U.S Trade Policy-Making in the Eighties
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This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau of Economic Research Volume Title: Politics and Economics in the Eighties Volume Author/Editor: Alberto Alesina and Geoffrey Carliner, editors Volume Publisher: University of Chicago Press Volume ISBN: 0-226-01280-8 Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/ales91-1 Conference Date: May 14-15, 1990 Publication Date: January 1991 Chapter Title: U.S Trade Policy-making in the Eighties Chapter Author: I. M. Destler Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c5420 Chapter pages in book: (p. 251 - 284) 8 U. S. Trade Policy-making in the Eighties I. M. Destler 8.1 Introduction As the 1970s wound to a close, Robert Strauss, President Jimmy Carter’s Special Trade Representative, won overwhelming congressional approval of the Tokyo Round agreements. This was a triumph of both substance and polit- ical process: an important set of trade liberalizing agreements, endorsed through an innovative “fast-track” process that balanced the executive need for negotiating leeway with congressional determination to act explicitly on the results. And it was accompanied by substantial improvement in the nonoil merchandise trade balance. Both the substance of trade policy and the process of executive- congressional collaboration would be sorely tested in the 1980s. During the first Reagan administration, a mix of tight money and loose budgets drove the dollar skyward and sent international balances awry. The merchandise trade deficit rose above $100 billion in 1984, there to remain through the decade (see table 8.1). The ratio of U.S. imports to exports peaked at 1.64 in 1986, a disproportion not seen since the War between the States. The constant-dollar ratio of imports to domestic goods production-the best single measure of change in the import pressure faced by U.S. firms-shot up from 18.9 percent in 1982 to 26.0 percent in 1986 (see table 8.2), and the figure for manufuc- tured goods jumped from 23 to 34 percent (Destler and Henning 1989, 121). Such increases had no precedent in modern U.S. history. Political reaction was substantial. Had the U.S. Congress been generally I. M. Destler is professor at the School of Public Affairs, University of Maryland, where he directs the graduate program on Public Policy and Private Enterprise. He is also a visiting fellow at the Institute for International Economics. His publications include American Trade Politics: System Under Stress. The author wishes to thank Paul Baker for research assistance, and Anne Krueger, Dani Rodrik, Robert Pastor, and the editors for their helpful critical comments. 251 252 I. M. Destler Bble 8.1 U.S. Merchandise Wade, 1970-89 Billions of Current Dollars Ratios Year Exports Imports Balance MIX D e fi c itl GN P 1970 44.5 40.9 3.6 .91 ... 1971 45.6 46.6 -1.0 1.02 ,001 1972 51.7 56.9 -5.2 1.10 ,004 1973 13.9 71.8 2.1 .97 ... 1974 101 .o 104.5 -3.5 1.03 ,002 1975 109.6 99.0 10.6 .90 ... I976 117.5 124.3 -6.8 1.06 ,004 1977 123.1 151.9 -28.8 1.23 ,014 1978 144.7 176.5 -31.8 1.22 .014 1979 183.3 211.9 - 28.6 1.16 .011 1980 225.1 247.5 - 22.4 1.10 .008 1981 238.3 266.5 - 28.2 1.12 ,009 1982 214.0 249.5 -35.5 1.16 ,011 1983 206.1 271.3 -65.2 1.32 .019 1984 224.1 334.3 - 110.2 1.49 .029 1985 220.8 340.9 - 120.1 1.54 ,029 1986 224.4 367.8 - 143.3 1.64 ,034 1987 225.1 412.8 - 157.7 I .62 ,035 1988 322.0 449.0 - 127.0 1.39 .026 1989 368.9 480.2 -111.3 1.30 .021 Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. Various years. Survey ofcur- rent Business. Nore: M = imports, X = exports. disposed toward trade protection-as often assumed in press commentary- and had its members given priority to actual impact on policy-as assumed in journalistic accounts and academic models alike-then there surely would have been a 180-degree turn in postwar U.S. trade policy. In fact, there was not. The dikes constructed over the decades to protect liberal U.S. trade pol- icy did spring some leaks, but in general they held. Congress did insist on enacting a new, omnibus trade law, but this tinkered at the margins rather than making fundamental changes. The overall policy erosion was far less than analysts and practitioners would have forecast in 1980 had they known the 12- digit trade deficits the decade would bring. There was, over the decade, a significant shift in policy emphasis. Both branches became much more aggressive in pressing for the opening of foreign markets, and, in the decade’s final year, the incoming Bush administration’s trade representative, Carla Hills, was driven to designate entire nations as unfair traders: “priority foreign countries” singled out for the “number and pervasiveness” of their “acts, policies, or practices” that impede U.S. exports (Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act 1988). And the “super-301’’ law that forced this action was a congressional creation. But even this was in the 253 U.S. Trade Policy-making Table 8.2 U.S. Merchandise Trade and Output, by Volume, 1970-89 Billions of Constant (1982) Dollars Percentage Year Output of Goods Imports Exports MIOutput X/Output 1970 1030.0 150.9 120.6 14.6 11.7 1971 1037.6 166.2 119.3 16.0 11.5 1972 1093.8 190.7 131.3 17.4 12.0 1973 1175.0 218.2 160.6 18.6 13.6 1974 1159.2 211.8 175.8 18.3 15.1 1975 1125.0 187.9 171.5 16.7 15.2 1976 1194.7 229.3 177.5 19.2 14.8 1977 1256.2 259.4 178.1 20.6 14.2 1978 1329.1 274.1 196.2 20.6 14.7 1979 1354.6 277.9 218.2 20.5 16.1 1980 1344.2 253.6 241.8 18.8 18.0 1981 1386.0 258.7 238.5 18.6 17.2 1982 1319.1 249.5 214.0 18.9 16.2 1983 1367.0 282.2 207.6 20.6 15.2 1984 1509.2 351.1 223.8 23.3 14.8 1985 1553.6 367.9 231.6 23.7 14.9 1986 1592.6 413.7 245.9 26.0 15.4 1987 1669.0 440.5 285.7 26.4 17.1 1988 1771.6 467.1 344.3 26.3 19.4 1989 1837.1 494.4 386.8 26.9 21.0 Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. Various years. Survey ofcur- rent Business. Nore: M = imports, X = exports. long-standing tradition of choosing toughness on (trade-expanding) export is- sues as an alternative to toughness in imposing (trade-contracting)import con- trols. * Reinforcing support for devices such as Super-301 was a growing concern about the relative competitive position of the United States. By late in the decade, Paul Kennedy (1987) had published his unlikely best-seller, Clyde Prestowitz (1988) had brought forth a widely noticed work, entitled Trading Places: How We Allowed Japan to Take the Lead, and Robert Gilpin had con- cluded his comprehensive work of contemporary political economy by asso- ciating “many of the troubles of the world economy in the 1980s” with “the relative decline of American hegemony.” It was “not likely,” he declared, “that a liberal world economy could survive without a liberal hegemon committed to its preservation” (1987, 365). Well before this, concern about the relative position of the United States had contributed, along with the trade deficits, to an atmosphere of dissatisfac- tion with liberal trade policies and interest in “strategic” alternatives. Politi- cians were reinforced in their propensity to believe that other nations were taking advantage of us, either through unfair trade practices or through clev- 254 I. M.Destler erer and more coherent pursuit of their self-interest. Political scientists and economists (Cohen and Zysman 1987; Krugman 1986; Richardson 1990) were exploring matters of “dynamic comparative advantage” and “strategic trade policy.” Mercantilism became semilegitimate. Dissatisfaction with liberal policies (and trade outcomes) did not lead to a strong alternative consensus: in fact, the prescriptive harvest from the strate- gic trade (or dynamic comparative advantage) school of economists, political economists, and business leaders was strikingly thin. But it did increase the pressures on and from Congress and the demands on executive-branch trade policy leaders, weakening the still-persistent U. S. bias toward open-market trade policies. For an analyst of U.S. trade policy-making, therefore, one major task in reviewing the 1980s must be to explain why the system held as well as it did. To this end, this paper will challenge (in sec. 8.2) the widely held notions that members of Congress are “protectionist” and that they seek to control trade policy. The body of the paper (secs. 8.3 and 8.4) will be a recounting of the major policy events of the decade. The evidence supporting the assertions of section 8.2 will be contained therein, and summarized in section 8.5. The events to be recounted will include: The rise of traditional protectionism early in the decade. The Reagan ad- ministration ended up, in the words of then-Treasury Secretary James Baker 111, granting “more import relief to U.S.