Social Empiricism and Science Policy Kristina Rolin and K

Science Studies 2/2008

Social Empiricism and Science Policy Kristina Rolin and K. Brad Wray

Miriam Solomon’s Social Empiricism is an exceptional work in contemporary philosophy of science in that it aims to contribute to science policy, and not merely to a philosophical debate about the social nature of scientifi c knowledge. In an attempt to contribute to science policy, Solomon proposes a novel theory of scientifi c rationality. She claims that we should evaluate scientifi c communities on the basis of how well they succeed in distributing research effort, instead of evaluating the reasoning and decision-making of individual scientists. We argue that Solomon’s anti-individualist theory of scientifi c rationality does not provide an adequate account of epistemic responsibility. We argue also that social empiricism fails to be relevant to science policy because science policy makers are not capable of identifying the kind of factors that social empiricism deems as relevant to science policy.

Keywords: philosophy of science, social epistemology, science policy

During the last three decades a number ally or collectively (see e.g., Haack, 1996; of scholars in science and technology Rolin, 2002). Philosophers of science studies have challenged philosophy of have responded to concerns about the science by claiming that social values role of social values in the production play a more signifi cant role in the pro- of scientifi c knowledge in a variety of duction of scientifi c knowledge than ways. One response has been to design what philosophers have acknowledged ways to strengthen the methods of sci- (see e.g., Barnes, 1977; Bloor, 1991; Proc- entifi c reasoning in the hope of mini- tor, 1991; Shapin and Schaffer, 1985). In mizing or eliminating the infl uence of philosophy of science it is uncontrover- social values in the production of scien- sial to suggest that social values are al- tifi c knowledge (Laudan, 1984; Norton, lowed to play a role in decisions about 2008). Another response has been to what research topics are considered as argue that social values do not neces- interesting and for what practical ends sarily undermine the epistemic integri- scientifi c knowledge is pursued. How- ty of scientifi c knowledge; instead, they ever, it is controversial to suggest that can contribute to the epistemic success social values are allowed to intervene of science (Hull, 1988; Kitcher, 1993; in the reasoning and decision-making Longino, 1990; 2002). processes that scientists are engaged in Miriam Solomon’s Social Empiricism when they decide to accept something (2001) is one of the most ambitious rep- as scientifi c knowledge, either individu- resentatives of the latter strategy. Solo-

Science68 Studies, Vol. 21 (2008) No. 1, 68-82 Science Studies 2/2008 mon argues that social values can play dividual scientists. Further, we argue a positive role in the production of sci- that Solomon is mistaken to rely on scientifi c knowledge by generating and ence policy makers to ensure that scien- maintaining an effi cient distribution of tists achieve their epistemic goals. Even research effort amongst those theories though we welcome philosophers’ at- that have some empirical successes. tempts to contribute to science policy, Solomon develops this argument into a we argue that social empiricism fails to thoroughgoing criticism of individual- be relevant to science policy. ism in philosophy of science. She claims In section I, we present Solomon’s that instead of evaluating the reason- theory of scientifi c rationality. In section ing and decision-making of individual II, we argue that Solomon’s argument scientists, philosophers should evaluate for her radical new normative theory of scientifi c communities on the basis of scientifi c rationality is a non sequitur. In how well they succeed in distributing re- section III, we argue that Solomon’s the- search effort. Like many other philoso- ory of scientifi c rationality fails to give phers of science, Solomon aims to devel- an adequate account of epistemic re- op a theory of scientifi c rationality. Her sponsibility. We explain what we mean theory is novel in claiming that insofar by epistemic responsibility and why we as scientifi c knowledge is an outcome of think that philosophy of science should a rational process, scientifi c rationality give an account of epistemic responsi- is realized at the collective level, not the bility. In section IV, we argue that social individual level. Also, Solomon intends empiricism fails to be relevant to science her theory of scientifi c rationality to be policy. We conclude by drawing a lesson relevant to science policy. According to for philosophers who aim to develop her, science policy makers are responsi- normative theories which are relevant ble for realizing most of the normative to science policy. recommendations given by social empiricism. To individual scientists social What is social empiricism? empiricism gives minimal guidance. In this paper we argue that Solomon Traditionally, many philosophers of sci- has not provided adequate grounds in ence contrasted epistemic values with support of her novel theory of scientifi c non-epistemic values. Epistemic val- rationality. We also argue that the nor- ues were thought to be constitutive of mative implications of her theory are science, and include such values as ac- unacceptable. Specifi cally, we object to curacy, consistency, scope, simplicity, the implications her theory has for indi- and fruitfulness (Kuhn, 1977; Longino, vidual scientists and for policy makers. 1990). These values are understood to We argue that there needs to be more be desirable features of scientifi c theo- constraints on individual scientists’ de- ries throughout the history of science. In cision-making than Solomon demands. contrast, scientists’ personal values, like In their efforts to acknowledge the fact moral and social values, are non-epis- that social values can play a positive role temic values (see e.g., Carrier, Howard in the production of scientifi c knowl- and Kourany, 2008; Machamer and Wol- edge philosophers should not neglect ters, 2004; Kincaid, Dupré and Wylie, the traditional project of evaluating the 2007). Some philosophers of science reasoning and decision-making of in- have sought ways to mitigate the effects

69 Science Studies 2/2008 of non-epistemic values on science (see Solomon rejects the traditional prac- e.g., Norton, 2008). Thomas Kuhn (1977), tice of equating non-epistemic values Helen Longino (1990), Philip Kitcher with “biasing factors” (2001: 53). In fact, (1993) and others have argued that such given an externalist account of scientifi c values do not only impede scientists, but rationality, Solomon argues that even often play a constructive role in science. those values that have traditionally been Solomon invites us to take a fresh look conceived as non-epistemic can play a at the distinction between epistemic rational role in science. They can play and non-epistemic values. She suggests a rational role by distributing research that we need to radically re-conceptu- efforts in the community among those alize the debate about the role of non- theories that have some empirical suc- epistemic values in scientifi c inquiry. cesses. Given this re-evaluation of non- Indeed, she recommends that we start epistemic values, Solomon recommends by re-conceptualizing the notion of sci- replacing the traditional distinction be- entifi c rationality. tween epistemic and non-epistemic val- Solomon believes that any scientifi c ues with an epistemologically neutral practice that leads to empirical success concept, “decision vectors.” A decision or truth deserves to be called scientifi - vector is any factor that infl uences the cally rational (2001: 52). This conception direction of research (53). Solomon be- of rationality is externalist in the sense lieves that “scientifi c rationality — con- that scientifi c rationality depends on duciveness to scientifi c success — is not the consequences of scientifi c practices an intrinsic property of most decision (16). From the externalist perspective vectors” (63). Hence, a particular type that Solomon recommends, it does not of decision vector is sometimes condu- matter whether scientifi c practices are cive to scientifi c success but sometimes “logical,” “clear,” or “objective” (52). It not. matters merely whether they are condu- Whether or not a decision vector is cive to empirical success or truth.1 conducive to scientifi c success will de- Solomon believes that empirical suc- pend on circumstances (Solomon, 2001: cesses come in many forms. Successful 53, 63). For example, the desire for fame predictions of new phenomena, explana- can motivate scientists either to aspire tions of already known phenomena, and towards higher standards of research or successful control and manipulation of to succumb to fraud. In the former case, natural processes all count as empiri- the desire for fame would be conducive cal successes (2001: 27). Solomon argues to scientifi c success. In the latter case, that empirical successes are the primary it would be an obstacle to scientifi c suc- goals of scientifi c inquiry because they cess. Solomon argues that we should not are “contingent on the world outside the prematurely judge any decision vector inquirers” (17). Thus, they are the prop- to be either irrational or a-rational since er aim of science. In Solomon’s view, the it may be able to function in many ways outcomes of scientists’ reasoning and in scientifi c inquiry. decision-making—whether they are hy- However, Solomon makes a distinc- potheses, theories, models, diagrams or tion between two types of decision vec- artefacts—deserve to be called scientifi c tors, empirical and non-empirical. Ac- knowledge if they are used to count for cording to Solomon, “empirical decision some empirical successes. vectors are causes of preference for the-

70 Kristina Rolin and K. Brad Wray ories with empirical success,” and “non- (SP) A normative theory of scientifi c empirical decision vectors are other inquiry ought to address the role of reasons or causes for choice” (2001: 56). both empirical and non-empirical Solomon emphasizes that “only the em- decision vectors at the community pirical decision vectors are always con- level by determining a rational dis- ducive to some scientifi c success, and tribution of research efforts in the even then, they do not typically maxi- community. mize attainable empirical success” (63). She cites the salience of data and the Let us now examine these two claims ability to generate novel predictions as in detail, beginning with (SN). Accord- examples of empirical decision vectors ing to Solomon, “social empiricism is so- (57). The salience of data is an empirical cial because what matters, normatively decision vector simply because “prefer- speaking, is the distribution of empiri- ence for a theory with salient data is a cal and non-empirical decision vectors preference for a theory with some data” across a community of investigators” (57). Solomon’s examples of non-empiri- (2001: 120). As Solomon explains, “nor- cal decision vectors include conserva- mative judgments are not [to be] made tiveness, competitiveness, peer pres- of the thoughts and decisions of indi- sure, deference to authority, elegance, vidual scientists” (120). Given (SN), pro- and simplicity (57-58). Just as salient vided that an individual scientist works data may cause a scientist to accept one with a theory with some empirical suc- of two competing hypotheses, conserv- cess, she is not violating her epistemic ativeness could also play a causal role obligations. The shift in focus to the in determining which hypothesis one evaluation of research communities accepts. makes Solomon’s position both radical Solomon’s social empiricism provides and thoroughly anti-individualist. a novel solution to the problem of under- For an individual scientist, social determination in philosophy of science. empiricism gives only one guideline. A The problem of under-determination is scientist should work with empirically the question of what criteria ought to successful theories (Solomon, 2001: guide theory choice when theory choice 150-151). Perhaps the most striking fea- is under-determined by empirical evi- ture of social empiricism is that it im- dence. Solomon’s solution involves two poses no constraints on the infl uence of claims, a negative thesis, which we will non-empirical decision vectors on the refer to as (SN), and a positive thesis, reasoning and decision-making of indi- which we will call (SP). The two theses vidual scientists. As Solomon explains, are as follows. her account of rationality “does not require individual scientists to make over- (SN) A normative theory of scientifi c all impartial assessments” (135). In this inquiry should not discourage the respect, social empiricism demands less infl uence of non-empirical decision than most normative accounts of scien- vectors at the individual level in de- tifi c rationality (135). termining a scientist’s choice of one Solomon argues that non-empirical theory over another. decision vectors should be permitted to infl uence an individual scientist’s theory choice since they can play a rational

71 Science Studies 2/2008 role in scientifi c inquiry. They play a theories that have some empirical rational role insofar as they distrib- successes (77, 95, 117-18). ute research efforts in the community among theories that have some empiri- Solomon emphasizes that an equitable cal successes.2 distribution of empirical decision vec- Social empiricism focuses on “a new tors is not necessarily an equal distri- locus of epistemic responsibility” (2001: bution. An equitable distribution is a 150). Whereas prescriptions in episte- proportional distribution. Hence, if one mology and philosophy of science are theory has more empirical successes typically addressed to individual know- than others, it deserves more attention ers, social empiricism focuses on epis- than the others (76). On the other hand, temic responsibilities at the level of sci- not all scientists should abandon a the- ence policy (150). That is, social empiri- ory which has less empirical successes cism is meant to be applied in science than another theory. Like Larry Laudan policy and funding decisions (13).3 (1977), Solomon suggests that the pur- Consider Solomon’s positive thesis suit of a theory can be rational even (SP), the claim that a normative theory when it is not the superior theory. She of scientifi c inquiry ought to determine believes that every theory that has some a rational distribution of research effort empirical successes deserves some at- in the community. According to Solo- tention. Only theories without any em- mon, a community of scientists should pirical success should not be pursued distribute research efforts when differ- (2001: 95). ent theories have different empirical Besides defi ning conditions for a ra- successes and none of the theories has tional distribution of research effort, all available empirical successes in a do- social empiricism defi nes conditions for main of inquiry. a normatively appropriate consensus. Ac- Solomon explicitly denies that an cording to Solomon, a consensus on a optimal distribution of research ef- theory is normatively appropriate only fort takes place by “an invisible hand when a theory has all the empirical suc- of reason” (2001: 67, 95). This is why her cesses available in a domain of inquiry normative theory is concerned with di- (2001: 119). recting science policy and funding decisions. According to Solomon’s theory, a Evaluating Solomon’s rational distribution of research effort argument for (SN) requires two things. It demands that In the remainder of the paper, we discuss (SP1) empirical decision vectors be the concerns we have with Solomon’s equitably distributed in proportion to theory of scientifi c rationality. First, we the empirical successes of the various argue that Solomon’s argument for (SN) theories under consideration so that is not valid. Indeed, it is a non sequitur. each theory will receive its fair share Second, we take issue with what she of attention, fails to say about epistemic responsibility. Third, we take issue with the role she and attributes to science policy makers. According to Solomon, we should ac- (SP2) non-empirical decision vectors cept (SN) because non-empirical deci- be equally distributed among those sion vectors can play a rational role in

72 Kristina Rolin and K. Brad Wray scientifi c inquiry. They can play a ration- of social values in scientifi c inquiry have al role by distributing research efforts produced detailed analyses of how non- in the community among theories that empirical decision vectors interact with have some empirical successes. Even if evidence, background assumptions, this latter claim is right, it does not sup- and cognitive values (see e.g., Anderson, port (SN), the claim that a normative 1995; 2004; Douglas, 2000; Lacey, 1999; theory of scientifi c inquiry should not Longino, 1990; Wylie, 2002). Such analy- set any constraints on non-empirical ses help philosophers and other science decision vectors in individual scientists’ studies scholars become aware of the reasoning and decision-making. In order often tacit infl uence of non-empirical for Solomon’s argument to be valid, she decision vectors on individual and col- would have to make the stronger claim lective decision-making, and thus en- that non-empirical decision vectors al- able them to provide more adequate ways function in a rational way in sci- accounts of the production of scientifi c entifi c inquiry. This claim, however, is knowledge. Whether non-empirical de- false. In fact, Solomon concedes that cision vectors have a positive, negative non-empirical decision vectors are not or neutral impact on the epistemic suc- always scientifi cally rational (2001: 53). cess of scientifi c inquiry is to be decided Non-empirical decision vectors can lead on a case by case basis. astray a whole community of scientists and not only some individual scientists. Is social empiricism an adequate Whether non-empirical decision vectors theory of epistemic responsibility? function in a rational way in science depends on the context. In this section we assess Solomon’s neg- In an attempt to challenge the tradi- ative thesis (SN) independently of the tional view that the infl uence of non-em- argument she presents in support of it. pirical decision vectors is always a sign We argue that Solomon’s normative the- of bad science, Solomon ends up glori- ory of scientifi c rationality does not in- fying the role of non-empirical decision clude an adequate account of epistemic vectors in science. We believe it is pos- responsibility. An adequate account of sible to appreciate the insight that non- epistemic responsibility will set more empirical decision vectors sometimes demands for individual scientists than play a constructive role in scientifi c in- Solomon’s thesis (SN). After explaining quiry without accepting (SN), the claim what we mean by epistemic responsibil- that a normative theory of scientifi c in- ity, we explain why social empiricism quiry should not set any constraints on fails to give an adequate account of it. non-empirical decision vectors in indi- By the term ‘epistemic responsibility’ vidual scientists’ decision making. we refer to a particular conception of A more adequate account of the role epistemic justifi cation. When one asks of non-empirical decision vectors in for epistemic justifi cation, one can seek science would benefi t from an in-depth to answer the following question: Under analysis of where and how these deci- what conditions is a scientist justifi ed sion vectors enter into scientists’ reason- in believing or accepting a particular ing and decision-making, both at the in- view? Thus, a philosophical account of dividual and the collective level. Indeed, epistemic responsibility aims to identify other philosophers interested in the role normatively appropriate conditions for

73 Science Studies 2/2008 a scientist’s being justifi ed in believing lenged in an appropriate way. In order or accepting a particular view. for a group to be epistemically responsi- In accordance with a widely accepted ble, it is not necessary that each member view, a scientist is epistemically respon- of the group carry out the duty involved sible in believing or accepting a view if in a defence commitment. The group she provides suffi cient evidence in sup- members can decide to distribute de- port of the view. Some philosophers, fence commitments among themselves most notably Michael Williams, argue (Rolin, 2008). that a scientist can be epistemically re- Clearly, this conception of epistemic sponsible in believing or accepting a responsibility is at odds with Solomon’s view under more relaxed conditions. account of scientifi c rationality. Accord- On Williams’s view, one is epistemically ing to Solomon, an individual scientist is responsible in believing or accepting a epistemically responsible insofar as she view also if one adopts a “defence com- works with a theory with some empirical mitment” with respect to the view (Wil- success. In accordance with Solomon’s liams, 2001: 25). A defence commitment negative thesis (SN), social empiricism means that one accepts a duty to defend does not set any constraints on non-em- or revise one’s view provided that it is pirical decision vectors in an individual challenged with an appropriate argu- scientist’s reasoning and decision-mak- ment. As Williams explains, epistemic ing. Given Williams’s conception of epis- justifi cation is “like innocence in a court temic responsibility, individual scien- of law: presumptive but in need of de- tists have greater epistemic duties than fence in the face of contrary evidence” Solomon suggests. Given his account, if (2001: 25). Epistemic justifi cation has a an individual scientist is asked why she “default and challenge” structure: “enti- works with a theory which has a par- tlement to one’s belief is the default po- ticular kind of empirical success rather sition; but entitlement is always vulner- than another kind of empirical success, able to undermining by evidence” (2001: she has a duty to provide an explana- 25). Thus, epistemic responsibility does tion. And if questions are raised about not require a scientist to cite evidence in her non-empirical decision vectors, she support of all her views. Insofar as her has a duty to defend them insofar as they views are not challenged, she does not can be defended. need to defend them. One problem in Solomon’s social em- Arguably, the notion of epistemic re- piricism is that the category of non-em- sponsibility is applicable to both indi- pirical decision vectors includes a dividuals and groups. For an individual verse set of factors. Some of them may scientist, being epistemically responsi- remain unconscious or tacit, whereas ble means that when she is faced with a others are put forward as explicit reasons challenge to her view, she has a duty to in scientifi c debates. Among non-em- produce evidence in favour of it (Wil- pirical decision vectors which can func- liams, 2001: 25). For a group of scientists, tion as explicit reasons are such values being epistemically responsible means as simplicity and consistency. As Kuhn that someone in the group has to carry points out, simplicity can mean a pref- out the duty involved in a defence com- erence for a theory which involves less mitment, that is, the duty to defend (or computational labour to make predic- revise) the group’s view when it is chal- tions than an alternative theory (1977:

74 Kristina Rolin and K. Brad Wray

324). Simplicity in this sense is clearly In order for a community to be epistemi- a non-empirical decision vector. Nev- cally responsible, it is not necessary that ertheless, it is a decision vector which each member of the community carry can be put forward as an explicit reason. out the duty involved in a defence com- Also, appeals to simplicity can be chal- mitment. But someone in the commu- lenged and defended. Similarly, consist- nity has to carry it out. Otherwise, the ency is a non-empirical decision vector community as a whole is epistemically because it is a desideratum that we im- irresponsible.4 Thus, Williams’s concep- pose on our knowledge claims. The use tion of epistemic responsibility implies of consistency as an explicit reason can that it is impossible for a community’s be defended by arguing that the value of epistemic responsibility to emerge from consistency is derivable from the value a community where all individuals are of truth. Insofar as truth is a goal of sci- epistemically irresponsible. entifi c inquiry, theories are not allowed We argue that Williams’s conception to include inconsistent statements (see of epistemic responsibility is superior to also Klee, 2003: 250). Thus, at least some Solomon’s minimal conception of epis- non-empirical decision vectors can be temic responsibility because the former articulated, challenged, and defended enables scientists to achieve their epis- and we see no reason why they should temic goals better than the latter. We ac- be exempt as decision vectors. Indeed, knowledge that Solomon is right to sug- the norm of defence commitment means gest that a distribution of research effort that an appeal to simplicity or consist- among those theories that have some ency should be defended provided that empirical successes is epistemically it is challenged in an appropriate way. benefi cial for scientifi c communities. We conclude that Williams’s concep- However, the potential benefi ts in such tion of epistemic responsibility is not a distribution are likely to be lost unless consistent with Solomon’s negative the- different perspectives are brought into sis (SN) because it sets a constraint on interaction with each other. Williams’s those non-empirical decision vectors conception of epistemic responsibility is which play a role in an individual scien- designed to promote such interactions. tist’s theory choice. Some non-empirical When an individual scientist or a group decision vectors can be adopted with a of scientists is faced with a challenge, defence commitment and defended if the scientist or the group has a duty to they are challenged. Some others may defend or revise their views. Such chal- turn out to be motivational factors lenges can give the scientist or the group which cannot be defended. reasons to look for novel empirical evi- Moreover, given Williams’s concep- dence in order to defend their views. tion of epistemic responsibility, it is in- Or they can give them reasons to revise coherent to suggest, as Solomon does, their theory. In either case, the practice that epistemic responsibility be located of challenge and response enables sci- in scientifi c communities and not in in- entists to advance their epistemic goals. dividual scientists (2001: 150). The sug- If on the other hand, scientists refuse to gestion is incoherent because a com- act in accordance with the defence community is epistemically responsible only mitment, they are in danger of losing a insofar as at least one member of the motivation to defend or revise their the- community is epistemically responsible. ory. Thus, the lack of epistemic responsi-

75 Science Studies 2/2008 bility, as Williams understands it, poses single scientist could defend her judg- a potential obstacle to the progress of ment that a particular hypothesis is su- scientifi c inquiry by removing a motiva- perior to the competitors, despite the tion to pursue new empirical successes. fact that everyone working in the sub- We believe that epistemic responsi- fi eld accepted the hypothesis. It is hard bility, as Williams understands it, is as to believe that anyone would say that crucial for the achievement of empiri- such a community is rational. Indeed, cal successes as is the distribution of it is hard to believe that such a situation research effort. Together — the effective could possibly occur. Hence, contrary distribution of research effort and indi- to what Solomon suggests, we believe vidual epistemic responsibility — can one cannot separate individual epis- generate a dynamic scientifi c com- temic responsibility from a communi- munity which makes progress towards ty’s epistemic responsibility. Williams’s empirically successful theories. A dis- conception of epistemic responsibility tribution of research effort alone can has the virtue that it enables one to un- generate a fragmented and stagnated derstand how a community’s epistemic scientifi c community. By ignoring the responsibility is dependent on an indi- importance of epistemic responsibility, vidual community member’s epistemic social empiricism ignores the epistemic responsibility. importance of the practice of challenge We recognize that some philosophers and response in science. of science think that systems in which Williams’s conception of epistemic cognition is distributed may seem to responsibility is superior to Solomon’s be counter-examples to our claim that minimal conception of epistemic re- it is impossible to attribute epistemic sponsibility also because it gives a more responsibility to a community without accurate account of the actual practices attributing it to some individuals in the in the sciences. Science, as a matter of community (see e.g., Giere, 2002). In fact, involves various practices, some such systems, one might argue, no in- of which involve the use of instruments dividual need be epistemically respon- and technologies and require skills sible in our sense. We disagree. Con- which remain tacit. Nevertheless, sci- sider a classic example of distributed ence involves also explicit discursive cognition, Edwin Hutchins’s example practices where arguments and coun- of a crew bringing a ship into a harbour ter-arguments are exchanged. Scientists (see Hutchins, 1995). If Solomon is right, expect other scientists to present evi- then no single crew member need have dence and arguments in support of their a personally justifi ed belief in order for results and to respond to counter-ar- the crew to have the knowledge of how guments. In our view, scientists expect to dock the ship. That is, no single crew such behaviour because it is epistemi- member need be able to personally de- cally responsible. fend her judgment when challenged. We argue also that it is not plausible We think that if no single individual to disconnect a community’s epistemic were able to personally justify her deci- responsibility from an individual scien- sions about what needs to be done, it is tist’s epistemic responsibility in the way unlikely that the boat would be docked that Solomon does (2001: 150). Imagine successful. More importantly, it seems a community of researchers in which no odd to say that the crew knew how to

76 Kristina Rolin and K. Brad Wray dock the boat in such conditions. What respect to non-empirical reasons is is unusual about distributed cognitive benefi cial to scientifi c inquiry because systems is that each individual involved non-empirical reasons can have an im- has only partial knowledge, and no sin- pact on which observations count as gle individual has the full perspective. empirical evidence and which ones fail But, when such systems function well, to do so. In Longino’s view, empirical they do so because many individuals are and non-empirical decision vectors are each individually epistemically respon- not two separate categories of reasons. sible for their parts in the whole. Their Instead, they interact with each other in many individual responsible acts give evidential reasoning. Therefore, she ar- rise to a capacity and knowledge that no gues, scientists should take responsibil- single one of them could have alone. ity for their non-empirical reasons, and Given Williams’s conception of epis- not merely for the empirical ones. temic responsibility, it follows that Solo- For example, Longino (1990) argues mon’s negative thesis (SN) is unaccept- that the background assumption of gen- able. Contrary to (SN), individual scien- der dimorphism has infl uenced research tists have greater epistemic obligations on human evolution and behavioural than to work with empirically success- differences among women and men. By ful theories. They have a duty to defend gender dimorphism she means the as- (or revise) not only the empirical rea- sumption that certain behavioural pat- sons but also the non-empirical reasons terns are best classifi ed as belonging to for their choice of theories if someone two categories, either masculine or fem- challenges them. And if it turns out to inine (1990: 120-121). Longino argues be the case that they are not capable of that this assumption tends to focus the defending some of their non-empirical attention of scientists on the differences decision vectors, then they should con- between men and women rather than sider the question of what other theories the variation among individuals when might account for the same empirical examining a body of data. Anne Fausto- successes as their favourite theory. Sterling (2000) presents an alternative Indeed, Helen Longino argues that to gender dimorphism, a more complex refl ection on non-empirical reasons is theory of the sexes that challenges tra- epistemically benefi cial for science be- ditional background assumptions about cause such reasons can play a crucial gender and gender differences. Thus, re- role in evidential reasoning (1990: 83). fl ection on the role of non-empirical de- As Longino explains, evidential rea- cision vectors can give scientists a mo- soning is dependent on background tivation to look for novel evidence or to assumptions which establish the rel- reinterpret existing bodies of evidence. evance of empirical data to a hypothesis Consequently, it enables scientists to or a theory, and background assump- achieve the epistemic goals of science tions can encode non-empirical reasons better than they would do without such (1990: 44). In other words, non-empiri- refl ection. cal reasons can infl uence evidential rea- Like Longino, we believe that an indi- soning indirectly by providing scientists vidual scientist or a group of scientists with reasons to prefer some background has an epistemic duty to refl ect on their assumptions to others. Longino sug- non-empirical decision vectors when gests that epistemic responsibility with they are challenged. We believe also

77 Science Studies 2/2008 that relying on background assump- of empirical and non-empirical decision tions that encode non-empirical deci- vectors across a community. sion vectors is not itself grounds for re- jecting research provided that research Can science policy makers really do has some empirical success (see also, the job? Longino, 1990: 128-130). Thus, we agree with Solomon that sometimes non-em- In this section, we take issue with the pirical decision vectors play a positive positive prescriptions that Solomon role in scientifi c inquiry by distribut- makes. First, we do not believe that sci- ing research efforts in the community. ence policy makers will have the abil- Hence, for an individual scientist to be ity to effectively bring about the desired epistemically responsible, it is not re- end. Second, we believe that the con- quired that she eliminate the effects of cerns that lead Solomon to attack in- non-empirical decision vectors from her dividualist accounts of rationality will reasoning and decision-making. How- ultimately arise again at the level of sci- ever, she has a duty to defend or revise ence policy makers. them if they are challenged. And if she Solomon’s social empiricism defi nes cannot defend them, then she should be conditions for a rational distribution of ready to consider alternative assump- research effort in a scientifi c commu- tions and theories. nity. According to Solomon, what counts To summarize, in this section we have as a rational distribution of research ef- argued that Solomon’s negative thesis fort in a scientifi c community changes (SN) is unacceptable because individual over time as the distribution of empiri- scientists have greater epistemic obliga- cal successes among competing theo- tions than to work with a theory with ries changes over time. According to some empirical success. More specifi - (SP1), research efforts should be focused cally, individual scientists have the epis- more on those theories that have been temic duty to defend, revise, or abandon successful in accumulating empirical their empirical and non-empirical deci- successes.5 According to (SP2), non-em- sion vectors if they are challenged. Such pirical decision vectors should be equal- duties enable scientists to achieve their ly distributed among theories that have epistemic goals better than they could some empirical successes. And accord- do without them. We have argued also ing to (SN), a normative theory of sci- that it is impossible to attribute epis- entifi c inquiry should not set any con- temic responsibility to a community straints on non-empirical decision vec- without attributing it to some individu- tors in an individual scientist’s decision als in the community. Contrary to what making. Solomon merely recommends Solomon suggests, an adequate norma- that an individual scientist works with tive theory of scientifi c rationality needs a theory with some empirical success. to make normative judgments of the In social empiricism it is science policy thoughts and decisions of individual makers who have the responsibility of scientists. Such judgments play an in- ensuring that changes in research ef- dispensable role in enabling scientists forts in a research community track to realize their epistemic goals. Hence, it changes in empirical successes. is a mistake to suggest, as Solomon does, We argue that the ability of science that all that matters is the distribution policy makers to direct scientifi c com-

78 Kristina Rolin and K. Brad Wray munities in accordance with social tifi c communities by ensuring that those empiricism is restricted because their research projects which have some em- capacity to identify and control non- pirical successes even though they do empirical decision vectors is limited. not belong to the mainstream in some Whereas scientists typically report at scientifi c specialty gain some resources least some of the empirical decision vec- to pursue their alternative theories. But tors that have infl uenced their decisions, insofar as science policy makers attempt they seldom report the non-empirical to cultivate dissent in scientifi c commu- ones. And those scientists who have nities, they can do this by considering connections to special interests groups, the distribution of empirical successes such as religious groups or industries, among alternative theories. They do not may even try to cover up such connec- need to pay attention to non-empirical tions in order to appear as “disinterest- decision vectors. Consequently, it is not ed” in front of other scientists and the clear why they need social empiricism larger public. to justify their decisions. Their attempts Historians of science often face the to cultivate dissent can be justifi ed by diffi cult task of trying to discern the plain old fashioned empiricism which non-empirical decision vectors that claims that a scientifi c theory is worthy might have infl uenced scientists’ deci- of pursuit insofar as it has some empiri- sions in the past. For example, Solomon cal successes. identifi es the captain’s religious beliefs Further, Solomon provides no evi- aboard the Beagle as a non-empiri- dence to support the confi dence she cal decision vector that played a role in has in the ability of science policy mak- Darwin’s acceptance of the theory of ers to direct scientifi c communities. evolution by natural selection. It is hard If individual scientists are unreliable to imagine what science policy makers at decision making, as social empiri- are to do in order to alter the distribu- cism implies, then it seems that the in- tion of such factors in a systematic way dividuals involved in directing policies as new evidence is gathered and one of to yield the desired results are apt to be two competing theories gains more em- equally unreliable. Moving to the level pirical successes. But, that is precisely of the community in the manner that what Solomon suggests policy makers Solomon recommends seems to provide ought to do. That is, science policy mak- no shield against the problems she be- ers are expected to identify non-empiri- lieves plague traditional individualist cal decision vectors in order to ensure normative theories of scientifi c ration- that they are equally distributed in a re- ality. Someone has to make a decision search community. Indeed, other critics somewhere. Clearly, scientists are apt of Solomon’s social empiricism point out to be as reliable in their decision-mak- that it is not clear how we can discover ing as science policy makers are in their empirical and non-empirical decision decision-making. vectors (Klee, 2003: 252; Schmaus, 2005: To summarize, in this section we have 109-110). And Solomon herself acknowl- argued that science policy makers are edges that identifying decision vectors is not capable of directing scientifi c com- one of the most diffi cult challenges fac- munities in the way social empiricism ing social empiricism (2001: 151). requires them to do. The reason for this We grant that science policy makers is that their capacity to identify non-em- can attempt to cultivate dissent in scien- pirical decision vectors is limited. Yet

79 Science Studies 2/2008 such factors would be highly relevant in decision vectors. However, their capac- their decision-making if they acted in ity to do so is limited. accordance with social empiricism. For Despite our criticism of social em- these reasons, social empiricism is not piricism we welcome philosophers’ at- relevant to science policy. tempts to design normative theories which are relevant to science policy. The Conclusion lesson to be learned from our criticism is that such theories should be based not In summary, we have argued that Solo- only on an epistemic analysis of social mon does not offer a valid argument in practices in science but also on an epis- support of her most radical claim, the temic analysis of indicators which are thesis that a normative theory of sci- actually accessible for policy makers. entifi c inquiry does not need to make For example, if policy makers are con- normative judgments of the reasoning cerned with cognitive diversity in scien- and decision-making of individual sci- tifi c communities, as Solomon recom- entists. Moreover, we have argued that mends they be, they can try to develop social empiricism is not an adequate indicators which track such diversity. In theory of scientifi c rationality. Indi- some circumstances scientists’ gender vidual scientists have greater epistemic or ethnic background may function as responsibilities than to work with em- a useful proxy indicator of diverse per- pirically successful theories. They have spectives even though neither gender a duty to defend or revise their views if nor ethnic background guarantees that a these views are challenged. The defence person will bring cognitive diversity to a commitment covers not only empirical community. However, in the absence of decision vectors but also non-empiri- direct access to non-empirical decision cal ones. Hence, it is false to claim, as vectors such proxy indicators are often Solomon does, that a normative theory the best available indicators science of scientifi c rationality should not set policy makers can rely on in their deci- any constraints on non-empirical de- sion making. Much work of course re- cision vectors in individual scientists’ mains to be done to develop an epistem- decision-making. Further, an epistemi- ic analysis of science policy indicators. cally responsible research community cannot emerge from a group where Notes every individual member is epistemically irresponsible. For a research com- 1 In Solomon’s (2001) social empiricism munity to be epistemically responsible, the emphasis is on empirical adequa- at least some individual members of the cy. In Alvin Goldman’s (1999) verit- community have to be epistemically ism, what matters is whether social responsible. practices are conducive to truth. Also, we have argued that science pol- 2 Solomon compares her social em- icy makers are not in a position to carry piricism with other philosophical out the responsibilities given to them accounts of how scientifi c communi- by social empiricism. Social empiricism ties distribute research effort (2001: fails to be relevant to science policy be- 66-67). Kuhn (1977), for example, cause it requires that policy makers be suggests that a distribution of re- capable of identifying non-empirical search effort is a function of rational

80 Kristina Rolin and K. Brad Wray

disagreement. Rational disagree- Anderson, Elizabeth (2004) ‘Uses of ment is possible because scientists Value Judgments in Science: A Gen- may interpret the norms of scientifi c eral Argument, with Lessons from a rationality in different ways. Accord- Case Study of Feminist Research on ing to Kuhn, epistemic values, such as Divorce’, Hypatia 19: 1-24. accuracy, internal and external con- Barnes, Barry (1977) Interests and the sistency, breadth of scope, simplicity, Growth of Knowledge (New York: and fruitfulness, are not so precise Routledge). as to forbid rational scientists from Bloor, David (1991) Knowledge and So- disagreeing (322). Kuhn also points cial Imagery, 2nd ed. (Chicago: Univer- out that epistemic values may confl ict sity of Chicago Press). with one another (322). Solomon ar- Carrier, Martin, Don Howard & Janet gues that Kuhn’s account of rational Kourany (eds) (2008) The Challenge disagreement is too simple to give an of the Social and the Pressure of Prac- accurate description of the causes of tice: Science and Values Revisited disagreement. According to Solomon, (Pittsburgh: The University of Pitts- “disagreement is caused by multi- burgh Press). ple decision vectors, some ‘rational,’ Douglas, Heather (2000) ‘Inductive Risk some ‘reasonable,’ some decidedly and Values in Science’, Philosophy of ‘non-rational,’ ‘unreasonable’ or even Science 67: 559-579. ‘irrational’ by traditional standards” Fausto-Sterling, Anne (2000) Sexing the (2001: 68). Body: Gender Politics and the Con- 3 Solomon’s position, with its confi - struction of Sexuality (New York: dence in science policy makers, has Basic Books). affi nities with Steve Fuller’s (2000) Fuller, Steve (2000) The Governance of view. Science (Buckingham: Open Univer- 4 To think otherwise is to attribute the sity Press). epistemic responsibility of the re- Giere, Ronald (2002) ‘Scientifi c Cogni- search community to the operation tion as Distributed Cognition’, in Peter of an invisible hand, something that Carruthers, Stephen Stich & Michael Solomon is explicitly loath to do (see Siegal (eds), The Cognitive Basis of Solomon, 2001: 67, 95). Science (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni- 5 Solomon’s social empiricism has af- versity Press): 285-299. fi nities with Imre Lakatos’s (1970) Goldman, Alvin (1999) Knowledge in theory of progressive research pro- a Social World (Oxford: Clarendon grammes in that social empiricism Press). favours those theories that have been Haack, Susan (1996) ‘Science as Social – successful in accumulating empirical Yes and No’, in Lynn Hankinson Nel- successes. son & Jack Nelson (eds), Feminism, Science, and the Philosophy of Sci- References ence (Dordrecht, Boston and London: Kluwer Academic Publishers): 79-93. Anderson, Elizabeth (1995) ‘Knowledge, Hull, David (1988) Science as a Process Human Interests, and Objectivity in (Chicago and London: The University Feminist Epistemology’, Philosophi- of Chicago Press). cal Topics 23: 7-58. Hutchins, Edwin (1995) Cognition in the Wild (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).

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Kincaid, Harold, John Dupré & Alison ity (Pittsburgh: University of Pitts- Wylie (eds) (2007) Value-Free Science? burgh Press). Ideals and Illusions (Oxford and New Norton, John D. (2008) ‘Must Evidence York: Oxford University Press). Underdetermine Theory’, in Martin Kitcher, Philip (1993) The Advancement Carrier, Don Howard & Janet Kourany of Science: Science without Legend, (eds), The Challenge of the Social and Objectivity without Illusions (New the Pressure of Practice (Pittsburgh: York and Oxford: Oxford University The University of Pittsburgh Press): Press). 17-44. Klee, Robert (2003) ‘Watch Out for Those Proctor, Robert N. (1991) Value-Free Decision Vectors’, Metascience 12: Science? Purity and Power in Mod- 249-252. ern Knowledge (Cambridge: Harvard Kuhn, Thomas (1977) ‘Objectivity, Value University Press). Judgment, and Theory Choice’, in The Rolin, Kristina (2002) ‘Is ‘Science as So- Essential Tension: Selected Studies cial’ a Feminist Insight?’ Social Epis- in Scientifi c Tradition and Change temology 16 (3): 233-249. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Rolin, Kristina (2008) ‘Science as Collec- Press): 320-339. tive Knowledge’, Cognitive Systems Lacey, Hugh (1999) Is Science Value Free? Research 9: 115-124. Values and Scientifi c Understanding Schmaus, Warren (2005) ‘What’s So So- (London and New York: Routledge). cial about Social Knowledge?’ Philos- Lakatos, Imre (1970) ‘Falsifi cation and ophy of the Social Sciences 35: 98-125. the Methodology of Scientifi c Re- Shapin, Steven & Schaffer, Simon (1985) search Programmes’, in Imre Laka- Leviathan and the Air Pump (Princ- tos & Alan Musgrave (eds), Criticism eton: Princeton University Press). and the Growth of Knowledge (Cam- Solomon, Miriam (2001) Social Empiri- bridge: Cambridge University Press): cism (Cambridge: MIT Press). 91-196. Williams, Michael (2001) Problems of Laudan, Larry (1977) Progress and Its Knowledge: A Critical Introduction to Problems: Towards a Theory of Scien- Epistemology (Oxford and New York: tifi c Growth (Berkeley and Los Ange- Oxford University Press). les: University of California Press). Wylie, Alison (2002) Thinking from Laudan, Larry (1984) Science and Val- Things: Essays in the Philosophy of ues: The Aims of Science and Their Archaeology (Berkeley and Los Ange- Role in Scientifi c Debate (Berkeley les: University of California Press). and Los Angeles: University of Cali- fornia Press). Kristina Rolin Longino, Helen (1990) Science as Social Unit of Philosophy Knowledge (Princeton: Princeton Helsinki School of Economics University Press). kristina.rolin@hse.fi Longino, Helen (2002) The Fate of Knowledge (Princeton: Princeton K. Brad Wray University Press). Department of Philosophy Machamer, Peter & Gereon Wolters (eds) State University of New York (2004) Science, Values, and Objectiv- [email protected].