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Home , Jeremy Thorpe, Nigel Fisher, Norman Tebbit

‘Asking too much and offering too little’? The Conservative–Liberal coalition talks of 1–4 March 1974

Recently released he general election as Argyll, were not announced held on 28 February until the Saturday4), ‘a tired and Cabinet papers have 1974 yielded a highly downcast fag-end of a Cabinet’5 provided new insights ambiguous and constitu- met to hear delin- into the March 1974 tionally intriguing result. eate the three options available TThe Conservative Party won to them. These were: to concede talks between Edward five fewer seats than the Labour defeat, and thereby advise the Party – 296 to 301 – yet polled Queen to invite Heath and Jeremy 240,000 votes more. Meanwhile, (the Labour Party leader) to form Thorpe over a possible the Liberal Party won 14 seats a minority administration; to (8 more than in 1970), although consider whether the Conserva- Conservative–Liberal they had actually polled six mil- tives themselves could continue coalition government. lion votes, thereby starkly illus- as a minority government, in the trating the iniquity of Britain’s hope that the party could secure Peter Dorey re- voting system. With neither overall parliamentary support for examines these talks, Labour nor the Conservatives a policy programme to tackle having secured an overall par- Britain’s urgent economic situa- and notes that their liamentary majority, Edward tion; and, finally, to seek support failure went much Heath was faced with the choice from the smaller parties for a pro- of either immediately conceding gramme which would address deeper and wider than defeat, and thus tendering his these immediate problems. resignation forthwith, or seek- The Conservatives were natu- the disagreement over ing a deal with one or more of rally reluctant to concede defeat electoral reform. They the smaller parties. Heath pur- immediately, partly because they sued the latter option, observing had actually polled nearly a quar- were always hampered that as neither of the two main ter of a million more votes than by a lack of support parties had secured an overall Labour, but also because minis- majority ‘My responsibility as ters were anxious that if Labour among MPs and Prime Minister at the time was formed a government and sub- grassroots members of to see whether I could form an sequently accrued the economic administration with a majority’.1 benefits of North Sea oil (which both parties, convinced He thereby heralded what one was just about to flow fully ‘on that the other was minister subsequently described stream’), then the ensuing eco- as ‘two days [of ] rather unseemly nomic upturn would rebound ‘asking too much and bargaining’,2 at the end of which to Labour’s political advantage offering too little’ in the Conservatives ‘were begin- in the next general election.6 Yet ning to give the impression that ministers also appreciated that return. Even if the we were bad losers.’3 the second option – attempting to continue in office as a minor- talks had succeeded, ity government and relying on the two leaders would I general parliamentary support At the end of Friday afternoon (1 for its policies – would not only have encountered a March), by which time the par- entail too much instability and lack of support from liamentary situation arising from uncertainty, but it would also the election result had become ‘not be honourable’ and would their parliamentary Jeremy Thorpe arrives at 10 much more apparent (although create a clear and damaging colleagues. Downing Street, the results in one or two remote impression beyond Westmin- 2 March 1974 Scottish constituencies, such ster that the Conservatives were

28 Journal of Liberal History 61 Winter 2008–09 ‘Asking too much and offering too little’? The Conservative–Liberal coalition talks of 1–4 March 1974

Journal of Liberal History 61 Winter 2008–09 29 ‘asking too much and offering too little’?

‘hanging on to office at all costs speech in Perth in 1968, Heath Having ministerial posts offered to other despite defeat at the election’, had expressed his support for a senior Liberals.10 in which case the party risked directly elected Scottish Assem- rejected the The Cabinet generally agreed being seriously ‘discredited’.7 bly, although there was little options of that the third option, ‘the forma- Having vowed not to relin- enthusiasm for such an institu- tion of a right-centre coalition’, quish political office immedi- tion amongst his parliamentary a political was the most attractive and feasi- ately, however, Heath and his colleagues – devolution ‘had ble of the three, not least because ministerial colleagues ruled out always sat lightly on the shoul- partnership the combined 17,900,000 votes a political alliance with either ders of Conservative MPs’.9 Fur- won by the Conservatives and the Ulster Unionists or the Scot- thermore, when the Kilbrandon with either the Liberals, compared to the tish National Party (SNP). Report was published in 1973, the Ulster 11,700,000 polled by the Labour Although the (Official) Ulster Heath’s own response was rather Party, was interpreted as evi- Unionists had returned 9 MPs more circumspect than might Unionists dence of ‘a large anti-Socialist (there were also two additional have been expected given his majority’ in Britain. Certainly, Unionist MPs not linked to the Perth speech. In contrast, it or the SNP, one or two senior figures were , and who had become apparent that the favourably disposed towards were therefore discounted in this SNP wanted a Scottish Assem- Heath – with this option almost solely on the context), most of whom ordinar- bly established immediately, the full grounds that ‘a coalition with ily took the Conservative whip and imbued with greater pow- the Liberals would keep the in the House of Commons, many ers than those proposed by the endorsement Labour Party out’,11 while other of them had, in this election, Kilbrandon Report, including a senior Conservatives acknowl- stood on an ‘anti-Sunningdale’ degree of ‘fiscal autonomy’. Such of his Cabinet edged that the Liberal Party platform, explicitly opposing the a stance thus effectively ruled supported two of the key poli- power-sharing Executive and out a deal between the Heath colleagues – cies in the Conservative mani- Assembly established in North- Government and the SNP. turned to the festo, namely the continuation ern Ireland by the Heath gov- of a statutory incomes policy (as ernment the previous year. In Liberal Party a vital means of curbing infla- so doing, they had made it clear II tion) which would eventually be that they would continue to Having rejected the options in an increas- replaced by a voluntary incomes oppose Heath’s current policies of a political partnership with policy, and British membership concerning Northern Ireland, either the Ulster Unionists or ingly desper- of the (then) European Eco- even though they would prob- the SNP, Heath – with the full ate attempt nomic Community (EEC).12 ably support him on most other endorsement of his Cabinet col- A Conservative–Liberal coali- issues. Consequently, Heath leagues – turned to the Liberal to remain in tion formed on this basis, min- adjudged the UUP to be ‘unreli- Party in an increasingly desper- isters agreed, could thus serve able’ potential allies, and thereby ate attempt to remain in office. It office. ‘to unite the moderates in the ruled out a deal with them. was reckoned that three options country.’13 Moreover, Heath At the same time, a deal with were available to the Cabi- himself noted that the Con- the SNP – which had achieved net. The first was to secure an servative Party and the Liberals the election of 7 MPs – was ruled undertaking by the Liberals to together had obtained 57 per out after informal talks between provide parliamentary support cent of votes cast, which under Conservative MP Teddy Taylor’s for ‘any policies and measures a system of proportional repre- agent (who had been a member introduced by a Conservative sentation would have secured a of the SNP prior to joining the administration which seemed to clear majority of parliamentary Conservatives) and Bill Lind- them right and justifiable in the seats.14 This observation proved say, Vice President of the SNP. national interest’, while remain- rather ironic, given that Heath Taylor informed Heath that the ing free to oppose other policies. and his ministerial colleagues SNP seemed amenable to a deal Secondly, the Conservatives subsequently refused to accede whereby they would support could seek a parliamentary pact to the Liberals’ insistence on a the Heath government in any whereby the Liberals would clear commitment to electoral parliamentary confidence votes provide parliamentary support reform, thereby precipitating the in return for the creation of a for a package of polices over breakdown of the inter-party Scottish Assembly.8 After all, the which they had been consulted, talks, and thus the resignation of previous year had witnessed the and which would constitute the the Heath government. publication of the Kilbrandon basis of the government’s legis- Report, which recommended lative programme for the next devolution for Scotland (and session. The third option would III Wales), albeit with divergent be to form a coalition govern- Having discussed these options views over the actual form that ment, with a Cabinet post for with his Cabinet colleagues, this might take. Moreover, in a Jeremy Thorpe, and one or two and obtained their approval

30 Journal of Liberal History 61 Winter 2008–09 ‘asking too much and offering too little’?

for approaching the Liberals, he be appointed agreement with the Liberals, to Edward Heath invited Jeremy in a coalition Cabinet. Moreover, which Heath retorted that both Thorpe, the Liberal leader, to 10 Thorpe claimed that he subse- sides would probably need ‘to Downing Street from his Barn- quently learned ‘from a reliable agree to postpone a number of staple constituency in Devon, source’ that Heath envisaged policies and measures which they where the latter had been cele- offering him a ministerial post would have thought desirable in brating the Liberals’ remarkable in the Foreign Office, with spe- other circumstances’, although 19 per cent share of the national cific responsibility for Europe.18 these would probably be polices vote. Although hindsight sug- In response to Heath’s deline- of lower priority compared to gests that it was entirely under- ation of the three options (and his those necessary to tackle the standable that the Conservatives expressed preference for the third, short-term economic situation. should seek a political deal with namely a coalition), Thorpe To this end, Heath informed the Liberals, at the time the invi- began by asking whether Heath Thorpe, on a highly confiden- tation by Heath was an initia- had contemplated a ‘Grand Alli- tial Privy Councillor basis, of tive that the Liberal Party ‘was In this ance’ of all three main parlia- some of the economic measures totally unprepared for’.15 first round mentary parties (Conservative, under consideration, including When Thorpe arrived at Labour and Liberal), with a view an approach to the International Downing Street on Saturday of talks to forming a National Unity Monetary Fund. afternoon, an 80-minute meet- government to tackle the grave In this first round of talks ing ensued (at which the only between economic situation facing the between Heath and Thorpe, other person present was Heath’s country. Heath swiftly rejected the crucial (for the Liberals) Private Secretary, Robert Arm- Heath and the idea, pointing out that, apart issue of electoral reform did not strong), which Heath opened Thorpe, the from any other considerations, prove to be a major stumbling by delineating the three broad such a move would split the block, for although the Liberal options available to them: ‘a crucial (for Labour Party (as it had done in leader naturally raised it, and loose arrangement’ whereby the 1931), and whilst many Conserva- received an equally predict- Liberals ‘could pick and choose the Liberals) tives might relish such a prospect, able non-committal response which governmental measures Heath was sure that the Labour from his Conservative coun- they supported’; full consulta- issue of elec- leader, Harold Wilson, would terpart, Thorpe acknowledged tion over the contents of the toral reform ‘wish at all costs to avoid the role that ‘electoral reform was of Queen’s Speech, which the Lib- and fate of Ramsay Macdonald’. less immediate priority than the erals would then support; and a did not prove Moreover, the Labour Party had economic situation and dealing coalition government, in which already issued a statement ruling with inflation’.19 This first meet- Thorpe himself would be offered to be a major out any deals with other par- ing concluded with both leaders a Cabinet seat (although the pre- ties, including the formation of agreeing to report back to, and cise post was not specified at this stumbling a coalition government. Clearly, undertake consultations with, juncture). Heath then intimated block, for Heath explained, this meant their senior colleagues pending to Thorpe that his (and the that a Conservative–Liberal another meeting the following Cabinet’s) preference was for the although parliamentary pact or coalition day over Sunday lunch. third of these options.16 government remained the most It is worth noting here that the Liberal viable and attractive option. the offer of a Cabinet seat to For his part, Thorpe remained IV Thorpe subsequently gave rise leader relatively guarded, emphasising It was during that Sunday, 3 to rather divergent accounts by naturally the natural need to consult his March, however, that the diffi- the two party leaders. Heath senior colleagues before offer- culties materialised which were claimed that Thorpe intimated raised it, and ing a response, but in lieu of such ultimately to contribute to the ‘a strong preference for the post consultation, Thorpe sought eventual collapse of the coali- of Home Secretary’, although received an Heath’s views on various other tion talks between Heath and Heath himself maintained that issues prominent at that particu- Thorpe. Thorpe consulted three ‘I made no such offer to him’, equally pre- lar juncture, most notably the of his most senior colleagues – particularly as the Cabinet Sec- dictable non- government’s stance on a pay his predecessor, , retary had warned Heath, prior deal for the miners, which was (the Liberals’ chief to the meeting, that ‘there were committal expected to be recommended whip), and Lord Byers (the Liber- matters in Thorpe’s private life, by the Pay Board in a few days’ als’ leader in the ) as yet undisclosed to the public, response time, and the fate of the Indus- – over Sunday lunch, although which might make this a highly trial Relations Act. He also asked many other Liberals, both inside unsuitable position for him to from his Heath what ‘dramatic changes’ and outside Parliament, were hold.’17 Yet Thorpe maintained Conservative he envisaged making to the Con- considerably uneasy, fearing ‘that that he neither demanded nor servative Party’s programme in some deal was being concocted’. indicated any expectation that counterpart. order to accommodate a political In fact, the four senior Liberals

Journal of Liberal History 61 Winter 2008–09 31 ‘asking too much and offering too little’?

affecting the putative coalition , who advised talks concerned the issue of elec- that if a deal with the Liberals toral reform, which most Liber- did not materialise, he should als deemed to be non-negotiable, seek a short-term coalition with and thus the prerequisite of any the Labour Party, his reason- parliamentary pact or coalition ing being that if Labour refused, with the Conservatives. Given ‘they will look very bad’, whereas that Heath had already alluded if they accepted, they would to the lower priority which this have to share responsibility for issue should enjoy in the (eco- the necessary austerity measures. nomic) circumstances – quite Either way, Wyatt advised Heath, apart from the Conservatives’ ‘you would look very good and own lack of enthusiasm for it – come out of it very well’.24 the insistence of other Liberals When Thorpe subsequently on the primacy of this issue was phoned Heath himself early bound to prove problematic. on Sunday evening, the Lib- However, it transpired that eral leader made no allusion to Thorpe had encountered an having already spoken to Nigel even more immediate and Fisher earlier in the day, but did ‘rather embarrassing’ problem report to Heath – ‘it is no good with his parliamentary col- beating about the bush’ – the leagues, namely their unwilling- concerns of other Liberal MPs ness to serve under or support a about the Conservative lead- Conservative administration led ership. Nonetheless, Thorpe by Heath himself. This prob- expressed his confidence that lem was initially reported to this particular issue as not ‘insu- Heath indirectly, following a perable … I can handle my party telephone call to Robert Arm- on that issue’. What was likely strong (Heath’s Private Secre- to prove more problematic, tary) from Conservative MP Thorpe warned, was the issue Nigel Fisher, who had himself of electoral reform, for this was been telephoned by Thorpe (the the issue that his colleagues ‘feel two of them were close friends, somewhat hard about’, to the in spite of their political differ- extent that there would need ences). Thorpe was at pains to to be some concrete proposals emphasise that this was certainly ‘before there could be talk about not a view which he personally an agreed package of economic shared, for although he acknowl- proposals’. If something could edged that he was ‘not very close be agreed concerning electoral to Ted’, he considered him to be reform before the end of the were agreeing at the time that Edward Heath ‘by far the most able man’ to lead year (1974), Thorpe suggested, the terms offered by Heath were and Jeremy the country at that moment, and then the Liberals might feel able inadequate as the basis for Lib- Thorpe as such, Thorpe himself would and willing to move beyond eral entry into a coalition gov- have been perfectly happy to offering ‘general support from ernment with the Conservatives, serve under him.21 Nonetheless, the Opposition bench to actual particularly as there was no firm many of his Liberal colleagues coalition’, whereas entering a commitment to introducing ‘had many grave reservations coalition under the existing vot- electoral reform.20 Yet in jump- about him [Heath] leading a coa- ing system would be viewed by ing to the wrong conclusions lition, partly because they had many Liberals as ‘simply putting over Thorpe’s ‘elite-level’ dis- been highly critical of Heath’s their heads under a chopper’. cussions, it may be that Liberal “handling of the miners” dispute The issue of electoral reform MPs were henceforth inclined to before the election’,22 but also subsequently yielded somewhat view almost any subsequent pro- because while it was difficult to divergent accounts of these talks, posals with unwarranted scep- discern who had actually won for according to Heath’s account ticism, thereby making it even the election, ‘we did know who of their first meeting, Thorpe harder for Thorpe to secure an had lost it.’23 ‘raised the subject of propor- agreement with either his own Incidentally, Heath might tional representation’, and when party or with Heath. have taken some comfort from Heath had a subsequent meeting Beyond this potential prob- another telephone call, this with his Cabinet colleagues, it lem, the first main difficulty time from former Labour MP, was ‘with particular reference

32 Journal of Liberal History 61 Winter 2008–09 ‘asking too much and offering too little’?

to proportional representation.’25 Liberal colleagues appeared to be given legislative effect by his too refers be proving somewhat intransi- Cabinet colleagues. Moreover, explicitly to the Liberals’ insist- gent on this issue (the implica- he pointed out, electoral reform ence on proportional representa- tion being that Thorpe himself had always been a matter for tion, hence her claim (see below) would much more readily have the House of Commons itself, that to accede to their demand reached an agreement with expressing its view by means of would have meant that the Con- Heath), acknowledging that a free vote. servatives would never form a ‘this is obviously hell – a night- Needless to say, Heath’s posi- majority government again.26 mare on stilts for you’.28 Cer- tion was effectively matched by For his part, however, Thorpe tainly Thorpe recalled that ‘I Thorpe’s stance on behalf of the insists that: ‘The term propor- don’t think I left him [Heath] Liberal Party, namely that there tional representation was never very sanguine about the chance could be no coalition or parlia- used’ when he sought a com- of success’ when leaving to con- mentary agreement between mitment from Heath that a coa- sult the Parliamentary Liberal the two parties without a firmer lition Cabinet would introduce Party.29 commitment from the Cabinet electoral reform.27 Following these consulta- Thorpe was with regard to electoral reform. In fact, Thorpe did use the tions during the Sunday evening, Thorpe reiterated that the Lib- term ‘proportional representa- Heath and Thorpe held another convinced eral Party would see little dif- tion’, but explicitly with regard meeting at 10.30pm to discuss ference between a minority to electoral reform for borough the respective outcomes. That that ‘unless Conservative government and a council elections, while recom- there was little progress on their Labour government, and would, mending the alternative vote for earlier discussions was indicated the Cabinet therefore, not be inclined to rural (shire) elections. There was, by the fact that this meeting only took a col- do a deal with either of them.30 however, no specific recommen- lasted for thirty minutes. Heath Thorpe was convinced that dation from Thorpe as to what explained that his senior col- lective view ‘unless the Cabinet took a col- type of electoral system should leagues had become even more lective view in favour of reform be adopted for general elections. convinced over the weekend in favour of and made it a vote of confidence The important point at this that nothing less than a coalition in the government, no reform stage, Thorpe emphasised, was with the Liberals would suffice reform and would have any chance of going for Heath to pledge the estab- in order to provide the country made it a through Parliament whilst the lishment of a Speaker’s Con- with the degree of political sta- Conservative Party continued ference on electoral reform, to bility that the economic situa- vote of confi- to favour the present first-past- report before the end of the year, tion warranted. An agreement the-post system.’31 This meeting whereupon its recommendations by the Liberals merely to sup- dence in the therefore ended with no clear (if acceptable to the Liberals, of port the government from the decision one way or another, course) would be enacted in the opposition bench in the House government, beyond Heath and Thorpe following parliamentary session. of Commons would not be suf- no reform agreeing to conduct further If this course of action could be ficient. Furthermore, Heath consultations with their respec- undertaken, then the Liberals insisted that if the Conservatives would have tive senior colleagues the next would subsequently be willing were to remain in office at this (Monday) morning. It was evi- to countenance the transition juncture, it would be under his any chance dent, however, that a ‘deal’ was from parliamentary support for continued leadership, which, he looking increasingly unlikely. the Conservative government to emphasised, was supported by of going This was confirmed the fol- participation in it through join- his senior colleagues. through lowing morning, when Heath ing a coalition. Without such a With regard to the Liber- and Thorpe reaffirmed that their course of action, however, most als’ demand that a Speaker’s Parliament – or, rather, their senior colleagues’ Liberal MPs would almost cer- Conference on electoral reform – positions had not subsequently tainly conclude that from their be established, with its recom- whilst the altered. Following a Cabinet perspective, ‘the difference mendations being implemented meeting at 10.00am, Heath wrote between a minority Labour and in the following parliamentary Conservative to Thorpe to reiterate the Con- a minority Conservative gov- session, Heath reported that Party contin- servatives’ view that nothing less ernment are matters which are while there was little objection than the participation of the Lib- outside their control’. to such a conference in prin- ued to favour erals in government (i.e., a coali- Thus it was that this second ciple, he could not guarantee tion) could provide the requisite round of talks was brought to an that its findings would prove the present political stability, but at the same end, in order that Thorpe and acceptable to the Parliamen- time, the Cabinet could only Heath could conduct further tary Conservative Party and as first-past- offer a Speaker’s Conference on consultations with their senior such, could not promise that the-post electoral reform, whose recom- colleagues. Thorpe did apolo- whatever was recommended by mendations would then be sub- gise to Heath for the fact that his a Speaker’s Conference would system’. ject to a free vote in Parliament.32

Journal of Liberal History 61 Winter 2008–09 33 ‘asking too much and offering too little’?

In reply, Thorpe insisted that this the bulk of the Conservative That the controversial remark I made was an inadequate basis for coop- Party was opposed to such a deal, at the time.’ Whitelaw subse- eration between the Liberals and especially if it might eventually coalition quently maintained, however, the Conservatives. He did sug- lead to the adoption of propor- talks failed that his televised comments gest, however, that in view of the tional representation.35 This had were a genuine reflection of his urgency of the economic prob- been confirmed at the Mon- to yield a views on the political situation at lems facing the country at the day morning Cabinet meeting, that time, and that the failure of time, ‘a Government of national when it had also been noted that Conserva- the coalition talks ‘was the cor- unity’ should be formed, com- many Conservatives were con- rect outcome’ constitutionally, prising members from all of the vinced that the Liberals were tive–Liberal even though it heralded ‘a weak main parliamentary parties.33 The ‘asking too much and offering administra- minority Labour government’.38 latter option was firmly rejected too little’.36 Heath was evidently forgiving of by Heath (the Cabinet had, ear- Similarly, Margaret Thatch- tion was not Whitelaw’s indiscretion, because lier that morning, acknowledged er’s ‘own instinctive feeling was he nonetheless invited him to that the time might come when that the party with the largest solely due join ministerial colleagues in a national unity government number of seats in the House to discuss their options would become necessary, but not of Commons was justified in to disagree- that weekend, but Whitelaw just yet), who cited a statement by expecting that they would be ments over was not well enough to under- the Labour Part y that it would not called to try to form a new gov- take the long journey from his be willing to enter into any such ernment’, and whilst she obvi- the issue of Penrith & Border constituency. coalition. The only option now, ously deeply disliked the notion Also believing that it was ‘just Heath explained, was to tender of the Labour Party benefiting electoral as well’ that the coalition talks his resignation forthwith.34 from the Tories’ travails, this failed was Peter Carrington, was probably preferable to a reform, who later acknowledged that the Conservative–Liberal coalition vitally impor- electorate would not ‘have taken V from which the Liberals secured kindly to the two minority par- That the coalition talks failed the prize of electoral reform – tant though ties (in the immediate past being to yield a Conservative–Liberal in which case the Conservative most abusive about each other) administration was not solely Party would never form a major- this was, of making common cause to form due to disagreements over the ity government again. 37 a Government and to exclude issue of electoral reform, vitally Meanwhile, one of Heath’s course. the majority party, however ten- important though this was, of closest colleagues at the uous the majority was.’39 course. What also undermined time, William Whitelaw, had Such comments, particularly Heath’s attempts at crafting a appeared on television on the as they emanated from senior coalition with the Liberals was Friday morning immediately figures spanning the ideologi- the antipathy towards such a following polling day to com- cal strands in the Conservative venture which existed amongst ment on the election results, Party at that time, suggest that senior figures in both parties, an declaring that ‘if Labour seemed even if Heath had managed opposition which was undoubt- to have won most seats, then to secure a commitment from edly often closely linked to pol- they had … effectively won Thorpe to enter a coalition, icy disagreements, but which the election’, which meant that many Conservatives themselves also derived from unease at the ‘any effort in 1974 by the Con- would have been antipathetic. clear impression of short-term servatives and Liberals to form Certainly, the parliamentary opportunism which such a a coalition together against majority that would have been coalition would engender, and Labour would have been very attained by a Conservative– which might ultimately damage unpopular and thus doomed to Liberal coalition would still the credibility and popularity of early failure’. Whitelaw subse- have been extremely narrow, both parties at the next general quently accounted for this some- and thus highly susceptible to election, to the Labour Party’s what injudicious assertion by ‘cross-voting’ or abstentions by electoral advantage. claiming that he had felt unwell even a handful of disgruntled Within the Conservative earlier that morning, and that MPs in either party. The ensu- Party, Norman Tebbit recalls whilst he had felt able to pro- ing image of weakness and lack that his surprise at Heath’s ceed with the television inter- of authority would probably refusal immediately to accept view, the medicine he took to have done lasting damage to the that he had lost, and resign alleviate his feverish symptoms Conservative Party’s reputation accordingly, ‘turned to real ‘completely dulled my memory for statecraft and strong govern- anger’ when it became evident and my senses’, to the extent ment, an important considera- that ‘he was seeking Liberal sup- that ‘I had absolutely no subse- tion which doubtless led many port for a coalition government.’ quent recollection of my inter- Conservatives to conclude that Moreover, Tebbit was sure that view … nor of the somewhat in the short term, allowing a

34 Journal of Liberal History 61 Winter 2008–09 ‘asking too much and offering too little’?

minority Labour government to propping up the Heath govern- still have been in a minority be formed was the lesser of two ment, and thereby destroying unless support was offered by evils (although as noted above, the significant progress achieved the SNP’s 7 MPs, and as such, there was also some concern that by the Liberals in February 1974. the putative coalition ‘would a Labour administration might Indeed, this consideration was have been strangled at birth.’ For subsequently benefit from North particularly pertinent given that all of these reasons, therefore, Sea oil revenues). much of the Liberal Party’s elec- Grimond observed that: ‘The Furthermore, there was con- toral success in February 1974 Liberal Party at that time were siderable antipathy in the Parlia- had accrued from erstwhile hostile to any arrangement with mentary Conservative Party to Conservative voters defecting to the Tories’, one which, in any pursuing a political alliance with the Liberals, to the extent that in case, ‘could not have got over a Liberal Party which ‘had been many constituencies, the Con- the first hurdle of a vote of con- the main beneficiary, if not the servatives, rather than Labour, fidence’ in Parliament ‘unless cause, of the Government’s loss were the Liberals’ main rivals. extra support could have been of support’, and as such, many In this context, more prescient drummed up from the minor- Conservatives were strongly Liberals adjudged that enter- ity parties.’41 Similarly, accord- inclined to ‘leave the Liberal ing a coalition with the Con- ing to a Conservative participant Party alone’, while anticipating servatives would appear to many in the ministerial discussions that much of its increased sup- voters to be highly opportun- that ‘dreadful’ weekend, two port would dissipate in the next istic, thereby undermining the other prominent Liberal MPs, election, whereupon many of Liberal Party’s perennial claim David Steel and , those who had voted Liberal in to offer a new kind of politics were not interested in any coa- February 1974 would ‘return’ to which transcended the oppor- lition with the Tories. Indeed, the Conservatives, suitably chas- tunism, partisan self-interest it is suggested that had Jeremy tened by their folly.40 and ‘short-termism’ which the Thorpe agreed to enter a coali- Liberals attributed to the Labour tion with the Conservatives, ‘his and Conservative Parties. It was Parliamentary Party would have VI also considered that the almost split.’42 Certainly, David Steel One might have expected rather inevitable failure of a fragile recalls that when Thorpe met more enthusiasm from the Lib- Conservative–Liberal coalition his parliamentary colleagues erals for a Conservative–Lib- would cause immense harm to on Monday 4 March, in lieu eral coalition, for participation A further the Liberal Party’s own cred- of making a final decision over in such a government would ibility and longer-term political Heath’s invitation to form a coa- ostensibly have raised the Lib- reason for prospects. lition, ‘it became clear that the eral Party’s profile and enhanced Certainly, with the Con- almost universal view was that their credibility after decades Liberal servative and Labour parties’ we should not go into a Heath of electoral decline and parlia- reluctance to combined share of the vote in government’. 43 Moreover, just as mentary marginalisation. How- February 1974 having fallen to Conservative opponents of a deal ever, the Liberals’ antipathy make a deal 75 per cent (this heralding a new felt that the Liberals were ask- went wider and deeper than the era of partisan dealignment in ing too much and offering too obvious disagreements with the with the Con- British politics), and the Liberal little, so did many Liberals feel Conservative leadership over Party having correspondingly that by asking them to entering electoral reform (or, rather, the servatives, increased its share to 19 per cent, a coalition while offering only a absence of it), and disapproval particularly many Liberals were of the view Speaker’s Conference and a par- of Heath’s refusal to resign the that their party’s future electoral liamentary free vote on electoral Conservative leadership, having in the form prospects would best be served reform, it was the Conservatives failed to win the election. Cer- by not aligning themselves with who were asking too much and tainly, many, if not most, Liberal of a coali- either of the main parties, but by offering too little. MPs were generally hostile to maintaining their independence A further reason for Liberal such a partnership in the politi- tion, was and ‘equidistance’, and thus their reluctance to make a deal with cal circumstances pertaining the fear that integrity. This, it was envisaged, the Conservatives, particularly at the time, this hostility being would leave the Liberal Party in the form of a coalition, was underpinned by a concomi- ‘they would, well placed to attract further the fear that ‘they would, sooner tant calculation that a coalition support from the growing num- or later, be swallowed up’.44 would be unsustainable in prac- sooner or bers of disillusioned, dealigned There was undoubtedly a sus- tice – in which case, another voters in subsequent elections. picion that this was one of the general election would prob- later, be Besides, as Jeremy Thorpe’s reasons why senior Conserva- ably have to be called, where- swallowed predecessor as Liberal leader, Jo tives were apparently so keen upon the Liberal Party was likely Grimond, observed, a Conserv- to persuade the Liberals to join to be ‘punished’ by voters for up’. ative–Liberal coalition would a coalition. Such scepticism

Journal of Liberal History 61 Winter 2008–09 35 ‘asking too much and offering too little’?

and antipathy towards doing Even if 1 Quoted in David Butler and Den- ‘Note for the Record: Minutes of a deal with the Conservatives nis Kavanagh, The British General meeting between Edward Heath was certainly not confined to Heath and Election of February 1974 (London: and Jeremy Thorpe, held on 2 Liberal MPs, for it was subse- Thorpe had Macmillan, 1974), p. 253. March 1974’, 3 March 1974. quently alleged that ‘Liberal 2 , Conflict of Loyalty 20 Steel, A House Divided, pp. 14–15. activists were … up in arms at succeeded (London: Macmillan, 1994), p. 81. 21 National Archives, PREM 15/2069, the suggestion that the party … 3 James Prior, A Balance of Power Robert Armstrong, ‘Note of Tele- might lend itself to propping up in agreeing (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1986), phone Conversation with Nigel a defeated Tory government.’45 p. 95. Fisher’, 3 March 1974. Indeed, it has been suggested the basis of 4 Butler and Kavanagh, The British 22 Most Liberals were also critical of that if Thorpe had agreed to a coalition, General Election of February 1974, p. the militancy of the NUM in its form a coalition with Heath’s 258. pursuit of the strike, but there was Conservatives – ‘For himself, they would 5 Margaret Thatcher, The Path to nonetheless considerable sympathy he would have loved to have Power (London: HarperCollins, in the party with the miners’ case been able to accept’46 – it would almost cer- 1995), p. 238. per se. almost certainly have prompted 6 National Archives CAB 128/53, 23 Thorpe, In My Own Time, p. 115. ‘a far-reaching split in the Liberal tainly have CM (74) 9th conclusions, 1 March 24 National Archives, PREM 15/2069, Party’, for the ‘radical anti-Tory encountered 1974. ‘Record of Telephone message from mood in the Party was strong’, as 7 National Archives, PREM 16/231, Woodrow Wyatt to Edward Heath’, articulated in the communica- a distinct and Robert Armstrong [Heath’s Private 3 March 1974. tions submitted to Liberal head- Secretary] ‘Note for the Record: 25 Heath, The Course of My Life, p. quarters in London throughout damaging Events Leading to the Resignation 518. the weekend.47 of Mr. Heath’s Administration on 4 26 Thatcher, The Path to Power, p. 239. It is evident, therefore, that lack of sup- March 1974’, 16 March 1974. 27 Thorpe, In My Own Time, p. 115. while the Conservative Party’s port from 8 National Archives, PREM 15/2069, 28 National Archives, PREM 15/2069, refusal to offer a firm commit- ‘F.E.R.B to Heath’, 2 March 1974. ‘Transcript of Telephone Conversa- ment to introducing electoral their respec- 9 Vernon Bogdanor, ‘Devolution’ in tion between Edward Heath and reform is the most obvious and Zig Layton-Henry (ed.), Conserva- Jeremy Thorpe’, 3 March 1974. well-publicised reason for the tive parlia- tive Politics (London: Macmillan, 29 Thorpe, In My Own Time, p. 115. eventual breakdown of the 1980), p. 88. 30 Of course, three years later, the Conservative–Liberal coalition mentary 10 National Archives, PREM 15/2069, Liberal Party did do a deal with talks during the first four days colleagues. ‘Points for Talk with Mr. Thorpe’, 2 a minority Labour government, of March 1974, these talks were March 1974; ‘Note for the Record: when it joined the Lib-Lab Pact. always hampered by a lack of sup- Minutes of meeting between 31 Thorpe, In My Own Time, p. 116. port among the MPs and grass- Edward Heath and Jeremy Thorpe, 32 National Archives, PREM 15/2069, roots members of both parties. held on 2 March 1974’, 3 March Heath to Thorpe, 4 March 1974 Heath and Thorpe conducted 1974. (morning). their negotiations, increasingly 11 Norman St John-Stevas, The Two 33 National Archives, PREM 15/2069, cognizant of the fact that many Cities (Faber, 1984), p. 71. Thorpe to Heath, 4 March 1974. of their Conservative and Liberal 12 National Archives CAB 128/53, 34 National Archives, PREM 15/2069, colleagues on the backbenches CM (74) 9th conclusions, 1 March Heath to Thorpe, 4 March 1974 were unenthusiastic about, or 1974, Jeremy Thorpe, In My Own (afternoon). See also CAB 128/53, even hostile to, any deal between Time: Reminiscences of a Liberal Leader CM (74) 11th conclusions, 4 March them, and with MPs in both par- (London, Politico’s, 1999), p. 114. 1974. ties convinced that the other was 13 National Archives CAB 128/53, 35 Norman Tebbit, Upwardly Mobile ‘asking too much and offering too CM (74) 9th conclusions, 1 March (London: Weidenfeld and Nicol- little’ in return. As such, even if 1974. son), 1988, p. 134. Heath and Thorpe had succeeded 14 Edward Heath, The Course of My 36 National Archives, CAB 128/53, in agreeing the basis of a coali- Life: My Autobiography (London: CM (74) 10th conclusions, 4 March tion, they would almost certainly Hodder and Stoughton, 1998), p. 1974. have encountered a distinct and 519. 37 Thatcher, The Path to Power, p. 239. damaging lack of support from 15 David Steel, A House Divided: The 38 William Whitelaw, The Whitelaw their respective parliamentary Lib-Lab Pact and the Future of British Memoirs (London: Aurum, 1989), colleagues. Politics (London: Weidenfeld and pp. 133–34, 135. Nicolson, 1980), p. 14. 39 Lord (Peter) Carrington, Reflect Peter Dorey is Reader in British 16 Heath, The Course of My Life, p. on Things Past: The Memoirs of Lord Politics at , and is 518. Carrington (London: Collins, 1988), the author of numerous books, arti- 17 Ibid. p. 266. cles and chapters on the three main 18 Thorpe, In My Own Time, p. 115. 40 National Archives, PREM 16/231, British political parties. 19 National Archives, PREM 15/2069 Robert Armstrong, ‘Note for the

36 Journal of Liberal History 61 Winter 2008–09 ‘asking too much and offering too little’?

Record: Events Leading to 42 Prior, A Balance of Power, p. 95. Mr. Heath’s Administration on 47 Butler and Kavanagh, The Brit- the Resignation of Mr Heath’s 43 Steel, A House Divided, p. 14. 4 March 1974’, 16 March 1974. ish General Election of February Administration on 4 March 44 National Archives, PREM 45 John Campbell, Edward Heath: 1974, p. 258. 1974’, 16 March 1974. 16/231, Robert Armstrong, A Biography (London: Jonathan 41 Jo Grimond, Memoirs (London: ‘Note for the Record: Events Cape, 1993), pp. 616–17. Heinemann, 1979), p. 232–33. Leading to the Resignation of 46 Ibid, p. 616.

RESEARCH IN PROGRESS If you can help any of the individuals listed below with sources, contacts, or any other information — or if you know anyone who can — please pass on details to them. Details of other research projects in progress should be sent to the Editor (see page 3) for inclusion here.

Letters of Richard Cobden (1804–65). Knowledge of the whereabouts Recruitment of Liberals into the Conservative Party, 1906–1935. of any letters written by Cobden in private hands, autograph collections, Aims to suggest reasons for defections of individuals and develop an and obscure locations in the UK and abroad for a complete edition of understanding of changes in electoral alignment. Sources include his letters. (For further details of the Cobden Letters Project, please see personal papers and newspapers; suggestions about how to get hold of www.uea.ac.uk/his/research/projects/cobden). Dr Anthony Howe, School the papers of more obscure Liberal defectors welcome. Cllr Nick Cott, 1a of History, University of East Anglia, Norwich NR4 7TJ; [email protected]. Henry Street, Gosforth, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, NE3 1DQ; [email protected]. Cornish Methodism and Cornish political identity, 1918–1960s. Liberal Unionists. A study of the as a discrete Researching the relationship through oral history. Kayleigh Milden, political entity. Help with identifying party records before 1903 Institute of Cornish Studies, Hayne Corfe Centre, Sunningdale, Truro TR1 3ND; particularly welcome. Ian Cawood, Newman University Colllege, [email protected]. Birmingham; [email protected]. Liberal foreign policy in the 1930s. Focusing particularly on Liberal anti- Life of Wilfrid Roberts (1900–91). Roberts was Liberal MP for Cumberland appeasers. Michael Kelly, 12 Collinbridge Road, Whitewell, Newtownabbey, North (now Penrith and the Border) from 1935 until 1950 and came from Co. Antrim BT36 7SN; [email protected]. a wealthy and prominent local Liberal family; his father had been an MP. Roberts was a passionate internationalist, and was a powerful advocate The Liberal Party’s political communication, 1945–2002. PhD thesis. for refugee children in the Spanish civil war. His parliamentary career is Cynthia Messeleka-Boyer, 12 bis chemin Vaysse, 81150 Terssac, France; +33 6 coterminous with the nadir of the Liberal Party. Roberts joined the Labour 10 09 72 46; [email protected]. Party in 1956, becoming a local councillor in Carlisle and the party’s Liberal policy towards Austria-Hungary, 1905–16. Andrew Gardner, 17 candidate for the Hexham constituency in the 1959 general election. I am Upper Ramsey Walk, Canonbury, London N1 2RP; [email protected]. currently in the process of collating information on the different strands of Roberts’ life and political career. Any assistance at all would be much The Liberal revival 1959–64. Focusing on both political and social appreciated. John Reardon; [email protected]. factors. Any personal views, relevant information or original material from Liberal voters, councillors or activists of the time would be very The political career of Edward Strutt, 1st Baron Belper . Strutt was gratefully received. Holly Towell, 52a Cardigan Road, Headingley, Leeds LS6 Whig/Liberal MP for Derby (1830-49), later Arundel and Nottingham; in 3BJ; [email protected]. 1856 he was created Lord Belper and built Kingston Hall (1842-46) in the village of Kingston-on-Soar, Notts. He was a friend of Jeremy Bentham The rise of the Liberals in Richmond () 1964–2002. Interested and a supporter of free trade and reform, and held government office in hearing from former councillors, activists, supporters, opponents, as Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and Commissioner of Railways. with memories and insights concerning one of the most successful local Any information, location of papers or references welcome. Brian Smith; organisations. What factors helped the Liberal Party rise from having [email protected] no councillors in 1964 to 49 out of 52 seats in 1986? Any literature or news cuttings from the period welcome. Ian Hunter, 9 Defoe Avenue, Kew, Student radicalism at Warwick University. Particulary the files affair in Richmond TW9 4DL; 07771 785 795; [email protected]. 1970. Interested in talking to anybody who has information about Liberal Students at Warwick in the period 1965-70 and their role in campus Liberals and the local government of London 1919–39. Chris Fox, 173 politics. Ian Bradshaw, History Department, University of Warwick, CV4 7AL; Worplesdon Road, Guildford GU2 6XD; [email protected]. [email protected] Liberal politics in Sussex, Portsmouth and the Isle of Wight 1900–14. Welsh Liberal Tradition – A History of the Liberal Party in Wales The study of electoral progress and subsequent disappointment. 1868–2003. Research spans thirteen decades of Liberal history in Wales Research includes comparisons of localised political trends, issues but concentrates on the post-1966 formation of the Welsh Federal Party. and preferred interests as aganst national trends. Any information, Any memories and information concerning the post-1966 era or even specifically on Liberal candidates in the area in the two general elections before welcomed. The research is to be published in book form by Welsh of 1910, would be most welcome. Family papers especially appreciated. Academic Press. Dr Russell Deacon, Centre for Humanities, University of Wales Ian Ivatt, 84 High Street, Steyning, West Sussex BN44 3JT; ianjivatt@ Institute Cardiff, Cyncoed Campus, Cardiff CF23 6XD; [email protected]. tinyonline.co.uk. Aneurin Williams and Liberal internationalism and pacificism, 1900– The Liberal Party in the West Midlands from December 1916 to 22. A study of this radical and pacificist MP (Plymouth 1910; North West the 1923 general election. Focusing on the fortunes of the party in Durham/Consett 1914–22) who was actively involved in League of Birmingham, Coventry, Walsall and Wolverhampton. Looking to explore Nations Movement, Armenian nationalism, international co-operation, the effects of the party split at local level. Also looking to uncover the pro-Boer etc. Any information relating to him and location of any steps towards temporary reunification for the 1923 general election.Neil papers/correspondence welcome. Barry Dackombe. 32 Ashburnham Fisher, 42 Bowden Way, Binley, Coventry CV3 2HU ; neil.fisher81@ntlworld. Road, Ampthill, Beds, MK45 2RH; [email protected]. com.

Journal of Liberal History 61 Winter 2008–09 37