The Conservative–Liberal Coalition Talks of 1–4 March 1974

‘ASKING TOO MUCH AND OffERING TOO liTTLE’? ThE CONSERVATIVE–LIBERal COaliTION TalKS OF 1–4 MARCH 1974 Recently released he general election as Argyll, were not announced held on 28 February until the Saturday4), ‘a tired and Cabinet papers have 1974 yielded a highly downcast fag-end of a Cabinet’5 provided new insights ambiguous and constitu- met to hear Edward Heath delin- into the March 1974 tionally intriguing result. eate the three options available TThe Conservative Party won to them. These were: to concede talks between Edward five fewer seats than the Labour defeat, and thereby advise the Party – 296 to 301 – yet polled Queen to invite Harold Wilson Heath and Jeremy 240,000 votes more. Meanwhile, (the Labour Party leader) to form Thorpe over a possible the Liberal Party won 14 seats a minority administration; to (8 more than in 1970), although consider whether the Conserva- Conservative–Liberal they had actually polled six mil- tives themselves could continue coalition government. lion votes, thereby starkly illus- as a minority government, in the trating the iniquity of Britain’s hope that the party could secure Peter Dorey re- voting system. With neither overall parliamentary support for examines these talks, Labour nor the Conservatives a policy programme to tackle having secured an overall par- Britain’s urgent economic situa- and notes that their liamentary majority, Edward tion; and, finally, to seek support failure went much Heath was faced with the choice from the smaller parties for a pro- of either immediately conceding gramme which would address deeper and wider than defeat, and thus tendering his these immediate problems. resignation forthwith, or seek- The Conservatives were natu- the disagreement over ing a deal with one or more of rally reluctant to concede defeat electoral reform. They the smaller parties. Heath pur- immediately, partly because they sued the latter option, observing had actually polled nearly a quar- were always hampered that as neither of the two main ter of a million more votes than by a lack of support parties had secured an overall Labour, but also because minis- majority ‘My responsibility as ters were anxious that if Labour among MPs and Prime Minister at the time was formed a government and sub- grassroots members of to see whether I could form an sequently accrued the economic administration with a majority’.1 benefits of North Sea oil (which both parties, convinced He thereby heralded what one was just about to flow fully ‘on that the other was minister subsequently described stream’), then the ensuing eco- as ‘two days [of ] rather unseemly nomic upturn would rebound ‘asking too much and bargaining’,2 at the end of which to Labour’s political advantage offering too little’ in the Conservatives ‘were begin- in the next general election.6 Yet ning to give the impression that ministers also appreciated that return. Even if the we were bad losers.’3 the second option – attempting to continue in office as a minor- talks had succeeded, ity government and relying on the two leaders would I general parliamentary support At the end of Friday afternoon (1 for its policies – would not only have encountered a March), by which time the par- entail too much instability and lack of support from liamentary situation arising from uncertainty, but it would also the election result had become ‘not be honourable’ and would their parliamentary Jeremy Thorpe arrives at 10 much more apparent (although create a clear and damaging colleagues. Downing Street, the results in one or two remote impression beyond Westmin- 2 March 1974 Scottish constituencies, such ster that the Conservatives were 28 Journal of Liberal History 61 Winter 2008–09 ‘ASKING TOO MUCH AND OffERING TOO liTTLE’? ThE CONSERVATIVE–LIBERal COaliTION TalKS OF 1–4 MARCH 1974 Journal of Liberal History 61 Winter 2008–09 29 ‘ASKING TOO MUCH AND OffERING TOO liTTLE’? ‘hanging on to office at all costs speech in Perth in 1968, Heath Having ministerial posts offered to other despite defeat at the election’, had expressed his support for a senior Liberals.10 in which case the party risked directly elected Scottish Assem- rejected the The Cabinet generally agreed being seriously ‘discredited’.7 bly, although there was little options of that the third option, ‘the forma- Having vowed not to relin- enthusiasm for such an institu- tion of a right-centre coalition’, quish political office immedi- tion amongst his parliamentary a political was the most attractive and feasi- ately, however, Heath and his colleagues – devolution ‘had ble of the three, not least because ministerial colleagues ruled out always sat lightly on the shoul- partnership the combined 17,900,000 votes a political alliance with either ders of Conservative MPs’.9 Fur- won by the Conservatives and the Ulster Unionists or the Scot- thermore, when the Kilbrandon with either the Liberals, compared to the tish National Party (SNP). Report was published in 1973, the Ulster 11,700,000 polled by the Labour Although the (Official) Ulster Heath’s own response was rather Party, was interpreted as evi- Unionists had returned 9 MPs more circumspect than might Unionists dence of ‘a large anti-Socialist (there were also two additional have been expected given his majority’ in Britain. Certainly, Unionist MPs not linked to the Perth speech. In contrast, it or the SNP, one or two senior figures were Ulster Unionist Party, and who had become apparent that the favourably disposed towards were therefore discounted in this SNP wanted a Scottish Assem- Heath – with this option almost solely on the context), most of whom ordinar- bly established immediately, the full grounds that ‘a coalition with ily took the Conservative whip and imbued with greater pow- the Liberals would keep the in the House of Commons, many ers than those proposed by the endorsement Labour Party out’,11 while other of them had, in this election, Kilbrandon Report, including a senior Conservatives acknowl- stood on an ‘anti-Sunningdale’ degree of ‘fiscal autonomy’. Such of his Cabinet edged that the Liberal Party platform, explicitly opposing the a stance thus effectively ruled supported two of the key poli- power-sharing Executive and out a deal between the Heath colleagues – cies in the Conservative mani- Assembly established in North- Government and the SNP. turned to the festo, namely the continuation ern Ireland by the Heath gov- of a statutory incomes policy (as ernment the previous year. In Liberal Party a vital means of curbing infla- so doing, they had made it clear II tion) which would eventually be that they would continue to Having rejected the options in an increas- replaced by a voluntary incomes oppose Heath’s current policies of a political partnership with policy, and British membership concerning Northern Ireland, either the Ulster Unionists or ingly desper- of the (then) European Eco- even though they would prob- the SNP, Heath – with the full ate attempt nomic Community (EEC).12 ably support him on most other endorsement of his Cabinet col- A Conservative–Liberal coali- issues. Consequently, Heath leagues – turned to the Liberal to remain in tion formed on this basis, min- adjudged the UUP to be ‘unreli- Party in an increasingly desper- isters agreed, could thus serve able’ potential allies, and thereby ate attempt to remain in office. It office. ‘to unite the moderates in the ruled out a deal with them. was reckoned that three options country.’13 Moreover, Heath At the same time, a deal with were available to the Cabi- himself noted that the Con- the SNP – which had achieved net. The first was to secure an servative Party and the Liberals the election of 7 MPs – was ruled undertaking by the Liberals to together had obtained 57 per out after informal talks between provide parliamentary support cent of votes cast, which under Conservative MP Teddy Taylor’s for ‘any policies and measures a system of proportional repre- agent (who had been a member introduced by a Conservative sentation would have secured a of the SNP prior to joining the administration which seemed to clear majority of parliamentary Conservatives) and Bill Lind- them right and justifiable in the seats.14 This observation proved say, Vice President of the SNP. national interest’, while remain- rather ironic, given that Heath Taylor informed Heath that the ing free to oppose other policies. and his ministerial colleagues SNP seemed amenable to a deal Secondly, the Conservatives subsequently refused to accede whereby they would support could seek a parliamentary pact to the Liberals’ insistence on a the Heath government in any whereby the Liberals would clear commitment to electoral parliamentary confidence votes provide parliamentary support reform, thereby precipitating the in return for the creation of a for a package of polices over breakdown of the inter-party Scottish Assembly.8 After all, the which they had been consulted, talks, and thus the resignation of previous year had witnessed the and which would constitute the the Heath government. publication of the Kilbrandon basis of the government’s legis- Report, which recommended lative programme for the next devolution for Scotland (and session. The third option would III Wales), albeit with divergent be to form a coalition govern- Having discussed these options views over the actual form that ment, with a Cabinet post for with his Cabinet colleagues, this might take. Moreover, in a Jeremy Thorpe, and one or two and obtained their approval 30 Journal of Liberal History 61 Winter 2008–09

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