AJC Memorandum on the Current Situation in Algeria

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AJC Memorandum on the Current Situation in Algeria THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE Paris> France June 6, 1958 * ^ Mr. Eugene Hevesi Cf** American Jewish Committee New York 16, N. Y. Dear Eugenes To date the situation of Jews in France and Algeria, as Jews, has remained virtually unaffected by the recent political crisis in France and the formation of the de Gaulle government. Jews were among the people violently for de Gaullej there were Jews violently against de Gaullej and Jews held every shade of position in between — in short, their position vis-a-vis the General was no different from that of any other Frenchman* One indication of this is the fact that neither the United HIAS nor the Jewish Agency has met with the slightest increased demand for emigration} whereas previous political events of importance — e.g., the outbreak of the Korean War — when Jews felt that they might eventually be threatened, resulted in a sharply increased desire to leave Europe. This does not mean, of course, that the changes in France, and the changes that may come in Algeria, will not have their effects in the months to come. Here we enter the realm of speculation, speculation involving not only the policies and personality of General de Gaulle but also of the potential development of the political forces in France during the next five or six crucial months. "Unknown" is the word for the views of France's new Premier, Charles de Gaulle, on most issues. He has — summarily enough — outlined his demand for French con- stitutional reform. He has begun to spell out his terms for settlement of the Algerian crisis. All the rest is guesswork. Given this enigmatic situation what are the bases we can have for speculation as to: What does de Gaulle's coming to power mean for Israel? What may it mean for the eventual position of Jews in France? With regard to Israel, it is known that on various occasions in recent years General de Gaulle has received the Israel Ambassador to France, Mr. Tsur, in pri- vate meetings and has expressed his admiration for Israel and for the work being done there. Something of this sentiment was expressed further in the reply^of General de Gaulle to the message sent him' by Israeli Premier, Ben Gurion, after de Gaulle became Premier, which saidt "I thank you for the amiable message that you sent me which expresses such noble sentiments. "I salute the courageous Israeli nation with which France maintains solid ties of friendship and with whom it shares the same spiritual ideal. "Like you, I hope that the wisdom of men will know how to assure peace and security in the world. Cordially yours, Charles de Gaulle" •» 2 — Favorable, too, for Israel have been the indications forthcoming from de Gaulle's conversations with French political party leaders in the days just before and after he took power that he had no desire radically to alter present French foreign policies and alliances. The presence in his cabinet of men like Socialist leader Guy Mollet (who was French Premier at the time of the French- Israeli-British invasion of Suez) and of former Premiers Pierre Pflimlin and Antoine Pinay, who have both backed French friendship with Israel on various occasions, was widely construed in Paris a3 an outward sign of this intended continuity of certain French policies, as well as being a bid by de Gaulle for greater internal political support. One should insert a caveat here, however. Many people have come away from de Gaulle conversations and reported indications of his thinking; and when the actual contents of the conversations became known later it was obvious there had been much wishful thinking, with de Gaulle making enigmatic pronouncements worthy of a Delphic sibyl. More important, perhaps, than the attitude of the old-timers in the French Cabinet is that of the Gaullists. One or two of these men have taken pro-Israel stands in the pastj e.g., world-famed novelist Andre Malraux, now Minister of Information. There are no indications of the attitude of the new Foreign Minister, Couve de Murville, but you probably know this from his American tour of duty. The grandfather of the new Minister of Justice, Michel Debre, was the Rabbi of Neuilly and of Strasbourg; but there are no special indications about his attitude toward Israel. A key post in the de Gaulle entourage, that of Chefi de Cabinet of the General, is held by M. Georges de Pompidou, a leading figure in Rothschild enterprises. Both the anti-Semitic and Communist press have already begun to give M* Pompidou their special attention. More important than any of these considerations, however — and, if it comes to a test, probably the main consideration in the General's thinking — is the fact that the major political factors that have brought France and Israel so close- ly together in the past few years still remain unchanged. France's coming closer together once more with the new states of Morocco and Tunisia, and with the Moslems in Algeria, should this occur, Would not necessarily affect the Israeli position adversely. The new states have no real quarrel with Israel, although they have . taken certain anti-Israel positions in deference to Arab popular opinion and the pressures of other Arab states. There has not been the slightest sign of any kind of reconciliation with the Nasser government, still considered by most Frenchmen as a vile enemy; and the Nasser radio has been vigorously and vehemently attacking de Gaulle. Nor, as was the case before the Suez invasion, do the French now have any real stake in Egypt, or any real hopes of becoming important once more in Egypt, so that there would be no practical rea'son for any major change in attitude. If despite all the favorable indications listed above, Israeli representatives are still a little bit concerned, the reason may well be that there is a realiza- tion that the kind of honeymoon which has existed between France and Israel during the past two years is really an abnormal state of affairs. De Gaulle's coming may mean a return to a more normal, basically friendly, but not necessarily as unre- servedly cooperative attitude as has been the case recently. - 3 - As far as the position of the Jews in France is concerned they certainly have nothing to fear — and obviously don't fear anything — from a de Gaulle government while that government effectively holds power. Certainly not the slightest charge of anti-Semitism has ever been laid to de Gaulle, whatever may be the attitude of various extremists who have rallied to his support in the past few crucial weeks. Jews have been ministers and have held other posts of importance in previous de Gaulle governments — e.g., Professor Rene Cassin — even though there are no Jews in the present Cabinet. (Debre's mother was non-Jewish; he is married to a non-Jewish wifej the few indications we have about his personal religious attitude seem to indicate an essentially lay position, but with no inclination to hide or worry about his Jewish origins). Before de Gaulle's Cabinet was actually named this time there were fairly persistent rumors that among his "technical" ministers would be one or two economic experts who are Jewish; and when these people did not get posts there were those who attributed it to anti-Jewish feelings among de Gaulle's entourage. The explanation given by the usually well-informed French afternoon paper, Le Monde, as to why these men had not been named, however, is probably the accurate one; they are men who favor a directed government economy. Such men obviously would hardly be compatible with the kind of policy advocated by Pinay, rooted in laissez ,faire thinking. Such fears as Jews in France have are not for now but for the future. In de Gaulle's thinking it is a situation that brought him to power. Others cannot help but consider, however, the kind of people who provoked this situation — the extremists in Algeria, Many of the people who helped engineer the coup in Algeria are known to have been rabid Petainists and Vichyites in the old days, whom the Jews certainly distrust. Others are known to have been associated with pre-war fascist movements such as the Croix de Feu. Algeria is the place where anti- Semitic publications like Riyarql, Nouveaux Jours and other anti-democratic and anti-Semitic publications have had their greatest circulation in recent years — and the cry of "down with 'the system"1 has been the war cry of these publications for several years* It is significant that the "Public Safety Committees" are trying to jump the Mediterranean and become an effective force in France. At least they are asserting that they are trying to do so. A leader of the Public Safety Committee in Algeria and a key personality in the coup, Leon Delbecque, has asserted that there is a network of over 200 such committees in France itself. Actually, they have only made their appearance in three or four localities — Tarbes and Lyon for example. The first declaration put out by the Lyon Committee is hardly one to reassure Jews. The Committee is headed by M. Georges Chappes, Dean of the Catholic Faculty of Letters and a friend of Jacques Soustelle, French Parliament member and former Governor General of Algeria, who is considered the symbol of the Algerian revolt, fevter aliai this statement called for a "resolute struggle against the activities of the enemies of the French nation and the Western civilization: international Communism and occult and stateless forces." Since the Hitler era, the last phrase means, to the average Frenchman, Jews, There is no real evidence that the Public Safety Committees have any real root or influence in metropolitan France yet.
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