Rinat Akhmetov's Business Unites Ukraine in the Fight Against Coronavirus: SCM Partners with Anti-Crisis Centres in Western and Eastern Ukraine

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Rinat Akhmetov's Business Unites Ukraine in the Fight Against Coronavirus: SCM Partners with Anti-Crisis Centres in Western and Eastern Ukraine March 23, 2020 Rinat Akhmetov's business unites Ukraine in the fight against coronavirus: SCM partners with anti-crisis centres in Western and Eastern Ukraine DTEK, Metinvest and other SCM businesses owned by Rinat Akhmetov, along with FC Shakhtar, have become partners of the regional anti-crisis centres to fight COVID-19 in Donetsk, Luhansk, Lviv and Ivano-Frankivsk oblasts. The centres were created by executive officials of oblasts, cities and towns following the initiative of the President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky after his meeting with the Ukrainian business owners on 16 March 2020. SCM businesses also support similar centres in other regions and cities of their presence, primarily including Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia and Kharkiv oblasts. The centres consolidate efforts of local authorities, as well as the national and regional businesses to focus on the following key objectives: fighting the spread of coronavirus, helping those affected by COVID-19, mitigating the job loss risks for the Ukrainians, keeping as many businesses running as possible, especially in critical sectors of the economy. We remind that Rinat Akhmetov has consolidated the efforts of all SCM businesses, his Foundation and FC Shakhtar to assist Ukraine in its fight against coronavirus. Earlier, Rinat Akhmetov at his own initiative allocated UAH 300 million to help the country combat COVID-19. Rinat Akhmetov Foundation is to procure 300,000 test kits for the Stabilisation Fund of the President of Ukraine, as well as at least 200 ventilators for the state hospitals along with other equipment. Rinat Akhmetov Foundation was the first to join the fight against coronavirus, and since 22 February it has been providing tranches of its support package to the Health Ministry and the National Healthcare Service. They include personal protective equipment, test kits and other required equipment. https://metinvestholding.com/en/media/news/rinat-akhmetovs-business-unites-ukraine-in-the-fight-against-coronavirus-scm-partners-with-anti-crisis-centres-in-western-and-eastern-ukraine.
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