety Inspectorate) S.KUTAS, VATESI, Lithuania
Monitoring of Personal Doses under Normal 45 And Accidental Conditions G.MORKUNAS, Radiation Safety Center,Lithuania
Organization of the Radiological Monitoring 50 S.MOTIEJUNAS,L.MORKELIUNAS, Environmental Ministry, Lithuania
A Swedish Co-operation Programme for Radiological 53 Emergency Planning Activities in the Baltic Sea Region B.A.PERSSON, SSI, Sweden
Emergency Preparedness at Barseback NPP Sweden 60 R.OLSSON, SKI, Sweden, C.G.LINDVALL, Barseback NPP, Sweden
On-site Emergency Preparedness in Finland 75 O.VILKAMO, STUK, Finland
Introduction to the Project "Harmonization of 107 Nuclear Emergency Preparedness" G.WINKLER, IAEA
Perspectives of Nuclear Energy in Lithuania 126 V.BIELIAUSKAS, V.MARCENAS, Economy Ministry, Lithuania
Preparedness and Planning for Nuclear Accidents at National Level 144 A.SIUKSTA, Civil Security Department, Lithuania "CIVIL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AT THE IGNALINA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT"
PROGRAMME
Date of the Workshop: 26th - 28th October 1998-12-02 Venue: Defence Ministry Advanced Training Center for the Military Nemencine Arrival of participants to Vilnius: 23rd - 25th October 1998-12-02
Monday. 26th October
Departure from hotel "Lietuva" 08.00
08.30 - 9.00 Registration 09.00 - 09.05 Opening Remarks 09.05 - 09.15 Welcome Address E.GJ.SOMER, NATO/CEPD C.STANKEVICIUS, Ministry of National Defence, Lithuania 09.15 - 09.20 Administrative Announcements
Session 1. Chairman E.G.J.SOMER
09.20 - 10.00 NATO SCEPC Functions and Tasks E.G.J.SOMER, NATO/CEPD 10.00 - 10.45 Emergency Preparedness at Ignalina NPP (part I) A.KAIRYS, Ignalina NPP, Lithuania
10.45-11.05 Coffee break
11.05 - 11.40 Emergency Preparedness at Ignalina NPP (part II) A.KA1RYS, Ignalina NPP, Lithuania 11.40 - 12.20 Activity and Functions of VATESI (State Nuclear Safety Inspectorate). S.KUTAS, VATESI, Lithuania 12.20 -13.00 Discussions
13.00 - 14.00 Lunch
Session 2. Chairman LTC Antanas Paulikas
14.00 - 14.30 Monitoring of Personal Doses under Normal and Accident Conditions G.MORKUNAS, Radiation Safety Center, Lithuania 14.30 - 15.10 The Swedish Support to Enhance Nuclear Safety and Emergency Preparedness at Ignalina NPP E.JENDE, Swedish International Project Nuclear Safely 15.10-15.30 Coffee break
15.30 - 16.00 Organization of the Radiological Monitoring S.MOTIEJUNAS, L.MORKELIUNAS, Environmental Ministry, Lithuania 16.00 - 16.30 A Swedih Co-operation Programme for Radiological Emergency Planning Activities in the Baltic Sea Region B.A.PERSSON, SSI, Sweden 16.30 - 16.50 Discussions 16.50 - 17.00 Administrative Announcements
Tuesday. 27th October
Session 1. Chairman LTC Viktoras Brazauskas
09.00 - 09.30 Emergency Preparedness at Barseback NPP Sweden R.OLSSON, SKI, Sweden C.G.LINDVALL, Barseback NPP, Sweden 09.30 - 10.00 On-site Emergency Preparedness in Finland O.VILKAMO, STUK, Finland 10.00 - 10.30 Introduction to the Project "Harmonization of Nuclear Emergency Preparedness" G.WINKLER,IAEA
10.30- 10.50 Coffee break
10.50- 11.35 Perspectives of Nuclear Energy in Lithuanias V.BIELIAUSKAS, V.MARCENAS, Economy Ministry, Lithuania 11.35 - 12.20 Preparedness and Planning for Nuclear Accidents at National Level A.SIUKSTA, Civil Security Department, Lithuania 12.20- 13.00 Discussions
13.00- 14.00 Lunch
14.00 - 14.45 Presentation of CD "Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant" P.MUDENAS, Joint Stock Company "Elektronines leidybos namai", Lithuania 14.45- 15.00 Administrative Announcements
15.00 - Social programme
Wednesday. 28th October
09.00 - 11.15 Departure to Visaginas 11.15 - 12.00 Observation of the Evacuation of Visaginas City Inhabitants 12.00 - 12.10 Departure to Ignalina NPP 12.10 - 12.40 Presentation on Ignalina NPP V.SEVALDIN, Ignalina NPP, Lithuania 5 12.40 -13.00 Acquaintance with the Functions of the Visaginas Fire Protection Brigade. Demonstration of the Fire Fighting and Rescue Equipment to be Used in Case of Accident at Ignalina NPP
13.00 - 14.00 Lunch
14.00 - 15.00 Functions of the Ignalina NPP Public Information Center. Representative of the Public Information Center 15.45 - 18.00 Departure to Vilnius
Thursday. 29th October
Departure of the participants PARTICIPANTS
NATO
Mr. Evert G.J. SOMER Staff Officer NATO Civil Emergency Planning Directorate NATO CEPD phone: +32 2 707 2676 fax: + 32 2 707 2677 address: Bid. Leopold III, B-l 110 Brussels Belgium e-mail egjsomer @ hg.nato.int IAEA
Mr. Gunther WINKLER Emergency Preparedness Officer International Atomic Energy Agency phone: + 43 1 2600 22745 fax: + 43 1 26007 22745 address: Wagramer Strasse 5, A-1400 Vienna Austria e-mail, g.winkler @iala.org AUSTRIA
1-stLtJohann FRANK Instructor NBC - Information System NBC - Defence School phone: + 43 1 727 61 41 102 fax: + 43 1 72 761 17130 address: Vorgartenstrasse 223 A-1024 Vienna
BELGIUM
Mr. Gert RIBBENS Comd Dept.NBC Ecole Du Genie - Dept. NBC phone: + 32 81 323952 fax: +32 81323999 address: Rue de Dave 262 5100Namen
Mr. Jean Jacques DAVID BE MOD-GENERAL STAFF-OPS DIVISION National Defence Ministry BE General Staff phone: +32 2 7016617 fax: + 32 2 701 6593 address: Rue d' Evere 1 B-l 140 Brussels e-mail:[email protected] 7 BULGARIA
Ms. Katerina KOSTADINOVA Radiation Protection Inspector Civil Protection of Republic of Bulgaria phone: +359 2 629111/343 fax: +359 2 688 115 address: Nicola Gabrovski str. 30, 1172 Sofia
CZECH REPUBLIC
Mr. Pavel LUKES Head of division of Crisis Management HEAD OFFICE OF CIVIL PROTECTION Head of Crisis Department MOD - Head Office of Civil Protection phone: +420 2 20 210751 fax: + 420 2 24310642 address: Namesti svobody 471 16000 Prague
FINLAND
Ms. Riita HANNINEN Head of Laboratory Radiation Safety Emergency Planning Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) phone: +358 9 7598 8312 fax: + 358 9 7598 8382 address: P.O. Boxl4 FIN-00881 Helsinki e-mail:RIITA.HANNINEN @ STUK.Fl
Mr. Matti JAUHIAINEN Special Adviser National Emergency Supply Agency phone: +358 9 66891537 fax: +358 9 66891527 address: Pohjois Makasiinik 7 A FIN - 00130 Helsinki e-mail: matti.jauhiainen @ nesa.fi
Mr. Olli VILKAMO Head, Radiation Safety Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) phone: +358 9 759881 fax: +358 9 75988382 address: P.O. Boxl4, Laippatie 4 FIN-00881 Helsinki e-mail:olli.vilkamo @ stuk.fi GERMANY
Mr. Hans KORN Head of the Section for Emergency Preparedness Federal Office for Radiation Protection phone: + 49 30 509 22 704 fax: + 49 30 509 22 712 address: Bundesamt fur Strahlenshutz Kopenicker Allee 120 - 130 D-10318 Berlin e-mail: Hkorn @ Bfs.DE
LATVIA
Dr. Uldis PORIS Head of Division State Fire and Rescue Service phone: + 3717 382617 fax: +3717 326119 address: Petersalas 10 LV-1045 Riga
Mr. Maigurs LUDBAR^S Head of Office Emergency Planning Department State Fire and Rescue Service phone: + 3717 382239 fax: +3717 326119 address: Petersalas 10 LV-1045 Riga e-mail: cac@ elva.org.lv
LITHUANIA
Mr. Juozapas Algirdas KATKUS Chairman Committee of National Security of the Parliament phone: + 370 2 22 46 91 fax: + 370 2 address: Gedimino 53 LT- 2600 Vilnius
Mr. Kestutis MILKERAITIS Consultant Committee of National Security of the Parliament phone: + 370 2 61 99 41 fax: + 370 2 address: Gedimino 53 LT- 2600 Vilnius Mr. Ceslovas STANKEVICIUS Minister Ministry of National Defence phone: + 370 2 73 55 01 fax: + 370 2 address: Totorin 25/3 LT- 2600 Vilnius
Cpt. (Navy) Eugenijus NAZELSKIS Defence Attache to Belgium Military Representative to NATO phone: + 810 322 7072845 fax: +810 322 7072850 address: Totoriu_ 25/3 LT- 2600 Vilnius
LTC Antanas PAULIKAS Acting Director Civil Security Department phone: + 370 2 62 28 20 fax: + 370 2 62 45 64 address: Pamenkalnio 30 LT- 2600 Vilnius
LTC Viktoras BRAZAUSKAS Head of Board Civil Security Department phone: + 370 2 62 26 97 fax: + 370 2 62 45 64 address: Pamenkalnio 30 LT- 2600 Vilnius
Cpt. Arunas SIUKSTA Head of Operational Division Civil Security Department phone: + 370 2 61 62 41 fax: + 370 2 62 45 64 address: Pamenkalnio 30 LT- 2600 Vilnius
Dr. Gintaras TAMULAITIS Head of System Development and Research Division Civil Security Department phone: + 370 2 62 45 54 fax: + 370 2 62 45 64 address: Pamenkalnio 30 LT- 2600 Vilnius
10 LTC Algis BOLYS Head of Communication Division Civil Security Department phone: + 370 2 62 95 57 fax: + 370 2 62 45 64 address: Pamenkalnio 30 LT- 2600 Vilnius
Mr. Paulius MUDENAS Director Join Stock Company "Electronic Publishing House" phone: + 370 2 23 00 64 fax: + 370 2 23 01 08 address: Rinktines 49-35 LT-2051 Vilnius
Mr. Egidijus URBONAVI&US Engineer Institute of Energy of Lithuania phone: + 370 7 74 88 10 fax: + 370 7 35 12 71 address: Breslaujos 3 LT- 3035 Kaunas
Mr. Benediktas CESNA Senior Researcher Institute of Energy of Lithuania phone: + 370 7 74 85 39 fax: + 370 7 35 12 71 address: Breslaujos 3 LT- 3035 Kaunas
Mr. Laimutis PASKEVICIUS Senior Specialist of Personnel Health Ministry phone: + 370 2 61 17 24 fax: + 370 2 22 46 01 address: Gedimino 27 LT- 2600 Vilnius
Hab.Dr. Vytautas BIELIAUSKAS Head of Nuclear Energy Division Ministry of Economy phone: + 370 2 62 87 59 fax: + 370 2 62 87 59 address: Gedimino 38/2 LT- 2600 Vilnius
11 Mr. Algimantas APYNYS Senior Specialist for Economical Programmes Ministry of Economy phone: + 370 2 62 56 92 fax: + 370 2 62 87 59 address: Gedimino 38/2 LT- 2600 Vilnius
Mr. Povilas SEMATOVIC Inspector of Management Department Civil Protection Subdivision Ministry of Interior phone: + 370 2 69 87 21/69 88 91 fax: + 370 2 69 87 94 address: Sventaragio 2 LT- 2600 Vilnius
Mr. Arturas MAJAUSKAS Commissar Inspector of Civil Protection Group Police department under Ministry of Interior phone: + 370 2 69 87 68 fax: + 370 2 61 50 30 address: Sventaragio 2 LT- 2600 Vilnius
Mr. Nikolajus CERVONIKOVAS Deputy Chief Fire protection Unit for Visaginas and Ignalina NPP Protection phone: + 370 2 fax: + 370 2 address: Sventaragio 2 LT- 2600 Vilnius
Mr. Vytautas SLAUSTAS Chief of Ignalina NPP Police Guard Team phone: + 370 2 fax: + 370 2 address: Sventaragio 2 LT- 2600 Vilnius
Mr. Virginijus SMAILYS Head of Utena Civil Protection Section phone: + 370 2 39 55 200 fax: + 370 2 39 55 200 address: Basanaviciaus 122 LT-4910 Utena
12 Ms. Egle BURBIENE Deputy director Specialised Centre of Hygiene phone: + 370 2 62 77 46 fax: + 370 2 62 19 62 address: Didzioji 7 LT- 2600 Vilnius
Mr. Albinas MASTAUSKAS Director Radiation Protection Centre Health Ministry phone: + 370 2 76 36 33 fax: + 370 2 76 36 33 address: Kalvarijn 153 LT- 2042 Vilnius
Ms. Danute SlDlSKIENE Medical Doctor of Radiation Hygiene Radiation Protection Centre Health Ministry phone: + 370 2 75 46 91 fax: + 370 2 76 36 33 address: Kalvariju 153 LT-2042 Vilnius
Mr. Vytautas Andriuska Director Utena Public Health Centre phone: +370 239 51459 fax: + 370 2 address:
Ms.Jane Ona PALSKIENE Head of Utena Region Emergency Management Centre phone: + 370 2 39 59 757 fax: + 370 2 39 59 536 address: Ausros 22 LT-4910 Utena
Mr. Saulius KUTAS Head of State Nuclear Energy Inspectorate phone: +370 2 62 4141 fax: +370 2 6144 87 address: Sermuksniu, 3 LT-2600 Vilnius
13 Mr. Darius JANUSONIS Inspector State Nuclear Energy Inspectorate phone: + 370 2 61 41 68 fax: + 370 2 22 71 00 address: Sermuksnin 3 LT-2600 Vilnius
Mr. Rimantas KRENEVI&US Inspector State Nuclear Energy Inspectorate phone: + 370 2 61 41 68 fax: + 370 2 address: Sermuksniij. 3 LT-2600 Vilnius
Mr. Stanislovas Algimantas KAIRYS Deputy Director for Regime Ignalina NPP phone: + 370 2 fax: + 370 2 address: Visaginas
Mr. Vytautas BERNADISIUS Deputy Director Environmental Strategy Department phone: + 370 2 62 79 69 fax: + 370 2 address: A.Jaksto 4/9 LT-2694 Vilnius
Mr. Stasys MOTIEJUNAS Head Radioactive Material Division Ministry of Environment phone: + 370 2 6111 10 fax: + 370 2 address: A.Jaksto 4/9 LT 2694 Vilnius
Mr. Linas MORKELIUNAS Senior Engineer Join Research Centre Ministry of Environment phone: + 370 2 72 38 25 fax: + 370 2 address A.Jaksto 4/9 LT-2694 Vilnius
14 Mr. Steponas ASMONTAS Director Semiconductors Physics Institute phone: +370 2 6197 59 fax: + 370 2 62 71 23 address: Gostauto 11 LT- 2600Vilnius
Mr. Rokas BERNOTAS Vice-minister Ministry of Foreign Affairs phone: + 370 2 62 01 47 fax: + 370 2 62 07 52 address: J. Tumo-Vaizganto 2 LT- 2600Vilnius
Mr. Algis DABKUS 1-st Secretary of Security Policy Division Ministry of Foreign Affairs phone: + 370 2 fax: + 370 2 62 07 52 address: J. Tumo-Vaizganto 2 LT- 2600Vilnius
Ms. Jurgita APANAVICIUTE 2-nd Secretary Political Co-operation Division European Integration Department Ministry of Foreign Affairs phone: + 370 2 fax: + 370 2 62 07 52 address: J. Tumo-Vaizganto 2 LT- 2600Vilnius
NORWAY
LTC Kaare BAEKKEVOLD SECTION LEADER HQ Defence Command Forsvarets Overkommando phone: + 47 23098072 fax: + 47 23098004 address: OSLO MIL/HUSEBY 0016 OSLO
Mr. Svein UHNGER Senior Executive Officer Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority phone: + 47 67 16 25 73 fax: +4767147407
15 address: Grini Naringspark 13 P.O. Box 55 N-1345 Osteras
POLAND
Mr. Maciej JURKOWSKI Head Department for Radiation and Nuclear Safety National Atomic Energy Agency phone: + 48 22 695 98 04 fax: + 48 22 695 98 46 address: Krucza 36 00- 921 Warszawa e-mail: jurkowski @paa.gov.pl
PORTUGAL
Ms. Fernanda Maria Oliveira Aires RODRIGUES Head of Technological Department Head of Division for Technological Risks CIVIL Protection phone: + 351 1 42 47100 fax: +351142 47180 address: Av. Do Forte Em. Carnaxide 2795 Carnaxide
SLOVAKIA
Mr. Jozef BELAN Nuclear Safety Inspector Inspector, Emergency Response Centre Nuclear Regulatory Authority phone: + 421 753 421 012 ext 134 fax: + 421 753 421 015 address: P.O. Box 24 SK-82007 Bratislava E-MAIL: .TOZEF.BELAN (a) U.TD.GOV.SK
SWEDEN
Ms. Kristina OLSSON Planning Officer County Administrative Board of Skane phone: + 4640 25 24 14 fax: + 4640 25 24 05 address: 205 15 MALMO e-mail: kristina.olsson @ m/st.se Mr. Richard OLSSON Co-ordinator Emergency Preparedness SKI
16 phone: +4686988451 fax: + 46 8 661 90 86 address: S-106 58 Stockholm e-mail: richard.olsson @ski.se
Mr. Kurt OLOFSSON Colonel/Consultant Swedish Radiation Protection Institute (SSI) phone: + 46 8 7297247 fax: + 46 87297108 address: S- 171 16 Stockholm
Mr. B.Ake PERSSON Director Swedish Radiation Protection Institute (SSI) phone: + 46 8 7297100 fax: + 46 87297108 address: S-171 16 Stockholm e-mail:b.ake.persson @ssi.se
Mr.ErikJENDE Project Manager Swedish International Project Nuclear Safety phone: + 46 8 6988696 fax: + 46 8209895 alt.6619086 address: P.O. Box 70283 SE-107 22 Stockholm e-mail: erik.jende @ski.se
Mr. Carl. Goran LINDVALL Manager Health Physics Barseback Kraft phone: + 46 46 724350 fax: + 46 46 724580 address: P.O. Box 524 246 25 Loddekopinge e-mail: Carl-go ran. Lindvall @ 6 kab.sydkraft.se
Mr. Ulf JALLANDER Director of Civilian Defence County Administrative Board of Halland phone: + 46 35 13 20 00 fax: + 46 35 13 21 62 address: Slottsgatan 2 301 86 Halmstad e-mail: ulf.jallander @ 1 st.n.se
SWITZERLAND
Prof. DR.MEP Alfred DONATH
17 Nuclear MedicineDepartment of Foreign Affairs
Hospital Cantonal Unoversitaire Hienere - Du - Crest phone: + 41 22 382 71 39 fax: + 41 22 37271 77 address: 1205 Geneva e-mail: alfred.donath@ heuge.ch
Mr. Christoph LANG Programme Coordinator PfP Ministry of Foreign Affairs phone: + 41 31322 3621 fax: + 41 31324 1694 address: SDC/HA Eigerstr.71 3003 Bern e-mail: christoph.Lang @ sdc.admin.ch
Mr. Michel PERRINJAQUET Scientific Advisor Federal Office of Energy BFE / NS phone: + 41 313225632 fax: + 41 313232500 address: Monbijoustrasse 74 303 Bern e-mail:michel.perrinjaquet @ bfe.admin.ch
UKRAINE
Col. Mikhaylo KRASKO Chief of Staff of Civil Defence of Rivno The Ministry of Ukraine of Emergencies phone: + 036 2 222284 fax: + 0362 222383 address: O.Gonchara 55 252030 Kyiv Rowno Ms. Natalya Tkachenko Head of Department The Ministry of Ukraine of Emergencies phone: + 38 044 247 3071 fax: +38 044 247 3194 address: O.Gonchara 55 252030 Kyiv
18 J
CIVIL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AT THE IGNALINA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
NATO SCEPC FUNCTIONS AND TASKS
Evert Somer, NATO/CEPD
VILNIUS, October 1998 19 fh'e/Earp-Atlantic Disaster Re4§pgi}se Capability
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25 CIVIL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AT THE IGNALINA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AT IGNALINA NPP
A.KAIRYS, IGNALINA NPP, LITHUANIA
VILNIUS, October 1998 26 REVIEW OF THE IGNALINA NPP SAFETY AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
In this report I am supposed briefly to account for activities already performed add still ongoing regarding the Ignalina NPP safety upgrading and personnel preparedness to act in cases of accidents. The Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant (INPP) contains two RBMK-1500 reactors, the first unit went into service in December 1983 and the second unit become operational in August 1987. This type of reactors differ from those RBMK-1000 operating in Russia and Ukraine nor only by a higher power level but also by improved safety systems one of these specially designed and improved Accident Localisation System (ALS). The power generated at Ignalina NPP is approximately 50 % lower in cost than at alternative electric power sources. In 1993 Lithuania set a world record for the share of nuclear- generated electricity produced in one country, with nuclear energy providing 88,1% of power produced in Lithuania. In 1996 and 1997 the Ignalina NPP generated 85,8 % and 81,3 % of all the country's electricity respectively. The Government and the Ministry of Economy of the Republic of Lithuania and also INPP management implemented and continues to implement the plant safety upgrading measures, to eliminate emergency situations or to reduce it maximally and to eliminate it in the shortest time periods. It is reasonable to stress the fact that the Ignalina NPP is unique in the scope and comprehensiveness of studies carried out to verify design parameters and level of risk. After the fall of the Soviet Union the design and operational parameters of the plant became accessible for western experts. An effective assistance regarding nuclear safety was provided by Sweden, subsequently other countries contributed to this assistance with significant nuclear expertise. International studies were of different forms. Especially valuable mode of assistance utilised the knowledge of international experts in extensive international study programmes which purpose was: a) collection,systematisation and verification of plant design data; b) analysis of the level of risk; c) recommendations concerning upgrading level of safety; d) transfer of methodology to Lithuanian specialists. There were carried out the following large scale international studies: -BARSELINA (1992 - 1996) - a probabilistic risk study conducted by Swedish, Lithuanian and Russian experts; -SAR (Safety Analysis Report, 1995 - 1996) - a very wide international study funded by a grant from Nuclear Safety Account of EBRD (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development). The objective of the study is to provide comprehensive review of plant status emphasising safety aspects. This study was conducted by the Ignalina NPP, Russian (mainly RBMK reactor designer RDIPE), Canadian and Swedish specialists. 27 -RSR (Review of the Safety Analysis Report, 1995 - 1997) - an extensive review of the SAR performed by independent group of international experts. Specialists from the U.S.A., the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Russia and Lithuania contributed. Mentioned studies provide a verified state of the art base of knowledge which makes it possible to evaluate the present level of plant safety. Compare it with levels of other reactors and also to plan improvements in plant hardware and operational procedures which upgrade the level of safety. The Ignalina NPP is the only plant with RBMK-type reactor the information of which is accumulated, verified, systematised and is available. Data concerning the plant safety provided in this review are based on conclusions drawn by international experts. One of the main SAR inferences is that none of the analysed safety problems require the immediate shut down of the plant. The safety of nuclear plant is of great interest not only to Lithuanian public, but also to some foreign organizations. The following questions are the most frequently occurring: Is it possible for Ignalina NPP to have a similar accident to that of the Chernobyl NPP
The consequences of Chernobyl accident are unique. The main courses are not the mistakes made by operators, but defects in design of RBMK-type reactors of that time. In a limited operating range the core reactivity coefficient was positive. This defect had fatal consequences. It is important to mention that this defect was eliminated. Subsequently hardware modifications were made which altered characteristics of Ignalina NPP. These were: introduction of absorber-rods, alternation of the fuel enrichment and modernization of control rod design. Therefore it is impossible to equal reactors of the Ignalina NPP with those of the Chernobyl NPP. The implemented modifications quarantee that the total power coefficient of reactivity remains negative under all possible circumstances. Extensive western experts analysis verified this characteristic. Even in case of hardly probable event, i.e. the similar operational mistakes were made as in Chernobyl accident, the consequences would be limited and neither nearby population nor plant personnel would suffer. Do the Ignalina NPP generating units have containment? In the field of safety the main stress is on function, but not on appearance. The function of containment is to ensure that in case of hardly probable event during which radioactive materials are released from the fuel elements they do not reach the environment. Many of western type reactors possess containment. Bellow mentioned facts indicate that we have similar to generally accepted containment. At the Ignalina NPP this function is accomplished by complex system, of great capacity, but not so prominently visible, so-called Accident Localisation System. This system functions according to the same principle as GE (General Electric) or BWR (Boiling Water Reactor) designed by ABB. The multifunctional ALS (Accident Localisation System) is one of design characteristics excluding the Ignalina NPP from other plants with RBMK-type reactors. What are the probabilities and potential consequences of accidents? Safety is too important issue to leave it to relative evaluation influenced by emotions and prejudices. It is necessary to refer to objective criteria, which can be quantified in terms of absolute indexes. In many technical spheres (e.g.transportation) such criteria are provided by statistical analysis of the database provided by previous events. This method is not appropriate in nuclear power field, as the number of accidents is much too small. That is why a method was developed which uses component failure data and detailed analysis to determine two aspects of an accident: the probability of occurrence and the consequences. The combination of these two indices for all possible accidents provides a measure, which can be used comparing the safety of different nuclear power plants and reactor types. After comprehensive analysis of the Ignalina NPP, international experts elicited that indicators of probabilistic risk of having an accident at Ignalina NPP are equal to indicators of 28 Western NPP designed in 60 - 70 -ties and which are under operation. It is worth noting that reactors of the Ignalina NPP are the only RBMK-type reactors compared this way. It is worth characterising such an important conclusion in a more detailed way. Provided conclusions certainly do not imply that the Ignalina NPP is identical to Western BWR-type reactors. It is a channel type reactor, with the graphite stack as a moderator and differs from Western BWR-type reactors. The documentation of the analysis detailing the consequences of these differences is very comprehensive. The probability of malfunction (e.g.piping ruptures, valve failure) at Ignalina NPP is higher than for comparable western BWR-type reactors. The objective reason for this is the higher complexity of the plant (a considerable large amount of pipes, valves and associated equipment), the lower level of quality of Soviet design and construction. From the point of positive side of evalution the international analysis pointed out that the Ignalina NPP is astonishingly robust and that a great number of malfunctions will not led to fuel overheating and the release of radioactive substances will not reach beyond the containment. It needs stressing that extensive studies carried out by western experts at Ignalina NPP include recommendations for enhancing plant safety and that this important issue is in the scope of attention of international experts. The major part of recommendations were already adopted and implemented. The Lithuaninan Government and its regulatory bodies fully accept that concern for safety is a continuous process requiring constant efforts and vigilance. A brief list of the past and still ongoing safety improvement projects is presented later.
Safety improvement programmes
Following Chernobyl accident hardware modifications were implemented at the Ignalina NPP to ensure that a negative power coefficient of reactivity exists at all operating regimes. The changes include the modification of control rods, introduction of additional absorbers, implementation of fast reactor scram system and improvement of operating regulations concerning core control. Efforts to improve the Ignalina NPP safety increased after Lithuania became fully responsible for the plant operation. The Ignalina NPP management with the assistance of international experts worked out a short-term Safety Improvement Programme, which was approved by VATESI in 1993. To implement this programme a Grant agreement was approved by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development on behalf of the Nuclear Safety Account. The Grant supported 20 projects concerning improvements of operation and safety. Operational safety improvements include nondestructive monitoring, seals for pressure tubes, routine maintenance instrumentation and equipment, radiation monitors, renewal of design and maintenance documentation, delivery and commissioning of a full scope INPP compact simulator. Commissioning of data process system TITAN, low flow and low reactivity margin reactor trip system, engineering studies concerning the second emergency shutdown system, seismic, fire and hydrogen explosion prevention and other systems also became issues of concern in a short-term Safety Improvement Programme. Following implementation of Safety Improvement Programme the activities in upgrading plant safety are still ongoing. The new Safety Improvement Programme of the Ignalina NPP based on the recommendations of the Safety Analysis Report, its review and experience gained during implementation of the first Safety Improvement Programme is in the process of implementation. The new Safely Improvement Programme was approved by Lithuanian institutions in 1997. The programme will be continuously renovated and reviewed annually and it will be completed in 3 years (1997- 1999).
29 All the activity in the frame of Safety Improvement Programme is divided into three groups: Design modifications; Management and organization development; Safety analysis. The new Safety Improvement Programme is being implemented especially rapidly. The Ignalina NPP management and especially Director showed a very positive attitude towards implementation of recommendations in the area of safety culture. This is applied to all levels of the plant. In a well-developed plan it is also foreseen to apply western technical expertise for implementation of essential tasks. Some examples of SIP-2 (2-nd Safety Improvement Programme) implementation are provided bellow. The work to develop safety cases for Accident Localization System and Reactor Coolant System is executed in compliance with work schedule. This schedule is realistic and would provide a good basis for VATESI in taking decisions concerning licensing process. The Ignalina NPP accepted recommendations for indispensable improvement in the Control and Protection System (CPS) and started a detailed and complete single failure analysis for this system. A thorough analysis was perfomed to find out whether failure of a single component could course a loss of safety function. Defence line of CPS/EPPS (Emergency Process Protection System) was enforced by the efforts of Ignalina NPP and its contractors. Due to it the overall plant safety was improved. The Ignalina NPP makes arrangements for implementation of an additional emergency protection system (DAZ) based on a high pressure signal from steam separators and a low flow indication through Main Circulation Pumps. This system will be commissioned at the first unit in 1998 and at the second unit in 1999. This is aimed at effectively eliminate consequences of emergency process and reactor shutdown. The activities for implementation of the independent reactor shutdown system were started this year under PHARE sponsorship. Improvement of methods and methodology related to equipment control and plant piping system has a great role in upgrading plant safety. At the beginning of 1992 the Ignalina NPP and Swedish firm ABB TRC AB co-operated in application of modern means for non-destructive monitoring at INPP. This activity was directed to control the primary system elements by applying computerized means of control. The main target of control is: - Welding of casings to fuel channels; - Welding connections of piping 800 in FMCL; - Welding of steel 08X18H10T piping 300; - Branches of ECCS; Fuel channels. The results of co-operative activities proved that modern western technology of nondestructive system could be successfully implemented at INPP. In the course of these years INPP personnel underwent training and certification in compliance with EN473 norm at ABB training centre (Sweden) and received certificates of international standard. I am going to review very briefly the activities concerning plant safety improvement and nuclear safety. 1. 1.Reduction of steam reactivity coefficient. 2. Change of all-type Control and Protection System rods to modernised ones. 3. Implementation of FRS (Fast Reactor Scram) system. 4. Implementation of enrichment fuel (2,4 % ) with burning out absorber. A lot of attention is paid to "human factor", personal responsibility of individual specialist and managers of all ranks.
30 In relation to this a programme in the area of safety culture was adopted and implemented.
Aims and tasks of Safety Culture
Safety culture is a matter of concern of every worker executing any activity influencing the plant safety. Safety culture covers behaviour of separate individual, plant operating mode and is the main element of Quality Assurance Programme. In June 1997, INPP safety culture development plan for 1997 was worked out and approved by Director General. The plan includes issues of priority related to problems in the area of Safety Culture and the main tasks are defined. The main aims and tasks in improving Safety Culture at INPP are: Plant authority approval of the safety policy and devotion to this policy. Achieve the situation in which Safety Culture becomes key element of plant monitoring activity. Change the attitude of the plant personnel towards the work done, formation of new thinking method and inner critical position which exclude irresponsibility, develop self-regulation in the maters of safety. Carry out audits in the area of safety culture in order to reveal difference between existing Activities and operating procedures with following corrective actions and improvements. Analysis of operational experience and incidents due to defining the areas for upgrading. - Open and effective way of transmitting information related to the activities carried out at the plant to all personnel in order to understand aims and plant operation perspectives by individual worker. Constant personnel training by demonstrating instances of good and bad practise.
Personnel notification about INPP policy in the area of safety and quality assurance
Brochures issued and distributed among plant personnel contain explanations of the key issues of the policy in the field of safety and quality assurance, the content of the brochures was review and discussed with the plant personnel during Safety Culture workshops. Due to Safety Culture audits the personnel understanding and adoption of the INPP safety policy was tested. All above listed measures aided to enhance the plant operation safety to higher degree. Though great activities are. performed in enhancing the plant operation safety, the INPP management pays a lot of attention to preparadness for emergency elimination or plant equipment failures and take measures to stop emergency spreading, especially in cases when are radiation release into atmosphere. For this purpose "Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant Emergency Preparedness Plan" was drawn up and became operational. It is the main guiding document to carry out organizational, technical, medical, evacuation and other activities to protect the plant personnel, population, the plant and the environment from accident consequences, catastrophes, natural calamities, threat of attack and blackmail. In case of an emergency at the plant the requirements of this "Emergency Preparedness Plan" are applied to Emergency Preparedness Organization Management and to the whole INPP personnel. The plan using procedure, its execution, amendments in order to correspond to alternated situation and to reflect the real status are specified in the operative instruction "INPP Emernency Preparadness Plan execution and Amendments to it". This plan was worked out instead of "Personnel Protection Plan in Case of an Emergency at INPP". 31 The old plan was drawn up in compliance with the requirements of Nuclear Ministry of Soviet Union and at the moment it did not correspond to IAEA requirements. Great assistance was rendered by Swedish experts in drawing up the new emergency preparadness plan, permanently consulted our work group in working out the main plan regulations. This plan is worked out on the basis of requirements of the following documents: - Nuclear Power Plant Safety Assurance General Regulations, (VD-B-001-0-97); Operating Organization Preparadness in Case of an Emergency at PP.IAEA Operative Instruction No.50-59-06; Population Protection Plan of Lithuanian Republic in Case of an Emergency at INPP, 1955 05 04; - State Nuclear Energy Safety Inspection Emergency Plan, VATESI; The Standards of Lithuanian Hygiene HN73-1997, "Basic Radiation Safety Standards"; Nuclear Power Plants Operation Quality Monitoring. Operative Instruction A.IAEA, Vienna; Population Protection Plan of Visaginas Town in Extreme Situations; - Fire Extinguishing Operative Plan at First and Second Units of Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant; - Fire - Prevention Plan for Elimination of Extreme Situations at Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant and Visaginas Town; - Generic Assessment Procedures for Determining Protective Actions during a Reactor Accident, IAEA - TECDOC-955/R; Method for the Development of Emergency response Preparadness for Nuclear or Radiological Accidents, IAEA - TECDOC -953/R. "Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant Emergency Preparedness Plan" consists of 3 parts: General Part; - Operative Part; Appendices; General Part of the Plan contains: - policy, goals, tasks set by INPP management for Emergency Preparedness Organization; responsibility of INPP management for emergency preparedness planning and organization; INPP Emergency Preparedness organization chart; - tasks of INPP Emergency Preparedness Organization Services and Units; INPP Emergency Preparedness Organization notification and preparedness; measures applied in case of an emergency at INPP; premises and technical means needed for execution of emergency preparedness functions; - co-operation with other organizations rendering assistance in case of an emergency; resources kept at the plant in case of an emergency and additional resources of other organizations; irradiation dose limits; personnel training. Operative Part of the Plan consists of: list of Heads of Emergency Preparedness Organization Services, their check-lists and instructions. Appendices to the Plan contain: Guiding document for determining emergency classes; Personnel Protection from Harmful Toxic Releases and Activities Instruction in Case of an Emergency at the Plant or any Neighboring Installation;
32 Fire Prevention Measures Plan in Case of Extreme Situations at INPP and Visaginas Town; Heads of Emergency Preparedness Organization Services Training Instruction; - Numeration of Emergency Preparedness Organization provision with individual protection means, dosimetric and monitoring devices; Numeration of Emergency Preparedness Organization Services provision with control and communication means, technical and medical stock; - Numeration of Emergency Preparedness Organization Services provisions with transport, special machinery, lubricants and fuel. The Plan is applied to the INPP personnel, Special and Fire Brigade personnel, and also to other contractor organizations personnel carrying out works at INPP. Measures are carried out at INPP controlled area in accordance with the Plan. Personnel protection of other enterprises and organizations at the INPP controlled area is carried out according to plans drawn up by these organizations under agreement with INPP authority. Population protection of Visaginas town is carried out according to "Population protection Plan of Visaginas Town in Case of Extreme Situations", worked out by Visaginas town authority under agreement with INPP authority. Population protection of settlements belonging to radiation affected zone in case of an emergency at INPP is carried out by Civil Defence Departments of Lithuania, Latvia, Byelorussia. Information about an emergency, its dimensions and projected consequences is communicated by INPP in accordance with the plan procedures. To our understanding emergency preparedness is INPP personnel qualifying and training,and actions taken in order to eliminate emergency situation threatening people, the plant and the environment. INPP management is responsible for measures in the controlled area. Local and state institutions carry responsibility for measures outside this area. In case of an emergency we must ensure safety of non-emergency unit and we will lead the following policy: inform the personnel, territorial and state institutions; - take timely measures to protect the personnel and carry out emergency-recovery work in order to take the situation at the plant under control, to localize and eliminate emergency consequences; to inform all foreign respondents, institutions and the media about the accident by means of possessed communication means without hiding and distortion of emergency facts, willingly give information about the event at the plant; ensure unity and reality of goals and tasks of all Emergency Preparedness Organization Services personnel; analyze thoroughly the present emergency state and forecast the development of the situation; organize emergency preparedness activity in compliance with the requirements of the plant documents orientating to better international experience; constantly improve emergency preparedness activity; implement new notification, communication and information accumulation and transmission technical means.
33 Emergency Preparedness Organization was founded in order to ensure all measures related to putting into execution Emergency Preparednesss Plan at the plant. INPP Director General is personally responsible for emergency preparedness at INPP, Each Head of Emergency Preparendness Organization is responsible for the competence and necessary konwledge of the subordinate personnel. Emergency Preparedness Organization must be able to cope with emergency situations at the plant or threatening it in order to protect people, environment, INPP equipment and premises. The Plan was agreed with institutions of great authority. This Plan is the guiding document in all the situations; also it is versatile in order to be able to work out temporary procedures in realizing emergency preparedness tasks. In order to ensure the correct activities the following conditions should be observed and executed: all INPP personnel must know the notification signals, assembly places and initial activities during these signals; - emergency Preparedness Organization personnel is instructed and is trained regulary; regular exercises for personnel are planned and performed; special premises should be equipped to carry out Emergency Preparedness Organisation tasks - to eliminate emergency situation the plant ir equipped with necessary installation, security and measuring means supply; predictable emergencies and INPP work drawbacks should be analysed and predictable consequences should be foreseen taking into consideration unfavourable conditions; computerized monitoring system is functioning constantly including environmental radiation and meteorological control in the controlled and 30 km observed areas; computerised radioactive releases monitoring system function constantly; - notification and communication system of the plant personnel and the population of Visaginas town is created; individual dosimetric control of the plant personnel is assured. - Emergency Operation Centres should be founded at the plant and Visaginas town territory and equipped with necessary technical means: a) communication; b) computers; c) notification; d) information collecting and processing; e) computerised emergency consequences forecasting and evaluation system. Information about taken decisions and bases of these decisions should be registered in logbooks. Authority and responsibility of Heads of Emergency Preparedness Organization are clearly stated in Emergency Preparedness Plan. I want to analyze Emergency Preparedness Organization chart in a more detailed way. (Using organization chart I am going to inform you what services were established and what structural divisions are their subordinates). To execute the tasks set by the plant for Emergency Preparedness Organization a number of organizations and state institutions are employed: 1. Medical institutions: a) Hospital of Visaginas town: First aid brigade; Reception department; Policlinic; 34 In-patient department (surgical, therapeutic department); b) First aid brigades of neighboring regions (Ignalina, Zarasai, Svencionys,Utena); c) Institutions of Health Ministry (Vilnius University Hospital "Santariskiq_ Clinics", Kaunas Medical Academy Hospital "Kaunas Academic Clinics"); d) Radiation Protection Centre of Health Ministry ; e) Visaginas Section of Ignalina Branch of Utena Public Health Centre; f) Zarasai Section of Utena Public Health Centre; g) State Warehouse of Medicine. 2. Fire Brigade: a) Fire brigades of Visaginas town; b) Fire brigades of neighboring regions; c) Fire brigades of Lithuanian Republic. 3. Visaginas Mechanization Enterprises. 4. Visaginas Bus Park. 5. Special Transport of Visaginas town. 6. Extreme Situations Management Centre of Visaginas town. 7. Civil Defence Department of Utena County. 8. Civil Defence Department of Lithuanian Republic. 9. Joint Experimental Centre of Environment Ministry. Emergency intervention levels are set at the plant for application of measures reducing consequences of plant work derangement. Emergency Preparedness Plan is put into execution under decision of INPP Director General. There are set the following emergency classes: incident; emergency situation; - alert; - local emergency; - on-site emergency; - general emergency. Separate intervention level corresponds to each emergency class. Incident - it is malfunction of power plant systems, exterior event or personnel mistakes due to which normal operation is disturbed and safe operation limits or conditions can break. Emergency situation - it is a disorder of design process parameters meanings leading to an emergency. Alert - it is power plant state characterized by disorder of normal plant operation limits or conditions, but do not leading to an emergency. Local emergency - it is disorder of plant process leading to release of radioactive materials and ionizing radiation beyond the bounds of equipment, process systems, premises, buildings into the plant area exceeding meanings set for normal plant operation. On-site emergency - it is disorder of plant process leading to release of radioactive materials into the controlled area exceeding meanings set for normal plant operation. There is a possibility for personnel irradiation and contamination of premises, buildings and territories with radioactive materials exceeding the standards. General emergency - it is disorder of plant process leading to release of radioactive materials beyond the controlled area exceeding meanings set for normal plant operation. There is a possibility for personnel and population irradiation exceeding the standards.
35 RADIATION DOSE LIMITS IN CASE OF AN RADIATION EMERGENCY
In case of an emergency at INPP the following radiation dose limits are fixed for the plant personnel and the Emergency Preparedness Organization personnel.
Personnel Radiation dose limits INPP personnel 50 mSv/year, 5 Rem/year, on the condition that in 5-year Period the average doses will not exceed 20 mSv/year. Emergency 100 mSv/year, 10 Rem/year. Preparedness Organization Personnel
Dose for the personnel of both INPP and Emergency Preparedness Organization must not be exceeded: pupils of the eyes - 150 mSv/year; skin, extremities (hands, feet) - 500 mSv/year (this limit is applied to skin dose of averagelcm2 area with the maximum irradiation amount). INPP Director General or Technical Director fixes the limit of 100 mSv/year for Emergency Preparedness Organization personnel in case of putting into execution INPP Emergency Preparedness Plan and when it is necessary: to rescue people; to escape collective irradiation; to escape emergency spreading and its catastrophic consequences. In these particular cases irradiation dose must not exceed 100 mSv/year, i.e. double maximum permissible dose. While rescuing people it is necessary to take all possible measures for personnel eliminating an emergency not to exceed 10 maximum permissible doses (500 mSv) and to avoid fatal health effects. Irradiation dose for pregnant women must not affect foetus growth. The limits of these irradiation doses are equalled to limits of population irradiation doses and they are: a) 1 mSv dose rate per year; b) in special cases - 5 mSv dose rate per year on the condition that in five years period the average dose will not exceed 1 mSv/year; c) for pupil of the eye - 15 mSv/year; d) for skin - 50 mSv/year (this limit is applied to skin dose of average 1 cm2 area with the maximum irradiation amount). EPO services personnel taking part in emergency elimination works and who are exposed to greater radiation doses should submit voluntary agreement in written form.
PERSONNEL TRAINING TO ACT IN CASE OF AN EMERGENCY
The whole INPP personnel must be trained to act in case of an emergency. The training comprises: initial preparedness meeting the requirements for held post while assigning to work; periodical annual training in accordance with annual training schedules; practical skills improvement during training and exercises. 36 The whole INPP personnel during the period from assigning to work till issuing pass to work independently undergoes 2 hours training covering activities in case of an emergency. Quantity of training hours and subjects are specified by INPP Civil Defence and Emergency Headquarters. These are: - notification signals in case of an emergency; personnel assembly places during alarm; storage facilities of individual protection means and radiation protection preparations; - bases of radiation effects on health; individual protection means and radiation protection preparations deliverance rules; - personnel activities according to warning signals; - behaviour rules at the assembly places in case of an emergency. Once per two years the whole personnel undergoes instruction for initial preparedness activities in case of an emergency. Once per three years the whole personnel takes part in training and exercises to improve practical skills in case of an emergency at INPP. These requirements are also applied to contractor organizations personnel working at INPP. Sent on mission personnel before issuing the pass to INPP is instructed at INPP Civil Defence and Emergency Headquarters how to act in case of an emergency. Operative personnel till issuing the pass to work independently should be additionally trained how to act in case of an emergency according to Preparation for a Post Programme. Once per year while checking the knowledge of the operative personnel it is checked the personnel preparedness to act in case of an emergency. Actions of the operative personnel should be listed in the operative personnel annual training programme. Not less than once per 2 months the operative personnel takes part in emergency prevention training. Emergency Preparedness Organization Management till they are appointed to their posts should be trained correspondingly. Subjects and quantity of training hours are fixed by Head of Civil Defence and Emergency Headquarters and approved by INPP Director General. Heads of Emergency Preparedness Organization Services are annually trained according to schedules and subjects specified by INPP Civil Defence and Emergency Headquarters. Not less than once per year Heads of EPO Services take part in training of the Headquarters to improve practical activities in case of an emergency at INPP. Not less than once per four year Heads of EPO Services take part in training organized by Republican Civil Defence Headquarters. EPO personnel must undergo initial preparedness meeting requirements set for held post in EPO till assigning to this post. Head of EPO Service specifies subjects and quantity of training hours for initial preparedness. Emergency Preparedness Organization personnel are annually trained according to schedules and subjects specified by Head of Emergency Preparedness Organization Service. Subjects and quantity of hours for exercises and training are specified by Head of Service and approved by Head of Civil Defence and Emergency Headquarters.
S.A.Kairys Deputy Director for Regime Ignalina NPP
37 CIVIL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AT THE IGNALINA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
ACTIVITY AND FUNCTIONS OF VATESI (STATE NUCLEAR SAFETY INSPECTORATE)
S.KUTAS, VATESI, LITHUANIA
VILNIUS, OCTOBER 1998 38 ACTIVITY AND FUNCTION OF VATESI
A strict division of functions between the operating organisation and the regulatory authority is a must when dealing with the nuclear safety issues. It is the State Enterprise Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant as on operator that is responsible for the safe operation of the units. VATESI performs the functions of the national regulatory authority be determining national nuclear safety regulation following up on their implementation of nuclear related facilities, exercising corresponding control measures. The Republic of Lithuania has undertaken an obligation to ensure safety at all nuclear installations under its jurisdiction, including Ignalina NPP, and to establish the legal framework for the nuclear safety regulatory system, namely: • national safety rules and requirements; • licensing system for nuclear facilities; • system for analysis and assessment of nuclear installations; • enforcement mechanism, ensuring observance of the requirements and license conditions. To deal with these issues, the Government has established State nuclear Safety Inspectorate (VATESI) on 18 October, 1991. Such system to ensure nuclear safety is a must for any country, envisaging the development of nuclear energy. The basic guidelines for the regulatory institutions are formulated in the recommendations of IAEA. The establishment of VATESI was complicated by the absence of experts, qualified in nuclear safety regulation and inspection. At first VATESI consisted of a group of inspectors, working at Ignalina NPP. On 21 October, 1992, the government of Lithuania approved the stature of VATESI, regulating its activities and determining the basic objectives, functions, and rights of the inspection. The main goal of the Inspectorate, as prescribed by the statute, is to ensure the state regulation and supervision of nuclear and radiation safety at nuclear installations and other related organisations. In addition to that, VATESI performs the following functions to: • form the principles and criteria of safety in nuclear energy, safe utilisation, transportation and storage of radioactive and nuclear materials, establish safety related norms and regulations; • issue licenses for the operators of nuclear or radiation related production or technologies; • prepare and perform inspection programmes; • make proposals related to preparation of laws and other normative acts, nuclear safety documentation in the facilities under control; • supervise the accounting of nuclear and radioactive materials. VATESI is an independent organisation, the head of VATESI is appointed by the Prime Minister. VATESI reports directly to the Government. The structure of VATESI is presented on Fig.
39 VATESI STRUCTURE
ASSISTANT HEAD ADMINISTRATION
DEPUTY
RESIDENT SAFETY DEPARTMENT OF NUCLEAR DEPARTMENT OF SUPERVISION ASSESSMENT NORMS AND MATERIALS RADIATION GROUP AT INPP: DEPARTMENT: REGULATIONS: CONTROL AND PROTECTION: functions of direct safety assessment of formation of licensing ACCOUNTING regulation of the safe supervises at Ignalina NPP; design solutions; conditions for INPP safety DEPARTMENT: management of radioactive - evaluation of safety systems; materials; inspections of the accounting and analysis reports; safety systems; drafting and approval control of nuclear materials; licensing of spent - probation and approval of nuclear safety regulatory nuclear fuel; monitoring of physical protection of of safety assessment related norms and technical technological process nuclear materials and control of INPP computer software; documents; and maintenance. nuclear installations; emergency preparedness; - regulation of core evaluation of control of export, planning of VATESI physics issues. reliability of NPP import, and transit of emergency preparedness; components and systems; commodities, used in informing formation of nuclear activities. international organisations conditions for operation of and neighbouring countries INPP and licensing of of nuclear accidents. operation.
Today VATESI consists of 26 employees. Lack of qualified experts is one of the main problems faced by VATESI. The majority of them work in Vilnius, but VATESI also has a group working at INPP, which is an extremely important division of the regulatory authority, performing supervision functions at INPP, the "ears and eyes" of VATESI. Inspectors of the supervision group are involved in the direct monitoring of the technological process within a nuclear installation. They focus their attention on all of the safety-activities at the nuclear power plant. VATESI co-operates with technical support organizations in Lithuania, also foreign and international institutions. The main national law, which regulates use of nuclear energy, is "Law on Nuclear Energy". Parliament promulgated it on 14 November 1996. This law is not the only law regulating this area: the Law on State Enterprises (promulgated in 1990), Law on Energy (promulgated in 1995), Law concerning control of import, transit and export of strategic goods and technologies (promulgated in 1995) and other which also regulate usage of nuclear energy. State control and supervision of the construction of nuclear facilities shall be effected during all the major stages of work: design and construction, commissioning, operation and decommissioning. Lithuania pledged to regulate internal relations, connected to the usage and international experience, IAEA requirements and recommendations require handling of nuclear energy and radioactive materials in a way it. Lithuania has signed international conventions, which directly regulate the use of nuclear energy:
40 1. The 1968 Treaty on the non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was ratified in 23 September 1991. The agreement with IAEA for Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was signed in 1992;
2. In 1992, Lithuania acceded the 1963 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, the 1988 Joint Protocol Relating to the Application of the Vienna Convention and Paris Convention and the 1997 Protocol to Amend the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage; 3. The 1986 Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident was acceded in 16 November 1994; 4. The 1979 Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materialas was acceded in 7 December 1994; 5. The 1994 Convention on Nuclear Safety was ratified in 12 June 1996; 6. The 1997 Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management was signed 30 September 1997; Safety of Radioactive Waste Management was signed 30 September 1997. The 1997 Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage was signed 30 September 1997. In implementing state regulation nuclear safety, radiation protection and accounting for nuclear materials in the area of nuclear energy VATESI shall: 1. Together with the Ministry of Construction and Urban Development approve technical regulations of the design and construction of nuclear facilities, and of maintenance of the structures; 2. Approve standards and rules of operation of nuclear facilities, standards and rules of storage and disposal of radioactive materials used in nuclear energy and establish the procedure for their drafting; 3. Control the compliance with the requirements stipulated in licences and safety regulations; 4. The state regulatory system for the accounting for and control of nuclear materials and ensure its viability; 5. Establish the procedures of accounting for and control of nuclear materials in the Republic of Lithuania and monitor compliance with them during the import, export, re-export, transport, use, storage and disposal of nuclear materials; 6. Issue licences to legal and natural entities for the design, construction, operation, safety appraisal of nuclear facilities and their systems, and other work related to safe operation of nuclear facilities; 7. Inform the mass media about the radiation and safety situation in nuclear facilities; 8. Prepare surveys on the safety of nuclear facilities and submit them to the Government, local authorities and other authorities concerned; 9. Organise and support research into and expert analysis of nuclear safety and radiation protection, independently carry out the analysis of incidents and occurrences; 10. Co-ordinate and control the preventive measures for the staff and the population in the event of a nuclear facility accident, monitor the state of accident preparedness of the facility; 11. Impose sanctions established in statutory acts on violators of safety rules; 12. Organise bilateral and multilateral international co-operation in the sphere of nuclear safety and radiation protection.
41 In performing its functions VATESI shall act independently, in accordance with laws, its own regulations and other legal acts. To prevent a possible nuclear accident,VATESI may resort to any preventive measures within its competence, a temporary shutdown of a nuclear facility included. Standarts and rules (guides and regulations) of nuclear safety and radiation protection approved by the Government or by the institutions authorised. It is mandatory for all public and local authorities, enterprises, institutions, organisations, their associations, the officials and other persons whose activities are related to the operation of nuclear facilities, to the use and management of nuclear and radioactive materials therein. Safety guarantees in nuclear energy based on the requirements of the laws and regulations of the Republic of Lithuania, on the requirements of the international treaties to which the Republic of Lithuania is a party, also on the recommendations of the IAEA and other international organisations and authorities. VATESI confirmed the regulations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Facilities in 1997 and also confirmed part of regulation and guides on nuclear safety and development procedures. Licensing procedures, list of regulations and guides on nuclear safety has been prepared. VATESI has prepared draft "Law on Radioactive Waste Management" and participated in drafting laws on radiological protection and on management of Ignalina power plant. A Grant Agreement was signed on 10 February 1994 by the Lithuania Government, the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant (INPP) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). The grant was to fund a project of short term safety upgrades in support of the Safety Improvement Program (SIP) being implemented at INPP. Included in the Grant Agreement was a commitment by Lithuanian authorities that an "In-Depth Safety Assessment of the Ignalina NPP" would be performed. The safety assessment was the responsibility of the INPP with the support of Western and Eastern nuclear safety experts and the reactor designer,NIKIET. Subject to budget and time constraints, the in-depth safety assessment was to be comparable to a Safety Analysis Report (SAR) produced in Western countries to demonstrate the adequacy of plant safety and to provide the major contribution for the regulator in the licensing process. In addition to production of the SAR, this particular project included the independent review of the safety analysis report (RSR) jointly by Western and Eastern experts. Unit 1 of INPP was the objective of this assessment. However, since no significant differences were identified between Units 1 and 2, the results apply to both units. Prior to project execution, Guidelines were developed and endorsed by the regulatory authority (VATESI). This endorsement required the examination of Lithuanian/Russian standards. The examination concluded that in general the current Lithuanian/Russian regulations constitute an adequate framework, but a number of specific areas were identified where the Western practice was to be taken as the basis for comparison for the plant. A Panel of international nuclear safety experts, Ignalina Safety Panel (ISP), was established in accordance with the Grant Agreement. The objectives of the Panel were to define, monitor and supervise the scope and production of the Ignalina SAR and its review. The Panel was to make independent recommendations to the Lithuanian Government, which has ultimate responsibility for plant safety, regarding a decision for continued INPP operation and implementation strategies of the SAR and RSR recommendations and to the EBRD. Ignalina Safety Panel recommendations were presented to the Lithuanian Government in February 1997. In April 1997 ISP members have visited Lithuania to present their recommendations to and discuss them with Lithuanian Government and specialists. All ISP recommendations were accepted and included into "INPP Safety Improvement Programme No 2" (SIP-2). SAR has examined three areas that are equally important to the safe operation of a nuclear power plant: Systems Analysis, Accident Analyses and Operational Safety Management. Each area has different requirements and different methods of assessment.Differing degrees of non- compliances with requirements were found in each area. However none of the numerous non- 42 compliances were severe enough to require shutdown of the reactors while they are being remedied. In view of the results of the accident analysis, assessment of the capability of the existing safety systems and of safety management practices produced in SAR, and with expeditious implementation of all of the identified modifications, procedures and processes, the SAR team supported the INPP management conviction that: 1. An adequate safety case for continued operation of INPP has been demonstrated. 2. The safety case is adequate to the point of first gap closure which is the life limiting factor. 3. The plant's safety standards and practices have been assessed and recommendations for improvement have been made and accepted. The Ignalina Safety Panel has evaluated the SAR development and its independent review. ISP had stated that this project was the first attempt to produce a Western style SAR for any Soviet designed NPP. The Panel believed that it represented an impressive effort that achieved a high degree of success. The Panel believed that it represented an impressive effort that achieved a high degree of success. The Panel made a summary on the major conclusions of SAR and RSR with regard to this project. In Lithuania the operation of Ignalina nuclear power plant is the dominant nuclear activity. The plant is located on the north-east corner of Lithuania, close to the borders with Belarus and Latvia and is sutuated on the southern shore of Lake Driikstai, 39 km from the town of Ignalina. The nearest cities are the Lithuanian capital Vilnius (130 km away) with a population of approximately 575,000 and the city of Daugavpils, in Latvia (30 km away), population 126,000. The plant's closest neighbour is the town of Visaginas, the residence of the Ignalina nuclear plant personnel. The town is located 6 km from the plant and has a population of about 32,600. The main document that regulates development of defence and national security system of the Republic of Lithuania, is the Act of the Fundamentals of National Security accepted in Seimas (Parliament) on 19th December, 1996, The system of national security in Lithuania consists of the basic resolutions, principles and methods confirmed by the purpose activities of the State and citizens, the whole complex of means directed towards the country integration into Europe and Transatlantic Unions, laws and other legal acts, activities of state institutions founded for this purpose and ways of their interaction. There are civil protection and rescue institution among them. Government manages all national security means implementation and obligates all civil protection institutions and Lithuanian economy infrastructure objects to execute compulsory rescue and civil security tasks. A radiation accident at the Ignalina NPP is defined as an infringement of the normal operation in which release of radioactive and ionising radiation goes beyond the specified limits and which requires stopping the operation of the facility/equipment containing ionising radiation sources. Accidents are classified according to the spread of involved radiation materials or ionising radiation into three types: on-site or local, off-site or area and general accidents. To enable an early start-up of the emergency organisation, on-site as well as off-site, technical criteria are under the development that will identify the level of radiation accident at an early stage. Local accident is an infringement of plant operation in which on-site release of radioactive materials and ionising radiation goes beyond the normal operation limits specified for equipment, process systems, facilities and buildings. Certain actions have to be taken to protect the plant personnel. Area accident is an infringement of plant operation in which off-site release of radioactive materials and ionising materials and ionising radiation within the exclusion zone exceeds the specified normal operation limits. Radiation exposure of personnel and contamination of plant facilities, buildings and territory may occur and go beyond the permissible limits. Actions have to be taken to protect the plant personnel.
43 General accident is an infringement of plant operation in which off-site release of radioactive materials and ionising radiation outside the exclusion zone exceeds the specified normal operation limits. Radiation exposure of plant personnel and population may exceed the specified limits. Actions have to be taken to protect the plant personnel and population. On site emergency plan defines three levels of emergencies based on radiological hazard. However, no alert status has been established to ensure early activation of emergency response. For example, situations that may degrade the safety of the plant, such as fire with potential damage of safety equipment or systems, may not cause activation of emergency plan. So alert status should be included in the emergency plan to ensure an adequate response to the events that threaten a radiological release but have not yet resulted in such release. Civil emergency preparedness is one of the main state functions that includes the preparation of all governmental institutions, local authorities executive institutions, all economy subjects and population for crisis situations and operational activities during them, utilisation of all state resources to provide its vitality, inhabitants survival, to protect property and environment from the concequences of the extreme situation, when inhabitants take active participation in these activities. Civil emergency preparedness is the whole complex of activities and means of state executive bodies and special forces, it is a prior trend of the governmental activity, providing organised, directed and expedient utilisation of forces and resources, implementing effective liquidation of disaster consequences and solving war time problems. Territory and publicity principles are the main principles according to which activities of civil protection and rescue institutions are organised. Civil protection is organised in the whole state territory according to its administrative division and covers all the population of the country and the foreigners who are in the territory of the Republic of Lithuania. All activities of governmental institutions connected with assuring safety of population are open for the society and its information means. In case of emergency residences of Lithuania will be protected in accordance with the "Plan for the Protection of residents of the Republic of Lithuania in the Event of Accident of the Ignalina NPP" adopted by the Prime Minister of the Republic of Lithuania on 4 of May 1995. The plan is needed for organisation and coordination of actions taken over by town and municipal authorities ministries, governmental authorities and services for taking safety measures with regarding to population and cattle, for arrangement of immediate response actions after the accident. According Nuclear Law INPP carries responsibility for nuclear emergency prevention and its consequences elimination. Nuclear emergency and its consequences elimination work is carried out in compliance with INPP Emergency Preparedness Plans and instructions. INPP Emergency Preparedness Plan is the main operative instruction to carry out organisational, technical, medical, evacuation and other activities to protect the plant personal the population, the plant and the environment from emergency consequences, catastrophes, natural calamities, the threat of attack and black mail. New Plan was approved in 1998.
44 CIVIL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AT THE IGNALINA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
MONITORING OF PERSONAL DOSES UNDER NORMAL AND ACCIDENT CONDITIONS
G.MORKUNAS, RADIATION SAFETY CENTER LITHUANIA
VILNIUS, October 1998
45 Control of personal doses under normal and accident Conditions
Control of personal doses is one of the most important means in assurance of adequacy of radiation protection both under normal and accident conditions. Legal basis for monitoring of personal doses in Lithuania are the Basic Standards of Radiation Protection HN 73-1997 which are in force since January 1,1998. These standards have been prepared on the basis of International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionising Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources and European Directive 96/29 EURATOM of May 13, 1996. According to the Lithuanian Basic Safety Standards licensees and employers are responsible for radiation protection of radiation workers in general (par. 7.1) and for monitoring of personal doses in particular (par. 7.7.1). Individual monitoring is performed for any worker whose annual personal dose is likely to exceed 6 mSv (par. 7.7.2). In the case when personal monitoring is inappropriate or impossible the personal doses are estimated using results of workplace monitoring. If annual personal dose is unlikely to exceed 6 mSv this dose is derived from the results of workplace monitoring according to the order determined by the regulatory authority (par. 7.7.3). The type and frequency of monitoring of doses is determined taking into account possible doses and variations of these doses (par. 1.1 A). The Basic Standards of Radiation Protection determine radiation protection of workers and members of public in the case of radiation accident. The standards do not make difference between accident in Ignalina NPP and other radiation accidents. The only difference is made between on- site and off-site accidents. In the first case licensees are responsible for preparation of emergency plans and carrying out of appropriate actions, in the second - responsibilities are laid on an intervening organisation. Par. 11.4.1 states that doses received because of radiation accident both by members of public and workers shall be estimated. Doses of persons taking place in remedial actions shall be registered and these persons shall be informed about their personal doses and their health risks (par. 11.6.7). Legal prerequisites for control of personal doses are created in the Lithuanian Radiation Protection Law which should be adopted by the Parliament this year. Par. 6 of Article 15 "Responsibilities of licensee" states that licensees shall "perform monitoring of personal exposures and workplace monitoring in accordance with the order determined by the Regulatory Authority". The General Order of Dosimetric Control in the Case of Radiation Accident has been approved by the Government on 12 th of May, 1998. Dosimetric control consists of: Registration of equivalent dose rate and exposure rate, Measurements of surface contamination, Personal and group control of doses of persons taking in remedial actions and members of public, Radiometric control of foodstuff, drinking water and other samples. The Radiation Protection Centre of the Ministry of Health and Joint Research Centre of the Ministry of Environment are responsible for organisation, co-ordination and control of personal dosimetry according to their competence. Sampling in the area of radiation accident is to be performed by special groups of Department of Fire Protection. The operational rules and standards on personal dosimetry (order of wearing of personal dosimeters, frequency of readout, means of calculation of personal doses, interpretation of results, quality assurance, etc.) recently are under preparation. Lithuania has about 880 users of sources of ionizing radiation (see Table 1). The main types of practices - production of nuclear energy, waste management, industrial radiography, medical diagnostics and therapy, scientific research.
46 Table 1. Data on licensees and sources of ionizing radiation
Licensees Number Number of sources of licensees total x-ray unsealed sealed Research institutions 25 559 45 53 461 Health care institutions 578 1445 1214 31 200 Education institutions 15 224 27 5 192 Food enterprises 5 28 - - 28 Industrial enterprises 122 18128 149 - 17979 Other licensees 121 5504 44 2 5458 Total 866 25888 1479 91 24318
The nationwide system of personal monitoring operates since 1991. Before it only separate licensees were running their personal dosimetric systems, based mainly on films. Ignalina NPP has its own personal dosimetry system since 1984, i.e.,its start up. Data on personal doses of workers of Ignalina NPP are available from period of time before their employment in the Ignalina NPP. Only scarce data on personal doses of Lithuanian radiation workers from research, medical and industrial enterprises are available from the period before 1991. Recently a few dosimetric services are operating in Lithuania. As it was mentioned above Ignalina NPP has its own dosimetric service. At the end of 1997 this service was monitoring doses of 3232 employees of Ignalina NPP and 566 outside workers. The Radiation Protection Centre provides service to 2071 radiation workers all around Lithuania. Two small services are available in Kaunas Academy Hospital and Vilnius Public Health Centre. In 1997 they performed measurements of personal doses of 507 workers. „-...... Technical help provided by the IAEA helps to upgrade the personal dosimetry service of the Radiation Protection Centre. The Rados thermoluminescent dosimetry system (reader, irradiator, computer and necessary number of dosimeters) and oven for annealing of pellets were provided in 1995-1997. Now this system is fully installed and under operation. The main and most urgent task to be solved in this field is creation of quality assurance system. Approximately 6000 dosimeters of the DTU system are still available in the Radiation Protection Centre. These dosimeters can be used for personal monitoring under accidental conditions. The Radiation Protection Centre and Ignalina NPP now take part in intercomparisons of personal dosimeters organised by the IAEA. Type-test intercomparisons were performed in 1997. This year intercomparisons under simulated workplace conditions are carried out. Intercomparison of dosimeters irradiated under real conditions in Ignalina NPP has been performed, as well. All the above mentioned dosimetry services took part in it. It helps to check performance of all the systems including the old DTU ones because problems connected with secondary standard laboratory in Baltic countries are still unresolved. Ignalina NPP has the same RADOS system with two readers. Vilnius Public Health Centre and Kaunas Academy Hospital still use DTU systems. All the services work with TLDs. LiF and L12 B4 O7 pellets are used as thermoluminescent materials. Deep doses Hp (10) are registered. Ignalina NPP has the whole body counter (with Ge(Li) detector) for determination of internal contamination of human lungs and body with gamma radionuclides. The counter allows to detect radionuclides with gamma energies 50 keV to 3 MeV. Range of measured activities is:for Cs - 137 in whole body is (1.2 104 — 1.1 107) Bq, for Co -60 in lungs (1.6 102-3.7 106) Bq.
47 The system of measurements of activity of 1-131 in thyroid (with Nal(Tl) detector) is also available in Ignalina NPP. Range of measured by this system activities is (3.7 103 - 1.9 106) Bq. Up to 1000 workers of Ignalina NPP and outside workers are investigated by these systems per year. System of measurements of internal exposure by means of bioassay is not available in Lithuania yet. The Radiation Protection Centre which has the radiochemical laboratory together with Ignalina NPP and Vilnius Santariskes University hospital has started creation of internal dosimetric service. Chernobyl experience shows that essential source of exposure is beta radiation. Though the available RADOS dosimetric systems allow to determine beta doses no calibration facilities are available for this kind of dosimetry. Different types of beta monitors are available in the Radiation Protection Center but they can be used only for spot measurements. Since all the three Baltic countries have the same RADOS dosimetry system the Baltic group of TLD users was created in 1996. This group coordinates activities of the dosimetry services of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in establishment of the system of quality assurance, solving technical problems, training of personnel. Workshops are held under the auspices of the IAEA. Close connections with the manufacturer help to solve many technical problems. The central dose registry is kept by the Radiation Protection Centre. Data from all the above mentioned services of personal dosimetry are transferred to this registry .Personal doses of workers and contractors (outside workers) of Ignalina NPP are transferred to the registry once a year, data from personal dosimetry services of Vilnius Public Health Centre and Kaunas Academy Hospital - once or two times per quarter. In the case of increased levels of exposure of dosimeters an information by the Radiation Protection Centre is sent without any delay. The centre together with a local public health centre and licensee takes steps to find our possible reasons of high exposure. If necessary corrective measures are taken after concultations. Results of measurements of internal contamination in Ignalina NPP are transferred to the Radiation Protection Centre though they are not entered to the dose registry. Results of personal monitoring are presented in Tables 2 and 3.
Table 2. An extent and results of monitoring of personal doses in 1995-1997
Area of activities, Number of workers Annual doses, mSv occupation 1995 1996 1997 1995 1996 1997 Medicine 1939 2186 2360 Medical doctors; 535 630 694 x-ray radiology 382 392 392 1.91 1.76 1.60 CT 18 20 25 1.65 1.77 1.16 dentistry 35 67 104 0.46 0,74 1,17 traumathology - 27 30 - 1.07 0.87 Interventional radiology 13 34 75 1.65 1.45 1.77 Angiosurgery 20 22 33 3.39 4.04 7.47 Nuclear medicine 29 29 31 1.37 1.05 1.25 . Gamma therapy 35 36 29 1.96 1.09 1.38 brachitherapy 3 3 3 1.88 1.32 1.73 Nurces: 1076 1186 1248 x-ray radiology 849 903 900 1.82 1.62 1.42 CT 9 10 14 1.53 1.26 1.08 dentistry 53 85 133 0.50 0.95 1.12 traumathology 6 27 32 1.36 0.97 0.83 Interventional radiology 61 65 75 1.43 1.34 1.16 Nuclear medicine 49 50 53 2.06 1.54 1.59 48 Gamma therapy 32 29 29 1.78 1.16 1.38 brachitherapy 17 17 12 1.87 1.02 1.82 Hospital attendants: 328 370 390 x-ray radiology 232 251 262 1.79 1.67 1.40 Nuclear medicine 9 10 15 1.90 1.39 2.03 Gamma therapy 18 18 16 1.59 1.09 1.40 Engineers of health care 26 33 37 1.19 1.05 1.14 Radiation protection officers 43 58 60 1.54 0.98 1.37 Industry 140 150 218 Gamma defectoscopy 33 24 43 2.78 3.09 3.84 Others 107 126 175 1.28 1.18 1.41 Total 2079 2336 2578
Table 3. Results of monitoring of personal doses in Ignalina NPP in 1995-1997.
Range of doses, Number of workers mSv 1995 1996 1997 Workers of Ignalina >50 1 X X NPP 35-50 69 47 58 16-34 105 146 175 Total 3081 3164 3232 Outside workers 35-50 24 37 91 16-35 66 69 65 Total 432 471 566
The directions of future development of Lithuanian system of personal dosimetric control are discussed recently with experts of the IAEA. The main directions should be: - establishment of program of quality assurance in all services of personal monitoring, creation of operational order of usage of personal dosimeters, creation of system of evaluation of internal exposure, - creation of system of measurements of doses caused by betas and neutrons, - creation of necessary prerequisites for control of surface contamination (equipment, techniques), - training of staff in sampling, control of surface contamination.
49 CIVIL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AT THE IGNALINA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
ORGANIZATION OF THE RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING
S.MOTIEJUNAS,L.MORKELIUNAS
ENVIRONMENTAL MINISTRY, LITHUANIA
VILNIUS, OCTOBER 1998
50 MONITORING OF ENVIRONMENT
Monitoring of environment in Lithuania is regulated by Law on Environment Monitoring, adopted in 1997. Program of monitoring of environment in Lithuania was first elaborated by Department of Environmental protection in 1992. On the basis of accumulated experience a new State Program for Monitoring of Environment was approved this year. Its implementation is expected to be started in 1999. The program covers radio-ecological monitoring as well.
Gamma Monitoring
Since the power of a gamma dose is a parameter to be the most quickly measured by physical measures, permanent gamma monitoring is the milestone in the system for pre-warning of a radial incident. Intensity of gamma radiation is determined by radionuclides, existing in the air and on the surface of the earth as well as by cosmic radiation. Under normal conditions, gamma radiation depends on composition and height of soil as well as on site latitude. Sudden increase of ionising radiation may be conditioned by spread of radioactive contamination in the air or by accident of a nuclear equipment or nuclear explosion on the surface of the earth. Contamination of lower rate may be conditioned by defaults in utilisation, storing or transportation of radioactive materials.
There are several organisations in Lithuania co-operating in commencement of the gamma monitoring . A network of automated gamma monitoring stations is maintained by United Centre of Research of the Ministry of Environment. In co-operation with Denmark and Sweden there was implemented 12 fully automated monitoring stations: 4 RADOS and 8 ARGOS PMS. The latter, in addition to accumulation of the power of gamma dose, also accumulates and analyses gamma spectrum and measures intensity of precipitation. 4 ARGOS PMS stations are located in Ignalina NPP, i.e., in the environment of a source of potential danger. Other 4 are located in neighbouring countries in directions of the existing electrical power stations (in Vilnius, Alytus, Klaipeda and Siauliai). Semi-automated gamma monitoring stations are operating in meteorological stations (14 stations).The mentioned stations are evenly located in country territory. Measurements are constantly carried out and data is read and coded by observers. Data of all the stations are transmitted by telephone lines (by modem) or teletype to the central computer of the system for gamma monitoring placed in the United Centre of Research. In this centre service duty is carried out 24 hours a day. If the power of gamma dose exceeds 0,20mSv/h, computer generates an alarm signal. Every three hours radiation information is updated with meteorological information from Hydro-meteorological Service. In addition to these information sources, Ignalina NPP regularly transfers data on intensity of emission of radioactive materials and nuclide composition. The information is processed applying ARGOS program. It enables modelling of radio-nuclide spreading and precipitation in atmosphere, estimation of radiation doses, evaluation and forecast of radiation situation.
Danish assistance enabled operation of the system for information transfer to other authorities, i.e., operation stations are equipped in Department of Civil Protection, VATESI, Centre for Radiation Safety and Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant.
51 In the nearest future, Lithuania as well as other Baltic countries intends to join a treaty for exchanging data on gamma monitoring among Northern countries. Therefore, with the help of Internet, data will be regularly exchanged with neighbouring countries.
Monitoring of the Weather and Atmosphere Precipitation
Monitoring of radio activity of aerosols and precipitation is carried out in order to estimate intensity of radio-nuclide flow onto the surface of the earth and identify abnormal radionuclides, establishing their origin. Examination of the atmosphere precipitation produce more precise and extensive information, if compared to measurement of gamma radiation and, therefore, the monitoring of precipitation supplements the system of "pre-warning". The atmosphere precipitation is constantly collected in five meteorological stations: in Vilnius, Kaunas, Klaipeda, Utena and Dukstas. Radiation laboratory of the United Centre of Research measures total beta- ray activity, carries out analyses of gamma spectra (establishing activity of ] 7C, 7B and other gamma rays) and radiochemical analysis ( Sr).
There are two aerosols monitoring stations operating in Lithuania: close to Ignalina NPP and in Utena. Air filtration equipment is constantly operating in these stations. Approx. 20 000 m3 of air is sucked every day. The filters are replaced on a week basis and measured in a laboratory in Vilnius (establishing concentration of natural and artificial radionuclides in the air).
Monitoring of Water Systems
Monitoring of four lakes is in progress, i.e., Druksiai, Dusia, Plateliai and Rubikiai. The water is analysed once a year (4 times in Druksiai lake), deposit on the bottoms - every 5 years and fish in the lakes - once per year. Activity of artificial radionuclides is also established.
Monitoring of river waters is carried out in the rivers crossing boards of Lithuania (in the Nemunas and the Neris). Cs and Sr concentration of radionuclides in the waters are measured four times per year.
There are 4 monitoring places in the Baltic Sea. Analysis of the water, deposits on the bottom, aquatic plants and fish is in progress there.
Monitoring of land Eco-System
Monitoring of land eco-systems is carried out in three Integrated Monitoring Stations (in national parks of Aukstaitija, Dzukija and Zemaitija regions). Activity of radionuclides in soil is measured every 5 years while that of herbs - every year.
52 J
CIVIL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AT THE IGNALINA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
A SWEDISH CO-OPERATION PROGRAMME FOR RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLANNING ACTIVITIES IN THE BALTIC SEA REGION
B.A. PERSSON, SSI, SWEDEN
VILNIUS, OCTOBER 1998
53 Swedish Co-operation Programme for Radiological Emergency Planning Activities in the Baltic Sea Region
Introduction
Since the beginning in 1993, several activities have been initiated with the aim of strengthening the radiological emergency preparedness and to develop the co-ordination of the emergency planning in the Baltic Sea Region. The background to realise such a programme is that the Swedish Government has allocated specific resources which are to be used for assistance and co-operation projects in the field of radiation protection and directed at countries in Central and Eastern Europe. These activities can also be considered as an extension of a well established tradition, as such a co-ordination of planning and exchange of information has already existed among the relevant authorities in the five Nordic countries. The bulk of the co-operation activities, carried out by SSI in the field of emergency planning which is directed to the Baltic Sea Region, has been organised under the heading of a main project, viz."Emergency Planning and Preparedness in the Baltic States". Within this main project several sub-projects were set up, each one having specific objectives. A steering group, with representatives from SSI, the Swedish International Project Nuclear Safety 9SiP) - SiP is an organisation within the Swedish Nuclear Reactor Inspectorate (SKI). And the Swedish Rescue Services Board (SRV) and two representatives from each of the three Baltic States, has been given the role of managing the sub-projects. In practice, some of the sub-projects also include an active participation by and co-ordination with some of the Nordic countries. The issues covered by the project are: administrative planning, reviews of national emergency plans, emergency measurement strategies, early warning monitoring exercises and matters related to public information. Some of the projects focus directly on the on-site emergency planning and preparedness and the handling of information issues at the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant (INPP). In the Baltic countries National seminars on radiological emergency planning have been sponsored. Participation from the Baltic countries in international training, seminars and international exercises has also taken place. Within the project a handbook has been produced containing technical data concerning the RBMK reactors of the INPP as well as an overview of the off-site national emergency planning in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. In addition to the project above, but to a less extent so far, Russia, Poland and Germany have been involved in work regarding exchange of monitoring data and in seminars and international exercises. However, planning continues with the aim of leading to a formal agreement regarding an exchange of monitoring data, generated by the national networks of fixed stations in the Baltic Sea region. The objective is that all participants on routine bases will have access to monitoring data from all the other contract parties. In the framework of an activity titled "Baltic Sea States Reference Group, Emergency Monitoring Integrated System and Early Warning" there has also been an extended exchange on information in the field of national radiological emergency planning. Working groups have been set up to deal with specific issues such as monitoring strategies, communication means and intervention levels. Six meetings have been held so far. The last was in September-98, in Helsinki and was hosted by STUK. Among other things the co-operation with the European Commission have included a workshop on "Decision-Making Support for off-site Emergency Planning" which was effected in 1966 with invited representatives from the Baltic Sea countries as well as from Central and Eastern Europe. 54 Short overviews of the sub-projects
1. Sub-projects on Planning, Training and Exercises
Workshops and seminars
The aim of these sub-projects is to transfer Nordic and Western standards and experience to the three Baltic States so as to be incorporated into their own national emergency plans and exercises. The methods used were to organise workshops and seminars on National Radiological Emergency Planning. The meetings were held in Sweden, in some of the other Nordic countries as well as in the three Baltic States. In many of the activities, there has also been an active participation by specialists in Emergency Planning from some of the other Nordic countries. The objective has been to concentrate the work mainly on national off-site radiological emergency planning. This includes issues regarding planning and preparedness for an international co-operation, concerning the notification and exchange of information in case of a nuclear accident. Not least these aspects are of importance for neighbouring countries, as well as countries located in the same region of the world.
Revision of National Emergency Plans
One measure for assisting very actively in connection with the revisions of national emergency plans in Latvia and Lithuania, was to establish ad hoc teams of experts from Sweden and Finland with the task of examining drafts of the national plans. The examinations were organised as workshops involving experts and invited representatives from the countries concerned. The results of the examinations were presented as findings, proposals and comments, which were handed over to the responsible organisations for consideration. The new national emergency plans of Latvia and Lithuania are now a good basis for the creation of revised national emergency organisations in these countries. However, a lot of work still remains for reaching a co-ordination between all the different organisations involved in a national radiological emergency planning. This also requires a national legislation stating the responsibilities and roles of the involved authorities and organisations.
Exercises
In connection with different exercises in Sweden, experts from the Baltic and Eastern European countries have been invited as observers and, in some cases to participate in the exercises to a limited extent. However, in the future, the observers ought to be engaged more actively in the exercises and, for instance, act as evaluators or national liaison officers. In the capacity of advisers and evaluators, Swedish experts have participated in exercises held in the Baltic countries. These exercises have been directed at national staff members. The main project has also supported planning processes for some of these national exercises, effected in the Baltic countries. The exchange of experiences gained, in connection with such exercises, has been very valuable for most of these involved and for their organisations. A seminar on methods and techniques used in the organising of exercises was held in Estonia. The seminar was also aimed at being one part of the preparation of an exercise, later on effected in Latvia and participation by the Baltic countries in the OECD/NEA international exercises programme (INEX 2).
55 International Exercises
Each of the last two international exercises within the INEX 2, (with Switzerland and Finland as accident countries), involved more than 30 countries and several international organisations such as IAEA, EU, WHO, WMO. The INEX 2 FIN exercise, which took place on 17 April 1997, was used as a specific test by this project for these Baltic States as to how far the national organisations had progressed regarding preparedness for international co-operation in the case of an accident in the surrounding region. The planning and the evaluation of the objectives defined for the Finnish exercise were co-ordinated within a project set up by the Nordic Committee for Nuclear Research (NKS). All five Nordic countries and the three Baltic countries participated in this NKS project. Even if more work needs to be done, the experience from the INEX 2 FIN exercise was encouraging for future co-operation within the Baltic Sea Region concerning the radiological emergency planning.
Training Cources
The emergency planning activities, on the county level in Sweden, has been demonstrated in a training course organised with the assistance of the County Administration Authorities of Kalmar. Participants from all three Baltic States attended the course. Also included in the course was a study visit to the Oskarshamn nuclear power site. The project has also supported participation in several courses on off-site emergency planning, organised by the European Commission.
International Standards
A need for and an interest in receiving up-dated literature published by ICRP, IAEA etc.has been identified through the project. According to individual national proposals, various kinds of literature have been sent to the involved organisations in the three Baltic countries.
2. Sub-projects on Measurement Strategies, including Early Warning Systems
Expert Meetings
One of the main activities within these projects has been to organise several expert meetings on emergency monitoring and measurement, including visits to different national environmental laboratories. Issues of interest for these projects are emergency monitoring strategies and measurement procedures. These also include the national networks of fixed gamma monitoring stations and the exchange of data on routine bases from these stations. The Swedish assistance within these projects also includes the providing of the equipment for gamma monitoring stations and air-monitoring stations. In addition, this includes computers for the communication of data and access to the Internet for the exchange of data with the Nordic countries. One further important aspect in connection with these matters is the co-ordination and the connection with a network of stations provided to the three Baltic countries by the Danish Emergency Management Agency.
56 Exchange of Monitoring Data
For some years there has been an agreement between the concerned authorities in the Nordic countries for the exchange of monitoring data on a routine basis, from the respective national networks of fixed stations. In the future, such an agreement is expected to include all the countries in the Baltic Sea region. Regarding the air sampling stations, there is now a need to arrange a training course for operating these stations and to prepare for an agreement concerning the procedures for the future exchange of data.
3.Sub-project on Information to the Public and the Media
In case of a radiological emergency, the demand for information from the public and the media will be one of the most important aspects to be met by a national emergency organisation. The international exchange of information can also be expected to be very intensive. One of the purposes of this project is to assist the Baltic countries in organising their own information structure in the respective national plans. This type of planning includes the co-ordination between a lot of involved authorities and organisations as well as the aspect of communicating with the media. Another aim is to establish a basis for the formulation of national information policies and strategies. The project has also given an opportunity for discussing and assisting the understanding of national differences in handling the public information issues. Such differences naturally depend on differences in national legislation as well as in differences in culture backgrounds. However, the experience has shown that much work still remains to be done, regarding the preparedness for handling the various issues related to public information.
Seminars and Workshops
Six meeting, seminars and workshops have so far been organised, two of which have been national meetings. In connection with exercises in Sweden, visitors have been invited to study the handling of information matters at SSI, SKI and at the office of administrative authorities in a country.
Information Exercises On-Site INPP
The information preparedness on-site the INPP for communicating information to the general public and the media in the case of an accident was discussed. Exercises have been organised by Swedish experts directed at the information division of the emergency organisation on-site INPP. These actions also constitute one part of a preparation for the exercise which will take place during the next days at the INPP.
4. Sub-projects on Review of the INPP on-site EOP and Planning of on-site Rescue Operations
Review of On-site EOP
57 Among the Lithuanian authorities there was a concern that the INPP plan for staff protection, in the case of an accident, was out of date. This was also confirmed by a IAEA/OS ART mission in 1995 and by other safety analyses. In addition, there is a need for the co-ordination of the emergency operation plan (EOP) of the INPP with the revised national off-site emergency planning. This was the background for the extensive review of the on-site plan of INPP which has now been completed. The objective of the review is to adapt the EOP to internationally accepted principles, standards and practices. Assisted by Swedish specialists and an advisory group, the review has been carried out by the INPP staff. The advisory group included representatives from the Lithuanian national off-site emergency organisations as VATESI, the Civil Defence Department and, on Swedish side, SSI and SiP. The revised emergency plan will now be tested in connection with the October-98 exercise.
Planning of On-site Rescue Operations
In connection with the planning of the main project and initial contacts with representatives from INPP, it was obvious that the preparedness for on-site rescue operations at the Ignalina plant was not in accordance with accepted international standards. To transfer western standards and experience within this field, this project has included visits of specialist teams from the Swedish Nuclear Power Industry to the INPP and, later on, a study visit to Sweden of specialists from Lithuania. Routines and training programmes used at Swedish NPP were demonstrated. Experts from the Swedish nuclear power industry also evaluated the capabilities of the INPP rescue force. The specialists at the plant now seem to have arrived at an understanding of organisation, routines and training of rescue operations at the Swedish NPP. Apart from this project modern protecting equipment has been provided by UK and Sweden to the plant upgrading preparedness, regarding on-site rescue operations.
5. Other Matters
Upgrading of Emergency Respond Centres
It is obvious that there is a need to upgrade the emergency respond centres allocated for the off-site emergency organisations in the three Baltic countries as well as at the INPP. As a first step, a project has been initiated with the aim of studying the need for actions to be taken and of advising and assisting with regard to providing the respond centres with modern equipment aimed at telecommunications, supply of electricity etc. So far the activities have been limited to the operation centre at the INPP and one off-site respond centre in both Lithuania and Latvia, the later located in the Daugavpils region, situated close to the border of Lithuania and the Ignalina site.
Budget allocations
Since 1993, the budget amount allocated for the above activities is 9 million Swedish crowns (SEK) (USD 1,1 million) of which the contribution from SiP is 1,5 million SEK (USD 0,2 million). The contribution of resources from SiP is allocated for joint SSI and SiP projects, directed at one-site matters at the INPP.
58 Conclusions
As expected the assistance and advisory work, as described above, has shown to be an effective initiator in developing a co-operation between the involved countries in the field of radiological emergency planning. Although a lot of work still remains to be done, specifically related to organisational and information matters, the exercises, so far effected to test the result of our work, are encouraging for further efforts to strengthen the security in the Baltic Sea Region. In general, such international co-operation is, in itself, a learning process for all involved and I do believe that the work, carried out, has contributed to such a process.
59 J
CIVIL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AT THE IGNALINA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AT BARSEBACK NPP SWEDEN
R.OLSSON, SKI,SWEDEN, C.G.LINDVALL,BARSEBACK NPP, SWEDEN
VILNIUS, OCTOBER 1998
60 ON-SITE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS IN SWEDEN; BARSEBACK NPP
On-Site Emergency preparedness in Sweden
By Richard Olsson, Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate Carl-Goran Lindvall, Barseback Kraft AB
In Sweden there are 12 NPP on four sites in the middle and south of Sweden. Seven NPPs are owned by the Swedish State company Vattenfall AB and the other five by private companies Sydkraft AB and OKG AB. Nine of those are BWRs of Swedish ABB designs and at Ringhals Power Station there are three PWRs of Westinghouse design. Nuclear Power produce about 50 per cent of the electric power used nationally and the other 50 by hydro. Nuclear power is regulated by the national authorities the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate and the Swedish Radiation Protection Institute. When it comes to emergencies preparedness numerous authorities on national, regional and local level cooperate. The emergency management centre at the regional county is in charge of all off-site measures and also coordinate the efforts of other participating authorities and organizations. Accordingly the NPP emergency organization is fully responsible for all on-site measures. This makes the regional emergency management centre and the NPP emergency organization the main "actors" of the protective measures. The responsibility of the national authorities is to support the main actors in their efforts to handle the situation in every way possible, competence, resources, logistics, communications, advice, et cetera
Figure 1 (left) Map of Sweden and the location of Swedish NPPs.
Figure 2 (below) Main actors and supporting actors in the emergency organizations
MAW ACTORS
NUCLEAR POWER PLAHT REGIONAL COUNTY ON-SITE EMERGENCY OFF-SfTE EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION ORGANIZATION
SUPPORTING ACTORS ORGANIZA- NATIONAL LOCAL OTHERS TIONS AUTHORITIES AUTHORITIES
61 Improvments in the 90ties In Sweden all parts of the emergency preparedness organizations have developed. Methods and systems for the calculation of the magnitude of an radioactive release and dispersion have improved, equipment and monitoring stations in the NPP surroundings have been installed. Cooperation between the NPPs, regional and national authorities has been well organized and the interaction is frequently trained in exercises. Also on the Nordic level, within the Nordic Emergency Preparedness Group and the Nordic Nuclear Safety (NKS) research programmes, emergency preparedness has been the object of cooperation. Early notification arrangements and mutual support is agreed upon and systems -are developed to give access to each others monitoring data. Frequent excercises are performed with the actors of the Nordic countries participating. What makes the Swedish development different from most other countries' is the focus on the acute part of an emergency, that is, when there is a threat of a radioactive release, a release is near or starting. In this early stage very little information is available to form the basis for decisions of protective actions and thus process parametres, the status of the plant and its likely behavior and resulting potential source term as to size and time must be used.
ITIATiNG TIME OF Tl EVENT EMISSION RELE
.J& PROTECTIVE MEASURES TAKE TMETO EXECUTE
Figure 3 To wait for off-site monitoring give little room for the execution of protective measures. Starting earlier means decisions have to be based on the potential threat.
FACTS THAT FORM THE CHALLENGES - To assess the damaged core with accuracy takes time (TMI 10 years) - Protective actions demand huge resources that take time to allocate - Protective actions take time to execute - Protective actions are most effective before a radioactive release occurs
Thus integrated emergency planning is of utmost importance.
62 MOTIVES OF THE INSPECTORATE In case of an emergency the inspectorate's need of information, from the process, emergency operations and strategies, to be able to assess the threatening source term, might become a burden on the NPP staff. At distance there are small possibilities to cope with the updates of a rapidly changing scenario where operators actions might turn the emergency in other directions. The risk of an information break-down that would block necessary decisions is obvious. As a result the Inspectorate strives for a situation where structured handling of input data, methods and preplanned strategies is used on-site. In Sweden cooperation and joint research projects between the authorities and the utilities is a fruitful way to develop means and methods. Since nearly two years the Inspectorate and Barseback Kraft jointly have further developed available methods and integrated them into a common procedure. The Barseback NPP had the results from the PSA level 2 studies and also a progressive attitude to emergency preparedness development.
The intentions of the recently finalized project • Integrate existing methods to improve the base for decisions • Facilitate decisions based on early assessments of the threat • Speed up work to fit a 30 minute assessment cycle also coping with changing scenarios • To use methods and tools adapted to available information and staff in each phase • Facilitate communications
THE IAEA APPROACH In parallel to the Swedish work, IAEA has since a couple of years started several projects to improve emergency preparedness and the ability to handle severe nuclear accidents. Based on the same values and point of views detailed guides were produced to assess emergency scenarios and source terms, sampling methods and process of decisions for acute protective measures. Whithin "the IAEA-Project" now ongoing Sweden participate as an active observer in the Area coordination group - North and intends to support the harmonization process.
63 On-Site Emergency at Barseback NPP This is a presentation of a recently ended project at Barseback NPP in the south of Sweden. At Barseback there are two 615MWe units of the Swedish ASEA-Atom BWR design, commercially operated since the mid seventies.
Figure 4 The two BWR units at Barseback NPP in the south of Sweden
The project integrates the methods and tools that support decisions of protective measures during emergencies involving a radioactive release. The Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate contributed with their results from the research programme on source term analyses based on plant status. The research programme emanates from the design studies of the FILTRA system - the containment filtered pressure relief system at Barseback NPP - that later became mandatory for Swedish NPPs.
NPP EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION AND ITS DUTIES On site protection is coordinated by the NPP emergency manager. In an emergency the responsibility of the NPP is to: • alarm the emergency organizations • spend all efforts to restore safe conditions • assess the potential source term as to size and time • protect their own personnel • inform personnel and public The ambition is to predict the potential release and its consequences before it turns into reality. The Regional Emergency Centre in Malmo is responsible for all off-site protective actions. They choose and execute the appropriate protective actions.
64 INPUT DATA AND MANPOWER BUILD-UP The NPP emergency organization grows rapidly in numbers and strength. At the initia- ting event it may consist of only the shift operators, the engineer on duty and the secu- rity staff. In case of an severe accident all vital functions in the emergency organiza- tions are staffed within an hour or two from the time of the alarm, emergency or alert. The use of fast and fairly accurate tools based on rule of thumb enables early assess- ment of the threat using core and containment states and precalculations as input data. Correspondingly the organization at the local emergency centre and authorities also grows as rapidly.
NUCLEAR POWER PLANT ' REGIONAL B*ER<3£NCYXENTRE Al 1OUR3 Figure 5 -*?* • Within an hour or two the emer- i gency organizations grow very fast. At Barsebdck all functions •,,jBp«rt« ; are manned an hour after the emergency alarm bells. PHASES OF THE EMERGENCY AND THE CRUICAL QUESTIONS To cope with situations where the sequence of events developes fast or alters direction the assessment cycle is very short. Crucial is naturally the properly and timely identification of the emergency and the promt alarm. The off-site engineers on duty become promptly the alarm message, also in our neighbouring country Denmark. During the subsequent phases of the emergency the conditions and the demands to assess the emergency repetedly change. Based on the availability of input data the emergency scenarios are divided as follows: from the time of the alarm to the time of emission from the core from the time of emission to the time of release from the time of release to the time when stable conditions are reached One phase may last for minutes or hours or even days. It is important to recognise that a situation where (airly safe conditions are reestablished may once again turn worse or the risk of a second release as a result of operator actions to restore sale conditions. This means source term assessment must continue until long term safely ''-• rcac lied. 65 The questions that should be answered are the same through all phases: • Is or will the core be damaged and how much? • Is there a release route? That is, can there be a release and how big? • When does the release begin and how long will it last? Where in the surroundings will there be consequences7 • What acute protective actions are appropriate? The NPP gives the answers to the first three questions whicli depend on the emergency scenario and the barriers that contain the core. They explain how successfully emission is prevented or how well the emitted radioactivity is contained, that is the spread of radioactivity on-site. The last two questions deal with how radioactivity can be or is dispersed off-site and which consequences it may have. Those are questions at the regional county. THE INTEGRATION FORMULA The integration of methods made at Barseback conform the procedures to a model where corrections can be made to the calculations throughout the whole emergency. Independent of the methods and tools being used changes in plant conditions in the middle of an emergency may not cause complete recalculations and assessments. To suit the assessment cycles in all phases a formula was adopted where each factor may be specified with different methods. The formula consists of a source term part and a consequence part or if you wish an on-site and an off-site part. The dominant radiological threat derives from the reactor, core, but the formula is also adapted to other radiological sources. Core Emission Leak Correction Source inventory* factor * fraction * factors term Source , Duration , Dispersion , Dose Consequence ' Heat cont. ' •~-"J~l- ' \:igure6: Parametres in the assessment formula. The source term or on-site pan concentrates on the emitted radioactunly that leaks out from the plant. That is also the definition of source term. The factors are figures beiweenO and I. The consequence or off site part add value and accuracy to the calculation of dispersion, choice of precalculations or the use of code, from which consequences (ire assessed. Procedure Overview The Procedure overview indicates the appropriate method in different phases of the emergency. Each factor in the formula above may be specified with different methods and tools or confirm or correct the previous calculation. In the procedure there is a single work sheet for each method and an assessment summary for each phase. You might get the impression there is a lot of calculations to do but it is merely a choice of predefined sets of data step by step. Inventory Emission Leak Correction Source Release Duration J*S?e Di?Per" factor fraction factors term time height/temp sion actons From ] f From leak mode leak mode r-"tfore I bumup Stack f Tmeof | t-ouiseof>r^Monitor^1f External monitor | j monitor j leakflow j'j position jj sampling [r eogr>ivv>/-"^ £ locations Figure 7 Interacting methods In the upper part are the factors of the formula and at the left the identified phases. The method used to specify a factor depends on the availability of input data, resources, et c. CORE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT - Initially emission factor is assessed with the the work sheet for core uncovery time. The time the core lacks cooling core temperatur rises until cladding is damaged and in an hour damage is global and core melt started. - Shortly after emission has started the work sheet for containment monitor readings are used. The noble gas concentration in the containment is correlated to the monitor readings which gives a fairly good picture of the core state and when emission started. It is used the first 5 to seven hours after emission before surface dose rates build up and make the method unreliable. - In the same way the work sheet for hydrogen concentration can be used to assess core damage. Core uncovery time Containm.monitors Hydrogen concentration rx LO • Correct 1the containment <3 as Containment Hydrogen calculation volume with pool level (graph) formula: e / H2HUM Cont.volume Contpressure 0,5 Monitor No KS11 K913 K9U r AC T / READINGS H2- 0,2 Detector GM SPG JK OHS S + 273 / Background K911 K913 K914 ContTemp. CORR.VOL 0,1 • Correlate Hydrogen to emitted POWER CORR fraction of noble gases (graph) LLJ / 10 20 30 60 CORRVALUE • Calculate the fraction of affected CORE UNCOVERY • Correlate Hydrogen to emitted zirconium (graph) TIME (min) fraction of noble gases (graph) Fiaure 8 From the methods worksheets: how to assess the extent of emission from the core.. 67 WEATHER CONDITIONS In the same way as core damage is assessed dispersion and off-site impact can be calculated: - with precalculations for source term levels and weather classes - with actual weather data from the NPP weather system or local weather station. - with the use of regional weather forecasts Precalculations Actual weather Forecasts WEATHSl: WlN)D6mte LOCAL REGIONAL RADIOACT.: 1131,1133,1136 NPP WEATHER SYSTEM WEATHER STATION AT MALMO DIRECTLY ON-LINE IN THE AIRPORT (40KM) ANALYST ROOM FORECASTS FOR THE NEXT 3-5 REGIONAL HOURS WEATHER STATION AT MALMO NATIONAL AIRPORT(40KM) WEATHER CLASSES, HEIGHTS DISPERSION SPECIALISTS AT ETCETERA. THE AUTHORITY IN NORRKOPING FORCASTS FOR THE NEXT HOURS AND DAYS. 4- 8 12 16 20 24 28 30 km Figure 9 Weather precalculation are in Jour classes. Actual and forecast weather is input data to the LENA code used both at the NPP and regional county THE MATRIX ADVANTAGES With the use of the simple work sheets and the three assessment summaries the whole assessment process is visible, is possible to backtrack and reconsider and easy to communicate. It also gives a good documentation. The assessment cycle is short, 30 minutes or less. The fact that all phases are supported and the use of supplementary methods makes it possible to cope with scenarios that suddenly turns into a new direction. The use of precalculated scenarios based on level 2 studies gives a probabilistic aspect and an expectation on sequence of events. As an example there are three assessments below, one in each phase. Decisions before emission from the core The plant status assessment, during abnormal conditions which may develop to an emergency, focus on if and when the core may loose cooling and if the containment is or will be isolated or not. As long as the core is cooled and the containment closed there is no risk of a release that demands acute off-site actions. Figure 10 The on-site part of the Core Emission Leak Correction Source assessment of the imminent x source term.. inventory* factor(e) * fraction factors term Core Damage Emission HOURS Databook Leak Mode 68 Figure 11 The off-site part of the Source • Duration • Dispersion • Dose Consequence assessment where term ' Heat cont. ' models "•" exposure Acute action precalculations of dispersion and doses is used. Whenever there is time 1 or as soon as new input ft EVACUATE data is available reassessment of source day/night term and consequences - neuto-' is made to confirm or correct the previous N, assessment. INDOOR SHELTER V ^ UJ Dj S o S 9 cn-ojo: 8 12 16 20 24 28 30 km The basis for decisions are: - The source term for the probable sequence of event and correspondingly the probable off-site impact is choosen from precalculated scenarios with the use of standard inventory, core uncovery time and containment leak mode. There may also be the need of alternative calculations. - Important to the decisions are also the possibilities to restore safety functions and safe conditions. - Depending on the scenario the possibilities to timely execute the actions is also important. Figure 12 Support of decisions of protective actions at the local county before emission has taken place. POSSIBILITIES TO RESTORE SAFETY Figure 12: Basis for decisions at the regional county. Dealing with threats there may be decisions of precautionary actions if the situation is fragile. As long as the situation lasts it is reassessed again and again. ASSESSMENT SUMMARY 1 Vital measures in the procedures are extracted to speed up work and smoothed to be easy to learn and easy to work with. Linked work sheets focus on essentials in each step and phase and give guidance and facilitate records. See figure page 14. 69 Decisions after emission from the core but before release Figure 13 When emission has started core damage is reassessed to Core Emission Leak Correction Source confirm or correct previous inventory factor (e) fraction factors — term results. Then the containment stale is attended to to find the possible leak paths and Containm. applicable correction factors. History Containm state? Decay Monitors Burnup Isolated? Hydrogen Leak path? Cone. Leak rate? Pressure? Containm Sampling Temp.? If core uncovery last an hour emission has started. The plant status assessment focus on the emitted fraction of the core inventory and the containment state. The standard inventory may be corrected for power history and burn-up and the emission factor and time may be confirmed with the containment monitors and analyses of hydrogen concentration. Wash out from containment spray and containment leak fraction may also be calculated to assess the source term. Figure 14 Dispersion and consequences Source Duration Dispersion • Dose .. , Consequence are calculated with actual term Heat cont. models ' exposure Acute action weather and forecasts and protective measures get geographical priorities. Containm. Off-site: pressure Dose levels and temp. Priorities I Course of leakflow Release height Off-site impact and the need of protective actions very much depends on how successfully the radioactivity may be contained and reduced. Under conditions with high containment pressure manual pressure relief to the filters reducing the source term about three orders of magnitude may be preferred to avoid containment rupture that is not possible to reclose. If manual containment pressure relief is decided it must be executed in coordination with protective actions to avoid exposure of the plume. Consequences is calculated for the actual weather and/or forecasts with the use of a dispersion code. 70 Figure IS Consequences and off-site action is decided upon with, calculations with actual weather and forecasts and protective measures get geographical priorities. EASURES TO CONTAIN RADIOACTIVITY The basis for decisions are: - The probable leak path and rate and the probable off-site impact. - Important to the decisions are also the measures to contain and reduce the emitted radioactivity. Measures may be restricted of the radiological situation - The possibilities to timely execute the protective actions. ASSESSMENT SUMMARY 2 Figure 16: Summary 2 (part of) used when emission has occurred. . For InEMISSiOHSFAKTCmH ffirlnUCKAGEFRAKTlON O MM och noteraUPPEKAUSTlOeN entlgtABSAeflerDB: Ttffl erilgt ABS-oietMl son anvdnts ceiAB6AdtervaltDBocb for bestamningavhanlskada: uppftatta kSItantwrc onifgtfeflande: «r EMISSIONS- LACKAGE- TVATT. UPPSKATTAD pp Kofr.lweut fAKTOR FRAKTION FAKTDR K&LL1ERM 1 l+l 1-1 : X X It x * t •*" 1 '•• 1 no j X K X -*• •>^- PUNKTochdessHdjO: • 1 fUTRA-storstefieo X X X I | | Annan: nwlcr X f. X - 1 AntecknaradandeVIND- X X X - MKTWNG (dot ha« linden X X X - Ha*«rmot)odiVIND- NNV NORDOST Jt X X MASnSHETi 337 45 X X X m/s X X X X X I; - X X X - X X X - X X X 31& X X X - f. X X - For in den uppskattade kail X X X - ter men, utsJappshoid och t. X X vaderdatal LEKA-systemet ?. X. X - och berlkna spridningen. / X - t. X «: - M arfcera tankJbara lonet f. X X - odh sektoter dSr dosbo 1 X K - lastnlng och kontatnf na- 1 X X - tion kan Ml hog octi a» X X X, - geprognos. X (. f. - ' < A 71 ), - Decisions when the release occurs and afterwards If a radioactive release turns into reality this is identified with the stack monitoring systems or, if the leak path is unmonitored, the off-site monitoring systems. From the monitor readings the assessed source term and release rate and temperature may be confirmed. Consequences is assessed with the dispersion code. Figure 17 Post release the assessment continues until stable Dose Consequence conditions are reached. exposure Acute action l:rom this point and onwards protective actions are based on sampling and Off-site sampling analyses unless a second The LENA System release threatens to appear. Unmonitored path: Relayed Off-site monit. Dose level Monitored path priorities Dose rate Temperature Course of flow Release height At this point there is not much room for precautionary measures. Undoubtedly, there will be consequences of the release if the core damage is large. However, blind actions not calculating the effectiveness and gain of the execution of the actions may occupy resources elsewhere needed. The assessments help to find out the priorities and how to allocate the resources. After the release when the plume has passed sampling and analyses is the basis for all further protective actions. However, at the NPP the calculation of a potential source term from a second release continues until safe and stable conditions are reached. Important to the decisions of acute protective actions are: - The "nature" of the release, duration, course of outflow, etc. - The probable off-site impact in a short perspective - Measures to close the leak path - Possibilities to timely execute the actions Figure 18 Supporting post release decisions of protective actions. MEASURES TO CLOSE THE LEAK PATH 72 ASSESSMENT SUMMARY 3 Avlasodi noteraFlODEN samt Alt KorrigeraDOSRATfbr effektoch flodeen DOSRATiskwstenarenligtfQljande: foljande: Syst Matpunkt Bakgnind Aviastvarde Effektkorr. (EF24H> Rtideskorrigering Korr.dosrat K {l0llKI nitv.-'ii WOO KPB •**I *| -'° • 4ft- Medeleffektsenaste24h enlAB4A: Flodeshastighet skorsten (S:a av fiaktfldden): ili'/h mm. K W i iriGv, Ii / iOG / 10 I'nGv/ ri Medeleffekt senaste24Ji enl AB4A: Gasflodeshastighet RLTRA 2-361K301: Ptotta KORR.DOSRAT i skorstenen i Plotta K0RR.D0SRATI Filtras skorsten i diagrainmet nedan: dia&ammet nedan: a=::::^===::j| I.CE-CO - Skwstel»tedsZ2<»0&irVb jj UWippsfiatolOm/s s • l.OCCE-02 N = • -• \ : OCC&OG I.CE-03 1 10 100 1000 1 10 100 Timmareilef snabtetopp Tlmma r eft er sn abbs topp Plotta KORR.DOSRAT i skorstenen I Q Plotta K0RR.D0SRATI Filtras skorsten dagrammet nedan: dlagrammet nedan: Figure 19 A part of the assessment summary used after release has occurred. Conclusions The Barsebiick ability to support the decisions of acute protective actions at the regional emergency centre has improved with the support of decisions of prerelease actions. With the focus on prerelease actions the Barsebiick approach is parallel I to and meets the demands of the I AHA. Though there still is room for further improvements Barsebac k Nl'l1 is proud ol the results of the project that also mfght serve as a model for other NPI's 73 SAMMANSTALLNING for hotsituationer PROGNOSBLAD INVOTORIUM GRADAVHARDSKADA GRADAVLACKAGE K0RREM10NER KAUTERM T1DPUNKT SPRIDNING PB3A i.J Staodard DB4 D Torrtagestid AB5A DLackagerf AB6A BTWfflaktof (Saknas) D F&kalkyl vattDB D UcfcagesS AB6A D LENAfftrtalk vattDB H ETfeklktHT. AB4A D Rt-moittoref AB5B Ulsoterfiitktioii AB6B B TMcberoeadeii (Sakus) D Berlkulng Nedai • Havwisekv valtDB gg AkLvSder Berakn B Ainat ^ VStgaskonc. AB5C S3 Uckagehastigh (SakM$}B B Monitoring B TWttr monitoring @ Vadetprognos BerSkn §3 Provtagniag AB5GH ^Tiyck/temp (Sakaas)B B B 3 Exteraprav/mfit Avlast Btraksa EMISSION arracfioakthitBt son I BerakM UCKAGEFRAKTIONEll enflgi I ARtMkMvantadUTSLAPPSPUNKTMbiteMHOJO: "8 fraktiM » hnentariet fotymde: NakUd T GRADAVHARDSKADA GRAO AV LACKAGE torn fmktkm at mntat V2 (etttal radian Oochl) lackaf«tatt (ett tal meNan 0 «h 1) Antockna radamto VINDRIKTNING ^•85mi 4.48h 5.31 enlist AB5A6lterAB5B: en««tAB6A: (dot bafl linden blaser mot)ech Kr-SS 10 ,\ir 1.82 £-16 VINDHASTIGHET: [ [ / Frigjord radio- Uppskattad Kr-88 ' 2 84ti 1..U f-18 aktivttet kaiftenn *e-l33m; 2.26a l.oy L-i? 1.47 E»19 (Bq) (Bg)l NNV 1. Se-133 i D.29C! 3.64 F.'IS NORDOST Val}d«tTYPHAVERlFBk9 337 45 ALTERNAT1VT: Xe-135 I 9.083h 1.09 E-18 MM BMtsmrar dm tpp- Emtssions- LSckage- Utslappsfraktion *kattad«kiBtBrBMB(att. a- faktor fraktion (talmellanOochl) ittlan>t(raltim)eHer S Uppskattad kalltarm beraknlBf Mm notnarar MentHiwat Kanario. (Bq)| NORDVAST 0N0 315 67 I o' Lackage- Utslappsfraktion 3 Emissions- Marfctra taakbara nmr faktor fraktion (talmellanOochl) •ditaktortrdardotb*- Frigjord radlo- Uppskattad lastiilagectikentainina- Cs-134 2.5ar 2.25 E+17 aktivitet Wlltemi OST 90 Cs-137 3 Oar 1.89 E+17 X 4.13 E+17 (Bq) ftpngms. vsv ALTERNATIVE •L 247 Emlssions- Lackage- UtslappsfraktioR faktor frakUon (talmeHanOocbl) SYDVAST 225 oso Antecfcna T1DPUNKT F6R TORRLAGE (nar drt te- A»tas och netera UPPEHALLSHDEN for vatt 112 traftsteflenrantasiatraffa): i | lackat«sattiAB6A: Tim.min AntocfcnaTIDPUNKTFdR EMISSION (nardet in- Btrakna T1DPUNKT FOR UTStAPP enllgt traftateflerTantasiirtraffa): j fol)ande: Tldpnnktfor Uppebalte- Berak«adtW- ; Tim.min emlsston tidfUm) pnnktHrotsUpp (ktockriag) (Mockslag) ssv SYDOST 202 135 CIVIL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AT THE IGNALINA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT ON-SITE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS IN FINLAND O.VILKAMO,STUK,FINLAND VILNIUS, OCTOBER 1998 75 &STUK Transport of radioactive clouds from source reactor to target SrUK • SATEILYTURVAKESKUS • STRALSAKERHF TSCENTRAl. EN RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY 76 €>STUK Radiation monitoring networks in vicinities of the Loviisa and Leningrad NPP's • • ' Finland Russia oviisa NPP ' Helsinki St. Petersburg Gulf of Finland Leningrad NPP (near Sosnovyi Bor) S I UK-SA rtli Y TURVAKESKUS'STRALSAKERHETSCENTRALEN'RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY iH@UTPUT OF COMPUTER FINNISH CKNTRB POR RADCATCN AND NUCLEAR SAFETY LOVTJSA2 oc rvo POWER LOVIISA1 NEAR HELSINKI PLANT PROCESS COMPUTER SYSTEM OTHER USERS LO1 CONTROL ROOM LO2 CONTROL ROOM SIMULATOR . EMERGENCY AT POWER PLANT CONTROL ROOM QPERAJlbNS FACUJTY &STUK Electricity supply in Finland in 1996, total 70.0 TWh Biofuels 10% Nuclear power 27% Net imports Natural Oil 5% gas 2 % 11 % Source: Nuclear Energy in Finland Ministry of Trade and Industry, 1997 sruK S i I F. i L V T U R V A K E S K iJ S • STRALSAKE RHETSCENTRALEN « A f.> i A r I O N AND NUCLEAfl SAF E T Y AIJTHORI T Y 79 Sfcy^shinc ffoiu'lhc cosik * Considerable outdoors v Decreases rapidly in concrete ocl 0 100 200300400500600 700 800900 XXX) NKS sciniitiir in I Ici.sinki .S. V DISTANOE, m SITUATION IN FINLAND Four operating units • Two OWRs in Loviisa (VVER-440) commissioned in 1977 and 1980 • Two BWRs in Olkiluoto (Ab Asea-Atom) commissioned in 1978 and 1980 The operating licences of all four units were renewed during 1998 • The licenses of Loviisa plants valid up to the end of 2007 • The licenses of Olkiluoto plants valid up to the end of2018 Modernization and power uprating connected with the licence renewal processes • Olkiluoto 710=>840Mwe(net) • Loviisa 445=>488Mwe(net) 81 Stages of licensing process of nuclear Facilities Decisionin principle Nuclear facilities of great general significance Construction permit Operating license STUK-Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority Objective To prevent and limit any harmful effects of radiation Roles Regulatory Body • Use of nuclear energy • use of radiation Research Centre • radiation measuring methods 82 • radiation in the environment • radiation protection • biological effects of radiation Expert organisation • preparedness for radiation accidents • training and public information • contracted expert services GENERAL PRINCIPLES IN THE WORK OF NUCLEAR SAFETY DEPARTMENT the licensees of nuclear facilities (i.e.,the utilities) bear full responsibility for safe use of nuclear energy the Nuclear Safety Department ensures that the licensees take the measures as needes to fulfill their responsibility - technical safety objectives and requirements - independent inspection and evaluation of the plans and safety analyses - inspections to verify the quality and state of equipment - regulatory control of all safety relevant activities within the utility - transfer of information on the research, development and experience in the nuclear field 83 the Nuclear Safety Department needs professional competence and engineering skills in all technical disciplines represented in the utility organization. STUK s ORGANISATION DURING EMERGIENCIES ACCIDENT SITUATION -assessment and development MANAGEMENT -source term -safety assessment -INES -recommendations -decisions, statements RADIATION PROTECTION -dispersion estimates for explosure -environmental monitoring SECRETARIAT -assistance of the management -communication EXPERT ADVICES AND with counterparts DOSE MONITORING PUBLIC INFORMATION -contacts with media ADMINISTRATION 84 Laws, Regulations and Regulatory Guidance The Atomic Energy Act and Decree (1988) The Radiation Protection Act and Decree (1992) The Act on Crisis Planning and Preperedness (1991) The Act on Fire Protection and Rescue Services (1975) - being revised Decision of the Council of State on the General Regulations for Emergency Response Arrangements at Nuclear Power Plants (397/1991) The Order of the Ministry of the Interior on the Planning of Protection Measures for Radiation Accidents and Information to the Public (1997) Guide on Nuclear Power Plant Emergency Plans, Guide YVL 7.4, STUK (1997) - on-site planning On-site Emergency Plans - prepared by the NPP staff - approved by STUK - revised regularly - plan and implementing procedures 85 «. •yrxnyr; «<«r«"w--- On-site Emergency Plans and Procedures • Classification of accidents • Emergency organisation: structure, tasks, authorities, staffing • Activation and communication arrangements • Restoring the safety of the nuclear power plant • Assessment of emergency development: plant status, radiation situation and dose estimation • Protection of personnel • Public information • Integration with off-site organisation • Emergency facilities and equipment • Training and exercises Notification and Activation of Emergency - Organizations • Alert - on-site organization activated - STUK notified (limited activation) - off-site organization notified according to situation • Plant emergency - on-site organisation and STUK activated - off-site organisation notified and key persons activated • General emergency -all organisations notified and activated • Detailed procedures 86 Site Emergency Control Centers • Located partly adjacent to control room and partly in a separate on-site building • Communication facilities - telephones - fixed telephone lines to local emergency control center and STUK - local and regional radio networks - telex, telefax • Maps, layouts, plant system diagrams, emergency plans and procedures, emergency operating procedures • Data links and computer aided assessment SPECIAL LOCAL FEATURES AT LOVIISA WITHIN 20-30 km:SMALL MUNICIPALITIES: SMALL RESOURCES, YETORDINARY FIRE BRIGADE AND DOZENS OF VOLUNTEER FIRE BRIGADES MOST PEOPLE LIVE IN ONE-FAMILY HOUSE NO TRAFFICJAMS TWO OFFICIAL LANGUAGES LOT OF COAST LINE; SHALLOW AND ROCKY COAST CLOSE CONTACTS BETWEEN AUTHORITIES WITHIN 5 km ONLY 40 INHABITANTS; NEITHER AGRICULTURE OR INDUSTRY - YET 400 SUMMER COTTAGES DUE TO THE FINNISH WINTER AND THE THERMAL DISCHARGE OF LOVIISA POWER PLANT VERY UNSTABLEICE CONDITION FROM DECEMBER TO APRIL 87 Radiation measurement devices j On-site: Off-site: Stable monitors Stable monitors - Containment -Near-site dose rate - Stack monitors: 2 at 0,4 km, - Main steam lines 5 at 2 km, 10 at 5 km -Others National SVO radiation Portable monitors monitoring system - External radiation Portable monitors - Contamination External radiation Sampling Surface air - Containment contamination - Reactor water Iodine detection device INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS Authority arrangements: Early notification via satellite from Peterburg NPP, Kola NPP, RTP Atomflot Murmansk,and Ignalina NPP in Lithuania Information exchange with Emergency Response Centre in St. Petersburg Automatic monitoring data - between the Nordic countries - Sosnovy Bor area - Kola area (in operation in 1998) 88 CONTROL AND COMAND SCHEME FOR AN ACCIDENT AT THE OLKILUOTO NUCLEAR POWER PLANT (OFF-SITE ORGANISATION) Other central administration Offices and institutions T • • rr- Provincial administration Liaison otiicer Turku -Ministry of the interior Liaison officer Rescue Department TVO/Olkiluoto Off-site Emergency Director STUK Nuclear Power Plant Liaison officer (Rauma Fire Chief) Liaison Officer * Nuclear Safety Authority 4 , • Emergency Co-operation Centre Management Team Finnish Broacasting Co. And private broadcasters oc Other Newsmedia Eurajoki municipality Rauma town Management team Fire and Rescue Service Kauma town Police Department Luvia municipality Rauma town Management Team Health Care Centre A Rauma town Social Affairs Office Pori Co-operation district Transports and road clearing Rauma town Technical works Information Rauma town Central Administration Authorisation By virtue of section 55,second paragraph, point 3 of the Nuclear Energy Act (990/87) and section 29 of the Council of State Decision (395/91) on General Regulations for the of Nuclear Power Plants, the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) issues detailed regulations concerning the safety of nuclear power plants. YVL Guides are rules an individual licensee or any other organization concerned shall comply with, unless STUK has been presented with some other acceptable procedure or solution by which the safety level set forth in the YVL Guides is achieved. This Guide does not alter STUK's decisions that were made before the entry into force of this Guide, unless specifically stated so by STUK. l.General The use of nuclear energy is stipulated in the Nuclear Energy Act (990/87) and the Nuclear Energy Decree (161/88) issued by virtue of the Act.According to paragraph 3, point 7 of the Nuclear Energy Act, emergency preparedness arrangements mean the measures needed to reduce nuclear damages at the nuclear facility, in its precincts, in other places or vehicles where nuclear energy is used. In accordance with paragraphs 1 and 2 of section 9 of the Nuclear Energy Act it shall be the licence-holder's obligation to assure the safe use of nuclear energy. It shall be the licence-holder s obligation to assure such physical protection and emergency planning and other arrangements, necessary to ensure reduction of nuclear damage, which do not rest with the authorities. In practice, the licence-holder is obliged to assure the safety of the nuclear power plant under all circumstances. Section 7 of the Nuclear Energy Act decrees about physical protection and emergency planning as follows: Sufficient physical protection and emergency planning as well as other arrangements for reducing nuclear damage and for protecting nuclear energy against illegal activities shall be s prerequisite for the use of nuclear energy. The Council of State Decision (397/91) sets forth general regulations for nuclear power plant emergency response arrangements. The licence-holder s emergency plan includes a description of the planning, implementation and maintenance of emergency response arrangements. The emergency plan sets out the measures to be taken during an emergency situation. An emergency situation is an unusual situation, which requires the emergency organisation to be alerted. In an emergency, the Emergency Preparedness Manager of the nuclear power plant is in charge of onsite rescue until the rescue authority announces to assume command responsibility for rescue operations. As prescribed in Guide YVL 1.1, STUK maintains preparedness to act in case of nuclear power plant emergency preparedness situations. In the event of emergencies STUK is an expert authority providing support to the authorities in charge of rescue services. 90 This Guide sets forth detailed requirements for the planning, implementation and maintenance by the licence-holder of nuclear power plant emergency preparedness and response. This Guide also applies to nuclear material and nuclear waste transport, as referred to in Guide YVL 6.6. Nuclear power plant physical protection is set forth in Guide YVL 6.11 and the physical protection requirements for nuclear fuel transport in Guide 6.21. Illicit action can also take place during an emergency situation. According to Section 10, first paragraph, of the Council of State Decision (396/91) on the general regulations for physical protection of nuclear power plants, during a threat, immediate action in compliance with the security plan shall be taken. Even other measures to gain control of the threat shall be taken, where necessary. According to paragraph 7, during a threat, the person designated for the task in the security plan takes over command of onsite activities. Command of activities is handed over to the police when the police officer concerned announces he assumes command of physical protection. Rescue and physical protection shall be co-ordinated/mutually consistent to facilitate evaluation of the safety of the nuclear power plant, its workers, the population and the environment as a whole. 2. Emergency response requirements 2.1. Emergency plan The emergency plan shall cover the following matters: classification of emergency situations and description of events and accidents on which the classification is based (see subsection 2.2) description of the emergency organisation (see subsection 2.3) description of the arrangements for alerting and data transfer (see subsection 2.4) management of an emergency situation and radiation protection (see subsection 2.5) worker safety and radiation protection (see subsection 2.6) on-and offisite radiation measurements during a preparedness situation provision of information (see subsection 2.8) rooms, equipment and facilities (see subsection 2.9) post -emergency debriefing and measures (see subsection 2.10) a description of the maintenance of preparedness (see subsection 3). 2.2. Emergency response planning According to section 3 of the Council of State Decision (397/91), emergency planning shall be based on the analysis of nuclear power plant behaviour in emergencies and on the analysis of the consequences of emergencies. 91 Action in an emergency shall be planned taking into account controllability of events as well as severity of their consequences. Therefore, emergencies shall be grouped into classes. Emergency response arrangements shall be consistent with management of operation and physical protection of nuclear power plants. Emergency response arrangements shall also be consistent with the rescue service and emergency plans made by the authorities in provision against nuclear power plant accidents. The progress and consequences of typical accident scenarios shall be analysed to facilitate emergency response and classification of preparedness situations. Highly unlikely accidents which may have severe consequences shall also be analysed. In the accident scenarios various plant states and event durations, and the quantities, qualities and release pathways of radioactive releases plus weather conditions shall be used. The radiation situation around the power plant shall be analysed at various distances and for various periods of time considering both internal and external radiation dose. The impact of protective measures shall be separately analysed. Radiation circumstances that may compromise actions at the plant and plant site shall be analysed in advance to plan what action and radiation protection measures should be taken during accidents. Guide YVL 7.3 sets requirements for the criteria for calculating the dispersion of radioactive substances. Guide YVL 7.2 deals with the calculation of radiation doses to the population in the vicinity of a nuclear power plant. Emergencies shall be rated by severity and manageabilily as follows: - A plant emergency is a situation during which nuclear power plant safety deteriorates or is in the danger of deteriorating significantly. In the event of a plant emergency, STUK shall be alerted and the rescue authorities informed without delay. - A general emergency is a situation during which there is the hazard of a radioactive materials leak that may require protective measures in the vicinity of a nuclear power plant. In the event of a general emergency, STUK and the rescue authorities shall be alerted without delay. Preparedness situations also include a state of preparedness which involves alerting the nuclear power plant emergency organisation in the extent necessary to ensure a certain plant safety level. The state of preparedness and its justification shall be promptly communicated to STUK and, if necessary, to the local rescue authority. The emergency plan shall show the classification of emergency preparedness situations. In addition to this, examples of various preparedness situations shall be given. Information about the state of the plant, its components or systems shall specifically be given to establish the situation. Also the emergency operating procedures for use during plant operation can be used for identifying events. 92 2.3. Emergency organisation According to section 4 of the Council of State Decision (397/91), the duties and responsibilities of personnel who plan and implement emergency response arrangements (emergency organisation) shall be defined. Duties The emergency organisation is headed by an Emergency Preparedness Manager who shall be in charge of management of onsite preparedness and of liaison with the authorities. The Emergency Preparedness Manager is also the person referred to in Section 8, third paragraph of the Council of State Decision (397/91) who uses authority of command as referred to in Section 30, third paragraph, of the Act (559/75) on rescue services, until the rescue service officer concerned announces to assume command responsibility. The Emergency Preparedness Manager is responsible for: indentification and announcement of preparedness class assurance of the safety of those onsite assurance of plant safety alerting the authorities care for and transport of those injured event registering provision of information to the emergency organisation, power plant personnel and the authorities provision of information for news broadcasts (see subsection 2.8) ordering plant site evacuation issuing recommendations for evacuation in the plant site's environment and for the carrying out of other response measures in the plant surroundings, if necessary, until STUK announces to assume responsibility for the issuing of recommendations having radiation measurements made and samples taken on-and offsite restriction and management of damage decisions about the scope and discontinuation of the operation of the emergency organisation. In the emergency plan, s sufficient number of individuals shall be assigned to perform the aforementioned tasks. If the Emergency Preparedness Manager is not at the plant site in the event of an accident, the Shift Manager shall act in his stead until he arrives and assumes command responsibility. The preparedness organisation The individuals or organisation units responsible for the making and maintenance of the emergency plan shall be named. When the duties involved are defined, attention shall, in addition to overall planning, be paid to the planning of the various sectors of the emergency effort. 93 The emergency plan shall describe the actions to be taken in emergency situations and how duties are assigned and carried out. For this purpose, the plan shall include the structure and tasks of and the assignment of duties within the emergency organisation. Furthermore, the plan shall give a general picture of other organisations active in emergencies and of their most important duties. The functions of a nuclear power plant s emergency organisation shall be presented in such a way that the nuclear power plant s obligations in the management of an emergency are defined in the emergency plan. The plan shall also describe how the plant s operation is made consistent/co- ordinated with (sovitetaan yhteen) rescue operations carried out by the authorities and with STUK s activities. Preparedness to act The nuclear power plant shall have sufficient, 24-hour preparedness for immediate emergency response, should it be required. The emergency plan shall describe the nuclear power plant s constantly available emergency organisation and also its organisation when fully manned. The licence-holder shall be prepared to continue the operation of the emergency organisation for several days in succession and to supplement the organisation, if necessary. The plan shall give a target period after which, at the latest, the emergency organisation is capable of operating to a high standard. The availability of the emergency organisation shall be regularly tested. 2.4. Alerting and communicating According to Section 5, third and fourth paragraphs, of the Council of State Decision (397/91) there shall be appropriate rooms and equipment as well as sufficient communication and alarm systems for emergency response arrangements. It shall be ensured that there are always enough personnel promptly available in an emergency. There shall be preplanned procedures for alerting and communicating with those at the plant site, the plant unit emergency organisation and the emergency and rescue organisations of the authorities. Also the contents of alarm messages shall be planned in advance. Alarm and communications procedures during situations defined in the emergency plan shall be agreed upon with offsite organisations. The licence-holder s emergency instructions shall include a procedure for assuring the recording of oral alarms and the most important oral messages. 2.5. Management of an emergency situation According to Section 5, first paragraph, of the Council of State Decision (397/91) provision shall be made at a nuclear power plant to carry out in an emergency the measures necessary to keep an accident under control. Provision shall be made to analyse the emergency and its consequences as well as to assess their postulated development. 94 Section 8, first paragraph, of the Council of State Decision (397/91) stipulates about emergency actions as follows: In an emergency, immediate action in compliance with the emergency plan shall be taken. Also in other respects, effective action shall be taken to prevent or limit radiation exposure. The emergency organisation shall prevent or restrict the progress of an accident and its duty is to bring the plant into a safe state. Radiation effects at the plant, on the plant site and in the plant s environment, which are caused by an uncontrolled release of radioactive materials, shall be prevented or restricted as well as possible. According to Guide YVL 1.9, the licence-holder shall make provision against abnormal situations by preparing emergency operating procedures to guide work during operating shifts, and, in the event of disturbances and emergencies, it shall also assign an individual to the main control room to give support to the shift manager. This individual s other duty will be to independently assess nuclear safety. During an emergency situation, the emergency organisation shall make assessments of the situation, of its development and position, the plant's technical condition and the radiation inside the plant, on the plant site and in its environment are assessed. On the basis of the assessment, measures to manage the situation and to prevent and restrict radiation explosure shall be planned and implemented. These assessments are also needed for the planning of worker and population protection measures as well as for the provision of information. Requirements for environmental radiation situation assessment procedures/methods are prescribed in Guide YVL 7.2 and YVL 7.3. There shall be pre-planned procedures for the planning, approval and implementation of operations and repairs during emergencies. The license-holder shall assure that the various units of the emergency and rescue organisation and STUK have sufficient and uniform data about a situation. The liaison and data transfer needed for situation assessment shall be arranged in such a way that there is as little as possible interference with the activities of the emergency organisation's various units, the control room in particular. There shall be liaison officers and automated data transfer equipment to handle liaison and data transfer. In addition to this, in an emergency, the licence-holder shall send a liaison officer to the rescue services command centre of the co-operation area and to the local area information centre. 2.6 Worker safety and radiation protection According to Section 8 of the Radiation Decree (151/91) measures needed to restrict the radiation hazard and bring the radiation source under control in an accident situation shall be taken in such a way that the radiation explosure due to the situation is kept as low as possible. As far as possible, the measures referred to above in the first paragraph shall be taken in such a way that the effective dose of a person participating in them does not exceed 0.5 Sv and the dose at any point on the skin does not exceed 5 Sv. 95 A pregnant woman shall not be ordered to take part in measures causing explosure to radiation referred to in this section. Only volunteers should be assigned to perform accident restriction measures involving the possibility of radiation explosure in excess of 50 mSv. These persons shall be appropriately trained and aware of the potential health risks of radiation explosure. All actions should be planned in advance. Radiation explosure should be kept below 100 mSv. Exceptions to this are life saving operations and prompt action to bring a radiation source under control. To monitor radiation explosure, those participating in accident restriction must carry a dosemeter which reliably records the dose incurred and also an alarming real-time dosemeter with alarm limits set in accordance with the above-mentioned dose limits. Workers must have appropriate protective equipment and a radiation work permit. Requirements for these are set in Guide YVL 7.9. There shall be procedures for the preparation and granting of a radiation work permit in an accident situation. It shall be planned in particular what the procedures should be if doses exceeding the annual limit for the normal operations might be incurred. When issuing the permit, attention shall be attached to the establishment and monitoring of the radiation situation in the work area, to instructions pertaining to habilitality times and whether it is possible to reduce the radiation exposure. The procedures for worker and equipment decontamination shall also be planned in advance. There shall also be preplanned access monitoring to areas where a radiation work permit is required plus procedures for keeping in contact with those working in the restricted area. Dose monitoring shall be arranged in such a way that dosemeters are read and the accumulation of dose is regularly followed as required. If necessary, individual doses shall be recorded after each task has been performed. Internal exposure shall also be monitored. Radiation exposures in excess of 50 mSv shall be reported to STUK s Dose Register separately and without delay. Data on radiation exposure incurred in an emergency situation shall be recorded and reported to STUK s Dose Register separately from doses incurred during normal operation. Doses incurred by all those onsite in a preparedness situation shall be recorded and reported to STUK s Dose Register separately from doses incurred during normal operation. Doses incurred by all those onsite in a preparedness situation shall be monitored as required by the radiation situation. Radiation doses in excess of 5 mSv incurred by the rescue personnel and other corresponding external workers shall be reported without delay to STUKs Dose Register after the accomplishment of work onsite. The emergency organisation must have a sufficient number of personal protective equipment available for emergency situations. This equipment shall be stored or placed appropriately for quick availability, if required. There shall be rooms available for the decontamination of workers and equipment during emergencies. The licence-holder shall make provision for assisting the rescue authorities in rescuing, giving first aid to and transporting injured workers to hospital. The instructions must take into account the possible contamination of the patients. 96 2.7. Radiation measurements According to Section 5, second paragraph, of the Council of State Decision (397/91) on site of a nuclear power plant provision shall be made to carry out radiological and meteorological measurements in an emergency to assess the dispersion of radioactive substances. According to Section 9, first paragraph, of the Council of State Decision (397/91) in an emergency, - the licensee shall arrange for off-site radiation monitoring in order to promptly obtain information on the dispersion of radioactive substances in the environment. The licence-holder shall be prepared to evaluate the volume and nuclide composition of radioactive releases in all emergency situations and to make prognoses pertaining to them. For this purpose, onsite and offsite measurement programs shall be designed for identifying exceptional releases. In addition to this, the licence-holder shall be prepared to carry out in the plant s vicinity measurements that help the authorities to clarify what radioactive releases into the environment have occurred and what population protection measures are needed. Radiation and release measurements are dealt with more closely in the Guides YVL 7.6,YVL 7.7 and YVL 7.11. The requirements for meteorological measurements are set forth in Guide YVL 7.5. Plans for making measurements at the nuclear power plant and in its vicinity shall be prepared as part of emergency response planning. Local conditions shall be taken into account in these plans and they shall also indicate the degree of preparedness of the personnel, the schedule of activities, the number and types of measurement equipment ready for use as well as personal protective equipment. There shall also be plans for the taking of samples. During an emergency. There shall be preparedness to apply and complement measurement and sampling plans according to the prevailing situation. The radiation circumstances allowing, environmental patrols shall be employed to complement the data about the location and consistency of the radioactive plume and fallout transmitted by fixed measurement stations. In order to quickly obtain an overall view of the radiation situation, if possible, the highest dose and the concentrations in the air of the most important nuclides corresponding to the dose rate shall be measured at several distances from the point of release. The nuclear power plant shall have a sufficient number of measurement equipment continuously ready for use for onsite and offsite measurements. The measurement equipment shall be appropriately placed. Each measurement patrol shall be capable of measuring external dose rate at all possible intensities concerned. At least one environmental measurement patrol must be capable of taking samples and measuring them for significant concentrations of airborne radioactive substances. A sufficient number of integrating or registering dosmeters shall be available for placement in the plant environment. The environment measurement patrols shall have in their use vehicles suited for making measurements and also communications channels to the onsite emergency organisation. A reliable method designed in advance shall be used for identifying the measurement locations. Data transfer for use by the power plant emergency organisation, rescue organisations as well as STUK shall be planned in such a way that the data are quickly and reliably available. 97 2.8. Provision of information According to section 5, fifth paragraph, of the Council of State Decision (397/91) informing the media and the public in an emergency shall be preplanned. Section 9, second paragraph, stipulates that the licensee shall, in liaison with the authorities responsible for rescue services, supply the local population with advance instructions for emergencies. Provision of information in advance In co-operation with the authorities in charge of the rescue services, the licence-holder shall see to it that an information bulletin is distributed to all permanently occupied and free-time residences as well as workplaces in the emergency planning zone (about 20 km from the nuclear power plant). The bulletin should include the following information: - basic information about radioactivity and its effects on man and the environment examples of various radiation hazard situations and their effect on the population and the environment - measures to alarm, protect and help the population in a radiation hazard - instructions for actions in a radiation hazard. The bulletin shall be regularly updated and distributed and it shall be continuously available to the population of the emergency planning zone. Provision of information during an event The rescue command is responsible for providing information pertaining to accidents and rescue activities. Only the rescue command is allowed to issue instructions and orders to the population. STUK follows and assesses situations involving a radiation danger or the threat of it and provides information to other authorities and the population. The licence-holder, too, shall be prepared to provide information about the emergency in question, its origin, extent and likely progress via the media to the population at risk at regular intervals and every time the situation essentially changes. When providing information, the licence- holder shall take into account that provided by the authorities. For the purpose of providing information, there shall be preparedness during the emergency response effort to classify a situation according to the International Nuclear Event Scale (INES). There shall also be preparedness to change preliminary classification if the situation changes or when more detailed information is obtained. The preliminary classification with its justification shall be delivered to STUK who decides the final classification. 98 2.9. Rooms, equipment and facilities According to Section 5, third paragraph, of the Council of State Decision (397/91) there shall be appropriate rooms and equipment as well as sufficient communication and alarm systems for emergency response arrangements. Rooms and equipment For the purpose of emergency preparedness and response planning, the nuclear power plant shall have rooms, equipment, facilities and instruments for accident management, overall assessment of the situation, alerting, communication, data transfer and recording, notification and provision of information, planning and repair, fire protection, transport, assembly and decontamination of personnel, first aid, personnel monitoring as well as radiation measurement and laboratory measurements. The rooms reserved for emergency response shall be designed in such a way that working there is safe during as event. Communication between them shall be sufficiently quick and safe. Access control shall be planned in such a way that the whereabouts of those on the site are known and that the operation of the emergency organisation is not disturbed. Rooms reserved for accident management, planning of emergency operations and laboratory measurements shall be provided with equipment, systems and computer programs for making an assessment of the situation, for updating the assessment, for presenting and recording it and for data transfer. The situation shall be assessed as promptly as possible and it shall be explicity presented. These rooms and equipment shall be available also in case large quantities of radioactive materials have been released and also in case power supply has been interrupted both onsite and off site. STUK sends its representative to the nuclear power plant, if necessary, STUKs representatives shall be reserved working space in connection with the rooms reserved for emergency operations. There shall also be offsite quarters available for media briefings. A record shall be kept of the location, availability and operability of the rooms, equipment and accessories. Communication connections The control room and the emergency command posts shall be equipped with redundant alarm and communication systems to warn those in danger, to launch preparedness and rescue operations and to keep contact with the command and operations units of the emergency organisation, the rescue services command centre of the co-operation area and STUK. Oral communication between the control room and emergency command posts shall as a rule be independent of single failures. There shall be an adequate number of communication 99 connections. The personnel who carry out onsite and offsite measurements and repairs shall have the necessary devices for keeping contact with the operations command post. STUKs representative shall be reserved an own telephone connection for offsite communication at the emergency operations command post. The control room and emergency command posts shall be equipped with communication equipment which has the capability of producing records of its use. For making an assessment of the situation, the licence-holder shall arrange a system for automatic data transfer and display from the power plant s computer to STUK and to the onsite emergency command posts. A redundant configuration shall also be designed in provision against system failures or malfunctions. The contents of data to be transferred shall be so planned that all data having relevance to the situation and the assessment of its development are transferred. Data on the status of the plant systems and on the measured parameters shall be transmitted. The data transmission systems must be capable of relaying both the current situation and the previous one for a sufficiently long period of time to facilitate event progress monitoring. When planning data transmission, attention shall also be paid to the lucid presentation of data. The transmitted data shall include at least - reactor main parameters - primary circuit main parameters - secondary circuit main parameters (PWR) make-up water and emergency cooling systems decay heat removal systems containment main parameters - most important reactor and plant protection signals major electrical systems - radiation situation at plant unit - radiation situation onsite radiation situation in plant vicinity meteorological data. Furthermore, transfer shall be arranged of the results of measurements made by environmental radiation situations and prognoses between the emergency command posts and to STUK. 2.10.Post-emergency debriefing and measures The principles governing post-emergency debriefing shall be defined. A precondition for debriefing is that the nuclear power plant has been brought into a safe state, that releases do not exceed the thresholds set for normal operation and that post-emergency measures are initiated. 100 Post emergency measures include at least the following: identification of any changes in the nuclear power plant s structures, components or systems with a bearing on keeping the plant in a safe state and on radioactive materials management - measures which may be required to keep the plant in a safe state and to prevent and reduce releases evaluation of radiation doses caused by the accident - research into event causes and writing an event report. Decontamination measures and waste management shall also be undertaken, if necessary. If rescue operations are continued after the post-emergency debriefing, there shall be preparedness for co-operation in a way corresponding to that during an emergency. 2.11. Emergency response records The licence-holder shall plan procedures for recording data pertaining to the course of events and to decisions of essential importance. 3. Maintenance of preparedness According to Section 9, third paragraph, of the Council of State Decision (397/91) the licensee shall maintain continuous preparedness to perform measures related to rescue services in an emergency. These measures shall be practised in co-operation with the authorities concerned. According to Section 7 of the Decision appropriate training and exercises shall be arranged to maintain operational preparedness. Exercises shall also be arranged in cooperation with the authorities concerned. The rooms and equipment reserved for emergency response arrangements shall be maintained operational at all times. Documents pertaining to emergency response arrangements shall be continuously updated. Operability of rooms and equipment Rooms shall be provided with the necessary equipment that are available for prompt action. The operability of all rooms, accessories and equipment shall be regularly ascertained at least once a year. The alarm devices as well as the information flow and data transfer connections shall be regularly tested according to a separate programme at least once a month. A maximum repair time shall be determined for faults, disturbances and defects detected by tests or otherwise. The significance of detected faults and defects shall be assessed to identify potential needs for improvement. The emergency plan and other documents pertaining to the emergency preparedness and response effort shall be reviewed and regularly updated at least once a year. All changes in contact information and computer programmes shall be promptly made. When the emergency plan is 101 under development, any defects detected during emergency exercises or otherwise shall be taken into account, as well as technical developments in the field, plus changes in operational conditions and legislation. Training Guide YVL 1.7 deals with the qualification and training of nuclear power plant personnel.Those in the emergency organisation shall be given basic training according to their tasks prior to their assignment to a task. They shall be arranged refresher and further training every year. Special attention shall be paid to defects and development targets observed during emergency exercises. All nuclear power plant staff, both permanent and temporary, shall be given training in how to act during preparedness situations. The training shall deal with alarm and accident situation instructions. Furthermore, an general idea of the operation of the emergency organisation during preparedness situations shall be given. The licence-holder shall make available training in nuclear power plant emergency preparedness and response to organisations contributing to the to the operation of the rescue services. An emergency training and exercise plan shall be drawn up every year. Emergency exercises Before the commissioning of a nuclear power plant unit, an exercise in the practical implementation of the emergency plan shall be arranged in co-operation with the preparedness and rescue organisations of the relevant authorities. During nuclear power plant operation, extensive joint exercises involving the public authorities and the nuclear power plant s emergency preparedness and response function shall be arranged approximately every three years. The licence-holder shall participate in the planning, arrangement and implementation of the exercises. When the nuclear power plant is in operation there shall be at least one emergency exercise every year. The objective of the exercises is to ascertain the appropriateness of the rooms, equipment and instruments reserved for emergency preparedness operations; the suitability and scope of the operating instructions and computer programs; and the capability of the organisation to identify potential needs for modifications or improvements. The rescue and preparedness organisations of the authorities shall be reserved the opportunity to participate in these exercises in a way that is suitable regarding the exercise situation. The annual emergency exercise shall cover a significant part of the activities contained in the emergency plan. Event exercises involving one or several sectors shall be arranged, too, to practice the performance of tasks, to improve co-operation and to develop operation. 102 An exercise plan shall be prepared before an emergency exercise is held. The date and participants of the exercise can be announced in advance but the exercise situation shall be kept unannounced in the first place. Exercises involving only some sectors of emergency planning can also be arranged for training purposes, in which case the exercise situation may be known in advance. The annual emergency exercises shall be evaluated. For this purpose, evaluators shall witness the exercises. The experiences of and suggested improvements by the participants to the exercise shall be collected for example in a post-exercise debriefing, by interviews or by means of written feedback. An exercise report shall be prepared stating any observed defects or objects of development and actions decided on their basis. An exercise and training record shall be kept to evaluate the scope and quality of the activities. A record shall be kept of all who have taken part in the training and exercises to ensure the regular participation of all who have emergency preparedness duties. 4. Measures to protect the population 4.1. Rescue services According to Section 9, third paragraph, of the Council of State Decision (397/91) the licensee shall maintain continuous preparedness to perform measures related to rescue services in an emergency. These measures shall be practised in co-operation with the authorities concerned. The plans for measures pertaining to rescue services are set forth in the emergency plan. According to Section 8, third paragraph, of the Council of State Decision (397/91) on site of nuclear power plant, the authority of command referred to in Section 30, third paragraph of the Act (599/75) which address rescue services is exercised by the individual designated for the task in the emergency plan until the rescue service officer concerned announces he assumes command responsibility for rescue activities. Enough assisting personnel with expert knowledge of nuclear technology and radiological protection shall then be placed at the disposal of the authority. The individual responsible for the licence-holders activities in a situation is obliged to comply with instructions pertaining to rescue issued by the public authority who has assumed command responsibility. In practice, however, the licence-holder is always responsible for matters of nuclear safety and radiation protection at the plant and on the site. Rescue management is based on the Fire and rescue act (599/75) and decree (1089/75). The management system of the rescue administration is based on allocation of responsibilities at local level in the whole of Finland. The Ministry of the Interior in cooperation with the rest of central government authorities is responsible for measures required at national level. Corresponding responsibility at provincial level rests with the provincial government which acts in co-operation with other local government authorities. Local chief fire officers and local authority rescue authorities manage the action taken in their fields of responsibility. By virtue of Section 29 of the Fire and rescue services act (559/75), the Ministry of the Interior can order an official in its employment to rescue command. 103 Rescue command by the Ministry of the Interior and provincial governments entails in the first place procurement and channeling of the necessary resources to the right targets, maintenance of a general idea of the situation, and, on that basis, issuing of orders and instructions to lower levels of management as well as provision of information. Local chief fire officers and local authorities are responsible for arranging and managing the actual rescue operations and other actions required in a situation. It is assumed in plans prepared in provision for a nuclear power plant accident that when rescue operations are initiated the local chief fire officer of the area of location of the power plant assumes rescue management and initiates the necessary notification, alerting and rescue operations. In the event of a severe accident which, in addition to the neighbourging municipalities, requires extensive action elsewhere, too, the aforementioned national command system is taken into use in the extent required. According to Section 8, second paragraph, of the Council of State Decision (397/91). The rescue services command centre and STUK shall be provided with the information necessary in the event of an emergency. It is STUKs duty in a radiation situation caused by a radiation and nuclear accident to assess the situation and to issue to the authority responsible for rescue operations recommendations for counter-measures, if any, to reduce the radiation exposure of the population. In the rearly stages of an accident situation the nuclear power plants emergency organisation shall ensure that recommendations for counter-measures to protect the population are issued to the authority in command of the rescue operations. This obligation stands until STUK has sufficient information about the event and announces to assume responsibility for recommendations. Even after the power plant emergency organisation shall assess the course of the accident and its consequental effects and deliver the information to STUK. According to Section 9, second paragraph, of the Council of State Decision (397/91). In emergencies the licensee is obliged to take part in warning and alerting those in jeopardy. The warning and alerting of those onsite and of the population in imminent danger in the vicinity of the nuclear power plant shall be planned in co-operation with the responsible authorities. The plan covering the site of the nuclear power plant shall include alerting, provision of information about the situation, issuing of instructions for action, and instructions on how to assemble and exit the plant site. It shall be assured that everybody on-site is alerted. To ensure action, the vehicles and routes for exiting the plant site shall be assessed in advance as well as the time it takes to exit the site. The nuclear power plant must be equipped with an efficient alarm system for alerting the population. The system shall be capable of operation although any single component were inoperable. Stable iodine tablets for use in permanent and free-time dwellings as well as workplaces shall be distributed to the population in advance at least at five kilometres distance from the nuclear power plant. The tablets are subject to regular re-issuing when the their use by date passes. 104 4.2. Guidelines for intervention levels to protect the population The following shall be taken into account when issuing recommendations for countermeasures.The objective of radiation protection in an emergency (an intervention situation) is to prevent all the serious direct (deterministic) health effects of radiation and to keep any late effects of radiation as low as practically possible in all population groups. The starting-point for the consideration of counter-measures is that the measures shall be justifiable under the circumstances in question. The rescue command decides about counter-measures on this basis of recommendations. When counter-measures are planned, the prevailing situation and the benefits and disadvantages ensuing from them are considered. For example, the objective of evacuation is that a release would not cause radiation exposure in excess of 50 mSv in a period of less than a week. During an accident, radioactive materials released from nuclear fuel can be transported to the environment quickly. It is thus necessary to initiate population protection measures already before the reactor is damaged, if practicable. First action in the plant s vicinity is to warn the population and to request preparation for sheltering. If the estimates are that the plant transient leads to severe reactor damage, it is recommendable to carry out temporary evacuation in the plant vicinity in an area with a ca.5 km radius. In the same way. It is necessary to prepare for the intake of stable iodine by intensifying or supplementing emergency preparedness, if necessary. Gradual temporary evacuation is recommendable at the latest when an accident has teached a phase where a reactor core melt is assumed to have occurred. It is advisable to carry out temporary evacuation according to need in an area extending to ca.20 kilometers' distance from the facility. The area subject to temporary evacuation can also extend further in case the weather conditions are particularly unfavourable from the viewpoint of the spread of the release, or it is assumed on the basis of measurements made during the accident that the amount of radioactive iodine in the release may be in excess of one per cent of the amount of radioactive iodine in the reactor. If dose rates within the impact zone of the accident can be raliably assessed on the basis of on-site or off-site environmental measurements, the intervention level guidelines in Table 1 are employed when counter-measures are considered to protect the population. If doses are predominantly caused by noble gases the guidelines for intervention levels are multiplied by five. 5. Regulatory control According to Section 35 of the Nuclear Energy Act when applying for a construction licence, the applicant must submit to the Finnish Centre for Radiation and Nuclear Safety: plans for physical protection and emergencies. According to Section 36,first moment, when applying for an operating licence, the applicant must submit to the Finnish Centre for Radiation and Nuclear Safety: a description of the arrangements for physical protection and emergencies. According to Section 6 of the State Decision (397/91) approval for the plan referred to in Section 35, point 4 (preliminary emergency plan) and the report reffered to in Section 36, first paragraph, point 6 of the Nuclear Energy Decree (161/88) and amendments therein shall be applied for with the Finnish Centre for Radiation and Nuclear Safety. 105 The licensee shall provide the Ministry of the Interior, the country government and the rescue service authority concerned with approved emergency plans and amendments therein. STUK regulates operation of nuclear power plants as described in Guide YVL 1.1. This Guide sets forth i.a. general procedures for the updating of documents approved by STUK. If contact information in an emergency plan changes and there are other corresponding minor changes or definitions to the operational procedures, which do not affect the operations, these are to be delivered to STUK for information. STUK shall be sent for information the annual plan for emergency exercises and training and a summary of their implementation as well as a more detailed emergency exercise plan with descriptions of situations. A report on the exercise shall be delivered to STUK for information within three months from the exercise. The training given to nuclear power plant personnel is subject to STUK s control as described in Guide YVL 1.7. During emergencies STUK monitors and assesses the situation and its development as well as the appropriateness of measures taken at the nuclear power plant to manage the situation. STUK s nuclear safety team maintains contacts with the nuclear power plant s emergency organisation, sends an emergency team to the site of the accident and folows data automatically transferred from the nuclear power plant on the condition of the plant and its environment. STUK's approval need not be obtained for measures that are required in an emergency. If necessary, STUK gives recommendations to the licence-holder for emergency measures and accident management. STUK prepares an overall assessment of the situation on the basis of the plant s condition and its postulated development and the situation in the plant s environment. On the basis of the overall assessment STUK issues recommendations for rescue operations, if necessary. These are presented to the rescue command which/who makes the necessary decisions. 106 CIVIL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AT THE IGNALINA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT INTRODUCTION TO THE PROJECT "HARMONIZATION OF NUCLEAR EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS" G.WINKLER, IAEA VILNIUS, OCTOBER 1998 107 Introduction to the IAEA regional project ,,Harmonisation of Nuclear Emergency Preparedness" o 00 Gunther Winkler International Atomic Energy Agency The IAEA Programme Obligations arising from • The Statute -e.g., ... to establish ... standards of safety for proyection of health and minimalization of danger to life and property ... and to provide for the application of these standards... o The Conventions on Early Notification and Assistance -e.g., ... assist ... in preparing emergency plans..., developing training programmes, ... maintain liaison with other relevant international orgs. Emergency Response Preparedness Documents Safety Requirements: International Basic International Requirements for Safety Standards Nuclear and Radiological For Protection against Ionising Emergency Preparedness and Radiation and for the Safety of Response Radiation Sources (SS-115) Safety Guide: Safety Guide: Method for the development of Intervention Criteria in a Emergency Response Preparedness Nuclear or Radiation for Nuclear or Radiological Emergency (SS109) Accidents Safety Report: Safety Report: Safety Report: Generic Assessment Generic Procedures for Assessment Generic Procedures for Procedures for Determining and Response during a Environmental and Source protective Actions during a Radiological Emergency Monitoring during a Reactor accident Radiological Emergency Implementation Model project on upgrading radiation and waste safety insrastructure Regional Technical Co-operation (TC) Projects (PER/9/050, RCA, AFRA etc.) National TC projects Harmonization of Regional Nuclear Emergency Preparedness PER/9/050 Department of Technical Co-operation (Europe Section) Department of Nuclear Safety Backgruond • Requested by Member States themselves • Severe reactor accident could result in trans-boundary releases • Without common understanding or standard methods -protective actions could differ considerably -difficult for countries to interrupt each other's data • Several countries have not developed detailed procedures or methods for assessing reactor accidents or for determining protective actions • Regional project more efficient than national projects IAEA Strategy • Develop detailed guidance, procedures, tools and training materials in English and Russian • Conduct training on materials, with procedures participants can use immediately and yet adapt to own conditions • Self-assessment of existing national capabilities • Development of regional solution to common problems • Workshops to foster co-operation and improve networking • Future 'experts' will give consistent advice • Maintain coordination with other international bodies Project Organisation Chart Project Steering Group IAEA secretariat Fixed composition after Sets up TWGs, provides ACGs nomination meets annually, with new information, procedures agrees on project plan, nominates etc. participants for ACGs Area Coordination Groups ACG-N ACG-E ACG-S ACG-W k A A Ad hoc Topical Working groups IAEA experts as facilitators for ACGs First year goals Project countries -with nuclear power reactors and neighbouring countries with borders within 100 km of a reactor implement arrangements for direct notification based on plant conditions -shall implement to the extent possible a common accident classification scheme for triggering protective actions -shall have carried out self-assessment of existing national plans for emergency response preparedness Participating and observer countries • 22 participating countries and 7 observer countries +EC observing • covering some model project countries Notification based on plant conditions Topical working group in February '98 -IAEA working material ,,Example Notification Procedures9' -agreed on harmonized fax form for forthwith and prompt notification together with the EC — • Discussed at the ACG meeting Formalization awaiting new release of IAEA emergency manual under the conventions Accident classification scheme In TECDOC-955 for PWRs and BWRs Topical working groups on RBMKs and CANDU Discussed strategy in ACG meetings \C Workshop on emergency classification Countries set up teams for development of scheme Self-Assessment Questions consistent with TECDOC-953 Started during a regional workshop in Ljubljana Second version of the questionnaire Answers are stored in a database O Results to be presented to PSG Will be updated annually to evaluate progress Extension for 1999-2000 • Tasks for 1999-2000 -Harmonization of procedures for environmental monitoring and environmental data exchange -Procedures for public information -Integrated planning • Follow-up of current activities Environmental monitoring procedures Procedures by 1999; implemented by 2000 ACGs -review and facilitate implementation of monitoring stategies, procedures, reporting and data transmission -develop joint scheme, implement and test to IAEA -develops common basis in Russian and English -arranges regional training Public information Review strategy and arrangements for public information IAEA provides documents for review by 1999 and implementation (workshops) by 2000 to Future IAEA strategy on emergency preparedness and response IAEA Formalization of IACRNA Response + global plan, response teams Conventions System Safety Safety Requirements 2000 Standards Safety Guides 2001 Conference Response TECDOC- 955 2001 Manuals Radi Emerp-eficie.s Monitoring Procedure;;— Review biennially Tools InterRAS starting 1999 Training Manual Participating and observer countries 22 participating countries and 7 observer countries + EC observing covering some model project countries J CIVIL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AT THE IGNALINA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT PERSPECTIVES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY IN LITHUANIA V.BIELIAUSKAS, V.MARCENAS, ECONOMY MINISTRY, LITHUANIA VILNIUS, OCTOBER 1998 126 NUCLEAR POWER IN LITHUANIA - PRESENT AND PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE By Hab. Dr. Vytautas Bieliauskas Nuclear Energy Division Energy Development Department Ministry of Economy INTRODUCTION. In 1991, after regaining its independence, Lithuania suddenly became a fully responsible owner of two powerful nuclear reactors - two RBMK-1500 units at Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant (INPP, hereinafter) (Slide 1). Five years later, in March 1996, Dr. Atsushi Takeda in Enerugi Rebiyu described the event in the following manner:'[...] the reactor fortunately or unfortunately fell into the hands of a small nation with little technical know-how for such reactor.' (Slide 2) This small nation had a lot of know-how in many areas, including electronics and scientific research in energy production, but there was practically a total lack of national specialists in nuclear matters, and, because of secretive nature of Soviet power, very little was known about real risks and dangers of INPP operation. The change of the ownership of nuclear reactors, known world-wide mainly as Chornobyl type reactors, created a fully understandable concern of the Western society (Slides 3 and 4) and especially neighboring countries. In the absence of national regulations and a national regulatory body, with almost no local specialists, except for personnel of the power plant itself, and no legal basis for the operation and supervision of the nuclear power plant, the Government of Lithuania had to take immediate and well founded actions to ensure its safe operation. CREATION OF INFRASTRUCTURE. In September 1991, Lithuania expressed the intention to join International Atomic Energy Agency and its membership was formally approved at the General Conference of the IAEA in October 1991. That same month the Government adopted a decision on the creation of a national regulatory body, i.e. the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspection (VATESI). Its staff was recruited mainly from former employees of INPP. Since it was impossible to create a utility level in the foreseen future, the Ministry of Energy was given the rights of the Founder of INPP and the Minister of Energy from 1 December 1991 provided to Ignalina NPP the status of 'Operator of Nuclear Facility'. In March 1992, the first technical support organization, Ignalina Safety Analysis Group (ISAG), was created, largely from specialists of the main research institution, i.e. the Lithuanian Energy Institute. The Government of Lithuania understood very clearly that it was in its very best interest to have as comprehensive and as competent information as possible about the real safely level of INPP. The possession of a comparatively large 127 electricity generation capacity in thermal power plants made the position of Lithuania significantly better than that of some other countries that have restored their independence. The by the West mostly feared possible dilemma "electricity production or safety" in Lithuania, could, in the worst case, appear as "cheap electricity production versus safety and more expensive electricity". But the understanding of an acceptable safety level could be and really was quite different from that adopted by Western nuclear utilities. Following a clearly defined policy of transparency, the Government of Lithuania invited IAEA Assessment of Significant Safety Events Team (ASSET), Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) and peer review missions for assessment of INPP safety (Slide 5). The management of NPP never refused a visit of serious teams or single foreign experts that were interested in an evaluation of safety issues. Actively seeking Western assistance in the form of bilateral assistance programmes, Lithuania took an equivalent effort to take part in multilateral efforts where experts from the East were actively involved. Possibly because of this policy of transparency, Ignalina Unit 2, together with Unit 3 of Smolensk NPP, was selected as representative models of second and third generation RBMKs for analysis of the generic safety issues and specific safety features in the framework of the IAEA Extrabudgetary Programme. During 1995 - 1996 the first comprehensive Safety Analysis Report (SAR) for RBMK type reactors was prepared for Units 1 and 2 of INPP as a part of a Grant Agreement, concluded between EBRD and the Government of Lithuania and INPP in 1994. Several generic safety issues for RBMKs were also defined. CREATION OF LEGAL BASE. Already on 25 June 1991 the Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania adopted the decision to join the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). One year later, on 15 October 1992, the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Lithuania and the IAEA for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was signed. The instrument of accession to the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage was deposited one month earlier, on 15 September 1992, and it entered into force from 15 December 1992. As an owner of powerful NPP Lithuania had a good reason to be the first country in the region to join Vienna Convention and, one year later, the Joint Protocol Relating to the Application of the Vienna Convention and the Paris Convention. Corresponding national legislation was developed, or still is developed as shown in Slide 6. So if we look more closely a< the risks involved in the operation of NPP (Slide 7) the most serious of them is large scale core damage during operation that could lead to contamination of large off-site areas. It can be caused by a human error, equipment failure, inadequate operation procedures, or some external hazards. Another risk is radwastc or spent fuel mismanagement that can 128 lead to unacceptable radiation doses received by the staff and public in general. Then follow well known risks of any industry like transport accidents, fires, floods, earthquakes etc. Knowing the risks we have to elaborate a policy how to deal with their known or predicted causes (Slide 8). Of course the best policy is a policy of prevention and nuclear industry is possibly only next to space industry in the degree of built-in accident prevention measures. On the other side elaborated redundant safety systems are very expensive and significantly decrease competitiveness of nuclear power. In the Law on Nuclear Energy exclusive responsibility of the Operator of NPP for safe operation is stipulated. But in any case zero risk is an unachievable goal and we have to agree with a finite probability of the risk. In a normally designed system we can expect sharp decrease of event probability when the consequences of event became more severe. In the Law on the Nuclear Energy responsibilities of State Emergency Commission, Civil Defense Department, Ministry of Health Protection and other state institutions in the mitigation of nuclear accident are defined. I will not stop on the adequacy of existing infrastructure and financement of emergency preparedness because I am not competent in these issues. Every civilized state in which NPPs are operated has to be ready to cover losses incurred to third parties. Lithuania has signed new international documents on civil liability, as Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage and Protocol to Amend the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage and it has a corresponding internal legislation. Currently INPP is not insured against nuclear accident and has no large resources to be used in the case of real liability. Decommissioning fund could be used for this purpose and, because NPP is a state owned enterprise, the state would take corresponding steps for full coverage of liability. SIGNIFICANCE OF INPP TO STATE ECONOMY. Very large percentage of electricity is currently produced by INPP (Slide 9) at substantially lower production costs. Bearing in mind very serious economic impact of early closure of nuclear units, future energy development strategy depends very much on how long these units will be operated, and the future of said units themselves will mostly depend on the success of improvement of their safely and reliability. For this reason in a draft updated National Energy Strategy (NES) two basic scenarios for INPP arc provided (Slide 10): a) both units are closed at the moment of fuel channel gap closure reaching unacceptable value; b) both units arc operated their full design lime. Of course we are perfectly aware of the possibility of a third scenario - thai because of some safety deficiency the licence for Unit 1 will be refused and it will be stopped even earlier but we hope that the probability of such event is small. The choice of the two scenarios is mainly based on the need for a basis of cost comparisons covering both early and late closure dates. It has been assumed that such procedure will require much less evaluation effort than the study of a larger number of different scenarios, but still provide an information that is accurate enough for the decision by the Government of Lithuania. However one more important reason for the choice of two scenarios is to give the Government a basis for contingency planning, whatever scenario is finally chosen. If an early closure, as in scenario "a", is decided, there will be very short time available for planning and action before the closure dates. If the license is granted and the combined available funding of Lithuania and European Community of early closure will appear insufficient to cover all consequences, including restructuring of the whole electricity supply in the country, it might appear necessary to re- channel and continue operation of nuclear reactors, as in scenario "b", simply because that would be the only option that Lithuania could afford. If Ignalina NPP should be closed and electricity would mainly be generated in thermal power plants, in the year 2015 total emissions of harmful substances and CO2 will reach the level of 1991, while generating only half as much of electricity. In this case remaining production capacity will meet internal needs until year 2010. The decisions on continuation of the use of nuclear power and introduction of new nuclear reactors is in the competence of the Parliament. It would involve some legal and financial problems (Slide 11). Current legislation provides for exclusive ownership of nuclear reactors by the State. In such conditions it would be very difficult to attract foreign investments into construction of new nuclear units. CONCLUSIONS. 1. No closure of Ignalina units 1 and 2 is expected in a short term, except for safety reasons. Implementation of more safety upgrades is foreseen for years 1999 - 2001. 2. Lithuania should not reverse from electricity export to import. 3. Installation of new nuclear reactor can be viable solution for electricity supply after imminent closure of Ignalina RBMK units. Legal issues should be changed towards private ownership. 130 Nuclear Power in Lithuania - Present and Prospects for Future By Hab. Dr. Vytautas Bieliauskas Nuclear Energy Division Energy Development Department Ministry of Economy 2XRBMK-1500 Channel type, light water cooled, graphite moderated boiling water reactor (1661 fuel channel, two cooling loops) Design capacity 4800 MWt, degraded by current regulations to 4200 MWt, approx. 1380 MWe. Unit I in operation from 1983, unit II from 1987, unit III - construction stopped, later demolished. IT SIMPLY HAPPENED ...reactor fortunately or unfortunately fell into the hands of small \—i: U) nation with little technical know how for such reactor." From the article by Dr. Atsushi TAKEDA in ENERUGIREBIYU, March 1996 WESTERN APPROACH a)...tell him to stop it immediately; b) let's look what's going on; c) let's help them because they are dangerous; d) we're a part of it! IS LITHUANIA A CHALLENGE TO THE WEST? IGNALINA -1 IGNALINA.-2 hy no means LESSONS FROM SAFETY ASSESSMENT Safety V V 1989 1993 1995 1996 1997 1999 Review by VATEsi LEGAL ISSUES CIVIL LIABILITY LAW - ADOPTED IN 1993 ENERGY LAW - ADOPTED IN MARCH 1995 NUCLEAR ENERGY LAW - ADOPTED IN NOVEMBER 1996 INPP MANAGEMENT LAW - SUBMITTED TO SEIMAS RADIATION PROTECTION LAW - DRAFT IN DEVELOPMENT WASTE MANAGEMENT LAW - DRAFT IN DEVELOPMENT SOURCES OF RISK Substantial core damage during operation - human error - equipment failure - inadequate operation procedures oc - external dangers Radwaste or spent fuel mismanagement Transport accidents Fire, flood, earthquake etc. RISK FREE E>mR<3NME1NT Legislation Lnfrastructure Staff Technical Financial means and means regulations Prevention Law on VATESI Well Adequate, but Tolerable Nuclear Center of trained no Energy Radiation containement Protection Upgrade during outages and maintenance Mitigation LNE State Adequate? Accident Adequate? Emergency Emergency localisation Preparedness commission, system Plans etc. Civil Defense Department Liability LNE, Vienna - - - Back-up by state. Convention, , Not insured against Paris nuclear accidents Protocole CM CD CO O OO CO CM ? oo ^ CO CO en OJ CO en CO CD CO T— r CD m cn in CO CJ CO en T— CD CM en CO O en CO O r— T— en CO en CO CM CO CN CO en CM en CM CO CO 1 CO CO ? 1 8 CO en en CO CO CO oo CO T— O5 T— CM CM CO CO o CO o . o CD CO CD T— CM en en CD w CD CO CO *— h- CO CO CD LO o CM en "~ en LO CO CD 00 O) CO O en en oo CM en in TO ar , % oo (D 140 TWO SCENARIOS IN NES A. Closure of Unit 1 in 2005, Unit 2 in 2010 - losses of 3.3 to 3.9 x 109 USD during 15 years B. Rechanelling, operation of Unit 1 until about 2020, Unit 2 until 2025 - least cost option - non compliance with NSA Grant Agreement CAN WE AFFORD A NEW REACTOR? 1000 MW of installed capacity would cost about 2x109 USD Current value of all power installations in Lithuania slightly exceeds 1.6xlO9 USD Lithuanian GDP for 1996 was about 7.8xlO9USD Ownership of nuclear reactors - exclusively by the State CONCLUSIONS No closure of Ignalina units I and II expected in a short term, except for safety reasons. Implementation of more safety upgrades Lithuania should not reverse from electricity export to import Installation of new nuclear reactor can be viable solution for electricity supply after imminent closure of Ignalina RBMK units . Legal issues should be changed towards private ownership J CIVIL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AT THE IGNALINA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT PREPAREDNESS AND PLANNING FOR NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS AT NATIONAL LEVEL A.SIUKSTA, CIVIL SECURITY DEPARTMENT, LITHUANIA VILNIUS, OCTOBER 1998 144 PLANNING OF PREPAREDNESS OF THE REPUBLIC OF LITHUANIA FOR NUCLEAR EMERGENCIES Dear Ladies and Gentlemen, My notice is aimed to present you a situation on preparedness of the Republic of Lithuania for likely nuclear emergencies. I shall start my notice with review of legislation base of the Republic of Lithuania, for it is one of key factors in implementation of planning of preparedness. The System of Civil Protection of the Republic of Lithuania is based on the following laws: Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania; Law on Backgrounds for National Security of the Republic of Lithuania; Law on Local Self-Government of the Republic of Lithuania; Law on County Management of the Republic of Lithuania; Law on Environmental Protection of the Republic of Lithuania; Law on Nuclear Power of the Republic of Lithuania; Law on Organisation of Defence System and Military Service of the Republic of Lithuania; Law on Government of the Republic of Lithuania; and In the nearest future - Law on Civil Protection of the Republic of Lithuania (currently in the process of consideration at the Seimas (the Parliament) of the Republic of Lithuania), and on the following enactments of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania: Temporary Statutes of the Department for Civil Protection, and on the following resolution and edicts of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania: On Public Information by Lithuanian Radio and Television about Emergencies; On Civil Protection Alarms; On Civil Protection Training; On State Reserve of Measures for Civil Protection; On Approval of Regulations for Prevention, Liquidation and Survey of Industrial Accidents; On Approval of the Emergency Management Centre and its Composition; and On the following ministerial enactments: Republican Standards for Construction. Civil Protection. Design Standards. RSN 127-91; On Approval of the Procedure for Elimination of Detrimental Radioactive Materials or Object Contaminated with Such Materials; On Approval of Temporary Statutes for Organisation of County Civil Protection; and on other documents. As you can see, the system of civil protection of the Republic of Lithuania has a legislation basis, which is regularly supplemented and updated. 145 Law on Backgrounds for National Security of the Republic of Lithuania identifies System of Civil Protection and Rescue which is designated to protect the population from accidents during wars and in peaceful times making it actively participate in the mentioned activity, ensure preparedness of all rescue services and preventive acts as well as assure warning and informing the population, secure their lives and protect their property, provide urgent help and evacuate them from dangerous areas in cases of natural calamities, disasters and military acts. Objectives of the System for Civil Protection and Rescue: Taking into consideration causes, nature and impending threat of emergencies, the mentioned system seeks for implementation of the following objectives: S to warn the population on a pending emergency, inform them on its consequences and measures of liquidation; •f to carry out evacuation of people and their property; S to organise self-supply and supply of the population with personal and collective means of protection; S to carry out rescue and other urgent operations; S to provide medical aid and carry out public health care in cases of emergency; S to arrange burial of the killed and organise related religious services; S to fight fires; S to reconnoitre and mark centres of danger; •S to carry out sanitary disinfecting and implement other means for elimination of infliction; S to arrange temporary placement of sufferers and their material supply; S to maintain public order in an area of disaster; */ to re-start supply of the most required utilities; S to provide assistance required for preservation of objects of vital importance; S to reserve stocks of valuables of vital importance; S to train managers, employees, forces of civil protection and the population how to act in emergency situations; S to carry out protection of cattle and plants in emergency cases. The System for Civil Protection and Rescue includes the Department of Civil Protection of the Ministry of Defence, Emergency Commission, the Centre for Emergency Management, other state and municipal services of civil protection, fire fighting, search and rescue, territorial public alarm, rescue, aid and evacuation. The Statutes of the Ministry of Defence approved by the Government of the Republic of Lithuania specifies that the mentioned Ministry shall be entitled to co-ordinate activities of ministries, other Governmental authorities, local self-government institution in the field of defence and civil protection of the Republic of Lithuania in the process of implementation of functions delegated to the above mentioned Ministry. Law on County Management of the Republic of Lithuania engages a head of a county to organise liquidation of consequences of natural calamities and accidents as well as search and rescue operations. 146 Self-government institutions, i.e., municipalities have been delegated by the state the competence to organise civil protection and fire fighting activities. Management of emergency situations in the Republic of Lithuania is implemented in three levels, while the general preparedness of the country is managed by the Government of the Republic of Lithuania. National level: Government of the Republic of Lithuania Emergency Management Commission Emergency Management Centre Civil Protection Department Ministries Fire Prevention Department Air Search and Rescue Centre Maritime Search and Rescue Centre Other Governmental Institutions County level: County Authority County Emergency Management Centre Warning and Information Service Other Civil Protection Services Municipality (local) level: Local Authority Local Emergency Management Centre Fire Protection Services Warning and Information Service Other Civil Protection Services Business and Industry Civil Protection Forces The Government implements the management through Commission for Emergency Situations and its resident institution - Centre for Emergency Management. General preparedness of the country for likely emergency situations may be characterised as follows: There are no ministries or state institutions excluded from preparation for likely emergency situations, 147 There are no ministries or state institutions excluded from participation in actions taken in emergency cases; the difference is in time, when such institutions join the mentioned process, In cases of emergency situations, ministries and state institutions carry out the same functions as in peace; however, their functions may be either expanded or restricted. For the time being we are already able to talk about preparedness of the Republic of Lithuania in case of a particular emergency, i.e., in case of the nuclear accident at Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant (NPP). Lithuania, as any other country having nuclear power objects, disposes of a plan for the population protection in case of emergency. After restoration of the independence, the first plan of the mentioned kind was elaborated in 1995, tested in a number of training and practical operations, and positively evaluated by experts. Objectives, Causes and Purpose of the Plan Elaboration In order to better estimate the scope of radioactive contamination and its consequences, the plan for the population protection in case of radioactive contamination shall be distinguished from other action plans in cases of other emergency situations. It includes extensive consideration of likely consequences and actions to be taken by institutions of civil protection and the population in case of emergency at Ignalina NPP. The key objectives of elaborating the plan for the population protection are as follows: J To maximally reduce risk of spreading of the accident out of the territory of the NPP and limit consequences of the accident on the site; U To avoid determinative effects of health injuries; • To reduce maximally the population risks to get serious diseases (cancer and other radiation- related diseases). The Plan for Protection of the Population of the Republic of Lithuania in Case of emergency at Ignalina NPP ("the Plan") provides for measures of protection, their scope, schedule, executive officers and procedure of implementation. It also specifies extents of forces, transport, equipment and resources. The Plan is designated for proper organisation and co-ordination of actions of local self- government institutions, ministries, state offices in implementation of protection means, organisation of rescuing operations and elimination of accident consequences. When Lithuania joined the project of IAEA on Harmonisation and Regional Preparedness for Emergencies the Plan, elaborated in 1995, has been amended on the basis of methodology - technical documents developed by IAEA-TECDOC-953. 148 The Plan is comprised of: Chapter 1. General Provisions: •f concepts, definitions, S legislation background of the Plan, ^conception of the Plan elaboration, ^relation to other plans, ^preliminary data for drafting of the Plan (characteristics of Ignalina NPP, characteristics of Ignalina NPP region, climatic and meteorological characteristics of the region, characteristics of radiation danger and criteria of the population protection against radiation). It should be notified that the criteria of the population protection against radiation specified in this Plan have been established by the Ministry of Environment of the Republic of Lithuania and meet the requirements of IAEA and documents regulating radiation protection and safety in the European Union. Chapter 2. Preparation for an Accident This chapter includes all government institutions involved in preparation for likely accidents, indicating their responsibilities and functions. The chapter also covers the procedure for the Plan reviewing and adjusting as well as the procedure for preparation of citizens to an accidental situation and related activities. Chapter 3. Organisation of Management in Civil Protection and Allocation of Functions In compliance with laws and other normative acts existing in the Republic of Lithuania, this chapter describes a system of warning and interrelated contacts among the responsible institutions as well as organisation of management on local and governmental levels. I would like to show you and make more comments on the scheme of initial announcing on radiation accident in Ignalina NPP, for we all have painful experience in this field. The management of Ignalina NPP shall notify on the accident in the Plant and existing situation in accordance with the scheme on initial announcing about radiation accident in Ignalina NPP indicating the following data: - time and character of the accident, ways of ejection and duration of radioactive materials in the environment; - total amount of radioactive material ejected from the reactor; power of radioactive materials in the centre of ejection and its variation in the course of time; radio-nuclide composition of the ejected materials; 149 distribution of concentration of radioactive materials in different distances from the ejection centre; meteorological conditions at the moment of ejection. The Department for Civil Protection of the Ministry of Defence informs counties' Departments for Civil Protection and regional municipalities via automated system for warning bodies of management and the population (telegraph for general use and subscription, telephone, fax) as well as through direct extra telephone, telegraph and radio channels arranged by the Department for Civil Protection. Organisation of Management in Stage of Preparation to a Likely Accident and During the Accident Governmental management of nuclear power is carried out by the following institutions pursuant to their competence: 1) the Government of the Republic of Lithuania; 2) the Ministry of Economy of the Republic of Lithuania; 3) institutions of local self-government in the territories covering the areas of prevention and other zones of urgent means of protection in Ignalina NPP. The Government of the Republic of Lithuania controls activities of ministries and other governmental institutions in elaboration of plans for prevention and liquidation of nuclear accidents. The Ministry of Economy is responsible for organisation of means for prevention, accident liquidation, survey and elimination of consequences in Ignalina NPP. Institutions of local self-government shall act in the territories covering the areas of prevention and other zones of urgent means of protection in Ignalina NPP pursuant to their competencies as follows: receives information from the NPP on damage in the reactor, impeding, ejection of radioactive materials and other incidents; develops plans for protection of the population and implements them in cases of nuclear emergency; informs the citizens on a radiation situation and means of radiation protection in progress. Governmental regulation of nuclear safety and radiation protection. Functions of nuclear safety and supervision are carried out by State Nuclear Power Safety Inspection ("VATESI"). 150 J Competence levels of central Governmental institutions in the field of nuclear emergency prevention in Ignalina NPP, response and recovery are the following: VATESI: - informs mass media on radiation situation and state of safety in the NPP; co-ordinates and controls means of protection of the personnel and population in a case of accident, checks the state of preparation of an object for a nuclear emergency; In case of a nuclear emergency: continuously collects information on the situation in the NPP; - analyses and forecasts course of the emergency, forecasts and evaluates likely emission of radioactive materials into the environment and the centres of the emission; - provides the Government of the Republic of Lithuania, the Ministry of Environment, the Ministry of Health Care and the Department for Civil Protection with information on the situation in the NPP, existing and likely emission of radioactive material into the environment; controls and takes necessary measures in order to assure safety in a non-affected block of the NPP; - informs and consults the Centre for Emergency Management; - provides mass media and public with information on the existing accidental situation and course of the emergency liquidation works; - informs IAEA and neighbouring countries pursuant to Convention, 1986, as well as to provisions and requirements of bilateral contrast! arid agreements. Ministry of Environment: - establishes rates for emission of radioactive materials into environment and permissible levels of environmental contamination, controls adherence to the mentioned rates and levels; in co-operation with the Ministry of Health Care establishes rates of radiation protection and controls their implementation; organises and co-ordinates state radio-ecological monitoring within the zone of control in the NPP, controls radiological monitoring in the zone of sanitary protection of the NPP. Ministry of Defence, Department for Civil Protection: - elaborates a plan for state radiation protection of the population in case of a nuclear emergency; this plan shall serve as a basis for other engaged institutions to develop their plans for prevention and liquidation of a nuclear emergency and elimination of its consequences; - within the limits of its competence implements the measures for liquidation of the emergency and its consequences. The Ministry of Defence shall concentrate military troops in the procedure established by laws. Ministry of Communications: assures proper operation of systems for communication and civil protection alarms; assures urgent delivery of telegrams of special purpose for their addressees; allows having urgent distant calls under passwords; if requested by managing links, emergency management centres, arranges extra direct telephone, telegraph and radio communications, installs extra final communication 151 equipment, insonifies premises and territory, assigns experts in operation of communication means and technical supervision; organises centralised application of official communications for the purposes of emergency management; arranges railway transport for evacuation of citizens from a dangerous zone in case of a nuclear emergency; organises road deactivation works in routes of evacuation of the citizens and force carrying. Ministry of Social Welfare and Labour: carries out supervision of potentially dangerous technical equipment; controls adherence to requirements specified by normative acts on labour, labour safety and other related documents; develops and presents recommendations on provision of social assistance for the evacuated and injured citizens. Ministry of Health Care: develops and approves normative acts and regulations for the population's hygiene, controls adherence to the mentioned; - carries out monitoring of health of the citizens located in the zone of control of the NPP; - assures preparedness of all health care provision institutions for liquidation of consequences of a nuclear emergency; - establishes rates of radiation safety for the population and controls their implementation; - organises hygienic control of forces involved in liquidation of the nuclear emergency or its consequences and of the population radiation as well as presents proposals on reduction of radiation. Ministry of Economy: - arranges supply of transport and machines, involved in liquidation of an accident, with fuel; - co-ordinates activity of local self-governmental institutions by supplying the evacuated citizens with foodstuffs; - prepares and presents recommendations on utilisation of state reserve as measures of civil protection. Ministry of the Interior: - forthwith liquidates fire centres in the NPP, participates in liquidation of a emergency and its consequences; - guarantees protection in 30 km zone, safe and organised operations of interim posts for evacuation of the citizens; carries out and guarantees physical safety of the NPP; assures public order and traffic regulation; organises examination of an contaminated territory. Ministry of Agriculture: - prepares and recommends measures, assuring protection of foodstuffs, co-ordinates evacuation of livestock out of places contaminated with radioactive materials. 152 State Veterinary Service: establishes procedure for protection veterinary institutions and livestock against radiation; is involved in evacuation of livestock; organises and commences radiation control of meet and dairy products and fodder. The heads of the counties shall act in compliance with powers conferred to them by Law on County Management of the Republic of Lithuania and other laws and acts of secondary legislation. Centre for Emergency Management: manages operations of liquidation of a nuclear emergency and elimination of its consequences; concentrates material and other resources for liquidation of the nuclear emergency; - implements other tasks set forth in the statutes of the mentioned centre. In case of a nuclear accident, the Emergency Management Centre shall carry out the following function in compliance with laws of the Republic of Lithuania, the statutes of the Centre for Emergency Management and the Plan for Protection of the Population of the Republic of Lithuania in Case of a Emergency at the NPP: - organise liquidation of the accident or its consequences; - co-ordinate activity of all institutions and forces involved in liquidation of the nuclear accident and its consequences; - regularly inform the President, Seimas and Government of the Republic of Lithuania on the course of liquidation of the nuclear accident and its consequences; - implement decisions and directions adopted by the Government; arrange evacuations of the citizens out of the dangerous zone; inform interested organisations, mass media and public on the course of liquidation of the nuclear emergency and its consequences, danger caused by ionising radiation and instruct the population on issues of protection against radiation. The heads of the counties and institutions of local self-government shall directly or through the emergency management centres organise protection of the population and operations of eliminating consequences of the accident. In case of necessity to evacuate the residents, it shall organise operations of evacuation organisations and interim posts for evacuation of the citizens. In order to ensure the work of the emergency management centres under conditions of radioactive contamination, protection control constructions are equipped with management posts and means for communication and warning. Chapter 4. Civil Protection Actions This Chapter covers: Activities in limiting consequences of an accident include the following: "' basic means of protection against radiation, ^ engineering - technical means, ^ the procedure for radiation observation and examination, * sanitary disinfecting and deactivating, v evacuation of citizens, ^ protection of livestock, 153 ^ protection of plants. Activity of special forces include the following: * health care, ^ fire fighting, ^ maintenance of public order, * material - technical supply, * forces of civil protection. Thank you for your attention. 154