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Download Chapter 3 TOP PRIORITIES FOR THE CONTINENT IN 2021 HUMAN 3DEVELOPMENT: Protecting vulnerable populations 36 FORESIGHT AFRICA Strategies for preserving gains in human development in Africa in the time of COVID “Vaccination is the world’s pathway out of the COVID-19 pandemic. Yet, in many African countries, 9 out of 10 people are set to miss out on a vaccine next year, while rich nations have secured enough doses to vaccinate their populations three times over. We must end the unjust system of monopolies, which puts profits be- fore lives. All pharmaceutical corporations and research institutions working on a vaccine must share the science, technological know-how, and intellectual proper- ty to maximize production and to ensure distribution based on need and free at the point of delivery. We need a People’s Vaccine. Africa must not wait in line!” Winnie Byanyima, Executive Director of UNAIDS & Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations Mortality in Africa due to COVID-19 tality in Africa, particularly among is significantly lower than original- children below five years of age, ly expected, although with limited could be double the direct mortality testing and poor reporting sys- from COVID by 2030, given expect- tems, we will likely never know the ed cutbacks to basic medical care true numbers. However, it’s not yet and related interventions.76 (For time to celebrate: That realization more on the reach of the COVID-19 must be tempered by the expecta- pandemic in sub-Saharan Africa, tion that many more Africans will see Figure 2.1). likely suffer due to the impacts that Jakkie Cilliers follow reductions in health and oth- In fact, within a year of Africa’s first er government expenditure. As tax reported case in Egypt, COVID-19 Program Head, African revenues decline on top of reduc- has wreaked extraordinary destruc- Futures & Innovation, tions in remittances, foreign direct tion upon Africa’s development Institute for Security investment, and possibly aid, the prospects. The pandemic has rap- Studies ability of African governments to idly evolved from a health crisis maintain pre-COVID services will to an all-encompassing economic @JakkieCilliers take a large hit in the short term. quagmire with serious internation- (For more on the drop in remittanc- al ramifications. es in the time of COVID, see the Stellah Kwasi viewpoint on page 17). One dev- Our estimates77 and that of others astating result is that indirect mor- such as the World Bank78 are that Researcher, African Futures & Innovation, Institute for 76 Jakkie Cilliers et al., “Impact of COVID-19 in Africa: A Scenario Analysis to 2030,” Institute for Security Security Studies Studies, August 2020. 77 Ibid. @nyanam 78 Nishant Yonzan et al., “Projecting Global Extreme Poverty Up to 2030: How Close Are We to the World Bank’s 3% Goal?” World Bank, October 9, 2020. 37 TOP PRIORITIES FOR THE CONTINENT IN 2021 Africa may lose up to a decade of developmen- The continent is also going to require substantial tal progress due to COVID-19, although a lot will debt relief, as even ahead of the crisis a number of depend on the early discovery, speedy manufac- states were already approaching debt distress. In ture, and efficient roll-out of vaccines as well as fact, in November 2020, Zambia became the first the subsequent rate of global economic recov- country to default on its loan repayments; it’s pos- ery. (For more on strategies for vaccine rollout in sible many other countries will follow. (For more Africa, see page 29).79 on debt relief in Africa under COVID, see page 9). Poverty and inequality Before the pandemic hit, the headline Sustain- ple is still likely to survive on less than $1.90 per able Development Goal to eliminate extreme day. Slow growth and high inequality means that poverty by 2030 was already out of reach.80 Now, sub-Saharan Africa is only likely to achieve the except for Cabo Verde, no country in sub-Saha- elimination of extreme poverty by mid-century. ran Africa is on track to eliminate extreme pov- erty by 2030, though, notably, Africa’s two high With high rates of inequality, few of the benefits income countries, Seychelles and Mauritius, of economic growth trickle down in sub-Saha- have already achieved this goal. (For different ran Africa,81 and, in the short term, the impact of approaches to the SDGs under COVID-19, see COVID-19 will worsen the already skewed dis- the viewpoints on page 41 and 44). tribution of income. Furthermore, as incomes decline and government revenues shrink, it’s not Using the International Futures forecasting plat- unreasonable to consider that the region is set form of the University of Denver, we find it is rea- to face increased turbulence and lose many of sonable to expect around 4 percent annual aver- the modest gains made in combatting violent ex- age economic growth for Africa post-COVID to tremism and ending conflicts in the Horn, Sahel, 2030. In this future, extreme poverty is likely to and Central Africa, among other places—plac- decline by only about five percentage points and, ing additional pressure on governments, peace- by 2030, a third of the continent’s 1.7 billion peo- keepers, and mediators. The pandemic has rapidly evolved from a health crisis to an all-encompassing economic quagmire. The vital importance of infrastructure for education Despite these challenges, with the right policies a smaller ratio of working-age persons to depen- and implementation plans, the COVID-19 pan- dents, income growth in Africa is inevitably slow demic may present Africa with the opportunity but will improve over time since, by mid-centu- to benefit from its large human capital endow- ry, the portion of working-age Africans will be ment. Steady increases in Africa’s working-age roughly similar to that in North America. If the population, improved economic productivity, and region’s leaders invest in that human capital en- enhanced job creation can turn the region into dowment, Africa could significantly benefit from an economic powerhouse accompanied with the steady increase in the portion of working-age improvements in quality of life more broadly. persons to dependents. Currently, only around 56 percent of Africa’s Reaping Africa’s demographic dividend presents working-age population is aged between 15 and many challenges, but perhaps most fundamen- 64—more than 10 percentage points below the tal is the need for a revolution in the provision average in the rest of the world (Figure 3.1). With of education. Quality education—especially im- 79 See Ibid and Christoph Lakner et al., “Updated Estimates of the Impact of COVID-19 on Global Poverty: The Effect of New Data,” World Bank, October 7, 2020. 80 Jakkie Cilliers, Africa First! Igniting a Growth Revolution (Johannesburg and Cape Town: Jonathan Ball, 2020). 81 North Africa, which has much lower levels of inequality, does significantly better in this respect, although it faces its own set of unique challenges. 38 FORESIGHT AFRICA FIGURE 3.1 SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA'S WORKING-AGE POPULATION CONTINUES TO RISE RAPIDLY Currently only around 56 percent of Africa’s working-age population is aged between 15 and 64—more than 10 percentage points below the average in the rest of the world. With a smaller ratio of working-age persons to dependents, income growth in Africa is inevitably slow but will improve over time since, by mid-century, the portion of working-age Africans will be roughly similar to that in North America. 70 Infant mortality has fallen by 52 percent since 1990. Incidence of HIV has fallen by 75 percent since 2000. 120 3.5 65 100 3.0 2.5 80 2.0 60 1.5 60 40 per 1,000 births per 1.0 HIV cases per 1,000 HIV cases per 20 uninfected population 0.5 0 0 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 55 Working-age population (% of total) Account ownership at a financial institution increased by 54 percent Access to electricity has improved by 71 percent since 1996. between 2011 to 2017. 80 50 50 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 40 60 30 Visual Key provement in the knowledge and skills in the rest of the world. Indeed, when 40 20 Sub-Saharan Africa of Africa’s rapidly growing labor force— it comes to learning outcomes, the 20 % of population North America is an absolute requirement for the conti- best-performing country in the region 10 nent to turn its fortunes around. The av- still scores lower than the worst-per- 1 % of population ages erage adult African has about 6.2 years forming country in Western Europe.82 0 0 Source of education, some 2.5 years below the It is, therefore, not surprising that the 2011 2014 2017 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 Authors' calculations using the average in the rest of the world. While World Bank in 201883 warned of a “learn- International Futures forecasting platform v7.54. levels of adult education have steadily ing crisis in global education.” Poverty headcount ratio (1.90 a day at 2011 PPP) has fallen by 34 percent Gross primary school enrollment has risen by 34 percent since 1994. improved in Africa that gap has been since 1994. constant for several decades. If the continent is to start closing the 80 100 gap on key human development indi- 80 Among its many challenges, COVID-19 cators, it must seize the opportunity 60 underlines the importance for Africa offered by technology to fundamental- 60 of focusing on the provision of house- ly change the provision of basic needs 40 hold electricity and internet access to like education and health care as well % gross 40 % of population 20 respond to the damage caused by the as key infrastructure like electricity and 20 pandemic.
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