Congressional Record—Senate S4260
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2020 NDU Graduation Program.Pdf
Congratulations Graduates! G NATIONAL RADUATION DEFENSE College of Information and Cyberspace UNIVERSITY Educating, Developing and Inspiring National Dwight D. Eisenhower School for Security Leaders National Security and Resource Strategy S STAF CE F R C O O F L L T E N G I E O J Joint Forces Staff College College of International Security Aff airs 2020 National War College Ten o’clock The 2020 National Defense University Graduation ceremony is a virtual Thursday, June Eleventh ceremony due to the global COVID-19 pandemic. Two Thousand Twenty = Fort Lesley J. McNair ATIONAL EFENSE NIVERSITY N D U Washington, D.C. www.ndu.edu NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY 1 GRADUATION College of Information and Cyberspace Dwight D. Eisenhower School for National Security and Resource Strategy Joint Forces Staff College College of International Security Affairs National War College 1 Ten o’clock Thursday, June Eleventh, Two Thousand Twenty Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C. NDU SENIOR LEADERSHIP VICE ADMIRAL F. J. ROEGGE, USN President AMBASSADOR ARNOLD A. CHACON DR. JOHN W. YAEGER Senior Vice President Provost MAJOR GENERAL ROBERT C. KANE, USAF (RET.) Chief Operating Officer COLLEGE OF INFORMATION AND CYBERSPACE DR. CASSANDRA C. LEWIS Acting Chancellor / Dean of Faculty and Academic Programs COLONEL RUSSELL E. QUIRICI, USA (RET.) COLONEL JONATHAN BEASLEY, USA Dean of Administration Dean of Students DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER SCHOOL FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AND RESOURCE STRATEGY BRIGADIER GENERAL KYLE W. ROBINSON, USAF Commandant AMBASSADOR WILLIAM A. HEIDT DR. JAMES L. LEPSE Deputy Commandant Dean of Faculty and Academic Programs COLONEL DANIEL M. ZERBY, USA Dean of Students JOINT FORCES STAFF COLLEGE MAJOR GENERAL LEWIS G. -
Congressional Record—Senate S3204
S3204 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE June 24, 2020 Secretary, Department of Defense, transmit- and Containments)’’ received in the Office of POM–208. A resolution adopted by the ting, pursuant to law, the report of a rule en- the President of the Senate on June 22, 2020; Board of Supervisors of the City and County titled ‘‘Department of Defense (DoD) Guid- to the Committee on Environment and Pub- of San Francisco, California, urging the ance Documents’’ (RIN0790–AK97) received in lic Works. United States Congress to pass Emergency the Office of the President of the Senate on EC–4882. A communication from the Direc- Earned Income Tax Credit; to the Committee June 22, 2020; to the Committee on Armed tor of Congressional Affairs, Office of Re- on Finance. Services. search, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, POM–209. A resolution adopted by the EC–4872. A communication from the Fed- transmitting, pursuant to law, the report of Board of Supervisors of the City and County eral Register Liaison Officer, Office of the a rule entitled ‘‘Regulatory Guide (RG) of San Francisco, California, urging the Secretary, Department of Defense, transmit- 1.233, Revision 0, Guidance for a Technology- United States Congress to pass H.R. 40 (Com- ting, pursuant to law, the report of a rule en- Inclusive, Risk-Informed, and Performance- mission to Study and Develop Reparation titled ‘‘TRICARE Pharmacy Benefits Pro- Based Methodology to Inform the Licensing Proposals for African-Americans Act) and gram Reforms’’ (RIN0720–AB75) received in Basis and Content of Applications for Li- implement a federal commission to study the Office of the President of the Senate on censes, Certifications, and Approvals for and develop reparations proposals for the Af- June 22, 2020; to the Committee on Armed Non-Light Water Reactors’’ received in the rican American Act; to the Committee on Services. -
An Introduction to Pakistan's Military
An Introduction to Pakistan’s Military July 2011 Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs Harvard Kennedy School 79 JFK Street Cambridge, MA 02138 Fax: (617) 495-8963 Email: [email protected] Website: http://belfercenter.org Design and Layout Tim Duffy Copyright 2011 President and Fellows of Harvard College Printed in the United States of America Contents Introduction 4 Pakistan’s Strategic Challenges: Traditional Threats and New Adversaries 8 External Threats, Inconsistent Partners 8 Internal Threats 19 A Short History of Pakistan’s Military 22 Indian Partition, Kashmir, and the Use of Proxies 22 US Military Aid, the First Military Regime, and the 1965 War 23 The 1971 War and a Return to Civilian Rule 24 Islamization, the Mujahideen, and Nuclear Stumbling Blocks 25 A Return to Civilian Rule 26 Musharraf and Kargil 27 The Post-September 11 World 27 Conventional Capabilities 30 Army 30 Air Force 31 Navy 32 Proxies 32 Nuclear Strategy and Security 34 Command and Control 35 Nuclear Doctrine 36 Key Concerns About Pakistan’s Nuclear Program 36 Counterinsurgency 38 Appendices 40 Acronyms 41 Endnotes 42 Introduction Pakistan’s military is a central actor in many of today’s most pressing security challenges, and few institutions face such extreme pressures from such diverse forces. In recent years the military has been asked to simultaneously combat a vicious internal insurgency, suppress international terror- ist groups, and respond to Pakistan’s worst floods in eighty years, all while squaring off against a much larger rival in one of the most strategically complex regions in the world. Pakistan’s armed forces are not only an instrument of the state’s foreign policy, but also the most influential actor in the country’s internal politics. -
BIOGRAPHICAL DATA BOO KK Pinnacle Class 2020-1 30 March
BBIIOOGGRRAAPPHHIICCAALL DDAATTAA BBOOOOKK Pinnacle Class 2020-1 30 March - 3 April 2020 Pinnacle Fellows Biographies Page 1 of 3 UNITED STATES AIR FORCE LIEUTENANT GENERAL DAVID W. ALLVIN Lt. Gen. David W. Allvin is the Director for Strategy, Plans and Policy, Joint Staff, the Pentagon, Arlington, Virginia. He provides strategic direction, policy guidance and planning focus to develop and execute the National Military Strategy. As the Director, Strategy, Plans, and Policy, he enables the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide military advice to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council. General Allvin graduated from the U.S. Air Force Academy in 1986. He has commanded at the squadron and wing levels, including the 97th Air Mobility Wing, Altus Air Force Base, Oklahoma. He has held major command staff assignments and served on the Joint Staff. General Allvin served as Commanding General, NATO Air Training Command – Afghanistan; Commander, 438th Air Expeditionary Wing, Kabul, Afghanistan; Commander, 618th Air and Space Operations Center; Director, Strategy, Concepts and Assessments; Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Plans and Requirements, Headquarters, U.S. Air Force and Director, Strategy, Plans and Policy, Headquarters U.S. European Command, StuttgartVaihingen, Germany. He most recently served as Vice Director, Strategy, Plans and Policy, Joint Staff. The general is a command pilot with more than 4,600 hours in more than 30 aircraft models, including 800 flight test hours. EDUCATION 1986 Bachelor of Science, Astronautical Engineering, U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, Colo. 1989 Master of Science, Management, Troy State University, Troy, Ala. -
The IRGC Command Network Formal Structures and Informal Influence
THE IRGC COMMAND NETWORK FORMAL STRUCTURES AND INFORMAL INFLUENCE A REPOrt BY AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT JULY 2013 WILL FULTON All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. ©2013 AEI’s Critical Threats Project Cover Image: Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei addresses IRGC commanders, Tehran, July 2011. Left to right: Mohammad Bagheri, Ali Saidi, Mohammad Ali Jafari, Qassem Suleimani, Mohammad Pakpour, Gholam Ali Rashid. Credit: leader.ir. The IRGC Command Network Formal Structures and Informal Influence Will Fulton July 2013 A report by AEI’s Critical Threats Project ABOUT US About the Author Will Fulton is an analyst, a Palantir fellow, and the IRGC Project team lead at the Critical Threats Project of the American Enterprise Institute. His research focuses on Iran’s IRGC and its global force projection network, including the Quds Force, Lebanese Hezbollah, and proxies, as well as Iranian domestic politics. Will has testified before Congress and briefed congressional staff, as well as members of the defense community. He received his B.A. in Political Science from the University of Wisconsin- Madison, and received his M.A. in Near Eastern Studies with a concentration in Persian and Iranian Studies from the University of Arizona. Acknowledgments The author would like to thank: Frederick W. Kagan for his patient guidance throughout the research, analysis, and writing process; Jessica Lewis for helping to frame the assessment in its early stages; Katherine Faley for her editorial expertise and support; Stephen Gailliot and Amir Toumaj for their invaluable research and analytical support; Maggie Obriwin for InDesign training, and; Marie Donovan and Mary Ella Simmons for their assistance. -
Current Data on the Indonesian Military Elite, April 2008-September
Current Data on the Indonesian M ilitary Elite, April 2008-September 2013 The Editors Introduction This report identifies the mutasi jabatan, or reshuffles, of key positions within the Indonesian National Defense Forces (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, TNI) headquarters, and includes changes that have taken place within the army's central and regional commands between April 2008 and September 2013. The timeline for this update covers primarily the second term of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's administration. Two major developments are the focal point of analysis during this period. First, a simultaneous reshuffle of the armed services' chiefs of staff, which took place one month after the reelection of President Yudhoyono. Second, there were three different TNI commanders-in-chief (Panglima TNI) during this time and four of the army's chiefs of staff were replaced. Overall, Indonesia's military personnel reshuffles during this period indicate a smooth and organized leadership transition from the alumni of the classes of 1976-78 to younger officers from 1980s classes. In the following sections, we highlight key patterns evident in recent personnel reshuffles and provide an assessment of steps taken to professionalize the military by looking closely at military organizational development. Indonesia 98 (October 2014) 92 The Editors Timing and Patterns of Personnel Reshuffles Table 1 highlights the timing of Indonesia's military personnel reshuffles during the period of this listing, particularly those involving seventy-three strategic positions within TNI headquarters and army commands, which have had an impact on both central and regional command structures. This report identifies five major waves of personnel turnovers during the past five years—affecting approximately one hundred officers each time, and including some minor reshuffles for a number of key positions. -
Consolidated List of Financial Sanctions Targets in the Uk
CONSOLIDATED LIST OF FINANCIAL SANCTIONS TARGETS IN THE UK Last Updated:25/03/2021 Status: Asset Freeze Targets REGIME: Iran (Nuclear) INDIVIDUALS 1. Name 6: ABBASI-DAVANI 1: FEREIDOUN 2: n/a 3: n/a 4: n/a 5: n/a. DOB: (1) --/--/1958. (2) --/--/1959. POB: Abadan, Iran (Islamic Republic of) Position: Senior Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) Scientist Other Information: (UK Sanctions List Ref):IWD0198 (UN Ref):IRi.001 (Further Identifiying Information):Has "links to the Institute of Applied Physics, working closely with Mohsen Fakhrizadeh-Mahabadi" (designated under IRi.016) [Old Reference # I.47.C.1]. Listed on: 24/03/2007 Last Updated: 31/12/2020 Group ID: 9049. 2. Name 6: AGHAJANI 1: AZIM 2: n/a 3: n/a 4: n/a 5: n/a. a.k.a: (1) ADHAJANI, Azim (2) AGHA-JANI, Azim Nationality: Iran (Islamic Republic of) Passport Details: (1) 6620505 (2) 9003213 Position: Member of the IRGC-Qods Force operating under the direction of Qods Force Commander, Major General Qasem Soleimani, who was designated by the UN Security Council in resolution 1747 (2007) Other Information: (UK Sanctions List Ref):IWD0196 (UN Ref): IRi.003 (Further Identifiying Information):Facilitated a breach of paragraph 5 of resolution 1747 (2007) prohibiting the export of arms and related materiel from Iran. [Old Reference # I.AC.50.18.04.12.(1)] Listed on: 02/12/2011 Last Updated: 31/12/2020 Group ID: 12274. 3. Name 6: AHMADIAN 1: ALI 2: AKBAR 3: n/a 4: n/a 5: n/a. DOB: --/--/1961. POB: Kerman, Iran (Islamic Republic of) a.k.a: AHMEDIAN, Ali, Akbar Position: Vice Admiral,Chief of IRGC Joint Staff Other Information: (UK Sanctions List Ref):IWD0194 (UN Ref):IRi.004 (Further Identifiying Information):Position changed. -
A Short History of the Iranian Drone Program
A Short History of the Iranian Drone Program MICHAEL RUBIN AUGUST 2020 AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE Executive Summary he 1980–88 Iran-Iraq War was a formative The third is the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) Tevent for the Islamic Republic of Iran. The sur- fleet, the focus of this report. While Iranian UAVs prise Iraqi invasion caught Iran’s revolutionary have been, until recently at least, among the least pub- regime unprepared. In the last decade of his rule, the licized Iranian asymmetric tools, they are among the ousted shah centered the Iranian military around Islamic Republic’s oldest, in service now for 35 years. big ticket items such as F-14 Tomcats, M60 tanks, The Iranian military utilizes its UAV fleet for two and AH-1 SuperCobra helicopters. At the time of the main purposes: surveillance and attack. Over the revolution, however, not only did many Iranian pilots last decade, Iranian UAV platforms for both pur- choose not to return to their homeland from training poses have expanded tremendously with not only ranges abroad but some of the equipment purchased the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps but also the by Iran also got stuck overseas. The Islamic Republic’s regular Iranian military and civil authorities gaining inability to purchase spare parts from Western sup- access to Iranian-made drones tailored for their spe- pliers further undercut its ability to defend itself over cific needs and mission sets. Whereas once, Iran did subsequent years. little more than attach cameras or grenades to rudi- As a result, both during and after the Iran-Iraq mentary drones that were limited both by weather War, Iranian authorities doubled down on indige- and line of sight to their controllers, today Iranian nous military industry so as not to become reliant on controllers can pilot drones for hours at a time over any overseas power and asymmetric technologies to hundreds of miles utilizing GPS coordinates. -
The Shi'ites of the Middle East
THE SHI’ITES OF THE MIDDLE EAST AN IRANIAN FIFTH COLUMN? Michael Rubin and Ahmad K. Majidyar AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE The Shi’ites of the Middle East An Iranian Fifth Column? Michael Rubin and Ahmad K. Majidyar A MERIC A N E NTERPRISE I NSTITUTE Contents INTRODUCTION: DOES AMERICA GET THE SHI’ITES WRONG? 1 Michael Rubin HAS IRAN OVERPLAYED ITS HAND IN IRAQ? 6 Michael Rubin IS SECTARIAN TENSION PLUNGING LEBANON INTO A NEW CIVIL WAR? 21 Ahmad K. Majidyar ARE BAHRAINI SHI’ITES PUPPETS OF IRAN? 45 Michael Rubin SAUDI ARABIA’S FORGOTTEN SHI’ITE SPRING 58 Ahmad K. Majidyar HAS KUwaiT REACHED THE SECTARIAN TIPPING POINT? 74 Michael Rubin IS SECTARIAN BALANCE IN THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES, OMAN, AND QATAR AT RISK? 95 Ahmad K. Majidyar AZERBAIJAN’S IRAN PROBLEM 112 Michael Rubin THE SHI’ITES OF PAKISTAN: A MINORITY UNDER SIEGE 126 Ahmad K. Majidyar CONCLUSION: WINNING THE SHI’ITES CAN CHECKMATE IRAN 140 Michael Rubin iii Acknowledgments The Shi’ites of the Middle East: An Iranian Fifth Column? is the product of two years of research and writing that we could not have accom- plished without the support of the American Enterprise Institute. Many of the chapters in this monograph were first published on AEI.org as part of AEI’s Middle East Outlook series, while the chapters relating to Shi’ism in Iraq and Azerbaijan were drawn from previ- ous work by the authors published by the Foreign Military Studies Office at Fort Leavenworth. We are especially grateful to Danielle Pletka, vice president for foreign and defense policy at AEI; Alex Della Rocchetta, manager for foreign and defense policy; and AEI’s editing and publications staff: Christy Sadler, Hilary Waterman, Jennifer Morretta, and Claude Aubert. -
The Quetta Experience
ASIA PROGRAM Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars One Woodrow Wilson Plaza 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue NW Washington, D.C. 20004-3027 www.wilsoncenter.org ISBN: 978-1-938027-82-6 Cover Image: Asianet-Pakistan/Shutterstock.com Copyright 2018, All Rights Reserved THE WILSON CENTER, chartered by Congress as the official memorial to President Woodrow Wilson, is the nation’s key nonpartisan policy forum for tackling global issues through independent research and open dialogue to inform actionable ideas for Congress, the Administration, and the broader policy community. Conclusions or opinions expressed in Center publications and programs are those of the authors and speakers and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Center staff, fellows, trustees, advisory groups, or any individuals or organizations that provide financial support to the Center. Please visit us online at www.wilsoncenter.org. Jane Harman, Director, President, and CEO BOARD OF TRUSTEES Chairman: Frederic V. Malek, Founder and Chairman, Thayer Lodging Group, a Brookfield Property Public members: Jon Parrish Peede, Acting Chairman, National Endowment for the Humanities; Don J. Wright, Acting Secretary, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services; David Ferriero, Archivist of the United States; Carla D. Hayden, Librarian of Congress; Rex W. Tillerson, Secretary, U.S. Department of State; Elisabeth DeVos, Secretary, U.S. Department of Education; David J. Skorton, Secretary, Smithsonian Institution. Designated appointee of the president from within the federal government: Vacant Private Citizen Members: Peter J. Beshar, Executive Vice President & General Counsel, Marsh & McLennan Companies, Inc.; Thelma Duggin, President, AnBryce Foundation; Barry S. Jackson, Managing Director, The Lindsey Group and Strategic Advisor, Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck; David Jacobson, Former U.S. -
Iran Sanctions
Iran Sanctions Updated April 6, 2021 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov RS20871 SUMMARY RS20871 Iran Sanctions April 6, 2021 Successive Administrations and Congresses have used economic sanctions to try to change Iran’s behavior. U.S. sanctions on Iran—primarily “secondary sanctions” on Kenneth Katzman firms that conduct certain transactions with Iran—have adversely affected Iran’s Specialist in Middle economy but have arguably not, to date, altered Iran’s pursuit of core strategic Eastern Affairs objectives including its support for regional armed factions and its development of missiles. Sanctions did contribute to Iran’s decision to enter into a 2015 agreement that put limits on its nuclear program— the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). During 2011-2015, in implementation of deliberate U.S. policy, global economic sanctions contributed to the shrinking of Iran’s economy as its crude oil exports fell by more than 50% and it could not access its foreign exchange assets abroad. Upon Iran’s implementation of nuclear program restrictions stipulated by the JCPOA, the Obama Administration eased the relevant sanctions and U.N. and European Union sanctions were lifted as well. Remaining in place were U.S. sanctions on direct trade with Iran and on Iran’s support for regional armed factions, its human rights abuses, and on its efforts to acquire missile and advanced conventional weapons technology. U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231, which endorsed the JCPOA, kept in place an existing ban on its importation or exportation of arms (which expired on October 18, 2020) and a nonbinding restriction on Iran’s development of nuclear-capable ballistic missiles (until October 18, 2023). -
Congressional Record—Senate S4306
S4306 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE July 20, 2020 (1) for non-Department of Defense and non- provided to the Committee on Homeland Se- CONFIRMATIONS intelligence community operations; and curity and Government Affairs of the Senate (2) through grants and cooperative agree- and the Committee on Oversight and Reform Executive nominations confirmed by ments entered into with non-Federal enti- of the House of Representatives. the Senate July 20, 2020: ties. SEC. 899F. STUDY. IN THE ARMY (b) INFORMATION SECURITY.—The policy de- (a) INDEPENDENT STUDY.—Not later than 3 THE FOLLOWING NAMED OFFICER FOR APPOINTMENT veloped under subsection (a) shall include years after the date of the enactment of this AS CHIEF OF ENGINEERS AND FOR APPOINTMENT IN THE the following specifications, which to the ex- Act, the Director of the Office of Manage- UNITED STATES ARMY TO THE GRADE INDICATED WHILE tent practicable, shall be based on industry ASSIGNED TO A POSITION OF IMPORTANCE AND RESPON- ment and Budget shall seek to enter into a SIBILITY UNDER TITLE 10, U.S.C., SECTIONS 601 AND 7036: standards and technical guidance from the contract with a federally funded research National Institute of Standards and Tech- and development center under which the cen- To be lieutenant general nology, to address the risks associated with ter will conduct a study of— MAJ. GEN. SCOTT A. SPELLMON processing, storing and transmitting Federal (1) the current and future unmanned air- EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT information in a UAS: craft system global and domestic market; RUSSELL VOUGHT, OF VIRGINIA, TO BE DIRECTOR OF (1) Protections to ensure controlled access (2) the ability of the unmanned aircraft THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET.