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1916 – 1921 Roy Douglas analyses Lloyd George’s answer to the after the . LloydLloyd GeorgeGeorge andand thethe PartitionPartition ofof IrelandIreland

ong before , Irish attitudes to Home Neither side liked this compromise, and by the sum- Rule had come to follow closely the divi mer the country appeared to stand on the brink of L sions, not of social class or perceived eco- civil war. As a last desperate effort to avert conflict, a nomic interest, but of religion. Practically every Conference of leaders of the principal British and Catholic was a Home Ruler, the vast majority of Irish parties was convened at Buckingham Palace. Protestants were Unionists. Ever since the s, an On  July the Conference broke down, and the off-and-on alliance had existed between Irish Na- Cabinet met in an atmosphere of high crisis to de- tionalists and Liberals, in support of Irish Home bate . When the discussion had been pro- Rule. ‘Home Rule’, like many expressions in poli- ceeding for some time, Foreign Secretary Sir tics, did not always mean the same thing, but it cer- Edward Grey reported the ultimatum which Austro- tainly included establishment of an Irish parliament Hungary had just issued to Serbia, warning his col- and executive in . The only large part of Ire- leagues that ‘it may be the prelude to a war in which land which was overwhelmingly Protestant was at least four of the great Powers might be involved’. north-east , and there the popular opposition Three days later, the risk of international conflict to Home Rule was every bit as strong as was support had increased, but so deep was the general concern in the rest of the country. But although, in theory, over Ireland that events in Dublin were still at the everybody in politics was either for or against setting top of the Cabinet’s agenda. up a new Home Rule authority for the whole of When Britain went to war with Germany on  Ireland, in practice by  many people on both August, a few Liberal and Labour MPs wisely and sides of the great divide were groping towards a so- courageously resisted the government’s decision to lution through which the Protestant areas of Ulster fight. Irish MPs, by contrast, were unanimous in sup- would receive different treatment from the rest of port: both the main body of Nationalists who fol- Ireland, at least in the short term. lowed , and the ‘Independent Na- As Jeremy Smith describes elsewhere in this issue, tionalists’ from Munster who looked to William during the course of  the Liberal government O’Brien and the Unionists alike. As far as this could forced its Home Rule – the Government of Ire- decently be done, the Home Rule question was land Bill – through parliament, against furious oppo- swept under the carpet. On  September, the King sition from Conservatives (or, to give them their signed the Home Rule Bill and also signed a new preferred name in this period, ‘Unionists’). The Bill Suspensory Bill which delayed its operation until was awaiting the formal signature of the King. The the end of the war. Yet – as one distinguished Irish new measure would set up an Irish Parliament with historian has reflected – ‘the Irish problem had been limited powers. The break from Great Britain would refrigerated, not liquidated. Nothing had been not be absolute, and some Irish MPs would continue solved, and all was still to play for.’ to sit at Westminster. A concession had been made to In May , the first Coalition government was the ‘separateness’ of the northern Protestant areas by established. Asquith remained Prime Minister and the a provision under which the six most Protestant Ul- Liberals still provided a majority of the Ministers. ster counties would be excluded from the Home Conservatives and Labour were brought into the gov- Rule authority for six years, but would then revert ernment, and so was Sir – born and automatically to union with the rest of the country. educated in Leinster, and MP for Dublin University,

Journal of Liberal Democrat History 33 Winter 2001–02 23 yet acknowledged leader of the Ulster the war lasted, his concern was to en- he stood was similar to that of Sinn Unionists who had been such a thorn in sure the most efficient prosecution of Fein. Thereafter Sinn Fein advanced the government’s side before the war. the war. Once the war was over he rapidly, winning a further five by-elec- Attempts were made to include John sought to produce a durable settlement tions in  and . Redmond as well, but these failed. in Ireland (whatever that settlement As Prime Minister, Lloyd George In April , the ‘Easter Week Ris- might happen to be), but he may have did not abandon his quest for an Irish ing’ took place in Dublin. The rebels, been even more anxious to keep his settlement. In May , he renewed with no recognisable authority from own government on an even keel. his offer to Redmond for immediate anybody, proclaimed an ‘Irish Repub- When his investigations were com- Home Rule for the twenty-six coun- lic’, and seized control of various build- plete, Lloyd George proposed immedi- ties, without success. In July, a Conven- ings. These rebels were often, though ate application of Home Rule legisla- tion of Irishmen of various persuasions inaccurately, described as ‘Sinn Fein’, tion to the twenty-six Catholic south- was set up, to try to evolve a solution. from the name of an extreme move- ern counties, while the six Protestant Sinn Fein refused to participate, which ment which sought to destroy all politi- northern counties would be excluded. considerably weakened its authority. cal links between Ireland and Great Whether this exclusion was to be per- Then in March , John Redmond Britain. The military were able to re- manent or temporary was uncertain – died from an operation which nobody establish control without too much dif- Redmond was given to understand one had expected to present serious risks. ficulty. In the aftermath, the leaders of thing, Carson was promised the other. So the most experienced, and perhaps the rising were tried in secret by courts- Both men were prepared to accept the the most responsible, Irish politician martial, and no fewer than ninety people arrangement as they understood it, but was suddenly removed from the scene. were condemned to death. both had great difficulty in selling it to He was succeeded as Nationalist leader Some days before any executions their followers. Part of the difficulty by . were carried out, John Dillon, more or with any arrangement of this kind was In the same month, while the Con- less Redmond’s second-in-command, that no line could be drawn which did vention was still sitting, the government wrote from Dublin to his leader that ‘so not leave many people on the ‘wrong’ faced a different and even graver prob- far feeling of the population of Dublin side of the proposed border. Northern lem. Russia had collapsed, and the is against the Sinn Feiners. But a reac- Catholics and southern Protestants Treaty of Brest-Litovsk gave the Cen- tion might very easily be created’. alike were aggrieved. Unionists in the tral Powers huge swathes of Russian Dillon went on to urge that ‘the wisest government, notably Walter Long and territory. In the west, the Germans course is to execute no-one for the Lord Lansdowne, waged a bitter war launched their spring offensive, which present.’ To anyone with a sense of against the settlement, while Lloyd at one moment seemed to threaten a Irish history, the wisdom of that advice George threatened resignation if it was similar result in France and Belgium. In was obvious, and Redmond did his not accepted. In the end, the contradic- desperate straits, Lloyd George’s gov- best. In the end, however, fifteen of the tory nature of Lloyd George’s promises ernment began to plan a great exten- rebels were shot. The contrast with the was appreciated by the Irish, and the sion of conscription in Britain, where it wise clemency with which DeWet’s whole thing collapsed – without Lloyd had already existed for a couple of rebels in South Africa had been treated George or anybody else resigning. years. The government also gave earlier in the war is sharp. A few months later, in December thought to the ideal of applying con- Asquith promptly visited Ireland to , Lloyd George became Prime scription to Ireland, which had escaped examine the situation on the spot. On Minister of a reconstituted Coalition it thus far. his return, he entrusted to the ever-re- government. The new Ministry, unlike There were anguished debates in the sourceful Lloyd George the task of en- its predecessor, did not include either Cabinet about the likely effects of Irish gineering a political settlement that Asquith or his closest followers, and the conscription, and various men who might somehow repair the damage. Prime Minister’s dependence on Un- were not Cabinet members were in- Like the rest of his party, Lloyd George ionist support was obvious. vited to give their own views on the was a Home Ruler; but, as has been Meanwhile, the situation in Ireland matter. Broadly, the military men ad- noted, ‘the cause of Irish home rule was was deteriorating rapidly. vised in favour, whilethose who were never one that roused (his) enthusiasm who would have rejoiced at Home concerned with preserving peace in or fighting spirit, nor was he particu- Rule a couple of years earlier were Ireland advised against. Field Marshal larly interested in Irish affairs.’ This as- now coming to demand complete Lord French thought that it could be sessment is important in explaining separation from Britain. On  Febru- worked ‘with a slight augmentation of Lloyd George’s behaviour not only on ary , a by-election in the appar- the existing troops in Ireland’, and a this occasion but throughout his career. ently rock-solid Nationalist seat of somewhat similar view was taken by Unlike all Irish politicians in all parties, North Roscommon resulted in a sen- General Sir Bryan Mahon, the Com- and many British politicians as well, his sational victory for Count Plunkett, mander in Chief in Ireland. By contrast, overriding concern was not to produce father of one of the executed Dublin General Byrne, head of the Royal Irish some particular constitutional result in rebels. Technically, Plunkett was an in- Constabulary, ‘had no doubt that (it) Ireland, but to do other things. While dependent but the platform on which would be a mistake; that by passing and

24 Journal of Liberal Democrat History 33 Winter 2001–02 us to keep troops in Ireland… I cannot think of any Liberal doctrine, and I do not think there is any Unionist doc- trine, which would justify the applica- tion of conscription to this country and not to Ireland’. The legislation the Prime Minister was seeking would not by itself apply conscription to Ireland. That could only be done by later issuing Orders in Council which would be authorised under the legislation. In practice, the government might very well decide not to issue such an Order at all. Lloyd George had hoped that the Convention which had been established some months earlier would report in a way which would render it possible to make a package deal under which Ireland re- ceived Home Rule and also accepted conscription. The Convention’s con- clusions were published while the par- liamentary debate was in progress. They were reached by a thoroughly uncon- vincing majority of forty-four to twenty-nine, and gave little hope for progress on those lines. It was immediately obvious that conscription would raise strong oppo- sition from all Irish parties except the Unionists – and, as has been seen, even Carson was profoundly doubtful about the wisdom of the measure. When the matter came before the House of The Kindest Cut of All Commons, Asquith warned that it Welsh Wizard: ‘I now proceed to cut this map into two parts and place them in the hat. would be ‘an act of terrible short- After a suitable interval they will be found to have come together of their own accord – sightedness’. On  April, there was an (aside) – at least let’s hope so; I’ve never done this trick before.’ (Punch, 10 March 1920) important debate on the proposal dur- ing the Committee stage of the gov- enforcing such a measure… The scription to Ireland. In fact they de- ernment’s Bill. The Conservative leader Catholics and Nationalists of Ireland cided in favour, and Lloyd George him- Bonar Law, speaking on behalf of the would be united against the British self gave the reason to his colleagues. Coalition Ministry, had already made it Empire’. H.E. Duke (later Lord His main concern does not appear to clear that if the government did not get Merrivale), Chief Secretary for Ireland have been with the number of Irish its way, it would resign. Asquith was put and a Unionist, thought that ‘we might men who might be enlisted, what de- on the spot, declaring that ‘if we were as well recruit Germans’. He believed gree of loyalty they might show, or in conditions which even in time of that the result would be ‘the loss of Ire- what the immediate and long-term war were normal or anything like nor- land’. The Lord Chief Justice of Ireland consequences might be in Ireland, but mal, I should not hesitate for a moment considered that application of con- rather with the apparent necessity to be to support and as far as I could give ef- scription to his country would be ‘at seen to apply conscription to Ireland, in fect to the opinions which I expressed the cost of tremendous bloodshed’, and order to make the new arrangements by appropriate parliamentary action’. In Sir Edward Carson indicated ‘that the acceptable in Britain. As he told the other words, he would have liked to number of reliable men that could be Cabinet, ‘I do not believe it possible in vote against the proposal but felt bound got would be very small, as at least two this country to tear industry apart, to to abstain because the war was at such a thirds would be anti-British’. take fathers of  and upwards for the critical stage. The government’s pro- Faced with such opinions, the gov- forces… without deep resentment at posal was carried on the crucial divi- ernment might have been expected to the spectacle of sturdy young Catholics sion by  votes to , plus two tell- drop the whole idea of applying con- in Ireland… drilling… and compelling ers each way. The minority included

Journal of Liberal Democrat History 33 Winter 2001–02 25 forty-two Liberals, sixty-four National- period of the campaign were very servatives – in effect, against any Coali- ists, five Independent Nationalists, six complex, but the upshot was that the tion Liberal – and promised Headquar- Labour and one Unionist. Asquith and Coalition secured a huge majority, and ters support. The split was not a sim- his leading supporters duly abstained. over two-thirds of those Coalition MPs ple division between ‘right’ and ‘left’, Inevitably, Parliament authorised the were Unionists. There were some as- between purists and trimmers, or even extension of conscription to Ireland. It tonishing casualties. Asquith and his between admirers of Asquith and ad- was never possible to enforce Irish con- principal followers had not been sup- mirers of Lloyd George. Each group scription; but the very threat of it alien- ported by the Coalition, and all were contained people who would eventu- ated Irish opinion even further. By this defeated. Of  new MPs, only thirty ally become Conservatives (actually or time, no doubt many young Irishmen had been returned without Coalition for practical purposes), people who had decided that – if fight they must – support. A few even of that little band would eventually join Labour and peo- they would rather fight to drive the might be regarded as Coalitionists at ple who would remain Liberals. Each British from Ireland than to drive the heart. The , with sixty group also contained people who were Germans from Belgium. MPs, made substantial advances; but quite prepared to give their putative The effect of the argument over most of its acknowledged leaders were leader a rough ride. Irish conscription on the Liberal Party defeated. In Ireland, the results were The  compromise provided that was profound. Many Liberal MPs, even even more sensational. Sinn Fein won the Government of Ireland Act would those who were not pacifists, had been seventy-three seats, the Unionists come automatically into effect as soon feeling increasingly alienated from the twenty-three. The Nationalists were re- as the last Peace Treaty was signed. This Coalition for a long time, and the fact duced to six (they held a seventh seat in was palpably out of the question. Sinn that so many of them were prepared to a Liverpool constituency). Only two Fein, commanding nearly three-quar- vote against the Lloyd George govern- territorial constituencies in the three ters of the Irish constituencies, was ment on an issue of confidence, when southern resisted pledged not to attend Westminster at all. Asquith advised abstention, was re- the Sinn Fein tide; Waterford City, Instead the elected members consti- markable. It is possible – though it where John Redmond’s son retained tuted themselves the Dail Eireann, and would be difficult to prove this – that his father’s seat by a small majority, and met in Dublin on  January . Asquith and his principal supporters Rathmines, a wealthy constituency Some Sinn Feiners had been elected for now realised that their own authority near Dublin, which returned a Union- more than one constituency, or were in over the non-Lloyd Georgeite mem- ist. Two Labour Unionists and an Inde- prison, so in all only  people an- bers of their Party would disappear un- pendent completed the Irish tally. swered the call. less they were prepared to come out The division between pro-Coalition On the very day that the Dail met, unambiguously against the Coalition and anti-Coalition Liberals became in- two policemen were shot dead in Co. on some suitable issue. This may explain creasingly sharp as time went on. Early Tipperary. Thereafter, violence escalated Asquith’s decision to divide the House in , the non-Coalition Liberals set rapidly. The , who – and the Liberal Party – on the more up their own House of Commons or- had been formed before the war in order famous, but much less clear-cut, ganisation, with Sir Donald Maclean as to enforce Home Rule legislation Maurice issue, just four weeks after the Chairman. It is not clear how they against possible violent resistance from Irish conscription vote. If that is so, should be labelled. They usually called Unionists, transformed themselves into then Irish conscription was of massive themselves ‘Independent Liberals’ – in- the Irish Republican Army, or IRA. importance for the whole future of the dependent, that is, of the Coalition. A Liberal, Ian Macpherson (later Liberal Party. People often called them ‘Asquithians’, Lord Strathcarron) became Chief Sec- On  November  the Armi- though some were by no means happy retary for Ireland in January , at stice was signed, and Lloyd George with Asquith’s leadership. Contempo- almost the very moment when the promptly called a new general election. raries sometimes nicknamed them Dail first met and a new wave of vio- The Prime Minister’s original hope had ‘Wee Frees’, after a small and exclusive lence began. Dealing with violence been that the government which he Scottish sect. The Wee Frees regarded was not MacPherson’s forte at all, but headed would be an almost universal themselves as an Opposition party: in- he was actively employed in working Coalition. Such hopes were dashed. deed, for procedural purposes Maclean out a political solution for ‘the trou- Asquith had already been invited to rather than the Labour Chairman was bles’. In December , the govern- join, and was offered the attractive pros- treated as de facto Leader of the oppo- ment considered three possible long- pect of nominating several Ministers, sition. Early in  Asquith himself term solutions to the Irish problem. but he refused to lead his followers into was returned to Parliament in a sensa- The simplest was that a parliament government. When the election was tional by-election. Soon afterwards, should be set up for Ireland, but that announced, Labour decided to with- Maclean declared that independent the six most Protestant counties of Ul- draw from the Coalition. Lloyd Liberals should be ‘at complete liberty ster should be allowed to vote them- George’s only substantial partners were to run a candidate’ wherever the Liberal selves out of the arrangements, and re- therefore the Conservatives. candidate or Liberal Association had main part of the . Electoral arrangements during the reached an arrangement with the Con- The second was to set up two Irish

26 Journal of Liberal Democrat History 33 Winter 2001–02 parliaments, one for all the nine coun- successor, the last man to occupy that ernment of Ireland Act. Elections were ties of Ulster, the other for the remain- ‘graveyard of political reputations’, was held in May . In the South, Sinn ing three provinces of Ireland. The another Liberal, Sir Hamar Green- Fein was returned unopposed every- third was a variant of this, under which wood, who moved into the Conserva- where except for the four Dublin Uni- only the six most Protestant counties tive Party a few years later. versity seats. They refused to participate would be represented in the northern Greenwood did not find the task of in the Southern parliament, just as it parliament. The Cabinet inclined to- dealing with a violent Irish campaign had refused to attend Westminster. The wards a two parliament solution, with- particularly uncongenial. The Royal southern parliament was dead in the out committing itself strongly to ei- Irish Constabulary was seriously de- water, but the elected candidates were ther variant. To please those people, pleted in numbers, and Greenwood treated as members of a new Dail. Irish or British, who hated the idea of filled the vacant places with men re- In the northern parliament, ‘the partitioning Ireland and leaving sub- cruited in Britain – mostly ex-soldiers, Stormont’, the Unionists had, predict- stantial disaffected minorities on both and sometimes ex-convicts. They con- ably, a huge majority. For the fifty-two sides of the border, a Council of Ire- stituted the notorious ‘Black-and-Tans’, seats, forty Ulster Unionists, six Nation- land would also be established, to deal who were linked to another body, the alists and six Sinn Feiners were returned. with common problems, and in the Auxiliaries (‘Auxies’), composed As Berkley Farr describes in the article hope of ultimately reuniting the coun- mainly of ex-officers. The Dail had lit- which follows, a pattern was set for try. Some MPs from both parts of the tle control over the IRA, and the Brit- politics which would country would continue to be elected ish government did not have much persist for half a century, and which ap- to Westminster. Macpherson took over the Black-and-Tans. So atrocities plied not only to people elected to the charge of the early stages of the gov- and counter-atrocities became the rule. Stormont, but to those elected to West- ernment’s Bill. In November , Asquith charged minster as well. Party allegiance was de- Nationalists and Sinn Feiners were Greenwood with pursuing a policy of fined essentially on sectarian lines. In uniformly hostile. Ulster Unionists at ‘reprisals’. One writer sagely observed practice, Ulster Unionists cooperated first reserved judgement, but then that Greenwood’s ‘stonewalling state- closely with Conservatives. swung in favour. This support, however, ments (in Parliament) were not unfairly The King was set to open the new was something of an embarrassment to caricatured as ‘there is no such thing as Northern Ireland parliament on  the government, for the Ulstermen reprisals, but they have done a great June . Shortly before he did so, he made it abundantly clear that they pro- deal of good’’. had discussions with the great South posed to make permanent, It is not difficult to visualise the ef- African statesman Jan Smuts, who which vitiated any remote chance of fect which all this was having on the urged him to make a ringing appeal for selling the idea to the other side. Liberals, whether Coalitionist (‘Coalie’) reconciliation. After the draft of the Asquith, who had by this time returned or Wee Free. They were sickened by to the House of Commons, came out the atrocities on both sides, and Lloyd George and Lord Derby (Secretary against the partition proposals in March memories of the old Home Rule bat- of State for War, 1916–18) . He drew attention to the atti- tles were revived. The division be- tude of the Ulster Unionists, whose tween the two Liberal groups was no principal spokesman had very recently longer a somewhat abstract argument made it plain that he could not envisage over whether the best interests of Lib- Irish unification taking place ‘within eralism would be served by a tactical the lifetime of any man in the House’. Coalition or by total independence. Asquith also raised a great issue which More and more issues of policy were would attract growing interest as time appearing on which Wee Frees took went on, proposing that Ireland should one view and Coalies a different one; be granted the status of a self-governing but disputes over the Irish question , like Canada or Australia. stirred the Liberal Party to its depths. This plan would allow provision to be When the National Liberal Federation made for Ulster – comparable, one met at Bradford later in November, might say, with the considerable au- this proved the occasion for an anti- tonomy enjoyed by the Canadian Prov- Coalition demonstration. A small inces or the Australian States. number of Coalie MPs and a few Progress of the Bill through parlia- other Coalitionist delegates were ment was protracted, but public interest heavily defeated when they sought to concentrated much more on the vio- amend a resolution condemning the lent episodes which were taking place. Irish reprisals. MacPherson retired from the post of The government’s proposal for two Chief Secretary in April , becom- Irish parliaments eventually passed into ing Minister of Pensions instead. His law at the end of , as a new Gov-

Journal of Liberal Democrat History 33 Winter 2001–02 27 speech had been vetted by others, in- by far the most liberal enactment in earlier, had witnessed a bloody war cluding Lloyd George, it was duly de- modern history ……Where Parnell conducted ruthlessly by a Liberal livered, and received an eager positive struck against granite, where Chief Secretary against a much more response almost everywhere. Gladstone failed, where Asquith as intransigent . But what was to happen in the party leader never had a chance, this Very soon, the viability of the com- South, where the proposed parliament Coalition achieves success … promise was called into question. The was obviously not going to function? split in the Dail led to a new kind of If success it was, the credit certainly Lloyd George acted over Greenwood’s shooting war in Ireland, this time be- goes overwhelmingly to the Prime head and on  July  a truce was tween Catholic ‘Free Staters’ who re- Minister himself. Like Gladstone with concluded between the British au- luctantly accepted the new arrange- the Irish Land Act of , Lloyd thorities and Sinn Fein. Thereafter ments and Catholic Republicans who George secured his Irish achievement there were innumerable discussions in- repudiated it. The Free Staters won; but through by-passing his Chief Secre- volving Irish leaders and members of it had not been a foregone conclusion tary. The Lloyd George Liberal Magazine, the British government. By this time that they would. Not until  did the dealing with the critical period of the Lloyd George himself was veering to- intransigents consent to enter the Dail, settlement, did not consider Green- wards the idea of some sort of ‘Domin- and ten years after that the Treaty was wood worthy even of a reference in its ion’ model for the whole of Ireland. for practical purposes abrogated under index. Bonar Law, the Conservative leader, the new Eire constitution. Asquith approved of the settlement. ruled it out, and the idea was dropped. What a tragedy for all concerned ‘No one has more reason than we have In the end, the Prime Minister fell back that Gladstone’s original Home Rule to rejoice over that agreement’, he told on a second line. The division between proposals had been rejected in . a Liberal demonstration January North and South would be accepted as . He could hardly resist going on permanent, but the South would be es- Roy Douglas is an Emeritus Reader of the to point out that the agreement was tablished as a Dominion, with the ex- University of Surrey and author of A His- remarkably similar to what he had ception of certain naval bases consid- tory of the Liberal Party  –  been proposing for a couple of years. ered vital for British defence. Eventu- Nor could he resist commenting on ally, representatives of the Dail were 1 Asquith to King (draft) 24.vii. 14, Asquith pa- the failure of Liberal Coalitionists to faced with an ultimatum. Accept a pers 7, Bodleian Library, Oxford, pp. 147 – 48. condemn Greenwood for ‘letting 2 Ibid, 27.vii, 149-50. treaty on those lines, or face war in loose his auxiliaries and his Black and 3F.S.L.Lyons, in A New , V1, three days. The Irish delegates decided W.E. Vaughan (ed), Oxford, 1996, p. 144 Tans in their retaliatory campaign of to recommend acceptance. 4F.S.L.Lyons: John Dillon: a biography, London, arson and outrage’. 1968, p. 373. The necessary legislation passed the And yet few people really liked the 5 George Boyce, in Lloyd George: twelve essays, House of Commons by  votes to ed. A.J.P.Taylor, London, 1971, p. 137. arrangement. The Southern Catholics, sixty. One hundred Coalies and 6F.S.L.Lyons, in A New History of Ireland, V1, who wanted a sovereign for W.E. Vaughan (ed), Oxford, 1996, p. 221. twenty-four Wee Frees supported the the whole of Ireland, abhorred both 7 See, in particular, War Cabinets 372 (25.iii.18), Bill; just two Coalies opposed it. The partition and the continued link with 373 (26.iii.18), 374 and 375 (both 27.iii.18), 376 Unionists were more split:  support- (28.iii.18) and 377 (29.iii.18). CAB 23/5, P.R.O. the Crown. The Northern Protestants ing it and fifty-three voting against. Of Lloyd George’s War Memoirs, London, 1936, would probably have preferred to re- vol 2, pp. 1597-1601, gives a remarkably objec- the minority, seventeen sat for Ulster main fully integrated in the United tive account of the problems involved. seats and two for Irish University seats. 8War Cabinet 385, 6.iv. CAB 23/6. Kingdom, and had never sought a In the , the critical vote 9 104 H.C.Deb. 53, 2001-6. Division No 16, separate parliament for themselves. 12.iv.18. was on a hostile amendment, which Protestants in the south, and Catholics 10 Memorandum of meeting with Lloyd George was defeated by  to forty-seven. 24.ix.18. Elibank papers 8,804, fo. 193-6. Na- in the north, were particularly ag- Ratification by the Dail was more diffi- tional Library of Scotland. grieved, for they were now powerless 11 See discussions by the present author in The cult, and a bitter debate took place. Not minorities in their respective areas. Background to the ‘Coupon’ election arrange- until  January  did the Dail accept British Conservatives, whose tradi- ments, Eng. Hist. Rev. vol. LXXXVI, No. 339 the Treaty, and then by the unconvinc- (April 1971), pp. 318 – 36, and A classification tional cry had been ‘Union’, were the ing majority of sixty-four to fifty-seven. of the Members of Parliament elected in 1918, dominant members of a government Bull. Inst. Hist. Res. Vol. XLVII No. 115 (May On these terms, the new Irish Free which had thrust upon the unwilling 1974), pp. 74 – 9. State was set up. 12 Liberal Magazine 1920, p. 167. north a measure of Home Rule The Coalitionists, and particularly 13 F.S.L.Lyons, in A New History of Ireland, V1, roughly the same as Redmond and his W.E. Vaughan (ed), Oxford, 1996, p. 240. the Coalition Liberals, rejoiced at the followers had sought for the whole of 14 C 10(19).3.xii.19.CAB 23/18 Irish agreement. ‘As for the Prime 15 See Liberal Magazine, 1920, pp. 233 – 37. Ireland, while the south was receiving Minister’, wrote an author in The Eng- 16 Dictionary of National Biography, 1941 – 45, p. much more self-government than the 325. lish Review, old Nationalists had demanded. British 17 Cited in Lloyd George Liberal Magazine 1922, p. 356. He has won to fame. The settlement Liberals, who had fought shoulder to 18 Liberal Magazine 1922, p. 48. is the greatest achievement of his life, shoulder for Home Rule eight years

28 Journal of Liberal Democrat History 33 Winter 2001–02