The London School of Economics and Political Science Bargaining Power in Multilateral Trade Negotiations: Canada and Japan in Th
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The London School of Economics and Political Science Bargaining power in multilateral trade negotiations: Canada and Japan in the Uruguay Round and Doha Development Agenda. Jens Philipp Anton Lamprecht A thesis submitted to the Department of International Relations of the London School of Economics for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, London, January 2014 1 Declaration I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it). The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without my prior written consent. I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any third party. I declare that my thesis consists of 95676 words. I can confirm that my thesis was copy edited for conventions of language, spelling and grammar by Trevor G. Cooper. Signed: Jens Philipp Anton Lamprecht. 2 In memory of my grandparents, Antonette Dinnesen and Heinrich Dinnesen. To my family: My parents, my brother, my aunt, and Hans-Werner am Zehnhoff. 3 Acknowledgements Very special thanks go to my supervisors, Dr. Razeen Sally and Dr. Stephen Woolcock. I thank Razeen for his constant patience, especially at the beginning of this project, and for his great intellectual advice and feedback. I am also thankful that he continued to supervise me with his full support even after leaving the LSE during the time of my PhD. I know that this is not a given. He has given me a feeling of constant support and I am very thankful that he was my supervisor. Very special thanks also go to Dr. Stephen Woolcock. I thank him for accepting the “risk” of taking on another PhD student as co-supervisor. I am grateful for his great intellectual advice and his constant support in all academic matters. He has also been a great source of emotional support and gave me a feeling of security, which was crucial for the process of writing this thesis. I also thank both my supervisors for their great help in getting in touch with interviewees for this research. I am very thankful to DDG Alejandro Jara and DDG Rufus Yerxa at the WTO for taking the time to do interviews and for their great support in organizing additional interviewees for my project. I am very grateful to DDG Alejandro Jara for his substantial support in the organization of my fieldwork at the WTO. This allowed me to profit from crucial insights and to obtain the necessary information to write this thesis. I am also thankful to Richard Eglin at the WTO for agreeing to take time for several interviews throughout the process of writing this thesis. These interviews were very helpful for its completion. My gratitude also goes to Roderick Abbott and Stuart Harbinson for their help in organizing additional interviewees. I am thankful to all of the interviewees who agreed to take time for this project, it was a crucial help. I am grateful to the LSE International Relations Department for the financial support and for allowing me to integrate a 5-month-traineeship at the European Commission’s DG TRADE into my studies. I would also like to extend my gratitude again to Prof. Simon Evenett for his extreme support of my application to this study program at the LSE. 4 I am thankful to Trevor G. Cooper for agreeing to proofread my thesis. It has been a crucial help during the final phase of this project. 5 Abstract: The thesis analyses the conditioning factors of Canada’s and Japan’s bargaining power in the multilateral trade negotiations of the Uruguay Round and Doha Development Agenda (DDA). It deals with two related research questions. The central question of this research is: to what extent and why did Canada’s and Japan’s bargaining power decrease from the Uruguay Round to the DDA? This question is related to the following auxiliary research question: what are the conditioning factors of Canada’s and Japan’s bargaining power during the Uruguay Round and DDA, and to what extent have these factors changed from one round to the other? While the thesis includes a general overview of their negotiation profiles, it analyzes specific, detailed case studies of the profiles of these countries in anti-dumping and market access/NAMA negotiations in both rounds. The hypothesis of this research is that Japan and Canada have lost bargaining power from the Uruguay Round to the DDA because of changes in the following conditioning factors: economic power; activity in country coalitions and groups; interests groups and decision-making structures on the domestic level; ideational power; and foreign policy objectives. In addition, the importance of the position of the preferences a country in the spectrum of the overall membership of multilateral trade negotiations is examined. The thesis finds that this hypothesis is partially confirmed. Canada and Japan have mainly lost bargaining power owing to a relative decrease in their economic power, a lower profile in central negotiation groups as well as coalitions, and due to domestic politics. Ideational power and especially foreign policy objectives can be considered less relevant. The thesis also finds that especially Japan’s bargaining power in anti-dumping negotiations was affected by a change of the position of its preferences within the spectrum of the overall membership of the negotiations. 6 Contents List of Tables: 10 List of figures: 11 List of Abbreviations. 12 Chapter 1: Introduction. 16 1.1: Introduction to the background of the research question. 16 1.1.1: Introduction to the topic and its relevance. 16 1.1.2: Justification of the country studies. 19 1.1.3: Setting the scene. 22 1.2: Stating the research questions and presenting the research framework. 27 1.2.1: The research questions. 27 1.2.2: Introducing the conceptual framework. 27 1.2.3: Methodology. 29 1.2.4: Justification of the case studies. 33 1.2.5: Structure of the research. 34 Chapter 2: Conceptualization of bargaining power in the GATT/WTO. 36 2.1: Introduction. 36 2.2: Power in international relations. 38 2.2.1: Theoretical approaches to power in international relations. 38 2.2.2: Elements of power in international relations. 43 2.3: Power in multilateral trade negotiations. 44 2.3.1: Theories of economic diplomacy. 45 2.3.2: Theories of negotiation and bargaining. 47 2.3.3: Different facets of bargaining power in multilateral trade negotiations. 49 2.4: Indicators of bargaining power in multilateral trade negotiations. 56 2.5: Conclusion. 69 Chapter 3: Analysis of Canada’s and Japan’s economic profiles and domestic decision-making structures from the Uruguay Round to the Doha round. 72 3.1: Introduction. 72 3.2: Overview of the economic history of Canada and Japan. 73 3.3: Canada’s and Japan’s relative economic development from the Uruguay Round to the DDA. 76 3.3.1: The “coming of age” of major emerging markets such as Brazil, India and China. 86 3.3.2: Analysis of forecasts of economic development of Canada and Japan compared with those of other key players. 92 3.4: Sectoral analysis of Canada’s economic profile from the Uruguay Round to the DDA. 95 3.4.1: The economic geography of Canada. 102 7 3.5: Sectoral analysis of Japan’s economic profile from the Uruguay Round to the DDA. 103 3.5.1: The defensive interests of the Japanese agricultural sector. 112 3.6: The increasing number of concessions made by Canada and Japan to key trading partners through bilateral and regional FTAs. 113 3.7: Analysis of Canada’s and Japan’s domestic and political decision-making structures as they relate to multilateral trade policy. 115 3.7.1: Canada’s domestic trade policy decision-making mechanisms. 116 3.7.2: Japan’s domestic trade policy decision-making mechanisms. 122 3.8: The relevance of the defensiveness in the agricultural sectors of Canada and Japan for their overall bargaining power through issue-linkage. 128 3.9: Conclusion. 131 Chapter 4: Institutional design, norms and ideas as conditioning factors of Canada’s and Japan’s bargaining power. 135 4.1: Introduction. 135 4.2: The evolution of the multilateral trade regime’s institutional design from the Uruguay Round to the DDA. 136 4.3: The growing amount of resources spent on the negotiations by developing countries and their increased representation during the DDA. 141 4.4: The importance of Canada’s and Japan’s increasing focus on negotiations of bilateral and regional FTAs. 142 4.5: Analysis of Canada’s and Japan’s procedural power during the Uruguay Round and DDA 143 4.5.1: Canada’s and Japan’s absence from the most central negotiating groups during the DDA. 145 4.5.2: Analysis of Canada’s and Japan’s profiles within different coalitions in the Uruguay Round. 149 4.5.3: Analysis of Canada’s and Japan’s profiles within coalitions in the DDA. 157 4.5.4: The overall impact of Canada’s and Japan’s profiles in coalitions and central negotiating groups on their bargaining power from the Uruguay Round to the DDA. 172 4.6: Analysis of Canada’s and Japan’s ideational power during the Uruguay Round and DDA.