The Theory of Event Coding (TEC): a Framework for Perception and Action Planning
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BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2001) 24, 849–937 Printed in the United States of America The Theory of Event Coding (TEC): A framework for perception and action planning Bernhard Hommel,a,b Jochen Müsseler,b Gisa Aschersleben,b and Wolfgang Prinzb aSection of Experimental and Theoretical Psychology, University of Leiden, 2300 RB Leiden, The Netherlands; bMax Planck Institute for Psychological Research, D-80799 Munich, Germany {muesseler;aschersleben;prinz}@mpipf-muenchen.mpg.de www.mpipf-muenchen.mpg.de/~prinz [email protected] Abstract: Traditional approaches to human information processing tend to deal with perception and action planning in isolation, so that an adequate account of the perception-action interface is still missing. On the perceptual side, the dominant cognitive view largely un- derestimates, and thus fails to account for, the impact of action-related processes on both the processing of perceptual information and on perceptual learning. On the action side, most approaches conceive of action planning as a mere continuation of stimulus processing, thus failing to account for the goal-directedness of even the simplest reaction in an experimental task. We propose a new framework for a more adequate theoretical treatment of perception and action planning, in which perceptual contents and action plans are coded in a common representational medium by feature codes with distal reference. Perceived events (perceptions) and to-be-produced events (actions) are equally represented by integrated, task-tuned networks of feature codes – cognitive structures we call event codes. We give an overview of evidence from a wide variety of empirical domains, such as spatial stimulus-response compatibility, sensorimotor syn- chronization, and ideomotor action, showing that our main assumptions are well supported by the data. Keywords: action planning; binding; common coding; event coding; feature integration; perception; perception-action interface 1. Introduction and overview Though TEC is meant to provide a new framework for perception and action planning, its scope is limited in the We propose a new theoretical framework for the cogni- following sense: As regards perception, its focus is on “late” tive underpinnings of perception and action planning, the cognitive products of perceptual processing that stand for, Theory of Event Coding (TEC). Basically, the theory holds or represent, certain features of actual events in the envi- that cognitive representations of events (i.e., of any to- ronment. TEC does not consider the complex machinery of be-perceived or to-be-generated incident in the distal the “early” sensory processes that lead to them. Conversely, environment) subserve not only representational func- as regards action, the focus is on “early” cognitive ante- tions (e.g., for perception, imagery, memory, reasoning) but cedents of action that stand for, or represent, certain fea- action-related functions as well (e.g., for action planning tures of events that are to be generated in the environment and initiation). According to TEC, the core structure of the (5 actions). TEC does not consider the complex machin- functional architecture supporting perception and action ery of the “late” motor processes that subserve their real- planning is formed by a common representational domain ization (i.e., the control and coordination of movements). for perceived events (perception) and intended or to-be- Thus, TEC is meant to provide a framework for under- generated events (action). standing linkages between (late) perception and (early) ac- In a nutshell, we believe that it makes sense to assume tion, or action planning. Therefore, we do not claim that that the stimulus representations underlying perception TEC covers all kinds of interactions between perception and the action representations underlying action planning and action exhaustively. The same applies to the represen- are coded and stored not separately, but together in a com- tationalist approach inherent in TEC. Though we do be- mon representational medium. This implies that stimulus lieve that the representationalist stance that we adopt forms and response codes are not entities of a completely differ- an appropriate metatheoretical framework for our theory, ent kind, but only refer to, and thus represent, different we do not want to imply, or suggest, that it is necessary or events in a particular task and context. Thus, it would be appropriate for understanding other kinds of interactions misleading to speak of stimulus codes and response or ac- between perception and action. tion codes unless one wishes to refer to the roles played by As we will point out below, TEC differs from other, in a code or the event it represents (see sect. 3.2.4). Irrespec- part related approaches to perception and action planning. tive of this role, though, cognitive codes are always event In contrast to the classical information processing view it codes – codes of perceived or (to-be-)produced events. does not see perception and action planning as different, © 2001 Cambridge University Press 0140-525X/01 $12.50 849 Hommel et al.: Theory of Event Coding functionally separable stages but as intimately related, account of the interface between perception and action sometimes even indistinguishable processes producing a planning. Unlike approaches in the domain of spatial orien- wide variety of interactions. This perspective TEC shares tation they neither have a way to accommodate the interac- with the ecological approach, from which it differs, how- tion between perception and action planning in a satisfac- ever, by its emphasis on representational issues – which are tory way nor to account for the impact of action-related anathema to ecological approaches by definition. Finally, knowledge on perception. As regards action and action con- TEC does not deal with the question of how consciousness trol, our review will also show that classical approaches are and externally guided pointing and grasping movements are insufficient on both theoretical and empirical grounds. They related, a topic gaining its attraction from demonstrations neither provide an adequate role for action goals nor can that both can be dissociated under specific conditions (for they account for evidence witnessing the operation of simi- reviews, see Milner & Goodale 1995; Rossetti & Revonsuo larity between perception and action planning. Based on 2000). Although these demonstrations are interesting and these two reviews we will conclude that a new framework is challenging, we do not see how they could provide a basis needed for taking care of the cognitive underpinnings of the for the general theory of intentional action we aim at. mutual interaction between perception and action planning. Our argument for TEC will take three major steps. In the Our review of shortcomings of classical theories will help first step we review classical approaches to perception and us to put constraints on a new framework claiming to ac- action planning, with special emphasis on their mutual link- count for these issues in a more adequate way. As a result, ages. As regards perception, this review will show that cog- TEC is presented in the second step. This theory proposes nitive approaches to perception that are based on linear as its core contention that codes of perceived events and stage theory and its derivatives do not give an adequate planned actions share a common representational domain, to the effect that perceptual codes and action codes may prime each other on the basis of their overlap in this do- main. The structural view underlying this notion regards Bernhard Hommel studied psychology and literature event codes as assemblies of feature codes, based on tem- at the University of Bielefeld, where he also worked as porary integration in a given task context. a research assistant from 1987–1990 and completed his As we will show, TEC is not entirely new. It rather takes dissertation. He then moved to the Max Planck Institute for Psychological Research in Munich to work as a senior up elements from old and forgotten theories and (re)com- researcher. Since 1999 he has been a Full Professor bines them in a novel way. This is particularly true of the (Chair of General Psychology) at the University of Lei- ideomotor principle (cf. Greenwald 1970) and of motor den, Netherlands. He has published empirical and the- theories of cognition that were so broadly discussed a cen- oretical work on human attention, planning and control tury ago (cf. Scheerer 1984) and then fell into oblivion be- of action, and the relationship between perception and cause the theoretical zeitgeist of the new century was input- action. centered throughout and did not much care about action Jochen Müsseler is senior scientist at the Max Planck per se. Precursor versions of TEC and treatments of some Institute for Psychological Research (Department of aspects of its functional logic have been published before Cognition and Action) in Munich. After graduating (cf. Aschersleben & Prinz 1995; 1997; Hommel 1997; from the University of Bochum, he obtained his Ph.D. 1998a; Müsseler 1995; 1999; Prinz 1984b; 1987; 1990; at the University of Bielefeld before moving to Munich. 1997a; 1997b; Prinz et al. 1995). Its present version has His research focuses on the interface of perception and emerged from our collaboration on a number of experi- action, the perception of space and time, and attentional mechanisms. mental projects and our efforts to understand the major theoretical implications of their results. Gisa Aschersleben studied psychology at the Uni- In the third step, we will then apply the framework of versities of Bielefeld and Braunschweig, Germany, and completed her Ph.D. at the University of Munich. She TEC to a number of pertinent experimental paradigms. As worked as a research assistant at the Technical Univer- TEC is more a loose framework of theoretical principles sity of Munich 1987–1991. In 1991 she joined the Max rather than a strict, formal theory, there is no obvious way Planck Institute for Psychological Research in Munich to test its validity directly, that is, by deriving predictions where she holds the position of a senior scientist.