Assessment Summary Sheet for UKAB Meeting on 16th Sep 2015

Total Risk A Risk B Risk C Risk D Risk E 20 7 6 4 1 2

Aircraft 1 Aircraft 2 Airspace ICAO Airprox Cause (Type) (Type) (Class) Risk

The TMA (NE) controller’s inadvertent instruction led to the EMB190 pilot descending in to conflict with the ATR42. Contributory: 1. The Thames controller missed the EMB190 pilot’s altitude report. 2. Mode S garbling. 3. Thames controller ATR42 EMB190 London TMA 2015055 distraction whilst making an C (CAT) (Civ Trg) (A) operational call with Southend. 4. Neither controller were practised in the implications of the Southend airspace change. Recommendation: The CAA and NATS plc review the process of the introduction of the Southend CTR.

L410 BE20 London FIR The L410 and the BE200 pilots 2015066 B (CAT) (Civ Pte) (G) flew into conflict.

ASK13 PA28 London FIR Effectively, a non-sighting by both 2015067 A (HQ Air Trg) (Civ Pte) (G) pilots.

The EC145 pilot flew close enough to the Chinook to cause Chinook EC145 London City CTR its pilot concern. 2015069 C (JHC) (NPAS) (D) Contributory: The EC145 pilot did not communicate his intentions to the Chinook crew.

The C208 crew allowed the parachutists to jump despite being informed of the approaching C208 C182 London FIR 2015070 C182. B (Civ Comm) (Civ Pte) (G) Contributory: The C182 pilot flew through a promulgated and active parachute jump site.

C525 DR400 London FIR The C525 pilot was concerned by 2015071 C (Civ Comm) (Civ Pte) (G) the proximity of the DR400.

A320 London TMA Probably a spurious aircraft 2015073 Unknown D (CAT) (A) indication.

C182 A109 London FIR The Oxford controller perceived a 2015075 E (Civ Trg) (Civ Comm) (G) conflict. Aircraft 1 Aircraft 2 Airspace ICAO Airprox Cause (Type) (Type) (Class) Risk

Tucano ASW20 A late sighting by the Tucano pilot London FIR 2015077 (HQ Air Trg) (Civ Pte) and effectively a non-sighting by C (G) the glider pilot.

LS8 Squirrel London FIR A late sighting by both pilots. 2015078 B (Civ Club) (HQ Air Trg) (G)

Effectively, a non-sighting by the Squirrel Glider London FIR 2015080 Squirrel pilot and a probable non- A (HQ Air Trg) (Unknown) (G) sighting by the glider pilot.

Lynx RANS S-6 London FIR Effectively, a non-sighting by both 2015081 A (JHC) (Civ Pte) (G) pilots.

B757 Drone Manchester TMA The reported drone was flown into 2015082 B (CAT) (Unknown) (A) conflict with the B757.

RV6 Drone London FIR The reported drone was flown into 2015084 B (Civ Pte) (Unknown) (G) conflict with the RV6.

Cavalon The drone was flown into conflict Drone London FIR 2015086 Autogyro with the autogyro. A (Unknown) (G) (Civ Trg)

The PA28 pilot flew into conflict with the Glasair. Glasair PA28 Sleap ATZ 2015087 Contributory: The PA28 pilot did A (Civ Pte) (Civ Pte) (G) not conform to the ‘Standard Overhead Join’ procedure.

A non-sighting by the DA42 pilot Sea King DA42 London FIR 2015089 and effectively a non-sighting by A (JHC) (Civ Trg) (G) the Sea King crew.

EV97 Drone Welshpool ATZ The drone was flown into conflict 2015096 B (Civ Pte) (Unknown) (G) with the EV97.

RV8 C172 Oban ATZ The AFISO perceived a conflict 2015102 E (Civ Pte) (Civ Trg) (G) between the RV8 and the C172.

RJ1 Drone London TMA The reported drone was flown into 2015106 A (CAT) (Unknown) (A) conflict with the RJ1. AIRPROX REPORT No 2015055

Date: 23 Apr 2015 Time: 13.40Z Position: 5136N 00001E Location: 5nm SE Lambourne VOR

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded Aircraft 1 Aircraft 2 Aircraft ATR42 EMB190 Operator CAT Civ Trg Airspace London TMA London TMA Class A A Rules IFR IFR Service Radar Control Radar Control Provider TMA Departures (NE) Thames Radar Altitude/FL 3700ft 4000ft Transponder A,C,S A,C,S Reported Colours Blue/white Blue/white/red Lighting HISL/Nav/Landing HISL/Landing Conditions VMC VMC Visibility 6KM NK Altitude/FL 3700ft 4000ft Altimeter QNH (1019hPa) NK Heading 021° NK Speed 210kt NK ACAS/TAS TCAS II TCAS II Alert Nil Nil Separation Reported 300ft V/2nm H NK V/NK H Recorded 600ft V/2.1nm H

THE ATR42 PILOT reports outbound from London City Airport (LCY) on a LYD 5U SID climbing to 4000ft. Once established on the BIG 021° radial, he was instructed by ATC to descend immediately to 3000ft and to turn right onto 090°.

He assessed the risk of collision as ‘Low’.

THE EMB190 PILOT reports inbound to LCY on a training flight. He was given a heading change with the phrase ‘avoiding action’. He complied with the instruction, there was no TCAS alert and no other aircraft was seen.

He assessed the risk of collision as ‘None’.

THE TMA DEPARTURES (NE) CONTROLLER reports that the planned release of the EMB190 to Thames Radar was subtly different to ‘normal’ in that it was for a descent to 5000ft only (see UKAB Note below). He issued a final heading and level to the aircraft, but missed the fact that the level was different to ‘normal’ and instructed the EMB190 to descend to 4000ft before then transferring the aircraft to Thames Radar. On then noticing an outbound aircraft climbing to 4000ft, he made a priority call to Thames Radar to point out the situation.

[UKAB Note: deconfliction procedures for inbound and outbound traffic to LCY had recently changed as a result of the introduction of the Southend CTR/CTA; previously, inbound aircraft were descended to 4000ft and outbound aircraft were climbed to 3000ft but, because of the introduction of the airspace, this had been changed to 5000ft and 4000ft respectively].

THE THAMES RADAR CONTROLLER reports co-ordinating with the TMA (NE) Controller that the EMB190 would descend to 5000ft. When the pilot checked in, he recalled circling the ‘5’ on his flight Airprox 2015055 progress strip but couldn’t fully recall what the pilot reported as his clearance limit. The ATR42 pilot then called in and was cleared to climb to 4000ft to provide 1000ft separation against the EMB190, which he expected to stop descent at 5000ft. The priority line then rang pointing out the EMB190 had actually been cleared to 4000ft. He checked the EMB190’s Mode S readout (which was garbling with other aircraft on the display) to confirm the cleared level – Mode S was indicating 4000ft. He then gave avoiding action to the EMB190, together with traffic information.

Factual Background

The London city weather at the time was:

METAR EGLC 231550Z 09007KT 050V110 CAVOK 15/06 Q1017

Analysis and Investigation

CAA ATSI

ATSI had access to reports from both aircraft, the Thames Radar controller and the NE Radar Controller, the area radar recordings and transcription of the Thames radar frequencies and telephone coordination. ATSI also had access to the unit investigation summary. Screenshots produced in the report are provided using the area radar recordings. Levels indicated are in altitude.

The ATR42 was operating IFR on a commercial passenger flight from LCY, and was in receipt of a Radar Control Service from Thames Radar on frequency 132.700MHz. The EMB190 was operating IFR on a training flight to LCY and, at the time of the Airprox, was also in receipt of a Radar Control Service from Thames Radar on frequency 132.700MHz, having just been transferred from the North East departures controller (NE).

At 1335:28, telephone coordination took place between the Thames Radar Controller and the North East Departures Co-ordinator (NE). During this coordination it was agreed that the EMB190 would leave the LAM (VOR) on a heading of 140°and descend to 5000ft. The NE controller reported that normal practice had been to descend such traffic to 4000ft and, at 1336:48, the EMB190 pilot was instructed to descend to 4000ft by the NE controller, despite the recent coordination limiting the descent to 5000ft. The pilot was subsequently instructed to change frequency to Thames Radar.

At 1338:50 the EMB190 pilot reported descending to 4000ft on the Thames Radar frequency. At the time, the controller was just completing telephone coordination with Southend Airport when the EMB190 reported on frequency. The controller acknowledged the call, issued a speed reduction, but did not assimilate the unexpected 4000ft reference by the pilot. The Thames Radar controller reported marking his flight progress strip (FPS) by circling a ‘5’, to indicate the level that had previously been coordinated.

At 1339:08 the ATR42 pilot reported onto the Thames Radar frequency, climbing to 3000ft having just departed from LCY. The controller responded by instructing the pilot to climb to 4000ft, as he believed the EMB190 was descending to 5000ft.

At 1339:57 a low-level Short Term Conflict Alert (STCA) activated as indicated in Figure 1. As this occurred, the North East controller made a priority phone call to the Thames Radar Controller and apologised that the EMB190 was descending to 4000ft. The Thames Radar controller stated in his written report that he had not seen the Mode S indication of a cleared level of 4000ft prior to this due to garbling of squawks. This is also evident in Figure 1 (although prior to this screenshot the aircraft data-block was green and blended with the other contacts to an even greater extent).

2 Airprox 2015055

Figure 1 (1339:57)

At 1340:07 the Thames Radar controller issued avoiding action instructions to the ATR42, which was instructed to stop climb and descend to 3000ft. The EMB190 was then given an avoiding action left turn and passed traffic information. At 1340:30 the required 1000ft vertical and/or 3nm horizontal separation was lost (Figure 2).

Figure 2 (1340:30)

CPA of 2.1 miles and 600ft occurred at 1340:52 as shown in Figure 3.

Figure 3 (1340:52)

3 Airprox 2015055

The NE controller descended the EMB190 to 4000ft in accordance with previous practice, forgetting that coordination had been made to stop the descent at 5000ft. The EMB190 was then transferred to the next controller – Thames Radar. The Thames Radar controller had coordinated a descent for the EMB190 to 5000ft so was expecting this report from the pilot when he reported on frequency. Although the pilot clearly stated descending to 4000ft, the controller missed the level report and marked his strip to indicate 5000ft. The fact that he was just completing a phone call at the time could have been a distraction.

As the EMB190 continued its descent, the Thames Radar controller did not notice the 4000ft cleared level on the radar data block, because (as he reported) there was garbling with other labels from aircraft below controlled airspace (Figure 1). The activation of the STCA brought the situation to the attention of both the NE controller and the Thames Radar controller. The Thames Radar controller commenced avoiding action to both aircraft immediately following a brief telephone call with the NE controller.

UKAB Secretariat

Because both aircraft were operating under IFR in Class A airspace, the controller was responsible for maintaining the prescribed 1000ft vertical and/or 3nm horizontal separation. In pure collision avoidance terms, both pilots remained equally responsible for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard1. Notwithstanding ATC instruction otherwise2, the incident geometry is considered as converging and the EMB190 pilot was ultimately required to give way to the ATR423 if they had come into close proximity.

Summary

An Airprox occurred at 16:52 on Thursday 23rd April between an EMB190 and an ATR42 in the vicinity of LCY. Both aircraft were under a Radar Control service, and both aircraft received avoiding action from the Thames radar controller, which resolved the situation.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from the pilots of both aircraft, transcripts of the relevant RT frequencies, radar photographs/video recordings, reports from the air traffic controllers involved and reports from the appropriate ATC and operating authorities.

The Board quickly agreed that this event hinged around the fact that both aircraft had evidently been mistakenly cleared to the same level. There then ensued an extended debate amongst the members as to the potential human factors and organisational aspects of this mistake. Specifically, the Board noted that although coordination had been agreed between the two qualified and experienced controllers for the EMB190 pilot to descend to 5000ft, the NE controller had then gone on to instruct the EMB190 pilot to descend to 4000ft before handing him over to the Thames controller, who did not assimilated the EMB190 pilot’s reporting of the incorrect altitude on his initial call. A controller member with knowledge of this incident informed the Board that the changes in airspace that had been introduced as a result of the introduction of the Southend CTR/CTA had required the modification of previous deconfliction measures between aircraft arriving and departing LCY. In the past, departing aircraft had been climbed to 3000ft, whilst arriving aircraft had been correspondingly coordinated in descent to 4000ft. It was explained that on 2nd April (some 21days before the event) the CAA had introduced the Southend CTR/CTA, which extended up to 3500ft near to the LCY CTA. This meant that, without positive control, southbound departures that had previously been climbed to only 3000ft were now in danger of penetrating the Southend CTA. The member explained that various methods of tackling this problem had been employed by different controller shifts such as issuing a heading to avoid the airspace, or climbing the aircraft above the airspace, as happened in

1 SERA.3205 Proximity. 2 SERA.8005 Operation of air traffic control service. 3 SERA.3210 Right-of-way (c) (2) Converging.

4 Airprox 2015055 this instance. These methods were new (in respect of the Southend airspace change) and both controllers concerned in the incident had not controlled, due to annual leave and other commitments, since the introduction of the Southend CTR/CTA – the incident occurred close to the start of their first shift. The controller member noted that the perception of the controllers was that, although they had been informed of the impending airspace changes, it was perceived within the operational environment that the introduction had been rushed; it was reported that although training was given in the form of briefings and written instructions, simulator time was only provided if it had been specifically requested by an individual controller (which had been taken up by some, but not all, of the controllers).

For their part, the NATS representative subsequently reported that the London Southend airspace change had been implemented by the unit some three weeks before the Airprox, and that in their opinion the airspace change was therefore not contributory to the Airprox event. They stated that NATS had fully complied with all the necessary processes to support the implementation of the London Southend changes into their operation. They also confirmed that NATS had obtained specific agreement from the CAA to offer simulated familiarisation to any controller who believed they would benefit from undertaking a simulated exercise of the new airspace procedures. This offer was made to all appropriately valid controllers and was accepted by some. The same briefing material and instructions were provided to all five Terminal Control watches. Because Swanwick is a very large unit, NATS commented that significant lead times are required to prepare for change, including the need to consider and prepare any specific briefing or training material for operational staff.

The Board noted the differing perspectives of how the airspace had been introduced and it’s bearing on the Airprox. Members also noted that this had been the first shift that these controllers had operated after the change and that, although written instructions and briefings had been given, simulator training was not a mandatory part of the introduction. They therefore concluded that the lack of familiarity with the new airspace may have been a factor in the Airprox in that, under the pressure of their first experience with the change, the controllers may have unconsciously reverted to many years of previous practice and transmitted and heard what they expected, rather than what they had agreed to in their coordination. The Mode S garbling and the distracting phone call with Southend were also considered to be contributory factors in this respect.

Thankfully, the safety barriers of STCA and the call from the NE controller had highlighted the problem to the Thames controller, and this had led to timely and effective avoiding action being taken. The Board therefore assessed the risk as Category C. Notwithstanding, the Board had sufficient questions over the fact that neither controller appeared to be sufficiently practised with the new airspace’s implications that they recommended that the CAA and NATS review the process of the introduction of the Southend CTR/CTA so that lessons may be identified for future airspace changes.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CAUSE AND RISK

Cause: The TMA (NE) controller’s inadvertent instruction led to the EMB190 pilot descending into conflict with the ATR42.

Contributory Factor(s):

1. The Thames controller missed the EMB190 pilot’s altitude report. 2. Mode S garbling. 3. Thames controller distraction whilst making an operational call with Southend. 4. Neither controller were practised in the implications of the Southend airspace change.

Degree of Risk: C.

Recommendation(s): The CAA and NATS plc review the process of the introduction of the Southend CTR/CTA.

5 AIRPROX REPORT No 2015066

Date: 11 May 2015 Time: 0819Z Position: 5202N 00022W Location: Nr Ledbury

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Aircraft 1 Aircraft 2 Recorded Aircraft L410 BE20 Operator CAT Civ Pte Airspace London FIR London FIR Class G G Rules IFR VFR Service Procedural Basic Provider Gloster Gloster Altitude/FL FL52 FL55 Transponder A,C,S NK Reported Colours White NK Lighting NK NK Conditions IMC VMC Visibility In cloud NK Altitude/FL FL50 NK Altimeter 1013hPa NK Heading 330° NK Speed 130kt NK ACAS/TAS TCAS II NK Alert RA N/A Separation Reported 200ft V/0m H NK Recorded 300ft V/0.4nm H

THE L410 PILOT reports climbing out from Glostershire airport, IMC passing FL50, when the controller passed Traffic Information on opposite direction VFR traffic. He received a TCAS RA to stop climb and initiate descent, which he followed. At the nearest point, the TCAS indicated the other traffic 200ft overhead but, being IMC, the pilot did not see it.

He assessed the risk of collision as ‘High’.

THE BE20 PILOT didn’t file a full report; however, he reported by e-mail that he was flying VFR in VMC, and the weather at the time was scattered broken layers. Once he had contacted Gloster Approach, they informed him of the outbound traffic and advised that its climb rate would prevent any conflict. He assumed that the other aircraft would have TCAS and would react accordingly. He saw the other aircraft emerge from the scattered cloud on a reciprocal heading about a mile away and so he elected to turn right to mitigate any further confliction. He had to make a fairly steep bank angle to avoid cloud to maintain VFR. He later understood that although Gloster were referring to a radar screen, they were unable to use it for Traffic Information, and that Western Radar declined to offer the IFR traffic a radar service: he opined that it seemed there was a lot of information available that was denied to either crew, moreover the Gloucestershire area is reasonably busy, but there is no provision for controlling IFR traffic below FL70.

THE GLOSTER CONTROLLER reports that he was the combined ADC and APP controller and was using the radar as a ‘spatial awareness tool’. The L410 was departing from Gloucestershire airport, routing direct to MONTY in the climb to FL80, and was pre-noted to Western Radar. The controller could see from the DF trace that the L410 was tracking approximately 335°. London Information called to pre-note the BE20, inbound and under a Basic Service, they advised that he was 14nm NW of Shobdon, and the Gloster frequency was passed. Generic Traffic Information was given to the

1

Airprox 2015066

L410 on the BE20. After a few minutes the controller asked the assistant to call London Information because the BE20 pilot had not yet called on frequency; they were given Traffic Information on the L410 and asked to send the BE20 over to the Gloster frequency. The BE20 pilot duly called inbound at FL95 and requested a Basic Service. DF indicated that he was on a bearing of 330° and he was passed Traffic Information on the departing L410. The L410 pilot was given an update on the inbound traffic and its level, and Traffic Information was updated to both pilots regularly. Because of the limitations of the radar the controller then called Western Radar to ask if they could see the inbound traffic and they advised that it was approximately 10nm north of the L410 and appeared to be descending. The Gloster controller asked the Western controller for a radar heading for the L410, but the Western controller declined as, in accordance with their service provision, they were unable to give a radar service below FL70. The Gloster controller once again gave updated Traffic Information to both pilots. He reported that the effective primary radar range to the NW was only about 15nm, and as the primary contact that was believed to be the L410 approached the edge of the radar cover, a weak contact appeared in close proximity. This was believed to be the inbound aircraft, and Traffic Information was given immediately because the proximity of the two contacts indicated a risk of collision. The contact believed to be the BE20 was seen to make a steep right turn, but neither pilot made any reference to TCAS alerts on the RT. After landing, the pilot of the BE20 was asked whether he was visual with the L410 and he confirmed he was. Recalled that the crew of the L410 subsequently advised by telephone that they had received a TCAS TA.

Factual Background

The weather at Gloster was recorded as:

METAR 0820Z 21010KT 9999 BKN014 15/121016

Analysis and Investigation

CAA ATSI

The Gloucester controller was providing combined Aerodrome and Approach Control without the use of surveillance equipment. The L410 was operating IFR from Gloucester and was in receipt of a Procedural Service from Gloucester. The BE20 was operating VFR to Gloucestershire Airport and was in receipt of a Basic Service from Gloucester. ATSI had access to reports from both aircraft and the Gloucester controller, area radar recordings and transcription of the Gloucester frequencies. During the investigation it was apparent that the R/T recording was not available between 0817:00 and 0821:00 due to a problem with the Gloster recording equipment. Screenshots produced in the report are provided using the area radar recordings, levels indicated are in Flight Levels.

At 0812:03, the L410 received departure clearance to remain outside controlled airspace and route on track to MONTY (a position approximately 70nm north west of Gloucester) climbing to FL75. At 0812:23, the L410 reported ready for departure. At 0813:00, the Gloucester controller phoned Western Radar to ascertain the position of the inbound BE20, which the Gloucester Controller was aware of. The Western Radar controller advised the Gloucester controller that the BE20 was approximately 5 miles north of Shobdon, which itself is approximately 30nm north of Gloucester. During this coordination it was agreed to transfer the BE20 to Gloucester immediately.

At 0813:15 (during the telephone call to Western Radar), the L410 was cleared for take-off by the Gloucester controller. At 0814:30, the BE20 reported on the Gloucester Approach frequency at FL95 and a Basic Service was agreed. The Gloucester controller then passed Traffic Information on the departing L410. At 0815:28, the L410 was provided with a Procedural Service. Traffic Information on the BE20 was then passed to the L410 (Figure 1) as the L410 was passing 1400ft.

2 Airprox 2015066

Figure 1 (0815:28)

At 0816:25, the BE20 reported leaving FL95 and was instructed to report passing FL40 on track for a right base join for RW22 at Gloucester. No further relevant transmissions were recorded until 0824:31. The controller report refers to an additional telephone call to Western Radar during the period 0817:00 to 0821:00, and a subsequent update to Traffic Information being passed based on weak primary contacts converging approximately 15nm north of Gloucester.

At 0819:19 Figure 2 shows the aircraft were 1nm apart and opposite direction. The L410, which was the southerly of the 2 contacts, showed a climb rate of 600ft per minute and was at FL53. The BE20 appeared to be commencing a right turn at this point and passing FL57 in the descent.

Figure 2 (0819:19)

At 0819:39, CPA occurred (0.3nm and 300ft) as the BE20 had turned to the right (Figure 3). The L410 had stopped the climb and descended to 5200ft – the climb rate indicated the L410 had levelled off.

3 Airprox 2015066

Figure 3 (0819:39)

There is no R/T evidence to record what the L410 pilot reported to Gloucester when radar indicated that the climb was arrested. In his written report, the pilot of the L410 reported responding to a TCAS RA. At 0824:31 (after the BE20 had landed at Gloucester), the controller explained to the BE20 pilot that he had not had radar available at the time the L410 passed the BE20, but asked the pilot if he saw the L410 to which the pilot confirmed “Visual with the Let”.

When providing a Procedural Service a controller shall provide Traffic Information if it is considered that a confliction may exist on other known traffic; however, there is no requirement for deconfliction advice to be passed, and the pilot remains responsible for collision avoidance.1 The BE20 was being provided with a Basic Service and therefore was not participating in the Procedural Service. Accordingly, deconfliction advice (in this case to the L410) shall not be provided against non-participating aircraft.2 Subject to workload, controllers may initiate agreements with aircraft on a Basic Service to restrict their flight profile in order to coordinate them with aircraft in receipt of a Procedural Service. This type of agreement shall be limited to those occasions that a clear confliction exists but is only to be undertaken when the workload permits.3 The pilot of the L410 received a TCAS RA which alerted him to the proximity of BE20, and he complied with the instruction to stop the climb and descend.

The Gloucester controller provided early Traffic Information and reported updating that information when the degree of confliction was checked with Western Radar. The Gloucester controller was also providing an Aerodrome Control Service so their workload would have been greater and the opportunity to restrict the levels of the BE20 may have been limited. Both aircraft were operating in Class G airspace; therefore, the pilots of both aircraft were ultimately responsible for their own collision avoidance having been provided with mutual Traffic Information.

UKAB Secretariat

Both pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard4. If the incident geometry is considered as head-on, or nearly so, then both pilots were required to turn to the right5.

1 CAP 493 Section 1 Ch.12 page 12 2 CAP 493 para 5F.5 Section 1 Ch.12 page 12. 3 CAP 493 para 5F.8 Section 1 Ch 12 page 12. 4 SERA.3205 Proximity. 5 SERA.3210 Right-of-way (c) (1) Approaching head-on.

4 Airprox 2015066

Summary

An Airprox was reported on 11 May 2015 at 0819 between an L410 and a BE20. The L410 was departing Gloucestershire under a Procedural Service and the BE20 was inbound, on a Basic Service. The controller passed Traffic Information to both pilots. The L410, whose pilot was IMC, subsequently received a TCAS RA to stop climb and then descend.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from the L410 pilot, transcripts of the relevant RT frequencies, radar photographs/video recordings, reports from the air traffic controllers involved and reports from the appropriate ATC and operating authorities.

The Board first looked at the actions of the Gloucester controller. He was constrained by the equipment that he had, in that the radar range at Gloucester did not go far enough out for him to see the BE20 inbound. Although he was aware of the BE20’s approximate location, controlling members on the Board agreed that, without having a positive return on his radar, he couldn’t have turned either aircraft in case he made matters worse. The Board noted that he had tried to ask Western Radar for assistance, but that they were unable to offer a radar heading. The Board asked for clarification on why this was so, given that Western Radar had both aircraft on their display. They were informed by the NATS representative that it was due to technical issues with the radar which meant that controllers are unable to provide a radar service below FL70; because of this, they have no terrain clearance charts covering that area, and so cannot provide any control to aircraft below FL70. As a result, although the Weston Controller was able to give Traffic Information because he could see the two aircraft concerned, he wouldn’t have been able to issue a radar heading, because of terrain and the limited radar performance in the area which meant that there may have been other traffic in the vicinity that he couldn’t see.

The Board then wondered whether the Gloucester controller could have used height to separate the aircraft. Acknowledging that he wasn’t required to separate aircraft under a Basic Service from those under a Procedural Service, CAP 493 nevertheless states that if the controller’s workload permits, he can initiate an agreement with aircraft under a Basic Service to provide separation from those under a Procedural Service - in this instance height separation would have seemed appropriate. The Board were aware that the controller was combining ADC and APP controlling positions, but were unable to assess his workload because, disappointingly, the RT recordings were not available for the few minutes surrounding the Airprox.

Turning to the pilots, the Board first looked at the actions of the L410 pilot. The Board wondered whether he was fully aware that, under a Procedural Service, the controller was not obliged to provide separation from anything other than other aircraft under the same service. There was a great deal of discussion about the rules which applied in this situation, and some members of the Board felt that even if he was completely familiar with the rules pertaining to a Procedural Service, the Gloucester controller’s numerous calls of Traffic Information about the BE20 may have led the pilot to believe that some separation was being applied. That said the Board did not wish this to imply that they thought that the Gloucester controller should not have given such comprehensive Traffic Information. It was simply that there was a need to be clear to pilots that there is no such separation being applied under a Procedural Service and, on the assumption that his TCAS would have given him an indication of the conflicting traffic for some time before the RA, the Board thought that it would have been wiser for him to act before he did.

The Board then turned their attention to the actions of the BE20 pilot; in this respect they were disappointed that he had decided not to file a report because more detail about his circumstances may have helped them to understand his situation better. There was a general feeling amongst members that he could also have done more than he did. He was VFR outside controlled airspace, had equal responsibility for averting a collision, and knew that traffic was departing Gloucester on an IFR departure and heading in his direction, yet he seemed to be under the impression that it would avoid him by using its TCAS. Because the RT recordings weren’t available, the Board weren’t able to

5 Airprox 2015066 determine what the controller had said to him to give him the idea that the L410’s rate of climb would keep the two aircraft apart. Such a call would have been highly unusual from a controller that didn’t have access to secondary radar to assess rates of climb but, without the RT recordings, the Board couldn’t decide whether the controller had said something misleading, or the pilot had just misunderstood. The Board also discussed at some length the wisdom of the BE20 pilot being on a Basic Service when, under his own admission, there was obviously a fair amount of cloud around. That being said, other than maintain above FL70 with Western radar, his only alternative in that area was to request a Procedural Service from Gloucester, which might have required him to fly IMC under their control; it was not known whether the pilot had an IMC rating to allow him to accept flight in cloud. As it had been for the L410 pilot, members wondered whether, in receiving comprehensive Traffic Information from the controller, the pilot was led to believe that the controller was separating the two aircraft when, in fact, it was the pilots’ responsibility.

When deciding on the cause of the Airprox, the Board quickly agreed that, irrespective of the fact that the Gloucester controller had provided Traffic Information, both pilots were in Class G airspace and were therefore responsible for their own separation. Moreover, both had received sufficient information to break the confliction well before it became an Airprox and it had been their mutual inaction that had led to the situation developing. Therefore, the Board determined that the cause was that the L410 and the BE20 pilots flew into conflict. Given the head-on nature of the incident, the risk was assessed as B; safety margins had been much reduced.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CAUSE AND RISK

Cause: The L410 and the BE20 pilots flew into conflict.

Degree of Risk: B.

6 AIRPROX REPORT No 2015067

Date: 21 May 2015 Time: 1427Z Position: 5145N 00044W Location: Halton

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded Aircraft 1 Aircraft 2 Aircraft ASK13 PA28 Operator HQ Air (Trg) Civ Pte Airspace London FIR London FIR Class G G Rules VFR VFR Service AGCS Basic Provider Halton Oxford Altitude/FL NK 1900ft Transponder Not fitted A, C, S Reported Colours Red/White Orange Lighting None HISL Conditions VMC VMC Visibility 30km 10km Altitude/FL 2200ft 2000ft Altimeter QFE (1017hPa) NK Heading 060° 104° Speed 40kt 110kt ACAS/TAS FLARM Not fitted Alert Nil N/A Separation Reported <100ft V/0m H 100-200ft V Recorded NK

THE ASK13 PILOT reports soaring around the edge of the Halton ATZ on a heading of approximately 060° after being released from an aero tow at 2000ft. After crossing the railway line, an unknown aircraft passed directly under his aircraft from his 7 o’clock position with less than 100ft vertical separation. He stated that it appeared that the unknown aircraft was following the railway line.

He perceived the severity of the incident as ‘High’.

THE PA28 PILOT reports inbound to Stapleford from the west, maintaining 2000ft to keep below the London TMA. At the time of the incident he was in receipt of a Basic Service from Oxford, and was flying straight and level, squawking an assigned code. He recalls seeing two aircraft around the time of the incident: one, a white glider at a similar height but half a mile away; and another, possibly a glider 100-200ft above, fairly close but behind him in his 7 o’clock position.

He did not assess the risk of collision.

THE OXFORD CONTROLLER did not submit a report

Factual Background

The Halton ATZ is a circle of radius 2nm based on the centre of the airfield and extending up to 2370ft amsl (2000ft AAL).

The Oxford weather at the time of the incident was recorded as follows:

METAR EGKB 211420Z 25009KT 210V300 9999 SCT045 17/04 Q1026

1 Analysis and Investigation

CAA ATSI

The pilot of the glider was receiving an Air/Ground service from Halton Radio. The pilot of the PA28 was receiving a Basic Service from Oxford Radar. RAF Halton is 22nm to the ESE of Oxford Airport. A review of the area radar recording at 1425:00 showed the PA28 17nm to the ESE of Oxford, tracking ESE towards a primary radar contact, 4.8nm directly ahead of the PA28. (Figure 1.)

Figure 1 - 1425:00

At 1426:30 that same primary radar contact had passed clear of the PA28’s track. (Figure 2.)

Figure 2 - 1426:30

At 1427:00 a new primary contact appeared, <1nm to the south east of the PA28. (Figure 3.)

Figure 3 – 1427:00

2

At 1427:27, the distance between the PA28 and the new primary radar contact was <0.1nm, with both tracks converging. (Figure 4.)

Figure 4 - 1427:27 Figure 5 - 1427:34

At 1427:34 both the PA28 and the primary radar contact merged. (Figure 5.)

At 1428:16, the primary radar contact reappeared 1.1nm to the NW of the PA28. (Figure 6.)

Figure 6 - 1428:16

Based on both pilot reports, correlated with the area radar recordings, it is considered highly likely that the primary contact in Figure 3-6 was the glider which reported the Airprox.

At no time whilst the PA28 was in communication with Oxford Radar did it receive any Traffic Information on any other traffic. However, at the time of the Airprox, the Oxford Radar controller was busy taking avoiding action with an inbound aircraft being vectored for an ILS for RW19 at Oxford; he also had a training aircraft in the hold and, including the PA28, 5 aircraft receiving a Basic Service.

At the time of the Airprox the PA28 was over 24nm to the ESE of Oxford Aerodrome and, under a Basic Service, there is no requirement for the controller to monitor the flight.

UKAB Secretariat

Both pilots had equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to fly into such proximity as to create a danger of collision.1 When converging, power-driven heavier-than-air aircraft shall give way to sailplanes.2

1 SERA 3205 (Proximity) 2 SERA 3210 (Right of way)

3 Comments

HQ Air Command

This situation emphasises the requirement for all operators to use all means available to enhance their situational awareness in areas of known intense glider activity. Even if he had been adjacent to (rather than inside) the Halton ATZ, due to his proximity a call to Halton may have increased the PA28 pilot's situational awareness to a greater degree than was being provided by the Basic Service from Oxford at the time. The glider pilot did well to spot an aircraft in his 7 o'clock, albeit too late to take any avoiding action.

Summary

An Airprox was reported when a PA28 flew into proximity with an ASK13 glider at 1427 on Thursday 21st May 2015. The PA28 pilot was in receipt of a Basic Service from Oxford, the ASK13 pilot an Air/Ground service from Halton. Both pilots were operating under VFR in VMC.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from the pilots of both aircraft, transcripts of the relevant RT frequencies, radar photographs/video recordings, reports from the air traffic controllers involved and reports from the appropriate ATC and operating authorities.

The Board first considered the actions of the PA28 pilot. Members opined that he might have been better served in opting for a service from the designated LARS agency for that area (Farnborough) rather than a Basic Service from Oxford which was some 24 miles distant. Notwithstanding the fact that the glider involved was not known traffic, and painted a poor radar picture, Farnborough might have been able to provide generic information in that area given that this was their specific task as opposed to Oxford who would be focused on their immediate local area. The Board also opined that it may also have been wiser for him to have given Halton a wider berth than he did (either laterally or vertically), not least because it was a promulgated and active airfield and glider site who’s ATZ he appeared to penetrate. At the very least, they considered that he should have communicated with Halton as he approached the ATZ to inform them of his intentions, which would then also have provided an opportunity for both him and the glider pilot to improve their situational awareness. Ultimately, the glider was there to be seen as he approached it from below; that the PA28 pilot only saw it after he had passed emphasised the need for pilots to pro-actively search the airspace ahead of them, and particularly when flying in the vicinity of ATZs and glider sites. The Board also dwelled on the value of PowerFLARM in GA aircraft and noted that, given that the glider was fitted with FLARM, PowerFLARM would also have provided valuable situational awareness to both pilots had the PA28 been fitted with one of these relatively inexpensive units.

Turning to the ASK13 pilot, the Board noted that he had only seen the PA28 very late as it approached from below in his rear-left quarter. Given the glider’s likely wing-obscuration of the PA28 in this geometry, and his undoubted likely focus on his flight path ahead as he soared on the ridgeline within the ATZ, the Board acknowledged that it was a challenging conflict to detect, and that it was not surprising that the glider pilot saw the PA28 too late to take avoiding action or increase the separation.

In the end, the Board determined that the cause of the Airprox was effectively a non-sighting by both pilots. The risk was assessed as Category A, separation had been reduced to the minimum and chance had played a major part in events.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CAUSE AND RISK

Cause: Effectively, a non-sighting by both pilots.

Degree of Risk: A.

4 AIRPROX REPORT No 2015069

Date: 21 May 2015 Time: 1951 (Twilight) Position: 5132N 00004W Location: Victoria Park London

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded Aircraft 1 Aircraft 2 Aircraft Chinook EC145 Operator HQ JHC NPAS Airspace Lon City CTR Lon City CTR Class D D Rules VFR VFR Service Aerodrome Aerodrome Provider London City London City Altitude/FL 400ft 600ft Transponder A/C A/C/S Reported Colours NR Blue/yellow Lighting NR Nav, strobes Conditions VMC VMC Visibility 50km >10km Altitude/FL 300ft 800-1000ft Altimeter QNH (1026hPa) NK Heading 270° NK Speed NK NK ACAS/TAS Not fitted TCAS 1 Alert N/A Nil Separation Reported NK V/100m H 0ft V/500m H Recorded 100ft V/<0.1nm H

THE CHINOOK PILOT reports that, whilst they were on an approach to Victoria Park Helicopter Landing Site (HLS) in London and turning downwind, a pre-briefed helicopter notified by London City Tower was identified overhead the Olympic Stadium. They considered that this was suitably deconflicted from them and so they continued their approach. On transitioning to the hover (at approximately 40ft) before landing, some light dust was noticed being kicked up by the helicopter's downwash, so an overshoot was initiated by the handling pilot due to concerns with people in the park and the severity of the dust. At this point, the No 1 Crewman called 'Hold, Police helicopter in our 9 o'clock'. Although dust was still being kicked up, the helicopter was held at around 80ft. The Police helicopter flew across their 12 o'clock and into the 3 o'clock, on a reciprocal heading. Deeming that it was clear, and assuming that the Police helicopter was flying away from the Chinook, the handling pilot climbed and transitioned into the 12 o'clock. At around 60kt and 300ft, intending to continue on route, the handling pilot started a right turn to transit towards the next destination, at which point he was told to 'move left, aircraft in their 3 o’clock'. The handling pilot looked right and saw, at approximately 5-6 spans (100m), the same Police helicopter at a similar speed and height, essentially he considered formating on them. Both pilots and a passenger on the Police helicopter were visible and observed to be waving. Its registration was written down. The Chinook was moved left and, at this point, the Police helicopter moved right and away from them. A call was made to London City by the handling pilot to ascertain the police helicopter’s callsign. No radio calls had been made between the two pilots until this point. There was very high workload due to landing at Victoria Park HLS inside controlled airspace. No contact had been made by the Police helicopter pilot, and his intentions were not made clear, so his appearance both at the start of the incident and the final stages was a surprise. For Chinook operators, downwash is a major concern, and he felt unable to take the appropriate safety precautions due to the actions of the Police helicopter pilot. The sortie continued without further incident.

He perceived the severity of the incident as ‘Low’.

1 Airprox 2015069

THE EC145 PILOT reports that the Chinook pilot was approaching Victoria Park for a practice approach and, because they were close by and in between active police jobs, they called ATC and the Chinook crew to inform them that they would film the landing site for them to check for obstructions or people in the park on the HLS point. The Chinook pilot’s approach was westerly. They positioned well above and behind the Chinook to the east of its position and filmed its approach and high hover. They filmed its departure and, as the Chinook pilot departed its declared westerly departure track, they flew a right-hand orbit to ensure that they remained behind the west-bound Chinook. They remained north and east (right and behind) of its position. They peeled away to the north to depart the area, and the Chinook pilot carried on west-bound. He then made a radio call to the Chinook crew to inform them that if they required the footage they had just taken for their training purposes, please feel free to contact them at their base and they would ensure that it was sent to them. From the Chinook arriving within approximately 3nm of Victoria Park, all three crew members were visual both with the naked eye and on the Police cameras. They were in full visual contact and on camera at all times throughout the encounter. They were in radio contact with Heathrow Radar (he reported) and had clearly stated their intentions to the Chinook crew prior to arrival overhead. They spoke again to the Chinook crew as the EC145 departed to the north but received no reply from them about the video footage. No TCAS TA was received and he considered that at no time were either aircraft on any heading or path that would conflict. No Airprox notification was given over the quiet ATC frequency of ‘Heathrow Radar’ 125.625 at the time. He did however hear the Chinook crew ask for the callsign of his aircraft once they had cleared to the west.

He assessed the risk of collision as ‘None’.

Factual Background

The London City weather was:

EGLC 212020 12012KT 9999 SCT021 09/04 Q1011

London sunset time 21/05/15 was 1954Z.

Analysis and Investigation

CAA ATSI

ATSI had access to the reports from the Chinook pilot and the London City unit report, area radar recordings and transcription of the London City frequencies. Screenshots produced in the report are provided using the area radar recordings. Levels indicated are in altitude.

The Chinook pilot was operating VFR on a local training flight from Odiham to Hendon and was in receipt of an Aerodrome Control Service from London City Tower. The EC145 pilot was operating VFR and had completed a task north of London City Airport and was also in receipt of an Aerodrome Control Service from London City Tower.

At 1944:10 the Chinook pilot contacted London City. He was cleared to route from the west (via the Helicopter Route H4 which follows the River Thames to the Isle of Dogs) and then via the Olympic Park to Victoria Park. The Chinook was squawking the code 7033.

At 1945:30 the EC145 pilot reported completing a task which was just outside the London City CTR and requested a clearance to the Olympic Park. The EC145 pilot was cleared to the Olympic Park and Traffic Information was passed about the Chinook. The Chinook pilot was then given Traffic Information on the EC145. Figure 1 shows their relative positions at this time.

2 Airprox 2015069

Figure 1 (1945:30).

At 1948:40 the Chinook pilot reported commencing descent into the landing site (Figure 2).

Figure 2 (1948:40).

At 1949:30 the EC145 pilot reported complete at their task and requested to route over to the Chinook’s landing area “to get some footage” of it landing. No co-ordination had previously taken place between the pilots but the EC145 pilot confirmed he had the Chinook “fully in sight”. The controller cleared the EC145 pilot to Victoria Park. (Figure 3.)

3 Airprox 2015069

Figure 3 (1949:30)

At 1951:00 the Chinook pilot reported lifting from the landing site and “visual with the Eurocopter”. Figure 4 shows the Chinook and the EC145 just as the Chinook appeared on radar. The Chinook pilot had not actually landed but went into a low hover because he was concerned about personnel on the ground and the amount of dust being created by the downwash from the rotors. The controller cleared the Chinook pilot to depart the CTR to the north VFR.

Figure 4 (1951:15).

Figure 5 shows the two aircraft tracking in close proximity to the north-west approximately 100ft vertically apart and less than 0.1nm horizontally.

4 Airprox 2015069

Figure 5 (1951:41).

At 1952:00 the EC145 pilot reported complete following the Chinook and diverged to the north- east. The Chinook pilot departed to the north. There was no mention of the intent to file an Airprox report at the time on the radio but the Chinook pilot did request the callsign of the other aircraft.

It was late evening in the London City CTR, it was still light, and both aircraft were operating VFR and being provided with an Aerodrome Control Service.

When providing an Aerodrome Control Service a controller is responsible for issuing instructions to aircraft under its control to achieve a safe orderly and expeditious flow of air traffic with the objective of preventing collisions between aircraft flying in, and in the vicinity of, the ATZ. However, Aerodrome Control is not solely responsible for the prevention of collisions. Pilots…..must also fulfil their own responsibilities in accordance with the Rules of the Air1.

The London City controller provided accurate and timely Traffic Information to both pilots prior to the Chinook landing. The controller did not update this Traffic Information.

The Chinook pilot acknowledged the receipt of the Traffic Information from the controller when first issued but did not gain visual contact with the EC145 until lifting from the Victoria Park vicinity, prior to the EC145 pilot apparently operating in close proximity to the Chinook. There was no evidence of any co-ordination between the pilots to fly in formation.

UKAB Secretariat

Both pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create collision hazard2.

With regard to formation flying:

‘Aircraft shall not be flown in formation except by pre-arrangement among the pilots-in-command of the aircraft taking part in the flight and, for formation flight in controlled airspace, in accordance with the conditions prescribed by the competent authority.’3

Notwithstanding, for police helicopters:

1) The Civil Aviation Authority, on behalf of the United Kingdom and pursuant to article 4 of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No. 923/2012 (‘the Standardised European Rules of the Air’ (SERA)), exempts the operator and Commander of any aircraft flying in accordance with the terms of a police air operator’s certificate from the requirements of SERA specified in paragraph 2 and subject to the conditions in paragraph 3.

1 CAP 493 Manual of Air Traffic Services Part 1, Section 2, Chapter 1, Paragraph 2. 2 SERA.3205 Proximity. 3 SERA.3135 Formation Flights.

5 Airprox 2015069

2) The specified requirements of SERA in paragraph 1 are:

a) SERA.3105 (Minimum heights); b) SERA.3135 (Formation Flights); c) SERA.3210(a) (Right-of-way); and d) SERA.5005 (f) (Visual Flight Rules).

3) The conditions in paragraph 1 are:

a) the Commander of any aircraft referred to in paragraph 1 shall only depart from the specified requirements of SERA at paragraph 2 to the extent necessary to achieve the purpose of the flight and in circumstances that render such departure necessary in the interests of safety; and b) the operator of the aircraft shall specify in the operations manual the procedures and minima appropriate to police flights.

4) In this exemption ‘police air operator’s certificate’ and ‘Commander’ have the same meanings as in article 255(1) of the Air Navigation Order 2009.’4

CAP 493 states the minimum service to be provided by ATC in Class D airspace:

‘Pass traffic information to VFR flights on all other flights and provide traffic avoidance advice when requested.’ 5

Occurrence investigation

Transcript of RTF London City Tower:

1945:25

EC145 Radar… err sorry City Tower (EC145 C/S). ADC (EC145 C/S) pass your message. EC145 We’re complete here at 123 we’ve gone back to our original job actually, we’ve just been called back again Olympic Stadium please. ADC (EC145 C/S) roger new QNH 1026 you can route Olympic Stadium. EC145 Cleared to the Olympic Stadium 1026 is set thank you (EC145 C/S). ADC (EC145 C/S) shortly there’s traffic just approaching the Isle of Dogs now it’s a Chinook and it’s going to be routing northbound shortly Olympic Park for Victoria Park. EC145 Looking for the Chinny thank you sir. ADC (Chinook C/S) north of you by 5 miles is a Eurocopter operating or will be operating in the vicinity of the Olympic Park currently low level VFR. Chinook (Chinook C/S) looking for that traffic.

1948:30

ADC (Chinook C/S) report setting down I’ll give you a wind check from here. Chinook Tower (Chinook C/S) now letting down at Victoria Park we’ll call you on lifting. ADC Roger set down at your discretion wind at City is 260 10. Chinook: Clear my discretion (Chinook C/S).

4 SERA. Exemption E 3931. Operations in Accordance with a Police Air Operator’s Certificate. 5 Section 1, Chapter 2, Paragraph 2.1.

6 Airprox 2015069

1949:25

EC145 City (EC145 C/S). ADC: (EC145 C/S). EC145 Complete here sir we’d just like to route over to Vicky Park we are visual with the Chinook landing we’re just going to get some good footage of him. ADC: (EC145 C/S) Roger Victoria Park it is. EC145 With the Chinny fully in sight Vicky Park thank you sir (EC145 C/S).

1950:52

Chinook Err… (Chinook C/S) we’re now lifting out of Victoria Park visual with the Police helicopter and departing off to the North Hendon. ADC (Chinook C/S) roger lift at your discretion wind at City 260 10 clear to leave the control zone to the North. Chinook Clear to leave the control zone to the north (Chinook C/S). EC145 On your right hand side.

1951:51

EC145 City (EC145 C/S) that’s us complete back to [base]. ADC (EC145 C/S) roger route direct. EC145 Straight to [base] thank you sir (EC145 C/S).

1952:06

Chinook City Tower (Chinook C/S). ADC (Chinook C/S) pass your message. Chinook [Unreadable]… request the callsign of that Police Helicopter please. ADC It’s err… (Chinook C/S) it’s (EC145 C/S) is the helicopter near you. Chinook (EC145 C/S) many thanks (Chinook C/S).

1952:27

EC145 We’ve got a little bit of recording if you wanted it boys of you coming into your landing site there. Chinook (Chinook C/S) err yeah we’re not going to be landing till much later we’ll give you a call tomorrow. 1953:24

ADC And (Chinook C/S) I understand you’re speaking to Heathrow Radar on box 2 you can go to them if you wish. 1953:36

ADC (EC145 C/S) outside the control zone and you can QSY [base] when ready. EC145 Back to [base] thank you sir goodbye.

Comments

JHC

Although this Airprox posed little risk of collision, the proximity of the Police helicopter caused the Chinook crew some concern at a time when their capacity was required elsewhere. Without an agreement to formate, it would have been prudent for the Police helicopter to remain further from the Chinook.

7 Airprox 2015069

Summary

The Airprox was reported by the pilot of a Chinook when his helicopter came into proximity with an EC145 helicopter, whose pilot was observing the Chinook attempt to land, and subsequently depart from, Victoria Park. Both pilots were in receipt of an Aerodrome Control Service, under VFR, within the Class D airspace of the London City CTR. The pilot of the EC145 reported that he had sighted the Chinook early, and had remained visual with it as he manoeuvred into close proximity. The Chinook pilot was surprised to observe the EC145 operating at close range during a particularly complex period of flight. No agreement had been made between the pilots to operate close together. Both pilots were ultimately responsible for their own collision avoidance having been provided with mutual Traffic Information. The minimum separation was recorded as 100ft vertically and <0.1nm horizontally.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD’S DISCUSSIONS

Information available included reports from both pilots, area radar and RTF recordings and reports from the appropriate ATC and operating authorities.

The Board first discussed the actions of the EC145 pilot. A Civil Helicopter Pilot member commented that he was surprised that he had positioned close to the Chinook without positively communicating his specific intentions to its pilot. He surmised that the EC145 pilot had probably then been surprised when the Chinook pilot had decided to abort his landing and overshoot, which may have resulted in him then becoming initially closer to the Chinook than he had planned. However, he went on to comment that this would not explain why the EC145 pilot had then subsequently flown alongside the Chinook, in close proximity, without any agreement with its pilot. The Board noted that the EC145 pilot had transmitted his intentions on the radio, and may have thus thought that effectively he had coordinated his activities; however, they cautioned that pilots should not assume that other parties had heard their transmissions without positively confirming that this was the case.

The HQ JHC member explained that the effects of downwash from a Chinook are readily understood, and the Chinook pilot had rightly decided not to land in Victoria Park because of the dust being displaced. He could also understand why the Chinook pilot may not have registered the EC145 pilot’s message about proceeding to his vicinity because it had occurred at a very busy time while he had been concentrating on his landing conditions. He also agreed that it would have been prudent for the EC145 pilot to have remained further from the Chinook given that the Chinook pilot’s attention would have been focused at the time more on his landing than on avoiding other aircraft.

The Board noted that the London City Aerodrome controller had issued Traffic Information to both pilots about the general position of the other traffic (i.e. the Chinook at Victoria Park and the EC145 at the Olympic Park). Some members wondered whether the controller should then have updated the Chinook pilot that the EC145 was proceeding from the Olympic Park towards his position. However, most members agreed that this was probably not considered necessary by the controller because he knew that the EC145 pilot had the Chinook in sight, and he had no reason to believe that its pilot would have flown into close proximity to the Chinook. A Civil ATC member commented that the controller may also have considered that it would have been inappropriate to have transmitted a message to the Chinook pilot while he was busy in a landing situation.

The Board opined that there had been two phases to this Airprox; first as the Chinook pilot had started his overshoot and became aware of the police helicopter crossing his nose, and then as he had proceeded on course and became aware that the police helicopter was positioned close to his right side. Turning their attention to the cause, it was quickly decided that the EC145 pilot had flown close enough to the Chinook to cause its pilot concern. The fact that the EC145 pilot had not communicated his intentions to the Chinook crew whilst doing so was considered to be a contributory factor. Notwithstanding questions over the wisdom of flying uncoordinated in close proximity, it was considered that, on both occasions, there had been no risk of a collision because the EC145 pilot had remained visual with the Chinook throughout, and the Chinook pilot had seen the EC145 early

8 Airprox 2015069 enough both as it crossed, and afterwards, in order to avoid it twice after he had cancelled his approach to land. Consequently, the Airprox was categorised as risk Category C.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CAUSE AND RISK

Cause: The EC145 pilot flew close enough to the Chinook to cause its pilot concern.

Degree of Risk: C.

Contributory Factor: The EC145 pilot did not communicate his intentions to the Chinook crew.

9 AIRPROX REPORT No 2015070

Date: 17 May 2015 (Sunday) Time: 0925Z Position: 5226N 00134E Location: Beccles

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Aircraft 1 Aircraft 2 Recorded Aircraft C208 C182 Operator Civ Comm Civ Pte Airspace London FIR London FIR Class G G Rules VFR NK Service Traffic NK Provider Norwich London Information Altitude/FL FL130 FL55 Transponder A,C NK Reported Colours White/Blue White Lighting Strobes/Nav NK lights Conditions VMC NK Visibility >10km NK Altitude/FL FL130 FL55 Altimeter 1013hPa 1013hPa Heading 270° N/K Speed 90kt N/K ACAS/TAS Not fitted Not fitted Separation Reported 500ft V/0ft H Not seen Recorded NK

THE C208 PILOT reports that he reported for duty at Beccles airfield at 0730 and notified London Information and Norwich ATC that the parachute drop zone would be active from 0800 to 1600, up to FL130. During the third lift, Norwich identified traffic routing towards the drop zone with a ‘spurious’ squawk, and they suggested that the pilot contact London Information. He did this and, although the frequency was very busy, managed to establish contact and inform them that Beccles was active and that he would shortly be commencing the run in. London Information acknowledged this and so the pilot switched back to the Norwich frequency. The Norwich controller stated that the subject aircraft was maintaining approximately 5600ft and was straight and level. The pilot called “running-in” to the Drop Zone controller, who gave a “clear drop”. As the last parachutist left the aircraft, Norwich gave further Traffic Information that the conflicting aircraft was now directly underneath, it passed through the drop zone, west to east passing along the northern edge of the runway. It did not make contact on the Beccles frequency. One of the free-fall parachutists confirmed that he had seen the aircraft pass directly underneath him with approximately 500-1000ft vertical separation.

He assessed the risk of collision as ‘None’.

THE C182 PILOT was contacted by the Airprox Board and, although he declined to fill out a full report, he did report the following by email. He departed from Duxford to transit back to Germany, routing over the coast via Lowestoft. He initially climbed to 6500ft, and had requested 7500ft, but ATC told him to descend to FL55, which he did. He was flying with a qualified pilot beside him and they did not notice anything unusual, or see a possible Airprox.

THE LONDON INFORMATION FISO reports that a large group of EU registered aircraft reported on frequency within a short space of time. The flights were un-notified and created a very high workload.

1 Airprox 2015070

The foreign pilots either could not hear the radio transmissions clearly, or they were having difficulty with the English language. The second rostered FISO was on a break, but he was re-called to the sector to provide assistance. The aircraft appeared to be tracking towards Beccles airfield, which was notified as active with parachute and sky-diving activity. A general broadcast was made providing this information. The para-dropping aircraft then came onto the frequency to advise that Norwich radar had concerns that several of the aircraft were transiting towards Beccles. The FISO then tried to warn each aircraft individually of the hazard. He was not informed about the Airprox on the day.

Factual Background

The weather at Norwich was reported as:

METAR EGSH 170820Z 27012KT 240V310 9999 FEW025 12/04 Q1025 NOSIG

Beccles parachute jumping site is promulgated in the UK AIP ENR 5.5 (Aerial Sporting and Recreational Activities); page 5.5-2 dated 5 Apr 2015, as follows:

Analysis and Investigation

CAA ATSI

The C208 aircraft involved was engaged in parachute drop flights and, although the pilot filed an Airprox, it was not the actual aircraft but one of the parachutists who came into close proximity with the C182 – the C208 was approximately 8000ft above the conflicting aircraft. The Cessna was under a Traffic Service from Norwich Radar. The pilot had notified both Norwich Radar and London Information that the parachute drop zone at Beccles would be active from 0800 to 1600 (UTC). The drop zone is detailed on navigational charts and in the UK AIP ENR 5.5-2 (5-Apr 2015). The C208 pilot reported to Norwich Radar that he had approximately 2 minutes before the drop, and Norwich Radar advised him about unknown traffic “One zero miles to the Southwest of Beccles indicating Five Thousand Six Hundred…….tracking on that present heading straight through your drop zone”. Attempts were made to identify the traffic and to establish whether the aircraft was working Anglia Radar or London Information. Although the unknown aircraft was squawking an Anglia Radar code, Norwich Radar, through coordination, established that it was not working them. Meanwhile the C208 pilot contacted London Information who could not help identify the aircraft either. There was no reported call on the Beccles Radio frequency either, and the drop zone controller had given permission for the drop. The unknown aircraft flew through the drop zone and the C208 pilot reported being visual with the other aircraft but unable to identify it. One of the parachutists, whilst descending, reported that the unknown aircraft flew underneath him at between 500 and 1000ft. Whilst there was radar coverage of both aircraft involved, there was no radar return from the parachutist so no CPA can be ascertained. The Norwich Radar controller issued timely and accurate Traffic Information in accordance with a Traffic Service and took reasonable steps to identify the unknown aircraft. The unknown aircraft later changed to a 7000 squawk as it approached the UK FIR boundary.

2 Airprox 2015070

UKAB Secretariat

The Air Navigation Order 2009 states that a person must not recklessly or negligently act in a manner likely to endanger an aircraft, or any person in an aircraft. 1

Summary

An Airprox was reported by a C208 pilot between one of his parachutists and a C182. The incident took place overhead Beccles, which had notified paradropping activity up to FL130. The C208 pilot was receiving a Traffic Service from Norwich radar, who gave Traffic Information on the C182. The C182 pilot was transiting at FL55, and receiving a Basic Service from London Information; he didn’t recall seeing anything unusual.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from the C208 pilot, transcripts of the relevant RT frequencies, radar photographs/video recordings, reports from the air traffic controllers involved and reports from the appropriate ATC and operating authorities.

The Board first commended the actions of the Norwich controller, he had seen that the C182 was on course to go through Beccles and tried to identify which agency were working it. He established that Anglia radar were not working it, despite displaying one of their squawks, and he passed Traffic Information to the C208 pilot to forewarn him that the aircraft was not known traffic and therefore its intentions were unclear.

The Traffic Information alerted the C208 pilot to the possible overflight of the drop site, and he pro- actively called London Flight Information to alert them to the fact that there was para-dropping at Beccles. London Flight Information were busy and the pilot reported that the frequency was very busy. As it later transpired, the FISO did have the subject aircraft on frequency, but was having difficulty making the numerous foreign crews that had called realise that they should avoid the para- drop site. The C208 pilot was unaware of this, but he was aware of the proximity of the C182 and that it was likely to transit through the parachute site.

The C182 was flown by a foreign crew returning to the continent after an event at Duxford. The Board were disappointed that they felt unable to participate fully in the Airprox process because it deprived the Board of information that may have proved helpful in assessing the Airprox. The Board members wondered whether the pilot was aware of Beccles and that it was active with para-dropping. Although it was likely that he didn’t know it was active, it is clearly marked on UK charts and, as such, the pilot should have been aware of it. Whilst pilots are not legally required to avoid para-drop sites (there is no avoid ‘zone’ around them), pilots are nevertheless expected to keep clear whilst para- dropping is in progress in accordance with ANO 2009 Article 137 regarding endangerment.

Turning to the cause of the Airprox, the Board noted that, although it had been unwise for the C182 to fly through the Beccles drop-zone, the crew of the C208 were aware that the C182 was tracking towards it, and yet they continued to allow the parachutist to leave the aircraft; had they not done so, the incident wouldn’t have occurred. In this respect, the Board commented that clearance to drop from the drop-zone controller did not override the aircraft captain’s responsibility to ensure the safety of his passengers and crew, including ensuring their safety after they had jumped from the aircraft if he had reason to believe that there was a hazard to their paradrop descent. Therefore the cause was determined to be that the C208 crew allowed the parachutist to jump despite being informed of the approaching C182. It was nevertheless considered a contributory factor that the C182 pilot flew through a promulgated and active parachute jump site. The Board debated the risk of the Airprox for some time, with some members believing that chance had played a major part because the parachutist had little ability to control his destiny as he fell towards the C182. Others thought that, in

1 ANO 2009 Article 137

3 Airprox 2015070

extremis, he could presumably have deployed his parachute and arrested his descent if he had been that concerned. Ultimately, the Board agreed that it would have been unlikely for the C182 pilot to see the parachutist falling from above given his small cross section and the fact that the high wing would have obscured much of the area above. Taking all of that into account, in the end the Board agreed that the risk had been Category B, safety margins had been much reduced below normal.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CAUSE AND RISK

Cause: The C208 crew allowed the parachutists to jump despite being informed of the approaching C182.

Contributory Factor: The C182 pilot flew through a promulgated and active parachute jump site.

Degree of Risk: B.

4 AIRPROX REPORT No 2015071

Date: 21 May 2015 Time: 0925Z Position: 5155N 00157W: Location: 8nm E Gloucestershire airport

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded Aircraft 1 Aircraft 2 Aircraft C525 DR400 Operator Civ Comm Civ Pte Airspace London FIR London FIR Class G G Rules IFR VFR Service Procedural Basic Provider Gloster App Brize Rad Altitude/FL 2200ft 2100ft Transponder A/C/S A/C Reported Colours White/blue White/blue Lighting Strobes, nav, Wing-tip landing, beacon strobes, HISL Conditions IMC VMC Visibility N/A ‘Very good’ Altitude/FL 2200ft 2600ft Altimeter QNH RPS (1026hPa) Heading 265° 185° Speed 185kt 110kt ACAS/TAS TCAS I Not fitted Alert TA N/A Separation Reported NK NK Recorded 100ft V/0.7nm H

THE CESSNA 525 PILOT reports that after a left turn at NIRMO, descending from 2500ft to 2000ft and established inbound on the final approach course 266° to the Final Approach Fix (FAF), he overheard the controller clearing the pilot of another aircraft to cross the final approach course. He relayed his concerns to the controller that he was unhappy that an aircraft was being cleared across his inbound course. He had sight of the traffic on TCAS, but no visual sighting of the traffic. The cloud was patchy between 2500-2000ft. He carried out an avoidance manoeuvre climbing initially to 3000ft and then to 3500ft because he had another pop-up traffic on TCAS as he commenced a right- hand turn to establish back on the inbound approach course slightly west of NIRMO. His passenger did comment that he thought that he saw the traffic passing under them as they were in the right turn and climbing. He established back inbound and relayed his concerns again on allowing an aircraft to cross the approach path. The controller informed him that a different agency was handling the traffic and he thought that the controller commented about not being radar rated. The rest of the approach was normal. He kept the controller informed of the avoidance and his intentions, during all phases of the event. His only comment was that in the approach phase of flight the approach course should be sterile; work-load is high, configuring the aircraft and ensuring the approach is being flown in accordance with the published procedure.

He assessed the risk of collision as ‘Medium’.

THE ROBIN DR400 PILOT reports that he was flying south in good or very good visibility. There was a Parachute Jump Exercise (PJE) at Little Rissington, with a 10nm radius around the airfield, which was on his direct route. This influenced his planning of his route. The 10nm radius cone of risk reduced nearer the ground, and his plan to mitigate risk and avoid conflicting traffic was to remain low and well clear of Little Rissington to remain outside the Oxford AAIA. He therefore routed west

1 Airprox 2015071 overhead Moreton-in-the-Marsh, turning south at Winchcombe, direct to Kemble. This track would put him clear of the NOTAM area, clear of the AAIA and would also avoid overflying the para/hangliding site south-east of Winchcombe. It would also put him just clear of the ‘feather’ of Gloucestershire’s instrument approach, with the reassurance that any procedural IFR traffic would avail themselves of Gloster Radar. Once airborne he contacted Brize Radar with details of his route and obtained a Basic Service. He was allocated a squawk, set Mode C and set the Cotswold RPS. The closest position to Little Rissington was where the Airprox was reported to have occurred. As far as he was concerned the flight was uneventful, he did not sight the C525. He commented that he had visited Brize ATC before the date of the Airprox to see their ATC services in action. He had heard from the controllers that even though a Basic Service is agreed, Brize, as part of their duty of care, will inform pilots when a collision risk is heightened. He therefore thought that he would be afforded the ‘protection required’. Reviewing the available north/south transit routes across the 5154N Latitude with a 10nm PJE at Little Rissington meant that there were not many options. East of Gloucester there are a number of airfields and then a small corridor before Benson. Given the PJE at Little Rissington, he opined that it was predictable that the traffic would be funnelled between the airfield and Gloucestershire airport. In his opinion, pilots and Gloster and Brize controllers should use knowledge and radar equipment to maximise effect on these occasions.

THE GLOUCESTERSHIRE APPROACH CONTROLLER reports that the C525 pilot was on the RNAV Approach, routeing via REKLO and had been cleared for the approach. The controller was operating as an Approach Procedural controller but was using the radar as a spatial awareness tool when he observed traffic believed to be approximately 3nm north of the final approach, southbound. It was estimated that the observed track would pass through the final approach track at approximately 8nm. At the time the C525 pilot had reported at NIRMO (from the south) and Traffic Information was passed on this contact based on the information available. Shortly afterwards the C525 pilot reported a TCAS RA, climbing to 3000ft and abandoning the approach.

Factual Background

The Gloucestershire weather was:

EGBJ 210920Z 29007KT 9999 FEW024 15/07 Q1026=

The Little Rissington NOTAM:

H1746/15 NOTAMN Q) EGTT/QWPLW/IV/M /W /000/130/5152N00142W010 A) EGTT B) 1505210700 C) 1505210900 E) PJE WI 10NM RADIUS 515200N 0014136W (LITTLE RISSINGTON AD) WI THE FLW CONE (ALL HEIGHTS AGL): SFC-3000FT 3NM RADIUS, 3000FT-6000FT 6NM RADIUS, 6000FT-12000FT 10NM RADIUS. DROP HGT SUBJ ATC CLR. OPS CTC 07881 837365. 15-05-0432/OPS 2. F) SFC G) 13000FT AMSL)

Analysis and Investigation

CAA ATSI

The C525 pilot was carrying out the RNAV approach to RW27 from the south (Figure 1) and had routed from the south-west to REKLO and then made a left turn to NIRMO before joining the final approach.

2 Airprox 2015071

Figure 1 – Extract from UK AIP (RNAV approach RW27).

As the C525 pilot commenced the final approach, the controller provided Traffic Information based on radar derived information. (Figure 2).

Figure 2 (Swanwick MRT at 0923:44).

Although the controller stated “radar service” while giving this Traffic Information the controller was providing a Procedural Service but reported using the radar for ‘spatial awareness’. The Traffic Information given related to an unknown aircraft tracking southbound with no height information. (Although the Swanwick MRT did indicate a height, the Gloucestershire controller would not necessarily have had this information). Deconfliction advice can only be given against other aircraft participating in the Procedural Service. The pilot queried the position of the Traffic Information which was repeated. The C525 pilot, once established on the final approach, reported receiving a TCAS RA which he responded to. The radar recording showed the CPA just as the pilot commenced a climb (Figure 3). The CPA was 100ft vertical and 0.6nm horizontal.

Figure 3 - CPA (Swanwick MRT at 0924:07).

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The C525 pilot then completed a 360° right-turn and re-established on final approach and subsequently landed. The Gloucestershire controller subsequently ascertained that the unknown aircraft was working Brize Radar under a Basic Service. When under a Procedural Service, collision avoidance remains the responsibility of the pilot.

Military ATM

The incident occurred between a C525 and a DR400 under a Basic Service with RAF Brize Norton radar.

The Radar Analysis Cell captured the incident based on the London QNH 1026hPa.

At 0906:38, the pilot of the DR400 called Brize Radar, “(DR400 C/S) is a DR400 out of [….] for Kemble via Winchcombe and Morton in the Marsh to avoid the parachute drop, request Basic Service, 2500 feet.” Brize applied a Basic Service at 0906:56 with a 3717 squawk.

Figure 1: Geometry at 0923:39 (DR400 3717; C525 7000).

Figure 2: Geometry at 0923:59.

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The CPA was estimated at 0924:10 with 100ft and 0.6nm horizontal separation.

Figure 3: Geometry at CPA at 0924:10.

At 0928:00, Brize informed the pilot to squawk 7000 and freecall Kemble. At 0929:30, the pilot transmitted, “(DR400 C/S) has 5 miles to run to Kemble, we’d like to change to 118.9, thank you.”

At 0929:35, Brize approved the request.

The DR400 was under a Basic Service with Brize Radar at the time of the Airprox. No Traffic Information was passed and the pilots were responsible for collision avoidance. The DR400 was not fitted with TCAS and the key barrier to prevent loss of safe separation would have been ‘see- and-avoid’. However, it appears that the pilot of the DR400 was not visual with the other aircraft.

UKAB Secretariat

Both pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard1. Because the geometry was converging, the C525 pilot was required to give way to the DR4002.

CAP 774, Flight Information Services, states;

‘Pilots must remain alert to the fact that whilst in receipt of a Procedural Service, they may encounter conflicting aircraft for which neither traffic information nor deconfliction advice has been provided. Pilots must still comply with the Rules of the Air with regard to the avoidance of aerial collisions and advise ATC of any deviation from their clearance in order to do so.’3

‘Pilots should not expect any form of traffic information from a controller/FISO, as there is no such obligation placed on the controller/FISO under a Basic Service, and the pilot remains responsible for collision avoidance at all times. However, on initial contact the controller/FISO may provide traffic information in general terms to assist with the pilot’s situational awareness. This will not normally be updated by the controller/FISO unless the situation has changed markedly, or the pilot requests an update. A controller with access to surveillance-derived information shall avoid the routine provision of traffic information on specific aircraft, and a pilot who considers that he requires such a regular flow of specific traffic information shall request a Traffic Service. However, if a controller/ FISO considers that a definite risk of collision exists, a warning may be issued to the pilot.’4

1 SERA.3205 Proximity. 2 SERA.3210 Right-of way (c) (2) Converging. 3 Chapter 5. 4 Chapter 2.

5 Airprox 2015071

Summary

The Airprox occurred in Class G airspace 8nm east of Gloucestershire airport. The C525 pilot was inbound to the airport IFR in patchy cloud on an RNAV approach to RW27 in receipt of a Procedural Service from Gloster Approach. The Approach controller was able to view a radar display but only for situational awareness and saw traffic approaching the RW27 approach path from the north but with no ability to determine its altitude. Using this information, Traffic Information was issued to the C525 pilot, who subsequently reported reacting to a TCAS RA to climb. The DR400 pilot was in receipt of a Basic Service from Brize Radar and was not aware of the presence of the C525. The minimum separation between the aircraft was 100ft vertically and 0.6nm horizontally.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD’S DISCUSSIONS

Information available included reports from both pilots, the Gloucestershire controller, area radar and RTF recordings and reports from the appropriate ATC and operating authorities.

The Board wondered why no ATC report had been obtained from the Brize Radar controller. A Military ATC member explained that the Unit had not been aware until some time after the event that an Airprox had been filed and so the controller involved could not remember the situation. The Board were disappointed, but noted that it had still been possible to obtain a recording of the Radar frequency.

The Board discussed the fact that, common to the reports of both pilots was the impression that they appeared to assume that a level of priority or protection was being provided by ATC under their respective services in Class G airspace. The C525 pilot, in receipt of a Procedural Service, commented that he considered that his approach course should have been ‘sterile’. The Board noted that under a Procedural Service separation is only provided from other aircraft receiving the same service. On this occasion the DR400 pilot had not been in contact with Gloster Approach, therefore its details had been unknown to the controller. Although the controller had been able to see the DR400 spatially on his radar display, and had passed associated appropriate Traffic Information to the C525 pilot, the Unit is not equipped with SSR and it had not therefore been possible to issue any altitude information about the unknown traffic. Board members noted that the C525 pilot had reported that he had overheard another pilot being cleared to cross his final approach course but, in fact, the DR400 pilot had been on the Brize frequency at the time. It was surmised that the C525 pilot had misinterpreted the Traffic Information from the Gloucester controller as a clearance to the other pilot. The Board noted that the C525 pilot had continued with his approach when not visual with the conflicting traffic, but had observed it on his TCAS display. Some members doubted that continuing the approach had been a prudent action knowing that there was unknown conflicting traffic operating close to his route; they opined that this perhaps gave insight into the mindset of the C525 pilot who clearly expected to have priority because he was conducting a procedural approach. That this was not the case in Class G airspace was germane to the incident. The Board also noted that the C525 pilot had reported climbing in reaction to a TCAS RA. Although he was no doubt operating in the best interests of himself and his passenger, the Board noted that the TCAS equipment fitted to his aircraft was not capable of generating a TCAS RA; the radar recording indicated that he commenced climbing after CPA.

As for the DR400 pilot, the Board commended him for having visited Brize ATC to witness ATC services in action. Unfortunately, it appeared that he had come away from the visit with a false expectation that, even under a Basic Service, the controllers, as part of their duty of care, would inform pilots when a collision risk was present. Consequently, he had thought that on this occasion he was being afforded the ‘protection required’. A Military ATC advisor explained that, under a Basic Service, controllers do not have to monitor an aircraft’s flight or routinely issue Traffic Information. Given that the area was routinely busy, there was no specific reason for the Brize controller to focus on the DR400’s flight unless he had been asked to provide a Traffic Service. Notwithstanding, if the Brize controller had been aware of the potential conflict between the DR400 and the C525 then he would of course have passed Traffic Information to the DR400 pilot. However, a military controller member noted that the C525 was squawking 7000 at the time and so would have been just another

6 Airprox 2015071 general track in the area. The Board wondered whether, if the C525 had been showing a Gloucester- specific squawk, the Brize controller might have assimilated this information and could possibly have telephoned them to exchange details of their respective traffic. Although Gloucester had no capability to display SSR themselves, there might be value in their being allocated squawks for aircraft operating with them so that other units could readily identify their traffic for potential coordination purposes.

The Board commended the actions of the Gloster Approach controller. He had used the limited information available to him to pro-actively issue Traffic Information to the C525 pilot, it had been unfortunate that this information had not been acted on to maximum effect.

The Board then discussed the cause of the Airprox. The discussion ebbed and flowed between it being considered a conflict in Class G airspace or the C525 pilot simply being concerned by the proximity of the DR400. In the end, and noting that the closest distance was 0.7nm at CPA, it was considered that there had not been a conflict, especially since no action had been taken until after the CPA and the DR400 had passed behind the C525. Therefore, the Board eventually agreed that the cause had been that the C525 pilot was concerned by the proximity of the DR400 because he could not see the DR400, did not know the pilot’s intentions, and erroneously considered that he had a degree of priority because he was conducting an approach to an airfield.

The Board then turned its attention to the risk. They considered that, although there had been no risk of a collision, the recorded minimum separation still indicated that this had been too close to be described as normal operations. It was agreed, therefore, that the Airprox should be categorised as risk Category C.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CAUSE AND RISK

Cause: The C525 pilot was concerned by the proximity of the DR400.

Degree of Risk: C.

7 AIRPROX REPORT No 2015073

Date: 28 May 2015 Time: 1210Z Position: 5138N 00019E Location: Approaching Lambourne

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded Aircraft 1 Aircraft 2 Aircraft A320 Unknown Operator CAT Unknown Airspace London TMA London TMA Class A A Rules IFR Service Radar Control Provider Swanwick TCC Altitude/FL ↓FL135 Transponder A, C, S Reported Colours Blue/White Lighting NK Conditions VMC Visibility >10km Altitude/FL FL135 Heading 270° Speed 230kt ACAS/TAS TCAS II Alert TA Separation Reported 200ft V/0m H Recorded NK

THE A320 PILOT reports P2 was acting as PF, at 8nm inbound to the LAM hold on the 100° radial, descending through FL135. They received a TCAS Traffic Alert with amber traffic displayed directly overhead at +200ft. The TCAS alert lasted for less than 5sec. The pilot noted that no RA was generated and that nothing was seen visually at any stage. Both transponders and the TCAS system were fully serviceable with no faults generated at any time. He noted that on informing ATC of the occurrence he was advised that they had reports of an unmanned drone in the Southend area, last reported at 6000ft.

He did not make an assessment of the risk of collision.

UNKNOWN TCAS CONTACT: Recorded radar replay did not indicate a secondary or primary contact in proximity to the A320, nor was another aircraft or air vehicle seen.

THE SWANWICK TCC LAMBOURNE CONTROLLER reports the A320 was inbound to Heathrow when the pilot asked him if there were any aircraft in the vicinity, as he had received a TCAS TA. There was nothing within 10 miles of him. There had been drone activity nearby, previously reported by the North East radar controller, so he passed that information on to the pilot. There was nothing to see on the radar at the time and no other reports from aircraft nearby.

Analysis and Investigation

UKAB Secretariat

A TCAS TA would normally be generated in response to other transponding traffic. Radar replay indicated that there was no such other traffic and therefore the TA must either have been caused by another source or have been spurious. Considering another source, such as a passenger-

1 Airprox 2015073

owned personal electronic device (PED), it was considered unlikely that a TA could be generated.1 Considering a spurious source, the TCAS is designed to detect other aircraft without interference from own on-board systems2 and is therefore integrated with these systems via a ‘mutual suppression bus’ which, in this case, suppresses TCAS reception whilst the SSR transponder is transmitting a reply. Failure of the bus could allow the aircraft’s TCAS to receive its own aircraft transponder replies to TCAS interrogation, which would in turn generate a TCAS alert. However, due to the proximity of the received reply it would be expected to be a TCAS RA. Intermittent failure of the mutual suppression bus may conceivably result in a short duration TCAS alert.

Summary

An Airprox was reported when an A320 pilot received a TCAS Traffic Alert at about 1210 on Thursday 28th May. He was operating under IFR in VMC in receipt of a Radar Control Service from London, in the descent through FL135, approaching the LAM hold. No other secondary or primary contact was observed on radar replay in proximity and no other aircraft was seen.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of a report from the A320 pilot, radar photographs/video recordings, a reports from the air traffic controller involved and a report from the appropriate ATC authority.

Members quickly agreed that although the incident was no doubt disquieting to the crew involved, there was a dearth of information with which to make any meaningful findings in respect of Airprox assessment. There was no secondary radar return of another aircraft in proximity, and the Board therefore agreed that the incident was probably caused by a spurious aircraft indication.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CAUSE AND RISK

Cause: Probably a spurious aircraft indication.

Degree of Risk: D.

1 Firstly, transponder signals lie within the internationally protected 960–1215 MHz Aeronautical Radio Navigation Service (ARNS) RF band and commercial PEDs have to be certified as not transmitting within this band. The band is shared with other functions, such as DME/TACAN and JTIDS (Joint Tactical Information Distribution System, a military data-link ), but these equipments are operated on a coordinated basis in order to avoid interference. Secondly, a transmitted signal would have to emulate the 1090MHz SSR transponder reply which is a series of tightly controlled pulses of specific width, spacing and rise and fall rates, unlikely to be accidentally formed. Additionally, the device would have to transmit with sufficient power to be detected at the external TCAS antennae. 2 For example, potential interference due to signals detected from on-board SSR transponder replies.

2 AIRPROX REPORT No 2015075

Date: 21 May 2015 Time: 1044Z Position: 5149N 00120W Location: 1.5nm S Oxford airport

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded Aircraft 1 Aircraft 2 Aircraft C182 A109 Operator Civ Trg Civ Comm Airspace Oxford ATZ London FIR Class G G Rules VFR VFR Service Aerodrome Basic Provider Oxford Tower Brize Radar Altitude/FL 900ft 2400ft Transponder A/C/S A/C/S Reported Colours White/blue White/blue Lighting NK Nav, red anti- col, strobes Conditions VMC VMC Visibility 20km >10km Altitude/FL 900ft 1800ft Altimeter QNH (1025hPa) QNH Heading 192° 025° Speed 90kt 150kt ACAS/TAS Not fitted Other TAS Alert N/A TA Separation Reported NK NK Recorded 1500ft V/0.6nm H

THE OXFORD RADAR CONTROLLER reports that at 1041 the Brize Norton Zone controller called with Traffic Information on a 3701 squawk (an A109) transiting his CTR via Farmoor Reservoir to Bicester. On assessing the track, he asked the Brize controller if the helicopter would be routeing to the east of D129 in anticipation of a confliction with the Oxford RW19 climb-out. The Brize Zone Controller confirmed that the aircraft would be "routing east of Weston". As the routing from Farmoor Reservoir to east of D129 would keep the A109 outside of the Oxford ATZ, he passed Traffic Information to Brize on a departing Seneca and ended the call. He subsequently passed Traffic Information to Oxford Tower regarding the helicopter. After a period of track observation on the 3701 squawk, it was clear that the subject helicopter was not changing course and was heading directly for the Oxford overhead at 1700ft as displayed on Mode C. A telephone call to Brize Zone was initiated immediately to ascertain the intentions of the traffic, and he was advised that Brize had instructed the pilot to route to the east. Traffic Information was passed to the Brize controller that the Oxford visual circuit was active with multiple aircraft, which was acknowledged. The A109 was observed to continue towards the Oxford ATZ; therefore, further Traffic Information was passed to Oxford Tower because the intentions of the helicopter were now unknown. The Oxford controller stated that the A109 entered the Oxford ATZ at 1044 at 1800ft as displayed on Mode C, into direct conflict with the C182 whose pilot was climbing upwind in the visual circuit passing 800ft as displayed on Mode C. Lateral separation was assessed as 0.25nm, but the C182 pilot did not report visual with the A109. An EC135 in the helicopter training area was also upwind, initially in a head-on geometry with the A109 before turning downwind right-hand, indicating 800ft on Mode C with a lateral separation of 0.5nm. Visual circuit altitude at Oxford is 1500ft based on the Oxford QNH. The A109 was observed to climb rapidly, and a further call to the Brize Zone controller found that the Brize Controller had instructed its pilot to climb, having seen it enter the Oxford ATZ. Due to further traffic entering the OX hold at 3500ft QNH, he requested that the Brize controller limited the climb of the A109 pilot to not above 3000ft. The subject aircraft subsequently called Oxford Radar some 6nm north of the airport, having also flown opposite direction to the RW19 final approach. The A109 pilot left the frequency at

1 Airprox 2015075

1048, descending into a private landing site near Bicester. At no time did the A109 pilot request entry into the Oxford ATZ, nor was any clearance or approval given to transit the Oxford ATZ. The aircraft entered the ATZ without permission and failed to conform to the pattern of traffic formed at Oxford.

THE BRIZE RADAR CONTROLLER reports that the A109 pilot was cleared to transit the Brize Norton CTR from a private landing site enroute to Bicester via Farmoor Reservoir not above altitude 1800ft Brize QNH. The pilot was asked to confirm that he would be avoiding the Oxford ATZ to which he replied "affirm". Traffic Information was passed to Oxford Radar. As the pilot cleared the Brize CTR he continued to fly towards the Oxford overhead; he was instructed to avoid the ATZ with Oxford traffic in the visual circuit and overhead, he replied that he was climbing to 3000ft to avoid the ATZ. Landline liaison was conducted with Oxford Radar to make them aware of his intentions. The A109 pilot cleared the Oxford ATZ to the north and changed en-route to Bicester, the A109 pilot apologised on frequency for the confusion.

He perceived the severity of the incident as ‘Low’.

THE A109 PILOT reports that he was transiting the Brize Zone via the Farmoor Reservoir. On entering the Zone he asked Brize to negotiate a transit through the Oxford ATZ. Brize came back saying that Oxford did not have traffic to affect. As he passed to the north of the Farmoor reservoir he asked if he could change to Oxford. Brize did not respond and he presumed they were negotiating a clearance for him to cross the ATZ. As he got closer to the ATZ he asked for a climb to fly over the top of the ATZ because he had a couple of TAS contacts in the ATZ at low level. Brize released him to climb to 3000ft, which he expedited due to the proximity of Oxford. He was then released by Brize and spoke to Oxford. By this stage he was well above the ATZ.

He assessed the risk of collision as ‘Low’.

THE C182 PILOT reports that he was on the climb-out from RW19, on the upwind leg, turning onto the crosswind leg. Just before turning onto crosswind, the Tower warned them of a helicopter that seemed to be heading towards the Oxford ATZ and that they had not been able to make contact with its pilot. All three of them in the aircraft kept a very good look-out, especially to the south in the direction of Brize Norton's airspace. He took control momentarily to lift the wings, to see if he could see the helicopter. At no point were they visual with the helicopter.

Also in the circuit was an EC135 pilot on a training flight. He reported that he was not involved in Airprox and had no recollection of any conflicting traffic in the circuit or transiting. He was giving instruction at the time. Radar recordings show that the minimum separation between the A109 and the EC135 was 1500ft vertically and 1.2nm horizontally.

Factual Background

The Oxford weather:

EGTK 281020Z 25009KT 220V280 9999 FEW039 16/08 Q1026

The Oxford ATZ is a circle, 2nm radius, centred on the longest notified runway (01/19), with an upper limit of 2000ft. Aerodrome elevation is 270ft.1

Analysis and Investigation

CAA ATSI

The Oxford Radar and Aerodrome controllers both reported the Airprox because they believed the A109 pilot had entered the Oxford ATZ and come into proximity with two aircraft operating in the Oxford circuit pattern. Prior to the occurrence, co-ordination had been attempted by the Oxford

1 UK AIP AD 2.EGTK-1

2 Airprox 2015075

Radar controller with Brize Radar who were working the A109 (SSR code 3701) on a northbound routing. As the A109 pilot approached the Oxford ATZ from the south, no clearance for the A109 pilot to enter the Oxford ATZ had been issued. At 1044:03 the C182 pilot (SSR code 7010) had just departed Oxford and was climbing out to enter the left-hand circuit (Figure 1).

Figure 1 (Swanwick MRT at 1044:03)

Just prior to the Oxford ATZ boundary (and just as the A109 pilot was leaving the Brize Norton CTR), the A109 pilot began a rapid climb from 1600ft to 3000ft to route over the Oxford ATZ. (The pilot reported having TAS contacts at low level ahead). [UKAB Note: as can be seen from the map on page 1, the Oxford ATZ boundary overlaps the Brize CTR, and so the A109 pilot was required to either maintain altitude within the CTR or gain approval from Brize before climbing as he approached the Oxford ATZ]. CPA between the C182 and the A109 was 0.5nm horizontally and 1500ft vertically occurred at 1044:11. (Figure 2.) The A109 was vertically clear of the Oxford ATZ at that point.

Figure 2 Swanwick MRT at 1044:11

The Aerodrome controller at Oxford had passed appropriate Traffic Information to the C182 pilot (and the EC135 pilot) having been pre-noted of the A109 by Oxford Radar. Neither the C182 or the A109 pilots reported visually sighting the other traffic.

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Military ATM

The Radar Analysis Cell captured the incident on the London QNH 1026hPa.

A portion of the Brize tape transcript is below:

From To Speech Time Brize Oxford Farmoor reservoir south west five miles three seven zero one 10.41.11 Oxford Brize Contact 10.41.13 Brize Oxford He’s routing er Farmoor Resovoir then up to Bicester er not above 10.41.14 one thousand eight hundred feet one zero two six as he transits the zone Oxford Brize Roger is he routing east of delta one two nine 10.41.20 Brize Oxford He will be routing to the east of erm Weston 10.41.25 Oxford Brize Okay traffic just airborne off runway one nine is a Seneca will be 10.41.27 turning north west bound climbing to three thousand feet Brize A109 [A109 C/S] entering Brize controlled airspace radar control 10.41.37 A109 Brize Radar control service er [A109 C/S] er would you be able to aqui- 10.41.41 arrange a handover to Oxford or should I speak to them on the other box Brize A109 [A109 C/S] I’ve just spoken to Oxford er on the landline er they have 10.41.47 departing traffic er but its departing up to the north and west and just confirm you route to the west of Weston on the Green which is active at the moment A109 Brize I will indeed [A109 C/S] thanks 10.41.57 Oxford Brize Request Traffic Information on your three seven zero one with 10.43.27 intentions please Brize Oxford Er he is to route to the east of Weston on the Green has been told 10.43.30 Oxford Brize Okay our visual circuit is active runway one nine left-hand as well with 10.43.34 multiple aircraft Brize A109 [A109 C/S] Oxford have multiple aircraft in their hold and in the visual 10.43.42 circuit are you going to avoid their ATZ A109 Brize [A109 C/S] that’s affirmative I can climb now 10.43.50

Brize A109 [A109 C/S] roger climb at your discretion clearing Brize controlled 10.43.55 airspace Basic Service A109 Brize [A109 C/S] climbing to clear the Oxford ATZ 10.43.59 Brize A109 [A109 C/S] now level two thousand eight hundred feet QSY Oxford 10.44.08 Oxford Brize Er Oxford your three seven zero one now infringing our ATZ through 10.44.08 our overhead Brize Oxford Yeah I’ve just told him to climb to get away from that he’s just clear of 10.44.14 it Oxford Brize Okay not above three thousand feet please something in the hold 10.44.17 Brize Oxford Not above three roger 10.44.17 A109 Brize [A109 C/S] QSY Oxford 10.44.21 Brize A109 [A109 C/S] climb not above three thousand feet Brize QNH one zero 10.44.22 two six A109 Brize Sorry I thought you were co-ordinating a clearance through Oxford so 10.44.38 that wasn’t particularly helpful do you want me to stay with you now? Brize A109 You er stay with me but not above three thousand feet 10.44.43 Oxford Brize Hi there can I get the details on the three seven zero one I’m going to 10.45.45 file on that

4 Airprox 2015075

Figure 1 outlines the positions of the Brize CTR, Farmoor Reservoir, Oxford airfield and Weston on the Green (D129).

Figure 1: Geography of the area.

The Brize controller placed the A109 pilot under the appropriate types of service for the zone crossing and Class G transit. The controller was working Brize Zone, Approach and Director Frequencies with 2 aircraft in total and a ‘medium-to-low’ workload. Prior to the Airprox, the controller reminded the pilot of D129 (Weston on the Green parachute site) and the Oxford ATZ. He also passed Traffic Information to Oxford, identifying the A109 by Mode 3A at 1041:11. During the information exchange with Oxford, the Brize controller confirmed that the A109 pilot was routing to the east of D129 and Oxford informed of traffic airborne to the north. However, at 1041:47 (Figure 2), the controller informed the A109 pilot of the traffic and, mistakenly said that he should route to the west of D129.

5 Airprox 2015075

Figure 2: A109 pilot informed to route to west of D129 at 1041:47 (A109 squawk 3701).

The pilot replied with, “I will indeed” at 1041:57. Brize had placed the A109 pilot at 1800ft QNH as a standard altitude to avoid their radar pattern traffic; the A109 pilot’s requested transit had been at 2400ft QNH. When Oxford asked for an update at 1043:27, Brize confirmed that the A109 pilot was routing to the east of D129 and Oxford confirmed that the visual circuit was active RW19 left- hand. At 1043:42 (Figure 3), Brize warned the A109 pilot of the traffic in the Oxford ATZ and asked him if he was going to avoid.

Figure 3: Brize warning of Oxford visual circuit traffic at 1043:42. (A109 squawk 3701; C182 squawk 7010).

The A109 pilot requested a climb and at 1043:55 (Figure 4), Brize confirmed, “climb at your discretion, clearing Brize controlled airspace, Basic Service.”

Figure 4: Climb instruction at 1043:55.

6 Airprox 2015075

The A109 pilot called level at 2800ft (Brize QNH 1026hPa) at 1044:08 (Figure 5); at the same time Oxford declared that the A109 pilot was infringing their ATZ.

Figure 5: Replay at 1044:08, approximately 2nm from OX.

The RAC replay at 1044:10 (Figure 6) shows the A109 at 2400ft (London QNH 1026hPa) climbing; CPA is estimated at 1044:10 with 0.5nm horizontal and 1500ft height separation.

Figure 6: CPA at 1044:10 with 0.5nm horizontal separation and 1500ft vertical.

Oxford requested that the A109 pilot be not above 3000ft due to hold traffic, and this was passed to him at 1044:22. Brize once again confirmed that the A109 pilot would avoid D129 but no direction was given. At 1044:38, the pilot of the A109 commented that he thought Brize were gaining a clearance through Oxford, and Brize confirmed that the pilot should remain on the Brize frequency. The routing instruction and confirmation to remain on the Brize frequency may have led the A109 pilot to believe that he was cleared on his current path. In the subsequent conversation between Brize and Oxford ATC, the Brize controller confirmed that he had given the

7 Airprox 2015075

route to the east of Weston and it may have been misunderstood by the pilot. The A109 pilot was transferred enroute at 1046:33.

Pilots are not routinely handed over to Oxford if the squawk has been passed by Brize. The Letter of Agreement (LOA) between Brize and Oxford states that:

‘LARS transits operating within 2nm of the OX at or below FL80 will be offered to Oxford Radar for a service. Aircraft crossing the final approach track for RW19 (within 8nm OX) will be offered to Oxford Radar for a service. BZN LARS operates within a large area and should Oxford Radar see traffic that conflicts with their operation they should contact LARS and ask to work the traffic.’

The Brize controller had called Oxford, applied the correct services and issued reminders of the Oxford ATZ and D129. It appears that the controller inadvertently issued route instructions for the A109 pilot to pass to the ‘west’ of D129, when he meant, and thought, that he had said ‘east’. This error may have been a slip by the controller, intending to route the A109 pilot to the east of D129, thus clearing Oxford laterally. The A109 pilot appears to have climbed above the Oxford ATZ and generic Traffic Information had been passed as a Class G transit under a Basic Service.

The normal barriers to an incident of this nature would be radar-derived Traffic Information, ACAS and sound deconfliction procedures. The CPA appears to be at 1044:10 with 1500ft height and 0.5nm horizontal separation between VFR traffic in Class G airspace. It is not known if ACAS would have alerted given the separation. Traffic Information was passed between units, and Brize informed the A109 pilot of traffic activity at Oxford. As the respective controllers had spoken, identified SSR codes and discussed routings, the controllers may have felt that they had satisfied the LOA and had a procedure to deconflict aircraft. However, an east/west cognitive slip from Brize may have led all parties to believe that a coordinated routing had been agreed. The A109 pilot had been informed of the traffic and he requested a climb above the Oxford ATZ as soon as he was clear of the Brize CTR; there does not appear to be any specific traffic for the pilot to ‘see- and-avoid’ because the traffic was below in the Oxford visual circuit.

UKAB Secretariat

Both pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard2. An aircraft operated on or in the vicinity of an aerodrome shall conform with or avoid the pattern of traffic formed by other aircraft in operation3.

Summary

At the time of the Airprox both pilots were operating in Class G airspace, the C182 pilot was within the Oxford ATZ climbing out from RW19 in receipt of an Aerodrome Service and the A109 pilot, in receipt of a Basic Service from Brize Radar, had climbed rapidly to transit above the ATZ. The minimum separation was recorded as 1500ft vertically and 0.5nm horizontally.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD’S DISCUSSIONS

Information available included reports from both pilots, the controllers concerned, area radar and RTF recordings and reports from the appropriate ATC and operating authorities.

The Board first discussed the actions of the A109 pilot. The civil helicopter pilot member was surprised that the A109 pilot had continued towards the Oxford ATZ without having received a positive clearance to transit the ATZ. In mitigation, he noted that the pilot had requested a handover from Brize Radar to Oxford and, although he had not received any positive instruction, it was possible that he had assumed that he had permission to continue on his current route and altitude given that he had been cleared by Brize to route west of D129; unfortunately he had not clarified the situation

2 SERA.3205 Proximity. 3 SERA.3225 Operation on and in the Vicinity of an Aerodrome.

8 Airprox 2015075 until the last minute. The Board noted that the A109 pilot had climbed rapidly as he approached the Oxford ATZ boundary, as his concern at the TAS contacts in the Oxford visual circuit grew. Some members questioned the degree to which the A109 pilot had infringed the Oxford ATZ, if at all, but after some discussion agreed that determination of airspace infringement was not a matter for the Airprox Board and that the question of whether or not the pilot had entered the Oxford ATZ was not germane to the Airprox, other than that it had been a cause for concern to the Oxford controller. They also recognised the conflict that the A109 pilot faced between complying with the Brize transit altitude clearance and the need to climb to clear the Oxford ATZ (which extends laterally within the Brize CTR boundary). Although they were of the opinion that the A109 pilot could have been more positive with Brize ATC in establishing his degree of coordination, the Board commended the A109 pilot for his action in making such a quick climb to achieve an altitude above the upper level of the ATZ once he had been released by Brize.

The Board noted that the Brize controller had contacted Oxford ATC to inform them of the A109 and confirm that it would be routeing from Farmoor reservoir to the east of Weston on the Green/D129. This routeing would have taken the A109 away from the Oxford ATZ. However, the Brize controller made a cognitive error and cleared the A109 pilot to route to the west of Weston on the Green instead. The Board also noted that, on his initial call to Brize, the A109 pilot had requested to transit at 2400ft. The Brize controller had instead cleared the A109 to transit not above 1800ft because this was a standard altitude to avoid traffic in their radar pattern. The Board observed that no aircraft were evident on the radar recording in the Brize radar pattern until after the A109 had passed Farmoor reservoir, some 8.5nm east abeam Brize airfield. Several members commented that if the A109 pilot had been cleared to transit at his requested altitude of 2400ft he would have remained clear of Brize radar traffic, above the Oxford ATZ, and therefore the whole incident would have been avoided. The Board were also surprised that the Brize controller had not taken positive action, either by instructing the A109 pilot to climb, or by transferring him early enough to Oxford, to ensure that the A109 would remain clear of the Oxford ATZ. The radar display would have shown that the A109 pilot was not routeing to the east of Weston on the Green as he had expected and that, on his actual route at 1800ft, it was evident for some minutes that he would be in conflict with the Oxford ATZ as soon as he left the CTR. Equally, the Board wondered why the Oxford controller had not requested the A109 pilot be asked to contact him. Although the reported routeing would have taken the A109 away from the Oxford ATZ, it was apparent that the A109’s actual routeing was taking it towards the Oxford ATZ, despite the Brize controller’s comments. Members felt that if the A109 pilot had been asked to contact Oxford, the controller could have coordinated it with the Oxford circuit traffic.

In short, the Board opined that the context of the incident was that: although the A109 pilot had asked for a handover or coordination, he had not positively confirmed that this had been achieved as he approached the Oxford ATZ; the Brize controller had unnecessarily altitude restricted the A109, had erroneously issued routing to the A109 pilot contrary to the agreed routing with Oxford and had not proactively addressed the apparent airspace conflict as the A109 headed towards the Oxford ATZ below its upper level and contrary to his expectation; and the Oxford controller had not revisited the A109’s routing with Brize early enough as he noted that it was not as he expected but instead heading towards his ATZ.

Although the Board could understand why the Oxford controller had decided to file an Airprox report in that he had been concerned that the A109 pilot might have flown into potential confliction with circuit traffic, they opined that the actual circumstances had been that the A109 pilot, climbing through 1800ft, had not flown into direct conflict with the C182 whose pilot was climbing upwind in the visual circuit passing 800ft. In the event, he had climbed quickly at the ATZ boundary to fly above the ATZ, had passed 1500ft above the C182 and well above other circuit traffic and had thereby avoided the pattern of traffic formed by other aircraft in operation. The purpose of the Board was not to assess what might have happened, but what had actually happened; therefore, the cause was considered to be that the Oxford controller had perceived a conflict and, because the A109 pilot had removed any possibility of a collision by climbing above the ATZ, it was considered that normal safety standards had pertained. Therefore, the Board unanimously agreed that the Airprox should be categorised as risk Category E.

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PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CAUSE AND RISK

Cause: The Oxford controller perceived a conflict.

Degree of Risk: E.

10 AIRPROX REPORT No 2015077

Date: 3 Jun 2015 Time: 1516Z Position: 5403N 00111W Location: 3nm NE Linton on Ouse

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded Aircraft 1 Aircraft 2 Aircraft Tucano ASW20 Operator HQ Air (Trg) Civ Pte Airspace London FIR London FIR Class G G Rules VFR VFR Service Basic None Provider Linton Approach N/A Altitude/FL 3600ft NK Transponder A, C, S Not fitted Reported Colours Black White/Orange Lighting Strobes, nav, None landing Conditions VMC VMC Visibility 30km 30km Altitude/FL 3600ft 3500ft Altimeter QFE (1020hPa) NK (1013hPa) Heading 140° Average 160° Speed 165kt 40-160kt ACAS/TAS TCAS I FLARM Alert Nil Nil Separation Reported 100ft V/700ft H Not Seen at CPA Recorded NK

THE TUCANO PILOT reports leading a formation pair, descending from 9000ft to 2000ft QFE as part of a close-formation recovery with the number 2 positioned echelon left. On passing 3600ft in a gentle left-hand turn, the rear cockpit QFI of the lead aircraft saw a glider in the right 2 o'clock, slightly above the formation. It was initially tracking parallel to the formation but then turned gently away. Separation was judged to be approximately 700ft laterally with the formation 100ft below the glider. The Airprox location was passed to Linton Approach whilst airborne. The pilot stated that no avoiding action was taken by the formation as the conflict had passed before useful action could be taken. He also noted that there were other TCAS contacts in the area they were descending towards, that their lookout was directed to the left towards their direction of turn, and that they were positioning for a visual join with a medium-to-high workload.

He assessed the risk of collision as ‘Low’.

THE ASW20 PILOT reports thermaling above Linton on Ouse between 3500ft and 6000ft. When at about 3500ft he heard aircraft engine noise from below and to the right. About 10sec later he saw a Tucano below him on approach to Linton. The pilot commented that he was listening out on the Linton VHF combined LARS/MATZ penetration service frequency and, consequently, ‘had knowledge of traffic’.

He assessed the risk of collision as ‘Low’.

THE LINTON APPROACH TRAINEE CONTROLLER reports the Tucano formation called for a visual recovery, was given a Basic Service, and was asked to squawk ident. When the ident feature appeared, the formation was approximately 20nm northwest of Linton, heading approximately 100°. Approximately 12nm west of Linton, the formation number 2 called a practice-pan, to which they then

1 Airprox 2015077 received a steer of 090°. The formation then requested to join via the overhead, not below 3000ft QFE. A climb-out restriction was placed with Tower, not above 2000ft QFE. At this time Linton had radar traffic in the approach lane, approaching 4nm and 12nm. The formation was passed this information. The formation informed him that there was a glider present in the overhead, at 3600ft. No Airprox was called on frequency. There was no primary contact on the glider, probably due to it being close to the overhead, within the cone of silence. The glider subsequently appeared on radar approximately 3nm southeast of Linton.

He perceived the severity of the incident as ‘Low’.

THE LINTON APPROACH SCREEN CONTROLLER reports the Tucano formation called for a visual join when about 10nm west of Linton. They were put on a Basic Service and given airfield details. Linton were using RW21RH and the formation requested to route through the overhead, west to east, not below 3000ft while conducting a practice emergency. This was approved and they continued as requested. Whilst in the overhead they reported that they had become visual with a glider about 2nm east of the overhead at about 3600ft and that they had passed approximately 500ft from it. There was no primary radar return in this position at the time and there had been no observance of a track entering the area of the airfield overhead. Subsequently a faint radar return became visible and tracked eastwards away from the airfield.

He perceived the severity of the incident as ‘Low’.

THE LINTON SUPERVISOR reports he did not witness the incident; however, once he had been informed of the event, he ‘checked on FLARM’ to see if there was any glider activity in the vicinity but could not see any FLARM contacts. He stated that the unit’s workload at the time was medium-to- low.

Factual Background

The weather at Linton was recorded as follows:

METAR EGXU 031450Z 27012KT 9999 SCT044 SCT250 15/04 Q1022 BLU NOSIG METAR EGXU 031550Z 27011KT 9999 FEW046 16/03 Q1023 BLU NOSIG

Analysis and Investigation

Military ATM

The incident occurred on 03 Jun 15 at 1516 between a pair of Tucanos, under a Basic Service with Linton Approach, and a glider.

At 1511:24, the formation requested a visual recovery and Linton Approach agreed a Basic Service, with a squawk ident at 1511:31. The formation simulated an aircraft system failure and Approach provided a steer for Linton as 090° at 1512:10.

Approach warned the formation of radar traffic approaching Linton at 5nm and the formation requested an overhead join, not below 3000ft. Approach approved the join, not below 3000ft, at 1513:50. At 1515:45, the formation leader transmitted, “[Number 2 C/S], glider right one o’clock, high they’re {unintelligible 2 to 3 words} break”.

At 1516:01, the formation advised Approach of a glider seen at 3600ft, 500ft away. The RAC estimated that CPA occurred between 1516:02 and 1516:10 with the Tucanos at 3300ft. The glider did not appear on any of the radar replays.

The Linton Approach controller had applied a Basic Service and identified the formation to pass Traffic Information on inbound Linton radar traffic. It would appear that the glider was not detected by the Linton radar as a primary return, possibly because it was in the radar overhead.

2 Airprox 2015077

Subsequently, a non-squawking return was observed leaving the radar overhead which was believed to be the glider. The formation crews had elected for a visual recovery and were responsible for their own collision avoidance, as per UK FIS; the formation leader had become visual with the glider and called it to the number two in the formation.

The normal barriers for aircraft in Class G airspace under a Basic Service would be ACAS/TAS and the principles of ‘see-and-avoid’. The crew were under a Basic Service and routing close to the radar overhead, which would have limited any potential Traffic Information available from ATC. The glider was non-squawking and would not provide a TCAS alert; the formation lead pilot first saw the glider at an estimated 700ft separation with the aircraft already on a diverging path.

UKAB Secretariat

The Tucano and ASW20 pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard1. If the incident geometry is considered as converging then the Tucano pilot was required to give way to the ASW202. If the incident geometry is considered as overtaking then the ASW20 pilot had right of way and the Tucano pilot was required to keep out of the way of the other aircraft by altering course to the right3. The glider did not appear on radar recordings, and CPA was estimated on the basis of the Tucano pilot reporting passing altitude 3600ft.

Comments

HQ Air Command

This Airprox took place in Class G airspace where both aircraft were perfectly entitled to be operating. The Tucano formation were under a Basic Service which was appropriate for their task at the time. Unfortunately, the limitations of radar cover meant that regardless of which Air Traffic Service was chosen, the controllers were unaware that there was any glider activity in the area. It is pleasing to see that the glider pilot was listening out on his radio; however, a transmission to let ATC know of his presence could have provided enough situational awareness to ATC to pass on to other aircraft thus enabling more focussed lookout.

Summary

An Airprox was reported when a Tucano formation and an ASW20 flew into proximity at about 1516 on Wednesday 3rd June 2015. Both pilots were operating under VFR in VMC, the Tucano formation leader in receipt of a Basic Service from Linton Approach and the ASW20 pilot not in receipt of an Air Traffic Service, but listening out on the Linton VHF combined LARS/MATZ penetration service frequency.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from the pilots of both aircraft, radar photographs/video recordings, reports from the air traffic controllers involved and reports from the appropriate ATC and operating authorities.

The Board first considered the actions of the Linton ATSU. The glider was not fitted with an SSR transponder and so would have presented as a primary return only, as is common with most gliders. Both the Linton Approach Trainee and Screen controllers did not observe an approaching track and the Airprox occurred near the airfield overhead where, it was supposed, the radar could not provide a return. Subsequently, the Screen controller reported observing a faint primary return tracking eastwards, away from the airfield. Members were heartened to learn that the Supervisor had FLARM

1 SERA.3205 Proximity. 2 SERA.3210 Right-of-way (c) (2) Converging. 3 SERA.3210 Right-of-way (c) (3) Overtaking.

3 Airprox 2015077 data available and had interrogated it to see if any situational awareness could be gained; the Board considered that it was unfortunate that the glider did not appear, given that it was reported as being fitted with FLARM. Given these constraints, members agreed that the controllers had no opportunity to pass Traffic Information to the Tucano formation regarding the glider.

Turning to the actions of the glider pilot and noted that although he had heard the Tucano formation, the Board surmised that he did not see another aircraft until after CPA. The Board considered that it was unfortunate that he had not contacted Linton on RT. Whilst it was agreed that his listening out would undoubtedly have helped him gain some awareness, members felt that contact with Linton would have been far more useful to everyone else. A military member stated that thermaling above the busiest military flying training airfield in the UK without contacting them presented a serious risk to operations that could have been effectively mitigated by making contact. Gliding members pointed out that many glider pilots did not possess an RT license and so were not legally allowed to communicate on the radio. They also opined that, anecdotally, controllers often tried to apply an Air Traffic Service to glider pilots when they did call up which, when they were often highly loaded and attempting to remain airborne, resulted in a reluctance to make contact at all. Notwithstanding, they reported that the BGA had recently issued a note to all its glider pilots reminding them of the desirability of contacting ATC when operating near or above ATZs. Some members also pointed out that RT contact from every glider pilot approaching the overhead in a competition, for example, would result in the frequency becoming unusable. The Board agreed that there was a balance to be had and that this was a matter for Linton in its liaison activities with local aviation communities. Members ultimately agreed that the radio remained a very useful means to mitigate collision risk, and that training and usage should be encouraged in order to lead to a better understanding from both pilots and controllers.

The Board noted that the Tucano formation had not received Traffic Information on the glider for reasons already covered, and that their TCAS I was not capable of receiving FLARM information. With the 2 aircraft in close formation, the number 2 crew would naturally have been concentrating their lookout on the leader, the student was also dealing with a practice emergency, and it was the rear seat QFI in the lead crew who saw the glider first. The Board noted that he assessed that there was no time to take effective action, but that there was also was no immediate risk of collision.

The Board considered the cause and agreed that, in this circumstance, the Airprox was due to the late sighting by the Tucano pilot and, because he did not see any Tucano until after CPA, effectively a non-sighting by the glider pilot. Members agreed that, although lower than would be preferred, the Tucano pilot’s estimate of separation meant that safety margins had not been reduced to the point where there had been a risk of collision.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CAUSE AND RISK

Cause: A late sighting by the Tucano pilot and effectively a non-sighting by the glider pilot.

Degree of Risk: C.

4 Airprox 2015078

AIRPROX REPORT No 2015078

Date: 3 Jun 2015 Time: 1400Z Position: 5206N 00214W Location: Great Malvern

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded Aircraft 1 Aircraft 2 Aircraft LS8 Squirrel Operator Civ Club HQ Air (Trg) Airspace FIR FIR Class G G Rules VFR VFR Service None Traffic Provider NA Brize Radar Altitude/FL NK FL40 Transponder Not fitted On, A, C, S Reported Colours White NK Lighting None NK Conditions VMC VMC Visibility 30K 40K Altitude/FL 4000ft FL40 Altimeter NK NK Heading 090° 360° Speed 80kt 110kt ACAS/TAS FLARM Other TAS Alert Unknown Nil Separation Reported 20ft V/100M H 0ft V/50M H Recorded NK V/NK H

THE LS8 PILOT reports heading East at 4000ft. He spotted a helicopter converging from the right at the same level. He put his glider into a dive to avoid the other aircraft.

He assessed the risk of collision as ‘High’.

THE SQUIRREL PILOT reports heading north under a Traffic Service from Brize at FL40. He was initially informed of several contacts by the controller, then, after a quiet period, he noticed a glider ahead with a large rate of descent and large bank angle crossing ahead of his aircraft. He took late avoiding action.

He perceived the severity of the incident as ‘High’.

THE BRIZE CONTROLLER reports providing the Squirrel with a Traffic Service. He called several primary contacts to the helicopter although he cannot recall if the subject glider was one of them. He was fairly sure that no contacts were displaying on his radar in the vicinity at the time of the incident.

He perceived the severity of the incident as ‘Low’.

Factual Background

The Gloucestershire weather at the time of the incident was:

METAR EGBJ 031150Z 28006KT 9999 SCT042 16/05 Q1023

1 Airprox 2015078

Analysis and Investigation

Military ATM

The incident occurred on 3 Jun 2015 at 1400 between a Glider and a Twin Squirrel. The Squirrel was under a Traffic Service with Brize Radar. The Radar Analysis Cell could not capture the glider on radar replay.

At 1337:19 the Squirrel left controlled airspace and was placed under a Traffic Service. The Squirrel requested vectors for Gloucester and Shawbury and was given a heading of 295° at 1337:31. At 1339:59, the Squirrel requested a Deconfliction Service and at 1340:15, the controller replied with: “[Squirrel c/s] Deconfliction Service avoiding action turn right immediately heading three six zero degrees traffic twelve o’clock seven miles crossing left right no height information.” The controller issued the warning at 1340:29, “[Squirrel callsign] reduced traffic information from all around due to high traffic density multiple contacts between yourself and Gloucester all manoeuvring no height information believed to be gliders.”

At 1344:01, the Squirrel crew requested a Traffic Service and were subsequently provided vectors for Shawbury of 320°. Three sets of Traffic Information were passed, including at 1347:24: “[Squirrel c/s] clear of last reported traffic further traffic twelve o clock four miles crossing right left ahead no height information possible glider.”

The CPA was estimated at 1350:50 (Figure 1) although no primary return appeared on radar.

Figure 1: CPA estimated at 1350:50 (Squirrel squawk 3730).

Further sets of Traffic Information were passed at 1351:39 and 1354:37. At 1355:37 the Squirrel crew commented: “we’ve just had a glider pop out of the cloud he was a reasonable distance in front of us but there was no warning of (unintelligible) that...” ATC replied at 1355:51 with: “Roger nothing showing on radar apart from the er traffic I previously called to you which has now passed behind.”

The controller had demonstrated duty of care by providing avoiding action and then Traffic Information to the crew throughout the transit. The service had been reduced due to high traffic density and this had allowed the crew to concentrate on lookout. The glider did not appear on radar replay but the controller had warned of the high glider activity and the crew had focussed on their lookout. TAS did not provide information on the glider as it appears not to have been transponding. The limitations of ‘see-and-avoid’ are well known, especially with the limited target characteristics of a white glider appearing suddenly against a white cloud background.

2 Airprox 2015078

UKAB Secretariat

Both pilots had equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to fly into such proximity as to create a danger of collision.1 When converging, power-driven heavier-than-air aircraft shall give way to sailplanes.2

Comments

HQ Air Command

In Class G airspace with gliders often not painting on ATC radar screens, the remaining barriers are CWS (Collision Warning Systems) and lookout. In this case the CWS on each aircraft were incompatible (the Squirrel’s TAS is IFF based and FLARM is only visible on other FLARM equipment) so look out was the remaining barrier. The Squirrel had 3 POB and had made efforts to improve his situational awareness knowing of the intense glider activity (he had requested to descend below cloud so that he could take a traffic service and the handling pilot had stopped using his visor to simulate IF). Even after these efforts, neither ATC nor the Squirrel pilot were aware of this specific glider’s presence until the late sighting and avoidance action was taken.

BGA

It seems likely that both aircraft were operating close to the reported cloudbase of 4200ft which can make any aircraft difficult to see. Both pilots are to be commended for their prompt avoiding action.

Summary

An Airprox was reported when a LS8 glider and a Squirrel flew into proximity on 3rd June 2015. The glider was operating under VFR in VMC with no ATC service. The Squirrel was operating under VFR in VMC under a Traffic Service from Brize Radar.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from the pilots of both aircraft, transcripts of the relevant RT frequencies, radar photographs/video recordings, reports from the air traffic controllers involved and reports from the appropriate ATC and operating authorities.

The Board commended the Brize Radar Controller for providing timely traffic information to the Squirrel crew on multiple targets, believed to be gliders, and commented that this had undoubtedly raised the level of situational awareness of the Squirrel crew as they prioritised their lookout accordingly. Unfortunately, the glider in question was not seen on radar, and so no warning could be given. Notwithstanding, the fact that all three crew members were made aware of the presence of returns in the vicinity of their flight path was considered instrumental in concentrating their lookout.

The Board then turned again to the issue of electronic conspicuity. They noted that the glider was fitted with FLARM, whilst the Squirrel’s TAS was only compatible with aircraft fitted with and employing SSR equipment. Noting that glider power issues meant that they could not be relied on to squawk SSR even if fitted, some members wondered whether the MOD were considering fitment of P-FLARM to their helicopter fleet given that there was likely conflict with gliders given that they both regularly operated in the same height bands. The JHC Board member commented that, although the MOD was looking at various options, the cost benefit of fitting P-FLARM to the Squirrel fleet was perceived as small because, historically, there had been few conflicts with gliders.

1 SERA 3205 (Proximity) 2 SERA 3210 (Right of way)

3 Airprox 2015078

The Board agreed that the cause of the Airprox was a late sighting by both pilots, Although they commended both pilots for their prompt avoiding action on sighting the other aircraft, they were sufficiently concerned by the reported separation at CPA to agree that, although late avoiding action had been taken by both aircraft, safety margins had been much reduced below normal, thus assessing the risk as Category B.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CAUSE AND RISK

Cause: A late sighting by both pilots.

Degree of Risk: B.

4 AIRPROX REPORT No 2015080

Date: 3 Jun 2015 Time: 1112Z Position: 5142N 00209W Location: 20nm SW Brize Norton

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded Aircraft 1 Aircraft 2 Aircraft Squirrel Glider Operator HQ Air (Trg) Unknown Airspace London FIR London FIR Class G G Rules IFR NK Service Traffic NK Provider Brize Radar NK Altitude/FL 3000ft NK Transponder A,C NK Reported Colours Black White Lighting HISLs, landing light. Conditions VMC Visibility 40km Altitude/FL 3000ft Altimeter QNH (1014hPa) Heading 065° Speed 110kt ACAS/TAS Other TAS Alert Nil Separation Reported 50ft V/50ft H NK Recorded NK

THE SQUIRREL PILOT reports he was transiting back to his base and receiving a LARS via Gloster and Brize. Shortly after being handed over to Brize Radar, he was advised of a contact ahead and below, assumed to be a glider, which was sighted 1000ft below. ATC then gave avoiding action to turn left onto a heading of 360°, whilst conducting the turn the student in the right-hand seat saw the wing of a glider approaching in the lower right-hand window, the glider continued to climb past the right-hand window approximately 50ft away. The student continued the avoiding action turn and reported the glider to the rest of the crew.

He perceived the severity of the incident as ‘High’.

THE GLIDER PILOT could not be traced.

THE BRIZE RADAR CONTROLLER reports that the Airprox was not reported on frequency at the time of the incident and he was only notified of it some days later; therefore, his recollection of the incident was hazy. The Squirrel was pre-noted by Bristol at 3500ft and on a Traffic Service. However, it free-called outside controlled airspace at FL50 and requested a Deconfliction Service. After starting to indentify the aircraft, the controller informed the pilot that if he wanted a Deconfliction Service, he would need to re-route 15nm to the west, and would be unable to transit through the Brize overhead due to the number of non-squawking tracks. The Squirrel was turned onto west for avoiding action against a track to the east, and the pilot stated that he would like a descent to become VMC, with the aim of accepting a Traffic Service. The pilot was duly given a descent and asked to report VMC below cloud. Once he had levelled, the pilot accepted a downgrade to Traffic Service and was given own navigation to BZN. Multiple tracks were called to the pilot on the transit, and it was reiterated on several occasions that there was intense glider activity around Nympsfield

1 Airprox 2015080 and Aston. Under its own navigation for Brize, he reported that the aircraft passed overhead Aston gliding site and the pilot was advised to climb to avoid a potential collision with the cable winch. [UKAB Note: the Squirrel did not in fact pass overhead the glider site, but to its west, as shown in the diagram on page 1]. The aircraft was then handed over to the Approach controller for his transit through the Brize CTZ.

He perceived the severity of the incident as ‘Low’.

Factual Background

The weather at Brize was reported as:

METAR EGVN 031050Z 26007KT 9999 SCT048 15/05 Q1022 BLU NOSIG

Analysis and Investigation

Military ATM

The Squirrel was under a Deconfliction/Traffic Service with Brize LARS. The Radar Analysis Cell captured the incident based upon the London QNH of 1022 hPa but could not detect the glider. The Deconfliction Service was provided at 1100:50 and the controller advised that he could not get the aircraft through the Brize overhead under the service due to multiple tracks operating in the Kemble area. At 1101:50, the crew requested a descent of 1500ft to get VMC below. Avoiding action was given at 1101:58 and the descent to 3000ft was given at 1102:15. The pilot called VMC below and was provided a Traffic Service and own navigation for Brize at 1104:43. Three sets of Traffic Information were then provided and a reduced service due to high traffic density. At 1110:35 the Squirrel crew were warned that they were heading for the Aston overhead, which was active with glider activity.

At 1111:18, the controller transmitted, "[Squirrel c/s] Aston winch gliding up to altitude 3300 feet, suggest you avoid Aston." The squirrel asked for a repeat at 1111:27 and at 1111:29 the controller repeated, "Suggest a northerly heading to avoid Aston with winch gliding up to altitude 3300." The crew confirmed that they were avoiding Aston. The CPA was estimated at 1111:44 (Figure 1) based upon the avoiding action and the pilot report.

Figure 1: CPA estimated at 1111:44 (Squirrel squawk 3710).

2 Airprox 2015080

The crew reported steady at 1112:34 and Brize gave a vector onto 090° with further Traffic Information at traffic at 3nm, with no height information. The controller, with a great deal of assistance from an experienced Supervisor, had attempted to help the crew remain VMC and clear of traffic. Multiple sets of Traffic Information had been provided and the Traffic Service was reduced due to high traffic density. Following further Supervisor guidance, the crew were reminded of Aston gliding site and were eventually offered an avoid onto north to remain clear. The Airprox occurred as the Squirrel turned onto north and the crew became visual at CPA. The glider did not appear on any of the RAC radar replays. The crew had requested a descent to remain VMC and their new altitude had conflicted with Aston winch launches.

The normal barriers to an Airprox would be radar-derived Traffic Information, lookout and ACAS. Traffic Information had been called on detected aircraft along with advice on routing to avoid Aston. However specific information was not passed on the glider as it did not appear on the Brize radar. The ACAS equipped Squirrel could not detect a non-transponder; FLARM was not available to the Squirrel crew or ATC. The limitations of lookout are well-known, especially against a glider that may be difficult to acquire due to its target characteristics, slow relative motion and lack of colour contrast with the backdrop of the clouds.

UKAB Secretariat

Both pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard1. When two aircraft are converging at approximately the same level, the aircraft that has the other on its right shall give way, except as follows: (i) power- driven heavier-than-air aircraft shall give way to … sailplanes...2

Comments

HQ Air Command

This event took place in a known area of intense glider activity. It highlights the fact that very often gliders do not show up on radar and regardless of whether on a Traffic Service or Deconfliction Service, if a radar unit cannot identify a glider, they will not be able to alert you to or direct you away from its position. It also highlights the fact that white gliders with no other conspicuity features make identification difficult. No matter how many gliders you are aware of (through Air Traffic identification or your own lookout); there is always the possibility that there could be others in the area. In this instance, it is fortuitous that the Air Traffic advice provided to the Squirrel pilot to avoid Aston Down winch launching site was the catalyst which enabled the Squirrel pilot to see the glider.

BGA

This incident again illustrates the potential hazards for aircraft routing overhead promulgated and known-to-be-active gliding sites. It is gratifying to see the efforts made by the Brize Controller to assist the Squirrel pilot in avoiding Aston Down. Pilots should be aware of not only cable launching but tug/glider combinations and gliders that have recently launched and are climbing away close to the airfield above circuit height. Stall/spin training will also take place nearby. The immediate vicinity of a gliding site can be a very busy place on a soarable day.

Summary

An Airprox was reported on 3rd June 2015 at 1112 between a Squirrel and an untraced glider. The Squirrel pilot was at 3000ft, receiving a Traffic Service from Brize Radar and had received non- specific Traffic Information about the intense gliding activity.

1 SERA.3205 Proximity. 2 SERA.3210 Right-of-way.

3 Airprox 2015080

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from the Squirrel pilot, transcripts of the relevant RT frequencies, radar photographs/video recordings, reports from the air traffic controllers involved and reports from the appropriate ATC and operating authorities.

The Board first discussed the actions of the Brize Radar controller and commended him for reminding the Squirrel pilot of his proximity to the Aston down glider site. Without his reminder, and subsequent avoiding action, the pilot may well have flown straight through at a height below the winch launch. The Board also noted that the controller had passed generic Traffic Information to the pilot about numerous non-squawking contacts in the area which he believed to be gliders, and thought it unfortunate that this particular glider had not shown on the radar to allow more accurate Traffic Information to be passed.

In looking at the actions of the Squirrel pilot, the Board commended him for taking up a Traffic Service to assist his look-out, but thought that his choice of routing could have been better; in particular, they wondered whether, without ATC intervention he would have continued through Aston Down. That said, because of the timely reminder by ATC, he hadn’t actually flown through it and the Board recognised that he was perfectly entitled to be in the airspace he was in. Notwithstanding, in Class G airspace, see-and-avoid is still the main mitigation against mid-air-collision particularly for gliders which are often not detected by radar. In this respect, members opined that this incident highlighted the need to clear the blind area on the outside of turns given that the incident occurred as the Squirrel was turning left away from Aston Down gliding site. The Board noted that the Squirrel pilot’s sighting of the glider to his right was effectively at CPA, and too late to change the trajectory of the conflict, which had resulted in separation being at the minimum.

The Board were disappointed that the glider pilot hadn’t been traced because it meant that they were deprived of the full picture of the nature of the Airprox and had no way of knowing whether the glider pilot was visual with the Squirrel. They noted that, despite extensive searching by the Radar Analysis Cell, it had not been possible to trace the glider pilot and no-one at Aston Down had reported seeing anything untoward (although it was recognised that the glider pilot could have been conducting a cross-country trip and therefore not from Aston Down). Ultimately, given the close proximity of the aircraft as reported by the Squirrel pilot and the absence of any report from a glider pilot (who would likely have also reported if he had seen the Squirrel so close), the Board believed that the glider pilot probably hadn’t seen the Squirrel at all.

The Board discussed the issue of glider electronic conspicuity, a recurring Airprox theme, and noted that because the Squirrel was not P-FLARM equipped, and because most gliders did not carry a transponder, the TAS on board the Squirrel wouldn’t have detected the glider. The JHC member commented that the MOD was investigating the feasibility of equipping Squirrels with P-FLARM, but that gliders were not considered to be the main risk of Airprox to the helicopter force, and it was likely that the cost of retrospectively fitting such equipment would be prohibitive.

Turning to the cause of the Airprox, the Board agreed that it was effectively a non-sighting by the Squirrel pilot (because by the time the crew saw the glider it was too late to take any action), and a probable non-sighting by the glider pilot. They determined the risk to be Category A, separation had been reduced to the minimum and chance had played a major part in the event.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CAUSE AND RISK

Cause: Effectively, a non-sighting by the Squirrel pilot and a probable non-sighting by the glider pilot.

Degree of Risk: A.

4 AIRPROX REPORT No 2015081

Date: 5 Jun 2015 Time: 1115Z Position: 5306N 00231W Location: 2nm W Crew

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded Aircraft 1 Aircraft 2 Aircraft Lynx Rans S-6 Operator HQ JHC Civ Pte Airspace London FIR London FIR Class G G Rules VFR VFR Service Basic None Provider Shawbury N/A Altitude/FL 900ft NK Transponder A, C, S Off Reported Colours Grey/Green Red/White Lighting Strobes, nav, NK landing Conditions VMC VMC Visibility 15km 10km Altitude/FL 500ft 800ft Altimeter agl (1012hPa) QNH (NK hPa) Heading 140° 100° Speed 120kt 45kt ACAS/TAS Not fitted Not fitted Separation Reported 20ft V/0m H 0ft V/25m H Recorded NK

THE LYNX PILOT reports he conducted a training radar approach to Liverpool RW27 and departed en-route to Stafford HLS, under VFR, at 1000ft altitude on a track of 140º. On clearing from Liverpool's airspace, the crew continued to fly a heading of 140º and contacted Shawbury Low-Level for a Basic Service, still at 1000ft on the Shawbury QNH of 1012hPa. They were aware of the Wrexham to Stoke flow corridor1 and the aircraft was descended to 500ft agl, he reported. The non- handling pilot, sitting in the left seat, saw an aircraft in the low eight o’clock position at a range of 10m travelling in a southerly direction approximately 20ft beneath their aircraft. He did not have time to warn or take control before the other aircraft passed beneath them. The handling pilot (HP), in the right seat, and the crewman, looked forward and right in order to identify the other aircraft. Nothing was seen and the HP began a right turn to establish the location of the other aircraft. After rolling out on an easterly heading, the crew saw the other aircraft, now heading in an easterly direction, and on closer inspection at a distance of approximately 300m it was believed to be a high wing Cessna 152, with a white upper and a red lower fuselage. At this point the HP transmitted an Airprox call on the Shawbury Low-Level frequency.

He assessed the risk of collision as ‘Very High’.

THE RANS PILOT reports he had just taken off from a farm strip. He looked down at a local building for no more than 5sec when a helicopter appeared on his right at a steep banked angle, taking avoiding action. He assumed that the helicopter had also just taken off from a hotel about 400m to the south since neither of them had reached cruising altitude he thought.

He assessed the risk of collision as ‘High’.

1 See Analysis and Investigation – UKAB Secretariat.

1 Airprox 2015081

THE SHAWBURY CONTROLLER reports he was the Low-Level controller working 2 frequencies when the Lynx pilot called for transit from Liverpool en-route to Stafford HLS through the [military] Dedicated User Area. Shortly afterwards, the Lynx pilot declared an Airprox. This was acknowledge and the pilot reported taking avoiding action after seeing what he thought was a red and white Cessna to the left of him at the same level at a distance of about 200ft. The other aircraft was later seen tracking 085° but neither aircraft were visible on radar at the time of the Airprox.

THE SHAWBURY SUPERVISOR reports that although he did not witness the incident, he was alongside the Low-Level controller as he was receiving the Airprox report from the Lynx pilot. As the report was being passed the Supervisor checked on the LARS position, and that controller did not appear to be working any aircraft in the vicinity of the reported Airprox. He also checked the radar screen, but there were no radar contacts in the reported area. The Lynx captain contacted the Supervisor via landline once he had landed and stated that although initially reporting the separation from the other aircraft as within 200ft, after discussions with his student, he now felt that the civilian aircraft was as close as 50ft from them.

Factual Background

The weather at Shawbury and Liverpool was recorded as follows:

METAR EGOS 051050Z 23012KT 9999 SCT025 20/14 Q1012 BLU NOSIG METAR EGOS 051150Z 24012KT 9999 FEW032 20/14 Q1012 BLU NOSIG METAR EGGP 051120Z 25008KT 230V290 9999 SCT031 18/11 Q1012

Analysis and Investigation

Military ATM

At 1113:08, the Lynx pilot was provided with a Basic Service. At 1114:55, the Lynx pilot declared an Airprox and the report at 1115:08 was of a fixed-wing red and white Cessna heading 085°.

The other aircraft was a primary only track and intermittent on the radar replay. The primary track was evident at 1115:00 by which time it was 0.5nm from the Lynx, which was at 800ft based on the London QNH of 1015 hPa.

The usual barriers to an Airprox in Class G airspace are lookout, ACAS/TAS and radar-derived Traffic Information. The Lynx was under a Basic Service below Shawbury’s radar coverage and the other aircraft was only displaying an intermittent primary track. The barrier of ACAS/TAS was absent because the other aircraft did not appear to be transponding and the Lynx was not fitted with ACAS/TAS equipment. The Lynx NHP became visual with the other aircraft at CPA, reported at 20ft passing beneath, which led to a review of lookout skills at the home unit.

UKAB Secretariat

The Lynx and Rans pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard2. If the incident geometry is considered as converging then the Lynx pilot was required to give way to the Rans S-63. If the incident geometry is considered as overtaking then the Rans S-6 pilot had right of way and the Lynx pilot was required to keep out of the way of the other aircraft by altering course to the right4. The low-flying system in the area of the Airprox has a flow arrow, as depicted below, with eastbound aircraft required to remain below 500ft agl, and westbound aircraft above 1000ft agl. Flow arrows are a part of the UK Military Low Flying System (UKMLFS), and are applicable only to pilots flying under military regulations. Information pertaining to the UKMLFS is available in the

2 SERA.3205 Proximity. 3 SERA.3210 Right-of-way (c) (2) Converging. 4 SERA.3210 Right-of-way (c) (3) Overtaking.

2 Airprox 2015081

CAA Safety Sense Leaflet 18 – Military Low Flying, although this does not include flow arrow height information.

UK Low Flying Chart – Flow Arrow Depiction

Comments

JHC

This Airprox highlights the need to maintain a comprehensive lookout scan at all times. The lack of TAS on the Lynx, and the Rans’ transponder not being utilised removed 2 barriers that could have prevented the situation. JHC aircraft remaining in service are undergoing TAS fitment programmes, but the Lynx is not included in the TAS programme as it is due out of service in 2018.

Summary

An Airprox was reported when a Lynx and a Rans S-6 flew into proximity at about 1115 on Friday 5th June 2015. Both pilots were operating under VFR in VMC, the Lynx pilot in receipt of a Basic Service from Shawbury, and the Rans pilot not in receipt of an Air Traffic Service.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from the pilots of both aircraft, radar photographs/video recordings, reports from the air traffic controllers involved and reports from the appropriate ATC and operating authorities.

Members first considered the actions of the controller involved and agreed that without a radar response at the time of the Airprox it was not possible for him to pass Traffic Information to the Lynx pilot; neither was it a requirement under the terms of the Basic Service the Lynx pilot had requested.

Turning to the pilots involved, members agreed that, from the reported geometry of the incident, it could reasonably be surmised that the Lynx was overtaking the Rans as it got airborne and that it had been the Lynx crew’s responsibility to keep out of the way of the Rans. However, the Board recognised that this was plainly not possible without visual acquisition or Traffic Information from an external or on-board source; the fact that they did not visually acquire the Rans earlier emphasised the need for an effective lookout from the crew. Members felt that the incident geometry, with the Rans below the Lynx, against the terrain and on a constant bearing, was a significant factor in the lack of timely visual acquisition.

3 Airprox 2015081

For his part, the Rans pilot had just taken off and, with the Lynx above and behind him, would not have been able to visually acquire it in his high-wing aircraft. Members commented that the Rans pilot did not seem to be aware of the flow arrow in the vicinity of his airfield, with the associated requirement for eastbound military traffic to remain below 500ft agl. Had he been aware of this flow arrow, some members opined that he might have been extra vigilant in his lookout before getting airborne. It was noted that the Board had previously recommended to both the CAA5 and HQ Air Command6 that GA education with regard to understanding of the implications of flow arrows be reviewed. Both recommendations had been accepted and actioned through articles in flight safety publications. A military member further stated that the UKMLFS flow arrow layout was available in the UK AIP7 although it was also noted that the height requirements for bi-directional flow were not included.

Members also noted that the Rans pilot had reported his SSR transponder was selected off, and commented that this represented a missed opportunity. Had it been selected on before takeoff, there was a possibility that the Shawbury controller could have detected his presence and issued Traffic Information to the Lynx crew. Members reiterated the importance of selecting the SSR transponder on, with all Modes, to enable other services or equipment to detect aircraft presence and help mitigate against mid-air collision.

In this instance, members agreed that neither pilot had seen the other aircraft in time to increase separation, effectively a non-sighting by both, and that the situation had only just stopped short of an actual collision.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CAUSE AND RISK

Cause: Effectively, a non-sighting by both pilots.

Degree of Risk: A.

5 Airprox 2013065. 6 Airprox 2014167. 7 ENR 6.5.1.2.

4 Airprox 2015082

AIRPROX REPORT No 2015082

Date: 8 May 2015 Time: 0749Z Position: 5313N 00210W Location: Macclesfield

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded Aircraft 1 Aircraft 2 Aircraft B757 UAV, Quadcopter Operator CAT Unknown Airspace Manchester Manchester TMA TMA Class A A Rules IFR NK Service Radar Control NK Provider Scottish NK Altitude/FL 5000ft Transponder A,C,S Reported Colours Blue/White Black Lighting Red and white strobes. Conditions VMC NK Visibility 30km Altitude/FL 5000ft 4800ft Altimeter QNH NK (1014hPa) Heading 188° NK Speed 250kt NK ACAS/TAS TCAS II Not fitted Alert Nil N/A Separation Reported 150ft V NK Recorded NK

THE B757 PILOT reports that they were following a standard instrument departure from Manchester, in good VMC, when the Captain, who was PM, spotted a black dot ahead, slightly left and slightly low. As he was trying to work out what it was, the dot bloomed into what looked like a black Quadcopter. With a closing speed of 250kts there was no time to react and the aircraft passed slightly above and to the right of the object. The first Officer also caught a glimpse of the object as they passed it, alerted by a call from the captain. It appeared that the object was flying just below 5000ft, but it was impossible to judge the size of the object or its distance as there was no frame of reference. The reported distances are based on the assumption that the object was 0.5-1m wide. The Airprox was immediately reported to Scottish Control, who indicated he could see something on the radar. The pilot reported that it was a very frightening incident; if the object had been displaced by 500m they would have hit it. He also noted that it happened very quickly, with the time from initial sighting to the object passing being around 2 seconds.

He assessed the risk of collision as ‘Severe’.

THE QUADCOPTER OPERATOR could not be traced.

THE MANCHESTER CONTROLLER reports he was SE Tac controller and had a planner in place because it was expected that traffic levels were due to increase. The B757 was on a LISTO departure and reported a drone to his left-hand side at approximately 5000ft. The controller instructed the aircraft behind to turn in order to keep them clear of the reported drone.

1 Airprox 2015082

Factual Background

The weather at Manchester was reported as:

METAR EGCC 080750Z 12007KT CAVOK 12/05 Q1014 NOSIG

The LISTO2S departure is published as shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1: LISTO2S departure

Analysis and Investigation

CAA ATSI

Pilot of the B757 reported having seen a black quadcopter on his left-hand side at a similar level to himself (5000ft). The STAFA controller passed positional information to following aircraft and subsequently a turn to avoid. The report from the pilot of the B752 indicated that he believed that the controller could see the drone on his radar screen, but this was not the case. Positional information was passed to the following aircraft based on the position of the reporting aircraft at the time.

UKAB Secretariat

The Air Navigation Order 2009 (as amended), Article 1381 states:

A person must not recklessly or negligently cause or permit an aircraft to endanger any person or property.

1 Article 253 of the ANO details which Articles apply to small unmanned aircraft. Article 255 defines ‘small unmanned aircraft’. The ANO is available to view at http://www.legislation.gov.uk.

2 Airprox 2015082

Article 166, paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 state:

(2) The person in charge of a small unmanned aircraft may only fly the aircraft if reasonably satisfied that the flight can safely be made.

(3) The person in charge of a small unmanned aircraft must maintain direct, unaided visual contact with the aircraft sufficient to monitor its flight path in relation to other aircraft, persons, vehicles, vessels and structures for the purpose of avoiding collisions.’

(4) The person in charge of a small unmanned aircraft which has a mass of more than 7kg excluding its fuel but including any articles or equipment installed in or attached to the aircraft at the commencement of its flight must not fly the aircraft

(a) in Class A, C, D or E airspace unless the permission of the appropriate air traffic control unit has been obtained; (b) within an aerodrome traffic zone …; or (c) at a height of more than 400 feet above the surface unless it is flying in airspace described in sub-paragraph (a) or (b) and in accordance with the requirements for that airspace.

A CAA web site2 provides information and guidance associated with the operation of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UASs) and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs).

The CAA has published a UAV Safety Notice3 which states the responsibilities for flying unmanned aircraft. This includes:

You are responsible for avoiding collisions with other people or objects - including aircraft. Do not fly your unmanned aircraft in any way that could endanger people or property. It is illegal to fly your unmanned aircraft over a congested area (streets, towns and cities). Also, stay well clear of airports and airfields.

In addition, the CAA has published guidance regarding First Person View (FPV) drone operations which limit this activity to drones of less than 3.5kg take-off mass, and to not more than 1000ft4.

Occurrence Investigation

NATS undertook an occurrence investigation, which noted that there was no radar contact correlating to the drone’s reported track and so exact distances could not be ascertained. The Cheshire police were informed about the incident.

Summary

An Airprox was reported on 8th May at 0749 between a B757 and a Quadcopter. The B757 was on a LISTO departure from Manchester and, when passing 5000ft, the crew reported seeing a Quadcopter type drone pass 500m down their left-hand side. The Quadcopter operator could not be traced.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from the B757 pilot, transcripts of the relevant RT frequencies, radar photographs/video recordings, reports from the air traffic controllers involved and reports from the appropriate ATC and operating authorities.

The crew of the B757 reported seeing an drone-like object at 5000ft overhead Macclesfield. The Board noted that CAA regulation states that it is illegal for drones to be operated at that height and

2 www.caa.co.uk/uas 3 CAP 1202 4 ORSA No. 1108 Small Unmanned Aircraft – First Person View (FPV) Flying available at: http://www.caa.co.uk/docs/33/1108.pdf.

3 Airprox 2015082 drones must not be flown within controlled airspace, in this case the Manchester TMA, without prior approval and a NOTAM issued. The drone operator was not entitled to operate there, and his non- compliance posed a safety risk. Furthermore, to reach a height of 5000ft, the drone would need to be flown on first person view (FPV), and regulation states that, when using FPV, an additional person must be used as a competent observer who must maintain direct unaided visual contact with the drone in order to monitor its flight path in relation to other aircraft. At 5000ft it would be impossible to see the drone from the ground, again contrary to the regulation.

The Board heard evidence provided by ARPAS-UK5 would seem to suggest that it would be quite difficult for a consumer drone to reach heights of 5000ft, and it would therefore be more likely to be an expensive, high specification model of the type normally used by professionals. Even if the drone was able to reach 5000ft, ARPAS-UK suggested that battery life would preclude it remaining there for any length of time; the average battery life for a drone is 15 minutes when flying conservatively, and the Board understood that flying at height drained the battery even more quickly. This led the Board to wonder whether the crew could have seen something other than a drone. Notwithstanding, with both members of the flight crew having seen the object, the Board did not doubt that the crew had seen something at their level; that they were convinced that it looked like a black Quadcopter drone had to be taken at face value.

In determining the cause, because the drone was operating in airspace which it should not be in, the Board agreed the cause to be that the reported drone had been flown into conflict with the B757. Turning to the assessment of the risk some Board members wondered whether chance had played a major part in preventing a collision. However, although there was no radar recording to provide accurate separation data, given that the object was described as being 150ft vertically and 500m horizontally away, it was decided that this was a Category B risk rather than a Category A: safety margins had been much reduced below normal but not quite to the extent where separation had been reduced to the minimum.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CAUSE AND RISK

Cause: The reported drone was flown into conflict with the B757.

Degree of Risk: B.

5 ARPAS-UK - Association of Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems-UK.

4 AIRPROX REPORT No 2015084

Date: 30 May 2015 Time: 1135Z Position: 5210N 00114W Location: Byfield, Northampton (Saturday)

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded Aircraft 1 Aircraft 2 Aircraft Vans RV6 Drone Operator Civ Pte Unknown Airspace London FIR London FIR Class G G Rules VFR NK Service None NK Provider Sywell NK Altitude/FL NK NK Transponder Mode A NK Reported Colours White, Red Red, yellow Lighting Anti-colls Nil Conditions VMC NK Visibility 50nm NK Altitude/FL 2000ft NK Altimeter QNH NK (1013hPa) Heading 063° NK Speed 150kt NK ACAS/TAS Not fitted NK Alert Nil N/A Separation Reported 0ft V/50ft H NK Recorded NK

THE RV6 PILOT reports that he had just switched to a listening watch on the Sywell frequency when he saw the red and yellow, 3-rotor drone. He reported that it was the type that can be easily bought in shops and not a commercial surveillance type vehicle. He took evasive action and the drone passed down the side of the aircraft and under its left wing.

THE DRONE OPERATOR could not be traced.

Factual Background

The weather at Cranfield was reported as:

METAR EGTC 301120Z 28009KT 240V320 9999 FEW045 14/04 Q1014

UKAB Secretariat

The Air Navigation Order 2009 (as amended), Article 1381 states:

‘A person must not recklessly or negligently cause or permit an aircraft to endanger any person or property.’

1 Article 253 of the ANO details which Articles apply to small unmanned aircraft. Article 255 defines ‘small unmanned aircraft’. The ANO is available to view at http://www.legislation.gov.uk.

1 Airprox 2015084

Article 166, paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 state:

(2) The person in charge of a small unmanned aircraft may only fly the aircraft if reasonably satisfied that the flight can safely be made.

(3) The person in charge of a small unmanned aircraft must maintain direct, unaided visual contact with the aircraft sufficient to monitor its flight path in relation to other aircraft, persons, vehicles, vessels and structures for the purpose of avoiding collisions.

(4) The person in charge of a small unmanned aircraft which has a mass of more than 7kg excluding its fuel but including any articles or equipment installed in or attached to the aircraft at the commencement of its flight must not fly the aircraft

(a) in Class A, C, D or E airspace unless the permission of the appropriate air traffic control unit has been obtained; (b) within an aerodrome traffic zone …; or (c) at a height of more than 400 feet above the surface unless it is flying in airspace described in sub-paragraph (a) or (b) and in accordance with the requirements for that airspace.

A CAA web site2 provides information and guidance associated with the operation of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UASs) and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs).

The CAA has published a UAV Safety Notice3 which states the responsibilities for flying unmanned aircraft. This includes:

‘You are responsible for avoiding collisions with other people or objects - including aircraft. Do not fly your unmanned aircraft in any way that could endanger people or property. It is illegal to fly your unmanned aircraft over a congested area (streets, towns and cities). Also, stay well clear of airports and airfields.’

In addition, the CAA has published guidance regarding First Person View (FPV) drone operations which limit this activity to drones of less than 3.5kg take-off mass, and to not more than 1000ft4.

Summary

An Airprox was reported on 30th May 2015 at 1135 between a Vans RV6 and a drone. The RV6 pilot was flying VFR in VMC at 2000ft and was listening out on the Sywell frequency. He saw the drone pass down the left-hand-side of his aircraft 50ft away. The drone could not be seen on the NATS radars and the operator could not be traced.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from the pilots of the Vans RV6 and radar photographs/video recordings.

The Vans RV6 pilot was flying VFR at 2000ft and not receiving a radar service. It was unlikely that a drone would have been detected by the radar anyway, and the pilot managed to spot the drone, albeit at a late stage, and take some avoiding action. The Board were aware of the existence of 3 rotored drones, albeit normally used by hobbyists rather than commercial operators, and were also told about ‘hexacopters’ which have 3 arms and 6 rotors. However, given that the pilot thought the drone was like the type normally bought in shops, they thought it likely that this indicated that the drone was at the same level as the RV6 (2000ft) giving the pilot the impression of just 3 rotors.

2 www.caa.co.uk/uas 3 CAP 1202 4 ORSA No. 1108 Small Unmanned Aircraft – First Person View (FPV) Flying available at: http://www.caa.co.uk/docs/33/1108.pdf.

2 Airprox 2015084

This led the Board to discuss the height at which the drone was operating. Even allowing for the fact that the ground was up to 6-700ft amsl in the area, the Board noted that the drone operator should not have been operating the vehicle at an altitude of 2000ft. The Board had previously been informed by representatives from ARPAS-UK5 that it was unlikely that an operator could effectively control a drone at this altitude through direct visual contact alone, and that therefore it was probably being flown under First Person View (FPV). Providing the drone was below 3.5kgs, CAA regulation allows drones to be flown under FPV at heights of less than 1000ft (but also requires that operators have a competent observer present to assist with detecting and avoiding other aircraft). The Board thought that, although it might just be possible for an observer to be able to see a drone at a height of 1300- 1400ft, it would be impractical to judge separation from other aircraft with any degree of accuracy (drone operators were also required to keep 50m away from any third parties, including other aircraft). Flying drones above 1000ft was, in any case, contrary to existing CAA regulations; the issue being whether this had been done knowingly or unknowingly. The Board also acknowledged the difficulty in policing and enforcing the regulations; unfortunately, the short battery life of drones means that, with a typical flying time of approximately 15 minutes, it is difficult for the police to respond and catch drone operators flouting the regulations. As in previous drone Airprox, the Board once again noted that a combination of technical solutions (such as geo-fencing), registration of drones, and education of drone operators was, in their opinion, key to reducing this type of Airprox.

When discussing the cause of the Airprox the Board quickly agreed that, because the drone was being operated at an altitude it should not have been, the reported drone was flown into conflict with the RV6. Although there was no radar data to measure the exact separation, the Board thought it was clear from the pilot’s report that this was a fairly close encounter, and they assessed the risk as Category B, safety margins had been much reduced below the norm, but not quite to the point where separation had been reduced to the minimum.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CAUSE AND RISK

Cause: The reported drone was flown into conflict with the RV6.

Degree of Risk: B.

5 Association of Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems-UK.

3 Airprox 2015086

AIRPROX REPORT No 2015086

Date: 17 Jun 2015 Time: 1152Z Position: 5117N 00034E Location: Detling

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded Aircraft 1 Aircraft 2 Aircraft Cavalon Phantom FPV Autogyro Flying wing drone Operator Civ Trg Unknown Airspace London FIR London FIR Class G G Rules VFR NK Service None NK Provider Rochester NK Altitude/FL 1600ft NK Transponder A,C,S NK Reported Colours White Yellow Lighting Strobes, Nav NK lights Conditions VMC NK Visibility 10km NK Altitude/FL 1500ft NK Altimeter QNH NK (1022hPa) Heading South East NK Speed 70 kt NK ACAS/TAS TCAS I NK Alert Nil Separation Reported 0ft V/20m H NK Recorded NK

THE CAVALON AUTOGYRO PILOT reports that he was on a training flight, the visibility was good and the cloud base was above their cruising height. As they transited over Detling village they encountered a drone at 1500ft. It passed down the left side of the aircraft at a range of 20m. The instructor took control of the aircraft, slowed it down and, having ensured there was no danger to the aircraft, was able to take some photographs. They then continued with the sortie. By looking at the photographs later they were able to identify the drone as a ‘Phantom FPV’, which has a wing span of 1550mm and a weight of 900g. [UKAB Note: the Phantom FPV is a flying-wing drone rather than a quadcopter]. A member of ground staff at their home base mentioned that there was a model flying club at Thurnham and wondered whether the

drone was being flown from there.

He assessed the risk of collision as ‘High’.

1 Airprox 2015086

THE PHANTOM FLYING WING DRONE OPERATOR could not be traced. RAC contacted a number of local model clubs, including Thurnham, who confirmed that the drone was not being operated from there.

Factual Background

The weather at Southend was recorded as:

METAR EGMC 171150Z 26015KT 230V290 CAVOK 21/13 Q1022

Analysis and Investigation

UKAB Secretariat

The Air Navigation Order 2009 (as amended), Article 1381 states:

‘A person must not recklessly or negligently cause or permit an aircraft to endanger any person or property.’

Article 166, paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 state:

(2) The person in charge of a small unmanned aircraft may only fly the aircraft if reasonably satisfied that the flight can safely be made.

(3) The person in charge of a small unmanned aircraft must maintain direct, unaided visual contact with the aircraft sufficient to monitor its flight path in relation to other aircraft, persons, vehicles, vessels and structures for the purpose of avoiding collisions.

(4) The person in charge of a small unmanned aircraft which has a mass of more than 7kg excluding its fuel but including any articles or equipment installed in or attached to the aircraft at the commencement of its flight must not fly the aircraft

(a) in Class A, C, D or E airspace unless the permission of the appropriate air traffic control unit has been obtained; (b) within an aerodrome traffic zone …; or (c) at a height of more than 400 feet above the surface unless it is flying in airspace described in sub-paragraph (a) or (b) and in accordance with the requirements for that airspace.

A CAA web site2 provides information and guidance associated with the operation of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UASs) and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs).

The CAA has published a UAV Safety Notice3 which states the responsibilities for flying unmanned aircraft. This includes:

‘You are responsible for avoiding collisions with other people or objects - including aircraft. Do not fly your unmanned aircraft in any way that could endanger people or property. It is illegal to fly your unmanned aircraft over a congested area (streets, towns and cities). Also, stay well clear of airports and airfields.’

In addition, the CAA has published guidance regarding First Person View (FPV) drone operations which limit this activity to drones of less than 3.5kg take-off mass, and to not more than 1000ft4.

1 Article 253 of the ANO details which Articles apply to small unmanned aircraft. Article 255 defines ‘small unmanned aircraft’. The ANO is available to view at http://www.legislation.gov.uk. 2 www.caa.co.uk/uas 3 CAP 1202 4 ORSA No. 1108 Small Unmanned Aircraft – First Person View (FPV) Flying available at: http://www.caa.co.uk/docs/33/1108.pdf.

2 Airprox 2015086

Summary

An Airprox was reported on 17th June 2015 at 1152 between a Cavalon Autogyro and a Phantom FPV drone. The autogyro was flying VFR and VMC at 1500ft when the pilot spotted the drone. They were able to slow down and take pictures of the drone, but unfortunately the drone operator has not been traced.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from the pilot of the Autogryo and radar photographs/video recordings.

The Board noted, as it had on many previous Airprox involving drones, that nominally the drone should not have been at 1500ft. That being said, they also noted that there was hilly ground in the area of the Airprox that extended up to 670ft at a nearby spot height from which the drone operator may conceivably have been operating. Nevertheless, it was the height of the drone over the ground above which it was flying which was important and this was around 2-400ft depending on the exact location. CAA regulation states that drone operators must maintain direct unaided visual reference to the drone, sufficient to monitor its flight path in relation to other aircraft for the purpose of avoiding collisions. An exemption allows a drone of less than 3.5kgs to be flown up to altitudes of 1000ft using First Person View (FPV). Operators using FPV must have a competent observer to maintain the direct visual reference and to ensure that the drone remains 50m away from other aircraft, vessels or structure. It appeared to the Board that, at best, the drone was being flown right at the top of the 1000ft allowed height, if not above.

In looking at the actions of the Autogyro pilot, the Board noted that he was operating VFR in class G airspace in good visibility and using see-and-avoid as mitigation to prevent mid-air-collision. Unfortunately, the nature and size of the drone made early sighting difficult. He had had no time to take avoiding action, and it was only after the event that he was able to slow down and take some photographs.

The Autogyro pilot was not receiving an air traffic service at the time of the Airprox and, therefore, the police would not have been informed of the incident: as with many of these type of Airprox the drone operator could therefore not be traced. The Board noted that this type of Airprox was on the increase, and that a combination of technical solutions (such as geo-fencing), registration of drones, and education of drone operators was, in their opinion, key to reducing this type of Airprox.

Because the drone was operating either at the top, if not above, the regulatory allowed height for FPV operations, this led the Board to identify the cause of the Airprox as the drone being flown into conflict with the Autogyro. Although there was no radar recording to measure the separation, the Autogyro pilot’s report indicated that the drone was only 20m away when they passed, which indicated that separation had been reduced to a minimum, and that chance had played a major part in preventing the collision. They therefore assessed the risk as Category A.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CAUSE AND RISK

Cause: The drone was flown into conflict with the autogyro.

Degree of Risk: A.

3 AIRPROX REPORT No 2015087

Date: 26 Apr 2015 Time: 1038Z Position: 5250N 00246W Location: Sleap Airfield

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded Aircraft 1 Aircraft 2 Aircraft Glasair PA28 Operator Civ Pte Civ Pte Airspace Sleap ATZ Sleap ATZ Class G G Rules VFR VFR Service Air/Ground Air/Ground Provider Sleap Sleap Altitude/FL 1200ft 1300ft Transponder A, C, S A, C, S Reported Colours White Red/white Lighting Strobes Strobes Conditions VMC VMC Visibility >10km >10km Altitude/FL ~1400ft 2000ft Altimeter NK QFE (1001hPa) Heading 010° NK Speed 120kt NK ACAS/TAS Not fitted Not fitted Separation Reported 75ft V/0m H Not seen Recorded 100ft V/<0.1nm H

THE GLASAIR PILOT reports departing from Sleap aerodrome on RW36. As he rolled, he heard another pilot call ‘descending deadside’. He did not see the other aircraft and assumed it would pass behind him, over the upwind threshold of the runway. He continued his take-off and, passing 1400ft at a point about ½-1nm beyond the upwind threshold, a blue, low-wing, ‘T tail’, single-engine Piper aircraft passed directly over him, perpendicular to his flight path and about 50-100ft above. Neither the Glasair pilot, sitting in the left seat, nor the pilot qualified passenger sitting in the right seat, saw the other aircraft before CPA and there was therefore no time to take avoiding action.

He assessed the risk of collision as ‘High’.

THE PA28 PILOT reports that he did not see an aircraft in close proximity and had no recollection of being in a position that he considered to be an Airprox. He had flown to Sleap for solo circuit practice. He conducted a standard overhead join at 2000ft QFE for 2 left-hand circuits on RW36 and then a full-stop landing. He noted that the time given for the Airprox suggested the reported incident may have been during the arrival phase of his flight rather than during the circuits. He recalled some other traffic in the circuit but also that the circuit was not busy. He had a note of the QFE on his flight log, indicating that he received at least an initial response from Sleap Radio for joining instructions and airfield details, and that his other standard positioning calls would have been made ‘blind’.

THE SLEAP A/G OPERATOR did not file a report.

Factual Background

The weather at Shawbury was recorded as follows:

METAR EGOS 260950Z AUTO 35013KT 9999 NCD 09/M01 Q1010 METAR EGOS 261050Z AUTO 33014KT 9999 FEW040/// 09/M00 Q1010

1 Airprox 2015087

Analysis and Investigation

UKAB Secretariat

The Glasair and PA28 pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard1. An aircraft operated on or in the vicinity of an aerodrome shall conform with or avoid the pattern of traffic formed by other aircraft in operation2. The ‘standard overhead join’ is not defined in statute but is regarded as ‘normal aviation practice’. The CAA GA Safety Poster ‘The Standard “Overhead” Join’3 states that pilots should ‘Position to cross at (or within if no other activity) the upwind end of the runway at circuit height’. The poster also states, ‘Watch for aircraft taking off, as they could pose a hazard’.

Summary

An Airprox was reported when a Glasair and a PA28 flew into proximity at 1038 on Sunday 26th April 2015. Both pilots were operating under VFR in VMC, in receipt of an A/G Service from Sleap. The Glasair pilot had just taken-off and was departing upwind when he saw the PA28 pass directly above, on a perpendicular track, at a vertical separation estimated to be 50-100ft; the PA28 pilot had just arrived at the airfield and was on the crosswind leg of his overhead join. He did not see the Glasair.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from the pilots of both aircraft and radar photographs/video recordings.

The Board members spent some time discussing upon whom the onus of responsibility lay with regard to collision avoidance in this incident. Both aircraft were being operated in the vicinity of the aerodrome, and hence both pilots were required to ‘conform with or avoid the pattern of traffic formed’ by the other. Members agreed that this was not a useful solution and, in the absence of specific legislation, agreed that the best guidance available lay in the definition of the ‘Standard Overhead Join’. In this regard, the departing Glasair pilot would have reasonably expected the PA28 pilot to cross near the upwind threshold of the runway, whereas the radar replay indicated the Airprox occurred at a distance equal to about a runway length north of the upwind threshold.

Members reiterated that both pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance, and that both aircraft were there to be seen, but they agreed that in this instance, by not adopting the Standard Overhead Join, the PA28 pilot had essentially flown into conflict with the Glasair. It was also agreed that if the Standard Overhead Join procedure had been followed there would have been much greater separation and reduced risk; therefore they agreed that not conforming had been contributory to the Airprox. Considering the risk, members agreed unanimously that safety margins had been much reduced below normal; they noted that the Glasair pilot did not see the PA28 before CPA, and the PA28 pilot did not see the Glasair at all. Therefore, they considered that chance had played a major part in events and nothing more could have been done to improve matters.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CAUSE AND RISK

Cause: The PA28 pilot flew into conflict with the Glasair.

Contributory Factor: The PA28 pilot did not conform to the ‘Standard Overhead Join’ procedure.

Degree of Risk: A.

1 SERA.3205 Proximity. 2 SERA.3225 Operation on and in the Vicinity of an Aerodrome. 3 http://www.caa.co.uk/application.aspx?catid=33&pagetype=65&appid=11&mode=detail&id=2166, reproduced at Annex A.

2 Annex A to Airprox 2015087

A-1 AIRPROX REPORT No 2015089

Date: 28 May 2015 Time: 1350Z Position: 5109N 00259W Location: 1nm N Bridgewater

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded Aircraft 1 Aircraft 2 Aircraft Sea King DA42 Operator HQ JHC Civ Trg Airspace London FIR London FIR Class G G Rules VFR VFR Service Traffic Basic Provider Yeovil Approach Yeovil LARS Altitude/FL ↓2200ft 2600ft Transponder A, C, S A, C, S Reported Colours Green White/blue Lighting Strobe, nav, NK nose spotlight Conditions VMC VMC Visibility 25km NK Altitude/FL ↓3000ft 2500ft Altimeter RPS (1011hPa) RPS (1011hPa) Heading 360° 218° Speed 100kt 140kt ACAS/TAS Not fitted NK Alert N/A Unknown Separation Reported 0ft V/400m H Not seen Recorded 300ft V/<0.1nm H

THE SEA KING PILOT reports conducting an air test in the vicinity of Bridgewater, in a right turn through north at 5000ft, when ATC called traffic 5nm northeast, 2000ft below. The call was acknowledged, but neither pilot could see the traffic. The Handling Pilot (HP) thought that ATC had reported the traffic as tracking southeast. He elected to continue the right turn through 270° to roll out on west in preparation for a low-speed autorotation test profile, leading directly into a second autorotation test profile, thinking that the reported traffic would be well clear astern and tracking away. During the turn the aircraft was climbed to 5500ft to check the radar altimeter ‘OFF flag’ and the area below and to the right (north) of the aircraft was cleared in preparation for the autorotation. The aircraft was established in a low-speed autorotation and yawed 90° to the right iaw the test schedule. The HP then selected and held 20° nose down to accelerate to 100kt; the rate of descent was in the region of 3000fpm. The HP had just raised the nose to about 5° nose down, and stabilised the aircraft at 100kt, when ATC called traffic 1nm north, 200ft below. A white, slender-winged, twin- engined aircraft was seen slightly low in the 1 o'clock, belly up to the Sea King in a turn to the right, crossing rapidly right-to-left. Although the conflicting traffic was initially slightly below the Sea King, both pilots were looking down and ahead into the autorotation flight path and had to look up to see the conflicting traffic. In addition, in the moments before the Airprox, both pilots had increased their scan of the rotor rpm-gauge as the aircraft was flared in autorotation. It was not possible to determine if the conflicting aircraft was climbing or descending. The HP initiated a turn to the right, although the confliction had passed before the aircraft responded. CPA was assessed to be as the Sea King descended through the level of the other aircraft. The Non-Handling Pilot (NHP) assessed the minimum separation to be 600m; the HP thought it was closer, perhaps as little as 250m. The aircraft was recovered to level flight at 2500ft and the right turn was continued in an effort to regain visual with the conflicting traffic but it could not be seen. An Airprox was reported to ATC and the sortie continued. The pilot noted that the Sea King crew assumed that the conflicting traffic was that initially reported at 5nm northeast. The pilots did not see the conflicting traffic in time to make any

1 Airprox 2015089 effective contribution to avoiding a collision. However, since the conflicting traffic was seen to be taking appropriate action, the perceived severity was assessed as Medium.

He assessed the risk of collision as ‘Medium’.

THE DA42 PILOT reports conducting an instructional sortie but was unable to recollect the event. At the Airprox position he was possibly talking to Yeovil Radar on a Basic Service. He stated that it was possible that the other traffic was reported to them, but neither he nor the student saw it or, if they did, it was far enough away that no avoidance action was required. The instructor contacted the student, who could not remember the event either.

THE YEOVIL APPROACH CONTROLLER reports the Sea King pilot was conducting a Check Test Flight operating approximately 16nm northwest of Yeovilton in the block from 2000ft to 6000ft on the Portland RPS. A LARS track was observed to close with the relative position of the helicopter from the north, with Mode C readout of A27. This aircraft was a DA42 in receipt of a Basic Service from Yeovilton LARS and was reported at 2500ft on the Portland RPS. The Approach controller called the traffic as the Sea King’s Mode C readout indicated it was within 3000ft of the conflicting traffic. The Sea King was observed to climb as the DA42 changed course towards the Sea King, which now had Mode C readout of A57. As the tracks merged the Sea King was observed to descend and traffic was again called, as a definite hazard was judged to exist. The Sea King pilot responded by informing the controller that he was taking avoiding action, and shortly after called an Airprox on the conflicting traffic.

He perceived the severity of the incident as ‘Medium’.

THE YEOVILTON SUPERVISOR reports that the Yeovilton Approach controller was observed calling conflicting traffic to the Sea King pilot who, whilst in receipt of a Traffic Service, had begun to descend quickly whilst in close proximity to another aircraft. After the conflicting traffic had been called, the Sea King pilot informed the controller that he was taking avoiding action. Once the pilot had resolved the confliction, he informed the controller that he wished to report this incident as an Airprox.

Factual Background

The weather at Yeovilton and Cardiff was recorded as follows:

METAR EGDY 281350Z 29012KT 9999 SCT040 BKN250 15/04 Q1016 BLU NOSIG METAR EGFF 281350Z AUTO 27015KT 9999 FEW026 13/07 Q1016

Analysis and Investigation

Military ATM

The incident occurred on 28 May 15 at 1350 between a Sea King and a DA42. The Sea King pilot was under a Traffic Service with Yeovilton Radar and the DA42 pilot under a Basic Service with Yeovilton LARS. The DA42 pilot was subsequently transferred to Exeter at 1353:48.

At 1346:47 (Figure 1), Yeovilton Approach called traffic to the Sea King as, “north east at 5 miles, tracking south-easterly 2000 feet below.” The crew responded that they were looking for the traffic.

2 Airprox 2015089

Figure 1: Traffic Information at 1346:47 (Sea King squawk 7410; DA42 squawk 4370)

At 1349:31 (Figure 2), Approach transmitted, “previously called traffic now 1 mile, north, tracking south west 200 feet below.”

Figure 2: Traffic Information update at 1349:31

The crew responded at 1349:38 (Figure 3), that they were taking avoiding action.

Figure 3: Avoiding action taken at 1349:38

3 Airprox 2015089

At 1349:42, the aircraft were at the same height with 0.3nm horizontal separation. The CPA was estimated at 1349:50 (Figure 4) with <0.1nm horizontal separation and 200ft height separation and the Airprox was declared at 1349:58.

Figure 4: CPA estimated at 1349:50

Traffic Information had been passed to the Sea King at 5nm and the crew responded with a westerly heading, with the conflicting traffic on a southeasterly track. The Sea King crew had decided to conduct two flight test profiles back-to-back, from a zero-speed autorotation to the 100- knot autorotation and, to mitigate against loss of safe separation, they had requested a Traffic Service and had manoeuvred away from the last traffic report. The excellent visibility on the day also aided crew lookout. The Sea King pilot believed the DA42 to be to the east, tracking southeast and, believing to be clear of the traffic, the autorotation was initiated with a 3000fpm descent. The autorotation manoeuvre reduced the Sea King crew’s situational awareness and capacity to maintain an effective lookout.

The DA42 altered course to the southwest and, at CPA, were believed to be taking avoiding action to miss the Sea King; however, the DA42 crew were unable to recollect the incident. The DA42 was under a Basic Service with Yeovilton LARS and both crews were responsible for their own collision avoidance, as per UK FIS.

The Approach controller was vectoring for an ILS recovery and calling traffic to another rotary prior to the update to the Sea King pilot. The DA42 was within the altitude block being used by the Sea King upon taking the southwest heading but still had 3000ft height separation.

The normal barriers to an Airprox would be lookout, Traffic Information and ACAS/TAS. Neither aircraft were fitted with ACAS/TAS. The Yeovilton investigation considered the combined factors that may have reduced the lookout for the Sea King crew, and the DA42 crew did not recall the event. Traffic Information was provided and updated immediately prior to the Sea King avoiding action and the investigation also considered the factors behind the timing and update of information from the Approach controller.

UKAB Secretariat

The Sea King and DA42 pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard1. The incident geometry was converging and the Sea King pilot was required to give way to the DA422.

1 SERA.3205 Proximity. 2 SERA.3210 Right-of-way (c) (2) Converging.

4 Airprox 2015089

Comments

JHC

This was a complex test profile which required significant capacity to monitor cockpit indications. The Sea King crew had mitigated the MAC risk by obtaining a Traffic Service. However, they could have informed ATC that they planned to fly a dynamic manoeuvre resulting in rapid height change. This would have allowed further Traffic Information to be provided.

Summary

An Airprox was reported when a Sea King and a DA42 flew into proximity at 1350 on Thursday 28th May 2015. Both pilots were operating under VFR in VMC, the Sea King pilot in receipt of a Traffic Service from Yeovil Radar, and the DA42 pilot in receipt of a Basic Service, from Yeovil LARS.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from the pilots of both aircraft, radar photographs/video recordings, reports from the air traffic controllers involved and reports from the appropriate ATC and operating authorities.

The Board first discussed the actions of the pilots. The Sea King crew were in a high workload environment, maintaining accurate dynamic control of the aircraft whilst simultaneously monitoring and assessing critical performance parameters. The crew had chosen to fly two test points concurrently, in order to expedite the air test, and some Board members expressed their opinion that the demands of this activity may have adversely affected their ability to maintain an effective lookout. Members recalled previous Airprox involving aircraft undergoing an air test where lookout may have been compromised by the demands of the air test itself, and that it appeared to members to be particularly prevalent in helicopter air tests. Previously suggested mitigations had been to carry extra crew to act as additional lookout, to tailor the air test to the weather conditions and level of Air Traffic Service available, or to conduct the air test in segregated airspace, if at all possible. It was acknowledged by the Board that the crew were appropriately in receipt of Traffic Information, and had made a reasonable decision based on the information they had. Unfortunately, they were not able to visually acquire the DA42 before CPA, effectively a non-sighting.

For his part, the DA42 pilot reported that neither he, nor his student, recalled seeing traffic in close proximity. Members were perplexed that the Sea King, descending through the DA42’s level in the 12 o’clock at less than half a mile, was not seen on the VFR training flight by either of the DA42 crew, or if it was, that it was perceived to be far enough away as to merit no recollection. That the DA42’s track turned sharply right at CPA indicated that there may have been an interaction of some kind, but the DA42 crew evidently did not consider it merited recollection or reporting and so it could have been simply a coincident manoeuvre.

Turning to the controllers’ actions, the Yeovilton Approach controller initially passed Traffic Information on the DA42 to the Sea King crew ‘as the Sea King’s Mode C readout indicated it was within 3000ft of the conflicting traffic’. He observed the DA42 change course towards the Sea King, which climbed to 5700ft in a right hand orbit as the DA42 approached, with Mode C indicating between 2400ft and 2700ft. The Board noted that he did not pass Traffic Information until he detected the Sea King crew start the descent. To that end, some members commented that the Sea King pilot should have been passed Traffic Information on all relevant traffic within his stated operating block (2000-6000ft). In this respect, it was pointed out by a military controller member that CAP774 (UK Flight Information Services)3 defines the provision of Traffic Information under a Traffic Service as ‘The controller shall pass traffic information on relevant traffic, …’ and that relevant traffic was defined as follows:

3 Second Edition incorporating amendments to 13 November 2014, Section 3.5, page 29 dated October 2014.

5 Airprox 2015089

‘Traffic is normally considered to be relevant when, in the judgement of the controller, the conflicting aircraft’s observed flight profile indicates that it will pass within 3 NM and, where level information is available, 3,000 ft of the aircraft in receipt of the Traffic Service or its level-band if manoeuvring within a level block. However, controllers may also use their judgment to decide on occasions when such traffic is not relevant, e.g. passing behind or within the parameters but diverging. Controllers shall aim to pass information on relevant traffic before the conflicting aircraft is within 5 NM, in order to give the pilot sufficient time to meet his collision avoidance responsibilities and to allow for an update in traffic information if considered necessary.’

Clearly, the Approach controller could hardly have been expected to anticipate the Sea King’s rapid descent, and many members felt that passing Traffic Information ‘within the level-band’ would not be achievable with a large block of airspace such as is used by high performance aircraft. Nevertheless, members agreed that the Approach controller could have passed Traffic Information earlier than when he perceived the Sea King’s rapid descent, and that his view of when to pass Traffic Information seemed to have been based only on the 3000ft height separation criterion. It was also agreed that the Sea King crew could have usefully assisted themselves by declaring their imminent intentions to descend rapidly during autorotation to the Approach controller, who would then have been able to warn them of the approaching DA42, below them.

In the event, neither crew reported seeing the other aircraft before CPA. Members discussed the risk and agreed that safety margins had been much reduced below normal. After some debate, it was also agreed that the high descent rate of the Sea King, and lack of SA of either crew, meant that chance had played a major part in events.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CAUSE AND RISK

Cause: A non-sighting by the DA42 pilot and effectively a non-sighting by the Sea King crew.

Degree of Risk: A.

6 AIRPROX REPORT No 2015096

Date: 11 Jun 2015 Time: 1430Z Position: 5237N 00309W Location: Welshpool

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded Aircraft 1 Aircraft 2 Aircraft EV97 Eurostar Drone Operator Civ Pte NK Airspace Welshpool Class G G Rules VFR VFR Service A/G NK Provider Welshpool NK Altitude/FL 1500ft NK Transponder Not fitted NK Reported Colours Grey Dark Lighting NK NK Conditions VMC NK Visibility >20km NK Altitude/FL 1500ft NK Altimeter QNH NK (1009hPa) Heading 220° NK Speed 69kt NK ACAS/TAS Not fitted NK Separation Reported 25ft V/50ft H NK Recorded NK

THE EV97 PILOT reports flying a solo circuit at Welshpool, on turning downwind at 1500ft he checked the fuel pressure gauge and then noticed a Quadcopter, approximately 50ft from the aircraft, appear from behind the edge of the instrument panel. He applied full power and initiated a tight climbing right turn to gain separation. Once straight-and-level at 1800ft, he reported the incident before repositioning back into the circuit.

He assessed the risk of collision as ‘Medium’.

THE EV97 PILOT’S INSTRUCTOR reports that this was a competent student that has flown gliders for some time. The incident happened over Powis Castle grounds and he contacted castle staff to see if they were aware of the drone. They had no knowledge of any drone activity and noted that drones are not allowed to fly from National Trust property. There is a park surrounding the castle, and the ground rises to 1000ft on the downwind leg of the RW04 circuit. Local pilots were made aware of the incident.

THE DRONE PILOT could not be traced.

Factual Background

The weather at Shawbury was reported as:

METAR EGOS 111350Z 09010KT 9999 FEW044 21/10 Q1018 BLU NOSIG

1 Airprox 2015096

UKAB Secretariat

The Air Navigation Order 2009 (as amended), Article 1381 states:

‘A person must not recklessly or negligently cause or permit an aircraft to endanger any person or property.’

Article 166, paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 state:

(2) The person in charge of a small unmanned aircraft may only fly the aircraft if reasonably satisfied that the flight can safely be made.

(3) The person in charge of a small unmanned aircraft must maintain direct, unaided visual contact with the aircraft sufficient to monitor its flight path in relation to other aircraft, persons, vehicles, vessels and structures for the purpose of avoiding collisions.

(4) The person in charge of a small unmanned aircraft which has a mass of more than 7kg excluding its fuel but including any articles or equipment installed in or attached to the aircraft at the commencement of its flight must not fly the aircraft

(a) in Class A, C, D or E airspace unless the permission of the appropriate air traffic control unit has been obtained; (b) within an aerodrome traffic zone …; or (c) at a height of more than 400 feet above the surface unless it is flying in airspace described in sub-paragraph (a) or (b) and in accordance with the requirements for that airspace.’

A CAA web site2 provides information and guidance associated with the operation of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UASs) and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs).

The CAA has published a UAV Safety Notice3 which states the responsibilities for flying unmanned aircraft. This includes:

‘You are responsible for avoiding collisions with other people or objects - including aircraft. Do not fly your unmanned aircraft in any way that could endanger people or property. It is illegal to fly your unmanned aircraft over a congested area (streets, towns and cities). Also, stay well clear of airports and airfields.’

In addition, the CAA has published guidance regarding First Person View (FPV) drone operations which limit this activity to drones of less than 3.5kg take-off mass, and to not more than 1000ft4.

Summary

An Airprox was reported on 11 June at 1430 between an EV97 and a drone. The EV97 pilot was flying in the Welshpool circuit at 1500ft when he encountered the Drone downwind. The incident did not show on the NATS radars so the actual separation is not known. The Drone operator could not be traced.

1 Article 253 of the ANO details which Articles apply to small unmanned aircraft. Article 255 defines ‘small unmanned aircraft’. The ANO is available to view at http://www.legislation.gov.uk. 2 www.caa.co.uk/uas 3 CAP 1202 4 ORSA No. 1108 Small Unmanned Aircraft – First Person View (FPV) Flying available at: http://www.caa.co.uk/docs/33/1108.pdf.

2 Airprox 2015096

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from the EV97 pilot and his instructor, the incident could not be seen on the NATS radar recordings.

The Board noted that this was one of a number of drone Airprox reports this month where the drone operators were either conducting their operations illegally or without due regard for the safety of other aviators. Drones above 7kg are not to be operated within an air traffic zones during notified hours of watch, unless permission from the air traffic unit has been granted. Irrespective of the drone’s mass, drone operators are required to stay well clear of airports and airfields, and are responsible for avoiding collisions with other people or objects - including aircraft. Ultimately, drone operators are required to not fly their unmanned aircraft in any way that could endanger people or property. On all counts, the Board considered that the drone operator should not have been operating where he was, in the Welshpool ATZ.

The Board were aware that many drones came with geo-fencing that was supposed to prohibit the use of the drone within sensitive airspace such as an ATZ; however, they had little information about whether this included all minor airfields. Ultimately, the Board noted that this type of Airprox was on the increase, and that a combination of technical solutions (such as geo-fencing), registration of drones, and education of drone operators was, in their opinion, key to reducing this type of Airprox.

The Board commended the look-out of the EV97 pilot, who managed to spot the drone and take avoiding action at a busy point in his flight profile, and one where he would not have expected to encounter a drone. This again highlighted the need for good lookout, even within the supposed protection of an ATZ, given that intruders (including aircraft) could unknowingly penetrate the airspace. Turning to the cause of the Airprox, the Board agreed that, because the drone should not have been in the ATZ, the drone had effectively been flown into conflict with the EV97. They assessed the risk as Category B; safety margins had been much reduced, but the EV97 pilot’s avoiding action had been effective in preventing a collision.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CAUSE AND RISK

Cause: The drone was flown into conflict with the EV97.

Degree of Risk: B.

3 AIRPROX REPORT No 2015102

Date: 5 Jul 2015 Time: 1227Z Position: 5628N 00524W Location: 1nm W Oban airfield (Sunday)

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded Aircraft 1 Aircraft 2 Aircraft RV8 C172 Operator Civ Pte Civ Trg Airspace ATZ ATZ Class G G Rules VFR VFR Service FIS FIS Provider Oban FISO Oban FISO Altitude/FL NK NK Transponder A/C/S A/C Reported Colours Blue White/maroon Lighting Wing-tip Standard anti- strobes, 2x wing collision, wing- mounted landing mounted lights strobes Conditions VMC VMC Visibility >10km 10nm Altitude/FL 300ft 1000ft Altimeter NK QNH Heading 340° 010° Speed 120kt 85kt ACAS/TAS Not fitted Not fitted Alert N/A N/A Separation Reported 700ft V/200m H 700ft V/0.5nm H Recorded NK

THE OBAN AERODROME FLIGHT INFORMATION SERVICE OFFICER (AFISO) reports that after obtaining start-up clearance, aerodrome information, and having passed relevant booking out details for a GA flight to Perth (located to the east of the aerodrome), the RV8 pilot was informed of a C172 in the established circuit entering the early downwind position performing touch-and-goes. On take- off, he reported that the RV8 pilot made a sharp right turn cutting in front of the C172 as it approached the right-base position. The RV8 was at approximately 300ft. The pilot informed the AFISO that he was departing direct to the north at low-level. The AFISO asked the C172 pilot if he was visual with the departing traffic, which he confirmed he was. Normal circuit height for an RV8 is 1000ft. [All circuits are to the west.]

THE VAN’S RV8 PILOT reports that he entered and back-tracked RW19 at Oban behind traffic performing a touch-and-go. He then departed with the traffic in sight at circuit height downwind. As his intention was to depart at low-level over the Loch to the north-west, he made a right turn and, in level flight, announced his intentions on the RT and the fact that he was remaining at low-level. The traffic concerned announced that he had him in sight. He passed beneath the downwind leg and the aforementioned traffic. At no stage did he consider that there was any conflict between their flight paths because they were well separated vertically. Both pilots could see each other and if his transmission was heard were both aware of each others’ intentions.

He assessed the risk of collision as ‘None’.

1 Airprox 2015102

THE CESSNA 172M (C172) PILOT reports that he was aware that the pilot of the RV8 had been using Oban as a base for local flying. He was flying the C172 downwind right-hand for RW19 and was in full two-way communication with the AFISO. The RV8 pilot took off from RW19 and he was mindful of the high performance of the type and their relative positions. As he recalled, after the RV8 took-off (which he was able to observe with some difficulty due to colour/terrain camouflaging), he heard the RV8 pilot announce that he intended to depart at low-level to the north-west. He then saw the RV8 turn well below them but on a 30-40° converging course and within the confines of the reasonable circuit shape and pattern. The RV8 had higher speed in low, and seemingly level, flight (he estimated 300-400ft above the sea) and departed the circuit beneath the standard circuit downwind track. Because of the speed difference he perceived that there was minimal collision risk but, if they had been perhaps twenty seconds later on in the circuit, they would have begun a descent on base leg thereby diminishing the vertical separation further, perhaps being unaware of the lower RV8, regardless of lookout.

He assessed the risk of collision as ‘Low’.

Factual Background

The Oban weather was:

EGEO 051220Z 17005KT 120V220 9999 -SHRA FEW014 SCT028 18/10 Q1014=

The Oban ATZ is a circle 2nm radius centred on longest notified runway 01/19, with an upper limit of 2000ft.1

Analysis and Investigation

CAA ATSI

ATSI Note: There is no useable radar cover in the area of Oban Airport. The following events have been analysed based on written reports and RT recording.

The C172 pilot had entered the RW19 circuit at 1215. At 1220, the pilot of the RV8 booked-out on the RT for departure to Perth and at 1222 reported ready for taxi. At 1225 the pilot of the RV8 reported ready for departure. The AFISO passed Traffic Information to the pilot of the RV8 on the C172 in the circuit and then cleared him to back-track RW19 and to report lined-up. The AFISO then asked the pilot of the C172 whether he copied the outbound (RV8) traffic, which the pilot of the C172 affirmed. At 1226 the AFISO issued a discretionary take-off clearance to the pilot of the RV8. At 1227, the pilot of the RV8 reported that he was departing to the north and remaining low- level. At 1227:33 the AFISO asked the pilot of the C172 if he was visual with the (RV8) traffic, which the pilot of the C172 affirmed. At 1228 the pilot of the C172 reported turning right base, being visual with the other (RV8) aircraft, and confirming he was well clear. The reporter stated that the RV8 made a sharp right turn cutting in front of the C172 in the circuit. The AFISO had issued Traffic Information to both pilots on each other, and both pilots’ reports confirm that they were visual with each other before, during and after this manoeuvre.

UKAB Secretariat

FISOs may issue advice and shall issue information to aircraft in their area of responsibility, useful for the safe and efficient conduct of flights. FISOs are not permitted to issue instructions, except in certain circumstances when aircraft are on the manoeuvring area or when relaying a clearance from an air traffic control unit. Pilots therefore are wholly responsible for collision avoidance in conformity with the Rules of the Air. 2

1 UK AIP AD 2.EGEO-5. 2 Flight Information Service Officer Manual, CAP 797. 2

Airprox 2015102

Both pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard3.

An aircraft operated on or in the vicinity of an aerodrome shall:

(a) observe other aerodrome traffic for the purpose of avoiding collision;

(b) conform with or avoid the pattern of traffic formed by other aircraft in operation.4

Summary

The Airprox occurred in Class G airspace of the Oban ATZ; both pilots were in receipt of a FIS from the AFISO. The C172 pilot was carrying out right-hand training circuits on RW19. Prior to the RV8’s departure both pilots had been informed about each other. After departing, the RV8 pilot made an early right turn and reported on the frequency that he would remain low-level. He passed through the downwind leg ground track just in front but below the C172 by 700ft according to the reports of both pilots. They had each other in sight.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD’S DISCUSSIONS

Information available included reports from both pilots, the AFISO concerned, RTF recordings and reports from the appropriate ATC and operating authorities.

The Board noted that the AFISO had provided appropriate Traffic Information to both pilots before the RV8 pilot had taken off. Although no radar recordings were available it was apparent that the RV8 pilot had turned right after departure to pass through the downwind circuit ground track close to the lateral position of the C172. However, the Board observed that as he did so he had reported that he would be remaining low-level over the Loch, below and with the C172 in sight. Some members wondered if this had been a conventional and appropriate course of action but it was considered that, although unusual, there had been no reason why the RV8 should not have carried out this action; especially since the RV8 pilot had been aware that the C172 pilot also had him in sight.

The Board noted that the C172 pilot had been concerned that if he had been further into the circuit he may have descended towards the RV8. However, this situation had not occurred, and the Board does not deal with what might have happened, instead confining themselves to assessing what had actually happened which, in this case, had been that the C172 was still at circuit height.

The Board could understand why the AFISO had decided to file an Airprox report given that he had observed the RV8 depart and turn unexpectedly towards the C172. However, they noted that the RV8 pilot had confirmed that he would remain below the C172, and that the AFISO was aware that both pilots had each other in sight. Accordingly, the cause was considered to be that the AFISO had perceived a conflict between the RV8 and the C172 that had not in fact existed, and the Board decided that, because normal safety standards had pertained, the Airprox should be categorised as risk Category E.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CAUSE AND RISK

Cause: The AFISO perceived a conflict between the RV8 and the C172.

Degree of Risk: E.

3 SERA.3205 Proximity. 4 SERA.3225 Operation on and in the Vicinity of an Aerodrome. 3

AIRPROX REPORT No 2015106

Date: 9 Jul 2015 Time: 1645Z Position: 5118N 00036E Location: Near Detling VOR

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded Aircraft 1 Aircraft 2 Aircraft RJ1 Drone Operator CAT Unknown Airspace London TMA Class A Rules IFR Service Radar Control Provider Thames Radar Altitude/FL 4000ft Transponder A, C, S Reported Colours White/red Lighting All on Conditions VMC Visibility NK Altitude/FL 4000ft Altimeter QNH (NK hPa) Heading 315° Speed 220kt ACAS/TAS TCAS II Alert None Separation Reported 60ft V/0m H Recorded NK

THE RJ1 PILOT reports turning on to heading 315° after DET when the First Officer saw a ‘helicopter type’ remotely controlled drone in the 10 o’clock position pass 60ft below the left wing. ATC were informed.

He assessed the risk of collision as ‘High’.

THE DRONE OPERATOR: A drone operator could not be traced.

Factual Background

The weather at London City was recorded as follows:

METAR EGLC 091650Z 28005KT 230V330 CAVOK 23/03 Q1022

Analysis and Investigation

CAA ATSI

The RJ1 pilot reported seeing a drone approximately 30-50ft below his aircraft, 5nm northwest of Detling VOR. The NATS report and radar replay confirmed that no other contacts were visible in the area.

1 Airprox 2015106

UKAB Secretariat

The Air Navigation Order 2009 (as amended), Article 1381 states:

‘A person must not recklessly or negligently cause or permit an aircraft to endanger any person or property.’

Article 166, paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 state:

‘(2) The person in charge of a small unmanned aircraft may only fly the aircraft if reasonably satisfied that the flight can safely be made.

(3) The person in charge of a small unmanned aircraft must maintain direct, unaided visual contact with the aircraft sufficient to monitor its flight path in relation to other aircraft, persons, vehicles, vessels and structures for the purpose of avoiding collisions.’

(4) The person in charge of a small unmanned aircraft which has a mass of more than 7kg excluding its fuel but including any articles or equipment installed in or attached to the aircraft at the commencement of its flight must not fly the aircraft

(a) in Class A, C, D or E airspace unless the permission of the appropriate air traffic control unit has been obtained; (b) within an aerodrome traffic zone …; or (c) at a height of more than 400 feet above the surface unless it is flying in airspace described in sub-paragraph (a) or (b) and in accordance with the requirements for that airspace.’

A CAA web site2 provides information and guidance associated with the operation of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UASs) and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs).

Additionally, the CAA has published a UAV Safety Notice3 which states the responsibilities for flying unmanned aircraft. This includes:

‘You are responsible for avoiding collisions with other people or objects - including aircraft.

Summary

An Airprox was reported when an RJ1 and a reported drone flew into proximity at about 1645 on Thursday 9th July 2015. The RJ1 pilot was at 4000ft, operating under IFR in VMC, in receipt of a Radar Control Service from the Swanwick Thames Sector. The drone operator could not be located.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of a report from the RJ1 pilot, radar photographs/video recordings and a report from the appropriate ATC authority.

The Board were advised by a commercial drone operator that multi-rotor drones were capable of ascending to some few thousand feet, but that the cost of the equipment required rose considerably as the altitude capability was increased. Small multi-rotor drones were not considered capable of ascending to more than a couple of thousand feet, and a multi-rotor drone with the capability to ascend to 4000ft, as reported, would have been significantly expensive and in the ’professional’ class of drones. Consequently, members agreed that the reported drone was unlikely to have been operated at this altitude as a passing whim, and that it represented a considerable investment in cost and time, if indeed it was a multi-rotor drone. Even if the drone was able to reach 4000ft,

1 Article 253 of the ANO details which Articles apply to small unmanned aircraft. Article 255 defines ‘small unmanned aircraft’. The ANO is available to view at http://www.legislation.gov.uk. 2 www.caa.co.uk/uas 3 CAP 1202

2 Airprox 2015106 representatives from ARPAS-UK4 had suggested that battery life would preclude it remaining there for any length of time; the average battery life for a drone is 15 minutes when flying conservatively, and the Board understood that flying at height drained the battery even more quickly. This led the Board to wonder whether the crew could have seen something other than a multi-rotor drone. Notwithstanding, with both members of the flight crew having seen the object, the Board did not doubt that the crew had seen something at their level; that they were convinced that it looked like a helicopter-type drone had to be taken at face value, although it was considered by some members more likely that the object may have been a fixed-wing drone, capable of being operated at the reported altitude for considerably less cost.

Irrespective, the drone operator was not entitled to operate there, and his non-compliance posed a safety risk. Furthermore, to reach a height of 4000ft, the drone would need to be flown on first person view (FPV), and regulation states that, when using FPV, an additional person must be used as a competent observer who must maintain direct unaided visual contact with the drone in order to monitor its flight path in relation to other aircraft. At 4000ft it would be impossible to see the drone from the ground and therefore to operate it legally.

Whatever the nature of the drone, members agreed that the incident occurred in the Class A airspace of the London TMA, that the drone operator should not have allowed the drone to be there, and that consequently it was flown into conflict with the RJ1. There was no radar return from the drone, as would be expected, so the Board based their assessment of risk on the separation reported by the RJ1 pilot. After some discussion, members agreed that separation had been reduced to the minimum and that chance had played a major part in events.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CAUSE AND RISK

Cause: The reported drone was flown into conflict with the RJ1.

Degree of Risk: A.

4 Association of Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems-UK.

3