Crisis in the Acquisition Workforce: Some Simple Solutions

Crisis in the Acquisition OPINIONWorkforce: Some Simple Solutions CRISIS IN THE ACQUISITION WORKFORCE: SOME SIMPLE SOLUTIONS James H. Gill The military acquisition system is facing a crisis of significant proportions, with the imminent loss, through retirement and attrition, of a substantial portion of its experienced workforce, which is responsible for the development, production, and deployment of new weapons. Implications for vital national security issues, for both the near and long term, are serious. The potential inability of the acquisition process to provide quality weapons in a timely manner and at a reasonable price should be disturbing to senior leaders within the Department of Defense (DoD). What can be done about the potential loss of this acquisition leadership? Here are some creative approaches, although they will require bucking entrenched bureaucracies to implement, that could resolve the current shortfall and prevent future ones. he acquisition workforce is aging. specialized civilian workforce. This is a “given” and has been doc- Further, 50 percent will be eli- T umented by the Acquisition 2005 gible to retire by 2005. In some Task Force Final Report: “Shaping the occupations, half of the current Civilian Acquisition Workforce of The employees will be gone by 2006. Future” (2000). The report identifies the problem as follows: This potential loss may or may not have significance on the ability of the Services [DoD] is facing a crisis that can to provide weapons to their customers dramatically affect our Nation’s (i.e., the warfighter), but the potential ability to provide warfighters with implications can’t be ignored. modern weapon systems needed While the composition of the acquisi- to defend our national interests. tion workforce is normally not an issue After 11 consecutive years of that has significance to senior national downsizing, we face serious im- security policy makers, in this instance balances in the skills and experi- they must pay appropriate attention. The ence of our highly talented and quality and the quantity of the civilian 83 Acquisition Review Quarterly — Summer 2001 workforce, and the continuation of ca- AN AGING WORKFORCE pable leadership within that discipline, is a critical issue. First, there can be no argument that the National security policy is a truly glam- acquisition workforce is aging. The DoD orous field of study that draws the atten- study released last year acknowledged the tion of the best and the brightest. Acqui- problem and contained recommended sition, especially the acquisition work- changes that would mitigate the conse- force, is less glamorous and usually takes quences of losing a significant portion of a back seat in the discussion of how to the workforce at one time. These changes revitalize the capabilities of the nation’s were divided into three major areas: military to project power in an often unfriendly world. It is certainly highly • what we can do immediately; unlikely that the new Presi- • what we should start in the near term; “The quality and dent has come and the quantity of the to office with civilian workforce, an agenda that • what we need legislative authority to and the continua- includes fixing do. tion of capable a deficient ci- leadership within vilian acquisi- that discipline, is Why is this an issue? Given the fact that a critical issue.” tion workforce within the next 5 years about 50 percent pool. While of the current workforce will be eligible not high on the to retire, there are truly significant conse- agenda, the ability of the acquisition pro- quences to the ability of the acquisition cess to provide critical weapon systems system to provide quality weapon systems in a timely manner can have a serious in good time. How did it happen? During impact upon the ability to accomplish the 1990s, DoD experienced a sizable high-priority, vital national security mis- reduction in the acquisition workforce. sions. The best foreign policy can be held During this reduction, the median age of hostage to an acquisition process that is DoD civilians rose from 41 to 46 years of not able to get weapons to warfighters age. The workforce was reduced by about when they are needed. 35 percent, and the acquisition workforce This article will describe the problem had even greater cuts. The cuts were jus- of an aging acquisition workforce, spe- tified on the basis that acquisition reform cifically those identified in “The Refined would streamline the process and reduce Packard Key Acquisition & Technology the need for business as usual. The reduc- Workforce.(Group IIA Organizations)” tion in the overall workforce was a direct (1999). It will discuss the ramifications result of the end of the Cold War, and the and consequences of failing to remedy the recognition that the United States no problem, and finally, identify viable ini- longer needed (or could afford) to main- tiatives that can mitigate the potential tain a military structure that was created impact of the aging workforce. to respond to a now-absent Soviet threat. From an economic standpoint, as well as 84 Crisis in the Acquisition Workforce: Some Simple Solutions a political one, it was critical that the infrared system, and evolved expendable “defense dividend” would translate into a launch vehicle) require at least that de- significant bonus to the U.S. Treasury. velopment period — even with the imple- mentation of many new “best practices.” There is also a cycle time associated with DOWNSIZING: MILITARY VS. CIVILIAN developing skilled acquisition personnel. This cycle may vary from discipline to Both Presidents George H. W. Bush and discipline, but it is certainly also requires Bill Clinton saw a need to have a reduc- 5 to 10 years. tion in the size of the military. This was a If we are to field a growing number of natural and beneficial consequence to both systems in that period, it seems reason- geopolitical and political forces. The prin- able that either additional people will be cipal differences lay primarily in the use needed, or the processes must be changed of the military and in what areas the to simplify and streamline the acquisition remaining funds would be spent (e.g., system itself. operations and maintenance, procurement, While acquisi- personnel). The ensuing surge in the tion reform has “Both Presidents economy and the resultant surplus in the improved these George H. W. Bush U.S. Treasury has caused a rethinking of processes, some and Bill Clinton saw a need to have a the “correct” sizing of the military. Per- capabilities re- reduction in the size haps some additional funding would be quire time and of the military.” prudent given the way that the military has experience to been used to implement foreign policy absorb. If a sig- during the past 8 years. There is a general nificant portion of the workforce leaves recognition that too many missions have within the next few years, where do we drained much of the morale that was find replacements? Under normal condi- evident at the end of the Persian Gulf War. tions, replacements would come from After witnessing 10 years of down- younger, lower-grade individuals who sizing, a growing number of analysts are would have been hired during the previous positing that we need to provide more 5 to 10 years. funding to improve existing weapon sys- Unfortunately, the civilian portion of tems and develop replacement systems in the DoD took a slightly different approach order to maintain our superpower status. to downsizing than did the military. The If we are to develop and field new weapon military had selective early retirement systems, the acquisition system must have boards, or SERBs, which effectively enough skilled personnel in the acquisi- pruned some less capable individuals from tion workforce. There is a cycle time the military. They then brought on board associated with the development and younger individuals (lieutenants). When production of weapon systems that — the senior members (lieutenant colonels even after several years of reform — does and colonels) retired, the junior officers not allow for less than a 5- to 10-year would have enough experience to replace cycle. The most highly touted systems in them. The use of SERBs was not trouble- the Air Force (F-22, the space-based free. Good officers were asked to retire 85 Acquisition Review Quarterly — Summer 2001 F-22 Raptor Air-Superiority Fighter rolls left before they were ready, and morale suf- candidates to replace those about to leave, fered to an extent. While disruptive, it was and there is inadequate time to train new by most accounts enacted humanely. Pre- ones. vious pruning by DoD during the 1970s saw many career military personnel forced out with no retirement — in some cases FACING THE STAFF SHORTAGE with as many as 18 years of service. The civilian workforce was spared this We now encounter the negative conse- disruption and suffered a much less severe quences of those downsizing decisions. blow to its morale. While there was some There will be too few qualified managers disruption in cases where a base or orga- to keep the system operating effectively nization was closed, there were minimal unless action is taken. What options are reductions in forces. Consequently, the available to policy makers? Incentives to workforce aged as a group, and there was retain individuals eligible for retirement minimal hiring of junior employees to act are one way to mitigate this problem. Un- as replacement parts when the workforce fortunately, this stopgap remedy will not aged and subsequently retired. The civil- succeed over the long term because it fails ian workforce management effectively to address the underlying problem: the postponed the inevitable, kicking the lack of younger workers to maintain can down the line, so to speak.

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