january 2011 . Vol 4 . Issue 1

Combating Terrorism Center at West Point CTC Sentinel Objective . Relevant . Rigorous

Contents Terrorist Awakening in

FEATURE ARTICLE 1 Terrorist Awakening in Sweden? Sweden? By Magnus Ranstorp By Magnus Ranstorp

Reports 6 British Universities Continue to Breed Extremists By James Brandon 8 Improving Airline Security in the United States By Rafi Ron 11 Al-Qa`ida’s Yemeni Expatriate Faction in Pakistan By Evan F. Kohlmann 15 Understanding Al-Qa`ida’s Business Model By Alex Gallo 18 Disengagement or Deradicalization: A Look at Prison Programs for Jailed Terrorists By Andrew Silke

21 Recent Highlights in Terrorist Activity 24 CTC Sentinel Staff & Contacts

Swedish police at the scene of a terrorist attack in central Stockholm in December 2010. - Photo by Jonathan Nackstrand/AFP/Getty Images or decades, sweden has Islamist extremism which outlined that been regarded as the relative it had identified about 200 extremists backwater of international in Sweden; more than 80% were socially terrorism. Even Usama bin connected, and most lived inside the FLadin had mentioned Sweden as immune three major cities of Sweden, with more from terrorism in an al-Jazira broadcast than half residing in Stockholm.1 in October 2004. This sense of immunity was shattered twice in December 2010. This article examines the circumstances First, a suicide bomber struck in the behind these developments and their About the CTC Sentinel Nordic countries for the first time ever implications for the evolution of The Combating Terrorism Center is an on December 11. The Swedish security terrorism in Sweden. It illustrates the independent educational and research service, Säkerhetspolisen (SÄPO), had interconnectivity of terrorist social institution based in the Department of Social no record of the bomber before the attack, networks, and it underscores the Sciences at the United States Military Academy, as he had studied and lived for a decade importance of terrorist travelers to West Point. The CTC Sentinel harnesses in the United Kingdom. At the same time, Pakistan and Somalia and the potential the Center’s global network of scholars and he admitted he had traveled to Iraq to for a boomerang effect. To some extent, practitioners to understand and confront perform jihad. Second, four Swedes were this article argues that the events in contemporary threats posed by terrorism and arrested later that month for planning Sweden are a microcosm or reflection of other forms of political violence. to conduct a protracted Mumbai-style broader terrorism trends. attack on the Jyllands-Posten newspaper in The views expressed in this report are those of Copenhagen, Denmark. The men were the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, arrested after driving from Sweden to the Department of the Army, or any other agency Copenhagen to execute the attack. Third, 1 “Våldsbejakande islamistisk extremism i Sverige,” Säk- of the U.S. Government. SÄPO produced a report on violent erhetspolisen, 2010.

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Anatomy of Sweden’s First Suicide Bomber His wife inserted a martyrdom picture, After sending his farewell e-mails, On December 11, 2010, a 28-year-old “Hoor al-Ayn,” depicting a martyr on al-Abdaly proceeded to ignite his Iraqi-Swede, Taimour Abdulwahab al- horseback as “mood background” for car filled with gas canisters and Abdaly, became the first suicide bomber the recording. This suggested either his flammable material, which burst into in Sweden when he accidentally detonated wife knew more than she claimed, or flames at 4:52 PM. He then walked one of the six pipe bombs strapped to his that there was possibly an accomplice toward the pedestrian shopping street body among busy Christmas shoppers in to al-Abdaly at large.2 Drottninggatan for 10 minutes, where central Stockholm. The Swedish public he began to fiddle with his equipment, narrowly escaped a major terrorist The issue of possible accomplices has walking in and out of a side street attack that was cleverly designed as a been strongly suspected for a number talking on either a communication radio multipronged, one-man mass casualty of reasons. First, in the pre-recorded or mobile phone before his explosive event. Beginning with the explosion of tapes, there is clearly a second person device detonated prematurely. From his station wagon filled with gas tubes breathing and there have been efforts eyewitness accounts, it is clear there and flammable material, al-Abdaly had to remove everything below 100 hertz was a malfunction rather than a desire planned to walk down Drottninggatan, on all three tapes.3 A second reason is to abort the operation. Taking refuge in a major pedestrian shopping street, the two-way radio found by his body a more deserted side street, al-Abdaly toward a large department store and the after one of the pipe bombs detonated placed his bomb belt down moments main central railway station placing two prematurely. Third, according to before his pipe bomb exploded.6 He died or more explosive devices at different those close to the investigation, the quickly without killing anyone else. locations before detonating his own contraption of pipe bombs was too serial-connected pipe bombs strapped cumbersome and complex for him to have Profile of Taimour al-Abdaly to his body. Al-Abdaly had at least six put on his body alone. Fourth, closed- Five days after the suicide bombing, pipe bombs filled with ball bearings, a circuit television footage captured, after SÄPO provided the findings of a pressure-cooker, and a backpack filled the accidental detonation, the images previously cabinet-commissioned with explosives and nails. of a man wearing a sketchy billboard report on Islamic extremism in Sweden. sign for “London restaurant” with a Embarrassingly, SÄPO had to admit Al-Abdaly commenced the operation red khaffiyeh wrapped around his face that al-Abdaly was not among the 200 earlier that day at the crack of dawn that seemed to be the only individual Islamic extremists it had previously by driving to Stockholm from his focused and drawn to the scene where identified. Interestingly, SÄPO’s chief, parents’ house in the small town of al-Abdaly was dying, as everyone else Anders Danielsson, also placed partial Tranås, a 170-mile journey northward. fled the explosion. Fifth, al-Abdaly’s blame why they missed him on MI5—his He would have arrived in Stockholm disclosure on the farewell tape that British counterpart—as al-Abdaly had about three hours later following the he frequently traveled to the Middle resided in the United Kingdom since collection of explosive devices from an East to wage jihad raised the prospect 2001 (although he frequently visited his undisclosed storage site. Assuming al- that he had links to more organized parents in Sweden). Abdaly arrived in Stockholm around terrorist networks in the region. This midday, it is still unclear where he was strengthened by his affinity to the Profiling Taimour Abdulwahab al- initially went and what he did prior Islamic State of Iraq on his Facebook Abdaly has produced a complicated to the commencement of the terrorist page, postings of Shaykh Muhammad picture of a relative loner that assault at 4:40 PM. At precisely that al-Maqdisi and multiple credible claims radicalized in Luton in the United time, al-Abdaly sent different e-mails to by radical al-Qa`ida-affiliated websites Kingdom, surrounded possibly by three recipients: his wife, the Swedish that suggested he belonged to the Islamic shadowy figures connected as “brokers” Security Service SÄPO (which failed to State of Iraq. Postings on al-Hanin to Mohammed Siddique Khan, a small check it for 4.5 hours), and Tidningarnas and the popular Shumukh al-Islam cadre of the outlawed Islamist group Telegrambyrå, the official Swedish websites suggested this affiliation.4 al-Muhajiroun, and possibly by a more wire service. The e-mail contained pre- It has also emerged that General Zia nefarious terrorist network emerging from recorded sound files. In the English and Alkanani, the counterterrorism chief in Iraq, as he traveled there frequently. Arabic versions, al-Abdaly’s message Iraq, has claimed that al-Abdaly spent was addressed to his wife asking for three months in Mosul at an explosives Al-Abdaly was born in Baghdad in 1982 forgiveness and explaining that he had training camp together with an Egyptian and arrived with his father, mother, and been secretly a mujahidin for the past accomplice, according to imprisoned al- older sister to Tranås, Sweden at the four years and that his business trips Qa`ida members.5 age of 10. Tranås is a small town with to the Middle East had been a lie. Al- a population of 18,000 inhabitants. Abdaly’s wife, living in Luton in the 2 Martin Ekelund, “Nätet avslöjar medhjälparen,” Af- It appears that al-Abdaly adapted United Kingdom, would later profess tonbladet, January 3, 2011. Also see www.gudmundson. well there, quickly learning Swedish, no knowledge of his activities in an blogspot.com. becoming known as a keen basketball exclusive interview to controversial 3 Mikael Stengård and Eveline Grassman, “Experter: player and was well-liked by his friends. television broadcaster, Muslim convert Ljudet är manipulerat,” Aftonbladet, December 18, 2010. He graduated from secondary school in and ex-Taliban prisoner Yvonne Ridley, 4 Sam Jones and Haroon Siddique, “Stockholm Suicide yet a longer unedited version of the tape Bomber Confronted by Luton Mosque Leaders,” Guard- 3 Months in Mosul,” al-Arabiya, January 7, 2011. appeared within 24 hours on the couple’s ian, December 13, 2010. 6 Richard Ashberg and Johanna Hellsten, “Buken full shared YouTube account: mona123timo. 5 “Iraqi Official to al-Arabiya: Stockholm Bomber Trained med metal,” Aftonbladet, December 16, 2010.

2 january 2011 . Vol 4 . Issue 1 natural sciences and there was no major to attend a terrorist training camp.11 It Some of these followers were connected indication that religion was a significant is still to be determined if there is any to radical cleric Omar Bakri Mohammed, part of his life. In fact, he had a Jewish connection between Q and al-Abdaly. and they had open recruitment stalls girlfriend.7 All of this would change as It is likely, however, that al-Abdaly on the high street near the al-Abdaly he moved to Luton in the United Kingdom came into contact with more extremist family home. to enroll at the University of Bedfordshire elements since the Bury Park area of to study sports therapy in 2001. Luton has “featured prominently in Al-Abdaly appears to have been affected counterterrorism investigations.”12 by a confrontation with Qadeer Baksh, Only weeks after al-Abdaly enrolled in Regardless, the July 2005 London the chairman of the Luton Islamic Center. the university, the September 11, 2001 attacks likely played a role in al- According to mosque officials, al- attacks occurred. This was a period Abdaly’s radicalization process. Abdaly showed up at the Luton Islamic of immense identity turmoil with Center, also known as the al-Ghurabaa intertwined experiences of xenophobia, It is also clear that al-Abdaly was mosque, during Ramadan 2006-2007. Islamophobia and extremist Islamist affected by the 2006 Israel-Hizb Allah According to Baksh, his congregation sentiments.8 The far-right English war in Lebanon. This is evident from immediately drew to his attention that Defense League was active in Luton his postings on Facebook. While he al-Abdaly harbored extremist views as well. The activities of the Finsbury seemed to admire Hizb Allah leader about jihad and takfiri principles and was Park Mosque and the openly radical Hassan Nasrallah, it was also clear that encouraging rebellion against Muslim Abu Hamza al-Masri were only a short he was vehemently anti-Shi`a in Iraq. leaders. This caused Baksh to undertake train ride away, and investigators are Similarly, he watched shock video clips several personal interventions in an pursuing leads as to whether al-Abdaly with violent images from Chechnya that effort to deconstruct his arguments visited the controversial mosque.9 There with a theological debate. On several are no signs that al-Abdaly was involved “The debate climate about occasions, it seemed al-Abdaly came to in radical groups at the university. accept Baksh’s rebuttals, but it became Instead, while at university he met his terrorist threat assessment known that al-Abdaly continued to future wife, Mona (also known as Umm in Sweden had been stifled spread extremist views among the Amira), a young woman from Romania community. As a result, Baksh decided who partially grew up in Sweden.10 He by ideologically-driven to publicly confront him in front of 100 married her in 2004, and he graduated debaters who used the worshippers at an early morning prayer.14 with a BSc in sports therapy. They had Al-Abdaly stormed out of the mosque their first daughter in 2006, the second label of Islamophobia humiliated, angry and disappeared, in 2008 and in the summer of 2010 and racism to silence the probably traveling back and forth to the they had a son and named him Usama Middle East and Sweden.15 in honor of Usama bin Ladin. After issue. This is not possible meeting al-Abdaly, she rapidly became anymore.” In 2007, al-Abdaly began traveling religious, wearing the djellaba. extensively to Jordan and Iraq. In 2008, he reportedly traveled to Syria as well.16 A suspected turning point for al-Abdaly Al-Abdaly collected new Swedish was the fact that Mohammed Siddique regularly portrayed Russian atrocities passports in 2001, 2007 and 2008, Khan and the London bombers had and the bravery of the mujahidin, suicide the last of which he claimed was lost driven to Luton railway station before operations in Iraq, and humiliating abroad.17 This is seen as evidence that heading to conduct the operation of July interrogation scenes where U.S. soldiers he was attempting to conceal his travel 7, 2005. In fact, three streets from al- taunted Iraqi prisoners. He also seemed patterns and destinations to perform Abdaly’s house in Bury Park, Luton, to have a fascination with Judgment jihad in the Middle East. It is possible lived Mohammed Quayyum Khan, Day, radical extremist ideologues that he even had an extra Swedish known as “Q,” who was instrumental and anashid (jihadist songs). His own passport so he could switch back and in arranging for the ringleader of the Facebook profile picture depicted a forth, concealing his entry and exit 2005 London bombers, Mohammed mujahid raising the black battleflag to suspicious destinations to British Siddique Khan, to travel to Pakistan of Islam. Some have speculated that officials. he came into contact with the Reflect Project, previously known as al- Al-Abdaly surfaced again on November 7 Eduardo Grutzky, “Jag var självmordsbombarens frit- Muhajiroun, which organized a protest 19, 2010 when he returned to Sweden idsledare,” Newsmill.se, January 5, 2011. at a homecoming parade in Luton for alone to stay with his parents long 13 8 Jonathan Githens-Mazer and Robert Lambert, Islamo- troops who had served in Afghanistan. phobia and Anti-Muslim Hate Crime: A London Case Study Home,” Sunday Telegraph, December 19, 2010. (Exeter: University of Exeter, 2010). 11 Sam Jones, Ian Corbain, Richard Norton-Taylor and 14 BBC Newsnight, December 13, 2010. 9 Sean O’Neill and Daniel McGrory, The Suicide Factory: Shiv Malik, “The ‘Bubbly’ Luton Radical Who Became 15 Ibid. Abu Hamza and the Finsbury Park Mosque (London: Harp- a Suicide Bomber in Sweden,” Guardian, December 14, 16 Martin Evans, “Stockholm Bomber: Family Blame er Collins, 2006). 2010. Britain for Radicalization,” Telegraph, December 13, 10 Olle Lönnaeus and Erik Magnusson, “Mannen som 12 Ibid. 2010. skulle sprang sig själv,” Sydsvenskan, December 19, 13 Jason Lewis, “Stockholm Bomber: Banned Extremists 17 Martin Ekelund, “Reste med olika pass,” Aftonbladet, 2010. Recruit Near Taimour Abdulwahab al-Abdaly’s Luton December 23, 2010.

3 january 2011 . Vol 4 . Issue 1 enough to celebrate his own and his Traveling in separate convoys, Safia These overlapping social networks made father’s birthday, which they commonly was with the wife of U.S. citizen Daniel it easy for SÄPO to identify and monitor share. He stayed in his parents’ flat in Maldonado, a convicted terrorist who the different suspects in the plot against Tranås and proceeded over the next two had undertaken training in bomb-making Jyllands-Posten. Apart from Munir Awad weeks to acquire a vehicle for $1,300, and volunteered for suicide operations.20 and Sahbi Zalouti, the network involved aluminum powder, pyrotechnics and 30-year-old Moroccan Omar Abdallah nails and ball bearings from local Second, Awad, his girlfriend and Aboelazm, a convicted sexual offender hardware stores. Few believe that he their baby were caught in Dera Ghazi who has been in psychiatric care, and was alone in what seems to be a rather Khan by Pakistani security, together 44-year-old Mounir Dhahri, a former overly complex operation for a lone with Mehdi Ghezali and seven other drug addict convicted of spousal abuse, wolf. His carefully prepared farewell Germans in August 2009 after traveling drug offenses and assault.22 It is believed tapes in Arabic, Swedish and English through Iran en route to Miran Shah in that Zalouti was the more senior leader strengthens this suspicion. North Waziristan Agency of Pakistan’s in the network, but he bailed out of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. trip to Denmark. Consequently, it is Al-Abdaly’s farewell tapes followed a It is believed that two of the Germans believed that Mounir Dhahri became familiar al-Qa`ida-inspired narrative have links to the Islamic Movement the key figure driving the plot forward. script. It emphasized humiliation of of Uzbekistan (IMU). According to Dhahri also spent significant time in Muslims under siege as evidenced Ghezali, he was traveling to a Tablighi Pakistan, which is likely to become key by the occupation of Muslim lands Jama`at meeting, although security to the investigation. (Afghanistan); reinforced by officials confiscated $10,940 in cash, metaphorical issues (the Lars Vilks knives, a neck trap (disguised in There are also indirect links between controversy18); offering reciprocal diapers) and electronic items.21 This 43- Munir Awad and the Jyllands-Posten plot revenge by urging “all mujahidin in day prison incident became problematic and the earlier 2009 plot against the Europe and Sweden” to strike now. for Helena Benaouda, the chairwoman same newspaper by David Coleman The issue of possible affiliation to the of the Swedish Muslim Council, who Headley (who has been linked to the Islamic State of Iraq was raised due to campaigned tirelessly protesting their senior terrorist Ilyas Kashmiri).23 the fact that al-Abdaly alluded to the innocence. Kashmiri, who also has close ties to “Islamic State” in his script. A puzzling Lashkar-i-Tayyiba, provided Headley feature is why the Islamic State of Third, Awad shared an apartment with with two sets of contacts for the planned Iraq, if involved, did not claim any 26-year-old Ellas Bille Mohamed, one 2009 operation in Copenhagen: two responsibility. By his own admission in of the two al-Shabab terrorists who followers in Derby, England, and the tape, he participated for four years were recently convicted of preparing one individual in Stockholm named in jihad overseas. and commissioning suicide operations Farid, a Moroccan-born businessman in Somalia. This connection reinforces who declined participation in August Munir Awad and the Jyllands-Posten Plot the overlapping social relationships in 2009 as he was believed to be under The second terrorist incident involving these semi-closed extremist circuits and surveillance by SÄPO.24 Farid is a major Sweden in December 2010 was the case suspicions about Awad’s previous travel figure in extremist circles in Stockholm of four Swedes arrested for planning to patterns in Somalia and Pakistan. Awad and he knew some of the suspects in the conduct a Mumbai-style attack on the also had strong social contacts with Jyllands-Posten plot of December 2010. Jyllands-Posten newspaper in Copenhagen, Sahbi Zalouti, one of the accomplices Denmark. The men were arrested after in the Copenhagen plot (who rented After discovering the December plot, driving from Sweden to Copenhagen to the vehicle for the trip from Stockholm SÄPO and the Danish Intelligence execute the attack. A central figure in to Copenhagen but never joined the & Security Service (PET) kept the the plot is Munir Awad, a 29-year-old operation). While Zalouti was similarly Swedes under surveillance for two Lebanon-born Swedish citizen. This detained in Pakistan in areas controlled months. On December 29, 2010, Awad, case is well-known in Sweden for a by the Taliban and al-Qa`ida, another Aboelazm and Dhahri left Stockholm number of reasons. accomplice, Mounir Dhahri, spent for Denmark in their rental car to considerable time with extremists in launch a “storming” operation against First, Awad and his pregnant girlfriend, Pakistan. Jyllands-Posten. In the middle of the night, Safia Benaouda (the daughter of the they started the six hour drive from head of the Swedish Muslim Council), Stockholm to Copenhagen. Later that vember 2010. was caught initially in Somalia in 2007 day in the morning, they were arrested in 20 Michael Taarnby and Lars Hallundbaek, “Al-Sha- by Ethiopian forces and interrogated by baab: The Internationalization of Militant Islamism in Kenyan and U.S. intelligence. They had Somalia and the Implications for Radicalisation Pro- 22 Ibid. veered off a trip to Dubai and decided to cesses in Europe,” report supported by the Danish Min- 23 Jette Elbeak Maressa and Heidi Plougsgaard, “Han er visit Somalia “to see a more traditional istry of Justice, February 26, 2010; “American Charged den pakistanske forbindelse,” Jyllands-Posten, October Muslim culture,” in their own words.19 with Receiving Al Qaeda Terrorist Training in Weapons, 28, 2010. Bomb-Making, and Interrogation Techniques in Soma- 24 Yassin Marmasbash, “Investigators Look into Pos- 18 Lars Vilks is a Swedish artist who depicted the Proph- lia,” U.S.A. v. Daniel Maldonado a/k/a Daniel Aljughaifi, sible Ties to ‘Mickey Mouse Project,’” Jyllands-Posten, De- et Muhammad in drawings. Southern District of Texas, 2007. cember 30, 2010; Kaare Sorensen and Carsten Ellegard, 19 “Nowhere to Go: Sweden’s Complicity in the World- 21 “Här grips de – misstänkta för terrorism,” Aftonbladet, “David Headley forsogte at rekruttere terrorist i Sverige,” Wide Detention of Monir Awad,” Cage Prisoners, No- September 12, 2009. Jyllands-Posten, November 9, 2010.

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Copenhagen in a joint Danish-Swedish contact and establish trust, the Somali out of the shadows, with no connectivity intelligence operation after continuous community is the reverse and keen to to al-Qa`ida, that are beginning to pose surveillance on the car throughout the work with authorities. The Somali issue a transnational terrorist threat. journey. In a joint news conference, both is also shared with other neighboring the SÄPO and PET heads emphasized countries as there are family and clan The Swedish context illustrates the that an attack was imminent. The links cutting across Sweden, Denmark, close social networks or circuits that terrorists had in their possession a Norway and the United Kingdom. Unlike extremists move in. Most know each machine gun with a silencer and 72 other foreign fighter destination points, other; some even live together. An cartridge shells as well as a 9mm pistol Somalis do not have a “romanticized” equally important, but often unexplored with 36 shells. They also possessed a view about the brutality of the conflict; issue is the role of women, wives and large quantity of plastic strips to tie the reverse is true for Pakistan or widows in these networks. These hands.25 While the terrorist plan was a Yemen. women play not only supporting roles Mumbai-style operation “in miniature,” and provide excellent cover for logistical closely resembling the original Headley Both Sweden and Denmark are transactions, but also become pivotal in plan, it is unclear whether the suspects increasingly focusing on Pakistan as a cementing social network ties.27 The role had conducted advance reconnaissance destination as well as to a lesser extent of widows of prominent terrorist leaders on Jyllands-Posten. The PET head, Jakob Yemen. For Denmark, the security is interesting in this respect as they can Scharf, did not want to rule out the environment has been “red” for a become recruitment sergeants, as in the possible connection to the Headley significant period as there have been Belgian case of Malika el-Aroud. case. four terrorist trials during the last four years. There have also been four Finally, the December 2010 attacks Microcosm of Terrorism: Reflecting Broader attacks against Jyllands-Posten and the in and from Sweden were sudden and Trends? Danish cartoonist Kurt Westergaard unexpected. Swedish politicians and the Sweden experienced both luck and skill since 2009. Not only are converts and public were shocked. The debate climate in averting two major mass casualty extremist recruits lured by extremist about terrorist threat assessment in attacks in December 2010. Intelligence facilitation brokers, but Denmark and, Sweden had been stifled by ideologically- by its nature involves filtering and to a lesser degree, Sweden are becoming driven debaters who used the label of puzzling together fragments of prioritized symbolic attack targets Islamophobia and racism to silence the information in a timely manner. As the for core al-Qa`ida, regional affiliates issue. This is not possible anymore. The former head of the United Kingdom’s and Pakistani extremist groups due challenge for Sweden will be to debate Joint Terrorism Analysis Center to the Prophet Muhammad cartoon the issues more frankly but sensibly, (JTAC) once said, “Our work can best affair and the Lars Vilks controversy. while simultaneously addressing the be described as trying to drink water This is exacerbated by the perception issue of countermeasures against from a water hydrant on full blast. It is of a possible “Madrid effect,” where extremism. For this, Sweden is looking not the absence of information; rather extremists are calculating that targeting toward Denmark, the Netherlands the difficulty lies in filtering out the Sweden, as well as Germany, would not and the United Kingdom, which have necessary and critical pieces and piecing only create a societal shock effect, but had longstanding community-based these together quickly, accurately and to also contribute to eroding support for “experiments” in countering violent the right agencies.”26 Even if SÄPO was ISAF contribution to Afghanistan. extremism. The trick is to find suitable blindsided, it had as much to do with transferable lessons. It will require a the UK intelligence agencies missing al- Terrorist mobility within the European national strategy against extremism. Abdaly under their watch. Union is also cause for concern. The The other challenge is for the Swedish recent case of Lars Doukajev, the one- Muslim community to address the issue Both the al-Abdaly and Awad cases legged Belgian-Chechen bomber who of extremism from within. illustrate the importance of intensifying was arrested in September 2010 after focus on so-called terrorist travelers his explosives detonated prematurely Dr. Magnus Ranstorp is the Research or foreign fighters. SÄPO has stated in a Copenhagen hotel as he was Director of the Center for Asymmetric that it believes there are 20-30 Swedes preparing a parcel bomb for Jyllands- Threat Studies at the Swedish National who have traveled to Somalia to Posten, is illustrative of the threat from Defence College. fight and join al-Shabab; three or “lone wolves” or unexpected sources. four individuals have died there. Doukajev filed off the serial number of Authorities have focused on working his prosthetic limb and did not have a cell with the Somali communities to phone, identification card, credit card, strengthen their resilience against or any other piece of unique information. extremism and recruitment. Unlike It took almost a week to identify him other minority immigrant communities, and it was not the intelligence services who are suspicious and difficult to but rather a tabloid newspaper that succeeded. The worrying element is 25 “Terrorsigtede havde 108 skarpe skud klar,” Berling- not what intelligence services see, but ske Tidende, December 30, 2010. rather what they do not know or miss. 26 Personal interview, Swedish National Defence Col- To an extent, this is the case with those 27 Nivette Dawood and Kristina Edblom, “Hustru – till lege, November 2006. extremist groups in Pakistan emerging en terrorist,” Aftonbladet, December 19, 2010.

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British Universities university students graduated to the At present, it is difficult to say whether battlefields of international jihad. British Muslims who go to university Continue to Breed Indeed, since the report was published, are any more or less likely to carry out Extremists another graduate of a British university, acts of terrorism than those who do not. Taimour Abdulwahab al-Abdaly, died Current research shows that around 35% By James Brandon in December 2010 while attempting to of British terrorist convicts have studied carry out a multiple bombing attack in for a higher education qualification— in early october 2010, University Stockholm.5 not far off the national average.9 That College London (UCL) published its said, many university graduates seem to official inquiry into the radicalization Background have played key roles in those terrorist of Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, who During the 1990s, British university is currently awaiting trial in the United campuses played a key role in the “These and other States for attempting to destroy a evolution of international jihadist cases suggest that Detroit-bound airliner on Christmas networks, providing extremist groups Day 2009. The inquiry concluded that a steady source of motivated and high- Abdulmutallab’s “there is no evidence to suggest either caliber recruits whose UK passports radicalization at UCL was that Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab was enabled them to move freely around the radicalized while a student at UCL or world. One of the earliest such recruits not an outlier; it was part that conditions at UCL during that time was Omar Saeed Sheikh, a British or subsequently are conducive to the Muslim from a privileged Pakistani of a trend of university- radicalization of students.”1 To reach background, who was radicalized in the educated radicals becoming this conclusion, the report overlooked early-1990s while at the London School abundant evidence that Abdulmutallab of Economics (LSE). After hearing involved in sophisticated had not only entrenched his extremist Omar Bakri, the leader of the radical terrorist plots.” leanings while studying in London, but al-Muhajiroun group, speak on campus also actively sought to popularize such about the then-ongoing massacre of views among his fellow students.2 The Muslims in Bosnia, he embarked on report, for instance, skimmed over the a career of jihadist action, becoming attacks that come closer to “success.” many web postings Abdulmutallab made involved with militant groups in Bosnia, For instance, the 2007 attempted car during his time at UCL that showed India and Pakistan.6 In 2002, Sheikh was bomb attacks in central London and his increasing theological rigidity and found guilty of leading the kidnapping Glasgow airport, which failed only due intolerance. It also did not mention that and beheading of U.S. reporter Daniel to minor technical flaws in the bombs’ the campus’ Islamic society (ISoc),3 of Pearl in Pakistan. Since then, British construction, was led by Kafeel Ahmed, which Abdulmutallab was president universities have consistently acted as who had studied engineering at several in 2006-2007, regularly invited hard breeding grounds for extremism, with British universities including Queen’s line Salafist and Islamist speakers to British university graduates joining University Belfast.10 campus during this period, holding jihadist movements in Iraq, Kashmir, events which one student described as Israel and elsewhere. Indeed, just one Similarly, one of the leaders of the “brainwashing.”4 year after the conviction of Sharif, sophisticated 2006 plot to use liquid Omar Khan Sharif, a former student at explosives to blow up transatlantic The UCL report is only the latest evidence King’s College university in London, airliners was Abdulla Ahmed Ali, a that UK universities are still failing to took part in a suicide bomb attack in graduate of London’s City University, understand, let alone seriously grapple Tel Aviv. Sharif, like al-Abdaly, the of whose ISoc he had been president. with, the problem of radicalization Stockholm bomber, is believed to have Another of the plot’s leaders was of students at UK universities—more been pushed toward violence by the Waheed Zaman, a graduate of London than 15 years since the first British rhetoric of Hizb al-Tahir (HT), a radical Metropolitan University.11 Similarly, but ostensibly non-violent Islamist the two leaders of the successful July 7 1 “Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab: Report to UCL Coun- group. Other students recruited into 7, 2005 London bombings, Mohammed cil of Independent Inquiry Panel,” University College HT at British universities have gone on Siddique Khan and Shehzad Tanweer, London, September 2010, available at www.ucl.ac.uk/ to play leading roles in setting up HT had both attended Leeds Metropolitan 8 caldicott-enquiry/caldicottreport.pdf. branches in Pakistan and Bangladesh. University. These and other cases suggest 2 For the most complete account of Abdulmutallab’s that Abdulmutallab’s radicalization at radicalization, see Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens and 5 Duncan Gardham, Marcus Oscarsson and Peter UCL was not an outlier; it was part of Jacob Amis, “The Making of the Christmas Day Bomb- Hutchison, “Sweden Suicide Bomber: Taimur Abdulwa- er,” Current Trends in Islamist Ideology 10 (2010). hab al-Abdaly Was Living in Britain,” Daily Telegraph, 9 Robin Simcox, Hannah Stuart and Houriya Ahmed, 3 In the United Kingdom, a campus “Islamic Society,” or December 12, 2010. Islamist Terrorism: The British Connections (London: The “ISoc,” is an independent university organization funded 6 Personal interview, eyewitnesses, October 2010. Center for Social Cohesion, 2010), p. 329. and run entirely by students. They are generally seen by 7 Shiv Malik, “NS Profile - Omar Sharif,”New Statesman, 10 Steve Bird, “Profile: Kafeel Ahmed, Glasgow Attack university administrations as the de facto “representa- April 24, 2006. Terrorist Who Burnt to Death,” The Times, December 16, tive” of Muslim students. 8 For instance, Dr. Nasim Ghani, a graduate of a Lon- 2008. 4 Adam Nossiter, “Lonely Trek to Radicalism for Terror don medical college, is now a leading organizer of Hizb 11 “Profiles: Airline Plot Accused,” BBC News, Septem- Suspect,” New York Times, January 16, 2010. al-Tahrir in Bangladesh. ber 7, 2009.

6 january 2011 . Vol 4 . Issue 1 a trend of university-educated radicals ISoc also invited radical speakers to their activities.18 One lecturer was so becoming involved in sophisticated give campus talks—some of which were frightened by the ISoc’s behavior that terrorist plots. canceled following pressure from civil she considered contacting the police. society groups and activists.15 A Case Study: London’s City University These events, which took place on a A striking example of the radicalization The hard line Salafi-jihadi ideology central London campus during the currently occurring on British university propagated by City University’s ISoc 2009-2010 academic year, illustrate the campuses is the events of the 2009- had immediate effects on campus. Jewish dangers that radical Islamists pose on 2010 academic year at City University,12 and homosexual students on campus British university campuses—both in a college of 21,000 students in central reported being harassed by students terms of disrupting relations between London that has a large population of suspected of being from the ISoc.16 Muslims and non-Muslims and in terms local and foreign Muslim students.13 A police investigation into an attack of increasing the risk of radicalization During this period, the university’s on Muslim students by local youths toward terrorism. They also show the ISoc, which was led by mainly UK-born, collapsed after the ISoc discouraged challenges of preventing radicalization. South Asian-origin Salafists, created Muslim eyewitnesses from assisting the For instance, although the ISoc’s an atmosphere in which extremism “kuffar” police service.17 The ISoc also repeated promotion of extremism has could, and did, flourish. For instance, sought to forcibly impose its views on undoubtedly increased the chances of throughout the year, the ISoc’s leaders Muslim students. For instance, in early terrorism, the police or the security gave Friday sermons in which they 2010 the ISoc attempted to order female services could do little to intervene as no defended the principle “defensive laws were broken. Such “sub-criminal and offensive jihad,” denounced the “Such ‘sub-criminal extremism” is inherently difficult to “Western value system,” endorsed tackle—not least because until a student homophobia as “Islamic” and called for extremism’ is inherently commits an act of terrorism, their the killing of Muslims who intentionally difficult to tackle—not radicalization is generally only more or missed prayers.14 Other sermons given less hypothetical. by ISoc leaders advocated the creation least because until a of an “Islamic state” in which adulterers student commits an Official Reaction would be stoned to death. The ISoc’s Despite the mounting evidence that website re-published material by Abu act of terrorism, their British universities remain a crucible Muhammed al-Maqdisi, the Jordanian radicalization is generally of extremism, the UK government has al-Qa`ida theorist, and Ali al-Tamimi, been slow to act. For instance, even a U.S. preacher convicted of terrorism only more or less after the 2005 London bombings, (“May Allah hasten his release,” in the hypothetical.” universities were largely excluded words of the ISoc website). Into early from the government’s “Preventing 2010, the website also re-published Violent Extremism” program. writings by Anwar al-`Awlaqi, the Simultaneously, university vice- wanted Yemeni-American cleric, who Muslim students to leave campus at chancellors are struggling to face up the ISoc had attempted to host via video- 4 PM every day, while students also to campus radicalization. “We all used link the previous year. When al-`Awlaqi reported that some female Muslims to be radicals…Radicalization can be was reported killed in an airstrike had been forced to wear the hijab. The a good thing,” this author was told in December 2009, the ISoc posted ISoc also prevented Muslims from by the vice-chancellor of one London a message of support, writing “May using an “interfaith prayer room,” a university whose alumni have recently Allah protect him and the Muslims” and practice which they believed was haram been involved in a number of terrorist predicting “there are many others like (forbidden). Instead, they began holding plots.19 Alarmingly, some universities al-Aulaqi [sic], and if he dies a hundred Friday prayers in the university’s main have not only turned a blind eye to more like him will arise, alhamdulillaah courtyard, a deliberately confrontational such extremism, but have actively [praise be to God].” During the 2009- gesture that disrupted the university’s defended such extremists. For instance, 2010 academic year, City University’s academic work and is credited with in early 2010 the national British media increasing tensions between Muslim reported that Friday sermons in the campus prayer room at the London 12 The following material is partly drawn from a brief- and non-Muslim students. ISoc School of Economics were being given ing paper co-written by this author. The paper is based members also sought to intimidate two by a prominent member of HT, who on recordings of ISoc sermons, open-source material university lecturers and students who is also a Ph.D. student and part-time and interviews with a wide range of staff and students at had sought to draw public attention to lecturer at the university, who was City University. For the full paper, see “Radicalisation on British University Campuses: A Case Study,” Quilliam Foundation, October 2010. 15 “Muslim Students Continue Street Protests,” Times 18 A sample of these problems can be seen in the follow- 13 The university does not keep statistics on the percent- Higher Education Supplement, March 16, 2010. ing article in City’s student newspaper, as well as in the age of Muslim students, but this is estimated by staff at 16 Jennifer Lipman, “London Campus was ‘Launch Pad comments that follow it: “City Islamic Society Defends between 10-20%. For more details, see ibid. for Islamist Terrorism,’” The Jewish Chronicle, October 21, Radical Preacher and Threatens the Inquirer,” The In- 14 “‘Taliban Rule’ at British University,” Sunday Times, 2010. quirer, January 2, 2010. October 17, 2010. Much of this data was also available on 17 For full details of these incidents, see “Radicalisation 19 Personal interview, vice-chancellor, anonymous Lon- the ISoc’s website, which has since been removed. on British University Campuses: A Case Study.” don university, January 2010.

7 january 2011 . Vol 4 . Issue 1 using this platform to promote the stand up to campus radicals, particularly group.20 In response, the university ones who control ISocs, have a monopoly Improving Airline Security issued a statement defending the HT over Friday sermons and, as in the case in the United States member on the grounds that he had not of LSE, are openly backed by university said “anything unlawful during sermons authorities. Moreover, once radicals By Rafi Ron at Friday prayers.”21 The student have seized control of an ISoc or a prayer union also issued a press release in his room, problems tend to self-perpetuate almost 10 years after 9/11, the defense, stating that “no-one should as this leadership appoints or grooms Transportation Security Administration be subject to a media witch-hunt” and equally radical successors each year. (TSA) recently introduced another that “we stand with students and staff There is also no official mechanism for technology system to improve airline united in opposition to Islamophobia taking radicals out of such leadership security. Known as Advanced Imaging and racism on campus...and are united positions since ISocs are independent, Technology (AIT), or “body scanners,” in opposition to the victimization of student-run organizations.25 the new devices created a public our colleagues.”22 Since then, Muslims uproar over privacy concerns since the attending LSE Friday prayers have said As a result of these trends, it is hard to technology effectively sees through a that this HT member still regularly uses see radicalization at British universities subject’s clothes during screening.1 The his Friday sermons at LSE to advocate lessening any time soon. This will not AIT systems have been rapidly installed HT policy, promote HT events and even only affect the security of the United at airports across the United States in denounce critics by name—despite HT’s Kingdom—individuals previously the wake of an attempted terrorist attack documented involvement in several radicalized at British universities on a U.S.-bound airliner on December instances of university radicalization.23 have beheaded American journalists 25, 2009. Many British universities appear to in Pakistan, carried out suicide bomb regard Islamist radicalization primarily attacks in Israel and, most recently, On that day, Umar Farouk as a public relations problem. Sweden, aided radical movements Abdulmutallab, a young Nigerian through South Asia and elsewhere, Muslim, concealed a small explosive Conclusion and Outlook and attempted to bomb U.S.-bound device in his underwear and boarded The presence of radicalizing forces on airliners. Ongoing radicalization at a flight departing from Lagos, Nigeria, British university campuses is clear. UK universities is not just a British connecting in Amsterdam to Detroit, What is less clear is whether any action problem, but a global one. Michigan. The young terrorist was on a will be taken to combat it. Although “divine” mission to blow up the aircraft the British prime minister has recently James Brandon is Head of Research at the along with more than 200 passengers spoken of the need to “de-radicalize our Quilliam Foundation, a counter-extremism and crew over Detroit. His intention universities,” the barriers government think-tank based in London. was to kill as many people as possible, must overcome are formidable.24 For including the unsuspecting Detroit a start, even the most radical students suburban inhabitants on the ground. rarely break the law, meaning that the Luckily, due to his poor skills (rather police and security services are largely than any security measures implemented powerless to take action against such at the airport) he failed his mission and radicalization, even if it might ultimately ended up in a federal jail. lead to terrorism. Simultaneously, the left-leaning nature of British academia This incident has special significance means that a right-leaning government for two reasons. First, Abdulmutallab’s has few natural allies on campus. At the attempt revealed security failures at same time, however, moderate students every layer—intelligence analysis, opposed to extremism, including many airport security, and the handling of the Muslims, have not yet found a way to incident by the on-board crew as well as the handling of the plane by ground authorities.2 Second, the attempted 20 Sean O’Neill, “Senior Member of Extreme Islamist Group Hizb ut-Tahrir Teaches at LSE,” The Times, Janu- ary 15, 2010. 1 The alternative to body scanning, however, is arguably 21 “Statement on Mr Reza Pankhurst,” London worse, as it involves intensive manual “pat downs” that School of Economics, undated, available at www2.lse. under other circumstances would be considered a form ac.uk/intranet/news/internalNews/internalNews- of harassment. Archive/2010/01/RPankhurst.aspx. 2 For example, despite the grave situation on board, the 22 “Statement from the Students’ Union Regarding captain reported to the ground that there was no need Recent Media Attention,” February 15, 2010, available for any emergency procedures. As a result, the airport at www.lse.oncampus.net/pages/representation/state- 25 Although ISocs feature heavily in accounts of campus called off any emergency measures and the aircraft (car- ment_on_mr_reza_pankhurst_.html. radicalization, this is not necessarily because of any in- rying a detained terrorist and an unexploded device) was 23 Personal interviews, anonymous students, London, trinsic problem with ISocs. Rather, it is likely because directed to a normal gate linked to the terminal (full of March-April 2010. radical groups often focus on taking over these societies passengers and employees) with other aircraft close by. 24 William Maclean, “Britain Admits Security Lapses and making them into vehicles for their own ideology; in Passengers were allowed to disembark and mix with After Sweden Blast,” Reuters, December 15, 2010. effect, making them hubs of campus radicalization. people present in the gate area without any screening

8 january 2011 . Vol 4 . Issue 1 attack was almost a carbon copy of an In both cases, there were clear “red flags” Current Security Practices Inadequate incident that took place eight years in the way their journey was prepared. Reviewing all attempted attacks against earlier when another poorly skilled Both Reid and Abdulmutallab had one- U.S. aviation—starting with 9/11, terrorist carried a similar explosive way tickets, both paid the travel fare in including Richard Reid’s shoe bomb device (concealed in his shoe) on an cash, and both did not check any bags attempt, the liquid explosives plot American Airlines flight from Paris to (for a transatlantic flight). Richard Reid and Abdulmutallab’s Christmas Day Miami, earning his place in history as twice failed a short interview conducted attack—a clear common denominator the “shoe bomber.” What is alarming by a private security firm (hired by is identified. It is the failure of is that Abdulmutallab’s attempted American Airlines as part of a procedure aviation security technology to detect terrorist attack in 2009 represents a implemented on inbound flights to the and prevent terrorists from carrying level of security failure worse than the out their missions successfully. In one eight years earlier. all of these attacks, the weapon or “Reviewing all attempted the explosive devices were smuggled Similarities to the Shoe Bomber attacks against U.S. through security checkpoints to the The similarities between the two aircraft, or, as in the case of the liquid attacks are astounding. Both devices aviation, a clear common explosives plot, was luckily stopped by used pentaerythritol tetranitrate denominator is identified. early intelligence as there was nothing (PETN) as the main explosive material. at the airport that could have detected Both contained no metal parts to avoid It is the failure of aviation explosives in liquid form. airport metal detection technology. security technology Both used improvised detonators. Both The problem started shortly after 9/11 were carried on the terrorist’s body to to detect and prevent when the TSA was created with the avoid x-ray screening. Both explosives terrorists from carrying conviction that the terrorist threat required some basic skill to detonate, could be met by improving the quality which is why both terrorists failed. out their missions of the airport screening operation. Yet successfully.” the notion that the terrorists’ success On the human side, both Richard Reid on the morning of 9/11 was the result (the “shoe bomber”) and Abdulmutallab of a “screening failure” is misleading. were inexperienced and were not able At that time, box cutters and other to avoid suspicion from people around United States). Abdulmutallab was sharp items were practically allowed on them prior to the attack. Richard Reid, not subjected to this procedure as it board. Even if such items were banned, for example, drew suspicion from the had since been changed to address however, there was still the open security guard that interviewed him immigration concerns. Security aspects cockpit door and the FAA guideline prior to checking in to his flight, to the of his limited human encounter were for pilots to cooperate with hijackers; point that French police were called in minimized to checking his name against indeed, this would have led to the same to interrogate him for more than two the “No Fly” and suspected terrorist tragic result. hours only to release him as a legitimate watch lists. There is good reason to passenger. Missing the original flight assume, based on his behavior after his Moreover, nine of the 19 terrorists on as a result, he showed up the next day arrest, that had Abdulmutallab been 9/11 were identified by a computerized and once again the French police were subjected to a professional security (non-racial) profiling system called summoned, although this time they interview, he would have been flagged CAPPS, which was developed by the cleared him to fly. Reid still drew further as “suspicious.” FAA and used by the airlines as a suspicion from the flight attendant at mandatory requirement. The response the aircraft door who described him The TSA’s conclusion from the protocol to CAPPS selection of “high as having a threatening appearance, “shoe bomber” attack in 2001 was risk” passengers was an additional as well as by the cabin attendant who disappointing and off the mark. It shallow “pat down,” which was less reported to the senior flight attendant a was characterized by a minimalist than adequate to stop Muhammad `Atta “suspicious passenger” prior to takeoff. approach, defining the terrorist modus and his team since they did not carry operandi (MO) as “carrying a bomb in banned items. shoes” rather than “carrying a bomb on the body.” This reactive approach led to In the aftermath of 9/11, the policy forcing passengers to take off their shoes that was created and implemented to and submitting them to x-ray screening. avoid another terrorist attack could As a result, it left the door open to an al- be summarized as using screening Qa`ida operative and bombmaker based technology to detect forbidden items or questioning (ignoring the risk of a second terrorist on in Yemen to take advantage of it eight prior to boarding the aircraft. The board). The wounded terrorist was detained by two law years later, sending Abdulmutallab emphasis was on the use of technology enforcement officers and was taken without any special with an explosive device concealed to mitigate the threat. The other aspect security measures by ambulance to the nearest hospital. in his underwear. The only surprise, of that policy was to avoid any form of This chain of events is characterized by a lack of under- perhaps, is that it took al-Qa`ida eight discrimination; as a result, the search standing of the situation and resulted in putting the pub- years to repeat the attack. for banned items had to be carried lic at risk of a potential disaster at the airport. out in a uniform manner. This policy,

9 january 2011 . Vol 4 . Issue 1 however, does not recognize different of this model is an interview process computerized (non-discriminating) individual passenger risk levels. with every single passenger by a security profiling program that would highly skilled professional. The term divide the passenger population into Indeed, this policy has proven less “profiling” is usually used to describe risk groups. The security checkpoint than successful with all the attempted this process. and baggage screening system would attacks since 9/11. After each attack, respond to the risk group level with a authorities have responded with small, The American environment, however, compatible level of search, including reactive changes in policy. After 9/11, is different from the Israeli one in many the use of highly professional face-to- for example, a substantial portion ways. Therefore, one has to be cautious face interviews for those passengers of security resources was spent on when attempting to implement a similar designated as “high risk.” confiscating small sharp items even solution in the United States. For after reinforced cockpit doors were example, the ethnic profile of the majority The key to the success of this approach introduced. After Richard Reid’s of travelers on Israeli aviation is rather is that it preserves the ability to identify shoe bomb attempt, security focused uniform compared to the plural ethnic the risk where it exists and adjust the on footwear only, neglecting more profile of the American population. search level to achieve the most effective intensive searches of the passenger’s There are also a number of differences in result. By using the interview technique body. After the liquid explosives plot, with the “high risk” passengers, authorities implemented a demanding authorities can take advantage of the policy of limiting quantities of liquids “By using the interview terrorists’ “Achilles heel”: the difficulty carried on board the plane, yet avoiding technique with the in maintaining a “cover story” in a any response related to checked bags. professional interview situation. It was only after the recent action by ‘high risk’ passengers, Abdulmutallab to carry a bomb on board authorities can take It is never too soon to replace the current in his underwear when authorities ineffective “one size fits all” approach finally moved to deploying “full body advantage of the with an effective “risk-based” strategy scanners.” terrorists’ ‘Achilles that builds on U.S. advantages and the terrorists’ vulnerabilities. Clearly, the one conclusion that can be heel’: the difficulty in drawn with certainty is that there is an maintaining a ‘cover story’ Rafi Ron is a leading aviation security urgent need to find a more effective way expert with more than 30 years of security to achieve “airport security.” Steps need in a professional interview and counterterrorism experience worldwide. to be taken to put airport security one situation.” He served as the Director of Security at Tel- step ahead of the terrorists, rather than Aviv Ben-Gurion International Airport pursuing a reactive approach which and the Israeli Airport Authority from characterizes the present strategy. 1997 to 2001. Mr. Ron helped establish the the legal environment between the U.S. EL-AL sky marshal program. Mr. Ron was Applying the Israeli Model constitution and Israeli law. There are hired by Massport immediately after 9/11 to A growing number of people in the U.S. differences in the volume of passenger upgrade security for Boston Logan Airport. government, the aviation industry, traffic, as well as the fact that more than Among the new programs he instituted was the media and the general public are 80% of travelers on Israeli aviation are the development of the Behavior Pattern pushing toward a strategy modeled international travelers equipped with Recognition (BPR) protocol that helps on a real “risk-based” approach, or, in passports and other travel documents authorities identify terrorists before they other words, “profiling.” The proven that contain significant information endanger airports or aviation travelers. In success of the Israeli aviation security about the passenger and their flight 2001, Mr. Ron formed New Age Aviation model, which is based on this approach, history. Most flights to and from Israel Security and New Age Security Solutions has drawn much attention, and it has are also long-haul flights, which require where he is president and CEO. In that become an attractive option to many in passengers to arrive at the airport three capacity he manages aviation security the United States. There is little dispute hours before departure—this allows related projects in the United States and over the track record of the Israeli authorities adequate time to complete a internationally, including: threat and model, but most people who suggest face-to-face interview process. vulnerability studies, security planning, its implementation “as is” are not fully system design and integration, and training. familiar with it. Having mentioned the above differences, the Israeli concept is still valid for the The Israeli model was developed and U.S. environment after some substantial refined for use by Israeli aviation and and careful modifications. First, tailored to address the unique conditions discriminating factors such as ethnicity, that exist in Israel. Largely speaking, religion or gender must be removed to it is based on the understanding that meet U.S. constitutional requirements. each passenger carries a different risk There is still enough behavioral level and that the depth of security information left to create effective processing and search is adjusted to profiles. Second, the 100% interview the individual’s risk level. At the heart standard must be replaced with a robust

10 january 2011 . Vol 4 . Issue 1

Al-Qa`ida’s Yemeni This article profiles three operatives evening of March 9, 2010, a group of part of this network: Ghazwan al- suspected militants who had gathered Expatriate Faction in Yemeni, Abu Dujanah al-Sanaani and at a mujahidin base near the town of Pakistan Abu Abdelrahman al-Qahtani. The Miran Shah in North Waziristan became lesson of their stories is that despite the next target of the CIA’s wrath.2 By Evan F. Kohlmann the recent flurry of plots emanating A barrage of Hellfire missiles struck from the Yemen-based al-Qa`ida in ever since umar Farouk Abdulmutallab the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), the attempted to blow up a transatlantic threat from al-Qa`ida’s core network “Al-Qa`ida’s Yemeni commercial airliner on Christmas Day in the Afghan-Pakistani border region expatriate faction based in 2009, public attention has been firmly remains just as potent, in part due to fixed on al-Qa`ida’s latest regional the ongoing role of Yemeni operatives North Waziristan has also franchise based in Yemen—a focus that in South Asia. Perhaps the only positive apparently been working has only increased in intensity following note is that many of the most prominent a subsequent cargo bomb plot thwarted Yemeni personalities operating in closely on the ground with in late 2010. Unbeknownst to many South Asia are now dead, having been high-profile European Americans, there is another prolific quietly removed in an unrelenting and deadly Yemeni terrorist network torrent of U.S. drone missile strikes and exiles who have likewise within al-Qa`ida that is operating far mysterious explosions. traveled to the region in beyond the confines of the Arabian Peninsula. This network includes Ghazwan al-Yemeni hopes of joining al-Qa`ida skilled bomb makers, martyrdom The real danger posed by this expatriate and the Taliban.” operatives, and senior commanders Yemeni al-Qa`ida faction was only tightly ensconced with al-Qa`ida’s exposed in the aftermath of the December top leadership in the rugged terrain 30, 2009 suicide bombing targeting on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. CIA agents at Camp Chapman—an the compound, inflicting numerous During the past year, these individuals attack carried out by a former jihadist casualties—including a Yemeni national have demonstrated their remarkable web forum administrator from Jordan in his early 30s with the name Saddam ingenuity, tech-savvy, and deadly known as Abu Dujanah al-Khorasani Hussein al-Hussami, better known precision. They have been linked to (also known as Humam al-Balawi). under the pseudonym Ghazwan al- some of the most serious attacks to take While the CIA believed it had turned Yemeni. According to a senior U.S. place in the Afghan-Pakistani region, al-Balawi into a key and trusted asset, official cited by the Associated Press, including the dramatic suicide bombing in the months leading up to his death al-Yemeni was an al-Qa`ida leader who in late December 2009 that killed seven the Jordanian was instead confidently had “specialized in suicide operations” agents from the Central Intelligence reassuring his online friends, “when the and was Agency and a Jordanian intelligence love of jihad enters the heart of man, it officer at an Afghan forward operating will not leave him even if he wished it believed to have played a key base near the border with Pakistan. to…Can any sane person accept that? role in the bombing of a CIA post Not me.”1 During a scheduled meeting in Afghanistan last December… The significance of the Yemeni terrorist with his handlers at Camp Chapman to [He] is considered an important network based in North Waziristan discuss the whereabouts of al-Qa`ida’s al-Qaida planner and explosives has gradually come into view during deputy commander, Ayman al-Zawahiri, expert who had established the past year due in large part to their al-Balawi detonated a suicide bomb and contact with groups ranging from public communications on internet web single-handedly wiped out some of the al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula forums. Although these men range in CIA’s most experienced personnel in to Afghan and Pakistani Taliban age from their early 20s to late 40s, the region. militant groups.3 and despite the fact that they come from a country that is hardly known Although the devastating attack was Less than four days after he was killed, for its extensive web connectivity, immediately claimed by the Pakistani tributes to Ghazwan al-Yemeni began these Yemeni nationals have taken Taliban, which produced a video of al- pouring into online social networking to the online world with an unusual Balawi sitting alongside top Pakistani forums frequented by jihadists. On gusto, employing jihadist-themed Taliban leader Hakimullah Mehsud, the March 13, administrators from the social networking forums to broadcast Camp Chapman bombing nonetheless notorious Falluja Islamic Network biographies of “martyred” militants, appeared to bear the telltale fingerprints issued a statement confirming that “the to appeal for assistance and technical of hard line foreign jihadists. The brave mujahid commander” had actually support, and to send messages back to CIA quickly vowed to take revenge been a registered participating user in al-Qa`ida fighters who are still based in for its losses, and soon missiles began Yemen. raining down from U.S. drone aircraft circling over Pakistan’s tribal regions 2 Lolita Baldor and Matt Apuzzo, “Top Al Qaeda Opera- at an unprecedented rate. Early in the tive Reportedly Killed In U.S. Drone Attack,” Associated Press, March 17, 2010. 1 Vanguards of Khorasan 1:15 (2009). 3 Ibid.

11 january 2011 . Vol 4 . Issue 1 its own web-based chat forum.4 The long period of time and then he A follow-up statement posted later that archived messages posted by Ghazwan al- was released…He turned his gaze day by another user, “al-Qairawani,” Yemeni on the Falluja Islamic Network— towards the precious land of… repeated that “Abu Hatem Mohammed the same online social networking venue Afghanistan, passing through a Naqaa’ Qaed al-Hamli al-Yemeni (Abu preferred by CIA bomber Humam al- third country where they stayed Dujanah al-Sanaani) has…passed away Balawi—offer an unprecedented inside for a lengthy period awaiting in the evening due to his severe injuries. look into his activities on the battlefield entrance visas to Iran. Eventually, These were caused by the premature in Afghanistan. In early October 2009, Allah permitted for them to enter, detonation of an explosive device he was al-Yemeni had posted a flurry of requests and from the first day here, they preparing to roast the flesh of Allah’s via the chat forum on behalf of “the enrolled in the training camps…I enemies, the crusaders and apostates.”11 Jalaluddin Haqqani Organization in remember the first time I saw him Al-Qairawani claimed to have the Shadow of the Islamic Emirate of in Wana and he came to learn about Afghanistan.”5 In one such message, he explosives from an expert in the participated with him for three appealed, “we, your brothers from the Afghani field—in fact, the expert years in actions and operations, Jalaluddin Haqqani Organization, have of all aspects of jihad, as they were and I only knew him to be a brave, encountered some problems in regards all the students of Abu Khabab al- heroic man, and a roaring lion who to the subjects Tawheed and Aqeedah, Masri…eventually, he went back to had no fear of death. May Allah and we want the email or website of North [Waziristan] and…settled in have mercy on him, he specialized the renowned shaykhs in this field so Miran Shah, where he organized in the science of explosives and we can direct to them our questions and trained the Taliban and he mastered it to the point that and seek fatwahs.”6 Another post assisted in making preparations he became a reference to all the from Ghazwan al-Yemeni highlighted an for many of their military needs.8 brothers in this regard. In this urgent need for translating “Shari`a and field, he demonstrated a degree military guides printed in the Russian By all accounts, Ghazwan al-Yemeni of ingenuity that distinguished language…into Arabic. If you can assist had served as a key liaison and conduit him and was of great benefit to me, whether with software, websites, between a variety of local armed jihadist the mujahidin. He also worked or translators, may Allah reward you factions, including al-Qa`ida, the to spread this art and teach it to generously.”7 Jalaluddin Haqqani network, and the the rest of the mujahidin, and he up-and-coming Pakistani Taliban. left behind him, praise to Allah, Fellow mujahidin comrades of Ghazwan a number of brilliant Taliban al-Yemeni from the frontline on the Abu Dujanah al-Sanaani students.12 Afghan-Pakistani border added their Less than two months later, mujahidin own voices to the chorus of discussion. online chat forums again began to In an interview with the online jihadist On March 12, 2010, a registered user light up with discussion of the latest media outfit “al-Balagh” only days on the Falluja Islamic Network calling Yemeni national “martyred” in North before his death, Abu Dujanah al- himself “Abu Abdelrahman al-Qahtani Waziristan—Mohammed Naqaa al- Sanaani introduced himself as in Waziristan” offered a first-person Hamli, also known as Abu Dujanah biography of the late Yemeni al-Qa`ida al-Sanaani.9 Indeed, the same voices from the children of Hijja province, commander: who had expressed such personal the municipality of Khiran bani grief over the passing of Ghazwan al- Hamla; a graduate from Sana`a We were not able to recover the Yemeni stepped forward once again to University, and a teacher at the first body until midnight, and acknowledge the fate of his brother- Ministry of Education. I studied our mujahid brother Ghazwan al- in-arms al-Hamli. Falluja Islamic Shariah education at al-Iman Yemeni [was one of the dead]. He Network user Abu Abdelrahman al- University, which is headed by had not even completed his third Qahtani issued an announcement on Shaykh Abdulmajid al-Zindani…I year [in jihad]. His journey with March 9 to am married and I have one jihad and martyrdom began when daughter and two sons.13 he was captured in al-Haramain the members of the Falluja forum along with his traveling companion [about] the joyful news regarding He insisted that “thoughts of my family Azzam al-Yemeni, due to their the martyrdom of your brother from and children” would not cause him any activities and communications the forum, Abu Dujanah al-Sanaani, hesitation in carrying out a “martyrdom with their mujahidin brothers. may almighty Allah have mercy operation”: He was in prison in Sana`a for a upon him and…allow him to join his fellow brethren. The brother was No, as my trust in Allah is very preparing himself for a martyrdom 4 This information was available at www.alfaloja.net/ big…I phoned my wife and I asked operation in Kabul.10 vb/showthread.php?t=107824 on March 13, 2010. 5 This information was available at www.alfaloja.net/ vb/showthread.php?t=115649 on May 9, 2010. vb/showthread.php?t=86082 on October 1, 2009. 8 This information was available at www.alfaloja.net/ 11 This information was available at www.alfaloja.net/ 6 This information was available at www.alfaloja.net/ vb/showthread.php?t=107512 on March 12, 2010. vb/showthread.php?t=115776 on May 9, 2010. vb/showthread.php?t=86086 on October 1, 2009. 9 This information was available at www.alfaloja.net/ 12 Ibid. 7 This information was available at www.alfaloja.net/ vb/showthread.php?t=115776 on May 9, 2010. 13 This information was available at www.alfaloja.net/ vb/showthread.php?t=86082 on October 1, 2009. 10 This information was available at www.alfaloja.net/ vb/showthread.php?t=116142 on May 11, 2010.

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her to keep praying to Allah to puppets—when I heard on the As for the military operations taking grant me martyrdom, moving radio that the well-known activist place on the battlefield where he was on and not returning, and she Abdulmajid al-Zindani has declared based, Abu Dujanah informed his online promised me she would do that, that any American interference in audience in March 2010 that “what is may Allah reward her goodness… Yemen is considered occupation, mentioned in the news is just the tip of No, there’s no part of me feeling and in a speech he calls for jihad the iceberg, and our enemies are reeling hesitation or weakness, but… [only] when an American force from their successive defeats, praise be to the contrary, I feel saddened invades Yemen!…Are you still to Allah. In Pakistan, the government in putting it off any further…We ignorant and unaware that America retreats each day under the painful promised the infidels, when our invaded the Arabian countries a blows of the mujahidin, and the same is brother Ghazwan al-Yemeni was long time ago and first of all in true in Afghanistan.”19 He warned of killed, that we would strike back Yemen?…You did not do a thing! twice as hard in response, and Excuse me my shaykh, you have armed drone aircraft…dispatched this operation, Allah-willing, will reached an older age so when will by the enemies of Allah…which fly be an unforgettable lesson to the you leave politics…Please, stand across the sky of Waziristan, and infidels.14 with yourself and redeem yourself an army of spies on the ground in before it’s too late, and we are ready the tribal areas as well, seeking Just like Ghazwan al-Yemeni, Abu to support you with people and to obtain intelligence data on the Dujanah al-Sanaani was also a prolific equipment; O’ shaykh, be devout to location of the mujahidin…and so, contributor to web-based jihadist social Allah and come to the frontline to the infidels were able to kill many networking forums, particularly the fight the enemies of Allah.16 of our fighters, especially those of Falluja Islamic Network. In January Arab origin and other non-Arab 2010, he posted a lengthy open diatribe He continued to demand that al-Zindani foreign fighters.20 addressed to his former mentor, Shaykh “besiege the American Embassy” `Abd al-Majid al-Zindani, in Yemen. At with a group of his followers, further Abu Abdelrahman al-Qahtani first, the message took a respectful, if suggesting that “a group of brothers Perhaps a testament to the deadly not congenial tone: [should] take control over the airbase in effectiveness of U.S. drone missile Sana`a,” “besiege the Republican Palace strikes, by this past November even I give you the good news that we in Yemen,” “carry an operation against those above Ghazwan al-Yemeni are here on the land of Khorasan the apostates in the Gold Mohur [Hotel] and Abu Dujanah al-Sanaani in the (Afghanistan)…Every day we in Aden,” and “storm the Ministry of hierarchy of al-Qa`ida’s Yemeni excel in power and number and Interior and kill the apostates there and expatriate contingent found their lives equipment while our enemy is the Interior Minister.” He closed with, in jeopardy. Abu Abdelrahman al- humiliated and degraded. I assure “This is what we wish for and want to Qahtani was not only a registered user you about the conditions of my see in the faith and wisdom valleys of on the Falluja Islamic Network, but comrades, the students from al- Yemen…Your brother, Abu Dujanah al- was also a 45-year-old Yemeni national Iman University; they are in Sanaani (Afghanistan).”17 who had spent “half of [his life] in the the frontline on the battlefields fields of jihad.”21 Al-Qahtani reportedly against the cross-worshippers. The Yemeni bombmaker was much more first arrived in Afghanistan during the Your students here and in Iraq are approving in his web commentary when late 1980s and “fought the communist leading the mujahidin with their it came to the merits of recent military Russians during the days of the Soviet Shari`a knowledge, which they operations carried out by al-Qa`ida in invasion—and after the order came for learnt from you…You were cautious the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). When mobilization after the American Crusade to raise young men who support this al-Qa`ida attempted to assassinate the attack…he went back to the land of religion and sacrifice for its sake, British ambassador to Yemen in April Khorasan to fight the Americans just as and here is the land of Afghanistan 2010, Abu Dujanah al-Sanaani posted he fought the Russians before.”22 which can testify to that.15 a public message of solidarity with his Yemeni brothers-in-arms: Despite being relatively older, al- Despite these rather friendly opening Qahtani was nonetheless sharply words, Abu Dujanah then suddenly O’ lions of jihad, even if the attuned to the value of internet-based veered into a sharp and personal attack British dog escaped from your communications, and relied on web chat on al-Zindani’s credibility as a Muslim swords this time, don’t slacken forums to disseminate news updates and leader: in your persistent efforts against recruitment calls carefully crafted to the infidels and apostates so that target an online audience. In February My Shaykh, I was preparing they will receive their share of explosive devices in order to your arrows…and that day will be vb/showthread.php?t=113444 on April 25, 2010. kill Allah’s enemies—the cross- coming soon…from Abu Dujanah 19 This information was available at www.alfaloja.net/ 18 worshippers and their apostate al-Sanaani in Afghanistan. vb/showthread.php?t=106985 on March 10, 2010. 20 Ibid. 14 Ibid. 16 Ibid. 21 This information was available at www.shamikh1. 15 This information was available at www.alfaloja.net/ 17 Ibid. net/vb/showthread.php?t=84143 on December 9, 2010. vb/showthread.php?t=100239 on January 18, 2010. 18 This information was available at www.alfaloja.net/ 22 Ibid.

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2010, he took pains to emphasize “those who seek more information It may be tempting in the wake of that a “major operation” had recently about the martyrdom of the brother” to Abdulmutallab’s attack and the most taken place in North Waziristan which “correspond with my beloved brother recent cargo jet bomb plot in late “included a number of beloved users al-Qairawani”—who is, in fact, the same 2010 to shift attention away from the from the jihadi forums—among them, online forum user who previously had activities of al-Qa`ida operatives in your brother ‘Abu Kandahar [al- helped spread details about the untimely Pakistan and Afghanistan to their Zarqawi],’23 brother ‘Ansar 13,’ and passing of Abu Dujanah al-Sanaani in ambitious ideological cousins in brother ‘Khattab al-Lubnani.’ All of an accidental explosion.27 Al-Qairawani Yemen, or other regional hotspots. Yet them send you their greetings and has indicated, in separate posts, that he just like AQAP, the Yemeni expatriate salutations, and [advise you] not to is currently fighting with the mujahidin network in South Asia is equally forget them in your prayers.”24 in Afghanistan and “used to live in dedicated to the principle of launching Europe.” He has further acknowledged pinpoint strikes on their enemies—on On the evening of November 16, 2010, that “my family and a number of our a global scale—and have mobilized in the midst of Eid celebrations, brothers were on trial in Brussels.” In extensive resources to actualize their more missiles fired from a U.S. drone one case, he vividly described to fellow mission, including networking with demolished a makeshift mujahidin online jihadists how he was “rushing to European recruits and spreading their encampment on the Afghan border, reach one of the call centers before they viral message on sympathetic internet killing several fighters—including Abu closed, because I was hoping to learn social networking forums. These men Abdelrahman al-Qahtani. According some news from one of the internet hardly fit the popular stereotype of to a statement posted on jihadist websites” about the progress of the trial bedraggled buffoons hiding in remote web forums, “Allah awarded them to taking place back in Belgium.28 Based mountain caves. Defanging this evolving spend Eid there in the highest levels on the rather specific personal details terrorist threat will require the U.S. of Paradise, with their beloved ones and hints volunteered over time by al- government to maintain an aggressive and brothers Ghazwan al-Yemeni, Abu Qairawani, his real identity appears tempo of action, including the use Dujanah al-Sanaani, and Abu Dujanah to be that of most-wanted Tunisian of controversial-but-demonstrably- al-Khorasani. Just as He gathered them national Moez Garsallaoui, an extremist effective tactics such as drone missile in life, He has gathered them in the who left Belgium for Pakistan’s tribal strikes. Although the Yemeni al-Qa`ida afterlife.”25 The author of the statement areas in late 2007.29 Garsallaoui is the contingent has undoubtedly suffered a confessed that in being tasked to “bring husband of the notorious “black widow” series of debilitating losses during the you the glad tidings about the martyrdom Malika el-Aroud, who reportedly past 12 months, if focus should start to of our brother Abu Abdelrahman al- posted a statement on the web on his stray, it is only a matter of time before Qahtani al-Yemeni…I write and the behalf in September 2008, urging a new group of fresh recruits will step words refuse to come out of heart; as it Muslims in Europe that “the solution, forward to help fill the void. is not easy to mourn your beloved, and my brothers and sisters, is not fatwas it is not easy to receive like this news but boooooooms.”30 Evan F. Kohlmann is a Senior Partner at without your body shaking and your Flashpoint Global Partners, a New York- emotions disturbed.” For anyone still Conclusion based security consulting firm. He is the unclear, he again confirmed, “Brother There are a number of important lessons author of Al-Qaida’s Jihad in Europe: Abu Abdelrahman was the one together to be learned from the cases of Ghazwan The Afghan-Bosnian Network. with us on the Falluja [network].”26 al-Yemeni, Abu Dujanah al-Sanaani, Abu Abdelrahman al-Qahtani, and their Networking with European Fighters? various other contemporaries within the In a rather disturbing twist, al-Qa`ida’s Yemeni mujahidin network perched on Yemeni expatriate faction based in the Afghan-Pakistani border. The degree North Waziristan has also apparently to which these hard line foreign fighters been working closely on the ground with have become closely intertwined with high-profile European exiles who have local allies from the Pakistani Taliban likewise traveled to the region in hopes and the Jalaluddin Haqqani network of joining al-Qa`ida and the Taliban. The could be quite problematic in the long- web statement announcing the death of term, especially if the United States Abu Abdelrahman al-Qahtani advised hopes to scale back its military forces deployed in the region. 23 On December 18, 2010, other users on jihadist web forums announced the death of “Abu Kandahar al- Zarqawi” (also known as Jordanian national Haithem bin Mohammed al-Khayat) during renewed clashes on 27 Ibid. the Afghan-Pakistani border. 28 This information was available at www.alfaloja.net/ 24 This information was available at www.alfaloja.net/ vb/showthread.php?t=124200 on June 22, 2010. vb/showthread.php?t=101792 on February 3, 2010. 29 Nic Robertson and Paul Cruickshank, “Belgian ‘al 25 This information was available at www.shamikh1. Qaeda Cell’ Linked to 2006 Airline Plot,” CNN, Febru- net/vb/showthread.php?t=84143 on December 9, 2010. ary 10, 2009. 26 Ibid. 30 Ibid.

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Understanding Al-Qa`ida’s because it can rely on other militant States. To remain relevant and to endure groups to perform this role. Many as a leading jihadist brand, al-Qa`ida Business Model policymakers argue that al-Qa`ida must diversify to survive and evolve is receiving increasingly diminished in order to thrive; it must diversify By Alex Gallo financing from the global diaspora of toward leveraging other groups to jihadist sympathizers.4 Yet, al-Qa`ida carry out its violent agenda against the during the past four years, two has adapted its “business model” United States and the West, and it must seemingly distinct and ostensibly accordingly (thereby diminishing its cost evolve toward focusing on its unique contradictory narratives have emerged structure) and no longer has to acquire value within the global jihad given its regarding the capability, positioning, as much money to fund operations. history, branding, and increasingly and operational strategy of al-Qa`ida. On Still others contend that al-Qa`ida is constrained environment due to U.S. the one hand, many government leaders contained in Pakistan due to the U.S. counterterrorism efforts. and counterterrorism experts have drone aircraft program.5 While this asserted that al-Qa`ida is weakening also may be true, these dynamics do In fact, al-Qa`ida’s senior leadership and too impotent to conduct large-scale not necessarily indicate that al-Qa`ida does not even evaluate itself through attacks—as evidenced by the dearth of cannot facilitate the violence of its the threat-based metrics that Western al-Qa`ida fighters in Afghanistan, its franchises, as well as other jihadist analysts tend to use to evaluate decreasing financial coffers, and its actors, to launch attacks against the them. Instead, al-Qa`ida’s senior perceived operational incompetence United States. In short, all of these leadership evaluates the exogenous in executing major attacks against the reflections of al-Qa`ida’s situational environment in which they operate, United States and the West. On the context are correct—yet to assert that al- and then dynamically looks inward to other hand, there are clear examples Qa`ida no longer possesses the capacity their organization to derive the most of al-Qa`ida’s ability to successfully to foment violence or lacks relevancy in optimistic outcome given the reality influence and facilitate smaller scale the global jihadist movement suggests of their constraining context. This attacks against the United States and a fundamental misunderstanding of multifaceted and emotionally intelligent around the world—as evidenced by the strategic advantages associated capability of al-Qa`ida’s senior Nidal Hasan’s attack at Fort Hood, the with the group’s unique positioning leadership to understand the world recent airliner packages plot, and Umar within that movement today. around them and optimize the outcome Farouk Abdulmuttallab’s attempted Therefore, while these metrics can within a given context exemplifies the attack on an airliner near Detroit on prove useful in understanding the very essence of al-Qa`ida’s aptitude Christmas Day 2009. capacity of al-Qa`ida to launch to survive. To be sure, analysis of al- attacks independently, they do little Qa`ida should begin via traditional, How does one reconcile these seemingly in providing insight into al-Qa`ida’s observable metrics; however, analysis paradoxical reflections of al-Qa`ida senior leadership’s positioning within cannot stop there. Analysts must situate and gain greater conceptual clarity the global jihad, current organizational al-Qa`ida within a broader competitive into how al-Qa`ida has evolved as an strategy, or consciousness of the context and observe how al-Qa`ida organization? exogenous environment in which they is positioning itself within the highly are operating today. competitive jihadist landscape in which Understanding Al-Qa`ida Today it operates to gain insight into how al- Analysts and policymakers alike tend Unraveling the Paradox Qa`ida’s senior leadership: 1) views to use “yesterday’s metrics when trying These seemingly inconsistent and itself internally, 2) operates within the to comprehend al-Qa`ida today,” which paradoxical understandings of al-Qa`ida milieu of global jihadist groups, and 3) can lead to faulty assumptions and a today are, in part, due to a tendency to positions its unique and differentiated flawed analysis that the al-Qa`ida-led evaluate al-Qa`ida one-dimensionally value to the overall global jihadist global jihadist movement is weaker, and apart from a broader context, and movement. One can begin to gain clarity ineffectual, or less viable than it likely an under-appreciation of the fact that in this manner by analyzing al-Qa`ida is.1 Analysts and policymakers often al-Qa`ida has fundamentally shifted through the lens of a business and how measure al-Qa`ida’s effectiveness its organizational approach as well it captures value for the overall global through the number of attacks, number as its parochial/elitist goals within jihadist enterprise. of fighters, and lethality of attacks.2 the global jihad. Rather than a one- For example, many analysts argue that dimensional, exclusively metric-based Al-Qa`ida’s Business Model” and its al-Qa`ida only has a couple hundred approach to understanding al-Qa`ida, Positioning within the Value Chain operatives in Afghanistan and Pakistan.3 the organization should be viewed as Framework While this may be true, al-Qa`ida operating within a highly competitive To gain greater conceptual clarity into does not have to fight in Afghanistan environment via-a-vis other jihadist al-Qa`ida today, one must assess al- groups—not to mention the United Qa`ida’s unique value, differentiated 1 Lieutenant Colonel Reid Sawyer used this phrasing in role, and strategic positioning within a conversation with the author within the context of his 4 Greg Bruno, “Al-Qaeda’s Financial Pressures,” Coun- the competitive landscape of the global perspective on the evolution of al-Qa`ida in March 2010. cil on Foreign Relations, February 1, 2010. jihadist enterprise as well as how it 2 Ibid. 5 Kristen Chick, “CIA Director Says Al Qaeda on the maintains its relevancy within the milieu 3 Sami Yousafzai and Ron Moreau, “Inside al-Qa’ida,” Run as Leader Killed in Drone Strike,” Christian Science of militant groups engaged in local, Newsweek, September 4, 2010. Monitor, March 18, 2010. regional, and irredentist jihad. This

15 january 2011 . Vol 4 . Issue 1 analysis could provide a unique window To that end, al-Qa`ida core appears infrastructure, and ideological support of insight into how al-Qa`ida views to have largely abandoned investing to materially shape the very nature itself and its unique value proposition its resources in the raw materials of the violence in Afghanistan as well to the global jihadist enterprise. (or recruiting fighters), production as the manner in which the jihadist (or training and indoctrination), and community understands the Afghan Ordinarily applied to business distribution (or global jihadist violence) jihad. While al-Qa`ida’s presence enterprises, Michael Porter portion of the value chain—for now. appears to be small, the impact of conceptualized the value chain its presence is reverberating across framework to describe the spectrum of To that end, al-Qa`ida’s approach to Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the West. activities in which value is captured the Afghan jihad is a microcosm of how Al-Qa`ida provides vital resiliency and and competitive advantage furthered. al-Qa`ida actualizes its “professional ideological ammunition to the Afghan Porter’s framework presents a services” role more broadly. Al-Qa`ida jihad through providing critical services continuum of value-creating activities operatives have a small footprint that these groups could not provide as that an enterprise can be engaged in Afghanistan because they do not robustly themselves, while concurrently in, including reception, production, have to act on their own there: they providing ideological cohesion to the and distribution of raw materials in can simply leverage and facilitate the global jihadist movement. In other addition to marketing and professional violence of their jihadist brethren. In al- words, al-Qa`ida is actualizing its services. Porter argues that competitive Qa`ida’s assessment, militant groups in operational ends via a consultancy advantage is ultimately realized through Afghanistan still would be fighting the approach. optimizing and coordinating these perceived U.S. occupation regardless of linked, value-creating activities.6 whether al-Qa`ida existed or not. To that For example, Fazul Abdullah Mohammad end, al-Qa`ida is largely abdicating the (also known as Fadil Harun), believed to In considering Porter’s framework, one responsibility of violently resisting the be a leading al-Qa`ida operative in East can observe that al-Qa`ida continues Africa, noted in his book War Against Islam to engage in all aspects of value- “Al-Qa`ida provides vital that although he did not want to become creating activity within the milieu of a formal member of al-Shabab, he was the violent jihadist enterprise—from resiliency and ideological nevertheless prepared to work with recruiting “raw material” recruits for ammunition to the Afghan them.8 Fazul essentially saw himself as violence to marketing its brand and a consultant to al-Shabab on behalf of expertise to other jihadist actors. Due jihad through providing al-Qa`ida; someone who “helps every to constraints on al-Qa`ida’s freedom of critical services that these Muslim who desires jihad; we train him movement imposed by the United States and offer him advice about the truth of and Pakistan, al-Qa`ida’s leadership groups could not provide jihad.”9 Fazul took it upon himself to appears to have made a calculated as robustly themselves, consult with al-Shabab in establishing, decision to privilege its organizational among other things, advanced training branding and expertise and, thereby, while concurrently courses for the elite forces, specialized move along the value chain toward providing ideological courses to train snipers, courses in almost exclusively engaging in information technology and spying, professional consulting or advisory cohesion to the global as well as establishing a budget.10 entrepreneurial activity. As a result, jihadist movement.” Therefore, al-Qa`ida core leverages other this positioning relieves al-Qa`ida militant actors, including its affiliates, from bearing the cost—opportunity to conduct these efforts.11 Al-Qa`ida or otherwise—of violent activity in realizes that the resource intensive (or Afghanistan, Pakistan, or around the United States on the battlefield to other recruiting, training, equipping, and world. Al-Qa`ida core has effectively jihadist actors in Afghanistan, thereby deploying) portion of the value chain de-emphasized the resource-intensive promoting its expertise as a leading does not embody its value proposition to portion of value-creating activity brand in the global jihad and solidifying the global jihadist effort—particularly (training, equipping, and deploying its relevancy to, and underpinning the because it no longer possesses the fighters around the world) and is purpose of, violent defensive jihad. Al- freedom of maneuver to conduct these leveraging other violent movements to Qa`ida is leveraging this critical dynamic efforts due to the U.S. drone campaign carry out these operational activities. Al- to further part of its grand strategy and in Pakistan and global counterfinancing Qa`ida provides value as a consultancy compel the United States to change its efforts. In short, al-Qa`ida understands in two critical ways: by serving as a foreign policy and remove itself from that given the constrained context in financial adviser and facilitator to the traditionally Muslim lands by providing global jihadist financial coffers, and train-the-trainer expertise, financial 8 Harun, p. 69. by providing the ideological coherence networks, strategic communication 9 Ibid., p. 138. 7 within the global jihadist movement. 10 Ibid., pp. 69-70. 2, 2009, p. 69, translated by Dr. Nelly Lahoud; “Trea- 11 Examples include al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula 6 Michael E. Porter, Competitive Advantage: Creating and sury Targets Taliban and Haqqani Network Leadership: (AQAP), al-Shabab, Lashkar-i-Tayyiba (LeT), Tehrik- Sustaining Superior Performance (New York: The Free Treasury Designates Three Financiers Operating in Af- i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Haqqani network, the Is- Press, 1985). ghanistan and Pakistan,” U.S. Treasury Department, lamic Jihad Union, and the Islamic Movement of Uzbeki- 7 Fadil Harun, War Against Islam (al-Harb ‘ala al-Islam) July 22, 2010. stan (IMU) to name a few.

16 january 2011 . Vol 4 . Issue 1 which it exists today, it is able to provide The Efficacy of the Al-Qa`ida Consultancy successful in inspiring, promoting, and more robust and enduring value (and Model re-orienting the violence of its jihadist solidify its long-term relevancy) to the Advantages brethren, actually remaining relevant global jihadist movement through its By positioning itself as a professional continues to be a significant challenge unique infrastructure and expertise in services or consultancy entity, al- and vulnerability for the group. In the marketing (media and fundraising) Qa`ida is able to be an effective player recognition of this challenging dynamic and services (provision of strategic within the global jihad—even within of their consultancy business model, al- vision, outreach, advising, and consulting the constrained security paradigm in Qa`ida’s speeches have taken on a more services) portion of the value chain Pakistan. Moreover, al-Qa`ida’s return populist tone by lamenting the lack of aid activities. on investment (given its limited freedom for the floods in Pakistan and blaming the to invest in jihad) is higher than it would United States and other industrialized Al-Qa`ida’s professional services be anywhere else along the value chain states for global warming.14 While this business model extends beyond the because resource “costs” (financial and rhetorical approach has led to more Afghanistan context. Globally, al-Qa`ida human capital) are generally lower due diversity within the current ranks of core has been able to amplify, foment, to the nature of the consulting business jihadists, al-Qa`ida’s brand runs the and re-orient the violence of local and model. risk of becoming adulterated as it tries nationalist jihadist groups through to incorporate and cohere together the consultation with and augmentation Al-Qa`ida must continually ensure increasingly diverse and fragmented of other militant jihadist groups. Al- that it remains relevant to these nature of the global jihad. In short, by Qa`ida uniquely understands how to local and regional jihadist groups; in trying to stand for everything and by play this role effectively, even though exchange, these groups effectively appealing to populist jihadist sentiment, “are” the al-Qa`ida movement. Thus, the al-Qa`ida-led jihadist movement al-Qa`ida’s consultancy approach may come to stand for nothing and “By trying to stand allows it to credibly claim that it is implode due to conflicting interests and for everything and by actively engaged in waging violence risky ideological rhetoric. against the “far enemy” across the appealing to populist globe, while remaining unburdened Conclusion jihadist sentiment, the by the actual costs associated with The fundamental consequence of waging the violence. Moreover, this al-Qa`ida’s evolution toward this al-Qa`ida-led jihadist approach ensures that a local face consultancy business model is that the movement may come to remains fully imprinted on violence jihadist profile and the type of groups in each theater, thereby increasing the who attempt to attack the United States stand for nothing and resiliency and legitimacy of various will increasingly become fragmented, implode due to conflicting insurgencies; this is a crucial lesson diffuse, and unpredictable. In fact, learned from al-Qa`ida’s experiences Faisal Shahzad’s attempted attack in interests and risky in Iraq and Afghanistan. At present, Times Square on behalf of the Pakistani ideological rhetoric.” al-Qa`ida core’s reliance on leveraging Taliban arguably could be viewed as the networked and affiliated organizations ultimate manifestation of al-Qa`ida’s presents a strength, but also a potential success as a consultancy because weakness to ensuring the longevity of the Pakistani Taliban’s violence was these groups may not wholly share the movement. opportunistically and successfully the same agenda due to their shared reoriented toward the U.S. homeland experiences and ideological vision from Disadvantages for the first time. Hakimullah Mehsud the anti-Soviet jihad in the 1980s. These Today, al-Qa`ida cannot lead within validated this point in a statement local jihadist groups’ membership often the global jihadist movement without released after the Times Square attack includes veterans of the anti-Soviet providing unique capacities to these by situating the group’s fight against jihad who serve as a bridge between groups (media and financial networks), the Pakistani state within al-Qa`ida’s al-Qa`ida core and the local jihadist remaining relevant to their grievances, grievance narrative.15 As a result, groups. In other cases, these groups and connected to the realities of the Times Square attack shows the require augmentation for specialized their local or regional environment. increasingly global orientation of a local skills and/or resources that they Ultimately, local groups have the jihadist group, which can be attributed cannot provide for themselves. Yet, in freedom to operate in the manner that to al-Qa`ida’s positioning within the all cases, al-Qa`ida core has been able they see fit. This can be detrimental to services portion of the value chain, to demonstrate the ability to provide the integrity of al-Qa`ida’s brand if, allowing it to possess greater ideational value to these groups and, in doing so, like Abu Mus`ab al-Zarqawi in Iraq, influence over jihadist actors such as nest the local, regional, or irredentist their mismanagement damages al- the Pakistani Taliban. In aggregate, grievance of these groups within their Qa`ida’s global image.13 As a result, 12 global jihadist narrative. while al-Qa`ida core appears to be 14 Wissam Keyrouz, “Bin Laden Concerned by Climate Change, Pakistan Floods – New Audiotape,” Agence 12 Scott Helfstein, “The Third Way: A Paradigm for 13 “Letter from Ayman al-Zawahiri to Abu Musab al- France-Presse, October 2, 2010. Influence in the Marketplace of Ideas,” CTC Sentinel 3:6 Zarqawi,” U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelli- 15 Don Rassler, “Al-Qa`ida’s Pakistan Strategy,” CTC (2010). gence, July 9, 2005. Sentinel 2:6 (2009).

17 january 2011 . Vol 4 . Issue 1 the reorientation of local, regional, Disengagement or The third option is usually not completely and irredentist jihadist actors could Deradicalization: A Look at pain free. Some jail time is normal, but create a critical mass that overwhelms it is not as prolonged or austere as that U.S. counterterrorism systems and, Prison Programs for Jailed for detained terrorists who do not join in al-Qa`ida’s view, a policy change Terrorists the program. The classic example of that removes the United States from this approach is the highly successful supporting regimes that jihadists have By Andrew Silke dissociati scheme introduced in Italy.3 declared to be apostate in the Arab As the 1980s progressed, it was clear world. at no time in the past 50 years has that the terrorist campaigns in Italy there been as much interest in the idea were in terminal decline. In 1987, a new At a micro-level, it is this shift by al- of deradicalizing terrorists as today.1 dissociation law was introduced to help Qa`ida toward the services end of the Programs to deradicalize those linked bring closure to the conflict. Prisoners value chain that, at a macro-level, has to al-Qa`ida have been established in were not immediately released under materially altered the very nature of multiple countries, with the hope that the scheme, but were instead allowed the violence toward the United States reforming these extremists is possible.2 to work outside prison while serving as well as the strategic “feel” of the Nevertheless, doubts remain over the their sentence. The prisoners were thus global jihadist movement. These micro effectiveness of these programs. This allowed to put their pasts behind them and associated macro level shifts are, in uncertainty is only heightened by the and move to a less restricted prison part, a reflection of the success of the chronic lack of proper evaluations on regime that also allowed them to begin to U.S. counterterrorism campaign, but it almost any of the programs involved. lay the foundations for life after release. also embodies a paradigmatic evolution Adding to the difficulty is confusion over The dissociated prisoners were expected in jihadist violence that will offer how to define the goals of the programs. to express genuine remorse for their unique challenges for law enforcement Should they seek to merely disengage actions, and to sever their links with the to precisely identify and target future subjects from violence and other illegal terrorist organization. The prisoners threats to the homeland. activity? Or should they actually also had to make a full and frank “deradicalize” a subject, which would confession of the crimes in which they In the final analysis, this symbiotic mean a complete shift in the prisoner’s had been involved—including crimes co-evolution of al-Qa`ida, and the mindset, sympathies and attitudes? for which they had not been convicted. broader jihadist milieu in which it The scheme proved so successful that exists, exemplifies the dynamism and This article assesses the differences many terrorists who were still at large complexity of the challenge that U.S. between disengagement and surrendered themselves to authorities law enforcement and counterterrorism deradicalization. It suggests that so that they could enter the program professionals currently face. To combat deradicalizing prisoners—which and close the chapter on their terrorist against this continued disaggregated requires changing their mindset and lives.4 threat, counterterrorism and law ideological beliefs—is exceedingly enforcement practitioners in the United difficult, and it finds that disengagement In 1982, Spain introduced a similar States must rigorously comprehend is likely a more realistic outcome. policy termed “social reinsertion.”5 The both al-Qa`ida’s grievance narrative policy was first introduced when the as well as the grievance narratives and Past Precedents ETA Político-Militar (ETA-PM) split associated trajectories of a myriad of In protracted terrorist conflicts, many into two factions, with one advocating local, regional, and irredentist jihadist states eventually come to recognize the non-violence while the other promoted groups who are situating their violence value of giving active terrorists a third a continuation of the terrorist campaign. within al-Qa`ida’s global jihadist option. The first option is continued Prisoners who identified with the non- vision. involvement in the terrorist group and violent faction could apply through the in terrorist activity. Option two is death courts for early release. The prisoners Alex Gallo is an associate at the Combating or incarceration at the hands of the were essentially offered an amnesty Terrorism Center at West Point. state. The third option is effectively a for their crimes, although this was not “get out” clause that allows individuals officially acknowledged.6 to put their involvement in a conflict behind them without having to face the 3 Michael von Tangen Page, Prisons, Peace and Terrorism: severe penalties normally meted out by Penal Policy in the Reduction of Political Violence in North- the state. ern Ireland, Italy and the Spanish Basque Country, 1968-97 (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1998). 4 Alison Jamieson, “Entry, Discipline and Exit in the 1 See, for example, Tore Bjorgo and John Horgan, Leav- Italian Red Brigades,” Terrorism and Political Violence 2:1 ing Terrorism Behind (London: Routledge, 2008); Omar (1990). Ashour, The De-Radicalization of Jihadists: Transforming 5 Marianne Heiberg, “ETA: Euskadi ’ta Askatasuna,” in Armed Islamist Movements (London: Routledge, 2010). Marianne Heiberg, Brendan O’Leary, and John Tirman 2 This is the case regardless of whether these individuals eds., Terror, Insurgencies and States: Breaking the Cycle of are members of what has come to be called al-Qa`ida core Protracted Conflict (Philadelphia: University of Pennsyl- or whether they belong to groups that are inspired by al- vania Press, 2007). Qa`ida’s example and ideology. 6 Von Tangen Page.

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“Social reinsertion” quickly became and flawed. This approach underlies announce re-offending rates that also one of the key elements of Spanish the programs run in Saudi Arabia, appear remarkably low. For example, counterterrorism policy. Prisoners Indonesia, Yemen and Singapore. Once the much-discussed Saudi program has who had not been convicted of crimes the individual is convinced of the flaws an alleged re-offending rate of less than involving serious injury or death were in the ideology, they are then supposedly three percent, while the Indonesian offered early release in exchange for “deradicalized.” Yet how realistic is program claims a re-offending rate of three conditions: 1) the renunciation the assumption that individuals can less than one percent.10 of violence and the breaking of links actually be deradicalized? with the terrorist organization; 2) a The recent UK experience, however, declaration that the prisoner would Is Deradicalization Even Possible? suggests that in the vast majority respect the law and acknowledge Claims of success vary, but the general of cases, disengagement from that they could be reimprisoned if assessment is that current jihadist terrorism will occur in the absence they did not; 3) recognition of the deradicalization programs generally of any participation in a prison suffering that they had caused. These only “work” with “soft core” militant deradicalization program. Indeed, three conditions were met through jihadists, while usually having little recent research has highlighted that the signing of a legal document that impact with hardcore members. was presented to a judicial tribunal, Crucially, no thorough evaluations of “While a desire to try to allowing their reintegration into any of these programs are available yet normal society. in the open literature and claims about rehabilitate should be their effectiveness need to be treated applauded, the manner Both programs operated in different with caution. political contexts. Dissociati occurred in which deradicalization when the wider terrorist campaign in There are two main reasons for programs are developing Italy was in serious decline, whereas this. First, re-offending by terrorist “social reinsertion” was introduced in prisoners is traditionally generally in the West raises serious a context where the terrorist violence low to begin with. Based on available concerns.” in Spain ultimately endured although reviews, on average probably less than the policy still facilitated the exit of five percent of all terrorist prisoners hundreds of prisoners from terrorist will be re-convicted for involvement groups. in terrorist-related activity.7 For some many prisoners (if indeed not most) groups, the figure is even lower. In remain highly sympathetic to the Disengagement vs. Deradicalization England and Wales from September cause but either no longer believe that Dissociati and “social reinsertion” were 11, 2001 to March 31, 2008, there were violence is the most effective way to probably the two most successful 196 convictions for terrorist-related achieve the movement’s aims or else disengagement programs introduced offenses, most of which were connected are no longer willing to break the law in prison settings during the past to al-Qa`ida-related extremism.8 Many themselves on behalf of the movement.11 50 years. Yet despite their success, of these individuals received relatively As one prisoner interviewed in a UK both are largely overlooked when short prison sentences, and by early jail explained, “the cause is a moral designing current “deradicalization” 2009 nearly 100 had already been cause,” while adding that he no longer programs aimed at jihadist prisoners. released back into society; to date, none believed that violence was the best way Crucially, neither program was have been re-arrested or convicted for to achieve it.12 a deradicalization scheme in the subsequent involvement in terrorist contemporary understanding of the activity (or apparently any other illegal A vital issue to consider is that many term. The programs were not designed activity).9 There is no evidence that any members of terrorist groups will to change a prisoner’s attitudes or have attempted to engage in terrorist eventually leave that group even if they opinions. On the contrary, the terrorists activity overseas. never experience a deradicalization who took part had already made the program. Psychologically speaking, decision to change before they applied If this is what can occur in absence of this is not surprising. In the U.S. for the program. The program did not a deradicalization program, it should military, for comparison, an annual convince them that continued life as not be surprising that when countries turnover of at least 15% is normal.13 a terrorist was wrong or unjustified; do run such programs they are able to Some 80,000 people who are in the rather, it allowed them access to a third U.S. military today will leave within the way once they had already reached that 7 See, for example, John Horgan and Kurt Braddock, decision for themselves. “Rehabilitating the Terrorists? Challenges in Assessing the Effectiveness of De-Radicalization Programmes,” 10 Horgan and Braddock. In stark contrast, modern Terrorism and Political Violence 22:2 (2010). 11 Neil Ferguson, “Disengaging from Terrorism,” in An- deradicalization programs take as the 8 Andrew Silke, “Terrorists and Extremists in Prison: drew Silke ed., The Psychology of Counter-Terrorism (Lon- starting point that the individual still Psychological Issues in Management and Reform,” in don: Routledge, 2010). believes in the terrorist ideology and Andrew Silke ed., The Psychology of Counter-Terrorism 12 Personal interview, anonymous prisoner, United remains committed to the “cause.” The (London: Routledge, 2010). Kingdom, 2006. modern programs aim to convince the 9 Personal interviews, prison staff in the United King- 13 “The All-Volunteer Military: Issues and Perfor- individual that these beliefs are mistaken dom, 2009-2010. mance,” U.S. Congressional Budget Office, July 2007.

19 january 2011 . Vol 4 . Issue 1 next 12 months.14 In the vast majority out means that these individuals are shows that ideology generally only of cases, the decision to leave is a no longer a direct threat to society, plays a secondary role in explaining voluntary one taken by the individual but does not necessarily mean that engagement, and that other factors tend in a context where the organization they could or should be described as to be more important.17 itself would prefer them to stay. The deradicalized. average length of service for new The language itself is also problematic. recruits is just seven years. Few stay Some skepticism is also needed In the 1970s and 1980s, there were as long as 15 years. with regard to the right vectors no claims of Irish Republican Army for deradicalization. In most of the (IRA) members being “radicalized,” Individuals join volunteer militaries deradicalization programs focused and there was no reference to a for a range of motives—not all of which on militant jihadists, a key role is “radicalization process.” Such a relate to ideology—and a similar set of assigned to conversations, dialogue and terminology and framework has motives explains why individuals join interaction with moderate Muslims. Yet primarily been a post 9/11 phenomenon terrorist groups. The processes that how realistic is it to expect individuals and it has been developed in regard to push and pull individuals into joining set in their ways to switch their support al-Qa`ida and its disparate affiliates. both types of organizations can be based on conversations with moderate This is not to say that there is no similar.15 In making the decision to imams? Indeed, the more “successful” value in the framework, but rather a leave a conventional military such as programs do not just involve dialogue. warning that analysts must be careful the U.S. Army, departing members They also involve several benefits in considering how useful and accurate do not go through a deradicalization for prisoners who graduate from the an understanding the framework gives. program. On the contrary, the U.S. deradicalization program. Graduates military runs several programs designed are moved to more lenient prison Since the IRA was not discussed in to persuade members to stay for longer, regimes, are released early, and in terms of “radicalization,” equally there but every year some 80,000 still make some cases receive special support was no discussion of dealing with its the call to end their commitment. with employment, housing and family. members in terms of “deradicalization.” Realistically, these benefits, rather than Former IRA Chief of Staff Martin Significantly, while these departed the much hyped ideological dialogue, McGuinness, for example, has never are no longer willing to continue to likely play the key role in successful been through a deradicalization be part of the military (i.e. they have disengagement. If it means getting out program, yet nonetheless he is now disengaged), that does not necessarily of prison early, many individuals are clearly committed to conventional mean that their attitude toward the prepared to tell the authorities that they politics and occupies one of the most military is generally a negative one. On have been convinced of their previous senior posts in Northern Ireland’s the contrary, most still have a positive errors. current regional government. Indeed, regard for their prior organization and no one during the troubles suggested have tremendous respect and goodwill Disengagement a More Realistic Outcome that a deradicalization program should for the comrades they have left behind. This reveals the heart of the issue. or could be established in prisons for In short, the fact that they left does not Which course of action is better? IRA prisoners. No one argued that mean that they are now opponents of Disengagement or deradicalization? Is the state should arrange for moderate the military. They are disengaged, not the priority to change people’s behavior Irish Republicans to enter prison deradicalized. or is it to change their psychology? In the and engage in dialogue with IRA end, acts of violence require behavior, members to convince them that their Similar levels of turnover seem to and changing this behavior should be interpretation of Irish Republicanism exist with many terrorist groups. It is the number one focus. was too extreme and too harsh and that a myth that “once a terrorist, always they needed to adopt a more moderate a terrorist,” or that terrorist groups While a desire to try to rehabilitate version instead. always ruthlessly punish members should be applauded, the manner in who try to leave. Most terrorist groups which deradicalization programs are explicitly recognize that membership developing in the West raises serious will be transitory and have processes to concerns. Unlike those elsewhere allow members to “retire.”16 A natural in the world, the Western versions drop-out rate of at least 15% per year are often not supported by clear is probably conservative given the incentives such as early release from high levels of stress associated with prison or increased financial support 17 See, for example, John Horgan, “From Profiles to being an active terrorist. Dropping- upon release. This is certainly the Pathways and Roots to Routes: Perspectives from Psy- case with the United Kingdom’s chology on Radicalization into Terrorism,” The ANNALS 14 Ibid. program. Instead, heavy emphasis of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 15 Andrew Silke, “Becoming a Terrorist,” in Andrew is placed on the dialogue element 618:1 (2008); Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, Silke ed., Terrorists, Victims and Society: Psychological alone. Such a framework depends “Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways To- Perspectives on Terrorism and its Consequences (Chichester: almost entirely on ideology being the ward Terrorism,” Terrorism and Political Violence 20:3 Wiley, 2003). key factor in explaining why people (2008); Jeff Victoroff and Arie W. Kruglanski eds., Psy- 16 John Horgan, Walking Away from Terrorism (London: engage in terrorism, yet a wealth of chology of Terrorism: Classic and Contemporary Insights Routledge, 2009). research on the psychology of terrorists (New York: Psychology Press, 2009).

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Almost certainly the principle reason no Recent Highlights in The group said the attack was an “act of attempt like this was made was because revenge.” – BBC, November 4 no one believed that such an approach Terrorist Activity would actually work. Yet across the November 5, 2010 (GLOBAL): Al-Qa`ida world today, this is a major principle November 1, 2010 (UNITED STATES): in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) claimed on which most jihadist deradicalization U.S. authorities arrested Mohamud Abdi responsibility for a major international programs are built. Yusuf in St. Louis on charges of providing terrorist plot that was disrupted in late material support to the al-Shabab terrorist October. The plot involved explosive A fundamental question facing these group in Somalia. – Wall Street Journal, packages mailed to the United States from programs is what is it that they are November 3 Yemen. – al-Jazira, November 6 trying to change? Most programs do not simply want to change the prisoner’s November 1, 2010 (UNITED STATES): November 5, 2010 (UNITED STATES): A behavior, but a prisoner’s beliefs and U.S. authorities charged three San Diego U.S. appeals court overturned a judge’s mind-set. They want the prisoner to men with aiding the al-Shabab terrorist order for the release of Guantanamo Bay believe that a cause that was previously group in Somalia. – BBC, November 3 detainee Mohamedou Ould Salahi, saying seen as good, worthy and justified is in that the lower court must reconsider the fact bad, misguided and unwarranted. November 2, 2010 (UNITED STATES): case due to new legal opinions in other In the end, prioritizing deradicalization U.S. authorities arrested Abdi Mahdi Guantanamo lawsuits. – AP, November 5 over disengagement is a dangerous Hussein in Minneapolis and charged him gamble. It provides a distorted view of with conspiracy to structure financial November 5, 2010 (PAKISTAN): A the real nature of both the problem and transactions. His case is connected to suicide bomber ripped through a mosque its solutions. Mohamud Abdi Yusuf in St. Louis, in Dara Adam Khel in northwest Pakistan, who was arrested the previous day for killing at least 66 people. According to Dr. Andrew Silke holds a Chair in providing material support to the al- press reports, the Sunni mosque that was Criminology at the University of East Shabab terrorist group in Somalia. – Wall targeted is frequented by anti-Taliban London where he is also the Program Street Journal, November 3 tribal elders. – Sky News, November 5 Director for Terrorism Studies. He was appointed in 2009 as a Specialist Advisor November 2, 2010 (IRAQ): A series of November 7, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): to the House of Commons Communities explosions across Baghdad killed at The Saudi government announced its and Local Government Committee for its least 75 people. The bombings occurred withdrawal from peace talks between inquiry into the Government’s program predominately in Shi`a areas. – Voice of Afghan President Hamid Karzai and the for preventing violent extremism. He sits America, November 2; Guardian, November 2 Afghan Taliban. – CBS News, November 9 on the British Psychological Society’s working group on the Psychological November 3, 2010 (IRAQ): Al-Qa`ida November 7, 2010 (PAKISTAN): A Risk Assessment of those Convicted in Iraq threatened that Christians in the U.S. aerial drone killed nine suspected or Detained under Terrorist Related country were legitimate targets who face militants in Ghulam Khan in North Offences. the “doors of destruction.” The statement Waziristan Agency of the Federally came three days after an October 31 Administered Tribal Areas. – Guardian, attack where militants wearing suicide November 7 vests attacked the Church of Our Lady of Salvation in Baghdad. During that attack, November 7, 2010 (PAKISTAN): A U.S. at least 52 people were killed. – Telegraph, aerial drone killed five suspected militants November 1; al-Jazira, November 2; Guardian, in Datta Khel in North Waziristan Agency November 3 of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. – Guardian, November 7 November 4, 2010 (GLOBAL): Al-Qa`ida second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri November 8, 2010 (IRAQ): A suicide released a new audio message, calling bomber in an explosives-laden vehicle for revenge after a U.S. court sentenced targeted Iranian pilgrims in Karbala, killing Aafia Siddiqui, a Pakistani citizen, to at least 10 people. – AFP, November 7 86 years in prison on multiple charges, including attempted murder and armed November 9, 2010 (GLOBAL): A new assault on U.S. officers. In 2008, video featuring Yemeni-American cleric Siddiqui, who was detained at the time, Anwar al-`Awlaqi appeared on Islamist fired a rifle at FBI agents and U.S. military web forums. In the statement, al-`Awlaqi personnel in central Afghanistan. – CNN, urged Muslims to murder Americans. November 4 He said that no religious permission is required to kill Americans because they November 4, 2010 (TURKEY): The are “from the party of devils.” – ABC Kurdistan Freedom Falcons claimed News, November 8; Australian Broadcasting responsibility for the October 31 suicide Corporation, November 9 bombing in Istanbul’s Taksim Square.

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November 11, 2010 (PAKISTAN): A U.S. at Guantanamo Bay, guilty of conspiracy parked near the Christmas tree gathering. drone strike killed at least six militants in to destroy U.S. government buildings and Both the detonator and the explosives North Waziristan Agency of the Federally property and for helping an al-Qa`ida were provided by FBI agents working Administered Tribal Areas. – AFP, cell. In a major setback to prosecutors, undercover in the investigation, but who November 11 however, the federal jury acquitted him of the suspect believed were connected to the more serious charges of murder and an international terrorist organization, November 11, 2010 (PAKISTAN): At least conspiracy. He faces 20 years to life in according to an affidavit filed in support six gunmen opened fire on the Criminal prison when he is sentenced in January. of the criminal complaint.” – Wall Street Investigation Department headquarters – Guardian, November 18 Journal, November 29 in Karachi. After opening fire, another militant drove a truck packed with TNT November 21, 2010 (GLOBAL): Al-Qa`ida November 26, 2010 (YEMEN): A suicide explosives into the boundary wall of the in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) released bomber in an explosives-laden vehicle facility, destroying the headquarters. a new issue of its Inspire magazine, saying targeted a funeral procession of Shi`a At least 16 people were killed. The that its recent attempt to bomb U.S.-bound Huthis in Marib Province, killing at least Pakistani Taliban claimed responsibility cargo planes only cost $4,200 to execute. one person. – Bloomberg, November 26 for the attack, saying it was “a reaction The magazine said that AQAP is pursuing to the drone strikes and such attacks will a “strategy of a thousand cuts” that will November 26, 2010 (SAUDI ARABIA): continue until drone strikes are stopped.” “bleed the enemy to death” by mounting Saudi authorities announced the arrests – Los Angeles Times, November 12; Dawn, more frequent, low-cost attacks. – Voice of 149 alleged al-Qa`ida-linked militants November 20 of America, November 22; Washington Post, during the past eight months. The November 22 militants are accused of plotting attacks November 14, 2010 (IRAQ): A suicide against the government and security bomber detonated an explosives-laden November 21, 2010 (PAKISTAN): A U.S. forces, as well as journalists. – Wall Street vehicle in Mosul, Ninawa Province, aerial drone strike killed six suspected Journal, November 27 killing two Iraqi army soldiers. – UPI, militants in North Waziristan Agency of November 14 the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. November 27, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): – AFP, November 21 Two suicide bombers wearing police November 14, 2010 (LEBANON): uniforms detonated their explosives at a Authorities arrested radical Lebanese November 24, 2010 (YEMEN): A suicide provincial police headquarters in Paktika cleric Omar Bakri after confronting bomber in an explosives-laden vehicle Province, killing at least 10 police officers. him in Tripoli. On November 11, Bakri targeted a group of Shi`a Huthis on their The Taliban claimed responsibility for the was convicted on charges of inciting a way to a religious ceremony, killing at attack. – Voice of America, November 27 months-long confrontation between the least 20 people. According to the New government and the militant group Fatah York Times, “Suspicions fell on Al Qaeda in November 30, 2010 (PAKISTAN): A al-Islam that took place in 2007. He faces the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), the local suicide bomber targeted a police van in life imprisonment. – Los Angeles Times, affiliate of Osama bin Laden’s terrorist Bannu District of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa November 15 network. But if Al Qaeda was responsible, Province, killing six people including a it would be the first act of violence policeman. – Daily Times, December 1 November 15, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): between two groups that have long Mullah Omar, the leader of the Afghan fought the government separately.” The December 1, 2010 (SPAIN): Spanish Taliban, purportedly released a new bombing occurred in al-Jawf Province. authorities announced the arrests of statement saying that peace negotiations In a statement released on November 25, seven men in Barcelona who are accused in Afghanistan were not possible until all AQAP purportedly took credit for the of stealing passports for terrorist groups foreign troops left the country. – Reuters, attack. – Investor’s Business Daily, November 24; such as al-Qa`ida, Lashkar-i-Tayyiba, November 15 New York Times, November 24; AFP, November and the Tamil Tigers. The suspects consist 26; AFP, November 28 of six Pakistanis and one Nigerian. Two November 15, 2010 (IRAQ): Twin car more Pakistanis and a Thai national bombs exploded in Mosul, Ninawa November 26, 2010 (UNITED STATES): were detained in Thailand. According to Province, killing a prison official and one U.S. authorities arrested Mohamed Osman one press report, “The [passport] thefts civilian. – Voice of America, November 15 Mohamud, a naturalized immigrant [in Spain] were allegedly requested by from Somalia, on charges of attempting the Thailand-based head of the group, November 16, 2010 (PAKISTAN): A to use a weapon of mass destruction by who asked for passports with specific suspected U.S. aerial drone targeted a detonating a car bomb at a Christmas nationalities and age brackets.” – Wall Street house and a vehicle in the village of Bangi tree lighting event in Portland’s Pioneer Journal, December 1; Australian Broadcasting Dar in North Waziristan Agency of the Courthouse Square. As stated by the Corporation, December 2 Federally Administered Tribal Areas. Wall Street Journal, “Authorities say the Approximately 20 suspected militants youth, who recently attended Oregon December 6, 2010 (PAKISTAN): Two were killed. – MSNBC.com, November 16 State University in Corvallis, twice suicide bombers attacked a gathering of attempted to use a cellphone to detonate anti-Taliban tribal elders, killing at least November 17, 2010 (UNITED STATES): what he believed were explosives stored 41 people. The incident occurred in the A U.S. court found Ahmed Khalfan in 55-gallon drums packed into a white town of Ghalanai in Mohmand Agency Ghailani, a 36-year-old Tanzanian held van, which he drove to the scene and of the Federally Administered Tribal

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Areas. According to the Los Angeles Times, December 10, 2010 (PAKISTAN): A December 19, 2010 (SOMALIA): “Witnesses said more than 300 people suicide bomber detonated an explosives- Somalia’s two main insurgent groups—al- were inside the building when the two laden vehicle outside a hospital in Shabab and Hisbul Islamiyya—reportedly attackers appeared. One of the bombers Hangu District of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa plan to merge to defeat the UN-backed was dressed in a police uniform and was Province, killing at least eight people. The government in Mogadishu. According able to walk into the offices where the attack appeared to target Shi`a. – AFP, to UPI, “The two Islamist groups have crowd had gathered. A second bomber was December 10 fought intermittently over the last couple stopped at a perimeter security gate. Both of years because of ideological differences. men detonated their explosives seconds December 11, 2010 (SWEDEN): Taimour Hizbul-e Islam is more nationalistic than apart.” – Los Angeles Times, December 6 Abdulwahab al-Abdaly, an Iraqi-born the more radical al-Shabaab, which favors Swede, detonated a car bomb in Stockholm a more international agenda as espoused December 7, 2010 (UNITED STATES): before taking his own life with a second by Osama bin Laden.” – AP, December 19; The U.S. Treasury Department designated bomb strapped to his body. Al-Abdaly was UPI, December 21 Fahd al-Quso as a global terrorist. Al- the only fatality. The incident marked the Quso was jailed in Yemen from 2002- first suicide attack in Sweden’s history. – December 20, 2010 (UNITED KINGDOM): 2007 for his role in the USS Cole attack. Guardian, December 13; Telegraph, December 12 British police arrested 12 men who were After his release, he joined al-Qa`ida in allegedly plotting a terrorist attack in the the Arabian Peninsula. – Wall Street Journal, December 12, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): United Kingdom. Five of the men were December 7 A suicide bomber in an explosives- reportedly of Bangladeshi origin. Three laden vehicle killed six U.S. soldiers in of the 12 men were later released without December 7, 2010 (PAKISTAN): A Kandahar Province. The Taliban claimed charge. According to one press report, suicide bomber detonated explosives responsibility for the attack. – Washington citing British broadcasters, “the men were near the convoy of Nawab Muhammad Post, December 12 accused of plotting attacks to coincide Aslam Khan Raisani, the chief minister with the Christmas holidays and had of Baluchistan Province. The minister December 12, 2010 (IRAQ): A suicide car reconnoitered targets like the American escaped injury, but the explosion killed at bomb killed at least 13 people in Ramadi, Embassy, the London Stock Exchange least one person. The incident occurred in Anbar Province. The explosion occurred and religious and political leaders.” – New Quetta. – BBC, December 7 near a heavily fortified provincial York Times, December 27 government compound. – Los Angeles Times, December 8, 2010 (UNITED STATES): December 13; New York Times, December 12 December 21, 2010 (UNITED STATES): Antonio Martinez, a recent convert to U.S. intelligence officials reportedly Islam, was arrested after he allegedly tried December 15, 2010 (SWEDEN): A new told CNN that al-Qa`ida in the Arabian to blow up a U.S. military recruitment Swedish intelligence report reveals that Peninsula (AQAP) considered poisoning center in Maryland. Martinez, however, possibly 200 violent Islamist extremists food served at hotels and restaurants in was provided with a faulty bomb as part live in Sweden. Taimour Abdulwahab al- the United States. AQAP was supposedly of an FBI sting operation. The 21-year- Abdaly, who executed a terrorist attack considering tainting food supplies with old Baltimore construction worker was in Stockholm on December 11, was not on the deadly chemicals ricin and cyanide. charged with attempted use of a weapon of that list. According to the report, most of – AFP, December 22 mass destruction and attempted murder the 200 “were born or grew up in Sweden, of federal officers and employees. – Los and it is here that they come into contact December 24, 2010 (NETHERLANDS): Angeles Times, December 8 with violence-promoting ideologies and Dutch authorities arrested 12 men of groups.” – AFP, December 15 Somali origin in Rotterdam due to concern December 8, 2010 (PAKISTAN): A suicide that they were planning an “imminent” bomber blew up a bus in Kohat District of December 15, 2010 (IRAN): Suicide terrorist attack. No weapons or explosives Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province, killing bombers attacked a mosque in Chabahar, were reportedly found, and a number of 17 people. – New York Times, December 9; AFP, killing at least 35 people. The militant the suspects were later released. – CNN, December 10 group Jundallah apparently claimed December 26 responsibility. – UPI, December 15 December 9, 2010 (CANADA): A Canadian December 24, 2010 (PAKISTAN): court ruled that Mohamed Harkat is likely December 15, 2010 (YEMEN): A bomb Approximately 150 militants an al-Qa`ida sleeper agent and remains was thrown at a vehicle carrying U.S. launched a coordinated attack on five a national security threat. Harkat, an Embassy staffers in Sana`a. Those in the checkpoints in Mohmand Agency of the Algerian and a former Ottawa pizza vehicle were not injured. – AP, December 16 Federally Administered Tribal Areas. delivery man, faces possible deportation Approximately 11 soldiers and 24 militants to Algeria. – AFP, December 9 December 17, 2010 (UNITED STATES): were killed. – Voice of America, December 24 A U.S. federal judge sentenced Madhatta December 9, 2010 (MAURITANIA): The Asagal Haipe to 23 years in prison December 24, 2010 (PAKISTAN): U.S. State Department warned Americans for his role in kidnapping 16 tourists, Pakistani military intelligence officials to practice extreme caution when in including four Americans, in the told reporters that they recently Mauritania due to the rising al-Qa`ida southern Philippines in 1995. Haipe was apprehended Nasiruddin Haqqani, the threat in the country. – UPI, December 9 a senior leader of the Abu Sayyaf Group. son of Afghan insurgent leader Jalaluddin – Washington Post, December 18 Haqqani. – Geo.tv, December 25

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December 24, 2010 (SAUDI ARABIA): December 29, 2010 (DENMARK): Danish CTC Sentinel Staff Saudi police killed a suspected al- authorities arrested five suspected Qa`ida militant and arrested another at terrorists who were planning to “kill as Editor-in-Chief a checkpoint in the central town of Wadi many people as possible” at the offices of Erich Marquardt al-Dawasir. One of the men was disguised Jyllands-Posten, the Copenhagen newspaper Senior Editor, CTC as a woman. – Reuters, December 24 that previously published cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad. The suspects Editorial Board December 25, 2010 (PAKISTAN): A apparently launched the plot from COL Michael J. Meese, Ph.D. suicide bomber detonated explosives Sweden, and that country’s intelligence Department Head in an aid line in Bajaur Agency of the services played a role in the arrests as Department of Social Sciences (West Point) Federally Administered Tribal Areas, well. – Independent, December 30 killing at least 40 people. The bomber, COL Cindy R. Jebb, Ph.D. reportedly a woman, first threw two hand December 29, 2010 (IRAQ): Two suicide Deputy Department Head grenades into a crowd of people, and bombers attacked a police battalion in Department of Social Sciences (West Point) then detonated an explosives vest. The Mosul, Ninawa Province, killing the incident occurred at the UN’s World Food commander and three other police officers. LTC Reid Sawyer Program distribution center in Khar. The According to Reuters, “The sources said Director, CTC Pakistani Taliban claimed responsibility two attackers, wearing explosive vests, for the bombing, saying that it was aimed detonated their vests in the room of Christopher Heffelfinger at members of an anti-Taliban tribe. – NBC Lieutenant Colonel Shamil Ahmed, who FBI Fellow, CTC News, December 25; Voice of America, December headed the battalion. A third suicide 26 bomber was killed by police before he was able to enter the building.” – Reuters, December 25, 2010 (PHILIPPINES): A December 29; Voice of America, December 29 bomb exploded during a Christmas Day Contact service at a chapel inside a police camp in December 30, 2010 (IRAQ): Militants Combating Terrorism Center Jolo, located in the southern Philippines. placed bombs near the homes of at least U.S. Military Academy A priest and 10 civilians were wounded. 14 Christian families in Baghdad, killing 607 Cullum Road, Lincoln Hall Authorities suspect that the Abu Sayyaf two people. – New York Times, December 30 West Point, NY 10996 Group was responsible. – AP, December 25 Phone: (845) 667-6383 December 30, 2010 (TURKEY): Turkish Email: [email protected] December 27, 2010 (IRAQ): Two suicide authorities announced that they recently Web: www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/ bombers detonated explosives in front of detained 10 people with suspected links a government office in Anbar Province, to al-Qa`ida. The suspects were allegedly * For Press Inquiries: (845) 667-6383 killing nine people. According to a press planning to execute a terrorist attack report, “Many of the people killed and before New Year’s Eve. – AP, December 30 injured in Monday’s violence were family members of police and soldiers who died Dec. 12 at the same location in another suicide blast. The family members were support at the provincial headquarters to receive The Combating Terrorism Center would compensation for their losses.” – AP, like to express its gratitude to its financial December 27 supporters, for without their support and shared vision of the Center products like December 27, 2010 (PAKISTAN): U.S. the CTC Sentinel could not be produced. If aerial drones destroyed two vehicles in you are interested in learning more about North Waziristan Agency of the Federally how to support the Combating Terrorism Administered Tribal Areas, killing 18 Center, please visit http://www.ctc.usma. alleged militants. – Guardian, December 27 edu/support/ or call Wayne Richardson at West Point’s Association of Graduates at December 27, 2010 (SOMALIA): A leader 845-446-1553. in Somalia’s Islamist insurgency, Fuad Mohamed Khalaf, warned, “We tell the American President Barack Obama to embrace Islam before we come to his country.” – AFP, December 27

December 28, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): A The views expressed in this report are those of suicide bomber killed two Afghan soldiers the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, in Paktika Province. – AFP, December 29 the Department of the Army, or any other agency of the U.S. Government.

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