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CTC Sentinel 4 JANUARY 2011 . VOL 4 . ISSUE 1 COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER AT WEST POINT CTC SENTINel OBJECTIVE . RELEVANT . RIGOROUS Contents Terrorist Awakening in FEATURE ARTICLE 1 Terrorist Awakening in Sweden? Sweden? By Magnus Ranstorp By Magnus Ranstorp REPORTS 6 British Universities Continue to Breed Extremists By James Brandon 8 Improving Airline Security in the United States By Rafi Ron 11 Al-Qa`ida’s Yemeni Expatriate Faction in Pakistan By Evan F. Kohlmann 15 Understanding Al-Qa`ida’s Business Model By Alex Gallo 18 Disengagement or Deradicalization: A Look at Prison Programs for Jailed Terrorists By Andrew Silke 21 Recent Highlights in Terrorist Activity 24 CTC Sentinel Staff & Contacts Swedish police at the scene of a terrorist attack in central Stockholm in December 2010. - Photo by Jonathan Nackstrand/AFP/Getty Images or decades, sweden has Islamist extremism which outlined that been regarded as the relative it had identified about 200 extremists backwater of international in Sweden; more than 80% were socially terrorism. Even Usama bin connected, and most lived inside the FLadin had mentioned Sweden as immune three major cities of Sweden, with more from terrorism in an al-Jazira broadcast than half residing in Stockholm.1 in October 2004. This sense of immunity was shattered twice in December 2010. This article examines the circumstances First, a suicide bomber struck in the behind these developments and their About the CTC Sentinel Nordic countries for the first time ever implications for the evolution of The Combating Terrorism Center is an on December 11. The Swedish security terrorism in Sweden. It illustrates the independent educational and research service, Säkerhetspolisen (SÄPO), had interconnectivity of terrorist social institution based in the Department of Social no record of the bomber before the attack, networks, and it underscores the Sciences at the United States Military Academy, as he had studied and lived for a decade importance of terrorist travelers to West Point. The CTC Sentinel harnesses in the United Kingdom. At the same time, Pakistan and Somalia and the potential the Center’s global network of scholars and he admitted he had traveled to Iraq to for a boomerang effect. To some extent, practitioners to understand and confront perform jihad. Second, four Swedes were this article argues that the events in contemporary threats posed by terrorism and arrested later that month for planning Sweden are a microcosm or reflection of other forms of political violence. to conduct a protracted Mumbai-style broader terrorism trends. attack on the Jyllands-Posten newspaper in The views expressed in this report are those of Copenhagen, Denmark. The men were the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, arrested after driving from Sweden to the Department of the Army, or any other agency Copenhagen to execute the attack. Third, 1 “Våldsbejakande islamistisk extremism i Sverige,” Säk- of the U.S. Government. SÄPO produced a report on violent erhetspolisen, 2010. 1 JANUARY 2011 . VOL 4 . ISSUE 1 Anatomy of Sweden’s First Suicide Bomber His wife inserted a martyrdom picture, After sending his farewell e-mails, On December 11, 2010, a 28-year-old “Hoor al-Ayn,” depicting a martyr on al-Abdaly proceeded to ignite his Iraqi-Swede, Taimour Adbulwahab al- horseback as “mood background” for car filled with gas canisters and Abdaly, became the first suicide bomber the recording. This suggested either his flammable material, which burst into in Sweden when he accidentally detonated wife knew more than she claimed, or flames at 4:52 PM. He then walked one of the six pipe bombs strapped to his that there was possibly an accomplice toward the pedestrian shopping street body among busy Christmas shoppers in to al-Abdaly at large.2 Drottninggatan for 10 minutes, where central Stockholm. The Swedish public he began to fiddle with his equipment, narrowly escaped a major terrorist The issue of possible accomplices has walking in and out of a side street attack that was cleverly designed as a been strongly suspected for a number talking on either a communication radio multipronged, one-man mass casualty of reasons. First, in the pre-recorded or mobile phone before his explosive event. Beginning with the explosion of tapes, there is clearly a second person device detonated prematurely. From his station wagon filled with gas tubes breathing and there have been efforts eyewitness accounts, it is clear there and flammable material, al-Abdaly had to remove everything below 100 hertz was a malfunction rather than a desire planned to walk down Drottninggatan, on all three tapes.3 A second reason is to abort the operation. Taking refuge in a major pedestrian shopping street, the two-way radio found by his body a more deserted side street, al-Abdaly toward a large department store and the after one of the pipe bombs detonated placed his bomb belt down moments main central railway station placing two prematurely. Third, according to before his pipe bomb exploded.6 He died or more explosive devices at different those close to the investigation, the quickly without killing anyone else. locations before detonating his own contraption of pipe bombs was too serial-connected pipe bombs strapped cumbersome and complex for him to have Profile of Taimour al-Abdaly to his body. Al-Abdaly had at least six put on his body alone. Fourth, closed- Five days after the suicide bombing, pipe bombs filled with ball bearings, a circuit television footage captured, after SÄPO provided the findings of a pressure-cooker, and a backpack filled the accidental detonation, the images previously cabinet-commissioned with explosives and nails. of a man wearing a sketchy billboard report on Islamic extremism in Sweden. sign for “London restaurant” with a Embarrassingly, SÄPO had to admit Al-Abdaly commenced the operation red khaffiyeh wrapped around his face that al-Abdaly was not among the 200 earlier that day at the crack of dawn that seemed to be the only individual Islamic extremists it had previously by driving to Stockholm from his focused and drawn to the scene where identified. Interestingly, SÄPO’s chief, parents’ house in the small town of al-Abdaly was dying, as everyone else Anders Danielsson, also placed partial Tranås, a 170-mile journey northward. fled the explosion. Fifth, al-Abdaly’s blame why they missed him on MI5—his He would have arrived in Stockholm disclosure on the farewell tape that British counterpart—as al-Abdaly had about three hours later following the he frequently traveled to the Middle resided in the United Kingdom since collection of explosive devices from an East to wage jihad raised the prospect 2001 (although he frequently visited his undisclosed storage site. Assuming al- that he had links to more organized parents in Sweden). Abdaly arrived in Stockholm around terrorist networks in the region. This midday, it is still unclear where he was strengthened by his affinity to the Profiling Taimour Abdulwahab al- initially went and what he did prior Islamic State of Iraq on his Facebook Abdaly has produced a complicated to the commencement of the terrorist page, postings of Shaykh Muhammad picture of a relative loner that assault at 4:40 PM. At precisely that al-Maqdisi and multiple credible claims radicalized in Luton in the United time, al-Abdaly sent different e-mails to by radical al-Qa`ida-affiliated websites Kingdom, surrounded possibly by three recipients: his wife, the Swedish that suggested he belonged to the Islamic shadowy figures connected as “brokers” Security Service SÄPO (which failed to State of Iraq. Postings on al-Hanin to Mohammed Siddique Khan, a small check it for 4.5 hours), and Tidningarnas and the popular Shumukh al-Islam cadre of the outlawed Islamist group Telegrambyrå, the official Swedish websites suggested this affiliation.4 al-Muhajiroun, and possibly by a more wire service. The e-mail contained pre- It has also emerged that General Zia nefarious terrorist network emerging from recorded sound files. In the English and Alkanani, the counterterrorism chief in Iraq, as he traveled there frequently. Arabic versions, al-Abdaly’s message Iraq, has claimed that al-Abdaly spent was addressed to his wife asking for three months in Mosul at an explosives Al-Abdaly was born in Baghdad in 1982 forgiveness and explaining that he had training camp together with an Egyptian and arrived with his father, mother, and been secretly a mujahidin for the past accomplice, according to imprisoned al- older sister to Tranås, Sweden at the four years and that his business trips Qa`ida members.5 age of 10. Tranås is a small town with to the Middle East had been a lie. Al- a population of 18,000 inhabitants. Abdaly’s wife, living in Luton in the 2 Martin Ekelund, “Nätet avslöjar medhjälparen,” Af- It appears that al-Abdaly adapted United Kingdom, would later profess tonbladet, January 3, 2011. Also see www.gudmundson. well there, quickly learning Swedish, no knowledge of his activities in an blogspot.com. becoming known as a keen basketball exclusive interview to controversial 3 Mikael Stengård and Eveline Grassman, “Experter: player and was well-liked by his friends. television broadcaster, Muslim convert Ljudet är manipulerat,” Aftonbladet, December 18, 2010. He graduated from secondary school in and ex-Taliban prisoner Yvonne Ridley, 4 Sam Jones and Haroon Siddique, “Stockholm Suicide yet a longer unedited version of the tape Bomber Confronted by Luton Mosque Leaders,” Guard- 3 Months in Mosul,” al-Arabiya, January 7, 2011. appeared within 24 hours on the couple’s ian, December 13, 2010. 6 Richard Ashberg and Johanna Hellsten, “Buken full shared YouTube account: mona123timo. 5 “Iraqi Official to al-Arabiya: Stockholm Bomber Trained med metal,” Aftonbladet, December 16, 2010.
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