In the Supreme Court of Ohio

Home , John Kasich

No. 20.14-0374 Original Action for Writ of 11'rohibition Expedited Election 1Llatter Under S. Ct. 1'ra.c. R. 12.08

STATF OF OHIO ex rel. CYNTHIA. BALAS-BRATTON

Relator,

JON HUSTED, OHIO SECRETARY OF STATE,

STARK COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS,

and

GEORGE T. MAIER

Respondents.

RESPONDENT GEORGE T. MAIER'S SUBMISSION OF:EVIDENCE

Craig T. Conley (0021585) Ryan L. Richardson (0090382) 6041-iuntington Plaza Erin Butcher-Lyden (0087278) 220 Market Avenlxe South Assistant Attorneys General Canton, Ohio 44702 Constitntional Offices Section Telephone: 330.453_ 1900 30 E. Broad St., 16th Floor Facsimile: 3 30.453 .2170 Coltimbijs, C?hio 43215 Te 1 L phone : 614 . 46 6.2 872 .Attorney for Relator Facsimile: 614.728.7592 1?nzail: Ryan. Richaxdson(ZDohioattorneygeneraL gov F?rin.Butcher-Lyden@ohioattorzieygefierai.; cgov

Attorneysfvr Respondent,Ton Hzisted

. ^i David M. 13ridenstine (0001223) Thomas L. Rosenberg (0024898) Special Counsel Michael R. Traven (0081158) 110 Central Plaza South, Ste. 240 RUET"LEI. & ANDRESS, LPA Canton, Ohio 44702 PNC Plaza, Twelfth Floor Telephone: 330.451.7065 155 East Broad Street Facsimile: 330.451.7906 Columbus, Ohio 43215 Email: dmbridEnstineC&stark-cocua.tyohio.gov Telephone: 614.463.9770 Facsimile: 614.463 . 9792 Attorney for Responclent ,^tark Cozcnty Board Email: trosenberg(&^ralaw.com o.f Elections [email protected]

Attorneys_fvr Besponclent Geo7jqe T. i1!1aier

2 8140265 1 127544,0001 RESPONDENT GEORGE T. MAIER'S SUBMISSION OF EVIDENCE

Respondent George T. Maier submits the attached evidence in support of his Merit I3rief

in this action. His evidence consists of the following:

1. Exhibits A through N subniitted as evidence during the administrative hearing

before the Board of Elections on February 21, 2014, and admitted into evidence. These

dotumeiits consist of the following:

• A - Letter of November 8, 2013, from Sheriff Ronald J. Myers of 1-Iarrison County to Mark Soos, Harrison County Auditor.

• B - Notice of Peace OfficerAppointznent of George T. Maier.

• C - Letter of November 8, 2013, from Airenne M. Fauber of Ohio Peace Officer Training Commission to Sheriff'Ronald J. Myers.

• ID - T'hree pay stubs of George T. Maier for employment as a Deputy Sheriff in Harrisozi County.

s E- Commission issued by Governor John Kasich to George T. Maier as Sheriff effective December 12, 2013.

• F- Position Description, Assistant Director for Ohio Department of Public Safety, State of Ohio.

• G- Appointment by forxner Governor Ted Strickland of George T. Maier as Director of Department of Public Safety effective I)ecem.ber 30, 2010.

• H - Position Description,l)irector of Public Safety for State of Ohio.

• 1- Organization chart, Department of Public Safety.

• J - Letter of January 18, 2013, from Glen L. Taylor, Sr., former Executive Director, Ohio Irivestigation Unit, Department ofPublic Safety.

• K-- Affidavit of Glen L. Taylor, Sr.

• L - Letter of Jan.uary 14, 2013, from Brenda D. Vogley to George T. Maier,

• M - Office of the Registrar, Transcript of Academic Record, George T Maier issued by Stark State College.

3 8 140265 1 127544.0001 • N - "State ex rel., Swanson v. Maier," (2013) 137 Ohio St.3d 400.

2. Response in Opposition to C.R.C. 3513.05, Protest Filed By Cynthia Balas-

Bratton, filed with the Board of Elections, as George T. Maier's Hearing Brief and accepted into

evidence by the Board Members at the hearing on February 21, 2014. This is attached as Exhibit

3. Stark County I3oard of Elections Tie-Vote Position Statement of Stark County

Board Members Samuel J. Ferruccio, Jr. and Deametrious St. John, filed with the Secretary of

State on oi, about March 4, 2014, and identified as Exhibit P.

4. Affidavit of Deametrious St. John tendered to the Board of I;lections, Stark-

County, Ohio, and identitied as Exhibit Q.

5, Time-stamped copy of Judgmcnt Entry issued by the Court of Appeals for Stark

County, Fiftli Appellate District in the case of "State ex rel., Cynthia Balas-Bratton V.

Deametrious A. St. John, Member Stark County Board of Elections, et crl.;" Case Number 2014-

CA00025 and attached as Exhibit R.

Respectfully submitted,

700 Thomas L. Rosenberg (6024898) Michael R. Traven (0081158) ROETZ.EI_, & ANDRESS, LPA PNC Plaza, Twelfth Floor 155 East Broad Street Coiumbus, Ohio 43215 Telephone: 614.463.9770 Facsimile: 614.463.9792 Email: trosenbergoaralaw.cozn mtraven(,-x,ralaw.com

Attorneysfor Respondent George T. Maier

4 8140265 1 127544.0001 PROOF OF SERVICF,

A copy of the foregoing was served on March 24, 2014, pursuant to Civ. R. 5(B)(2)(f), and S. Ct. R. 12.08(C) by e-mail as noted below, to:

Craig T. Conley Ryan L. Richardson 604 Huntington Plaza Erin Butcher-Lyden 220 Market Avenue South Assistant Attorneys General Canton, Ohio 44702 Constitutional Offices Section E-muil: pthekena`^^yahoo.coin 30 E. Broad St., 16th Floor Columbus, Ohio 4' )215 Attorney for Relator E.naail: Ryan.Richardson^s^,ohioattorncpygencral9gov Erin. Btrtcher- Lyclen(i^,ohioattorn eygeneral.gv v

Attorneys, for• Resj)ondent Jon 1-lusted David M. Bridenstine 110 Central Plaza South, Ste. 240 Canton, Ohio 44702 Ernail.: rltarbr°icleyr,stine(q,starukcortntyohia.gov

Attorney for ReslaondentSfcrrk Cozrnty Board of Elections

'Thomas L. Rosenberg (0024898) Atlor•ney for Respondent Geo7 °gE T .Maier

5 8140265 l 127544.0001 Harrison County Sheriff's Office

^ ^v 114 Coust St. Ca3iz, ^?iio 4390 I Sheriff ^ J. ^I/ers Fhone: {740)-94Z-2297 Fax: (740^94'2-4159 e-mail: barrisozzcountysheriffC frontier.cotr

November 8, 2013

c cwv

Harrison County Auditor Mark Soos 100 West Market Sfreet Cadiz, OH 43907

Dear Mr. Soos

Please use this as notification that the Harrison County Sherif€'s Office was Re hired full time mernber to the staff of the Harreson County Sheriffs O'°rfice. George T. Maier was re°hired full time as a Deputy Sheriff as of November 6th, 2013 and started on the 8tr, of November, 2013 I'm requesting all paper work for the new hire as well

Sincerely

Sheriff, Ronald J. Myers 3 t^^-"'`` ^_ /^"C. Oi;.io Peace Officer'I'.ra:sin_g Cop,,mission Office 800-346-7682 MixE I[) E W Fag 740--845-2675 - - ^ OH3O AT TCtRNIEY GENEPi P.O. Box 309 ondc^ Ol.' w NOTICE OF PEACE OFFICER APPOINTMENT _p lt:gov 1. Vdithin ten days of the appointment or status change, submit ane ^I3V of this form either by email, fax or mail. 2. Type or print legibly and complete all blanks. Ep,ter N/A if not applicable, 3. agencySubmit pagesand retums. 1 and 2 for a t+fewPppointment. A new appointment occurs when an officer is first svvom into your agency, or has previously left the 4. Subrnii only page 1 €or a Status Change. A status change occurs u.hen an officer cor,tinues to be appointed status, as listed in Box 15, to a ditferent status. by your agency, buf has a change ,rom one 5. Enter any necessary inforrnation for a Correction to Record, submitting all affected pages, and atfach a;etter explaining the requested change,

OFFICER INFORMATION " "`am` , MaFer George !

1 1111/1 959 @ hotmaii. corxf 7. Home MeiEina

8. B_-ic Training A..idetny 4m Stark (on(y comp(ete f this is the oifire^s frrsE appointment or

AGEft^GY INFORMATION m Ayency Name ^ Harrison County Sheriffs C3ffi e i(}. Agency Email Addrecs 19. Ageacy Phone i3 harrtsoncountysheriffCfrontier.carri i 740-942-2197 12. C;gency Maiiing Addr2ss (N5treeLIPO Eox (City) "t 14 Court Street Cadiz 43907 Harrison

APPtJINTMENT INFC3RMAT1C3N {complEte nate Statîs arrr ^tt RL7 1s. N^^^pobtrien (}-( 96 12013 -J 11 P6 % 2013 I5. saem New Status 0 Full-Time 0 Part-iime 0 Auxiliary 0 Reserve El Special 16. Sefcvt têw DRU 0 Seasonal ^City/Municipality Full-Ti€nelPart Time (737.02} 0 Cit,y/fîunicipality Auxiliary/Reserve/Specia[ (737.051) OCityfMunicipality Chief (737.02) ^Vflage Futl Titne/Paet TimelSpecial {7^7.'{6} ^1liliaae Aux,iliarylReserve (737.161) ^ Village Chief(737.i5) ^Tovunship Police Oîcer (5005>40) OTownship Constable ( 509.01^ 00ther Chief - List ORC/CheLer ^ £^ther - List Of^C/Charfer ^ DeputySheriff (3'f 1<04J ^Sheriff (311)

ATt"EST^1€`iON OF AUTHORITY 1 atlest that the on this form is true and correct and is based on my

d J. / 241,?

Stqom to and subseribed before me this ^ day of 20 ' in the county of t7hio. My commisston ex,oires 5igrsafureof 'fary Af f j . II &gy 8` RtaN - ^` NotsY PUW, ^e'af OW 5F4b[fadm Page 1 of 2 This form may be emaited fo: SF4O090hioattomeygerterat.gov , Revised 04/0712011 ^g ^ORttEY 4hpf _".C Ohio Peace Officer Tras.ing Commission Ofdce 800-346-7682 MIKE DEWINE Fa_^ 740-845-2675 >` •^ ^ ;^ ^ * OHIO ATTORNEY GENERAL * F.O. Box 309 London, Oll 43140 wwu:.Oh.io

November 8, 2013

Sheriff Ronald Myers . y{J ^/-^`$k• ^",--f'^.^ 4^ ^r^e`^

Harrison County Sheriffs Office r^^k^l ^ ur^Z^1 . rre 114 Court Street Cadiz, OH 43907-1194

Re: t7pdate Training Evaluation for Officer George Maier

Dear Sheriff Myers:

This letter shall serve as notice that no update training is required.

This determination is based solelv upon the i_nformation reported to the Comsnission; and does not relieve this officer or the appointing authority of any obligation to coinply with the training requirements of O.A.C. 109:2-1-12. This determination does not relieve this officer of the annual firearms re-qualification and Continuing Professionai Training requirements.

Should You have any questions or concerns regarding this determination, please feel free to contact me at tb.e number provided below.

Sincerely,

Arienne M. Fauber Certification Officer FrofessionalStandards Section

cc: Officer

r1FIJw Employee G`hk/Advice Fund Dept 272449908 7268 )K 0 0 470 EARNINGS STATEMENT Period Ending 11108/13 Harrison (_--rurzY Pay i:ate 11/15/13 1010 W.Mar?cet St. Caet.;.z, 0H 43907 Taxable Marital Status; FED-S Exer-.^.^. t; on.s/A.I:laz,rarces GEORGE T bf:.^s.IER Federal c 0 0.00 1idd, Tax State . 0 0.00 Add. Tae-,.

•r^ ;,y EARNINGS ?t^.te H ours "'^.?^s Period Yea ^° to Date Hct;:rly n n !2.a90 8.00 ±03.12 301.367

Gros s Pay 30I.36 DEDUCTIONS This Period Y ear to date Thzs Pe?°? od Year to date ------(EZ7IC 1,54 4.37 `ED-S 0.55 9.41 FH?'O 0.52 Z.63 'ADIZ 1.03 3.O? :Avqr - 8 12.99 37.97 EXHiBIT ^

^^T PAY 8^a^3

^^^^^^^^ J. ^^^^^^IRE AVD57£3A HAftsi-73£ xd ^ , .•,, ^ ^^ ^^ 726 .t -^`^7, f` Z 9 ,

bbaAR Av'f'T i`3A.`f`E AA'^O

PAY GEORGE T MAIEI2 TO THE oRaER OF Employee Chk/Advice Fzmd Dept EAR-NlNGS STATE^ENT 272449908 7356" X00 47f) Rer:.od _•z?din.^ 11f22/13 Pay Date 11/29/13 Harrison County 100 W. Market St. Cadiz, OH 43907 Taxable Marital Stl-a'zus : FED-S Exem-pticans/.F.-! i-owa^?ces Federal : 0 0.00 Add. Tax GEORGE T MAIER State : 0 0.00 Add. Tax

Rate F-ours This P?ri-csti Year to Date

Hourly 12.890 80.00 1,031.20

Gross Pay 1,031.20 If332.55 DEDUCTIONS Th='_.s Period Year to date This Period Year to date

MEDIC 14.95 I9.32 FED-S 105,33 114.74 OHIO 18 .0 ri 19.63 wAD.I Z 10.31 13.32 LAt}<< - S 12 9.93 167 .90

NET PAY

hT1+ IW . . . _ ...... 17-. . , . , MEN.,ts g ^¢ { } . r^ ^^,^ ^ f ^+" f^ t I ^r ^04,^^,.,.^ .wisP i f$tP, i I'A R' P xSO N f d'a,j ;'KT'

u { ry ^ ^ 'aY 4;^

^"FP^^^TT D"^TF

PAY EXAC3'LY ** $EVEN %iLTNI3RE-D FIFT^ TWO DOLLARS AND 681-100

PAY GEORGE T MAIER TO THE ORI7ER t)F Emplo_yee Chk/Advice Fund Dept EARNINGS STATEMENT 272449908 7446 x0o 470 Period Ending 12/06/13 Pay Date : 12/13/13 Harriscn Cr?z-n-ity. 100 W. Market St". Cadiz, OH 43907 Taxable Marital Status: FED-S Exemptions/Al'-s lcwancea . Federal ; 0 0.00 Add. Tax GEORGE T MA-I ER ,^tate 0 0.00 Add. Tax

EARNTNGS Rate Hours This Period Year to Date

Hourly y2.890 sU.G0 1 tJ31.L0 2,363.7G

Gross Pa;r 1,031.20 2t363..76 Year to date DEDUG'i IQhTS This Period Year to date This Period iED T C 14.01 33.33 7ED -S 95.58 210_:52 3FTo 15.73 35.36 'AD iG 9,66 22 . 98 Iosp 125 65.00 65.00 ;^AW - S 129.93 297.83

NET PAY 701.29

sr #'

. . . ;^ y ^ ^ s' 4's24.^Y„FRx

Cr- .C., 3^ H'O 43'i:l 44t)

WARI^.R::NT D.ATE ?3MGLIN`.t, 7446 12/13113 $701. 2-9 PAY E„ACTL,Y $EVEN HUNDRED DNk DOLLARS A-ND 23/100

PAY GEOFcaE T MAIER TO THE ^^^ ORDER OF ^^^

Cpistz d2fs^4,4 ^^:

I-o aCCto lvFcom these Presents sfi:uLl c:ome, i5reetiaW;

,9Crzow Je, -ffiat Whereas

GE^;:>s cE _ T. MAiFUFZ

of St.ark Couizty has been cCuiu appointecCto tlieyositioti of

CC•Uis?Y SNHRfFF

A7v2; C6}ZTP.dL'i13G Utvi;L A>U.CESSG?. 15 EG..ECT=O f.ivD 4l:AL i=

1Ties-efore, B^ -viattre of the authority 1lestedin tFie Govertzor bv, the Constitution andin-pur+uance af v yro:lision of tfie Statutes, r do rwi-e6y con-mtiissior h.i7rt, tte said

`. .^s Î t^5Y-T^STE: GEO:^Ê 1.- MAIER ^ dE!"^^^Î3 CL ERK to be

COUNTY SHWPIFF ^.^! , aa e y ctafth-Lorizing a.ndemyo-wenn6 him to execute anddrfiscl2a,rde aCCccndsingZ.ciar, t!e dirtzes.:, appertaini.ng to sauCoffice, a7^t^^ enjoy alf tlieyYiviCeges tt7ticCi7nmuiuties t^Cea-a^

3 .,%G ^^..GIill/^ ^( {""^'z.^../'f/%".lP.':.?`%/?r//iiN!-Ji'){.^^%.^%!i,?f9"(!!/IJIN y-^--.--_-.•^ :,

AGENCY OHIO DEPARTMENT OF Ohio Depart.netzt of Public.Safety ^^^I T 10 N ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES DMStON OR INSTITUTION Ade.tinistration Division ^ESCR1PT[O^ UNIT OR OFFICE PERSONNEL DfVlSION Di rector• ` s Office 7f;(1-ftt3fl P E^ Statt; Agency 0 County Agency D NeWV Position 0 Chanie UNTY F EMPL YMetfT Franlcl in W USUAL WORKING TITLE OF POSITION POSfTtON ^YO_ AND TrTLE OF IMT 3 EDtATE SUPERVISOR Ass z stant Director 4 1Qt}0.0 Director 4 ^ NORMAL WORKING HOURS (Expfairi unusual or rotating sfiift) z FROV_. $:00 a.m_ Te_ 5:00 p.m.

rr0 JOB DESCRfPTiDN AND WORKER CHARACTERfSTFCS 4- o/n Job Duties in order of !rn aortance Minimum Acce tabte Characteristtcs Z rr

f3(= 0-1 40 Acts as Director in absence of Director; assists 5; 7:; 9a,b; 10; l1a,b; 13b; }- Director in defining departfinental goals, objectives 14; 16; 30i; 32m,r; 34f, g. 0 & formulation of policies, procedures, & adru.nistra- tive rules necessary for the efficient management & operation of the department; supeivises_ & directs -coesrd'in.ation of all criminal investigations with the Governor's -Chief Legal. Counsel & State Highway Patrol perGovernor's procedure on reporting of .sllsi3eGted ].i^.eCgal act1.V3.t1eS.

25 Directs & coordinates all incom.ing requests for & conduction of background checks for persons to be hired, in the unclassified service.

35 Adrnin.isters supervision of-Emergency Medical Services Program; erisures '.comploiar3ce iaa th depa r^^- ea mental policies . & ;procedures goverazing aecr^di^a:= 4--) taan,;of officers. Assists Director in supervvision 4) of a1l ^pe-tior.ts of =departraent, delegating duties V) & responsibill.ties to various divisions, ensuring •^, effective accomplishment of tasks & functions cz within specific jurisdictions. tver-sees s-uper= vision af Office of Human Resources Ecqual Employ- u, men.t Opportunity Programs, Safety & Health Programs, _J Budget & Fiscal Office, Collective Bargaining, labor rela.tions matters, legal, and non: Higbw-ay. Patrol investigation areas. Represezs.ts d^gartment. on various boards, committees &/or commiss3eonSt 0 acts as Director's designee on special projects, meetings, public gatherings & various public relation activities. Q EXHIBIT This is an unclassified position seTving at the LU pleasure of the Appointing Authority; per Article 124.3:1 (A) (9) of the Ohio Revised Code.

ci: ^s . m t ur>45s:^a1F

STATE OF C3HiCt

OFFICE OF THE GC7VE€^ft►^3R

I; Ted Stricklandf Govemar of the State of C3bio; do 4ereby a ainf cecsrge Maier; frnin Packerington, Fairfield Couniya C)hiq, as In er rxrecto'r of the Departmento.f Public Safety for a ter-^rt:^^^^^ning-jant^ar^r 2011zmd cc^ntznul-ng ^t the easure cif th^ Goverhor, t eplacing 'Mon%as Sticlrathr v^ha resigned.

WIIFREOF,I have here unto subscribed MY name arfd cati sed #he ir_-^re^&_§jaT of the 8_tale of ^3.hzcr.tti b^ _ffi-x^dX,this ' 3°ffida.yof I?eceznber zn the year oUr LordTwo ^mou^and

-: -^' : ^^ a`.. ... ^ed Stricl^I^n^ . :. 1Governar OHIO DEPARTMENT OF (7i1i POSITION ADMiN9STFiATlVE SERVtCES ' D1Vf liN(T OR OFFICE DESCRIP t. PERSONNEL DIVISION Director's Office

760000U of 1 State Agency q q rfY County A.gerlcy New Positiort Change COU[ OF EMPLoM USUAL tA'ORK4t^G T1TCE E}F POS3TiOM Frankiin` pP^l D` POSPTiOtYtrector of Public Safety NO. AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPEf2VfS{ Governor of State of Ohio NORMAL WDRfC(htG tiOURS (Explain unusual or rota6ng s€tiff.) ^4 o FROM: TO: 00 JOB DESCRiPT[ON AND Wf3RKER CH5 tRACTERiST[CS gl .lab i3uties in order crf im{torfance cra fdinimusn AceeptabEe Ck O 100 Act as ."`.7ovexnor's appointee, directs operations of a large & most com.plex department (i.e., Ohio Department of Public Safety; directs over 3800 employee statewide in divisions of Administration, Bureau of.Motor Vehicless State Highway Yatrol, Emergency Medical Services, Emergency Management Agency, & LIqtior & Food. Stamp Fnforcerrlent); directs, coordinates, & evaluates all internal & external operations of Department of Public Safety & directs activities of all major divisions involv7ng bigial,y complex activities in nurnerous locations.

Formulates & sets policy (i.e., defines goals objectives & formulation of policies, procedures & adniinistrative rules necessary for efficient management & operation of department); directs development of plans for all departmental functions; directs development of large budget, organizational structure & staff-ng pa~vtei-ns_ W 0 E--, Firlples.nents programs through complex decision processes involving extensive research, coordination & cooperation witbzrz department & with ^ other departments & agencies.

c^ Meets with legislature to explain deparfinentaI crperafions &to iden:tify new legislation needed.

1-t rusmon tvuMbers and Class Titles of Positsorts dire y sa,psrvi^secl "r!)RE OF Asst Dir 3 (tQQQ.1); f twy Patroi Cot_ {3t}0d"0); Dep Dir 6 '5Q0'E:D); [?ep f^ir 4(1009.0; 1500.0); Dep Dir 3(1U().0; 'f OD.f^); Atforrtey 6 (8134.0); Adm ,Asst 3(9 {303.0). 17.

An E9vaf OPPo tsrt^ !Y EmP1q: 12,

01.

^-,

^ .„.^

:.^ ca

^;t

EXH1E3tT Z Glenn L. Taylor Sr.

Friday, January 18, 2013

Letter of Recommendation: George T. Maier Director of Public Safety and Service Massillon, Ohio

It is my pleasure to offer this letter of support for Director Maier as he is considered for the position of Sheriff of Stark County. ,--^ From 2007 through 2011, Director Maier served as my direct supervisor during my tenure as Deputy Director and subsequent Executive Director for the Ohio Investigative Unit at the Department ofPublie Safety. His duties at the Ohio Department of Public Safety also included director of Administration, Bureau of Motor Vehicles, Emergency Management Agency, Emergency Medical Services, Homeland Security, State Highway Patrol, and the Office of Criminal Justice Services.

As Director and the h.ighest ranking law enforcement official for the Ohio Investigative Unit, his oversight included the maaragernerit of a rn.ulti-million dollar budget, a staff of 120 Pmployees, five million dollars of state of Ohio assets and 25 znzllion dollars in federal grants. His leadership also included: the development and reorganization of the hiring practices; recruitment and promotioiial processes; the negotiation of agreeinents for all contracts and necessary purchases of goods and services. The implean.en.tatioli of gambling, alcohol, food stamp, and tobacco enforcement programs with other governmental agencies and civic groups were also under his command.

Most importantly, Director Maier was very instrum,ental in directing the accreditation process tbrough the Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA), awarded to the Ohio Investigation Unit November 2009.

Director Maier 30 years experience in management, decision making, team building, investigative and leadership skills lzas earned him a solid track record as a leader in law enforcemexat,

I am continually impressed with his driven detezmination, leadership while taclcling the challenges and responsibilities i-.ra laav enforcement. i^is strength, character and dedication were demonstrated daily in the way he treated the employees and the pu.blic. He is a committed and dynamic individual who would be an outstanding candidate for sheriff of Stark County.

.\1 I respectfully ask you to carefully consider Director Maier as a candidate for sherif£

Sincerely,

Glem L. 'l aylor Sr, Former Executive Director Ohio Jnvesti.gative Unit ^ ^ Z STATE OF OHIO ^ { _ } Ss: COUNTY OF FRANKLIN j

I, Glenn L. Taylor, Sr., being first duly cautioned and sworn states as follows:

1. I am over the age of 18 and a resident of Franklin County, Ohio.

2. From. 2007 through 2011, I served as the Executive Director of the Ohio

Investigative Unit ("OIC7`'} of the Ohio Department of Public Safety.

^. During my tenure as Executive Director of OIU, George T. Maier ("Maier'°)

served as my direct supervisor.

4. During my tenure as Executive Director of OIU, Maier also served as the

supervisor over the Divisions of Administration, Bureau of Motor Veb-icles, Emergzncy

Management Agency, Emergency Medical Services, Homeland Security, State Highway Patrol,

and the Office of Criminal Justice Services.

5. As the supervisor of OICT, Maier's oversight i.ncluded the management of a multi-

million dollar budget, a staff of 120 employees, $5,004,.E}40 of State of Oxzo assets, and

$25,000,000 of federal grants.

6. During Maier's tenure, we implemented enforcement programs over gamblina,,

alcohol, food stamp, and tobacco in the State of Ohio.

7. In addition to his administrative duties typically performed during traditional

vc.rork hours of 9:04 a.m. through 5:00 p.m. Monday through Friday, Maier also wozked nights

and weekends with OIU on specific enforcement missions. These "ve.re often special, high

profile enforcement missions, examples of which include but are not limited to the Ohio

University Halloween party, Ohio State T.Jniversity Football games, Jamboree-in-the-Hills

Country Concert and the like. Mr. Maier performed these duties in the capacity of lead

E?f{,IB{T

1 a commanding officer of OIU, a law enforcement unit with full powers of arrest. Ivlr. Maier did so as a peace officer, as u=ere the other enforcement agents at the scene, wearing a badge and having a weapon. In addition because these were high profile events involving large groups of people,

?v1r. Maier had the responsibility to review and approve the specific operational pla-ns for our unit.

8. Duriitg my term as Executive Director of OlU; Maier was the lead commanding officer perfarming coaifidential, law enforcement security briefings, evidence oversight acti.vities, and he was inst-rurrteiital in directina, the accreditation process through the Conn-nission on

Accreditation for La"T Enforcement Agencies (`'CALEX") av;rarded to the OIU in November, 2009.

9. Througho€rt iny tenure as Executive Director of (31U.. I as well as other senior rank and file members of GR7 recognized Maier as their supervisor in their chains of command.

FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH iNAUGHT.

GIe E. Ta or, Sr.

Sworri to and subscribed before me this q f-^ day of April, 201a.

otary Public

^ 13

2 STARK STATE COLLEGE

C;hangsng Lives ... BuilrlingFutures

J-anuary 14, 2013

Creorge T. Maier

I3ear Mr. Maier:

Thank you for submitting your portfolio of experience and: college transcripts to Stark State College for review for prior Iearrdng credit assessment {PLA.}/work experience credit.

Based on our review ofyoux materials and transcripts, we have determined an equivalency of 67 college-level semester hours. According to the Ohio Board of Regent's Operating Manual far Two-Year Campus Programs, each Associate of Arts and.for Associate of Science degree requires successful completiozi of a minimurr of ninety quarter (or sixty semester) credit hours. Full-time students are required to enroll in a minimum of 12 credit hours per semester. These equivalency hours will be documented as transfer credits.

No training hours, certifications or curriculum that is ir3.cl:uded in the Ohio Peace Officers Tra.ining Academy were included in the calculation of the 67 equivalent credit hours.

You may request a copy of your official transcript from Stark State College by following the instructions for a transcript request at: http:!lwww.starkstate.edu/transcri12t

Please let me know if I can be of further assistance to you.

Sincerely,

Brenda D. Vogleyy Prior Learning Assessment Coordinator

-,, - . . . , . . . 1 . - , :: ------,_ = ^^^^^. ^ta^r^c ^b^ffie ^ti _ ^s^^cô^ ^^^ ^^^^ r^^ ^^tJO Fran^^ê N^1, No^^â^, Q^ _^7^t^ . ;_. f^^^CR^^T ^^^±î3^t^D #^^^f^t^:_:_:^r: : ^ Phone D^ 4^3a-s17U v^zvsn^„ s^^ks^ê ^^ - - ^^=: _ .`,:: ^^^^^t _: T^^^^ _ _

=ê^C^^ti a€ ^^^rg^^ heo^cit^dJtîer _ â^ Issâed C^^l f 51201T - â^ ^ .^faôr 'ch Sf^dr^s• ^^re^^Sûrii^s-._ - ^^ticiiîf 1D S^6^f?^^^ . ^--- ft^ #4ôIDay:__j1^t^

^â^t^se -Y evel Uzuier^rad race - - _ -- F3BJ' 330 - H-rtuJ7^ LJRM;^ T - . : Stucent Zype ZZeu Faxst , xzme:;' :::_:. _• ::" - -F'-= = C32EI3 RTT .-= - . - :-•. •^. : _•r.> ^,..,.._.... - ._. _,. ._.:= _._- ^,, ^ . _ . ..: _ . °. PT S .v,3 h Schoo^ ktash?^r^tor^f£iy^r 9ool C3e^-OA-JIIt7-2978_ ,. _.r , " ;.^ _ - ..,..:..- ^^ - .Oaly k3ma.t Staâm 24i ^ _ T^•: - ^_ . .^ - -_ .-a.-s^r.2X 25 Xn'IOtn[c^LaQF -_Cant ^nt'ed_ ^ rGT2^ -POZ^CIa j ^ Lasre'^t Progê.^ -- ^ -- ^ -, _ On1T'^£c. . - -.^,'^z,^Tlo?^ -A;soc a e af Tea.hniâY Scit^33^s - ,- .. t: -_ - . - . -:: - .• I^COM 122 -F..F'FEL^7VE SpER3CSi7G I^cagr^ I^^Gû^âl'Stud_.^^-Gexf,^ti^ ^k^^ =- -:. -^ _. -_. sG DZS 222 ^^t, PORT S^ Tî* 2 Ca.c3ege 58(:T ^reciit "= ^ - s zTIIa . 3 tt4k Z^* ^G k BIISSIIs ^y C53Ts;CSDtî^,^^^7 Ma,3a TeeFr ^:Ludig-_,s Ge^kâ.3 tFi^,s FST ^^5 .z2^^T30IIS ^7EZ2^5 DQ_ - _ __ ' , . - - -...^^^._. -: iDRSE ^6 . _ '2^LE ^ _ _ ___.._ - ' HTw .. 7 2I :-r}+ 3 Fi£i Ts ^GîS^ ^' 3 06^_^R* _ . C R E II G32U R I HLS -223 _ CONEtiY'an TF 2^Niî^ ^+ - cYIS`^0 g _. __„ ^^ `L _îP^ cEI^t2?xT'R 3 O RT^ TrZ 2f1D 7. ^ Sif^3 -3'a^.Fi- V $I3ILi: IlM>'_ . ------' ^ -- .-^- _: L^/N.[ NIi43t3^ SI3C -'I'S2AN5F`^^ t,'BED^s ^C:fiP.TS•^ $Y ^3•ir. S'Q&TL^^TY"$OkIC&3 ^ -' 1_1 x^ - - - - -::: .._ . ,.-, _...... ÎIIÊ.G63 q .:_:::. .- _ _...__ .._. - ._._: ._-....__ - 3 g7ÎQ' 32SFa ^ p^^xg* ,.^^, E1^ , : - ^ ::_..f^^'A^#? NFL . irLSTON :_ F - . ^# _ Q-^^. -- : ^ t7nzvez . » --- . _.,_sit Of_£,oui.r5t^.1'i^ X . . ` ^ î SDs" , ^ - ^ .. ^...... ^ . . _^-- .- -. ..^- ---..SFfE€ >. SlTtffcìS^hAL . r, #^^bR , _ . ...__^ :-- ..__, - r . . . . - :•• - _ > ""'^• L11 3 - SaF,^^$ZtS^- - T`^N OOT:: t^sua^::ir^;3^w e _ ; OQ^^. ^ ?.u3 tt 3 . OQD T T_^ . - - - : _ .- t# 2^-z £ . ^^HEEÂ RESO^{'E N^T'^ 7 ^,c, -;:3_'&i^' :^F^53 ` _ P^3i ce;-Acmaxzis^satj,tiîi 3.0DD ^R. 3 ff = _- '- Sbr% 5 _V2CPSM ANI) CRTSSS Z2E£ERVER-T-ON 3--'f p^ '3^ . 2RPT=pl 22^31 Lss.i^ ^t Pa} iâm 3 aHI- T7^ • Phzs 43 fs04 ¢Pts: =:"v ' TR2l -^01 Orjarr.2za 13r^ra Taw E^f ^ 0 ^ft {P2'-7^f3 ^ OOm TR34 002 P7nri^îrig Ozy3A22•-'^'ex^Z-^t 3 QD^t1 T`r"R ***S*4f*** , ... L^+ ^fx^-*t^•r^3t`^^. ^ff4 0^ a AT_ *+re**^*-t -a +:i-£ . -E}aSS. . { ^29 - __ 0'^4' ^2^ ^ = c- ^ NSTS fiDTaI3N r ,kf E}1L5 ^ r 0 - :GPA 1i^'S _. : 0.6D0 -CìPA _- =- :. . . .. g ff 00 . : -._. -0L^D ^ -^: - r .- .:^^:_.•:_: -- _ ..: . ^::î?A 3irs„ , .- - _ ------> -- '. w: - Dff :^r"^ - - . __.:::- _ -- --- ^- ._ = _ .= _ 0& C31^ ^tv 3dau^ Caxm^tls TRAN^^FR^y^ z_ ::- -: -:- _- -2= 4i$:- QPts_ ^' O. 04 PSY^ha-s :?21 _ GEN£dAF, . ^?SYEmE^7ACi3_ ` GPA '% 3 Hr400 A*_ ^^^0# ^}I#Qa LrÂ 0.000

3 fF(t0 ^t ^ti 0 4 a1r£pA^ ff^ r1i^s 5z OOri^ GPI^ 0 i^Eib GPA Q£lt3£F y Pt s ^ T2G 0 a^0 _ -L#*1r 44xf*a1-3 2^3-F^^^t+ ^41'^ .: '*^_ xxxx:*#+*x^ ..- 4"^l^ +^n^t 3^^'^T^^ +* Rd_. ..2013 . VcZi]CZ , . _C xLd1t .._. _- ' ^ - _ .... . -V ..:: ...... F .__...^. '

A£i°T IDf _. . ALPcLANCTfdER^C ^f^CiAftt^7leT x c9^? 1_ 02 .- ., __- ...... TR^ ....._ ' - ___-^ , . = ^1C7`l. . GÎZdPLT£Efr'^z3t i}^Ttatss w. C .. = s.00a:- ^R^: _ . -- - ^ .Aa``. 104 ___. rrrat^€^^^ Vr^ - A^F.... - -1, ooa-.' _^£* - AtST; T4B COtiP^ APPi fiXCEZ-. .°-: zaa^:- 3.ifa. , . ^ ^^^ ^ . »._.- I 4ffD ^ri __ - . ^. .3 -aQa s+^ - _. - - _ t^X iz^ 2rô ^^zz,**,^* ^ts^zct s uô^t

SF#*YF+*#4t'Yr^t*^4^r*+?^Zk ntaX^rmy^^y^ _ ^-(^• {+^(s .^^•f-^y ^y^^ -•..^ :-'' - -. -^^'^xv+S^Nik^J YF^ ^+Y.C^^ titC-i+VYSii-Yf-,*f-Xx*x*#*^k84*1f^ -' ..• . -

.. . y : f - , • '^( ^, [ j, p` ^t^- _ .. , . _: ...... (

. . ^ = - . .. . - ^ge/^4i^WF 4{.^^€]^^Z^^ ^ . _ -:- " ..._:=~- . ... : . ' S^s iL l3i S3^G^ . . . _ .."- ,^_ _ . . ^. - ^ _ .. •_-._._... . ^..... _ - • • -• '^ ._: -_ - : : ^ . t^..S^f3^1EF^_ _.:_ -. - `__ -- _. -. - _ - _. ---... ___ __.__ ; , . ;... -»_ ._... - -M - _ _ '- '- -=---- • - --•-- k _ : _ _ _ .^ _ -:<: - - ^tt f -„ ,__,... .. _ . ..., _ . - -_ _:-:» - . ...= _._ _-=.. - - _ _:..-::.:- ^--: ....- .: --= =-__. -__:=._ , - ..- :-__T,- ^_- _: __ . -- .__ _ . .: = ^ ; _ = - .__ __ --_ . _... :-- __.:. ,--- _._, =-. •--•• ------. _,. .. ::^:.._ _ --- ....._. _ _ i. __-- :___- __.=.._ _-;__ °=.--.... __•.- : ._ -_ ...... _ ..• _. :-- , - -• - _ .- = __ _ _ - ._ T _ ;- i, _T _^ : ! Y_ 11:: G20^ MÎEt.. ..M _. .- _^_.. : - =.. -, ::. _: ."^- .. _ _. :_=. - - ' -: -:-- . ._ - ^ __ ^ - :^ - ^*^ ^ EXFIIBfT'aâsideredv7fiaafmtfeoucâi. T - _ vr^^ ^^^rss^ât^zr ji®^ - _ Notr

' ^eaFa^f^Educaix6naf ^ - ^. ; w ^+tJrae ^C

_ Hls^vcur^}Z37ePfF7#faacademrc de _ _ ., Jfr i --_7tfiS^n^ _^ ^ ^_ _ `I ..r. :--. .,-:: .-.--- -...... ,-- _ :6. . ... _...._ . ..^ .. .-r . _: .. __ .. ^ ^.- ! - .. - . . ... ,_ .-... _. __.__ .__- ...... ^g .._. . _ .,» ^. ^ ....._.... _...._...... - z 1...1! i L I

[Cite as State e.r reL Swanson v Maler, 137 Ohio St.3d 400, 2013-Oiiio-4767.1

TkIE STATE EX ItEL. SWAN\SON V. 1V1r-iIER.

[Cite as State ex rel. Swanson v.l6datea•, 137 E3b.io St.3d 400, 2013-Ohio-4767.1 Quo Warranto to oust county sheriff-Appointed sheriff lacks statutorj, quaZifications necessary to be sheriff--R. C. 311. 01-Tf'rit granted. (No. 2013-0274---Submitted July 9, 2013--Decided November 6, 20I3.) IN QUO WARRANTO.

Per Curiam. €¶ 1} This is a case in quo warranto challenging the qualifications of George T. Maier, wlso was appointed to the office of Stark County sheriff. {1 2} The person elected in 2012 to the office of Stark County sheriff,

Michael A. McDonald, could not assume the office for health reasons. The Stark County commissioners, under R.C. 311.01 and. 305.02(F), appointed relator, Timothy A. Swanson, as acting sheriff until someone could be appointed to occupy the office. Because the sheriff-elect was a Democrat, the Stark County Democratic Central Committee ("DCC") was responsible for appointing a qualified person to occupy the office under R.C. 305.02(B). One of the applicants for the appointment was respondent, George T. Maier. Despite concerns expressed by several members at the DCC meeting that Maier did not meet the

qualifications for county sheriff, the DCC appointed him. {¶ 3} Swanson filed this original action in quo warranto, claiming that Maier does not meet the qualifications to assume the office of sheriff and that Swanson remains acting sheriff and therefore has standing to bring this action. {¶ 4} Because Maier fails to meet the statutory qualifications to be a county sheriff, we grant the writ of quo warranto and reinstate Swanson as acting sheriff of Stark County until the DCC appoints a qualified person.

EXHIBIT

a< _ , SUPREME CoL'RT OF OHIO

Facts1 {^ 5} Swanson served as slierlff of Stark County from 1999 until February 2013. I-1e was appointed to the position in 1999 and was elected in 2000, 2004, and 2008. He decided not to run in 2012. {T 6} At the 2012 election, Michael A. McDonald, a Democrat, was elected sheriff, but before he could take office in January 2013, he notified the Stark County commissioners that for health reasons, he would not be able to assume the duties of sheriff. {^ 7} Under R.C. 311.01 and 305.02(p'), the county commissioners were authorized to appoint an acting sheriff until a sheriff could be appointed by the DCC. The Stark County commissioners appointed Swanson acting sheriff. Swanson took the oath and was bonded as acting sheriff. {T 8} Because the sheriff-elect was a Democrat, R.C. 305.02(B) gives the DCC authority to appoint a qualified person to assume the office of sheriff in place of the sheriff-elect. Thrze people submitted applications to the DCC to be appointed Stark County sheriff. Maier was one of these applicants. He submitted an application and supporting documents. {4( 9} On February 4, 2013, another applicant for the office, Lou Darrow, filed an action in prohibition in this court to restrain the DCC from proceeding with a meeting to appoint the sheriff, because he challenged Maier's qualifications. State ex t°el. Darrow v. Stark Cty. Democratic Cent. Conamt., Supreme Court case No. 2013-0211, This court ultimately dismissed that actiozi on Darrow's application. 134 Ohio St.3d 1461, 2013-Ohio-476, 982 N.E.2d 737. {¶ 10} While the prohibition action was pending, the DCC held its meeting, on February 5, 2013, and voted under R.C. 305.02(B) for a replacement

1. Maier objects to certain portions of the deposition testimony submitted in this case. Our decision does not rely on those portions of the record.

2 January Term, 2013

sheriff. Swansan alleges that the DCC made no effort to determine whether Maier met the qualifications for sheriff set forth in R.C. 311.01. {^l 11} At the DCC meeting, John D. Ferrero, a member of the committee who is also the Stark County prosecuting attorney, told the committee that.ithad a duty to determine whether the candidates met the qualifications for sheriff under the statute. Ferrero had reviewed Maier's qualifications and told the committee that he believed that Maier did not meet the statutory requirements for a candidate for sheriff. {1^ 12} Maier received a majority of the committee vote for sheriff, and based on the vote, he assumed the office of Stark Couzity sheriff. Swansonclaims that because Maier was i}ot legally qualified to assume the office of sheriff under R.C. 311.01, his appointment was a nullity, leaving Swanson the duly appointed acting sheriff until a qualified successor is properly appointed. {1 13} As pai-t of the process of being appointed sheriff, on January 16, 2013, Maier submitted an application to the Stark County Court of Common Pleas as required by R.C. 311.(}I(F)(1). The application presents the evidence that Maier claims shows that he meets the qualifications to be sheriff. Additional evidence was adduced at depositions. 15 14} Maier was employed by the Ohio Department of Public Safety from May 21, 2007, to January 11, 2011. Most of Maier's tenure at the Department of Public Safety was as assistant director. He testified that from July 24, 2008, until. Januaiy 7, 2011, he was a full-time agent for the Ohio Investigative Unit of the Department of Public Safety as part of his duties as the assistant director of the Department of Public Safety. He also supervised several investigative units of the department. From January I until January 11, 2011 (11 days), he was interim director of the Department ofPuhlic Safety. {1^1 15) Maier testified tliat he was "in the chain of command as the civilian authority" over the Ohio Investigative Unit, Ohio Homeland Security, and

3 SUPREN4E COL'.ZT OF OHIO

other peace-officer units. The superintendent of the Ohio Highway Patrol-who holds the rank of colonel-reported to Maier on active investigations, and Maier oversaw and helped manage those investigations. He also was an agent of and helped manage the Ohio Tnvestigative Unit, which investigates liquor violations and food-starnp fraud. {j[ 16} In addition, Maier was a deputy in the Harrison County sheriff's office in January 2013. He was in that position only a very short time and actually worked only two eight-hour shifts. He was also the safety and service director for the city of Massillon, starting in January 2012. Analysis

A. Oral argument is unnecessary to decide this case 15 17} Maier has moved for oral argument in this case. 1lis only ar^ument is that the issues are complex and oral argurnent would allow the parties to address any of the court's concerrzs. Swanson states that the evidence submitted is sufficient for the court to decide this case. We agree with Swanson. {^j 18} "Oral argument is not required in an original action in this court; instead, oral argument is discretionary in these cases." State ex rel. Afun. Constr. Equip. Oper-ator-s' Labor Council v. CleyeZand, 114 Ohio St.3d 183, 2007-Ohio-

3831, 870 N.E.2d 1174, T, 42. "Nevertheless, we have discretion to grant oral argument pursu:ant to S.Ct.Prac.R. IX(2)(A) [nov,J S.Ct.Prac.R. 17.02(A)], and in exercising this discretion, we consider whether the case iilvoIves a matter of great public im.portance, complex issues of Iaiv or fact, a substantial consti-tutional issue, or a conflict among courts of appeals." State ex Yel. Davis v. Pub. Ernps.

Retirefnent Bd., 111 Ohio St.3d 118, 2006-Ohio-5339, 855 N.E.2d 444, TI, 15. {¶ 19} However, here, the parties' briefs and evidence are sufficient to resolve the issues raised in this case. See State ex rel. Allen v. Warren Cty. Bcl of Elections, 115 Ohio St.3d 186, 2007-Ohio-4752, 874 N.Eo2d 507, ^ 21. Therefore, we deny Maier's request for oral argument and proceed to the merits.

4 January Tenn, 2013

B. Swanson has standing as a relator in quo warranto {¶ 201 As a preliminary matter, Maier makes several arguments questioning Swanson's standing to file an action in quo warranto; all of these arguinents lack merit. Quo warrantc) is the exclusive remedy to litigate the right

of a person to hold a public office. State ex t•eZ. Deiter v. McGuire, 119 Ohio St.3d 384, 2008-Ohio-4536, 894 N.E.2d 680, ^j 20; State ex r•el. Ebbing v. Ricketts, 133 Ohio St.3d. 339, 2012-Ohio-4699, 978 N.E.2d 188, ¶ 8, citing State ex rel. Johnson v. Richardson, 131 Ohio St.3d 120, 2012-Ohio-57, 961 N.E.2d 187, !j 15. "`To be entitled to the writ of quo warranto, the relator naust establish that the office is being unla-vvfully held and exercised by respondent and that

relator is entitled to the office.' " Id., quoting State ex rel. Zeigler v. Zu»ihar-, 129 Ohio St.3d 240, 2011-Ohio-2939, 951 N.E.2d 405, ^ 23. {I 21} Maier argues that Swanson is not legally entitled -to the office of count^, sheriff and lacks standing. We have held that to establish standing, a relator in quo warranto "need not prove his own title beyond all doubt. He need

only establish his claim 'in good faith and upon reasonable grounds.' " State ex reL Hanley v. Roberts, 17 Ohio St.3d 1, 6, 476 N.E.2d 1019 (1985), quoting State ex reL Ethell v. Hendricks, 165 Ohio St. 217, 135 N.E.2d 362 (1956), paragraph three of the syllabus; State ex rel. Halak v. C`ebzila, 49 Ohio St.2d 291, 293, 361 N.E.2d 244 (1977). However, "[a] mere possibility of appointment dcies not constitute entitlement in any way." Id. {j[ 22) Swanson asserts, and Maier does not disagree, that he was lawfially appointed acting sheriff: Swanson has asserted in good faith and on reasonable grounds that if Maier is ousted, he would be entitled to the office of county sheriff until a qualified sheriff is appointed by the DCC. He is not asserting "[a] mere possibility of appointment," but rather that he was properly appointed as the acting holder of the office and that he still holds it pending the appointment of a qualified candidate by the DCC.

5 SiJPFLIslV.f"r, COIjRT OF OHIO

{^ 23} Maier argues that Swansc^ii is retired and has no interest in beina sheriff of Stark County. IIowever, Swanson's long-terrn. i.ntent to be retired is irrelevant. He does not assert that he is entitled to the office for its entire current terna, but only until the DCC appoints a qualified applicant to occupy the office.

t¶ 241 We hold that Swanson has standing to bring this action in quo warranto. {^ 25} Maier also argues that the qualifications of a county sheriff are a matter for the local board of elections to determine, or, in the case of a vacancy, for the central committee of the appropriate political party, and not the court. Essentially, Maier asser-Es that the determination of qualifications for sheriff in this circumstance is a political question outside the realm of the courts. This argu.ment is also without merit. {l^ 261 The DCC has a responsibility in the first instance to determ.irie the qualifications for its appointee for sheriff. However, the qualifications for sheriff are set by the General Assembly in R.C. 311.01, and the courts may be called upon in a quo warranto action such as this one to make a deter.mination tuhether an appointee meets those qualifications. C. Maier does not meet the statutory qualification for county sheriff {¶ 271 R.C. 31:1.01 expressly prohibits the appointment of a canclidate for county sheriff who does not meet the specific statutory requirements set out in that section. Specifically, subsection (B) states, "[N]o person is eligible to be a candidate for sheriff, and no person shall be elected or appointed to the office of sheriff, unless that person meets all of the following requirements. The requirements at issue here are found in subsections (B)(8) and (B)(9):

(B) Except as otherwise provided in this section, no person is eligible to be a candidate for sheriff, and no person shall be

6 January Term, 2013

elected or appointed to the office of sheriff, unless that person meets all of the following requirements:

(8) The person meets at least one of the following coiiditions: (a) Has obtained or held, within the four-year period ending immediately prior to the qtialification date, a valid basic peace officer certificate of training issued by the Ohio peace officer training commission or has been issued a certificate of training pursuant to section 5503.05 of the Revised Code, and, within the four-year period ending immediately prior to the qualification date, has been employed as an appointee pursuant to section 5503.01 of the Revised Code or as a full-time peace officer as defined in section 109.71 of the Revised Code performing duties related to the enforcement of statutes, ordinances, or codes; (b) Has obtained or held, within the three-year period ending immediately prior to the qualification date, a valid basic peace officer certificate of training issued by the Ohio peace officer training commission and has been employed for at least the last three years prior to the qualification date as a full-tiine law enforcement officer, as defined in division (A)(1.1) of section 2901.0I of the Revised Code, performing duties related to the enforcement of statutes, ordinances, or codes. (9) The person meets at least one of the following conditions: (a) Has at least two years of supervisory experience as a peace officer at the rank of corporal or above, or has been appointed pursuant to section 5503.01 of the Revised Code azid

7 SUI'RE'vfF COURT oI? Oxto

served at the rank of sergeant or above, in the five-year period ending immediately prior to the qualification date; (b) Has completed satisfactorily at least two years of post- secondary education or the equivalent in semester or qtlarter hours in a college or university authorized to confer degrees by the Ohio board of regents or the comparable agency of another state in which the college or university is located or in a school that holds a certificate of recristration issued by the state board of career colleges and schools under Chapter 3332. of the Revised Code.

R.C. 311.01(B). Thus, to qualify for county sheriff a candidate must meet the qualifications of R.C. 311.01(B)(8)(a) or (b) asivell as R.C. 311.01(B)(9)(a) or (b). In other words, Maier need not meet all four qualifying conditions, but must meet at least one under subsection (B)($) and one under subsection (B)(9). i^ 28} The "qualification date" referred to in R.C. 311.01(B) is defined in R.C. 311.01(H).

(H) A-ss used in this section: (1) "Qualification date" means the last day on which a candidate for the office of sheriff can file a declaration of candidacy, a statement of candidacy, or a declaration of intent to be a write-in candidate, as applicable, in the case of a primary election for the office of sheriff; the last day on which a person may be appointed to fill a vacancy in a party nomination for the office of sheriff under Chapter 3513. of the Revised Code, in the case of a vacancy in the office of sheriff; or a date thirty days after the day on which a vacancy in the office of sheriff occurs, in the

8 January Term, 2013

case of an appointment to such a vacancy under section 30-5.02 of the Revised Code.

Ilere, McDonald indicated before the beginning of his term that he was unable to assume the office, so the vacancy occurred on January 7, the first day of McDonald's term. And 30 days after that date is the "qualification date," February 6_, 2013, {^ 29} As explained above, to qualify for county sheri:ff, a candidate must meet the qualifications of R.C. 311.01(B)(8)(a) or (b). Maier acknowledges that he is not qualified under (B)(8)(b), but asserts that he is qualified under (B)(8)(a). To qualify under (B)(8)(a), Maier must (1) have held or obtained a valid certificate of peace-officer training within the four years immediately prior to the qualifying date and (2) have been employed within the four years immediately prior to the qualifying date as a highway patrol officer or "as a full-time peace officer as defined in section 109.71 of the Revised Code performing duties related to the enforcement of statutes; ordinances, or codes." {T 30} The main cliallenge by Swanson is that Maier was not employed as a fi.iIl-time peace officer within the four years immediately preceding the qualifying date. XVb.ile Maier was a highway patrol officer at one time, his employment with the patrol ended in May 2007, which was before the qualifyinc, time period. {¶ 31} However, Maier has held two other positions that he asserts qualify him under R.C. 311.01 (B)(8)(a). First, he was assistant director (and for a short time, interim director) of the Department of Public Safety fram May 21, 2007, until January 11, 2011. He asserts that during his tenuz'e, he acted as a "peace officer" and therefore meets the (B)(8)(a) qualification. The term "peace officer" is defined in R.C. 109.71 as, among other things, "[e]nforceznent agents of the

9 SUPREIVIE COURT OF OHIO

department of pubIic safety whom the director of public safety designates under section 5502.14 of the Revised Code." I.R.C. 109.71 (A)(5). {^( 323 Maier, when he was assistant director of the Department of Public Safety, was appointed an enforcement agent under R.C. 5502.14. Specifically, the director. Cathy CoIiins-Ta.ylor, appointed him an enforcement agent of the Ohio Investigative Unit of the Department of Public Safety starting on July 24, 2008. His status as an enforcement agent was terminated when his service as assistant director ended on January 7, 2011. Moreover, he worked with agents in the field, in surveillance and making arrests on search warrants and raids. He carried a badge and a weapon. We find that Maier was a "peace officer" as defined in R.C. 109.71 from July 24, 2008, until January 7, 2011. {l^, 33} The pivotal question is whether. Maier was a "full-time" peace officer during that time. There are two aspects to making this deterrnination. The first is whether Maier worked the number of hours required to be a fuli-time employee. For state empioyees, that means "an employee `vhose regular hours of duty total eighty hours in a pay period in a state ageaicy." Ohio Adm.Code 123:I- 47-01(A)(37). Maier was clearly a full-tiine employee at the i:3epartnnent of Public Safety under that definition. {^( 341 The second aspect is whether Maier was a peace officer on a full- time basis. The Ohio attorney general has addressed the meaning of "full-time" in the context of R.C. 311.01. 2001 Ohio Atty.Gen.Ops. No. 026. The attorney general determined that the defmition of "full-time" should be based on its ordinary meaning and common usage. Id. at 5. After reviewing several defmitions of "full-time," the attorney general concluded that a person is employed as a"`fu1I-time' law enforcement officer for purposes of R.L. ^I I.O1(B)($)(b) when the person's work as a law enforcement offcer tal:es alI of his reguiar working hours." Ia'. at 6. We accept and adopt the attorney general's definition of "f►all-time" for purposes of R.C. 311.01(E3).

10 January Term, 2013

{, 351 The question then is whether Maier's work as a peace officer when he was assistant director of the Department of Public Safety took "all of his regular worki:ng hours." The job description for assistant director indicates many tasks that would be perforrned by a "peace off cer," including supervision and direction of all criminal investigatioiis, direction and coordination of requests for background checks, and oversight of non-highway-patrol investigations. He directed the Bureau of Motor. Vehicles, the State i-iighway Patrol, Emergency Medical Services, Emergency Management Agency, and the Ohio Investigative Unit. In addition, the administrative form: used by the attorney general to docurnent peace-officer appointrnents shows that the director of the l7epartmeiit of Public Safety appointed him as a full-time enforcement age.n.t. Il( 36} On the other haatd; Maier admits that the scope of his full-time job went beyond supervising and directing criminal investigations and involved the supervision of eight divisions with nearly 4,000 employees. The job description includes some tasks that are not specifically related to law enforcement, such as supervising the human-resources office, equal-opportunity programs; and collective bargaining, as well as defining the department's goals and formulating the department's policies. The job description lists the criminal-investigation aspect of the job within the duties th:at take up 40 percent of the job holder's time. {137} We find that while Maier made law enforcement a central theme of his service as assistant director of the Department of Public Safety, he was not a "full-time peace officer" as required by R.C. 311.01(R)(8)(a), becattse his duties as a peace officer did not take "all of his regular working hours." {¶ 381 Maier also suggests that his very brief stint as a deptaty sheriff of Harrison County satisfied the R.C. 311.0I(B)(8)(a) requirement that he was employed as a full-time peace officer within the four years immediately prior to the qualifying date. Specifically, he worked a singIe weekend, January 12 and 13, 2013. While his work as a deputy sheriff did take "all of his regular working

II SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

hours," he did not satisfy the other aspect of "fix1l-tirne"-that is, he was not a full-time employee of the Flarrison County Sheri.ff's Office. The definition of `:fu.Il-time" for county employees is set forth in R.C. 325.19:

(K) As used in this section: (1) "Full-time employee" means an employee whose regular hours of service for a county total forty hours per week, or who renders anv other standard of service accepted as full-time by an office, department, or agency of county service.

1sTeither party provided evidence that the Harrison County Sheriff's Office accepts less than 40 hours of service a week as full-time employment, and in any case, it is u.nlik-ely that working a single weeicend would count as full-time employinent. Thus, Maier's short stint as a deputy sheriff in Harrison County did not make him a"fuIl-time peace officer" for purposes of R.C. 311.01. {¶ 39} As he satisfies neither R.C. 3 I 1.0 1(B)(8)(a) nor (b), Maier does not meet the qualifications for a county sheriff. We need not explore his qualifications under R.C. 311.01(B)(9), because he meets neither criterion in R.C. 31 1.01(.}(8). Conclusion {l( 40} Maier fails to meet the criteria in R.C. 311.0 1(B) to be a county sheriff. We grant a writ of quo warranto ousting Maier as Stark County sheriff and reinstating Swanson as acting sheriff to serve until the DCC, pursuant to R.C. 305.02(B), appoints a person qualified under R.C. 311.01 to assume the office of Stark County sheriff. Writ granted. O'CaNmx, C.J., and O'DormEt,L, 1JAtvZmTcrEx, KE?vNIEDY, and FRE^TcH, JJ., concur.

12 January'Term, 2013

PFEIFER and O'NEILL, JJ., dissent.

PFEIFER, J., dissert_tin.g. {$ 41} In State ex rel. Woe v. Delaivare Cty. Bd, of Elections, 88 Ohio St.3d 182, 724 N.E.2d 771 (2000); I dissented, iuriting:

The statute at isstie, R.C. 311.01, is overly restrictive without a rational basis. I would find it unconstitutional. R.C. 311.01 is denying Ohio citizens a meaningful choice in electing sheriffs. In Ohio's small counties, R.C. 311.01 effectively rules out competition. Active police officers cannot run for sheriff because as classified civil servants they are prohibited from political activity. R.C. 124.57. A sheriff's deputy in an unclassified position could run for office, but an officer running against his boss is not a realistic possibility. Indeed, even the Attorney General of this state, defined by statute as our "chief law officer," R.C. 109.02, would not be qualified to be a county sheriff under R.C. 311.01. See, e.g., R.C. 31 1.01(B)(8). Reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions upon votin^ rights are generally upheld Nvhere the state's important regulatory interests justify the restrictions. Burdick v. ?'akushi (1992), 504 U.S. 428, 434, 112 S.Ct. 2059, 2063-2064, 119 L.Ed.2d 245, 253- 254. R.C. 311.01 does not further the regulatory interests of the state. Stifled competition does not yield better sheriffs.

Id. at 186-187 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting). {1^ 42} Unfortunately, nothing has changed in the meantime. The example I gave in YYolfe, that the attorney general, the chief law officer for the state, does

13 SLTI'P.Ek4E COURT OF OHIO

not meet the statutory requirements to be a county sheriff, is still true. And today, this court holds that a person who has been the assistant director of the Department of Pti(alic Safety is unqualif ed to be a county sheriff. {^ 43s I would liberally construe the qualifications contained in R.C. 311.01. I.n my opinion, a person who served within the qualifying time period as an enforce.=nent agent of the Ohio Investigative Unit of the Departinent of Public Safety satisfies the requirements of R.C. 311.01. In my opinion, a person who served as the full-time assistant director of the Departm.ent of Public Safety and who in that capacity worked with agents in the feld and in surveillance, made arrests on search warrants and raids and carried a badge and a weapon satisfies the requirements of R.C. 311.01. In my opinion, a person who directed the State Highway Patrol, Emergency Management Agency, and the Ohio Investigative Unit satisfies the requirements of R.C. 311.01. That the person also supervised the human-resources office, defined the department's goals, and formulated the department's policies is more an in:dication of competence than, as stated in the majority opinion, a reason for automatic disqualification. f¶ 44} I dissent. O'NF,11.1., J., concurs in the foregoing opi^^.ion.

Bak-er, Dublikar, Beck, Wiley & Mathewrs, Gregory A. Beck, and James F. MatheNvs, for relator. Roetzel & An:dress, L.P.A., Thomas L. Rosenberg, and Michael R. Traven, for respondent.

14 IN THE BOARD OF ELECTIONS STARK COUNTY, OHIO

IN RE: PROTEST RELATING TO THE CANDIDACY OF GEORGE T. MAIER FOR SHERIFF OF STARK COUNTY

RESPONSE IN OPPOSIT:CON TO O.R.C. 3513.05 PROTEST FILED BY CYNTHIA BALAS-BRATTON

Incumbent Sheriff of Stark County, Ohio, George T. Maier ("Maier") respectfizlly submits the follo-%ving Response opposing the Protest filed by Cynthia Balas-Bratton

("Protestor") on or about February 11, 2014 (the "Protest"). The Protest is limited in scope as it relates to the declaration of candidacy filed by Maier on February 5, 2014 (the "Petition"). The sole basis underlying the Protest is whether Maier is qualified to serve as the Sheriff of Stark

County pursuant to R.C. 311.01(B)(8) and/or (B)(y). ' Accordingly, this Board of Elections (the

"Board") should restrict its analysis and conclusion only to those two statutory sections.

I. STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS

On February 5, 2013, Maier was originally appointed by the Stark County Democratic

Central Committee ("DCC") as Sheriff of Stark County following the resignation of the duly- elected sheriff, Michael A. McDonald, due to health reasons. Shortly thereafter, Maier's appointznent as Sheriff was challenged via quo warranto proceedings before the Ohio Supreme

Court. See State ex rel. Swanson v. Maier, 137 Ohio St.3d 400, 2013-Ohio-4767. The issues presented to the Ohio Supreme Court were the same issues as presented before this Board; to wit, whether Maierrlualifies as sheriff pursuant to R.C. 311.01(B)(8) and (B)(9). See id. ¶ 27.

' Although the Protest argues that Maier has not meet the requirements to constitute a "peace officer" under R.C. 109.741, that argument is subsumed in the R.C. 3 11,01(B)(8) issue.

J 80406202 F Q ^ a ^ Q During the quo warranto proccedings, Maier submitted substantial evidence to the Ohio

Supreme Court to support his position that he was qualified under R.C. 311.01(B). Much of the

evidence submitted before the Ohio Supreme Court is contained in the Petition which this Board has in its possession. Other relevant evidence not contained in the Petition will be submitted to the Board during the hearing.

Based upon the evidence submitted in Swanson, the Ohio Supreme Court reached the following relevant factual conclusions:

Maier was employed by the Ohio Department of Public Safety from May 21, 2007, to January 11, 2011. Most of 10!taier's tenure at the Department of Public Safety was as assistant director. He testified that from July 24, 2008, until January 7, 2011, he was a fiill-time agent for the Ohio Investigative Unit of the Department of Public Safety as part of his duties as the assistant director of the Department of Public Safety. He also supervised several investigative units of the department. From January 1 until January 11, 2011 (i l days), he was interim director of the Departynent of Public Safety.

Maier testified that he was "in the chain of command as the civilian authority" over the Ohio Investigative Unit, Ohio Homeland Security, and other peace-officer units. The superintendent of the Ohio Highway Patrol-who holds the rank of colonel-reported to Maier on active investigations, and Maier oversativ and helped manage those investigations. He also was an agent of and helped manage the Ohio Investigative Unit, which investigates liquor violations and food-stamp fraud.

Swanson, 137 Ohio St.3d at TTI 14-15.2 'I'he factual conclusions reached by the Ohio Supreme

Court in Swanson are extremely persuasive findings and should be adopted by this Board.

Additionally, while the Ohio Supreme Court did not specifically reference Maier's educational issues as it relates to R.C. 311.01(B)(9)(b), Maier submitted evidence to that Court in that regard, which is also being submitted to the Board. In summary, Maier's evidence demonstrates that, while he has never attended classes at Stark State College, he submitted all of

' And affidavit and letter from Glenn Taylor, Sr., who was the Executive Director of the Ohio Investigative Unit within the Dept. of Public Safety from 2007 to 2011, which were submitted to the Court in Swanson, will be submitted to the Board during the hearing for its consideration.

2 80406202 his education and training, except for OPOTA training (which he specifically excluded from the

submission), for the purposes of deterinining his work, experience equivalency for post-

secondary education. In return, the College determined an equivalency of 67 college level

semester hours excluding OPOTA-related training.

Following the decision by the Ohio Supreme Court in Swanson, Maier sotaght

employment from and was hired by the Harrison County Sheriffs Office as a full-time Deputy

Sheriff. Although the Protestor has questioned the motivation behind Maier's employment with

Harrison County, the fact remains that he was hired for the position, he was qualified for the position, and he actually perfonned his job duties and responsibilities while on duty. Moreover, following the Court's decision, which removed Maier from his office, he needed to find employment. Based on his previous employment as Deputy Sheriff with Harrison County in

January 2013, obtaining employment with that off ce was a logical choice.3

Maier held the position of Deputy Sheriff of Harrison County from November 8, 2013, until he tendered his resignation on December 5, 2013. During this time-fran2e, Maier worked

168 full-time hours. 4 He unquestioningly performed the duties and responsibilities of a Deputy

Sheriff required by law. A letter submitted to the Harrison County Auditor by the Harrison

County Sheriffs Office proves that Maier was hired as a full-time employee. On or about

December 5, 2013, Maier resigned his position as Deputy Sheriff of Harrison County.

3 In Swanson, the Sheriff of Harrison County, Ronald J. Myers, was deposed. Sheriff Myers testified that he hired Maier as Deputy Sheriff because Maier was very well qualified for the position, he had background and experience in law enforcement, he knew what was going on in the County with oil and gas issues, had been Post Commander of the State Highway Patrol in the region, and Sheriff Myers was very knowledgeable and acquainted with Maier. 4 Maier worked an eight-hour shift during the pay period ending November 8, 2013. Then, Maier worked eighty-hours during the next two, two-week pay periods.

3 80406202 Maier timely submitted his application with the Stark County Court of Common Pleas to

be considered for appointment by the DCC at the December 11, 2013 meeting. At the meeting,

Maier was appointed by an overwhelming majority vote (101 of the 166 votes). Since his

appointment as Stark County Sheriff and to the present day, Maier has faithfully performed all of his required duties in good faith and with diligence. Importantly, despite whispers and rumors,

Maier's current tenure as Sheriff of Stark County has not been challenged in any quo warranto proceedings before any Ohio court. As a result, Maier is the incumbent Sheriff of Stark County. lI. LAW AND ARGUMENT

A. Legal Standards Applicable to the Board

Maier acknowledges this Board's authority and duty to determine his qualifications for sheriff under R.C. 311.01(B). At the hearing, this Board will act in a quasi-judicial capacity in resolving the factual and legal issues presented to it. See State ex rel. Varnau v. Wenninger, 128

Ohio St.3d 361, 201 I-Ohio-759, 13. State ex rel. Murray v. Scioto Cty. Bd. of Elec., 127 Ohio

St.3d 280, 2010-Ohio-5846, ^31. During the hearing and the decision-making process thereafter, the Board is "obligated to weigh evidence of a candidate's qualifications." State ex rel. :Ke11, v_ Cuyahoga C.^ t^f^. Elec., 70 Ohio St.3d 413, 414 (1994).

The relevant sections of R.C. 311.01 that this Board rnust consider are as follows:

(B) Except as otherwise provided in this section, no person is eligible to be a candidate for sheriff, aiid no person shall be elected or appointed to the office of sheriff, unless that person meets all of the following requirements:

(8) The person meets at least one of the following conditions:

(a) Has obtained or held, within the four-year period ending immediately prior to the qualification date, a valid basic peace officer certificate of training issued by the Ohio peace officer training commission or has been issued a certificate of training pursuant to section 5503.05 of the Revised Code, and, within the four- year period ending immediately prior to the qualification date, has been employed

4 80406202 as an appointee pursuant to section 5503.01 of the Revised Code or as a full-time peace officer as defined in section 109.71 of the Revised Code performing duties related to the enforcement of statutes, ordinances, or codes;

(b) Has obtained or held, within the three-year period ending immediately prior to the qualification date, a valid basic peace officer certificate of training issued by the Ohio peace officer training commission and has been employed for at least the last three years prior to the qualification date as a full-time law enforcement officer, as defined in division (A)(11) of section 2901.01 of the Revised Code, performint; duties related to the enforcement of statutes, ordinances, or codes.

(9) The person meets at least one of the following conditions:

(a) Has at least two years of supervisory experience as a peace officer at the ranh of corporal or above, or has been appointed pursuant to section 5503.01 of the Revised Code and served at the rank of sergeant or above, in the five-year period ending immediately prior to the qualification date;

(b) Has completed satisfactorily at least two years of post-secondary education or the equivalent in semester or quarter hours in a college or university authorized to confer degrees by the Ohio board of regents or the comparable agency of another state in which the college or university is located or in a school that holds a certificate of registration issued by the state board of career colleges and schools under Chapter 3332. of the Revised Code.

R.C. 311.01(B). As the Ohio Supreme Court has stated, "to qualify for county sheriff, a candidate must meet the qualifications of R.C. 311.01(B)(8)(a) or (b) as well as R.C.

311.01(B)(9)(a) or (b). In other words, Maier need not meet all four qualifying conditions, but must meet at least one under subsection (B)(8) and one under subsection (B)(9)." Swanson, 137

Ohio St.3dTi 27 (emphasis in original).

When reviewing and interpreting the statutory provisions before it, the Board must adopt a liberal construction in favor a candidate's ability to seek office:

Words limiting the right of a person to hold office are to be given a liberal construction in. favor of those seeking to hold office, in order that the public may have the benefit of choice from all those who are in fact and in law qualified. State ex .re1. Schenck v. Shattuck, supra, I Ohio St.3d at 274, 1 OBR at 383, 439 N.E.2d at 893 (quoting Gazan v. Heery [1936], 183 Ga. 30, 42, 187 S.E. 371, 378).

5 80406202 R.C. 311.01(B) limits both the right to be a caildidate for sheriff and the right to hold the office. Thus, the statute should be construed under this rule of liberal construction.

State ex rel. Altiere v. Trumbull Cty. Bd. of Elec., 65 Ohio St.3d 164, 165 (1992).

The "qualification date" applicable in these proceedings is February 5, 2014, or "the last day on which a candidate for the office of sheriff can file a declaration of candidacy .,.." R.C.

311.01(H)(1); R.C. 3 513.05.

B. R.C. 2733.14 Does Not Apply to this Protest.

In a clear attempt to blur the salient issues before this Board, the Protestor initially cites to R.C. 2733.14 as an alleged basis to renlove Maier's name from the primary ballot as sheriff on

May 6, 2014. See Protest at 3-4. That statute has no application to this matter for one important and obvious reason: Maier's current tenure as incuYnbent Sheriff has not been subject to any quo warranto proceedings (let alone a finding granting the writ). Consequently, there is no basis to

"exclude" Maier from the Office of the Sheriff of Stark County or from his right to serve as a candidate for that Office. The I3oard should reject the Protestor's claims under that statute.

C. Maier Satisfies the Requirements of R.C. 311.01(B)(8)(a).

Maier does not claim qualification under R.C. 311.01(B)(8)(b), only (B)(8)(a). Maier meets this statutory requirement because, within the four-year period ending immediately prior to the qualification date (i.e., from February 4, 2010, to February 4, 2014) he has (1) held or obtained a valid Peace Officer Certificate of Training issued by the Ohio Peace Officer Training

Commission, and (2) has been employed as a fdzll-time peace officer as defined in R.C. 109.71 performing duties related to the enforcement of statutes, ordinances, or codes.

1. Valid Peace Officer Certificate of Trainin^

Included among the documents submitted in the Petition is evidence that Maier obtained numerous Peace Officer training certificates on the letterheads of former Attorneys General Petro

6 8040620 2 and Cordray and current Attorney General DeWine. These demonstrate appointments of Maier as a Peace Officer effective July 2008, re-appointment by Attorney General Cordray on or about

November 18, 2009, and another appointment as a Peace Officer effective January 11, 2013. An additional appointment as a Peace Officer effective November 8, 2013, on Attorney General

DeWine's letterhead will also be submitted to the Board during the hearing. In short, these documents clearly demonstrate that Maier has satisfied the certificate of training requirement and, indeed, the relator in the Swanson case never challenged that fact.

Nevertheless, the Protestor appears to argue that Maier is required to obtain non-OPOTA training in order to qualify under R.C. 311.01(B). The Protestor is wrong. The issue before the

Board is whether Maier has satisfied the requirements of R.C. 311.01(B)(8)(a) and R.C.

311.01(B)(9)(a) or (b). None of those statutory sections requires non-OPOTA peace officer training. Instead, as it relates to the training certificate that is required, R.C. 311.01(B)(8)(a) simply requires "a valid basic peace officer certificate of training issued by the Ohio peace officer training commission." The evidence cited above clearly meets that mandate.

2. Maier's Em lo . ment as a Full-Time Peace Officer.

The basis for the Court's decision in Swanson was that Maier's time as the Assistant

Director (and short stint as Interim Director) of the Department of Public Safety did not constitute "fizll-time" employment as a peace officer "because his duties as a peace officer did not take `all of his regular working hours."' Swanson, 137 Ohio St.3d ^( 37. 1'he Court likewise held that it did not have sufficient evidence before it to hold that Maier's short time as Deputy

Sheriff of flarrison County (where he worked on January 12 and 13, 2013) made him a full-time peace officer for purposes of R.C. 311.01. Id. ¶ 38. Since the decision in Swanson, Maier has obtained the necessary employment to meet this statutory requirement.

7 8Q40G20 2 In determining whether Maier was a full-time peace officer when working as a county

employee (for the Harrison County Sherift's Office), the Court cited R.C. 325.19(K)(1):

(K) As used in this section:

(1) "Full-time employee" means an employee whose regular hours of service for a county total forty hours per week, or who renders any other standard of service accepted as full-time by an office, department, or agency of county service.

Swanson, 137 Ohio St.3d ¶ 38.5

Here, there are two independent bases to conclude that, within the applicable time period,

Maier was a full-time peace officer.6 First, from December 12, 2013 to February 4, 2014 (and continuing to the present), Maier has been employed as the full-time Sheriff of Stark County.

The Board is able and should consider his time as the incumbent sheriff when analyzing R.C.

311.01(13)(8). See State ex rel. Varnau v. Wenm"ner, 12 Dist. No. CA2009-Ohio-3904, 2011-

Ohio-3904,TT,, 39, 43. In Vamau, a quo warranto action, the incutnbent sheriff was duly-elected in 2000 and 2004 and he lawfully held the office during each term. While protests to his candidacy to participate in the elections were filed with the relevant board of elections, said protests were withdrawn. The relator argued that the court could not consider the incumbent sheriffs experience during those 2000 and 2004 terms for purposes of R.C. 31 1.01(B)(8) and

5 The Court analyzed two "aspects" to determine whether Maier met the "full time" definition under R.C. 311.01(B)(8): (1) whether Maier was a "full time employee," and (2) whether Maier's "work as a law enforcement officer takes all of his regular working hours." Swanson, 137 Ohio St.3d ^Tj 33-34. It determined that, when working as a deputy sheriff (or, similarly the sheriff), Maier spent all of his regular working hours as a law enforcement officer, satisfying the second "aspect" of the analysis. Id. T 38. To determine whether he was a "full time employee," the Court looked to R.C. 325.19(K)(1). See id. 6 Importantly, R.C. 311.01(13)(8)(a) does not state for how long the candidate must have been a "full-time peace officer" within the applicable four-year period, only that, within the stated time-frame, the candidate "has been employed ... as a full-time peace officer . . . ." Id. Indeed, the Court in Swanson was willing to consider as little as two days of employment to satisfy the requirement if it has met the "full time" requirements.

8 80406202 (B)(9) because he was never qualified under R.C. 311.01 prior to the 2000 or 2004 elections,

despite his service as sheriff during those terms. The court disagreed:

Wenninger was duly elected as sheriff in 2000 and 2004, and he lawfully took office pursuant to those elections. There were no successful protests or challenges to his candidacy or his right to hold office during either of these two prior terms. Varnau cannot now seek to challenge or void Wenninger's right to hold office for past terms which have already expired. Wenninger's status as elected sheriff of Brown County for the period of 2001 to 2008 remains .,..

Id. ^j 39. As a result, the Court considered the incumbent sheriff's time for purposes of both R.C.

311.0I(B)(8) and (B)(9). Id. ^, T 39, 43.

For approximately two months during the qualifying period, Maier has served as Sheriff of Stark County, without any challenges to his right to hold office. There can be no question that his service as Sheriff "totals forty hoLU-s per week," or constitutes a"stanctard of service accepted as full-time by an office, department, or agency of county service." R.C. 325.19(K)(1); Swanson,

137 Ohio St.3d ^j 38. There also can be no question that Sheriff Maier devotes all of his regular working hours as a law enforcement officer. For this reason alone, the Board should conclude that R.C. 311 01(B)(8)(a) has been satisfied.

Second, and alternatively, even if the Board does not consider Maier's current tenure as the iricumbent Sheriff of Stark County, Maier's time as Deputy Sheriff of Harrison County from

November 8, 2013, to December 5, 2013, surely qualifies as a "full-time peace officer." A deputy sheriff constitutes a peace officer pursuant to R.C. 109.71(A)(1). Maier worked 168 hours as the Harrison County Deputy Sheriff during that time, which included two, two-week pay periods in which he worked eighty hours. This clearly satisfies the "full time employee" requirement under R.C. 325.19(K)(1). And, as the Court in Swanson already determined, a deputy sheriff spends all of his regular working hours as a law enforcement officer.

9 80406202 Accordingly, this Board should hold that, within the fotir-year applicable time frame,

Maier has been employed as a "full-time peace officer," thereby satisfying the requirements

under R.C. 311.01:(B)(8)(a).

It is noteworthy that the Protestor ignores Maier's current tenure as Sheriff in her Protest

filing. Instead, the Protestor argues in hyperbolic fashion, that this Board cannot consider

Maier's time as Deputy in November and early December 2013 because it was allegedly a

"sham" hiring. The Protestor also carelessly alleges that Maier purportedly violated R.C. 124.57 and/or Ohio Adm. Code 123:1-46-02. The Protestor's incredulous pandering aside, R.C.

311.01(B)(8)(a) is silent as to how or why a candidate obtains employment that satisfies the

"full-time peace officer" requirement. In other words, intent is irrelevant. The only issue before the Board is wliether Maier's employment within the applicable qualification period satisfies the requirement. There is no argument or factual evidence before this Board to dispute that (1) between December 12, 20131 and February 4, 2014, Maier has been the full-time, duly-appointed

Sheriff of Stark County, or (2) from November 8, 2013; to December 5, 2013, Maier was a full- time Deputy Sheriff of 1-larrison County. Under those two facts, the Board can only conclude that Maier satisfies tlie R.C. 311.01 (B)(8)(a) requirements.

D. Maier Satisfies R.C. 311.01(I3)(9)(a)

Maier meets batdi subsections (B)(9)(a) and (b), though he must only meet one of them to be qualified under the statute.7 As it relates to (9)(a), Maier is qualified because, within the five- year applicable period (February 4, 2009; to February 4, 2014), Maier has "at least two years of supervisory experience as a peace officer at the rank of corporal or above." See State ex rel.

Wolfe v. Delaware Cty. Bd. of Elec., 88 Ohio St.3d 182, 184 (2000) (holding that, under R.C.

7 The Ohio Supreme Court in Swanson did not address Maier's arguments regarding subsection (B)(9). See S-vvanson, 137 Ohio St.3d ¶ 39.

10 8040620 2 311.01(B)(9)(a), "in order to be eligible to be a candidatefor sheriff, the person must, within the

five-year period, have two years of supervisory experience and that supervisory experience must

have been earned when the person served as a peace officer at the rank of corporal or above.")

As it relates to the supervisory experience, it is important to note that the employment need not

have been "full-time." See State ex rel. Hawkins v. Pickaway Cty. Bd. of Elec., 75 Ohio St.3d

275, 278 (1996) ("R.C. 311.01(B)(9) also does not require that [the candidate's] two years of

supervisory experience ... be full-time."). Additionally, and contrary to the Protestor's

argument and reliance on R.C. 1.44(B), the two-years of supervisory experience may be obtained

in a piecemeal, non-consecutive fashion during the five-year qualifying period. See Wolfe, 88

Ohio St.3d at 185 (analyzing sheriff candidate's non-consecutive employment during the five-

year period to deterynine if it qualified as two years of supervisory experience).

As the Ohio Supreme Court found in Swanson, "Maier was a`peace officer' as defined in

R.C. 109.71 from July 24, 2008, until January 7, 2011," based upon. Maier's employment as the

Assistant Director (and Interim Director) of the Department of Public Safety.8 Id. ^j 32. As it

relates to the five-year qualifying period, this Board can consider Maier's role as

Assistant/Interim Director from February 4, 2009, until January 7, 2011, which equals

approximately 23 montlls. Because the Ohio Supreme Court has already defined this time as a

"peace officer," the only question is whether his employrnent was at the rank of corporal or

above. R.C. 311.01(B)(9)(a) does not define what is required to meet the "rank of corporal or

above" requirement. Ohio case law provides no guidance either. Nonetheless, the Protestor

$ Although the Ohio Supreme Court determined Maier's time with the Department of Public Safety was as a "peace officer" pursuant to R. C. 109.71 under its R.C. 311.01(I3)(8) analysis, the same definition applies under an R.C. 311.0 1 (13)(9) analysis. See 2001 Ohio Atty. Gen. Ops. No. 026, 2001 WL 846345, *7 ("`[P]eace officer,' as it appears in R.C. 311.01(B)(9)(a), is to be construed in accordance with the definition of that term in. R.C. 109.71(A).").

11 8040620 _2 states, in conclusory fashion, that the "rank" requirement must be paramilitary raiik, and cannot be civilian rank. See Protest at 9. The statute makes no such restrictions. And, because this

Board is required to interpret the applicable statutes liberally in favor of the candidate's ability to run for office, Maier respectfully submits that his role with the Department of Public Safety meets the statutory intent of R.C. 311.01. See State ex rel. Wellington v. Mahoninp- Cty. Bd of

Elec., 120 Ohio St.3d 198, 2008-Ohio-5510, !j 29 (stating that, in construing R.C. 311.01, the

"paramount concern is the legislative intent in enacting the statute" (citation omitted)).

As stated in the fact section above, in his position as the Assistant Director, Maier was the civilian authority over the Ohio Investigative Unit, Ohio Homeland Security, and other peace-officer units. Swanson, 137 Ohio St.3d T 15. "The superintendent of the Ohio Highway

Patrol-who holds the rank of colonel-reported to Maier on active investigations, and Maier oversaw and helped manage those investigations." Id. Maier also helped to manage the Ohio

Investigative Unit. Id. For a nuinber of high-profile, state functions, Maier was the lead commanding officer of the Ohio Investigative tTnit. Maier submits that this 23 months of supervisory experience should be considered by the Board pursuant to R.C. 311.01(B)(9)(a).

Indeed, while in this capacity, he oversaw the conduct of the Colonel of the State Highway

Patrol. By definition, then, his role as the Assistant/interim Director of Public Safety was at the rank of corporal or above.

Maier performed the above tasks for 23 months during the qualifying period. However, his almost two months dttring the qualification period as the current, incumbent Sheriff of Stark

County (between December 12, 20I3 and FebrLiary 4, 2014) is added to his 23 months of supervisory experience. As explained above, the appellate court in Varnau considered the incumbent sheriffs time as sheriff when analyzing R.C. 311.01(B)(9)(a) requirement, See

12 80406202 Varnau, 2011-Ohio-3904, ¶ 39. Adding that time to Maier's time as Assistant/Interim Director

of the Dept. of Public Safety would give Maier 24 months of supervisory experience as a peace

officer at the rank of corporal or above during the applicable five-year qualification period,

which is more than the required two years.

E. Maier SatisBes R.C. 311.01(B)(9)(b).

Maier also meets the requirements of Subsection 9(b) because he has "at least two years

of post-secondary education or the equivalent in semester or quarter hours" with an

appropriately-designated Ohio college. The evidence submitted to the Board demonstrates that

Maier tendered his academic qualifications to Stark State College for analysis and review. Maier

subznitted his materials to Stark State College for a Prior Learning Assessment to iinplement the

Ohio Articulation and Transfer Policy, which allows a state college such as Stark State to

evaluate a student's previous academic credentials to determine what Stark State would consider

for prior learning and traiasfer credits for the student's academic caret;r. See Affidavit of Brenda

Vogley,'( 4, attached to the Protest. Such Prior Learning Assessments are governed by college

policy. Stark State concluded that a review of Maier's materials and transcripts demonstrates an

equivalency of 67 college level semester hours excluding any consideration of any training

hours, certifications or curriculum from the Ohio Peace Officer's Training Academy or OPOTA.

See letter of January 14, 2013 from Brenda Vogley to George Maier.9

9In State ex rel. Knowlton v, Noble Cty. Bd. of Elec., 126 Ohio St.3d 483, 2010-Ohio-4450, the Ohio Supreme Court analyzed whether the candidate's "life-experience" credit hours could be considered for purposes of R.C. 311.01(B)(9)(b). Although the Court rejected these hours, it did so because said hours were part of the candidate's OPOTA courses which are ineligible for consideration under Subsection (9)(b). See id. T 44. The Court did not, however, reject those hours simply because they were "life experience" credits and the candidate did not actually attend a college or university. Therefore Maier's 67 equivalent credit hours from Stark State, which are essentially "life experience" credits, are to be considered under Subsection (9)(b) even though Maier admittedly never attended any courses at the school. See also Altiere, 65 Ohio

13 804U62t) 2 According to this letter, "Full time student are required to enroll in a minimum of 12 credit hours per semester." Thus, in any given year, a full-time student would have 24 hours of credit hours (i.e., 12 for the fall semester, and 12 for the spring semester). In order to obtain the equivalent of two years of post-secondary education by semester hours, Maier would need to demonstrate that he has at least 48 semester hours. See R.C. 311.01(B)(9)(b); see also,

Knoivlton, 126 Ohio St.3d at T,, 41 (relying upon registrar's statement of number of hours needed for a student to be considered fuil time, and holding that candidate exceeded that amount thereby establishing com,pliance with R.C. 311.41(B)(9)(b)). As stated above, Maier has 67 equivalent semester hours, which exceeds the required 48 hours. Consequently, Maier has demonstrated that he qualifies under R.C. 31 1. 01(B)(9)(b).

III. CONCLUSION

For all of the foregoing reasons, this Board should reject the Protest. The Board should determine that Maier has satisfied all of the statutory requirements under R.C. 311.01(B) and it should cerCify his petition for candidacy.

RI;Zo , lIy sub itted,

` C)M L. RrBERG (Q024898) trosenbe g^^ral oc^om 1VIICHAEI, R. 'r1tAVEN (0081158) mtraven(^ara1 aw. com Roetzel & Andress, LPA 155 East Broad Street PNC Plaza, 12th Floor Columbus, OIT 43215 Telephone: 614.463.9770 Facsimile: 614.463.9792 A ttorneys for Incumbent Sheriff of'Stark County George T Maier

St.3d at 165 (urging liberal construction of R.C. 311.41(B) in favor of the candidate's ability to run for office).

14 8Q4()62a 2 PROOF OF SERVICE

A copy of the foregoing was hand-delivered to the following on FebrLtary 21, 2014:

Craig T. Conley Craig T. Conley Co., LPA 220 Market Avenue South Suite 604 Canton, Ohio 44702 Facsimile # 330.4532170 Attorney fbr Protestor

^^ ^ --.... One of t Attorne for George T.1VMaier K

15 8040620 --2 S°f°ARK COU TY BOARD OF ELECTIONS TIE VOTE

iN RE: Protest Hearing fiieethy Cynthia Ba9as-Bratton Against the Candidacy of George T. Ma►er for the Office of Stark County Sheriff

pOSiT1ON STATEMENT OF STARK COUNTY BOARD MEMBERS SAMUEL J. FERRt9CC{O, JR. AND DEAMETRIOUS ST. JOHN

Introduction

The current Sheriff, George T. lvt'aier filed a declaration of candidacy petition as a candidate for county sheriff on December 31, 2413. Along with the petition, a qualifications notebook packet was filed. Administrative Judge Forchione filed the Journal Entry re: Application for Candidacy for Sheriff of Stark County, Ohio for Candidate Maier on January 27, 2014. An amended journal entry was filed on January 28, 2014.

On February 11, 2014, a protest was filed by Cynthia Baias-Brafton in accordance with Ohio Revised Code 3513.05. The protest challenged the qualifications under Ohio Revised Code 311.01 (B) (8) (a) or (b) as well as 311.01 (B) (9) (a) or (b).

At the Board meeting on February17, 2014, the Board certified the validity and sufficiency of Candidate Maier's petition and reserved the judgment on the qualifications as to Ohio Revised Code section 311.01 (B) (8) (a) or (b) and 311.01 (B) (9) (a) or (b) pending the protest hearing.

In accordance with Ohie Revised Code section 3513.05, the Board promptly scheduled the protest hearing for February 21, 2014. Notice of the hearing was sent to all parties involved.

Both parties were given an opportunity to make opening statements, caCl witnesses for direct examination and cross e.

' The term of Deametrious St. John on the board expired effiective March 1, 2014, but he was a participating member of the board on the date of the hearting and vote and therefore joins in submitting this Position ^ 1 THE MOTiON

tmov+a to Deny the Protest filled by Cynthia Baias-Brattorr and certify the validity and the sufficiency [sic] of George Maier;s petition and qualifications for Stark County Sheriff.

The abcve Motion was made at the end of the Protest Hearing held on February 21, 2014 by Member ®eametrious St. John and seconded by the Chairman, Samuel J. Ferraccio, Jr.

Members Samuel J. Ferruccio, Jr. and Demeatrious St. John voted to denythe protest and allow Sheriff George T. Maier's name to be placed on the ballot as being qualified under O.R.C. 311.01 B(8){a) and (9).

Members Cline and Braden voted to allow the protest and not allow Sheriff George T. Maier's name to be placed on the ballot

A roll call vote was taken and the resuPts are as follows:

Roll Caii Vote: Chairman Ferruccio Yes Member Braden No Member Gline No Member St. John Yes

Sewnd RoIf Ca11 Vote: Chairrnari 1=errucclo Yes Member Braciert No Member Cline No Member St. John Yes

A tie vote was declared.

SUMMARY OF THE LAW AND FACTS AS PRESENTED ON FEBRUARY 21, 2014

It is the position of Member Ferruccio and Member St. John based on the testimony and evidence provided during the protest hearing, that Candidate Maier meets all the statutory quafifications necessary in accordance with Ohio Revised Code 311 .(?1 to be a candidate for sheriff. Member Braden and Member Cline agreed that Candidate Maier meets the qualification of Ohio Revised Code 311.01 (B) (8) (a). Members Braden and Cline do not think Candidate Maier meets the qualifications in Ohio Revised Code 311.(}1 (B) (9) (a) or {b}. Therefore, the only issue for consideration in this tie vote ia whether Candidate Maier meets the quaiifications of Ohio Revised Code 31°fa01 (B) (9) (a) or (b). Also, all members agreed that O.R.C. 2733.14 does not apply to the protest. 1-1 1

However, in that the protestor's attorney agreed "So far as my client's protest, we are asserting that he's not quaiified under (B)(8)(a) or (B)(8)(b) and that he's not qualified under (B)(9), and I think that' (a). and (b) too." Transcript p.7. Members St. John and Ferruccio focus on the evidence to O.R.C. 311.01 (B) whirh sates in pertinent part: (B) Except as otherwise provided in this section, no person is eligible to be a candidate for sheriff, and no person shall be elected or appointed to the office of sheriff, unless that person meets aCl of the following requirements.

(8) The person meets at least one of the following conditions:

(a) Has obtained or held, within the four-year period ending immediately prior to the qualifications date, a valid basic peace officer certificate of training issued by the Ohio peace officer training commission or has been issued a certificate of training pursuant to section 5503,05 of the Revised Code, and, within the four-year period ending immediately prior to the qualification date, has been employed as an appointee pursuant to section 5503.01 of the Revised Code or as a fuil time peace officer as defined in section 909.71 of the Revised code performing duties related to the enforcement of statutes, ordinances, or codes;

(b) Has obtained or held, within a three-year period ending immediately prior to the qualification date, a valid basic peace officer certificate of training issued by the Ohio peace offioer training commission and has been employed for at least the last three years prior to the qualification date as a full-time law enforcement officer, as defined in division (A)(1°i) of section 2901.01 of the Revised code, perForming duties related to the enforcement of statutes, ordinances or codes;

(9) The person meets at least one of the following conditions:

(a) Has at least two years of supervisory experience as apeace officer at the rank of corporal or above, or has been appointed pursuant to section 5503:01 of the Revised Code and serviced at the rank afsergeant or above, in the five-year period ending immediately prior to the qualifcation date;

(b) Has completed satisfactorify at least two years of post-secondary education or the equivalent in semester or quarter hours in a college or university authorized to confer degrees by the Ohio board of regents or comparable agency of another state in which the college or university is located or in a school that holds a certificate of registration issued by the state board of career colleges and schools under Chapter 3332 of the Revised Code. The Ohio Supreme C:>ourt has ciarifted that Maier must meet only one of the subsections in both (B)(8) and (B)(9); "Thus, to qualify for county sheriff, a candidate must meet the qualifications of R.C. 311.(}1(B)(8)(a) ar (b) as well as R.C. 31 'f .tt'E (B)(9)(a) or (b). in other words, Maier need not meet all four qualifying conditions, but must meet at least one under subsection (B)(8) and one under subsection (B)(9)." State ex rel. Swanson v. Maier, 137 Ohio St.3d 400, 2013-Ohio-4767, 999 N.E.2d 639, at ^27. (Ernphasis original.)

The statute requires that Maier have earned his qualifications Within certain time periods before the "qualification date." For purposes of this protest, the "qualification date" is defined in R.C. 311.01 (1-1)(1) as "the last date on which a candidate farthe office of sheriff can file a declaration of candidacy * * * in the case of a primary election for the office of sheriff." All the parties agree that the qualification date in this matter is February 5, 2014- (90 days before the primary eiection. R.C. 3513.05).

MAIER SATISFIES THE REQUIREMENTS OF R.C. 811o01(B)(8)(a)

Maier does not seek to qualify under R.C. 311.01 (B)(8)(b), so only subparagraph (a) is pertinent to our consideration.

Compelling

1. Maier obtained or held a valid basic peace officercertificate of training issued by the Ohio peace officer#raining commission, and

2. Maier has been employed as a full time peace officer as defined in section 109.71 of the Revised Code performing duties related to the enforcement of statutes, ordinances, or codes.

Three of the four board members, (Ferruccio, St. John and Cline (see Transcript p. 225)) agree that Fvlaier meets the qualifications of (E3)(8)(a). Although this issue has been decided in favor of Niaier and against the protester, the evidence is summarized below.

1. Valid Peace oWicer Certificate of Training

On February 5, 2014, Maier filed a Declaration of Candidacy. That declaration included a number of documents proving that Maier obtained numerous Peace Officer Training Certificates on the letterheads of former Attorneys General Petro and Cordayand current Attorney General DeWine. These documents demonstrate that Maier was appointed as a peace officer effective July 2008, re-appointed by Attorney General Cordray on or about November 18, 2009, and appointed again effective January 11, 2013. In addition, Maier introduced at the hearing a"Natice of Peace Officer Appointment" dated November 6, 2013 (Exhibit B) on the ietterhead of current Attomey General Mike DeVItine. Further, Maier introduced a letter from Attomey General DeWine, dated November 8, 2013 (Exhibit C) indicating that "no update training is required" for Maier as a peace officer.

4 These documents and exhibits corroborated the testimony of Maier at the hearing, where he stated: ui've had a valid peace officer certificate of training since 1981 with no break in service." Transcript p. 115. Taken together, the documents, exhibits and testimony clear€y establish the certfficate of training requirement. At the hearing, the protester did not challenge this point and introduced nothing to rebut this evidence.

2. Employed as a Full-Time Peace Officor.

R.C. 311.01 (B)(3)(a) requires that at some point during the fouryears before February 5, 2014, Maier must have been employed as a full-time peace officer.

Maier readily satisfres this requirement. Maier was appointed Stark County Sheriff on December 11, 2013. At the hearing, Maier introduced his commission as Sheriff as signed by Governor Kasich and Secretary of State Husted on December 12, 2014 (Exhibit E). Since then, he has performed the duties of a peace officer in the office of Sheriff. Maier testified as follows:

Q. Now, (8)(a) goes on and says you have to be a full-time peace officer. You're currently a#uIl-time peace officer with the Stark County Sheriff?

A. Yes, sir.

Transcript p, 191. Maier's current tenure as Sheriff ofStark County has not been challenged in any quo warranto proceedings before any Ohio Court.

Maier further satisfies the full-time peace officer requirement because on or about November 3, 2013, he was hired as a fulltime Deputy Sheriff of Harrison County, Ohio. Maier held this full-time peace officer position until December 5, 2013. At the protest hearing, Harrison County Sheriff Ronald Myers testified as follows:

Q. Now, when Sheriff Maier was hired, he was hired full-time, correct?

A. Correct.

Q. Now- so, therefore, was George Maier a full-time deputy for your office, the Harrison County Sheriff, from November 8 to December 5, 2013?

A. Yes, George Maier was a full time law enforcement officer at the Harrison County Sheriff's Office.

Q. Okay. And what was the rate of pay, if you recWl, that Candidate Maier received?

A. The full-time rate, $12.00 and I'm believing 98 cents or something close to it. Q. That was his - he was compensated at that rate?

A. Yes. He was classified as full-time law enforcement.

^**

Q. do you know approximately - or do you know how many hours each of those pay periods covered that were actually worked by the candidate?

A. That should be the 80-hour pay. *** For 40 hours a week and for 80 hours cu^r7u€ative.

Q. It says 80 hours. What does that mean to you?

A. 80 hours, he worked 80 hours, a full 80 hours, 40 hours each week.

Transcript, pp. 57, 67, 45-46, 48-49, 65.

Maier himself a€so testified that he was a fu€€-time peace officer for Harrison County:

Q. Now, (8)(a) goes on and says you have to be a full-time peace officer. You're currently a full-time peace officer with the Stark County Sheriff?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And you were with Hairrison County?

A. Yes, sir.

Transcript p. 791.

To corroborate this testimony, Maier introduced a number of documents as exhibits. Exhibit A is e€etter dated November 8, 2013, from theHarrisbn County Sheriffs Office to the Harrison County Auditor, indicating Maier's full-time status. Exhibit B is the Ohio Attomey Genera€'s Notice of Peace Officer Appointment, where Maiec's full-time status is clearly indicated. Exhibit D is three pages of Maier's pay stubs from Harrison County, confirming that Maier worked at least four weeks of 40 fulf-time hours, and was compensated in blocks of 80 hours at the full-time wage of $12,89 per hour. The testimony and exhibits c€ear€y establish that Maier met the definition of full-time as found in R.C. 325.19(K)(1): "Full-time employee" means as employee whose regular hours of service for a county total forty hours per week." Additionally, Maier testified that his full-time work as a Deputy Sheriff of Harrison County fully occupied his regular work hours: ul did the job of the lowest-level deputy there, handled calls, domestics, relayed prisoners. € served as the jail operations person. You name it, € did it, handled traffic crashes. Whatever came along, if I was next in line, I had to do the job.' Transcript pp. 195-196. This clearly fulfills the requirements discussed by the Ohio Scipreme Court in Swanson, at 135-37. T:he protestor alleged that Maier's employmenfwith Harrison County was a"sharn" and that the only reason h1€aier worked as a Deputy Sheriff in Harrison County was "so you could attempt to get yourself qualified." Transcript p. 100. However, R.C. 311.01(13)t8)(a) makes absolutely no reference to a candidate's subjective intent behind working ful!-tirne. Working full- time with the intent of becoming qualified is no less legitimate than attending school with the intent of becoming qualified. The protesters argument is completeiy irrelevant, and no credible evidence was introduced to substantiate the allegations of "shae employment. To the contrary, the documents, exhibits, and testimony clearly establish that Maier satisfies the full-time peace office requirement. aier S2tisfias: tne Re uirements of R.C. 311,01Jg 9 a The relevant time period for the requirements of R.C. 314.01 (S)(9)(a) is the five year period ending immediately prior to the qualification date (February 4, 2009 to February 4, 2014). Compelling evidence was presented that Maier satisfies the requirement of subparagraph (B)(9)(a) because, within the five-year period ending immediately prior to the qualification date (February 4, 2009 to February 4, 2014), Maier had at least two years of supervisory experience as a peace office at the rank ofcorporal or above. The protestor relied on the Swanson case and we did review some of those findings which are part of the record in the case asfollows: €Uteierwas employed by the Ohio Department of Public Safety from May 21, 2007 to January 11, 2011. Most of Maier's tenure at the Department ofPublic Safety was as assistant director. He testified that from Ju€y 24, 2008until January 7, 2011, he was a full-time agent for the Ohio Investigative Unit of the Department of Public Safety as part of his duties as the assistant director of the Department of Public Safety. He also supervised several investigative units of the department. From January 1 until January 11, 2011 (1 °l days), he was interim director of the Department of Public Safety. Maier testified that he was "in the chain of command as the civilian authority„ over the Ohio Investigative Unit, Ohio Homeland Security, and other peace-officer units. The superintendent of the Ohio Highway Patrol-who hold the rank of colonet- reported to Maier on active investigations, and Maier oversaw and helped manage those investigations. He also was an agent of and helped manage the Ohia Investigative Unit, which investigated liquor violations and food-stamp fraud. Swanson at1S 4-15:

7 The Ohio Supreme Court has already found "that N(ai;'er was a `peace officer as defined in R.C. 109:71 from .1uiy,24, 2008 until January 7, 2011." Swanscrn at%32.

The Supreme Court has also described in detail Maier's extensive supervisory experience as a peace officer while he served as Assistant Director of the Ohio Department of Public Safety: The job description for assistant director indicates many tasks that would be performed by a "peace officer," including supervision and direction of a!l criminal investigations, direction and coordir►ation of requests of background checks, and oversight of non-highway-patrol inrrestigations, he directed the Bureau of MoforVehieles, the State Highway Patrol, Emergency Medical Services, Emergency Management Agency, and the Ohio Investigative Unit, in additiDn, the administrative form iisect by the attorneygeneraE to document p¢ace-oFfice appointments shows that the clirector of the Department of Public safety appainted him as a fulE-tirne enforcement agent. fdAt %35. All ofMaier's testimony at the hearing reinforced and oorroborated these facts: A. I have submitfied to the Board of Elections, in my packet, information pertaining to my-my role with the Ohio Department of Public Safety, with position descriptions, showing me over the executive director of the Department of Ohio Investigative Services and over the executive director position of the colonel of the Highway Patrol and over the Investigative Unit of the BMV and others within that agency.

I was in the-as submitted, I was in the chain of command>and held a peace officer's commissican and certificate at the time of that.

1also submitted information related to my duty and tenure with the Massillon +City, as the safety and service director, which under code is the - deorrtied as the director's appointee of - of the police and fire department. **^ Q. Okay. So it's your assertion that your job with the Department of Public Safety was the equivalent of the rank of corporal or above? A. Absolutely. Q. All right. So the colonel of the Ohio State Highway Patrol reported to you? A. That's Correct. Q You supervised him? A. Yes, sir. Q. And colbnel is above corporal?

8 A. Absolutely. ^: * *

A **' [F]rom January of 2012 until February of 2013, t was the Safety and Service Director for the City of Massillon, I was a peace officer, and I was the commander in chief of the police andthefire departmsnt, so pw.as involved in investigations, involved in the operations of both the police and fire department, and well as other responvibilities. Transcript pp. 11 6-,18; 180, 188.

To further corroborate his testimony, Maier again introduced a number of documents as exhibits. Exhibit F is the Position Description for Maier's job as Assistant Director ofth:e Ohio Department of Public Safefy. This document details the extensive supervisory responsibilities of the position: supervises & directs coordination of all criminal investigations with the Governor`s Chief Legal Counsel & State Highway Patrol per Gouernors procedure of reporting of suspected illegal activities.

Exhibit His the Position Description for Maier's job as Director of Pubiic Safety, with a description of the extensive responsibilities that position holds: Act as Governor's appointee, directs operations of a large & most comp(ex department {i.e., Ohio Department of Public Safety; directs over 3$00 employee statewide in divisions of Administration, Bureau of Motor Vehicles, State Highway Patrol, Emergency Medical Services, Emergency Management Agency, & Liquor & Food Stamp Enforcement), directs, coordinates, & eualuates all internal & external operations of Department of Public Safety & directs activities of all major divisions involving highly complex activities in numerous Eocations.

Exhibits J and K are a letter and affidavit from Glenn L. Taylor, Sr:, the former Deputy Director and executive Director for the Ohio Investigative Unit at the Ohio Department of Public Safety. lmportantly, Mr. Taylor explains that Maier was"the highest ranking law enforcement official for the Ohio Investigative tJnit." Exhibit J. lVtaier is further described as the "lead commanding officer of OiU, a law enforcement unit with full powers of arresf. fVMr. Maier did so as a peace officer, as were the other enforcement agents at the scene, wearing a badge and having a weapon." Exhibit K. The overwhelming weight of the evidence compels us to find that Maier has extensive supervisory experience as a peace officer. Thus, only two issues remain. The first is whether Maier's supervisory experience as a peace officer was "at the rank of corporal of above." The second is whether (Viaier's supervisory experience totals at least 24 months,

The protestor contends thatthe statutaryfanguage ("at the rank of corporat or above") requires a "uniform or paramilitary rank" of corporal or above. Because Maier was nct in the uniform or paramilitary ranks while he served as a supervising peace officer, the protest+ar alleges that Maier was not at any "rank" and therefore does not meet the statutory requirement. We disagree.

In that this is a quasi judicial matter, we do natfeef this instant position paper is bound solely by legal authorities as presented by the Protestor and Cancfidate. We are, however, bound solely by the facts in the recor€f. In that regard, we feel it is necessary to apprise the Ohio Secretary of State of additional legal support for our position.

The term "rank"is not defined. "Where a particuParterm employed in a statute is not defined, it will be accorded its ' plain, everyday meanirtg." Sharp v. Union Carbide Corp., 38 Ohio St.3d 69, 70, 525 N.F.2d -13 86 (1988).

The Ohio Supreme Cnurt has used Webster's Third New International Dictionary to define terms used in statutes. See State v. Chappell, 127 Ohio St.3d 376, 379, 2{71p-C}hio-5991„ 939 N.E.2d 1234. Merriam-Webster's current online edition defines the noun form of °rank" as "a position in a society, organization, group, etc." This is consistent with the term's definition in cases from other jurisdictions. For example, in Meadows v. Palxner; 775 F .2d 1193, 1198-99 (C.A.D.C. 1985), Circuit Judge Robert Bork stated that "the term rank means something more than a numerical grade, or class, or [evel utider a classification system or its equivalent in the Federal Wage System. Basically, it means an employee's relative standing in the agency's organizational structure, as determined by his official position assignment." The meaning of the noun form of "rank" is also consistent with how the word is used throughout the Revised Code. For example, R.C. 1701.11(C)(6) refers to the "order of a rank and the succession to the duties and authority of officers° of a corporation. There are many other examples in the Revised Cade. Nowhere does the Revised Code restrict the term "rank" solely to uniform or paramilitary contexts. In this case, Maier"s former position as anAssistan.t Director of an Ohio department is specifically described as a "rank" in R.C. 102.02(A) : "the director, assistant directors, deputy directors, division chiefs, or persons of equivalent rank *'." Thus, Maier"s position as an Assistant Director constituted a "rank" under our review of the evidence and iaw;

The Protester seeks to write a new requirement in the statute. However, R.C. 311.01(B)(9)(a) does not include any "uniform® or "paramiEitary" rank requirement. tf the legislature had intended the narrow view advocated by the protester, it could have so provided in the statute by expressly stating that the rank must be in the uniform ranks. Or thelegislature could have expressly stated that the supervisory experience must be as a uniform peace officer. But the General Assembly did neither. See State v. Chappell, 127 Ohio St.3d 376, 2010-phio- 5991, 939 1V.F.2d 1234, 10 The fallacy of the protestor's contention is further illustrated by other sections of the Revised Code. For example, R.C. 124.52 and 124.53 deal with the head of traffic control, the superintendent of buildings and the superintendent of fire equipment in cities. These statutes, enacted in 1973, refer on three occasions to "un'rform ranks":

^"The status within the uniform ranks of ^i-ir-h member whiie serving as the head of such traffic unit shail remain unchanged *° *." R.C. 124.52

"**'`and appoints to either position a member ofthe uniform rank by assignment'**''.A R.C. 124.53.

Thestatus within the uniform rank of such member while so serving in such assignment shall remain unchanged *"*." R.C. 124.53.

The General Assembly's use of the term "uniform ranks" stands in>stark contrast to the legislature's use of the work "rank" alone ira R.C. 311.01 (B)(9)(a): 1`hus if the General Assembly had wanted to include a uniform rank rec#uirernent in R.C. 311.01, it certainly knew how to do so. Instead, the General Assembly merely reqtjirecl a"rarik,° or a relative position in the organization of peace officers. The absence of a"unifiorrn" rank requirement in R.C. 311.01 means that the General Assembly chose not to require that restriction for sheriff candidates. This isa rule of construction that the Ohio Supreme Court has used regularly, and we are required to follow the Court's lead. The Court has repeatedly held that when language is present in one statute, but absent in a second statute, the absence is a compelling indication that the legislature intended to omit the language. Some examples include: ^"i`urthermore, if the General Assembly had truly intended to make [the statute] the sole and exclusive remedy for whistlabiowers, it certainly knew how to do so. ***The absence of such language in [the statute] can hardly be characterized as a mistake or oversight. Therefore, we presume that it was not the intent of the General Assembly in enacting [the statute] to set forth the sole and exclusive remedies ***." Kulch v. Structural Fibers, Inc., 78 Ohio St.3ci 134, 158-59, 1997- Ohio-219, 677 N.E.2d 308,

"R.C.3509.05 requires an absentee voter to either (1) mail the identification envelope containing his or her ballot to the director of the board of elections, or (2) `personally deliver the ballot (or have some person specified in the statute deliver the ballot) to the director of the board of elections. R.C. 3509.05 does not mandate that an absentee voter personally mail his or her ballot and identification envelope to the director of the board of elections. The term `personally' in R.C. 3509.05 is used only in connection with the phrase `personally deliver.' Had the General Assembly intended to impose an obligation on an absentee voter to personally mail his or her ballot and identification envelope to the board ofefections, it certainly knew how to do so, i.e., the term `personaliy' could easily have been inserted in R.C. 3509.05 immediately before the term `mail.' Given that the General Assembly expressed no such intention, we presume that R.C. 3509.05 11 imposes no obligation on an absentee voterto personaity place his or her ballot and identification envelope in the mailbox." ln i-e Election of Member of Rock Hill Local Sch. Dist: Bd. OfEduc:, 76 Ohio St.3d 601, 608, 560 N.E.Zd 1116 (1996).

"In addition, it is instructive to compare and coritrast the actuad tanguage of each section of the code. Specifically, R.C. 2744.02(A)(1) provides for immunity from civil liabilify. In contrast, R.C. 2744.02(B)(5) is not as narrowly drawn. All it requires is express imposition of 'liability' by another section of the Revised Code. When that exists the exception to immunity is satisfred. Accordingly, had the legislature intended to restrict the exception to immunity in R.C. 2744.02(B)(5) to civifliabiEity, it certainly knew how to do sn." Campbe0l v. Burton, 92 Ohio Ste3d 336, 342, 2001-Ohio-206, 750 N.E.2d 539. (Emphasis original.) (Superseded by statute.)

In this matter, if the General Assembly had wanted to require sheriff candidates to have served at the uniform rank of corporal or above, it certainly knew how to do so - by simply inserting "uniform" in R.C. 311.07(B)(9){a). The absence of this word in the statute requires us to conclude that the General Assembly chose not to include that restriction on the supervisory experience of candidates for sheriff. Indeed, to include a"uniform rank" requirement would be tantamount to rewriting the statute- The Ohio Supreme Court has stated, "it is our legitimate function to interpret legislation, but not to supply its omissions:0 Hough v. Dayfon Mg. Co., 66 Ohio St. 427, 438, 64 N.E. 521 (1902}. Further, to interpret a "uniform rank" requirement into the statute would lead to the absurd result that even the Director of the FBI - not a uniform rank position - would be deemed "unqualifect" to serve as a county sheriff in Ohio. "It is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that a statute should nrat be interpreted to yield an absurd result." Mishr v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 76 Ohio St. 3d 238, 240, 1996-nhio-400, 667 N.E.2rd 365.

The fact of thematter is that in the organization of Ohio peace officers, certain non- unifocm persa«nel supervise and occupy a higher rank than unifomn personnel. Thus, Maier served in the rank as Assistant Director of-the Ohio Department of Public Safety, with diredt supervision over the uniform rank of the Ohio State Highway Patrol's SuperintendentlCofonel. The Colonel certainFy out-ranks a corporal. Therefore, Maier was a supervisor who held a higher rank than corporal. The same analysis applies to when Maier served in the rank of Director of Public Safety for the City of Massillcsn, R.C. 737.02 states that "the director of public safety shall be the executive head of the police and fire departmertts*** He shall haveell powers and duties connected with and incident to tne appointrrient, regulation and govornment of such departments except as otherwise provided bp law.U Under R.C. 737.06, the director of pubaic safety has the power to prescribe rules and regulations that the chief of police is required to f4lCcrw. And under R.C. 737.12; the director of public safety has the exclusive power to "render judgmenf' upon all suspensions of police officers_ Under this legal command structure, the director of public safety is the executive head of police, has the power to set rules and regufafiions that are binding on the chief of police, and renders judgment on suspensions of

12 police officers. Given Maier's lawftal duties and supervisory responsibilities, it defies logic to suggest that his rank was not at or above corporal. We must presume that the General Assembly was fully aware of this blended rank system where non-uniform personnel supervise and out-rank uniform personnel. To suggest that Maier did not out-rank a corporal would be like suggesting that the civilian Secretary of the Army does not out-rank a uniformed Army corporal. Truly, what matters in R.C. 311.01(B)(9)(a) is not whether 1tlEaier wore a uniform, but whether he occupied a rarrk in the organization of peace officer where he supervised at or above the rank of a corporal. 2 The final issue is whether Maier's supervisory experience totals at least 24 months. As can be seen in the summary below, we find *hatMaier's supervisory experience at the rank of corporal or above well exceeds the, 24 month recluirement.3 Dates Supervisor°^ ^ erience gLa^^

Q2104I2{}09 -- 0111 11201 1 Assistant Directord Acting Director 23 months Ohio Department of Public Safety

Jan. 2012 - Feb. 2013 Director of Public Safety & Service 13 months City of Massillon

12.11112013 -2/412014 Stark County Sherifl`4 2 months

Totaf: 38 months

At the hearing, noteworthy testimony was provided by Robert A. ComwelP, the Executive Director of the non-partisan Buckeye State Sheriffs' Association for the past 30 years. Cornwell holds unique insights into the statue because he "assisted in the drafting of the legislation [R.C. 311.01] back in 1987, along with Representative Ron Gerberry, who was the prima ry sponsor of the bili:" Transcript p. 153. Comwell testified that Maier satisfies R.C. 311.01(A)(9)(a) because there is no requirement of a uniform rank, nor any requirement that the 24 months of supervisory experience must be consecutive. Transcript. Pp. 158-162. Further, Cornwell testified that there are other sheriffs in Ohio whose non-uniform rank as a peace officer has met the two years of supervisory experience, and whose two years of supervisory experience as a peace officer met the statute without being consecutive. Transcript pp. 160-62.

2 it is anticipated that the iwo board members jarho voted in favor of the protest may reCy on Wellington v. Mahoning County Bd Ot;~'lectTans; 117 Ch±ro St.3d 143, 200£# 0hio-554, 882 N.E.2d 420. However, that case sheds no light on what it takes to actually meet the rank requirement because the candidate "admitted that hehad never served as a peace officer at the rank of corporal or above." Id at ¶47. 3 The protest^or claims that the supervisory experience must be 24 consecutive and uninterrupted months. As with the claim about "uniform and paramilitary rank;" this contention finds no support in R.C. 311.01(B)(9)(a). indeed; if 24 consecutive and uninterrupted months were required, then the two-year educational requirement in R.C. 31 1.01(B)(9)(b) would also require 24 conseGutrJe arYd uriinterrupted months of education or its equiva[ent The Protestor's extremely narrow interpretation would disqualify a candidate who eamed a two-year degree while attending the traditional fall and spring semesters- but who broke the consecutive months by not attending summer ctasses. We find nothing in the statute or case law that requires such an absurd result. Further, it the two years must be consecutive, why would the legislature grant five years in which to accumulate two? 4 Maiers supervisory experience as the current Sheriff counts towards the requirement of ft:C. 311.01(B)(9)(a), See State ex relo Vamau v. Wenninger, 12'h Dist Brown No. CA2009-02-010, 2011-Ohiu-3904 atT39. 13 Thus, the ovRrwheiming weight of the evidence and lav,o corzpels our finding that iVfaier has at least two years of supervisory experience as a peace otficer at the rank of corporal or above, in the five-year period ending immediately prior to the qualificatiart date. Maier therefore satisfies the requirements setforth in R.C. 311.01(B)(9)(a).

Maier Satis^es the F^^ ^zire^en#s ^f ^':^. ^^^,^1 ^ 9 b

As an alternative to (B)(9)(a), the evidence established that Maier satisfies the requirements of subparagraph (B)(9)(b) because he has completed satisf'actorily at least two years of post-secondary education or the equivalent in semester or quarter hottrs in a college or university authorized to confer degrees by the Ohio board of regents.

Maier introduced as Exhibit L a le#ter dated January 14, 2014, from Stark State CQiiege, indicating that the Ohio Board of Regents requires 60 semester credit hours for a two-year Associate degree. Exhibit L also indicates that Maier has earned "an equivalency of 67 college-level semester hours." This exceeds the requirements for a two-year Associate degree, and therefore we find that Maier satisfies the requirements of R.C. 311.01 (B)(9)(b). See State ex rel. i4nowlton v. Noble Cty, Bd. of Elections, 126 Ohio St.3d 483, 201 0-t7hin-4450, V38-43 (relying upon the registrar's staternent that college considered candidate to have completed the equivalent of two years of postsecondary education at the school, and holding that candidate established compliance with R.C. 311 s01(B)(9)(b)).

14 CONCLUSION

In our consideration of the protest, we are guide,d by an important principle set forth by the Ohio Supreme Court: "1lVords limiting the right of a person to hold office are to be given a liberal construction in favor of those seeking to hold office, in order that the public may have the benefit of choice from all those who are in fact and in law qualified." State ox ret Altiere v. Trumbull Cvunty f3d. Of Elections, 65 Ohio St.3d 164, 165, 602, N. E.2d 613 (1992). Indeed, the Altiere case interpreted R.C. 311.01 - the very statute at issue here.

Secretary of State Husted has consistently recognized and followed this tenet. A recent example is In re: Tie Vote on Aprf! 11, 2012 regarding the eligPbility of WiIliam Jason Lawless to be certified to the IVoorem6er 6, 2012 ballot as an Independent Candidate forShert{f (May 12, 2,0'f 2.)

Secretary Husted has also consistently afFirmed that the voters should have the right to choose the office-holder when, as here, a board of elections has deadlocked on whether an individual is ttualified. We have every confidence that these principles will guide Secretary Husted's consideration ofthis case.

Based upon the ovprvrhelrrting weight of the testimony and exhibits, and the legal authority as set forthirr the Revised Code and the decisions of the Ohio Supreme Court, we find that candidate George T. {V1aiQr has satisfied the requirements of R.C. 311.01 (t3)f$)(a), (B)(9)(a) and (E3)(9)(b). The protester having failed to present credible evidence to the contrary, we find the declaration of candidacy and petition of George T. Maier for the Democratic primary ballot for Sheriff to be valid. Therefore, we vote to deny the protest. We urge the Secretary of State to break the tie and deny the protest and vote in favor of placing Sheriff George T. Maier upon the ballot in the upcoming election.

^^^^^^^.^ :d ^E L J. F RUCCIO, JR. DATE ^ _ = ------^ do i3EA^ETR S^'. ,9C^H^ DAT^

15 16 BEFORE THE BOARD OF ELECTIONS

STARK COUNTY, OHIO

IN RE: PROTEST RELATING TO THE CANDIDACY OF GEORGE T. MAIER

AFFIDAVIT OF DEAMET.RIOUS ST. JOHN

Deametrious St. John, after being duly sworn, states the following to be true:

I ani competent to testify to the matters stated herein. I make this Affidavit upon

personal knowledge, information and belief.

I ani a member of the Stark County Board of Elections, having been duly appointed by

the Ohio Secretary of State.

3. It is my understanding that Cynthia Balas-Bratton has filed a protest against the

candidacy of George T. Maier to be on the Democratic primary ballot for the office of

Stark County Sheriff on May 6, 2014.

4. I hold no personal bias for or against Cynthia F3alas-Bratton, George T. Maier, or any

other interested party to this niatter, or their a.ttorneys, nor do I hold any personal bias

against the protest filed by Ms. Balas-Bratton.

S. I hold no hostile feeling or spirit of ill-will or undue friendship or favoritism toward any

of the interested parties to this matter or their attorneys.

J w

F¢- 6. I have not form.ed an opinion o.r fixed anticipatory judgtnent regarding the merits of the

protest filed by Cynthia Balas-Bratton. Indeed, the protest was filed only three days ago,

on February 11, 2074. The protest and its associated docuinents are voltiminous and

must be fully and comprehensively reviewed, a p.rocess that is ongoing.

7.. Previously, certain limited statements were attributed ta me in the press regarding the

qualifications of Mr. Maier for the office of Stark County Sheriff. I3owever, those

attributed statements constituted only edited portions of the full statements that vvere

actually rrzade, and do not accurately refleet the full and complete context in which the

statements were made.

8. 1 specifi^cally deny the allegation that I have already decided, pre-hearing, that the protest

should be denied, The ^tark Cc^unty Board of Elections has not yet heard the protest as

recluired by R.C. 351 ^.05, and I will not form an opinion regarding the rnerits of the

protest until all appropriate information and evidence has been submitted to the Stark

Couiity Board of Elections and the parties have had an opportunity to be heard.

9. I af^rmatively state that I am approacliing the protest with an open state of mind which

will be governed by the law and the facts. I understand my duty to render a fair and

impartial judgment upon the protest filed by Cynthia Balas-Bratton, and I have the full

ability tn rei^der a fair judgment in the faithful execution of my duties.

10. In relation to the protest tiled by Cynthia Ba1as-Bratton,l will perform the cluties of n^y

office to the best of my- ability and will enforce the election laws, in accordance with the

oath I took pursuant to R.C. 350I.08.

.^^,..^,^^---°-.,._._... ^ -

Deametrious ^t^John/i

:f Sworn to aiid subscribed before me on February 14, 2014.

Katherine L. Fabinack Notary Public, State of Ohio My Commission Expires 08-02-2017 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR STARK COUNTY, OHIO

PIFTI•-! APPELLATE DISTRICT

c{?.

^ sz{y Sn^ STATE EX REL. CYNTHIA BAI..AS-- BRATTON ^ ^>C T Case No. 2014CA00025 C. .'r Relator v? ^ r ..tls- JUDGMENT ENTRY DEAMETRtOi.lS A. ST. JOHN, MEMBER STARK CTY. BD. OF ELECTIONS, ET AL.

Respondents

This inatter comes before the Court upon a Complaiiit for Writ of

Prohibition arid/or Mandamus. C+.ne of the named respondents, peametrious A.

St. John, has filed a motion to disrriss for failure to state a claim upon which

relief may be qranted.

The complaint seeks to have a protest hearing which was scheduled for

February 21, 2013 continued because the Board of Elections has refused to

issue two subpoenas as requested by Relator. The complaint also seeks to

prohibit one rnember of the board of elections from participating. at the protest hearing due to alleged bias:

"A court may take judicial notice of rnootness, and an event that causes a case to be moot may be proved by extrinsic evidence outside the record.,,

Golphin v. State, 8th pist. Cuyahoga No. 82305, 2003-Ohio-1849,

a ^ ^ .^d The instant compiaint was filed on February 20, 2014 at 3:40 p.m> The

complaint did not indicate the time the hearing was to be held on February 21,

2014. The Court takes notice that the hearing set for February 21, 2014 which Reiator sought to continue began sometime around 9:00 a.nz. and has concluded. Further, all members of the Board of Elections, including the one member sought to be excluded, participated in the vote.

For this reason, the Court finds the complaint to be moot and dismisses this cause. See State v. Jones; 2005-Ohio-1 15 aff'd strb r,orn. State ex rel,

Pv7adsen v. Jones, 2005-Ohio-4381, 106 Ohio St. 3d 178, 833 N.E.2d 29.1.

CAUSE DISMISSED.

COSTS TO RELATOR.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

^.^ A,^:^^k,- JUDG^^^SH^EIL^ G.

JUDGF, tLLiANI'4;r ^FltllAN

JUDGE JOHN W. WISE

A: Rl:11E COPY TESTEe NAi'

3y Cc`a6^ abeoo^raovb^a3, bJ^^t2L'^.

liE