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Social Empiricism and Science Policy Kristina Rolin and K Science Studies 2/2008 Social Empiricism and Science Policy Kristina Rolin and K. Brad Wray Miriam Solomon’s Social Empiricism is an exceptional work in contemporary philoso- phy of science in that it aims to contribute to science policy, and not merely to a philo- sophical debate about the social nature of scientifi c knowledge. In an attempt to con- tribute to science policy, Solomon proposes a novel theory of scientifi c rationality. She claims that we should evaluate scientifi c communities on the basis of how well they succeed in distributing research effort, instead of evaluating the reasoning and deci- sion-making of individual scientists. We argue that Solomon’s anti-individualist theory of scientifi c rationality does not provide an adequate account of epistemic responsibil- ity. We argue also that social empiricism fails to be relevant to science policy because science policy makers are not capable of identifying the kind of factors that social em- piricism deems as relevant to science policy. Keywords: philosophy of science, social epistemology, science policy During the last three decades a number ally or collectively (see e.g., Haack, 1996; of scholars in science and technology Rolin, 2002). Philosophers of science studies have challenged philosophy of have responded to concerns about the science by claiming that social values role of social values in the production play a more signifi cant role in the pro- of scientifi c knowledge in a variety of duction of scientifi c knowledge than ways. One response has been to design what philosophers have acknowledged ways to strengthen the methods of sci- (see e.g., Barnes, 1977; Bloor, 1991; Proc- entifi c reasoning in the hope of mini- tor, 1991; Shapin and Schaffer, 1985). In mizing or eliminating the infl uence of philosophy of science it is uncontrover- social values in the production of scien- sial to suggest that social values are al- tifi c knowledge (Laudan, 1984; Norton, lowed to play a role in decisions about 2008). Another response has been to what research topics are considered as argue that social values do not neces- interesting and for what practical ends sarily undermine the epistemic integri- scientifi c knowledge is pursued. How- ty of scientifi c knowledge; instead, they ever, it is controversial to suggest that can contribute to the epistemic success social values are allowed to intervene of science (Hull, 1988; Kitcher, 1993; in the reasoning and decision-making Longino, 1990; 2002). processes that scientists are engaged in Miriam Solomon’s Social Empiricism when they decide to accept something (2001) is one of the most ambitious rep- as scientifi c knowledge, either individu- resentatives of the latter strategy. Solo- Science68 Studies, Vol. 21 (2008) No. 1, 68-82 Science Studies 2/2008 mon argues that social values can play dividual scientists. Further, we argue a positive role in the production of sci- that Solomon is mistaken to rely on sci- entifi c knowledge by generating and ence policy makers to ensure that scien- maintaining an effi cient distribution of tists achieve their epistemic goals. Even research effort amongst those theories though we welcome philosophers’ at- that have some empirical successes. tempts to contribute to science policy, Solomon develops this argument into a we argue that social empiricism fails to thoroughgoing criticism of individual- be relevant to science policy. ism in philosophy of science. She claims In section I, we present Solomon’s that instead of evaluating the reason- theory of scientifi c rationality. In section ing and decision-making of individual II, we argue that Solomon’s argument scientists, philosophers should evaluate for her radical new normative theory of scientifi c communities on the basis of scientifi c rationality is a non sequitur. In how well they succeed in distributing re- section III, we argue that Solomon’s the- search effort. Like many other philoso- ory of scientifi c rationality fails to give phers of science, Solomon aims to devel- an adequate account of epistemic re- op a theory of scientifi c rationality. Her sponsibility. We explain what we mean theory is novel in claiming that insofar by epistemic responsibility and why we as scientifi c knowledge is an outcome of think that philosophy of science should a rational process, scientifi c rationality give an account of epistemic responsi- is realized at the collective level, not the bility. In section IV, we argue that social individual level. Also, Solomon intends empiricism fails to be relevant to science her theory of scientifi c rationality to be policy. We conclude by drawing a lesson relevant to science policy. According to for philosophers who aim to develop her, science policy makers are responsi- normative theories which are relevant ble for realizing most of the normative to science policy. recommendations given by social em- piricism. To individual scientists social What is social empiricism? empiricism gives minimal guidance. In this paper we argue that Solomon Traditionally, many philosophers of sci- has not provided adequate grounds in ence contrasted epistemic values with support of her novel theory of scientifi c non-epistemic values. Epistemic val- rationality. We also argue that the nor- ues were thought to be constitutive of mative implications of her theory are science, and include such values as ac- unacceptable. Specifi cally, we object to curacy, consistency, scope, simplicity, the implications her theory has for indi- and fruitfulness (Kuhn, 1977; Longino, vidual scientists and for policy makers. 1990). These values are understood to We argue that there needs to be more be desirable features of scientifi c theo- constraints on individual scientists’ de- ries throughout the history of science. In cision-making than Solomon demands. contrast, scientists’ personal values, like In their efforts to acknowledge the fact moral and social values, are non-epis- that social values can play a positive role temic values (see e.g., Carrier, Howard in the production of scientifi c knowl- and Kourany, 2008; Machamer and Wol- edge philosophers should not neglect ters, 2004; Kincaid, Dupré and Wylie, the traditional project of evaluating the 2007). Some philosophers of science reasoning and decision-making of in- have sought ways to mitigate the effects 69 Science Studies 2/2008 of non-epistemic values on science (see Solomon rejects the traditional prac- e.g., Norton, 2008). Thomas Kuhn (1977), tice of equating non-epistemic values Helen Longino (1990), Philip Kitcher with “biasing factors” (2001: 53). In fact, (1993) and others have argued that such given an externalist account of scientifi c values do not only impede scientists, but rationality, Solomon argues that even often play a constructive role in science. those values that have traditionally been Solomon invites us to take a fresh look conceived as non-epistemic can play a at the distinction between epistemic rational role in science. They can play and non-epistemic values. She suggests a rational role by distributing research that we need to radically re-conceptu- efforts in the community among those alize the debate about the role of non- theories that have some empirical suc- epistemic values in scientifi c inquiry. cesses. Given this re-evaluation of non- Indeed, she recommends that we start epistemic values, Solomon recommends by re-conceptualizing the notion of sci- replacing the traditional distinction be- entifi c rationality. tween epistemic and non-epistemic val- Solomon believes that any scientifi c ues with an epistemologically neutral practice that leads to empirical success concept, “decision vectors.” A decision or truth deserves to be called scientifi - vector is any factor that infl uences the cally rational (2001: 52). This conception direction of research (53). Solomon be- of rationality is externalist in the sense lieves that “scientifi c rationality — con- that scientifi c rationality depends on duciveness to scientifi c success — is not the consequences of scientifi c practices an intrinsic property of most decision (16). From the externalist perspective vectors” (63). Hence, a particular type that Solomon recommends, it does not of decision vector is sometimes condu- matter whether scientifi c practices are cive to scientifi c success but sometimes “logical,” “clear,” or “objective” (52). It not. matters merely whether they are condu- Whether or not a decision vector is cive to empirical success or truth.1 conducive to scientifi c success will de- Solomon believes that empirical suc- pend on circumstances (Solomon, 2001: cesses come in many forms. Successful 53, 63). For example, the desire for fame predictions of new phenomena, explana- can motivate scientists either to aspire tions of already known phenomena, and towards higher standards of research or successful control and manipulation of to succumb to fraud. In the former case, natural processes all count as empiri- the desire for fame would be conducive cal successes (2001: 27). Solomon argues to scientifi c success. In the latter case, that empirical successes are the primary it would be an obstacle to scientifi c suc- goals of scientifi c inquiry because they cess. Solomon argues that we should not are “contingent on the world outside the prematurely judge any decision vector inquirers” (17). Thus, they are the prop- to be either irrational or a-rational since er aim of science. In Solomon’s view, the it may be able to function in many ways outcomes of scientists’ reasoning and in scientifi c inquiry. decision-making—whether they are hy- However, Solomon makes a distinc- potheses, theories, models, diagrams or tion between two types of decision vec- artefacts—deserve to be called scientifi c tors, empirical and non-empirical. Ac- knowledge if they are used to count for cording to Solomon, “empirical decision some empirical successes. vectors are causes of preference for the- 70 Kristina Rolin and K. Brad Wray ories with empirical success,” and “non- (SP) A normative theory of scientifi c empirical decision vectors are other inquiry ought to address the role of reasons or causes for choice” (2001: 56).
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