Factionalism in Chinese Communist Politics
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The Mao Era in Objects Money (钱) Helen Wang, The British Museum & Felix Boecking, University of Edinburgh Summary In the early twentieth century, when the Communists gained territory, they set up revolutionary base areas (also known as soviets), and issued new coins and notes, using whatever expertise, supplies and technology were available. Like coins and banknotes all over the world, these played an important role in economic and financial life, and were also instrumental in conveying images of the new political authority. Since 1949, all regular banknotes in the People’s Republic of China have been issued by the People’s Bank of China, and the designs of the notes reflect the concerns of the Communist Party of China. Renminbi – the People’s Money The money of the Mao era was the renminbi. This is still the name of the PRC's currency today - the ‘people’s money’, issued by the People’s Bank of China (renmin yinhang 人民银 行). The ‘people’ (renmin 人民) refers to all the people of China. There are 55 different ethnic groups: the Han (Hanzu 汉族) being the majority, and the 54 others known as ethnic minorities (shaoshu minzu 少数民族). While the term renminbi (人民币) deliberately establishes a contrast with the currency of the preceding Nationalist regime of Chiang Kai-shek, the term yuan (元) for the largest unit of the renminbi (which is divided into yuan, jiao 角, and fen 分) was retained from earlier currencies. Colloquially, the yuan is also known as kuai (块), literally ‘lump’ (of silver), which establishes a continuity with the silver-based currencies which China used formally until 1935 and informally until 1949. -
Resignation and Appointment of Independent Non-Executive Director
Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited and The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Limited take no responsibility for the contents of this announcement, make no representation as to its accuracy or completeness and expressly disclaim any liability whatsoever for any loss howsoever arising from or in reliance upon the whole or any part of the contents of this announcement. (Incorporated in the Cayman Islands with limited liability) (Stock Code: 3393) RESIGNATION AND APPOINTMENT OF INDEPENDENT NON-EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR The Board announces that: (1) Mr. Wu Jin Ming has resigned as an independent non-executive director of the Company with effect from 18 October 2016; and (2) Mr. Huang Jing has been appointed as an independent non-executive director of the Company with effect from 18 October 2016. RESIGNATION OF INDEPENDENT NON-EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR The board of directors (the ‘‘Board’’) of Wasion Group Holdings Limited (the ‘‘Company’’,together with its subsidiaries, the ‘‘Group’’) announces the resignation of Mr. Wu Jin Ming (‘‘Mr. Wu’’)asan independent non-executive director of the Company with effect from 18 October 2016, as he would like to devote more of his time to his academic development. The Board would like to express its highest regards and deepest gratitude to Mr. Wu for his valuable contribution to the Group during his term of office. Mr. Wu has confirmed that he has no disagreement with the Board and there is no matter relating to his resignation that needs to be brought to the attention of the shareholders of the Company. – 1 – APPOINTMENT OF INDEPENDENT NON-EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR The Board is pleased to announce the appointment of Mr. -
REVIEWS (Composite).Qxd 8/3/05 4:20 AM Page 88
REVIEWS (Composite).qxd 8/3/05 4:20 AM Page 88 88 Reviews Whose Challenge? Roland McIntosh, Challenge to Democracy – Politics, Trade Union Power and Economic Failure in the 1970s, Politico’s Publishing, 400 pages, ISBN 1842751573 £25 Roland McIntosh was appointed Director General of the National Economic Development Council in 1973. He resigned towards the end of 1977. During the whole of this period he kept a diary in which he recorded his impressions of events, policies and personalities. It was a turbulent period in which the Conservatives lost power following a dispute in the mining industry, to be succeeded by a Labour Government, first under Harold Wilson and then under James Callaghan. For more than twenty years the diary remained in Ronald McIntosh’s possession. In 2003 he showed it to Roy Jenkins, who encouraged him to get it published. Publication took place this year, 2006. The book is a shorter version than the original diary. Neddy, as it was generally known, was a tripartite organisation, first established in 1962 by the then Prime Minister, Harold MacMillan. Its purpose, as seen by its founder, was to seek cooperation wherever possible on agreed strategies between the government of the day, the employers and unions. It survived not only the Conservative and Labour Governments of the 1960s and 1970s but also the entire period of the Thatcher Government. It was finally abolished by John Major in 1992. Originally, it was the intention of the Conservative Government to involve employers and unions in joint decisions to curb inflation and promote productivity. -
Mao Zedong's Rise to Power: How One Man Changed the Future for the Better; Then Changed It for Himself
Bard College Bard Digital Commons Senior Projects Spring 2018 Bard Undergraduate Senior Projects Spring 2018 Mao Zedong's Rise to Power: How One Man Changed the Future for the Better; then Changed it for Himself Shadeed Haneef Ali II Bard College, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.bard.edu/senproj_s2018 Part of the Chinese Studies Commons This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License. Recommended Citation Ali, Shadeed Haneef II, "Mao Zedong's Rise to Power: How One Man Changed the Future for the Better; then Changed it for Himself" (2018). Senior Projects Spring 2018. 237. https://digitalcommons.bard.edu/senproj_s2018/237 This Open Access work is protected by copyright and/or related rights. It has been provided to you by Bard College's Stevenson Library with permission from the rights-holder(s). You are free to use this work in any way that is permitted by the copyright and related rights. For other uses you need to obtain permission from the rights- holder(s) directly, unless additional rights are indicated by a Creative Commons license in the record and/or on the work itself. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Mao Zedong’s Rise to Power: How One Man Changed the Future for the Better, then Changed it for Himself Senior Project Submitted to The Division of Asian Studies Of Bard College By Shadeed Haneef Ali II Annandale-on-Hudson, New York May 2018 In the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful. Have We not opened your breast for you? And We removed from you your burden, Which weighed down your back? And We exalted for you your reputation? So verily, with the hardship, there is relief, Verily, with the hardship, there is relief So when you have finished, then stand up for Allah's worship And to Allah turn your invocations. -
International Security 24:1 66
China’s Search for a John Wilson Lewis Modern Air Force and Xue Litai For more than forty- eight years, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has sought to build a combat-ready air force.1 First in the Korean War (1950–53) and then again in 1979, Beijing’s leaders gave precedence to this quest, but it was the Gulf War in 1991 coupled with growing concern over Taiwan that most alerted them to the global revolution in air warfare and prompted an accelerated buildup. This study brieºy reviews the history of China’s recurrent efforts to create a modern air force and addresses two principal questions. Why did those efforts, which repeatedly enjoyed a high priority, fail? What have the Chinese learned from these failures and how do they deªne and justify their current air force programs? The answers to the ªrst question highlight changing defense con- cerns in China’s national planning. Those to the second provide a more nu- anced understanding of current security goals, interservice relations, and the evolution of national defense strategies. With respect to the ªrst question, newly available Chinese military writings and interviews with People’s Liberation Army (PLA) ofªcers on the history of the air force suggest that the reasons for the recurrent failure varied markedly from period to period. That variation itself has prevented the military and political leaderships from forming a consensus about the lessons of the past and the policies that could work. In seeking to answer the second question, the article examines emerging air force and national defense policies and doctrines and sets forth Beijing’s ra- tionale for the air force programs in light of new security challenges, particu- larly those in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea. -
China's Fear of Contagion
China’s Fear of Contagion China’s Fear of M.E. Sarotte Contagion Tiananmen Square and the Power of the European Example For the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), erasing the memory of the June 4, 1989, Tiananmen Square massacre remains a full-time job. The party aggressively monitors and restricts media and internet commentary about the event. As Sinologist Jean-Philippe Béja has put it, during the last two decades it has not been possible “even so much as to mention the conjoined Chinese characters for 6 and 4” in web searches, so dissident postings refer instead to the imagi- nary date of May 35.1 Party censors make it “inconceivable for scholars to ac- cess Chinese archival sources” on Tiananmen, according to historian Chen Jian, and do not permit schoolchildren to study the topic; 1989 remains a “‘for- bidden zone’ in the press, scholarship, and classroom teaching.”2 The party still detains some of those who took part in the protest and does not allow oth- ers to leave the country.3 And every June 4, the CCP seeks to prevent any form of remembrance with detentions and a show of force by the pervasive Chinese security apparatus. The result, according to expert Perry Link, is that in to- M.E. Sarotte, the author of 1989: The Struggle to Create Post–Cold War Europe, is Professor of History and of International Relations at the University of Southern California. The author wishes to thank Harvard University’s Center for European Studies, the Humboldt Foundation, the Institute for Advanced Study, the National Endowment for the Humanities, and the University of Southern California for ªnancial and institutional support; Joseph Torigian for invaluable criticism, research assistance, and Chinese translation; Qian Qichen for a conversation on PRC-U.S. -
Information to Users
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Xi Is Facing Enormous Opposition“
stars insights: 13 March 2020 „Xi Is Facing Enormous Opposition“ Over the course of the past 40 years, as China has transformed itself from a poor country into a major player on the global stage, the West has grown increasingly wary of China’s rise and its government’s assertive behaviour. What are the drivers behind these developments? And is China a threat for the existing rules-based international order? At a stars Switzerland alumni chapter meeting, China expert Prof. Dr. HUANG Jing shared his unique view of China’s internal politics and what it means for Europe and the world. Michael SETTELEN: The rise of China has led to an increasingly wary West. Is China a threat? HUANG Jing: China is a threat if you look at the country from the perspective of rivals, especially in terms of Western values or the political system. The fundamental difference is that the Washington Consensus – the neoliberal policies propagated by the West – upholds that, first, the individual’s right is more important than the collective good, and the well-being of the individual determines the well-being of society; second, the development is driven by a capitalist market economy in a – third – liberal democratic system. The Beijing Consensus – or China’s model – on the other hand believes that, first, the collective good, i.e. national interests, trumps everything. By this logic, individual rights can be sacrificed if necessary. Second, the development is driven by the “socialist market economy”. Some call it state capitalism. Third, the system is a socialist system under one- party rule. -
JUDITH SHAPIRO [email protected] EDUCATION Ph.D. (1999) American University (International Relations / International Environm
JUDITH SHAPIRO [email protected] EDUCATION Ph.D. (1999) American University (International Relations / International Environmental Politics). M.A. (l979) University of California at Berkeley (Asian Studies). M.A. (l978) University of Illinois at Urbana (Comparative Literature). B.A. (l975) Princeton University (magna cum laude, Anthropology; Program in East Asian Studies; University Scholar). Certificat d'Etudes (l970) Universite de Grenoble, France. Current Academic Position: Director, Natural Resources and Sustainable Development MA, School of International Service, American University. Other Academic Affiliations and Courses Taught: American University, School of International Service. Environmental Security in Asia, Fall 2004. From Maoism to Market-Leninism, Fall 2003, Honors Seminar. Cross-cultural Communication, Fall 2002 (two sections), Spring 2003 (Honors), Fall 2003, Fall 2004, Spring 2007. “Global Environmental Politics in the Public Imagination,” Fall 2006. Washington Environmental Workshop/Advanced Studies and Research in Environmental Policy, Fall 2001 and every Spring 2002-2011. Contemplation and Political Change, Spring 2001, Spring 2002, Spring 2005, Spring 2006. Challenges of Political Transformation, Spring 2004. Beyond Sovereignty, Spring 2000, Fall 2000, Fall 2001 (two sections each semester). International Environmental Politics, Summer 1998. “China, Japan, and the US,” Fall 2006. Environment and Politics, Fall 2009-2013 (two sections), WRI Practicum to China and Peru, Spring 2013-2014, Environmental Politics of Asia, Spring 2012-2014. University of Aveiro, MA Program in Chinese Studies. Modern and Contemporary China, Winter 1998-99. Chinese Society and thesis supervision, Fall 1999. Thesis supervision, Sp. 2000 - Fall 2001. Southwest Agricultural University, Environmental Protection Department (Chongqing, China). International Environmental Issues, Fall 1998. University of Pennsylvania, Lauder Institute, Wharton School. AHistory of China and Southeast Asia,@ Fall 1994 and 1995, Spring 1996 and 1997. -
WATCHWORDS Reading China Through Its Political Vocabulary
JMSC Working Papers WATCHWORDS Reading China through its Political Vocabulary By Qian Gang* INTRODUCTION: Watchwords: the Life of the Party CHAPTERS: 1. Reading Deep Red: The Four Basic Principles and Mao Zedong Thought 2. Preserving Stability: Will the Party Continue to Arm Itself Against Social Unrest? 3. Political Reform: Are Its Chances Improving? 4. Total Denial and the Will to Forget: The Cultural Revolution 5. Xi Jinping on the Origins of Power: Will a New Watchword Be Born? 6. The Power of Separation: Can the Party Divide and Monitor Itself? 7. Democracy with the Doors Shut: Understanding Intraparty Democracy 8. Society Lost: The Role of Civil Society Development in China’s Politics 9. Pride and Positioning: How Top Leaders Push Their Policies, and Construct Their Legacies 10. The Mixed Bag of Socialism: What Does the Party Mean by “Special Characteristics”? CONCLUSION: The 18th National Congress Report Card Endnotes *Qian Gang is Co-Director of the China Media Project, a research project at the Journalism and Media Studies Centre at The University of Hong Kong. Best known for his tenure as managing editor of Southern Weekend, one of China’s most progressive newspapers, Qian is one of China’s foremost journalists. Qian was also the executive editor and a co-creator of “News Probe,” CCTV’s pioneering weekly investigative news program with nearly 20 million viewers. He is also the author of “The Great China Earthquake,” (Foreign Language Press, Beijing, 1989) a book that details for the first time the destruction and the human stories of 1976 earthquake at Tangshan in which 250,000 people were killed. -
Mao's Failure, Deng's Success
MAO'S FAILURE, DENG'S SUCCESS Roderick MacFarquhar Professor of History and Political Science, Harvard University June 24, 2010 Revolutionaries have to be optimists as well as believers, and revolutionary leaders have to be able to inspire their followers, convince them that "Yes, we can!" How could they endure years of struggle on a long march towards a seemingly ever-receding promised land without believing, as Mao Zedong put it during the darkest days of the Chinese revolution, that "a single spark can start a prairie fire?" During the anti-Japanese war, Mao laid down that in the aftermath of defeat, a communist should correct his ideas "to make them correspond to the laws of the external world, and thus turn failure into success; this is what is meant by 'failure is the mother of success' and 'a fall into the pit, a gain in your wit."1 Twenty years later, during the upheaval within international communism brought about by Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin and the subsequent Hungarian revolt, Mao remained determinedly optimistic, claiming that bad things can be turned into good things ... In given conditions, a bad thing can lead to good results and a good thing to bad results. More than two thousand years ago Lao Tzu said: "Good fortune lieth within bad, bad fortune lurketh within good."2 Alas for Mao, not only was Lao Tzu right, but, more importantly, Mao's countrymen and his successors did not agree with him as to what constituted good and bad things. On his deathbed, Mao claimed that the Cultural Revolution was one of his two major lifetime achievements, the other being the victory that brought the communists to power in 1949.3 But within the utopian vision of Mao's Cultural Revolution, egalitarian and collectivist though it was, lurked the seeds of its antithesis, the Chairman's bête noire, the helter- skelter capitalism of the Deng Xiaoping era. -
The China Quarterly Stuart Reynolds Schram, 1924–2012
The China Quarterly http://journals.cambridge.org/CQY Additional services for The China Quarterly: Email alerts: Click here Subscriptions: Click here Commercial reprints: Click here Terms of use : Click here Stuart Reynolds Schram, 1924–2012 Roderick MacFarquhar The China Quarterly / Volume 212 / December 2012, pp 1099 1122 DOI: 10.1017/S0305741012001518, Published online: Link to this article: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0305741012001518 How to cite this article: Roderick MacFarquhar (2012). Stuart Reynolds Schram, 1924–2012. The China Quarterly, 212, pp 10991122 doi:10.1017/S0305741012001518 Request Permissions : Click here Downloaded from http://journals.cambridge.org/CQY, IP address: 128.135.12.127 on 27 Jan 2013 1099 In Memoriam* Stuart Reynolds Schram, 1924–2012 Roderick MacFarquhar† I Stuart Schram, polymath and polyglot, the greatest Western expert on Mao Zedong’s life and thought, died peacefully in Brittany early in the morning of 8 July 2012 at the age of 88. During his lifetime he had studied a wide range of subjects and countries before finally settling into what readers of this journal would consider his major field in his thirties. Stuart was born in Excelsior, Minnesota on 27 February 1924, the son of a dentist and a company financial officer who divorced when their son was quite young. Stuart’s anger that they never spoke to each other thereafter persisted well into manhood, indicating the emotional scar the divorce caused him. Though much of his adult life was spent in great cities – New York, Paris, London – he never lost his taste for fishing the lakes of his native state.