171 Saiyid Sa'id Bin Sultan Al Bu Sa'idi of Oman (1791-1856) And

ARAM, 11-12 (1999-2000), 171-180 B. NICOLINI 171 SAIYID SA'ID BIN SULTAN AL BU SA'IDI OF OMAN (1791-1856) AND HIS RELATIONSHIPS WITH EUROPE BEATRICE NICOLINI During the first half of the 19th century Saiyid Sa’id bin Sultan Al Bu Sa’idi (1791-1856) – a revolutionary merchant-prince of Maskat and Zanzibar – cre- ated in the western Indian Ocean a great and powerful mercantile empire. The aim of this paper is to investigate, through a brief examination of the relationships between Saiyid Sa’id bin Sultan Al Bu-Sa’idi and Europe, whether he really was a revolutionary merchant-prince or if he was simply a pawn within the framework of European rivalries in the Oriental seas. The following portrait of Saiyid Sa’id bin Sultan Al Bu-Sa’idi brings about a revision of the role effectively played by this Arab prince in his relationships with European powers. When Saiyid Sa’id bin Sultan Al Bu-Sa’idi rose to power in Maskat in 1806, he was fifteen years old; he had few friends and many enemies; the prosperity built by his father had ended; and he soon understood that the only possible asset for himself and for his country was the sea.1 He soon revealed himself to be a keen minded and clever sovereign; in fact, Saiyid Sa’id bin Sultan Al Bu-Sa’idi immediately saw the importance of the expansion of the African trade; he also considered important the creation of an Omani merchant fleet for patrolling the African trading ports. But, to arm a fleet strong enough to fight against his enemies in Arabia, he needed a substantial financial basis, and the necessary revenues came from Africa, not from Oman. His modernity was characterised by a great mobility among three continents: Asia, Arabia, and Africa; moreover, the unsettled state of his power, both in Maskat and in East Africa, enabled him to open a new phase of history in the Indian Ocean, in that microcosmic world that would soon become universal. At the time of his accession to power in Oman, the French menace to British India led to the involvement of the Al Bu Sa’idi of Oman within European ri- valry in the Indian Ocean. This led to the treaty of 12th October 1798 between his father, Sultan bin Ahmad Al Bu-Sa’idi (1792-1804), and Britain, Oman in 1 J. G. Lorimer, Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman and Central Arabia, 2 vols., (Calcutta, 1915), Vol. 1, pp. 440-469; R. S. Ruete, Said Bin Sultan (1791-1856). Ruler of Oman and Zanzi- bar. His Place in the History of Arabia and East Africa, (London, 1929); S. A. S. Farsi, Seyyid Said Bin Sultan. The Joint Ruler of Oman and Zanzibar (1804-1856), (New Delhi, 1986); V. Maurizi, History of Seyd Said, Sultan of Muscat, (London, 1819), (new ed., Cambridge, 1984). 172 SAIYID SA'ID BIN SULTAN AL BU SA'IDI OF OMAN (1791-1856) which agreed to exclude the French from its ports.2 But the result was that the French started to attack Omani ships in the Indian Ocean. Nevertheless, after Austerlitz Napoleon renewed his Oriental policy, which led to the signing of the Treaty of Finkenstein with Persia – 4th May 1807 – and to a new agreement with Saiyid Sa’id bin Sultan Al Bu-Sa’idi.3 In June 1807 Saiyid Sa’id bin Sultan Al Bu-Sa’idi sent one of his agents, Majid bin Khalfan, to Île de France with the task of restoring political relations, and, most of all, precious commercial links with the French. Saiyid Sa’id bin Sultan Al Bu-Sa’idi, claiming the neutrality of his country, accepted the establishment of a French consul, M. Dallons, in Maskat, and, on 16th June 1807, he signed a Treaty of Amity and Commerce with General René Decaen, Governor of Île de France, in which France had the privileges of the most fa- voured nation in his African dominions.4 This was because, from a trading point of view, “the French were great favourites in Zanzibar.”5 Moreover, as – according to Coupland – “the shores of the Indian Ocean were one vast whispering-gallery,”6 voices had reached Bombay with regard to the renewed receptiveness of Saiyid Sa’id bin Sultan Al Bu-Sa’idi to French avances.7 Jonathan Duncan, Governor of Bombay, was instructed from London not to involve Britain in direct interventions in the internal affairs of the Oriental po- tentates. Consequently, he decided to use the same policy adopted by John Malcolm, political agent in the Persian Gulf, with the father of Saiyid Sa’id bin Sultan Al Bu-Sa’idi, and gave to the Omani ruler the following warning: the consequences of his political choices in favour of the French would mean a much less warm welcome to Omani ships in the Anglo-Indian ports. And, from then on, any French presence in the Persian Gulf would be considered a hostile presence and, consequently, attacked. As stated above, the new architecture developed by Napoleon, based on new plans for the invasion of British India, included the enforcement of the strate- gic base of Île de France as a centre against English trading routes to India, and as a maritime base for a land invasion through Persia and Baluchistan,8 with the alliance of Saiyid Sa’id bin Sultan Al Bu-Sa’idi. On 27th January 1807 the Governor of Île de France met Napoleon in Paris, who welcomed him warmly and sent him back to his island with 9 men-of- war, 11 vessels and 4,600 soldiers, increased in October of the same year to 3 other ships and 12,000 soldiers. In the meantime, the French supplied weapons 2 J. C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East. A Documentary Record, 2 vols., (Toronto, 1956), Vol. I, p. 64. 3 Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, p. 77. 4 R. Coupland, East Africa and its Invaders, (Oxford, 1938), p. 116. 5 J. M. Gray, History of Zanzibar from the Middle Age to 1856, (London, 1962), p. 180. 6 R. Coupland, East Africa and its Invaders, p. 112. 7 S. B. Miles, The Countries and Tribes of the Persian Gulf, (London, 1919), (new ed. Lon- don, 1966), pp. 310-311. B. NICOLINI 173 to the Arabs of Maskat, and instigated acts of piracy against the British East Indiamen which reached an intolerable level for the East India Company. Cal- cutta decided that it was time to extirpate the thorn of the Île de France from the British flesh. In July 1807 Lord Gilbert Minto was appointed Governor General of India; Minto was an exponent of the Enlightenment, a Whig, supported both by the Tories and by the directors of the East India Company,9 and his scope was not restricted to “counter-attack Napoleon's power”, but allowed him to “destroy it”.10 Since Minto understood that the East African scene was only part of the picture and could not be considered in isolation from the other shores of the Indian Ocean,11 he prepared a very detailed plan which included an exhaustive examination of the possibilities of attack against Île de France Bourbon. How- ever, the British Navy did not have nautical charts of the Mascarene islands: this necessary information was obtained from the Portuguese, loyal allies of the British in this dramatic moment, fully informed of the plans against the French and perfectly in agreement with the English decision to occupy these two islands. The intelligences of the East India Company communicated that the best attack against Île de France Bourbon would be by surprise.12 During the summer of 1810, without waiting for official confirmation from London, 4,000 soldiers set out from the Rodriguez islands against Bourbon and Île de France, and conquered them in July.13 Île de France was renamed with its an- cient Dutch name, Mauritius.14 The year 1810 represented for East Africa the end of an epoch and the be- ginning of a new era.15 Going back to Saiyid Sa’id bin Sultan Al Bu-Sa’idi, on 21st March 1821 the Duke of Gloucester, President of the African Institution, sent a memorandum to the Court of Directors of the East India Company, urging the Company to interpose its powerful mediation with the Imam of Muscat for the entire aboli- tion of the slave trade. Saiyid Sa’id bin Sultan Al Bu-Sa’idi had to collaborate with Britain, positively, prohibiting the sale of slaves to any Christian nation. Nevertheless, he could not ban the export of slaves to Muslim states.16 8 V. F. Piacentini, “Aspetti originali della politica napoleonica in Persia nel quadro del duello anglo-francese”, Storia e Politica, (42, Milano, 1968), pp. 637-647. 9 E. Ingram, Britain’s Persian Connection 1798-1828. Prelude to the Great Game in Asia, (Oxford, 1992). 10 Coupland, East Africa and its Invaders, p. 126. 11 M. V. Jackson Haight, European Powers and South-East Africa. A Study of International Relations on the South-East Coast of Africa 1796-1856, (London, 1966), p. 161. 12 B.M. Add. 13772, Wellesley Papers, Series I, 5th November 1800-18, Private Secret. 13 B.M. Add. 37292, Wellesley Papers, Vol. XIX, Proclamation in the Name of His Majesty George III, of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, St. Denis, July the 18th, 1810. 14 R. W. Beachey, The Slave Trade of Eastern Africa, (London, 1976), p. 41. 15 Jackson Haight, European Powers and South-East Africa, p.

Load more