North Korea and Prospects for Chemical Weapons
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MM aa gg aa zz ii nn ee Journal on Chemical and Biological Wepons CBW Volume 9 Number 1-2 Jan-Jun 2016 ISSN: 0974-0619 EDITORIAL 3 INVITED ARTICLE 4 Preparations for the Eighth Review Conference to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention John Hart COVER STORY 8 Investigating the use of Chemical Weapons in Syria Cindy Vestergaard SPECIAL FEATURE 11 PrepCom: Setting the Stage for the 'Eighth' Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention Animesh Roul OPINION 13 India’s Policy towards WMD Weapons: Status and Trends Chandreyee Chakraborty FOCUS 17 North Korea and Prospects for Chemical Weapons Disarmament Kapil Patil KALEIDOSCOPE 20 Chemical Weapons are just as dangerous as ever! Elaheh Pooyandeh CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL NEWS 23 BOOK REVIEW 54 Neuroscience and the Future of Chemical-Biological Weapons by Malcolm Dando, (2015) Arul R Jan-Jun 2016 1 Journal on Chemical and Biological Weapons 2 Editorial Executive Editor he Preparatory Committee Meeting for Tthe Eight Review Conference scheduled Ajey Lele in November 2016, was concluded in April. The follow up meeting will take place in August 2016. Keeping this in focus, Animesh Roul in this issue of the CBW Magazine Assistant Editor discusses what the important agendas are for the upcoming Review Conference. John Gunjan Singh Hart emphasizes on the preparations towards the Eighth Review Conference and argues the importance of maintaining the treaty norms. Cindy Vestergaard in her article discusses the success of the three investigative mechanisms undertaken to explore the truth about the use of chemical weapons in Syria. North Korea's possession and probable use of chemical weapons against the United States and South Korea with the help of delivery platforms has been highlighted by Kapil Patil. Chandreyee Chakraborty traces the differences in Indian response towards WMD regimes. This issue also comprises other regular features like the Book Review, Kaleidoscope and Chemical and Biological News. With our readers' feedback, we wish to publish issues in the future that focus on a subject of particular concern. Contributions and feedback are welcome and can be addressed to: [email protected] Jan-Jun 2016 3 Invited Article umerous planning documents and Preparations for Npolicy statements are being generated in the lead-up to the Eighth Review the Eighth Conference to the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) for which Review Ambassador György Molnár of Hungary is the President-Designate. The Preparatory Conference to Committee (PrepCom) is being held in two sessions: 26-27 April and 8-12 August, while the Biological the Review Conference itself will take place on 7-25 November in Geneva. The treaty and Toxin currently has 174 States Parties. Of the non- Weapons parties, eight are signatories.1 The April session of the PrepCom elected the Convention Review Conference officials and adopted the Review Conference agenda. The two John Hart* PrepCom Vice Chairmen are Ambassador Michael Biontino of Germany and The author is a Senior Ambassador Boujemâa Delmi of Algeria. Researcher and Head of the During the Review Conference, they will Chemical and Biological serve as the Chairman of the Committee of Security Project within the the Whole (CoW) and the Chairman of the SIPRI Arms Control and Non- Drafting Committee, respectively. The proliferation Programme, Review Conference will also have 20 Vice- Stockholm. Presidents distributed geographically as follows: 10 from the Group of Non-Aligned Summary Movement and Other States, 6 from the The States Parties to the 1972 Western Group and 4 from the Eastern Biological and Toxin Weapons European Group. Geographically balanced Convention are preparing for the workshops and consultations are being Eighth Review Conference in convened this year to help facilitate the November. Their focus remains on process of ensuring a successful Review institutional capacity and exchange of Conference outcome. Such an outcome will views and information, rather than on probably entail a fourth series of annual possible specific compliance concerns. inter-sessional political and technical Consultations and proposals are meetings (i.e., until the 9th Review reviewed. Treaty norms and Conference) with revised agenda items. appropriate capacity must be maintained. The criteria for a successful outcome include ensuring: * The views expressed are the author’s (a) the principle of not harming the regime and do not necessarily reflect those of (perhaps inadvertently) is observed; SIPRI. Journal on Chemical and Biological Weapons 4 (b) preparations are well managed (e.g., relevant actors for the implementation of the through constructive consultations World Health Organization’s (WHO) among relevant actors, and the timely International Health Regulations (IHR) availability of relevant documents); and (revised 2005), and the relevant goals of the G7 Global Partnership Against the Spread (c) the Review Conference outcome of Weapons and Materials of Mass maintains and strengthens the relevance Destruction. The EU supports putting in (perceived and actual) of the regime, place ‘more frequent and focused including to the broader public, assessments’ of relevant science and international actors and government technology developments which could, in communities. principle, incorporate ‘a standing science and technology advisory function’ in the Notable developments in the third inter- Implementation Support Unit (ISU). Finally, session process which ended in December the EU supports a comprehensive review of 2015 include discussions and papers on confidence-building measure (CBM) compliance, including a joint Belgium- formats, including moving the regime Luxembourg-Netherlands peer review towards a position where annual CBM forms system to assess national implementation of act as ‘the regular declaration tool’ which the Convention based, in turn, on a December inform consideration of the Convention’s 2013 pilot-peer review exercise hosted by ‘implementation and compliance’. This France and involving the participation of implies that the parties should eventually experts from Canada, China, Germany, make CBMs legally binding. India, Mexico, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. The Russia has expressed continued support for Benelux peer review proposal is being a reconsideration of compliance issues that implemented in two phases: (a) a written takes into consideration the work of the Ad consultation based on 2015 CBM Hoc Group of Governmental Experts to submissions (Form A and Form E) of these Identify and Examine Potential Verification states, and (b) an ‘event’ in which this Measures from a Scientific and Technical information is discussed which is then Standpoint (VEREX). In December 2015 followed by on-site visits to ‘installations Armenia, Belarus, China and Russia tabled a declared in Form A in the host country’. proposal for inclusion in the final document of the 8th Review Conference (The proposal The EU maintains that verification ‘remains does not include visits (i.e. routine a central element of a complete and effective inspections), which was one of the most disarmament and non-proliferation regime’. difficult issues during negotiations on a It has also noted the importance of protocol to strengthen compliance with the strengthening the operational capabilities of Convention between 1995 and 2001.) They the UN Secretary-General’s mechanism for proposed that an open-ended working group investigating alleged chemical and/or elaborate on a consensus basis ‘appropriate biological weapon use by expanding the pool measures and draft proposals’ to strengthen of qualified experts, as well as carrying out the Convention as a legally binding training, table-top and field exercises. The instrument. Such a working group shall EU has also pledged to support consider: implementation of Article X by inter alia supporting the development of the (a) the incorporation of existing and Cooperation and Assistance Database, the potentially further enhanced confidence Jan-Jun 2016 5 building and transparency measures, as ‘liaise’ with the ISU in order to assist it to appropriate, into the regime; prepare for further annual inter-sessional meetings. It also called for the parties to (b) measures to achieve effective national agree on the parameters or guidelines to implementation of the Convention; inter-sessional annual meetings of the states parties, which should be able to take (c) measures for considering the decisions (e.g. with respect to the implications of developments in areas implementation of the ISU Cooperation and of science and technology relevant to Assistance Database). (The ISU has worked the Convention and agreeing in that to establish a database with offers and regard appropriate steps to enhance the requests for assistance in accordance with a effective implementation of the decision by the Seventh Review Conference Convention; in 2011.) (d) measures for strengthening Also in 2015, eighteen states parties international cooperation for peaceful provided views and proposals concerning purposes in accordance with Article X implications of the spread of technology and of the Convention; disease outbreak, including the proposal that ‘States Parties should agree to discuss the (e) procedures and mechanisms for role of the BWC and the Implementation assistance and protection against Support Unit in an investigation determining biological weapons in accordance with whether a disease outbreak’ is naturally Article VII of the Convention;