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Venezuelan Overview Venezuela DEBATES Venezuela Coordinated by JOHN POLGA-HECIMOVICH, IÑAKI SAGARZAZU, and RAÚL SÁNCHEZ URRIBARRÍ Venezuelan Overview by JOHN POLGA-HECIMOVICH | U.S. Naval Academy | [email protected], way to support the government, often at IÑAKI SAGARZAZU | Texas Tech University | [email protected], and clear odds with obvious interpretations of RAÚL SÁNCHEZ URRIBARRÍ | La Trobe University | [email protected] the constitutional and legal framework. The year 2016 was remarkable for Latin understanding of the importance of the Despite winning a legislative majority, America, marked by the impeachment of current crisis and provide us with the tools and possibly a supermajority, in the President Dilma Rousseff in Brazil, the to follow developments and engage in the December 2015 elections, the MUD has forging, rejection, and reforging of peace debate. been largely unable to legislate. Through in Colombia, and the passing of Fidel a combination of presidential vetoes and Castro in Cuba. No less noteworthy was favorable rulings from government-stacked the deepening of the economic, political, Political-Economic Crisis and the Recall courts, President Maduro has rendered and humanitarian crisis in Venezuela. Referendum the National Assembly nearly powerless. Perhaps the most salient political event This has included giving the Supreme was the October suspension of the Venezuela’s deteriorating social and Court (Tribunal Supremo de Justicia, TSJ) political opposition’s recall referendum economic situation is well documented the power to approve the budget law in against President Nicolás Maduro and the (PROVEA 2011, 2012; Amnesty October 2016 (a prerogative that belongs postponement of regional elections. By International 2016). The country faces to the legislature) (Chinea and Ellsworth removing this last bastion of government the world’s highest inflation rate (Werner 2016; Ellsworth 2016), perpetuating accountability, these actions marked the 2016), calamitous shortages of basic Maduro’s recurring state of emergency, and end of democracy in its most minimal goods (García Mora 2011; Caselli 2013; even declaring the National Assembly in definition, hence transforming what until Sánchez and Goodman 2016), frequent contempt of court. recently was considered a competitive and lengthy power outages (Bakke authoritarian regime into a dictatorship. 2016), and political deadlock (Alarcón, In response to the ongoing crisis, the Nonetheless, the international reaction— Álvarez, and Hidalgo 2016). A majority opposition is trying to remove the including governments, supranational of Venezuelans—as shown in most public president from office. Venezuela’s organizations, and even our own opinion polls—want President Nicolás 1999 Political Constitution does not professional forums—has been relatively Maduro of the ruling United Socialist Party provide for presidential impeachment subdued. Furthermore, despite substantial of Venezuela (Partido Socialista Unido de but does allow for a recall referendum, media attention, there has been little Venezuela, PSUV) to step down, and the the functional equivalent of a popular discussion of the implications for Venezuela opposition Democratic Unity Roundtable vote of no confidence. A minimum of and the region of the government’s decision (Mesa de la Unidad Democrática, MUD) 7,587,532 votes is required to remove the to suspend the referendum and, more pushed for a constitutionally sanctioned president—one more vote than Maduro important, whether the country’s liberal recall referendum to cut short the received when he was elected in 2013. democratic institutions will be minimally president’s term. Far from yielding to According to the Constitution, if a valid respected in the coming future. the circumstances, the government has recall vote takes place before January 10, tightened its grip by engaging in growing 2017, the president is removed from office To rectify this perceived shortcoming, we repression and blocking or impairing and fresh elections take place. However, have convened an interdisciplinary panel of legal avenues for dissent and prospective if elections occur later and the president distinguished Venezuelanists to analyze the political change. It has jailed members of is voted down, the vice president takes country’s current situation. We asked these the political opposition, fired some state the president’s place and serves out the scholars to speak about the recent social, employees who favored the referendum, remaining two years of the term. Adding to political, and economic crisis unfolding in doubled down on economic controls, and the stakes (and confusion), the Constitution the country from their different areas of militarized large parts of the public security allows the president to freely appoint and academic specialization and perspectives. apparatus. Most important, supposedly remove the vice president as well as cabinet We hope that these rigorous, yet accessible independent branches of power (especially ministers, meaning Maduro also has the accounts of the situation in Venezuela the judiciary and the national electoral ability to appoint his successor. will help to enhance our collective authority) have reliably gone out of their 35 lasaforum winter 2017 : volume xlviii : issue 1 Strategic Delaying Tactics stages, as has been well documented by backed institutions used unconstitutional journalists following the electoral beat means to effectively block a democratic Based on the existing legal framework (Martínez 2016c, 2016a). However, the election from taking place. This, of course, (Normas para regular los referendos opposition remained committed to the all but guaranteed that any referendum revocatorios 2007), two steps need to recall process and appeared to have the would only take place, if it took place at happen to call a recall referendum. First, signatures needed for a referendum—after all, after January 10, 2017, thus ensuring in order to initiate the recall process, all, it collected 1.8 million for the initial the continuity of Chavismo in office until the National Electoral Council (Consejo petition in only three days in late June 2019. Nacional Electoral, CNE) must receive a 2016. petition signed by 1 percent of the voting- The domestic public outcry at suspension age population (about 195,721 signatures). of the recall process was swift. In addition After initial hesitation, the opposition A Turning Point for Democracy? to public demonstrations, the Catholic finally cleared this hurdle on August 1, Postponement of the Recall Referendum Church, local human rights NGOs such as 2016 (for a detailed account of the process, PROVEA, and others expressed concern. including the two-week delay in even The turning point came when the In an extraordinary legislative session, the making the announcement, see Martínez government postponed regional elections MUD-controlled assembly approved an 2016b, 2016c). and suspended the recall referendum, “accord for the restitution of constitutional effectively removing the last remaining order and democracy” (Acuerdo para Second, once the 1 percent of signatures check on governmental power. These la restitución del orden constitucional). have been validated, an official petition events occurred in rapid succession. First, Declaring the executive, the TSJ, and the must be made to collect the signatures on October 19, the CNE issued a ruling CNE in breach of the 1999 Constitution, of at least 20 percent of the voting-age postponing the December 2016 regional the accord outlined ten actions, including population (roughly four million people), elections for governors and mayors debate on the constitutionality of which is the only requirement established (the head of the CNE, Tibisay Lucena, Maduro’s presidency; a move to replace by the Constitution. The rules established did not elaborate why). That same day, TSJ and CNE magistrates; submission by the CNE limit the collection of these the constitutional chamber of the TSJ of a complaint before the International signatures to three days and in the ruled that the MUD would be obliged to Court of Justice (ICJ) against the TSJ and locations and with the machines established collect the signatures of 20 percent of the CNE; and a request to the military not to by the electoral body (Normas para registered electorate in each of the country’s follow government orders. Governments regular los referendos revocatorios 2007). states in order for the second signature and regional organizations were also Further rules new to this year’s process collection of the recall referendum to be critical. Secretary General Luis Almagro were created by the CNE. Principally, valid. Impartial observers as well as the of the Organization of American States following the collection of the 1 percent in opposition immediately questioned the (OAS) condemned the suspension of the each state, the body required the collection legitimacy of both decisions (Prodavinci referendum and equated it to a rupture of 20 percent of voters in each state, 2016a, 2016c, 2016b, 2016d). of democracy, while Argentina, Brazil, contravening the constitutional norm that Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, establishes that the signatures must be Next, on October 20, the CNE issued a Honduras, Guatemala, Mexico, Peru, collected in the circuit under recall (i.e., the statement suspending the second signature Uruguay, and the United States issued a national circuit for a national presidential round altogether, after lower courts with joint document
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