Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

The ‘self has been the most important matter of concern for human being.

Philosophy, religion, psychology etc. have all devoted themselves to the pursuit of the self and its meaning.

In the history of Greek philosophy, Heraclitus (Heracleitus, 535 to 475 BC.) said, I pursue my self. Antithesnes (444-368 BC.) said that the purpose of

Philosophy was the ability to associate with our self The Delphic oracle ‘Man!

know thyself has attracted a great deal of Philosophers. ‘

In the history of Indian philosophy, the self is pursued in the form oi Atman.

The term ‘ataia/i'originally meant ‘the breath’." In Sanskrit, it is used as a

reflexive pronoun, equivalent to ‘oneself in English, 'sicH or 'selbst in German,

‘se in French. Regarded as the subject of the life, it means principal of life and

sensation. All inclusively, it means individual and body. To distinguish its

existence from others, it means ‘self. More philosophically and intrinsically

apprehended, it comes to mean ‘soul’ or ‘spirit’.^ The pursuit of the a t ma n is

^ Simon Blackburn, Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, , 1994; Y Masih, A Critical History of , Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1994, p.viii; H. Nakamura, Universal Thought [Fuhen 5&o], Shunj}msha, Tbkyo, 1999, pp. 449-457, and The Pursuit of Self \Jiko no Tankydi, Seidosha, Tokyo, 1980, pp.llff. ^ Cf D. H. De A Wijesekera, Buddhist and Vedic Studies -A Miscellany, Forward by R.N. Dandekar, Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, p. 258. ^ A Sanskrit-English Dictionaryhy Monier Williams, Oxford University Press, p. 135; emphatically taught in Upanisadic Philosophy/

Buddhists in the early time in India seemed to use the word atman basically as meaning ‘self. The word atman in this context was translated as

self) by the people in China at that time. In classical Chinese, the word

means the first person singular accusative, that is, it stands for ‘me’ in

Enghsh, WcA'in German, tooi’in French. On the other hand, V u ’(^ ) is used as Nominative. Therefore it can be said that the translators in old China understood the word ‘atzna/2'objectively as ‘oneself.^

Buddhism also has been one of its most enthusiastic investigators. One of the examples in Buddhist scriptures shows this point: One day, a man asked

Buddha whether he had seen the girl who had ran away from the man. Buddha rephed the man, ‘which, do you think, is better to search for the women or the self.'’ Buddhism emphasizes the need not only to search for self, as shown by the above example, but also to tame and train the self

Buddhism, however, has the ‘not-self doctrine which is regarded as one of its essential marks. Because of the negative characteristic of anatta teaching.

Encyclopaedia of Buddhism, vol. 2. BPS in Kandy, pp. 316-32. ^ For instance, see the Chindogya Upanisad(yill.l.l). The importance of searching of the ‘self is emphasized in many religioiis writings; ‘A wise man who knows that women are a slough, as it were, will get no harm from them, but will wander about searching for the Self {Uttaradhyayana, 11.17, SEE. vol.45, p. 11); ‘The yogis striving [for perfection] behold A t m i abiding in their heart’ {yatantoyoginascai’naibpasyanty atmany avasthitam, Bhagavad-Glta, 15.11. Cf Ramananda Prasad, The Bhagavad- Gita- The Song of God, Delhi, 1996, p.232). “ H. Nakamura, The Pursuit of Self [Jiko no Tankyu], Seidosha, Tokyo, 1980, pp.l2- 13. Cf E. Kanakura, The Thought of Self in Indian Philosophy [Indo-tetugaku no Jiga-sisd[, Tokyo, Daizo-syuppan, 1974, p. 18-19. ® Vmaya, Mahavagga, 1.13 (vol. 1, p.23). It is interesting to see that there is a smiilar story in a classical Chinese text 'Mo-tzii written by M o Ti (Master Mo, about 468-376 B.C.). It reads as follows: ‘It is pity that everybody goes in search of a dog or a hen when they are missing but he does not search of his true self (Cf The History of Thought {Siso no ReMs^, vol.2, p. 155). Buddhism has been sometimes regarded as nihilism or atheism.' Thus the teaching of Buddhism on ‘self has become comphcated and apparently self- contradicting.®

l-l] Object of present studies

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A question of self and non-self has been an important topic of Buddhist study. Mrs. Rhys Davids once said, ‘the doctrine of Anatta is very deep. One assumes that it will need more than life-time to get to the bottom of it.’ A great number of explanations on anatta are found in Buddhist scriptures, and numerous attempts have been made by scholars to find out what the ‘atta and

‘anatta mean in the Buddhist context.

We can find various definitions of ‘anatta’, and a variety of explanations of what anatta doctrine is, not only in the Buddhist original scriptures but also in the books and dissertations by the scholars. Sometimes their interpretations are directly opposite to each other. I will look over in detail these definitions

^ It depends on the definition of‘God’ to decide whether Buddhism is atheism or not. E. Conze states that if indifference to a personal creator of the Universe is Atheism, then Buddhism is indeed atheistic’ {Its Essence and Buddhism: Development, Oxford, Cassirer, p.39). Lai Mani Joshi states: ‘AU the Buddhists are united in rejecting the idea of the reahty of a Personal-Creator-Lord or God. The notion of God-Creator as found in theistic tradition is not accepted by any Buddhists’. And he introduces in his book some of interpretations of the scholars which explain Buddhism as atheistic idea {Discerning the Buddha - A Study of Buddhism and of the Brahmanical Hindu

Attitude to It - Delhi, Munshiram Manoharled Publishers, 1983, p . 152-154). Cf. O.H. de A Wijesekera, Buddhist and Vedic Studies - A Miscellany, Foreword by R.N. Dandekar, edited by M.H.F. Jayasuriya, Delhi, MotHal Banarsidass, 1994. p.3; 8. ® Though Buddhism is generally regarded to adopt the avyakata attitude towards metaphysical questions such as ‘soul’, we have to admit that Buddhists have been always interested in the concept of the soid. This is attested by the fact that we can find lively discussions on the subject of such concepts in the history of Buddhism. and explanations in the next chapter in which I shall spend a good deal of space in order to survey previous works on the subject done so for. This fact shows that the question of ‘atta and 'anatta of Buddhism has not been solved yet, despite a larger number of studies.

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The fundamental problem which makes it difficult to study the concept of self and its negation is due to the fact that the question of self is thoroughly subjective matter, on the other hand, the academic research is basically depending on the objective investigation. In addition to this fundamental difficulty, we have to admit some specific problems when we try to study the concept of self and not self in Buddhist Uterature, which seem to make us produce variety of interpretations on them. In this section, firstly, we shaU consider why so many definitions on 'anatta have been made by the scholars.

These reasons are closely related to the difficulties when we try to study this topic.

X' As I shall mention later in detail, the concept of anatta has been changed

through the process of the doctrinal development of Buddhism. It can be said

that one of the reasons why so many explanations on anatta are found depends

on the fact that the meaning of anattahdiS been changing historically.®

® The fact that there has been historical development about anatta doctrine is pointed out by the scholars: Mrs. Rhys Davids, Sakya or Buddhist Origins, pp.209-210; P.T. Raju, ‘The Concept of Man in Indian Thought’, in The Concept of Man, ed. S. Radhakrishnan and P.T. Raju, Harper Collins Publishers, 1955, p.258; E. Kanakura, The Thought of Self in Indian Philosophy [Indo-tetugaku no Jiga-sisc^, Tbkyo, Daizo Shuppan, 1974, p. 179; A. Hirakawa, A History of Indian Buddhism - from Sakyamuni to Early Mahayana, translated and edited by Paul Groner, Delhi, Motilal, Since the meaning of anatta has evolved and changed, it is a matter of

course that many kinds of definitions of it are possible depending on the texts

compiled in various times. Then the definitions of it differ depending on

which texts we use for our study, for example, texts in Early Buddhism,

Abhidhamma, Mahayana, and so on. (It is notable that, only within the texts in

Early Buddhism, as we shall observe later, there is supposed to be a big change

in its meaning.)

® Another reason why we can find various types of definitions and

explanations about anatta is supposed to be its complexity of the term ‘anatta.

The term anatta composed by adding ‘aii to ‘atta, so we can try to interpret its

meaning in various ways depending on the meaning of the negative particle

‘aii, and the meaning of the word 'atta.

Regarding 'aii, as a negative prefix to ‘atta, it has been a subject of

controversy whether it indicates the absolute negation or the qualified

negation. Joaquin Prerz-Remon suggests: ‘The reader should always keep in

the distinction between the doctrine of relative or qualified anatta and

the doctrine of absolute or unqualified anatta.’^'^ It will be useful here to make

these two types of negation clearer.

(1) relative anatta In this type of negation, atta is negated in relation to

something (viz. ‘something is not atta). It does not intend to negate the

existence of atta but only intends to explain that something is not atta.

Many passages in the Nikayas teach that the aggregates (khandhas), the

1993, p.6. senses, the sense-objects, etc., are not atta, do not belong to att^ are not in

atta, and atta\s, not in them. This denial constitutes for us the doctrine of

relative anatta. The English translation of the term 'anatta which means

the relative negation should be ‘not atta or ‘not-self in order to distinguish

from the absolute anatta which I usually translate as ‘no atta or ‘no-self.

(2) absolute anatta: In this type of negation, the existence of atta is directly

denied. We can find absolute negation of atta especially in the hterature of

A b h i d h a m m a and later commentaries. I translate the term ‘anatta which

means the absolute negation as ‘no atta or ‘no-self.

$ The next reason of variety of definitions depends on what the term atta

means when the doctrine of anatta is taught." Buddhists in the early time

seem to use the term atta basically as the meaning of‘self, which bears some

resemblance to the term ‘citta or mind. However, in later time, it sometimes

had the meaning of the puggala, jiva, satta, and so on. Edward Conze points

out with regard to the semantic contents of the term atta as follows: ‘Not-self,

No entity in the world of dharmaic fact corresponds to such words as “self’, “ I”,

or “mine”, or their derivatives, such as “soul”, “substance”, “property”, “inward

essence”, “belonging”, “owing”, “being”, “persons”, etc.’*"

J.P. Remon, Self and Non-Self in Early Buddhism, p.2. “ The term ‘atta (pitman’in Sanskrit) is reflective pronoun, so that the ordinary English translations are ‘myself, ‘yourself, ‘himself, etc. depending on the context. However, the Pali or Sanskrit form does not vary with the person or number depending on the subject because they are understood firom the context. It is possible to say that this invariance of form was also one of the reasons to make it easy for the interpreters to mark a variety of meanings about the word 'atta (C£ K Bhattacharya, Some Thoughts on Early Buddhism - With Special Reference to Its Relation to the Upanisa

S The next reason is the difference of approaches when we study the teaching of anatta. Its multiplicity of meaning is caused by approaches which the scholars adapted. It is possible to try to interpret anatta adopting the approaches of philology, philosophy, rehgion, psychology, and so on. Here, I wiU take an example of a psychological approach towards the meaning of anatta.

Studies done by Peaget and other scholars point out clearly that a specific

characteristic of the childhood is self-centeredness, or selfishness. With

spiritual development this selfishness decreases and ultimately disappears

at the stage of boyhood. But the relative selfishness remains. Needless to

say that the relative selfishness, hke the absolute selfishness, also should be

eliminated. Anatta means the state where both the types of selfishness are

disappeared.^^

Yosiharu Akisige, ‘A constancy of anatta and a low of awareness’, in Journal of <3>

The major object of my investigation is to know the doctrine of Not-self

(anatta) in Buddhism. Though a great deal of effort has been made regarding the problem of atta and anatta, there is httle agreement so as to what the teaching of anatta really imphes in Early Buddhism. This is obvious from the fact that we can find various tjT^es of interpretations by the scholars whose opinions sometimes differ from each other widely. The reasons for such variety of interpretations as 1 observed above are the points that we have to pay careful attention to in order to consider what the doctrine of anatta means in Early

Buddhism.

The following are the motives which make me write on the topic afresh.

X Having recognized the fact that there has been doctrinal development

concerning what the anatta denotes, we should try to identify the exact

reasons for this historical change. For this it is essential to make clear the

meanings of 'atta, the negative particle ‘aii, and the negative compound

anatta in the texts which we carefully classify according to their dates, order

of compilation etc. from the philologico-historical approaches.'^ The pursuit

of anatta without concerning this historical evolution makes it difficult for us

to understand clearly the anatta doctrine of Buddhism. I think it is very

difficult, or better to say is impossible, to make one definition about what

anatta mQ A m generally in Buddhism, which is general enough to fit in all the

Indian an d Buddhist Studies, vol. 22-1. Thought it may be difficult to clearly separate the various approaches apart, in this paper, I shall basically take the philological way of approach to know the meanii^ of the words clearly, and to study the historical development of it. I also intend to consult the previous studies done by adopting other approaches so as to make our times. The first point of what I wish to show in this paper, the matter of

problem, is to study historical development of anatta doctrine.

D It should be made clearer as to what was exactly denied and how it was

denied by the teaching of anatta. In order to know the not-self teaching, it is

not sufficient to investigate only the word atta. We should also pay due and

deeper attention to other substantial concepts which have relation to the

word atta and anatta, for instance, puggala, jiva, satta, sara, vinnana, etc.

The semantic contents of the word atta are changed and the meaning of such

words have been added to that of att^ This is the point which I mostly gave

weight throughout my observations, and this is also the reason why the

thesis is entitled 'A Study of Certain Concepts of Substantial Existence in

Buddhism.

S' The teaching of anatta is closely related to the negation of attachment,

which is presented by various terms in the texts, for instance, negation of

‘mama, ‘ahamkara, ‘asmimana, and so on. Firstly, we should carefully

examine these words and try to know the relations of these to both the atta

and anatta. It will offer the key to the clearer understanding of anatta

doctrine.

understanding clearer. E. Kanakura, The Thought of Self in Indian Philosophy [Indo-tetugaku no Jiga- sisc^, Ibkyo, Daizo-syuppan, 1974, pp. 18-19.

10 1-2 The material for the present studies

The Pali Canon, which is classified into three baskets (Tipitaka), was not composed by Sakyamuni Buddha, nor by any individual author, but was composed successively by a large number of compilers.Therefore, we should keep in mind the possibility of a later accretion in the existing Nikayan Uterature.

One of the main objects of this thesis is to know some points of historical development concerning ‘not-self doctrine; therefore we should carefully separate original elements of early Buddhism from its later expansion. For this a careful text criticism concerning Nikayan literature becomes indispensable.

In this section, I shall classify the texts into three groups on the basis of compilation, depending on the observations of various scholars who devoted

themselves to chronological stratigraphy and identification of the elements

representing the original teaching of the Buddha.^"

Cf M. Winternitz, History of Indian Literature [New translation by VS. Sarma, 1983], II, pp.11-12. Winternitz states: ‘the Tipitaka is nothing but a large collection of such collections. It is evident that such collections can only be the finale of long period of hterary activity preceding them and that thier constituents must belong to various epoques.’ (ibid.p.6). Cf R.Otto Franke, Dighanikaya, Das Buch der langen Texte des buddhistischen Kanons in Au sw ah l ubersetzt, Gottingen, Vandenhoech und Ruprecht: Leipzig, 1913, Introduction p.X f£ G.C. Pande was one of the most remarkable contributors in this field. He has classified various suttaa in the Nikayas in order to detect their earher and later contents, by employing some criterions. His classifications will serve as a very useful reference when we try to know the historiceil development of the Doctrine (Studies in the Origins of Buddhism, Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1995). The notable studies on this subject are; T.W. Rhys Davids, Buddhist India, Motilal, 1971, pp. 161-188; Kanai lal Hazxa, Pali and Literature - A Systematic Survey and Historical St u d y -, vol.l, pp. 151-169; B.C. Law, History of Pali Literature, 2 vols., London, 1933; Wilhelm Geiger, Pali Literature an d Language, translated by Batakrishna Ghosh, third reprint, Munshiram Manoharlal, Delhi, 1978; Mayeda Egaku A History of the Formation of Original Buddhist Texts, Tokyo Japan, Sankibo-Buddhorin, 1964 [Summary in English, pp.9-42]; Hajime Nakamura, The Rise of Early Buddhism [Gensi Bukkyou no Seiritu\, 1992, Tokyo, Shunjyusha, pp. 573-732. The names of the seven suttas mentioned in the edict of Bairat (249 B.C.) give us important information for chronological stratigraphy, though opinions differ among scholars as to which of them is the one most probably referred to (Winternitz, ibid p. 24; n46; T.W. Rhys Davids, Buddhist India, p.l69£f; H. Nakamura, ibid. p.611f^ D.R. Bhandarkar, Asoka, 2“** ed 1932, p.89; Vidhusekhara

11 Though opinions of various scholars differ considerably as regards the precise period and relative chronology of the Nikayas, we should try to find out as many criterions as may be possible to decide its chronology. These criterions should be in conformity with a scientific text-criticism based on various approaches such as historical, sociological, cultural and hnguistic.

G. C. Pande states that the evolution of the Nikayas faUs between the age of the Upanisads and that of the A b h i d h a m m a and other Buddhist sectarian hterature. And he gives the general criteria which may help us in stratification of the Nikayas.

X The growth of monastic learning and of philosophical analysis and

controversy led to increased complexity, subtlety and system in the realm of

ideas.

1 The spread of Buddhism amongst the multitudes led it to imbibe many

elements of popular rehgion and helped the apotheosis of Buddha.

@ At the same time, with this orientation in doctrinal change there was

a corresponding change in the style of expression which tended to lose

simplicity and spontaneity and poetic vigour in favour of dry-as dust

abstract scholastic formulae.

@ Linguistically, too, the change may be seen in the use of new

technical terms and in the development of new technical senses for old

Bhattacharya, Buddhist Texts, as Recommended by Asoka, Calcutta, 1948, p.xi; Mayeda Egaku, ibid. pp.604-609; E. J. Thomas, The Life of Bu dd ha - As Legend and Motilal Banarsidass. 1993, p.212). G.C. Pande, ibid. p.27. Regarding the concept oVdukkhd, Pande states: ‘Du k k h a in the Nikayaa seems to mean primarily pain or disagreeable feeling, actual or potential, and secondarily, through the extension of meaning, what may be proximately or remotely causal to

12 words.

The classification between the verses and the prose in the Nikayaa has been one of the most convincing criterions, which has supported by many scholars.

It has been generally stated that the teaching written in a form of verse igatha) is older than that in the form of prose. Though we have to admit some important exceptional phrases in the Nikayas, it should be said that this criterion is one of reliable measures when we try to make a chronological stratigraphy of the

Nikayan hterature.

The following are the reasons why the scholars have regarded the verse part of Nikayas as older.

® Linguistically, we can find the older form of words in the verses. In the

verses of the Nikayas, we find the word forms used in Rig-Veda, which

influenced by Magadhi language.^' S. Levi and M. Wintemitz etc. pointed

out that Pali canon once had been compiled probably in Magadhi before its

compilation in Pali.~ such feeling (G.C. Pande, ibid., p.405). R Otto Franke, ibid p.XLVI; V. FausbOU, The Sutta-Nipata, SBE. vol. 10, p.xi; Rhys Davids and Carpenter, The Dighanikaya, vol.2, p.VIII; Hajime Nakamura, The Rise of Early Buddhism {Gensi Bukkyo no Seiritii[, p.58; Hakuju Ui, ‘Gensi Bukkyo Siryo-ron’, in Study of Indian Philosophy, vol. 2, Iwanami Syoten, 1965, pp. 185-190 and 237-244; Teturo Watuji, Gensi Bukkyo no Jissen Tetugaku, Iwanami Syoten, 1927, pp. 27-34. H. Nakamura, stating that we can find in the verses of the Nikayas the old forms of words which correspond to the usages of the Rig- Veda, makes a detailed hst of them (Hajime Nakamura, ibid., pp.625-652). S. Levi, ‘Observations sur une langue precanonique du Buddhisme’, in Journal Asiatique, Paris, XX, 1912. M. Winternitz states: ‘even the monks who compiled the Canon at Patahputra, the capital of Magadha, had made use of the Magadhi dialect. Traces of the Magadhi Canon are stiU visible in the Pali Canon’ {History of Indian Literature, II, translated by Bhaskara Jha, p.20). The phonetic characteristics of the Magadhi dialect in P a H have been proved by some scholars (See, M. Winternitz,

13 (D The teaching given in the form of verses is much simpler than that in the

form of prose.^

@ The verses are explained in detail by the sentence written in prose. In

some places, the different explanations are given of the same verse. One can

assume from this fact that the teaching written in verse had acquired the

authority as the teaching of Buddha when the prose was added to it as its

explanation.

4) In the prose part, we can find some sentences which seem to be amplified by

the author on the basis of the verse.

® We can find in the part of the verses phrases and ideas which seem to be

similar to those of Upanisads, however, such similarities are very rare in the

prose part.

© In verses, we can find almost same expressions with those of Jain texts.'^

@ Regarding the phraseology appearing in the verses of the Nikayas, there are

few phrases which are peculiar to Buddhist terminology. The phrases used

in the verses are of the same kind with Jaina and Brahmanism. However, in

ibid., p.20, n.38. Cf. H. Sakurabe, ‘Some Problems of A n a t m a n Theory - In reference to the Pali Nikayas’, The Annual Report ofResearches of Otani University 35, pp.67-100). H. Oldenberg had supposed that the earliest expression of the D b a m m a must have been in dogmatic paragraphs consisting of such formulas as the Four Noble , The Twelve Nidanas,, etc. and devoid of all narrative details. However, we should say that the teachings given by such technical terms mentioned by Oldenberg belong to relatively new groups of the Nikayas. Pande points out that formulae and technicalities and system appear relatively later with the growth of the school and controversies etc., and that they must be of secondary consequence. He says that the original concepts mostly at first express themselves quite nebulously taking frequently the aid of myth (G.C. Pande, Studies in the Origin of Buddhism, p. 19). The stylistic and doctrinal affinity can be found between the Nikayaa written in verses (especially, the Sutta-Nipata and the D h a m m a p a d ^ and the early Jaina literature such as the Ayaranga-sutra, the Suyagadanga, the Uttaradhyayana and the Isibhasiyaim {Cf. H. Nakamura, p.588; 684-722).

14 prose, we can find some special usages, which are peculiar to Buddhism.^

We can suppose that Sakyamuni Buddha originally taught his teaching in colloquial prose style, and then the essential points of his teaching took the form of verses. After that, the followers of the Buddha had given an explanation or philosophical commentary to the verses in the form of prose.'*’

We must keep in mind that, in the part of verses too, there are many cases which obviously are added later. So we have to pay careful attention to each case in order to decide whether it is old or not.

Since it can be said generally that the verse part of the Nikayas, is older in compilation than the prose part, I select the following text as the first group for our study of the doctrinal development about aaafia teaching.

The first group consists the teaching given in the verses especially appearing in the following suttas: Sutta-iupata,'^ D h a m m a - p a d a , Udana,

Itivuttaka, Theragatha, Therigatha and Sagatha-vagga in Samyutta-nikaya.

The second group is that of the teaching appearing in the prose part of the

Nikaya&. Of course, it is reported that there is a chronological classification among the prose parts of the Nikayas too. For example, Anguttara-nikaya is said to be later in compilation than the other three Nikayas.'^ I shall follow the

^ H. Nakamura, ibid., p.731. H. Nakamura, ibid., p.589. He assumes the origin of the Canon in the following three stages: CD Sakyamuni Buddha and his followers had probably discussed about teaching in colloquial style (probably in MagadhI). @ The disciples have handed down Buddha’s teaching orally in the style of prose and fix expressions, and the teaching had been gradually gotten in sharp of elegant verses. @ The disciples explained these verses in the form of prose sometimes giving philosophical interoperations (H.Nakamura, ibid., pp.608-609). The statements in the Suttanipata and the Sagitha-vag^ in Samyutta Nikaya are quoted in many other suttas. This signify that the Suttanipata and the Sagatha- are older in compilation (H. ibid., 28vagga Nakamura, p.609). Many of the suttas of the Aiiguttara Nikaya present one aspect of the A b h i d h a m m a

15 chronology of the suttas in the prose part of the Nikayas also.

As the third group, I chose the text of the Milindapanha, which is especially

noteworthy for our present study for two reasons; ® It contains a profound

discussion on the substantial concepts. © It gives invaluable information about

the doctrinal development of anatta because it is said that the text has been

compiled sometime after the Nikayan Uterature and before the A b h i d h a m m a

literature came into existence. It means that the Milindapanha holds an

important position on the historical change of the idea.

I also refer to the texts such as the Patisambhidamagga, the Mahaniddesa

and the CuUanidessa which seem to be important when we examine the

developed form of Buddha’s teaching.

Wherever necessary I have consulted the statements in the A b h i d h a m m a

hterature, Atthakatha-s and Tika-s, and have also referred to the Literature of

other reUgious groups (for example, Upanisads, Jain literature, etc.). This

would help us understand the real import of Buddhist aTJatta doctrine.

The method of treatment and presentation

In order to study our subject with due awareness of the above mentioned

problems involved in it, I have carefuUy classified the texts by following

philological method. After making careful classification of the texts into three

groups, I shall now proceed in the following order.

Uteratiure. M. Anesaki thinks that both Pali Anguttara Nikaya and the Chinese Ekottaivgazna bear traces indicating that this collection is later than the three others. Cf. Kanai lal Hazxa, Pali Language an d Literature, vol.l, pp.251-252.

16 ® Consideration of the meaning of atta and anatta.

® Consideration of the meanings of the terms which have relation to atta, such

as puggala, jiva, vedagu, satta, citta, and such others.

$ Marking relation between atta and these concepts. Does the word atta

contain the meanings of these concepts? Are these concepts negated by the

teaching of anatta, or are accepted?

J In order to know the historical development of anatta doctrine, I should also

pay attention to the historical change of the meaning of these concepts. For

example, it is obvious that the word puggala had a special meaning as

substantial subject in A b h i d h a m m a hterature and its existence is negated by

the word 'anatta.

$ Accounting for the reason why the anatta doctrine underwent a change.

Various factors could be thought of for instance, individual factors, social

factors, influence of thought outside Buddhism, etc.

The anatta theory is the teaching of denial some form of atta-heMei. The question is what kind of beUef was denied in early Buddhist Literature. Is it a heretical idea with certain metaphysical implication? Or, is it a wrong belief in the form of an innate egocentric characteristic of man, or an innate tendency to try to regard something metaphysical? Is it emphatically stated because of the fact that there is no ‘self at aU, or because of counseKng people to find the true self?-"*

It is not likely that the Sakyamuni Buddha taught emphatically the negation of atta by using the term ‘anatta. I assume that the Buddhists

29P. Harvey, The Selfless Mi n d - Personality, Consciousness an d Nirvana in Early

17 themselves who were the followers of the Buddha deduced the theory of'anatta through the process of their interpretation. However, there might have been certain elements, though not originally impUed by the Buddha, from which the finished product of anatta theory was formulated. We have to make all possible efforts for tracing these original elements.

In the Nikayas, we find easily the teachings which seem to be contradictory to each other. One of the most debatable topics is the relation between the teaching of anatta and the subject of K a m m a (or transmigration). There have been numerous discussions on this topic. The interpretations with the intention of finding a solution of this problem regarding atta and subject of k a m m a may prevent us from correct understanding of what the Buddha’s teaching of anatta reaUy intends to mean. In the history of Nikayan development, and in the history of scholarly researches too, we found interpretations for the purpose of finding a way out of this difficulty. These dogmatic approaches wiU prove to be an obstacle when we try to know the historical development of anatta, for which we have to know what the texts really intend to convey in the each group of the texts classified by chronological order. The dogmatic approach to try to solve the contradiction may be valuable, however, in the present study, I shall take a

historical approach, with which I wish to know the contradiction as it is without

any effort to solve it, and to find out the reason why the contradiction was

brought about.

The important thing, when we study a particular thought in the history, is

to avoid one’s own prejudice on the subject. I wish to study on this topic with

careful attention to attempt to know what was the intention behind the

Buddhism, Richmond, Curzon Press, 1996, p. 6.

18 teaching.®

Another point we have not to ignore is the context in which anatta was taught. Here, I suppose the four possible contexts:^’

1 The context when the teaching of anatta was given directly to the

intellectuals who had already known basic phraseology of Buddhism. It is,

for instance, when the Buddha delivered his lecture to his eUte disciples such

as Ananda, Sariputta, etc.

i The context when one introspects his meditative insight of anatta, or

expresses it to others. In this context, it may be expressed by pecuhar

phraseology which can be understood only by the people who have same

meditative experience.

a The context when anatta teaching was given for the people who did not

have about Buddhism, or who had not been ready for listening to

the teaching of anatta. In this context, it is supposed that the teaching was

given in plain language by using stories of everyday experience without

using terminology of anatta.

i The context when the teaching of anatta was explained towards the

heretics or the people who were confused by heretical ideas. Anatta was

taught in order to make the audience realize that the idea of atta held by

I agree with P. Harvey when he states that; ‘I hold that a sensitive approach does allow the scholeur, qua scholeir, to explain what the use of the no-Self teaching “means”. In doing so, of course, one must seek carefuUy to allow the text to speak for themselves, being ahve to the fault of imposing one’s own prejudice on the material’ {SeMess Mind, p. 8). S. Collins discusses the two different ways of approaches — the denial of self appropriated by the monk earnestly engaged in meditative reflection, and the way it was appropriated and elaborated by the Buddhist scholastic - (Selfless Person: Imagery and Thought in Theravada Buddhism, p. 13, cf. p. 71).

19 them were baseless. In this context, we have to be careful to know the

meaning oi'atta and ‘anatta because it is quite possible that the meanings of

atta\ie\

different from each other.

General remarks

<1>

I feel the need for examining clearly the definitions of some of technical terms that I shall be often using in the present research. I should make it clear what I intend by these words.

The first word is the ‘metaphysics’ which is often used in the sentence such as ‘Did the Buddha deny the existence of metaphysical existence?’ It has generally been stated that Buddhism kept ‘unanswered attitude’ toward the questions of metaphysical problems, however it is very difficult to discuss this point without clear definition of what ‘metaphysical’ means.

Generally, the word meta-physics (from Greek me ta - after, phisica - natural things) hterally means ‘behind nature’. It is now applied to a branch of enquiry that deals with fundamental questions about ‘being’, ‘what kinds of things there are in the world’, and of enquiry that raises questions about reality which lie beyond or behind those capable of being tackled by the methods of science.^"

Simon Blackburn, Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford Paperback Reference, Oxford University Press, 1994, p.240; Colins Dictionary of Philosophy, G. Vesey and P. Foulkers, Glasgow, HarperCoUins, 1990, p. 192. As an equivalent Sanskrit'word, Dictionary ofA English and Sanskrithy Monier W illiama (p.498) mentions ‘anviksiki’. A. P. Buddhadatta’s Engh'sh-PSli Dictionary (p.330) lists the following words: ajjhatta-vijja, paramattha-dhamma, and as adjective form, ajjhattika, arupayatta. Cf Saigiisa Mitsuyoshi, Principal Thoughts of Early Buddhism, voLl, Daisan

20 The second word to be considered is substantial’, which has similar meaning with the word ‘metaphysical’.“ The word ‘substance’ (from Latin sub - under, stare - stand) literally means ‘that which stands under’. It is explained as follows: ® its essence, or that which makes it what it is. This will ensure that the substance of a thing is that which remains unchanged through change in its properties; 2. that which can exist by itself; 3) that which bears properties.^

One has a deep-rooted inclination for looking for something absolute (an absolute principle, the only and central existence) which he behind a diversity of actual world. We understand this fundamental attitude and enquiry as metaphysics. As a result of such enquiry, philosophers have established various concepts which we caU substantial existence’. This enquiry has been made everywhere in the world since the beginning of human speculations.®^ For instance, it appears clearly in a famous phrases of ‘Creation Hymn’ {Rig Veda,

10.129).

Generally thinking, one recognizes ‘self or ‘mind’ as being the center and playing an important role in one’s activity. On the other hand, outwardly one tends to admit ‘God’. We have to admit the fact that, in the Nikayas, there are some words which are generally understood as ‘substantial concepts’ settled as

Bunmei Sha, Tokyo, 1995, p. 74-78; O.H. de A. Wijesekera, Buddhist a n d Vedic Studies - A Miscellany, Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1994, p.4; E.J. Thomas, The Life ofBu d d h a - As Legend an d History, Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1993, p.l92. “ A Dictionary of English and Sanskrit by Monier Williams lists the following words to explain the word ‘substance’; vastu, padirtha, dravya, sattva, artha and bhava (p. 783). Simon Blackburn, Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford Paperback Reference, Oxford University Press, 1994, p.366. The words ‘metaphysic’ and ‘substance’ are used in the following context; Metaphysics inspired by modern science tends to reject the concept of substance in favor of concepts such as that of a field or a process, each of which may seem to provide a better example of a fimdamental physical category (ibid. p.366). ^ VP. Varma, Early Buddhism a n d its Origins, Delhi, Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers, 1973, p. 139.

21 the result of metaphysical thinking, and some of relatively later texts are determined to negate its eternal characteristic.

I shaU use the term ‘substantial existence’ to refer to any kind of existence which is regarded as being central or essential to the whole of the actual world.^

<2>

In this section, I shall deal with the problem how to translate the term att^

Some Buddhist terms are very difficult to be translated into English. The term

‘atta is one of the most difficult words to be expressed with an exact equivalent in

English. It is variously translated by the scholars depending on the various contexts in which it is used, for instance: ‘self, ‘Self, ‘ego’, ‘soul’ and ‘spirit’.

The Dictionary lists the following words as the meaning of atta: ‘the soul as postulated in the animistic theories’, ‘Oneself, ‘himself, ‘yourself {Pali-English

Dictionary, ed. by T. W. Rhys Davids and Wiliam Stede, PTS. p.22); ‘self, ‘soul’,

‘the spiritual and vital principle of all human action’ {Encyclopedia of Buddhism,

Buddhist Publication Society, vol.2. p.322); ‘the soul’, ‘oneself {Concise Pali-

English Dictionary, A. P. Buddhadatta, p.8). And the words ‘ego’ and ‘spirit’ are also used as the translation of atta.

Joaquin Perez-Remon made several important statements.^' Regarding the word ‘soul’, he told: ‘The translation of atta as soul ought to be discarded’.

The reason why he asserts thus is: ‘The soul is supposed to be whoUy involved in all bodily and mental process, vivifying the body and constituting the substrate

^ I shall consider some concepts which are discussed in the Nikayas whether they are eternal or transient. Thought the transient existence may not be included to the category of‘substantial existence’, I also deal with these transient concepts in the same group because they are often regarded as something center plajdng a role of subject even if they are not eternal

22 of all intellectual and emotional phenomena. It is obvious that this kind of atta or soul is emphatically rejected in many a page of the Nikayas.’ And he told: ‘A term should be chosen general enough to fit all context.’ In regard to the word

sprit, he says; There are indeed many contexts where spirit could be considered a convenient rendering of the term atta, ex. sampassam attham attano (seeing the good of spirit), pahitatto (man of resolute spirit), bhavitatto (the man fully developed in spirit)’; ‘But spirit is a concrete term which stand only for the immaterial aspect of man. There are passages in Nikayas where atta refers to man in general without any abstraction either fi-om the mental or the spiritual part of man; Atta is often used to denote what may be said to be the core of man s personality. The spirit does not appear fiilly to convey this meaning.’

After examining the words ‘soul’ and ‘spirit’, he states that the word ‘self is the best fitted to the translation o f ‘atta. He says; ‘Therefore it seems better to choose self as the English equivalent to atta ] ‘Self connote primarily identity to being what a man is, also separation from other individuals.'

Then, we have to inquire into the English Dictionary in order to grasp the exact meaning of each of the English words. The Concise Oxford Dictionary explains each word as foUows;

X ego: a conscious thinking subject; the part of the mind that reacts to

reahty and has a sense of individuahty; self-esteem.

® soul: the spiritual or immaterial part of a human being, often regarded as

immortal: the moral or emotional or intellectual nature of a person or animal;

the personification or pattern something: an individual; a person regarded

37 J.P. Remon, Self and Non-Self in Early Buddhism, pp.7f.

23 with familiarity or pity etc. a person regarded as embodying moral or

intellectual qualities: a person regarded as the animating or essential part of

something; emotional or intellectual energy or intensity, esp. as revealed in a

work of art.

$ spirit: the vital animating essence of a person or animal; the intelligent

non-physical part of a person; a rational or intelligent being without a

material body; a supernatural being such as a ghost, fairy, etc; a prevaihng

mental or moral condition or attitude; a mood.

® sel£ a person’s or thing’s own individuahty or essence; a person or thing as

the object of introspection or reflexive action; one’s own interests or pleasure.

What the explanations of the dictionary make clear is that, as a whole, it is better to use the word self as a translation of the word ‘atta. The word soul’ has the characteristic of mental side of the being and of eternal nature. The words ‘ego’ and ‘spirit’ are also the concepts which mark only the mental side of

our existence. But atta found in the Buddhist texts generally means not only

our mental side of the existence but also our physical side of the existence. In

some contexts, the words ego and spirit are the useful equivalents of att^

however, I think it is difficult for them to convey the meaning of all usages of atta

found in the Nikayas.

Now I say that it is impossible to choose one word which will fit in all the

contexts. It is not necessary to decide here one English word as an equivalent of

‘atta. We should consider and use different words considering their usage in

different contexts. In my study, basically, I shall translate the term atta as ‘self

except the cases which obviously have the meaning of ‘soul’, ‘ego’ and ‘spirit’.

24 And if necessity, I try to mention, after the word I translated, what kind of

characteristic the term ‘self has. For instance, ‘self which basically means

conventional subject, or self which is regarded as reality’ etc.^®

As to the translation of the word ‘anatta, it is more difficult to find its

precise rendering which is proper to fit in all the contexts. We find the term

anatta variously translated by the scholars:^® viz.

no-Self, ‘Non-Self, ‘the non-existence of a self, ‘the absence of the self, ‘non-

selfish’, ‘Non-Soul’, ‘soullessness’, ‘the non-existence of the soul’, ‘without an

atman, Non-Ego’, ‘Non egoity’, ‘no changing eternal soul’, ‘not-man’.^°

<3>

The scholars have discussed the nature and style peculiar to the Buddha’s teaching method. S. Radhakrishnan points out: ‘We find in the early teaching of

Buddhism three marked characteristics, an ethical earnestness, an absence of any theological tendency and an aversion to metaphysical speculation.’^^

Acknowledging the difficulty to find exact equivalent word to atta, the scholars contrive a mean for the translating the atta into English. Akira Hirakawa, on his book wntes; ‘In this study, when the word self is used ia the sense of an eternality, it is capitahzed; when it is used in the sense of changing entities or personalities, is not capitaHzed’ (A History ofIndian Buddhism — From ^akyamuni to Early Mahayana). E. Conze points out: ‘At this stage it will be best to translate somewhat critically as “not-self’ so as to avoid a decision on whether the term should be rendered as “not a self’, “not-I”, “is without self’, “unsubstantial”, etc.’ {Buddhist Thought in India - Three Phases ofBuddhist Philosophy-, 1962, pp.36-37). ^ Concerning the term ‘anatta, J.R Remon explains the difference of translations between the non-self and ‘non-self. He emphasizes that ‘rupam anatta should not be translated as ‘bodily form is the non-self but as ‘bodily form is non-self because there are many other things besides bodily form falling under the denotation of non­ self {Selfan d Non-Self in Early Buddhism, p. 195). Indian Philosophy, voLl. Oxford Indian Paperbacks, 1996, p. 358. I agree with E. Frauwallner in saying that ‘It [the oldest Buddhism] shows no special and original features and produces no thoughts which further proved finiitfiil and helpfiil. On the other hand, if philosophically considered, it shows pronounced wealmess and

25 We can explain the characteristics of Buddha’s way of teaching more concretely as foUows^^:

(D The Buddha skillfully adopted the mood and concerns of the hearers

without any hostility.

'D The Buddha gradually moved the audience towards sharing his own vision

of .

® The Buddha strictly censured misinterpretations of what he taught.

® The Buddha emphasized the examinations and analysis of actual

experience.

® The Buddha emphasized that his teaching had a practical purpose like that

of a boat for crossing over the waters and not for holding it forever.

® The Buddha often gave new meanings to old terms.^'*.

I should focus attention on the last characteristic of the above list.

Buddha often gave the old terms his own meaning. Or, the Buddha adapted the term of his opponents and gave them the new sense. The word 'Bra h m i n ' is a

defects in comparison with other teachings.’ {History of Indian Philosophy, 2 vols., Translated & v m Original German into English by VM. Bedeka, Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1993, voLl, p. 189, see also p. 124). Cf P. Harvey, A n Introduction to Buddhism - Teachings, History and Practices Cambridge University Press, 1997, pp. 29-31. ^ H. Nakamura, The Rise of Early Buddhism [Gensi Bukkyou no Seiritu}^, Tokyo, Shunjyusha. 1992, voLl, pp.33-35. Cf. De Silva Lynn, The Problem of the Self in Buddhism an d Christianity, Sri Lanka, Center for EleHgion and Society, 1975, pp. iv- v. ^ When the Buddha discussed with the heretics who performed fire ritual, he turned skillfully into a metaphor for his discourse: our own existence is just like a blazing fire. This is also similar means of teaching employed by the Buddha. He made people stop some form of behavior and then used it as a metaphor in order to lead them to a more profound truth (C£ SN.VIL1.8, Aggika, voLl, pp. 166-167. See, H. Nakamura, Goutama Buddha, voLl, pp.604-605).

26 typical example: In the early Buddhist literature, it meant not merely a member of this caste, but meant frequently the holy life or Aarabat-.^ Another example is the title of the sutta, ‘ Tevijja-sutta in the Digha-Nikaya, thought it basically means the three Veda&, in the Buddhist sense it means the three knowledge that an arahat attains on enlightenment.^

When we notice this way of teaching adapted by the Buddha, we should be careful in interpreting the word ‘atta and ‘anatta in the Nikayas. That is, when we find the same expression in the both texts - Nikayas and Upanisads it does not always intend to convey the same idea. It is wrong to conclude, without detailed consideration of their contexts, that ‘an-atta was taught intending to negate 'atmaii in the Upanisads. At the same time, it is also wrong to conclude, that just because Nikayas also emphasize to reahze the self that early Buddhism taught to reahze the true self or A t m a n as ultimate reaUty as imphed in the

Upanisdic teachings.

When we examine the teaching of anatta with reference to that of other religious groups, it is important to bear in mind that the similarity of phrases does not always mean the sameness of idea.

^ SN.VII.7 (voLl, p.l66). Dhp. Brabmana vagga, 383-423. V. P. Varma points out that: ‘Thus what Buddha means by appropriating the term Brabmana into his own vocabulary is not the incorporation of or adherence to Brabmanical views but it is only the use of a term prevalent in society and giving to that a more moral connotation’ {Early Buddhism and its Origins, Delhi, Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers, 1973, p.363). ^ E. Frauwallner, ibid., p. 126.

27