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Mellan Salafism Och Salafistisk Jihadism

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Mellan Salafism Och Salafistisk Jihadism STUDIE Mellan salafism och salafistisk jihadism Påverkan mot och utmaningar för det svenska samhället Magnus Ranstorp Filip Ahlin Peder Hyllengren Magnus Normark 2 Faktaruta Mellan salafism och salafistisk jihadism – Påverkan mot och utmaningar för det svenska samhället. Juni 2017-juni 2018. Centrum för Asymmetriska Hot- och Terrorismstudier (CATS), vid Försvarshögskolan. Ansvarig forskare: Magnus Ranstorp, forskningsledare CATS. Denna studie undersöker påverkan från salafistiska och salafist-jihaditiska miljöer i Sverige samt relationen dem emellan. Fokus läggs på framväxten av salafist-jihadistiska miljöer i Sverige samt omgärdande salafistiska element; vilka budskap miljöerna förmedlar, metoder för påverkan samt vilken upplevd påverkan miljöerna har i svenska lokalsamhällen. Publikationsnummer: MSB1322 – juni 2018 ISBN-nummer: 978-91-7383-897-9 MSB har beställt och finansierat genomförandet av denna studierapport. Författarna är ensamma ansvariga för rapportens innehåll. 3 4 5 Förord Försvarshögskolan fick i juni 2017 i uppdrag av Myndigheten för samhällsskydd och beredskap (MSB) att genomföra en beskrivning av budskap i salafistiska jihadistmiljöer i Sverige. Fokus i uppdraget var att påvisa om salafistiska jihadistbudskap aktivt sprids i Sverige och vilka metoder som i så fall används. Informationspåverkan inom de salafistiska jihadistmiljöerna i Europa är ett förhållandevis nytt forskningsområde, och det saknas idag i stor utsträckning studier och forskning på området i en svensk kontext. Uppdraget syftade till att förbättra samhällets förmåga att identifiera och möta islamistiska aktörers informationspåverkan och därigenom stödja såväl operativa som förebyggande åtgärder. Målet var att öka kunskapen om de metoder som kan ligga bakom informationspåverkan som bedrivs av salafist- jihadistiska inspirerande aktörer mot sekulära och muslimska målgrupper i Sverige. Vid sidan om internet angavs fysiska miljöer i Sverige vara av särskilt intresse. Denna omfattande och väl genomarbetade rapport har ett något vidgat perspektiv till att också beskriva relationen mellan salafistiska och salafist- jihadistiska miljöer. Därmed belyses ett tidigare helt obeforskat område i svensk kontext, vilket ger ny kunskap om såväl de specifika formerna för informationspåverkan inom de aktuella miljöerna, samt samspelet dem emellan. Slutsatserna leder också till tänkvärda förslag om nya kunskapsbehov. Lars Nicander Chef, Centrum för Asymmetriska Hot- och TerrorismStudier (CATS) 6 Innehållsförteckning Faktaruta .................................................................................... 2 Förord ......................................................................................... 5 Innehållsförteckning .................................................................. 6 Sammanfattning ......................................................................... 9 Ordlista ..................................................................................... 12 1. Inledning .............................................................................. 15 2. Teoretiska utgångspunkter ................................................... 20 2.1 Introduktion ...................................................................... 20 2.2 Begreppsförklaringar........................................................... 20 2.3 Vad är salafism? ................................................................. 22 2.4 Salafismens ideologiska anknytning ...................................... 26 2.5 Salafismens typologi ........................................................... 27 2.6 Vad skiljer salafism och salafistisk-jihadism? .......................... 32 2.7 Salafismens narrativ i gränslandet mellan salafism och jihadism .................................................................................. 35 2.8 Social rörelseteori och salafism ............................................ 36 2.9 Informationspåverkan ......................................................... 38 2.10 Samhällets grundläggande demokratiska värden ............. 39 2.11 Forskningsläget om salafism och salafistisk jihadism i Sverige och internationellt ..................................................................... 41 3. Metodologiska överväganden ............................................... 46 3.1 Inledning ........................................................................... 46 3.2 Begränsningar .................................................................... 48 3.3 Intervjuer .......................................................................... 50 3.4 Övrigt material ................................................................... 52 3.5 Källkritik ............................................................................ 53 3.6 Etiska överväganden ........................................................... 54 4. Svenska salafist-jihadistiska miljöer och omgärdande element .................................................................................... 56 4.1 Introduktion ...................................................................... 56 4.2 Östkustbältet ..................................................................... 57 4.2.1 Stockholm ............................................................................................. 57 4.2.2 Örebro ................................................................................................... 70 4.2.3 Gävle ..................................................................................................... 75 4.2.4 Eskilstuna ............................................................................................. 82 4.3 Norra Sverige .................................................................... 85 7 4.4 Västkustbältet .................................................................... 86 4.4.1 Malmö och södra Sverige ..................................................................... 86 4.4.2 Lund, Landskrona och Hässleholm .................................................... 92 4.4.3 Halmstad och Falkenberg .................................................................... 94 4.4.4 Göteborg ............................................................................................... 96 4.4.5 Borås och Uddevalla ........................................................................... 105 4.5 Svenska IS-resenärer ....................................................... 108 4.6 Slutsats ........................................................................... 110 5. Social media, predikanter och budskap............................... 111 5.1 Introduktion .................................................................... 111 5.2 Social media och predikanter ............................................. 112 5.2.1 Metasajter på social media kopplade till salafistiska predikanter ... 112 5.2.2 Abu Muadh .......................................................................................... 113 5.2.3 SMS-Bilal ............................................................................................. 116 5.2.4 Anas Khalifa ......................................................................................... 119 5.2.5 IslamIDAG .......................................................................................... 122 5.2.6 Al Bushra Dawah Center .................................................................... 122 5.3 Anti-demokratiska budskap från salafistiska predikanter........ 123 5.3.1 Jihadistiska budskap och stöd till jihadistiska grupperingar .......... 124 5.3.2 Könssegregering och kvinnoförtryck ................................................ 127 5.3.3 Homofobi ............................................................................................ 130 5.3.1 Antisemitism ...................................................................................... 132 5.3.2 Avståndstagande från samhället och mot icke-troende ................... 133 5.4 Islam.nu och ”Järvasalafisterna” ......................................... 137 5.5 Slutsatser ........................................................................ 139 6. Metoder för påverkan ......................................................... 141 6.1 Introduktion .................................................................... 141 6.2 Da’wa ............................................................................. 141 6.2.1 Die Wahre Religion ............................................................................. 141 6.2.2 iERA .................................................................................................... 146 6.3 Koranskola ...................................................................... 151 6.4 Finansiering ..................................................................... 154 6.5 Slutsatser ........................................................................ 161 7. Påverkan på det svenska samhället .................................... 163 7.1 Introduktion .................................................................... 163 7.2 Svenska städer ................................................................ 164 7.2.1 Borås ................................................................................................... 164 7.2.2 Tranemo .............................................................................................. 168 7.2.3 Västerås ............................................................................................... 169 7.2.4 Mindre ort ..........................................................................................
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