In the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
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Case 1:20-cv-00989-CCC-MCC Document 42 Filed 12/15/20 Page 1 of 17 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA CONSTANCE WILSON ANDRESEN, : CIV NO. 1:20-CV-989 : Plaintiff, : (Judge Conner) : v. : (Magistrate Judge Carlson) : COMMONWEALTH OF : PENNSYLVANIA, et al., : : Defendants. : REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION I. Statement of Facts and of the Case This is a pro se civil rights lawsuit brought by Constance Wilson Andresen against six individual and institutional defendants. (Doc. 1). This civil lawsuit appears to arise out of prior criminal proceedings brought against Andresen in the Court of Common Pleas of Huntingdon County. As to these underlying criminal proceedings, state court records reveal that on October 4, 2019, Andresen entered a plea of nolo contendere to barratry, a violation of 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5109.1 See Commonwealth v. Andresen, Crim. No. CP-31-CR-0000442(Court of Common 1 Pennsylvania defines the crime of barratry in the following terms: “A person is guilty of a misdemeanor of the third degree if he vexes others with unjust and vexatious suits.” 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5109. 1 Case 1:20-cv-00989-CCC-MCC Document 42 Filed 12/15/20 Page 2 of 17 Pleas of Huntingdon County, Pennsylvania). As a result of her conviction, Andresen was required to pay costs of prosecution and was fined. Notwithstanding her nolo contendere plea to this charge, in her complaint, Andresen alleges that one of the defendants, Pennsylvania State Police Corporal Jonathan Thomas, engaged in improper conduct on or about June 19, 2018 when he arrested Andresen on these charges. While the thread of Andresen’s factual narrative is occasionally difficult to follow, the plaintiff appears to allege that when Corporal Thomas arrived to “to arrest Plaintiff for stealing a farm,” (Id., at 10), she was dressing and according to the plaintiff, “her robe fell off.” Id. Andresen alleges that she then “fell and bagged [sic] her left knee” “when being starred [sic] at and yelled and threatened by Trooper Thomas,” causing an injury that “lead to the attachment of a surgery.” (Id., at 5, 10). Andresen was then arrested, handcuffed, and transported to jail. On the basis of these averments, Andresen sues both Corporal Thomas and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, asserting that these defendants engaged in “[e]xcessive force, false probable cause, false address [sic], abuse of process, assault, injury/surgery, verbal abuse of threats/bullying” in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. (Id., at 3). The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and Corporal Thomas have now filed a motion to dismiss this complaint which seeks: (1) to dismiss all claims brought by the plaintiff against the state; (2) to dismiss all official capacity claims brought 2 Case 1:20-cv-00989-CCC-MCC Document 42 Filed 12/15/20 Page 3 of 17 against Corporal Thomas; and (3) to dismiss all malicious prosecution and false arrest claims brought against the defendants since Andresen’s state criminal case did not result in a favorable termination of these charges for Andresen.2 (Doc. 26). For her part, Andresen has responded to this motion, in part, by attempting to make new factual allegations, averments which are not set forth in her complaint. (Doc. 37). The motion is fully briefed by the parties3 and is therefore ripe for resolution. For the reasons set forth below, it is recommended that the motion to dismiss be granted, but Andresen should be given leave to amend her complaint, in part, to endeavor to state an excessive force claim against Defendant Thomas. II. Discussion A. Motion to Dismiss – Standard of Review A motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. It is proper for the court to dismiss a complaint in accordance with Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal 2 As we construe this motion to dismiss, it does not challenge any excessive force claims that the plaintiff may be attempting to bring against Defendant Thomas. 3 The briefing of these motions has been somewhat erratic. Various parties have sought and obtained extensions of time in which to file their briefs. To the extent that the movants sought extensions of time, the extension of their briefing deadlines also extended Andresen’s response deadlines as well since the local rules provide that the party responding to a motion has 14 days in which to respond to the movant’s brief. In some instances, Andresen did not use the 14 days allotted to her by the rules, because she may have been confused regarding her response deadline. However, in any event, she then later filed a comprehensive surreply brief, something that is not permitted absent leave of court. Given this extensive, albeit somewhat eccentric, briefing conducted here, we deem this motion to be ripe for resolution. 3 Case 1:20-cv-00989-CCC-MCC Document 42 Filed 12/15/20 Page 4 of 17 Rules of Civil Procedure only if the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). With respect to this benchmark standard for the legal sufficiency of a complaint, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has aptly noted the evolving standards governing pleading practice in federal court, stating that: Standards of pleading have been in the forefront of jurisprudence in recent years. Beginning with the Supreme Court’s opinion in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), continuing with our opinion in Phillips [v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 2008)], and culminating recently with the Supreme Court’s decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, BU.S.B, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009), pleading standards have seemingly shifted from simple notice pleading to a more heightened form of pleading, requiring a plaintiff to plead more than the possibility of relief to survive a motion to dismiss. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 209-10 (3d Cir. 2009). In considering whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the court must accept as true all allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien & Frankel, Inc., 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). However, a court “need not credit a complaint’s bald assertions or legal conclusions when deciding a motion to dismiss.” Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). Additionally, a court need not “assume that a . plaintiff can prove facts that the . plaintiff has not alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of 4 Case 1:20-cv-00989-CCC-MCC Document 42 Filed 12/15/20 Page 5 of 17 Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). As the Supreme Court held in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), in order to state a valid cause of action, a plaintiff must provide some factual grounds for relief which “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of actions will not do.” Id., at 555. “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. In keeping with the principles of Twombly, the Supreme Court has underscored that a trial court must assess whether a complaint states facts upon which relief can be granted when ruling on a motion to dismiss. In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), the Supreme Court held that, when considering a motion to dismiss, a court should “begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id., at 679. According to the Supreme Court, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id., at 678. Rather, in conducting a review of the adequacy of a complaint, the Supreme Court has advised trial courts that they must: [B]egin by identifying pleadings that because they are no more than conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief. Id., at 679. 5 Case 1:20-cv-00989-CCC-MCC Document 42 Filed 12/15/20 Page 6 of 17 Thus, following Twombly and Iqbal, a well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere legal labels and conclusions; it must recite factual allegations sufficient to raise the plaintiff’s claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere speculation. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has stated: [A]fter Iqbal, when presented with a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, district courts should conduct a two-part analysis. First, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The District Court must accept all of the complaint’s well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions. Second, a District Court must then determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for relief.” In other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff’s entitlement to relief. A complaint has to “show” such an entitlement with its facts.