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STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT 2020 Into a New Era of Great Power Competition Edited by Thomas F. Lynch III Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT 2020 STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT 2020 Into a New Era of Great Power Competition Edited by Thomas F. Lynch III Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University NDU Press Washington, D.C. 2020 Published in the United States by National Defense University Press. Portions of this book may be quoted or reprinted without permission, provided that a standard source credit line is included. NDU Press would appreciate a courtesy copy of reprints or reviews. Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the contributors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Department of Defense or any other agency of the Federal Government. Cleared for public release; distribution unlimited. Library of Congress Control Number: 2020946460 National Defense University Press 300 Fifth Avenue (Building 62) Suite 212 Fort Lesley J. McNair Washington, DC 20319 NDU Press publications are sold by the U.S. Government Publishing Office. For ordering information, call (202) 512-1800 or write to the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office, Washington, DC 20402. For GPO publications online, access its Web site at: http://bookstore.gpo.gov. Book design by Marco Marchegiani, U.S. Government Publishing Office Contents List of Illustrations . vii Foreword . .ix . Aaron L. Friedberg Acknowledgments . .xiii . Major Findings on Contemporary Great Power Competition . xv Part I. Conceptualizing the New Era of Great Power Competition 1 . Introduction . 1. Thomas F. Lynch III 2 . Past Eras of Great Power Competition: Historical Insights and Implications . .17 . Thomas F. Lynch III and Frank G. Hoffman 3a . Contemporary Great Power Geostrategic Dynamics: Relations and Strategies . 45 . Thomas F. Lynch III and Phillip C. Saunders 3b . Contemporary Great Power Geostrategic Dynamics: Competitive Elements and Tool Sets . 73 Thomas F. Lynch III and Phillip C. Saunders 4 . Contemporary Great Power Technological Competitive Factors in the Fourth Industrial Revolution . 105 T.X. Hammes and Diane DiEuliis Part II. Warfighting, Innovation, and Technology in a New Era of Great Power Competition 5 . Key Technologies and the Revolution of Small, Smart, and Cheap in the Future of Warfare . 121 T.X. Hammes 6 . Emerging Critical Information Technology and Great Power Competition . .139 . Richard Andres 7 . Social Media and Influence Operations Technologies: Implications for Great Power Competition . 153 . Todd C. Helmus 8 . Weapons of Mass Destruction, Strategic Deterrence, and Great Power Competition . 169 Paul Bernstein, Justin Anderson, Diane DiEuliis, Gerald Epstein, and Amanda Moodie v vi Contents Part III. Geostrategic Interactions in a New Era of Great Power Competition 9 . The Indo-Pacific Competitive Space: China’s Vision and the Post–World War II American Order . .185 . Thomas F. Lynch III, James Przystup, and Phillip C. Saunders 10 . Rogues, Disrupters, and Spoilers in an Era of Great Power Competition . 219. Bryce Loidolt, Mariya Omelicheva, and James Przystup 11 . Counterterrorism and the United States in a New Era of Great Power Competition . .233 . R. Kim Cragin, Hassan Abbas, Zachary M. Abuza, and Mariya Omelicheva 12 . Whither Europe in a New Era of Great Power Competition? Resilient but Troubled . 251 Steven Philip Kramer and Irene Kyriakopoulos 13 . Competing Visions and Actions by China, Russia, and the United States in Latin America, the Middle East, Africa, and the Arctic . .271 . Bryce Loidolt, David Auerswald, Douglas Farah, Shannon Smith, and Caitlyn Yates Part IV. Preparing to Compete 14 . U .S . Strategies for Competing Against China . 289 Frank G. Hoffman 15 . Conclusion: Realities, Imperatives, and Principles in a New Era of Great Power Competition . .309 . Thomas F. Lynch III Appendix A . Selected Bibliography . 335 . Appendix B . Contemporary Great Power Competition Dynamics Matrix (online only) . 349 List of Contributors . 351. Index . 357. Illustrations Figures 1 .1 . Continuum of Major State Interaction Postures . 3. 2 .1 . Britain (William Pitt) and Napoleon Carving Up the World . 25 . 2 .2 . Britain, Germany, and Russia in Pursuit of Colonies . 29 2 .3 . Britain and U .S . Rapprochement: Uncle Sam and John Bull Shake Hands . 31 2 .4 . U .S . Army Anti-Japanese Propaganda Poster . 34. 3b .1 . Comparison of Great Power GDP . .77 . 3b .2 . Correlation Between Level of Industrialization and Percentage of Commercial Global Financial Markets . .79 . 4 . Global Natural Gas Benchmark Prices in USD per MMbtu . 110. 5 .1 . Kalibr Cruise Missile Ranges if Launched from West or Gulf Coasts . 128 5 .2 . Range of Missiles, Drones, and Aircraft in Nautical Miles . 132 9 .1 . China’s Nine-Dash Line (in green) in the South China Sea . 190 . 9 .2 . The First and Second Island Chains . .196 . 11 .1 . Number of Successful Attacks and Failed Plots Conducted by VEOs by Region, 1990–2018 . 235 11 .2 . Proportion of Attacks Conducted by VEOs in Salafi Jihadist Movement, 1996–2018 . .237 . 11 .3 . Number of Successful Attacks and Failed Plots by U .S . Homegrown Extremists, 2002–2018 . 238 . 13 .1 . Russian and Chinese Aid and Investments in Latin America . .273 . 13 .2 . Chinese Strategic Partnerships in the Middle East . 276. 13 .3 . Total Chinese Investment and Construction in Africa (2005–2018) as a Percent of Recipient 2018 GDP . 278. Tables 2 .1 . Frameworks for Thinking About Categories/Dimensions of Competition . 21 2 .2 . A Framework for Assessing the Aspects/Categories of Competition . 24 2 .3 . Major Dyadic Dynamics During Four Eras of Great Power Competition . .24 . 2 .4 . Great Power Iron and Steel Production in Selected Years (in Tons) . 28 2 .5 . Percentage of International Exports: Selected Years . .32 . vii viii Illustrations 3a .1 . Basic Postures and Compatibility of Strategic Aims, 2020–2025 . 61. 3a .2 . Geographic Regions and Great Power Strategic Interest Intensity, 2020–2025 . .64 . 3b .1 . A Framework for Assessing the Aspects/Categories of Competition . 76 3b .2 . Percentage Disparity Between Gross and Net Overall Power Factors Using Beckley’s Net Power Index . 78 . 8 .1 . Biological Weapons and Gray Zone Operations . 177. 14 .1 . Alternative Strategies (X equals Major Line of Effort) . 292 . Foreword n retrospect, it seems clear that the new era of Great Power competition that is the sub- Iject of the chapters in this volume began to take shape almost as soon as the last era had drawn to a close . With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the sudden end of the Cold War, the United States found itself in a position of unchallenged (and seemingly unchallenge- able) global preponderance . Surveying the scene in the early 1990s, American policymakers quickly decided to put aside their previous grand strategy of containment in favor of what the George H .W . Bush administration initially described as “collective near-term engage- ment” aimed at the global “promotion of peace and democracy,” and what William Clinton administration national security adviser Anthony Lake subsequently labeled a policy of “engagement and enlargement ”. 1 Henceforth, Lake declared, the goal of U .S . policy would be to encourage the spread of “democracy and market economics” to places where these had not yet taken firm root, most notably across the vast expanse of Eurasia, an area that included China, Russia, the newly independent nations of the former Soviet Union, and the former members of its erstwhile empire in Eastern and Central Europe .2 What Lake and his colleagues had in mind was nothing less than the fulfilment of Woodrow Wilson’s vision for an all-encompassing liberal world order, an international sys- tem made up of states bound together by free trade, international rules and institutions, and a shared commitment to the principles of democratic governance and universal human rights . This was the third time in the course of the 20th century that American policymakers had sought to remake the world along liberal lines . Wilson’s first attempt, at the close of World War I, had ended in failure . Twenty-five years later his successors would try again, only to find their path blocked by the descent of the Iron Curtain and the start of the Cold War . In place of a truly global liberal order, in the wake of World War II, U .S . policymakers had to settle for a partial, geographically limited subsystem that ultimately came to include the advanced industrial democracies of Western Europe, East Asia, and the Western Hemi- sphere . Despite its constrained scope, this collection of nations (often referred to loosely and somewhat inaccurately as the “West”) proved to be enormously successful in gener- ating both wealth and power . Over a 40-year period of intense and sometimes dangerous rivalry, its members were able to out innovate, outproduce, and ultimately outlast their Communist competitors . With the Cold War over, American policymakers hoped, in effect, to extend the boundaries of the Western system, expanding a partial order operating on liberal principles to encompass the entire globe, including nations that had previously chosen to remain out- side its limits . Over the course of the 1990s, the United States and its European allies were able to induce the smaller and weaker nations of the former Soviet empire to reshape their economic and political systems along liberal lines by making reform a requirement for full ix x Foreword membership in the Western system . Lacking equivalent leverage with Russia and China, the democracies chose to take the opposite tack: incorporating these major powers as fully as possible into existing institutions (and, in particular, into the international economy) in the hopes that doing so would, in itself, promote liberalizing reforms . It is the failure of this approach, evidence of which has been accumulating for at least the past decade, that set the stage for the new era of Great Power competition . Traveling by different routes, in the 30 years since the end of the Cold War, Russia and China have ended up in broadly similar positions .

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