ARAM, 11-12 (1999-2000), 171-180 B. NICOLINI 171

SAIYID SA'ID BIN AL BU SA'IDI OF (1791-1856) AND HIS RELATIONSHIPS WITH EUROPE

BEATRICE NICOLINI

During the first half of the 19th century Saiyid Sa’id bin Sultan Al Bu Sa’idi (1791-1856) – a revolutionary merchant-prince of Maskat and – cre- ated in the western a great and powerful mercantile empire. The aim of this paper is to investigate, through a brief examination of the relationships between Saiyid Sa’id bin Sultan Al Bu-Sa’idi and Europe, whether he really was a revolutionary merchant-prince or if he was simply a pawn within the framework of European rivalries in the Oriental seas. The following portrait of Saiyid Sa’id bin Sultan Al Bu-Sa’idi brings about a revision of the role effectively played by this Arab prince in his relationships with European powers. When Saiyid Sa’id bin Sultan Al Bu-Sa’idi rose to power in Maskat in 1806, he was fifteen years old; he had few friends and many enemies; the prosperity built by his father had ended; and he soon understood that the only possible asset for himself and for his country was the sea.1 He soon revealed himself to be a keen minded and clever sovereign; in fact, Saiyid Sa’id bin Sultan Al Bu-Sa’idi immediately saw the importance of the expansion of the African trade; he also considered important the creation of an Omani merchant fleet for patrolling the African trading ports. But, to arm a fleet strong enough to fight against his enemies in Arabia, he needed a substantial financial basis, and the necessary revenues came from Africa, not from Oman. His modernity was characterised by a great mobility among three continents: Asia, Arabia, and Africa; moreover, the unsettled state of his power, both in Maskat and in East Africa, enabled him to open a new phase of in the Indian Ocean, in that microcosmic world that would soon become universal. At the time of his accession to power in Oman, the French menace to British India led to the involvement of the Al Bu Sa’idi of Oman within European ri- valry in the Indian Ocean. This led to the treaty of 12th October 1798 between his father, Sultan bin Ahmad Al Bu-Sa’idi (1792-1804), and Britain, Oman in

1 J. G. Lorimer, Gazetteer of the , Oman and Central Arabia, 2 vols., (Calcutta, 1915), Vol. 1, pp. 440-469; R. S. Ruete, Said Bin Sultan (1791-1856). Ruler of Oman and Zanzi- bar. His Place in the History of Arabia and East Africa, (London, 1929); S. A. S. Farsi, Seyyid Said Bin Sultan. The Joint Ruler of Oman and Zanzibar (1804-1856), (New Delhi, 1986); V. Maurizi, History of Seyd Said, Sultan of , (London, 1819), (new ed., Cambridge, 1984). 172 SAIYID SA'ID BIN SULTAN AL BU SA'IDI OF OMAN (1791-1856) which agreed to exclude the French from its ports.2 But the result was that the French started to attack Omani ships in the Indian Ocean. Nevertheless, after Austerlitz Napoleon renewed his Oriental policy, which led to the signing of the Treaty of Finkenstein with Persia – 4th May 1807 – and to a new agree- ment with Saiyid Sa’id bin Sultan Al Bu-Sa’idi.3 In June 1807 Saiyid Sa’id bin Sultan Al Bu-Sa’idi sent one of his agents, Majid bin Khalfan, to Île de France with the task of restoring political rela- tions, and, most of all, precious commercial links with the French. Saiyid Sa’id bin Sultan Al Bu-Sa’idi, claiming the neutrality of his country, accepted the establishment of a French consul, M. Dallons, in Maskat, and, on 16th June 1807, he signed a Treaty of Amity and Commerce with General René Decaen, of Île de France, in which France had the privileges of the most fa- voured nation in his African dominions.4 This was because, from a trading point of view, “the French were great favourites in Zanzibar.”5 Moreover, as – according to Coupland – “the shores of the Indian Ocean were one vast whispering-gallery,”6 voices had reached Bombay with regard to the renewed receptiveness of Saiyid Sa’id bin Sultan Al Bu-Sa’idi to French avances.7 Jonathan Duncan, Governor of Bombay, was instructed from London not to involve Britain in direct interventions in the internal affairs of the Oriental po- tentates. Consequently, he decided to use the same policy adopted by John Malcolm, political agent in the Persian Gulf, with the father of Saiyid Sa’id bin Sultan Al Bu-Sa’idi, and gave to the Omani ruler the following warning: the consequences of his political choices in favour of the French would mean a much less warm welcome to Omani ships in the Anglo-Indian ports. And, from then on, any French presence in the Persian Gulf would be considered a hostile presence and, consequently, attacked. As stated above, the new architecture developed by Napoleon, based on new plans for the invasion of British India, included the enforcement of the strate- gic base of Île de France as a centre against English trading routes to India, and as a maritime base for a land invasion through Persia and Baluchistan,8 with the alliance of Saiyid Sa’id bin Sultan Al Bu-Sa’idi. On 27th January 1807 the Governor of Île de France met Napoleon in Paris, who welcomed him warmly and sent him back to his island with 9 men-of- war, 11 vessels and 4,600 soldiers, increased in October of the same year to 3 other ships and 12,000 soldiers. In the meantime, the French supplied weapons

2 J. C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East. A Documentary Record, 2 vols., (Toronto, 1956), Vol. I, p. 64. 3 Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, p. 77. 4 R. Coupland, East Africa and its Invaders, (Oxford, 1938), p. 116. 5 J. M. Gray, from the Middle Age to 1856, (London, 1962), p. 180. 6 R. Coupland, East Africa and its Invaders, p. 112. 7 S. B. Miles, The Countries and Tribes of the Persian Gulf, (London, 1919), (new ed. Lon- don, 1966), pp. 310-311. B. NICOLINI 173 to the of Maskat, and instigated acts of piracy against the British East Indiamen which reached an intolerable level for the East India Company. Cal- cutta decided that it was time to extirpate the thorn of the Île de France from the British flesh. In July 1807 Lord Gilbert Minto was appointed Governor General of India; Minto was an exponent of the Enlightenment, a Whig, supported both by the Tories and by the directors of the East India Company,9 and his scope was not restricted to “counter-attack Napoleon's power”, but allowed him to “destroy it”.10 Since Minto understood that the East African scene was only part of the picture and could not be considered in isolation from the other shores of the Indian Ocean,11 he prepared a very detailed plan which included an exhaustive examination of the possibilities of attack against Île de France Bourbon. How- ever, the British Navy did not have nautical charts of the : this necessary information was obtained from the Portuguese, loyal allies of the British in this dramatic moment, fully informed of the plans against the French and perfectly in agreement with the English decision to occupy these two islands. The intelligences of the East India Company communicated that the best attack against Île de France Bourbon would be by surprise.12 During the summer of 1810, without waiting for official confirmation from London, 4,000 soldiers set out from the Rodriguez islands against Bourbon and Île de France, and conquered them in July.13 Île de France was renamed with its an- cient Dutch name, .14 The year 1810 represented for East Africa the end of an epoch and the be- ginning of a new era.15 Going back to Saiyid Sa’id bin Sultan Al Bu-Sa’idi, on 21st March 1821 the Duke of Gloucester, President of the African Institution, sent a memorandum to the Court of Directors of the East India Company, urging the Company to interpose its powerful mediation with the Imam of Muscat for the entire aboli- tion of the slave trade. Saiyid Sa’id bin Sultan Al Bu-Sa’idi had to collaborate with Britain, positively, prohibiting the sale of slaves to any Christian nation. Nevertheless, he could not ban the export of slaves to Muslim states.16

8 V. F. Piacentini, “Aspetti originali della politica napoleonica in Persia nel quadro del duello anglo-francese”, Storia e Politica, (42, Milano, 1968), pp. 637-647. 9 E. Ingram, Britain’s Persian Connection 1798-1828. Prelude to the Great Game in Asia, (Oxford, 1992). 10 Coupland, East Africa and its Invaders, p. 126. 11 M. V. Jackson Haight, European Powers and South-East Africa. A Study of International Relations on the South-East Coast of Africa 1796-1856, (London, 1966), p. 161. 12 B.M. Add. 13772, Wellesley Papers, Series I, 5th November 1800-18, Private Secret. 13 B.M. Add. 37292, Wellesley Papers, Vol. XIX, Proclamation in the Name of His Majesty George III, of the of Great Britain and Ireland, St. Denis, July the 18th, 1810. 14 R. W. Beachey, The Slave Trade of Eastern Africa, (London, 1976), p. 41. 15 Jackson Haight, European Powers and South-East Africa, p. 167. 16 Gray, History of Zanzibar, p. 232. 174 SAIYID SA'ID BIN SULTAN AL BU SA'IDI OF OMAN (1791-1856)

On 4th April 1821 Captain Fairfax Moresby17 was instructed by the Gover- nor of Mauritius, Robert Farquhar, to report on the slave trade conducted by the French between Zanzibar and Bourbon; Moresby communicated that “the French are guilty of the most atrocious crimes in the neighbourhood of Zanzi- bar by carrying off the Negroes and murdering those who resisted”.18 On 10th May 1821 Farquhar wrote to Saiyid Sa’id bin Sultan Al Bu-Sa’idi that French vessels had left from Zanzibar with 4,000 slaves on board in the direction of Bourbon. According to Sheriff, 19 the dispatches written by Farquhar, as well as those written by Moresby, were deliberately exaggerated with the object of drawing attention, and, consequently, military intervention from the British Government. On the other hand, he also maintains that the losses of Saiyid Sa’id bin Sultan Al Bu-Sa’idi from the abolition of were exaggerated as well. On 1st October 1821 Farquhar informed the Marquis of Hastings in Calcutta that it was necessary to persuade Saiyid Sa’id bin Sultan Al Bu-Sa’idi to sign a new agreement, with the aim of convincing him to exercise his influence on his slave merchants, and, most of all, to “gain the co-operation of the Native Chiefs in forcing France also to abandon the slave traffic.”20 During the autumn of 1821, after a close correspondence between Farquhar in Mauritius and Montstuart Elphinstone (1819-1827), successor to Napean as Governor General of Bombay, a draft treaty was prepared with the object of bending Saiyid Sa’id bin Sultan Al Bu-Sa’idi to British policy. In December 1821 the Arab ruler of Oman had to accept a British representative of the Company. Following this decision, he received compliments from Farquhar and from Elphinstone for his enlightened policy.21 On 27th August 1822, Moresby called at Maskat, and, appealing to the privileged relationships of amity, commerce, and alliance subsisting between Britain and Oman, con- vinced Saiyid Sa’id bin Sultan Al Bu-Sa’idi to sign a treaty composed of six articles, full of political implications for both countries. On Saiyid Sa’id bin Sultan Al Bu-Sa’idi’s side: the slave trade was a social and economic neces- sity which had to be tolerated;22 losses would have been very high (around

17 Fairfax Moresby was Senior Officer in Mauritius; he was very much involved in the fight against the slave trade and piracy in the Indian Ocean. In 1837, weakened by the tropical climate, he was transferred to the Mediterranean sea, and in 1862 was appointed . G. S. Graham, Great Britain in the Indian Ocean, a Study in Maritime Enterprise, 1810-1850, (Oxford, 1967), p. 198. 18 B.M. Add. 41265, Clarkson Papers, Letter from Capt. Senior Officer F. Moresby to Gov. Comm. in Chief of Mauritius, Farquhar, 4th April 1821. 19 A. Sheriff, Slaves, Spices & Ivory in Zanzibar. Integration of an East African Commercial Empire into the World Economy, 1770-1873, (London, 1987), p. 47. 20 B.M. Add. 41265, Clarkson Papers, To Marquis of Hastings, Gov. Gen. of India, 1st Octo- ber 1821, from Gov. Comm. in Chief of Mauritius, Farquhar. 21 Beachey, The Slave Trade of Eastern Africa, p. 43. 22 Gray, History of Zanzibar, p. 226. B. NICOLINI 175

45,000 Maria Theresa dollars per year); on the other hand, the very political existence of the Al Bu Sa'idi in Arabia and in East Africa was, from now on, in British hands, and the prosecution of Omani trade in the East India Compa- ny’s ports constituted a tolerable exchange. The first article of the Moresby Treaty of 1822 prohibited the slave trade to all Christians of all nations,23 and defined a corridor in the Indian Ocean where English patrolling would have been effective: the Moresby line started from Cape Delgado in the south, up to the border with , passing along the East African littoral, then deviating in the direction of India at a distance of about 60 miles east from island, and reaching the western Indian port of Diu. The violation of the Moresby Treaty within this line would have led to the immediate confiscation of the ships and to the same penalty as that given for acts of piracy: “death without benefit of clergy.”24 But the Moresby Treaty featured another interesting article which gives us a better understanding of the relationships between Saiyid Sa’id bin Sultan Al Bu Sa’idi and Europe. An additional component of the Treaty was exposing that the quid pro quo to the banning of the slave trade from the collaboration offered by Saiyid Sa’id bin Sultan Al Bu Sa’idi would have been the formal acceptance of his full sovereignty and authority over the waters of the East Af- rican littoral.25 Therefore, it was really Britain that made the first move towards an offi- cial – a European – acceptance of the uncertain and unstable power of this Arab ruler and of the rich mercantile empire founded by the Al Bu Sa’idi of Oman. It is true that the Moresby Treaty hid many ambiguities; in fact there were serious contradictions between the English version and its Arab official trans- lation made in Bombay. For example: a) The English text included penalties effective after four months from the signing of the treaty, that is, starting from January 1823, a clause totally omit- ted in the Arab version; b) According to the English text, as the waters of the Oriental African litto- ral were under the sovereignty of Saiyid Sa’id bin Sultan Al Bu-Sa’idi, the re-

23 The original text quotes the date of 8th September 1822. I.O.R. V/23/217/24, Treaties and Engagements concluded between Her Britannic Majesty and His Highness the Imaum of Muskat and between the Hon.ble East India Company and His Highness, 1799 to 1846; the reprint quotes the date of the signing as 4th September. Aitchison, A Collection of Treaties, vol. XI, p. 245; Coupland, East Africa and its Invaders, p. 212, maintains that the treaty was signed on 22nd Sep- tember; see also P. P. Slave Trade Series, 361, Vol. XXV, Correspondence with Said bin Sultan concerning the Moresby Treaty of 1822; R. W. Beachey, “Anti-Slavery and Anti-Slave Trade Decrees and Treaties: Their Aftermath”, in R. W. Beachey, A Collection of Documents on the Slave Trade in Eastern Africa, (London, 1976), pp. 103-107. 24 Penalty confirmed by the Consolidating Act of 1824. Beachey, The Slave Trade of Eastern Africa, p. 268. 25 Particulars of Additional Requisition, Moresby Treaty, in Beachey, A Collection of Docu- ments on the Slave Trade of Eastern Africa, p. 106. 176 SAIYID SA'ID BIN SULTAN AL BU SA'IDI OF OMAN (1791-1856) sponsibility for the application of the penalties was totally within his jurisdic- tion. But the Arab translation delegated this unwelcome task to British navy.26 The Moresby Treaty represented the territorial acknowledgement of Al Bu Sa’idi’s dominions as a great concession in exchange for the Arab banning of the slave trade. But its real meaning was that of securing British control of maritime routes to India, gaining the consensus of British public opinion against the slave trade and, finally, turning Saiyid Sa’id bin Sultan Al Bu Sa’idi from an ‘absentee ruler’ into a stable and reliable political sovereign. On the other hand, the great political advantage for the Arab ruler was the official recognition of his dominions, especially in front of his local enemies. With regard to slavery, the boundary line from Cape Delgado to the Persian coast left the main channels of Arab commerce intact.27 The British Government was determined to ban the trafficking of slaves by the French in the Indian Ocean, and wanted to stop the ancient custom of ac- quiring young Indian girls for the Al Bu Sa'idi. But the Moresby Treaty proved to be ineffective, the slave trade continuing to be prosecuted on neutral vessels flying the Arab red flag. Yet, on 1st January 1823 Farquhar defined the Moresby Treaty as a “suc- cessful result of those measures of impressing upon the Imaum the solid ad- vantages which he must expect to derive from the continuance of the friendship and protection of Great Britain.”28 At the beginning of 1829 Saiyid Sa’id bin Sultan Al Bu-Sa’idi decided to move his court from Maskat to Zanzibar, where he ordered the building of a magnificent palace in Mntoni, at a distance of about three miles from Zanzibar town. This decision was the final act of a series of events, caused by four fac- tors, all of equal importance: 1) The Moresby Treaty of 1822 with Britain; 2) The gradual political-financial fall of the Al Bu Sa'idi in the ports of the Persian Gulf; 3) The Owen episode in and the defeat inflicted by Saiyid Sa’id bin Sultan Al Bu-Sa’idi on the Mazrui along the East African coast;29 4) The new commercial and financial expansion of Zanzibar island.

26 Beachey, The Slave Trade of Eastern Africa, p. 272; C. S. Nicholls, The Swahili Coast. Politics, Diplomacy and Trade on the East African Littoral 1798-1856, (London, 1971), pp. 223- 4. 27 Graham, Great Britain in the Indian Ocean, p. 200. 28 P. P. Slave Trade Series, Vol. XXV, Correspondence with Said bin Sultan concerning the Moresby Treaty, Correspondence Relating to Mauritius, N. 1, Copy of Sir R. Farquhar's Des- patch dated Mauritius, 1st January 1823, respecting the close of the Slave Traffic by the Imaum of Muscat, addressed to Earl Bathurst. Already laid before Parliament 11th July 1823, N. 556. 29 Captain W. F. Owen’s expedition had been despatched only because accurate maps of East African waters were lacking. When he reached Mombasa in 1824, he prepared plans to eliminate the trade in slaves, and he took possession of Mombasa. London completely ignored the fact that the British Establishment at Mombasa had set up a of freed slaves, and an order to with- B. NICOLINI 177

After 1826 the Omani ruler realised that he could not count on British mili- tary support in his personal struggles in Arabia and East Africa. Between 1827 and 1828 Saiyid Sa’id bin Sultan Al Bu-Sa’idi was defeated at Basra and in . Then he asked for a permanent political agent from the Government of the Great Company, which he thought a rich and fat lady (sic), to advise him daily on the best political line.30 The Charter Act of 1833 abolished commercial privileges of the East India Company (with the exemption of those on salt and opium) which had lost the monopoly in the Indian Ocean; it was the beginning of free market competi- tion. During these years the Russian advance in Central Asia led to a new Brit- ish policy in the Indian Ocean. Within this changed political situation from 1839, Lord Palmerston (1784-1865) at the Foreign Office revised and com- pleted the chessboard of English strategic security in the Indian Ocean. The capture of the island of Socotra in 1834 and the conquest of Aden in 1839 were part of British political interventions within new European rivalries. But Saiyid Sa’id bin Sultan Al Bu-Sa’idi remained an important pawn of the Great Game. In this sense, the diplomatic interventions of the Anglo-Indian Government were twofold: on 17th December 1839 Hennel, Brit- ish Resident in the Persian Gulf, obtained from the Al Bu Sa’idi sultan in Maskat the signing of three articles completing the Moresby Treaty of 1822.31 Article 1 defined another line for patrolling the slave trade which started from Cape Delgado and reached Pasni, an Omani enclave in south-central Asia, and, together with the port of Gwadar, an important centre of slave traf- fic coming from Africa and directed towards Central Asia. Article 2 warned of the confiscation of all vessels within this new line with slaves on board, while the third article prohibited the selling of free Somali women – in open contrast with Islamic law on slavery – equating this act to piracy, and following the same penalties as indicated in the Felony Act of 1811. The second diplomatic step of the new English relationships with Saiyid Sa’id bin Sultan Al Bu Sa’idi soon followed. On 3rd May 1839 Captain Robert Cogan, authorized by the Governor of Bombay, Lord Auckland (1786-1849), and on behalf of Her Majesty Queen Victoria, signed with the Omani ruler a Treaty of Commerce composed of 17 articles.32 The first article gave to Britain draw Owen’s establishment was immediately issued. Saiyid Sa’id bin Sultan Al Bu Sa’idi was bitterly resentful about Owen’s enterprise in Mombasa, a feeling immediately exploited by the French. W. F. Owen, Narrative of Voyages to Explore the Eastern Shores of Africa, 2 Vols., (London, 1865); J. M. Gray, The British in Mombasa, (1824-1826), (London, 1957); Nicholls, The Swahili Coast., pp. 139-142. 30 R. Bhacker, Trade and Empire in Muscat and Zanzibar. Roots of British? (London, 1992), pp. 110-113. 31 Reprint of the Treaty in, Beachey, A Collection of Documents on the Slave Trade of East- ern Africa, pp. 107-108. 32 Original text sent to Bombay in: I.O.R. R/15/1/82, Political Department, Treaty of Com- merce between Her Majesty, the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and 178 SAIYID SA'ID BIN SULTAN AL BU SA'IDI OF OMAN (1791-1856) the privileges of most favoured nation, with commercial concessions of 5% duty ad valorem. Article 13 repeated the perpetual abolition of the slave trade between the dominions of His Highness and all Christian nations. And a Brit- ish consul was appointed as political agent and advisor for political matters at the court of the Al Bu Sa’idi. At that time France was petitioning the Omani Sultan for the concession of the same privileges given to the English. In fact, in June 1840, the French ob- tained the agreement of Saiyid Sa’id bin Sultan Al Bu Sa’idi to the appoint- ment of a French consul in Zanzibar. The French explorer Guillain called on the island together with Noel, the French consul. But the Arab ruler was, by chance, in Maskat, and both French representatives were sent back to Bourbon by the son of Saiyid Sa’id bin Sultan Al Bu-Sa’idi, Hilal bin Sa’id Al Bu- Sa’idi, who could certainly not assume this responsibility. But Saiyid Sa’id bin Sultan Al Bu-Sa’idi had no choice but to subdue to English policy; he understood that his destiny was definitely in British hands, the only ones who could guarantee his dominions against renewed European menaces. In 1841 the sudden French occupation of the port of Nossi Bé in Madagas- car, and of in the Comore islands the following year, convinced Saiyid Sa’id bin Sultan Al Bu-Sa’idi of the importance of a strong alliance with Great Britain. Around the second half of the 19th century, thanks to the agricultural devel- opment of clove cultivation in Zanzibar, the growth of the slave and ivory trades within the interior of the African continent, and through a wide net of international treaties and agreements with European powers, Saiyid Sa’id bin Sultan Al Bu-Sa’idi found himself at the head of a mercantile empire in the Indian Ocean.33 He was a great navigator; his fleet was composed of 18 sailing ships and of the Liverpool, a beautiful vessel made in Bombay in 1826, carry- ing on board 100 men and 74 guns. In 1833 he tried to soften British inflexibil- ity with regard to the slave trade, and presented it to King William IV, who duly renamed the Liverpool, in honour of its donor, Imam. On 4th May 1841 Captain Atkins Hamerton (1804-1856) of the 15th Native Infantry of Calcutta was appointed British consul and political agent in Zanzi- bar.34 Following an agreement between the East India Company and the For- eign Office, Captain Hamerton had the twofold task of surveying the commer- cial interests of the Company and of corresponding with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in London, as well as with the Government in Bombay,

Highness Sultan Seid Syeed Bin Sultan, Imam of Muscat, 24 Sept., 1839. Copy sent to London in: F.O. 54/8, Extract from the Convention of Commerce between H. M. the Queen and H. H. the Imaum of Muscat, May 31st, 1839. Reprint in, P. P. Vol. XXXI, The Zanzibar Papers, N. 68, pp. 9-16. The Treaty had to be effective fifteen months from its signing. 33 Farsi, Seyyid Said Bin Sultan. The Joint Ruler of Oman and Zanzibar. B. NICOLINI 179 referring to “any intelligence of a political nature which it may be interesting to HMG to be made acquainted with.”35 In this regard, Bhacker maintains that British policy was that of controlling Maskat, not Zanzibar; and the proof was the appointment of Hamerton from the government of Bombay to Maskat. He had to leave for Zanzibar only due to the sudden, as well as unpredictable decision taken by Saiyid Sa’id bin Sul- tan Al Bu Sa’idi to move his court to the African island.36 The presence of Hamerton in Zanzibar enforced British authority over the Omani Sultan, and a great friendship was born between Saiyid Sa’id bin Sul- tan Al Bu-Sa’idi and Atkins Hamerton, who was the only European repre- sentative who spoke Arabic. In 1845 Broquant was appointed French consul at the court of Saiyid Sa’id bin Sultan Al Bu-Sa’idi, but his influence was obscured by the eccentric and bizarre personality of Hamerton. In 1847 Broquant fell ill and died, leaving suspicions of assassination among the French. The new French consul, Belligny, was appointed only in 1849 and left the island in 1855, substituted by Cochet. Saiyid Sa’id bin Sultan Al Bu Sa’idi, despite his numerous efforts to pro- mote the goodness of slavery as an ancient institution, very profitable for the Arab community and for the entire local society, was constantly pressed by Hamerton to ban the slave trade within his dominions. In 1842 Saiyid Sa’id bin Sultan Al Bu Sa’idi decided to send one of his rep- resentatives to London asking for Bahrain in exchange for the abolition of slavery. And he sent to Queen Victoria the following presents: “two pearl necklaces, two emeralds, an ornament made like a crown, ten cashmeer shawls, one box containing four bottles of roses, four horses.”37 But the Brit- ish Lion remained inflexible, the slave trade had to be banned without any ex- change of benefits or lands, and at all costs. On 20th November 1844, turning back to his old balance of power between France and Britain, the Arab ruler signed a Treaty of Amity and Commerce with France.38 According to Article 17 of this treaty, the French obtained the concession for the construction of “magazins d'approvisionements”, while the English thought they had the concession for store houses, arsenals for weap- ons. And this misunderstanding gave life to a diplomatic international crisis.39

34 R. H. Crofton, The Old Consulate at Zanzibar, (London, 1935). 35 See correspondence concerning Hamerton in: F.O. 54/4 P.R.O. 1841-42; F.O. 54/5 P.R.O. 1843-44; F.O. 54/6 P.R.O. 1844-45; F.O. 54/7 P.R.O. 1845-46; F.O. 54/10 P.R.O. 1846-48; F.O. 54/12 P.R.O. 1848-50; F.O. 54/13 P.R.O. 1850-54. 36 Bhacker, Trade and Empire in Muscat and Zanzibar, p. 157. 37 F.O. 54/4, Hamerton to Lord Palmerston, 11 February, 1842. 38 Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, Vol. I, p. 127. 39 F.O. 54/7, Letter from Capt. Hamerton n. 9, to India Board, relative to 17th article of Treaty between the Imam of Muscat and the French, dated Zanzibar, 25th October, 1845. 180 SAIYID SA'ID BIN SULTAN AL BU SA'IDI OF OMAN (1791-1856)

Britain was tired of the political conduct of the Al Bu Sa’idi of Oman. On 2nd October 1845 Saiyid Sa’id bin Sultan Al Bu Sa’idi signed a treaty with Great Britain for the abolition of slavery. Every vessel with slaves on board would be confiscated. Moreover, the slave trade was prohibited to all British subjects, that is, to Indians as well. And this important clause included the In- dian banyans – both Hindu and Ismaili – a fundamental making up the hierarchy of Omani power. Hamerton also promised to Saiyid Sa’id bin Sultan Al Bu-Sa’idi 2000 pounds as compensation for his signing the Treaty, but Palmerston did not maintain this pact. On the Arab’s side the profits in the slave trade were too high; a slave bought on Zanzibar market for five-ten dollars, could be sold in Maskat for twenty-twenty-five, and in Bushire or in Basra for forty. In fact, the reality was a complete “ineffectiveness of Hamerton's Treaty.”40 But on 19th October 1856 Saiyid Sa’id bin Sultan Al Bu Sa’idi died. And on 5th July 1857 Atkins Hamerton died in Zanzibar. The Al Bu Sa'idi dominions over Maskat and Zanzibar were ended in 1861 by the Canning Award, confirmed by the Anglo-French Agreement of 1862 between the sons of Saiyid Sa’id bin Sultan Al Bu-Sa’idi, Majid bin Sa’id Al Bu-Sa’idi (1856-70) at Zanzibar, and Thuwayni bin Sa’id Al Bu-Sa’idi (1856- 66) at Maskat.41 It was the final yielding of a great and magnificent commercial emporium to overwhelming British supremacy. And it was the beginning of the gradual and increasing erosion of Arab power, and of the growing overwhelming power of Great Britain in the Indian Ocean.

ABBREVIATIONS

Adm. Admiralty Records, Public Record Office, (Kew) F.O. Foreign Office Records, Public Record Office, (Kew) I.O.R. India Office Records, Oriental & India Office Collections – The British Li- brary, (London) P.R.O. Public Record Office, (Kew) P.P. Parliamentary Papers, (London)

40 F. O. 54/7, Letter from Capt. Hamerton n. 9 to India Board. 41 Bhacker, Trade and Empire in Muscat and Zanzibar, pp. 179-193; J. C. Wilkinson, The Imamate Tradition of Oman, (Cambridge, 1987), pp. 228-230.