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Dyadic power theory. Item Type text; Dissertation-Reproduction (electronic) Authors Schampel, James Howard. Publisher The University of Arizona. Rights Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author. Download date 05/10/2021 08:25:32 Link to Item http://hdl.handle.net/10150/185279 INFORMATION TO USERS The most advanced technology has been used to photograph and reproduce this manuscript from the microfilm master. llMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of computer printer. The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. 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Contact UMI directly to order. U-M-I University Microfilms International A Bell & Howell Information Company 300 North Zeeb Road. Ann Arbor. M148106·1346 USA 313 761·4700 800'521·0600 Order Number 9111964 Dyadic power theory Schampel, James Howard, Ph.D. The University of Arizona, 1990 U·M·I 300 N. Zeeb Rd. Ann Arbor, MI 48106 DYADIC POWER THEORY by James Howard Schampel A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements For the Degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY In the Graduate College THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA 1 990 2 THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA GRADUATE COLLEGE As members of the Final Examination Committee, we certify that we have read the dissertation prepared by ~J~ame~~s~R~~Sbh~amp~~e~l~ ________________________ __ enti tIed Dyadic PCMer Theory and recommend that it be accepted as fulfilling the dissertation requirem~nt for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy ~---....." Date S-43/CZ'J DatE! ' ·S-I ;) ,0'if Date"- , Date Date Final approval and acceptance of this dissertation is contingent upon the candidate's submission of the final copy of the dissertation to the Graduate College. I hereby certify that I have read this dissertation prepared under my direction and recommend that it be accepted as fulfilling the dissertation requirement. Dissertation Director 'i Date 3 STATEMENT BY AUTHOR This dissertation has been submitted in partial fulfillment of requirements for an advanced degree at The University of Arizona and is deposited in the University Library to be made available to borrowers under the rules of the library. Brief quotations from this dissertation are allowable without special permission, provided that accurate acknowledgment of source is made. Requests for permission for extended quotation from or reproduction of this manuscript in whole or in part may be granted by the the head of the major department or the Dean of the Graduate College when in his or her judgment the proposed use of the material is in the interests of scholarship. In all other instances, however permission must be obtained from the author. SIGN 4 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS ... • • . 6 LIST OF TABLES . • • • • • • • • 7 - 8 ABSTRACT .. • • 9 1. INTRODUCTION. .10 2. LITERATURE REVIEW, POWER .25 INTRODUCTION . .25 DEFINITIONS OF POWER · .28 BEGINNINGS OF HYPOTHESIS FORMATION AND TESTING .. 30 SUMMARY . .. ... .51 3. LITERATURE REVIEW, ALLIANCE BEHAVIOR · .52 INTRODUCTION . .52 ALLIANCE . · .52 PRE-SCIENTIFIC. ERA . .53 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS .62 SUMMARY ..... · .76 4. THE THEORY OF DYADIC POWER-RATIO CHANGE DEFINED .... 78 INTRODUCTION .. ....... · . .78 APPROACH . · .78 CRISIS . .80 DYADIC POWER-RATIO CHANGE DEFINED ..... · . 83 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE THEORY OF DYADIC POWER- RATIO CHANGE . · .86 ALLIANCE . · .94 SUMMARY. .. · . 97 5. METHODOLOGY. · 102 6. NATIONAL POWER RATIOS, FINDINGS. · 129 INTRODUCTION . · 129 CHANGES IN VELOCITY AND ACCELERATION . 134 MEAN LEVEL OF CHANGE . 142 AVERAGE OF VELOCITY AND ACCELERATION AND "ACTION"/ "NON-ACTION" . 143 5 ACCELERATION . 143 VELOCITY . 144 SUMMARY ...... · . 148 7. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS ... · . 150 INTRODUCTION . ... .. · . 150 VELOCITY . .. ...... 150 CONTIGUITY . 158 THE NON-ACTION EVENT . · . 159 NON-FINDINGS . ...... 159 FUTURE DIRECTIONS .. 162 LIST OF REFERENCES. 166 6 LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS FIGURE Page 1. STATISTICAL CASE .. 22 2. RISK AND UNCERTAINTY . .. ... 47 3. LIST OF MAJOR CONTRIBUTIONS FOR CAUSE OF WAR .... 88 4. CONCEPTS OF DYADIC POWER-RATIO THEORY . .. 98 7 LIST OF TABLES TABLE Page 1. POWER RATIO DATA -- WAR ... 107-114 2. POWER RATIO DATA ALLIANCE. 116-120 3. POWER RATIO DATA NON-EVENT 121-126 4. AVERAGE MONTHLY VELOCITY .... 127 5. AVERAGE MONTHLY ACCELERATION .. 127 6. CHANGE IN POWER RATIO WAR/NO WAR 131 7. CHANGE IN POWER RATIO ALLIANCE/NO WAR. 131 8 . CHANGE IN POWER RATIO BY YEAR WAR/NO WAR 132 9. CHANGE IN POWER RATIO BY YEAR ALLIANCE/NO WAR 132 10. CHANGE IN POWER RATIO BY YEAR ACTION/NO WAR 132 11. CHANGE IN VELOCITY WAR/NO WAR. .. ... 136 12. CHANGE IN VELOCITY ALLIANCE/NO WAR. 137 13. CHANGE IN VELOCITY BY YEAR WAR/NO WAR 137 14. CHANGE IN VELOCITY BY YEAR ALLIANCE/NO WAR. 137 15. CHANGE IN VELOCITY BY YEAR ACTION/NO WAR. 138 16. CHANGE IN ACCELERATION WAR/NO WAR ..... 140 17. CHANGE IN ACCELERATION ALLIANCE/NO WAR 140 18. CHANGE IN ACCELERATION BY YEAR WAR/NO WAR 141 19. CHANGE IN ACCELERATION BY YEAR ALLIANCE/NO WAR 141 20. CHANGE IN ACCELERATION BY YEAR ACTION/NO WAR 142 21. LEVEL OF ACCELERATION WAR/NO WAR. 143 22. LEVEL OF ACCELERATION ALLIANCE/NO WAR. 144 23. LEVEL OF VELOCITY -- WAR/NO WAR ..... 145 8 LIST OF TABLES (Continued) 24. LEVEL OF VELOCITY -- ALLIANCE/NO WAR .. 145 25. LEVEL OF VELOCITY, CONTIGUOUS BOUNDARIES - ALLIANCE/NO WAR . 146 26. LEVEL OF VELOCITY, NON-CONTIGUOUS BOUNDARIES - ALLIANCE/NO WAR . 147 27. LEVEL OF VELOCITY, CONTIGUOUS BOUNDARIES -- WAR/NO WAR. 147 28. LEVEL OF VELOCITY, NON-CONTIGUOUS BOUNDARIES -- WAR/NO WAR. .. 147 ABSTRACT Dyadic power theory proposes that the speed of power ratio change between two nations predicts to both the onset of war and alliance formation. The speed of power-ratio change is measured utilizing the concepts of velocity and acceleration. It is posited that decision-makers perceive high velocity change and/or high acceleration of change in the power-ratio between them and a potential adversary as threatening. The lack of reaction time encourages the decision-makers to act in non-traditional ways. Thus, they opt for hostilities or alliance partners rather than utilize traditional diplomatic measures such as "summits", conferences, protests, etc. The independent variables of national power were provided by Jacek Kugler in private correspondence, and the dependent variables of alliances and wars were selected from data-sets compiled by Singer and Small. Dyadic changes in power previous to these events were then correlated with the events, themselves. Moderate support for the theory was obtained. Although there was little correlation between acceleration of power ratio change and either event, there were moderate correlations between average velocity of change and the event, suggesting that decision-makers react precipitously to rapidly changing conditions vis-a-vis potential adversaries. The findings suggest that future studies that will isolate such factors as size of nation, century of event, contiguity, and even type of political system of the adversaries or partners are warranted. 10 CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION We seem to be not a great deal closer to determining the causes of the onset of war than we were thirty years ago, for contradictions abound. It would appear that we have barely started to correlate alliance behavior, community of interest, a common enemy, and power relations with the onset of war. However, these disparate approaches have led to the consider ation of changes in power, measured in terms of acceleration and velocity, as a reasonable explanation for the onset of war. The thrust of this investigation is threefold: 1) investigate the relationship between power ratio changes and war; 2) investigate the relationship between power ratio changes and alliance performance (specifically, formation and entry); and 3) investigate the relationship between power ratio changes and "action" events. "Action" events are defined as the combination of initiation of hostilities and the formation of alliances, both of which are defined as pro ducts of "non-normal" diplomatic behavior. In all three of the aforementioned investigations, the event is correlated with a "non-action" event, a condition of "normal" diplomatic behavior, in order to determine whether the same power ratio change might also predict those events. The broad research questions addressed in this disser tation include "What effect do changes in power ratios among 11 and between nation-states have on the onset of war?" "Have we not exhausted the possibilities of alliance behavior predict- ing to the onset of war?" "Do changes in power ratios among and between nation-states predict equally to changes in alliance behavior and war?" If the last of these questions were answered in the affirmative, it would appear reasonable to posit that the relationship between alliance behavior and the onset of war is spurious.