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Electoral Reform and the Left

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Electoral Reform and the Left cDIREoCTIONmFOR THE pass DEMOCRATIC LEFT Electoral reform and the left By Jonathan Hopkins September 2009 3 5 r Tr hink e b m m u N PIECES 3 5 Tr hink e b m u N PIECES Electoral reform and the left By Jonathan Hopkins “This abstract theory provides a neat explanation of what has happened in the Labour party over the last couple of decades. In the 1980s, the hard left (representing, purportedly, the Low income group) made an attempt to take control of the Labour party, offering policies which were almost equally unattractive to the middle class as to the wealthy.” Compass publications are intended to create real debate and discussion around the key issues facing the democratic left - however the views expressed in this publication are not a statement of Compass policy. Electoral reform and the left www.compassonline.org.uk PAGE 1 Electoral reform succinctly, there is abundant evidence from representatives of the most powerful and the left around the democratic world that PR groups, while consensus institutions gives the policies of the left a head-start, disperse it, allowing minorities the chance whilst First Past the Post benefits the right. to influence, or even veto, policy decisions. As a result, Liphart argues, consensus Introduction It is little known amongst those that are democracy produces 'kinder, gentler' not political scientists that there is a good policy outcomes, including greater deal of research about the relationship redistribution from the wealthy to the he 2005 election was a turning between types of electoral systems and poor. Although this means that all groups, point in contemporary British redistributive, progressive policies. This not just the poor, are able to push for T politics. It represented a historic literature has identified a pretty clear policies favourable to their interests, a moment for the centre-left, as Labour negative correlation between 'majoritarian' more inclusive system is obviously to the won a third consecutive election for the or 'plurality' electoral systems - like First benefit of the most vulnerable social first time in its history, ensuring more than Past the Post in Britain - and redistributive groups since they are least able to defend a decade of majority government for the welfare states. So, in countries like the UK, their interests in more competitive party. But it also marked a point of no US, Canada and (formerly) New Zealand, institutional environments. return for the British electoral system. majoritarian electoral rules have been Although Tony Blair’s Labour party won a associated with the kinds of hardline Could Britain function as a ‘consensus comfortable majority of 66 seats, it won neoliberal policies of Thatcher, Reagan and democracy’? In a sense, thanks to reforms little more than a third of the popular others, whereas in continental Europe, implemented by the Labour government, vote on a very low turnout. Indeed the home of the 'social market economy', it already does. Devolution to Scotland, Conservatives were only a couple of forms of proportional representation are Wales and Northern Ireland represents a percentage points behind, and won more the norm. Although there are exceptions - big step in the direction of a more votes than Labour in England. With the Ireland has PR and little redistribution, consensus-oriented political system. PR has support of less than a quarter of the France has a two-round majoritarian been adopted for elections in those three British total electorate, the current Labour system and an extensive welfare state - countries, and in election to the European government lacks legitimacy to govern as a the pattern over the post-war period is Parliament and Greater London Assembly. majority administration. The ‘First Past the fairly clear. The evidence from this recent UK Post’ electoral model (FPTP) – which experience is that although Labour has forces citizens into tactical voting and Political scientists offer two broad sacrificed the chance of dominating the marginalizes the supporters of minor interpretations of this trend. Welsh and Scottish institutions – under parties – is an increasingly inappropriate FPTP Labour would have won way of electing the representatives of a Arend Lijphart has written extensively comfortable majorities – this has not diverse and demanding civil society. about the difference between prevented the formation of centre-left 'majoritarian' and 'consensus' democracy. coalitions, which have adopted consistently The argument for electoral reform – and Majoritarian democracies tend to elect more progressive policies than in the UK specifically for adopting a form of representatives in single member districts, as a whole. Extending consensus proportional representation (PR) for so that the ‘winner takes all’ and large democracy principles to England and the Westminster elections – has long enjoyed parties are over-represented at the UK as a whole would not automatically support on the left. This support waned expense of small ones. In consensus have the same effect – after the 2005 during New Labour’s triumphant early democracies, elections are governed by election a Conservative-Liberal coalition period, in which Tony Blair enjoyed such a the principles of PR: representatives are would have been just as feasible as a colossal majority in the House of elected in multi-member districts, so that Labour-Liberal one – but what it certainly Commons that the Jenkins Commission the seats can be allocated to the various would do is ensure that a long period of was ignored and a manifesto commitment parties in proportion to their vote share. Conservative dominance, such as the for a referendum on electoral reform Small parties are able to win seats in destructive 18 years under Thatcher and conveniently forgotten. Now, with Labour parliament, and large parties are denied Major, could never happen again. facing defeat next year, many of us are inflated majorities, and forced to seek rediscovering our interest in fair voting. But alliances in order to form government Of course, the flip side of this is that the above and beyond the obvious short-term coalitions. Electoral systems are part of a three terms of comfortable majorities for attractiveness of PR, which would limit the broader collection of institutions which New Labour since 1997 would also have scale of a likely Tory victory, there are push political systems in a particular been impossible, given the vote shares powerful longer-term considerations which direction: majoritarian institutions enjoyed by Labour fell well below the 50% the left should take seriously. To put it concentrate power around the threshold. Didn’t the huge majorities of compass PAGE 2 www.compassonline.org.uk Electoral reform and the left 1997-2005 give Tony Blair the chance to votes in parliament, and can establish a their disadvantage. The result: New Labour. reverse the damage of the Tory years, government which would redistribute However, New Labour's redistributive rebalancing public policy in favour of the resources from High. They can bargain strategy was ultimately unstable, since it dispossessed? This is true to some extent, about how to distribute these resources had to redistribute away from the middle but most on the left would concede that among themselves, in the knowledge that classes to some extent, and part of this the New Labour project did not achieve if one group seeks an unfair advantage, the group is clearly shifting back to the as much as was hoped. Level of income coalition would break down and both Conservatives - in other words, a Middle- inequality in Britain, which exploded after sides would lose out. As a result, High alliance. 1979, have been moderated under Blair redistribution is the likely outcome. and Brown, but remain far higher than in How would PR change this? By allowing a 1979, and indeed higher than in almost In a majoritarian system, the electoral more stable alliance of Low- and Middle- any Western European democracy. There rules tend to favour two large parties (as income groups. Under majoritarian rules, are many interpretations of the New is evident in the US and UK), not three. negotiations between these groups must Labour project, but one perspective So, in order to act jointly to achieve take place within the Labour party, and largely missing from the debate is the redistribution, Low and Middle must form leaderships of political parties tend to be effect the FPTP electoral system had on a political party jointly. But, although Low 'sticky' - if a party heads in the direction the policy stances adopted by the party in and Middle have a joint interest in of one set of interests rather than another, the 1990s. Labour’s push to the centre redistribution, they have divergent it is difficult to get it to change direction. was a direct result of FPTP, because FPTP interests when it comes to distributing This means that trust between the groups makes it difficult for left parties to these resources amongst themselves. The represented within the party can easily advocate extensive redistribution without Middle income group, in particular, may be break down – as they clearly did in the losing support amongst middle class, concerned that the Low group could take Labour party in the early 1980s. When centrist voters. control of the party and redistribute not this happens, the most likely outcome is only from the High income group, but also that the middle classes will desert the The reasons for this have been examined from the Middle. So in order to head off redistributive coalition, and opt instead for by Torben Iversen of Harvard University this possibility, Middle may choose instead an alliance with the wealthy. It is not and David Soskice of Oxford, who have to ally with High, and keep its income to optimal - under redistribution they would studied the effects of electoral systems on itself.
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