United Nations UN LIBRARY-f!J~ FOURTH COMMITTEE GENERAL ~ ~ 32nd meeting DEC 7 1976~ i/ held on ASSEMBLY ""'""?~ Thursday, 25 November 1976 THIRTY-FIRST SESSION LIJNLSA COLLECiiON at 10.30 a.m. Official Records* . New York
SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 32nd MEETING
Chairman : Mr. VRAALSEN (Norway)
CONTENTS AGENDA ITEM 85: QUESTION OF NAMIBIA (continued)
AGENDA ITEM 25: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES (continued)
• This record is subject to correction. Corrections should be inco~or~ted in a copy_ ot Distr. GENERAL the record and should be sent within one week of the date of publrcanon to the Chief, Official Records Editing Section, room I..X-2332. A/C.4/31/SR.32 2 December 1976 Corrections will be i~sued shortly after the end of the session, in a separate fascicle for ENGLISH each Committee. ORIGINAL: FRENCH r6-91343 / ... A/C.4/31/SR.32 English Page 2
The meeting was called to order at 11 a.m.
AGENDA TIME 35: QUESTION OF NAMIBIA (A/31/23/Add.l, A/31/23/Add.3, A/31/24 (vol. I and II), A/31/45, A/31/92, A/31/155, A/31/181, A/31/190 and Corr.l, A/31/197, A/31/213, A/31/237; A/C.4/31/L.29) (continued)
1. Mr. GIGNAC (Canada) noted with regret that the situation in Namibia had evolved little in substantive terms since the Fourth Committee's last debate on the question. It had been ten years since the United Nations terminated the South African mandate over Namibia and five years since the International Court of Justice gave its advisory opinion on that matter. Moreover, 13 resolutions to that effect had been adopted by the Security Council. Aside from those resolutions, the Security Council had repeatedly deplored the militarization of Namibia, had enjoined the Repvbli c of South Africa to withdraw its illegal administration from Namibia and had declared itself in support of a reasonable means of enabling the people of Namibia freely to determine their own future.
2. Canada had whole-heartedly supported the various resolutions and initiatives. It had advised the Government of South Africa of its position and had taken measures to ensure that no recognition was given by it to the illegal South African administration of Namibia. Canada maintained no diplomatic or consular representation in Namibia and warned any Canadian company or citizen proposing to invest or travel there that they did so at their own risk. It had also prohibited Canadians travelling on diplomatic or official passports from going to the Territory and, in addition, had placed an embargo on the sale of arms to South Africa. While recognizing that the efforts undertaken so far had not succeeded, it was essential to continue supporting all action taken by the Security Council to promote a peaceful solution and, in particular, Security Council resolutions 366 (1976) and 385 (1976).
3. With respect to the Constitutional Conference being held in Windhoek, he noted that it was being conducted by representatives of various ethnic groups in Namibia but that no provision had been made to ensure the presence of all political representatives of the Territory or of organizations such as SWAPO which, it was clear, had popular support. Bearing those factors in mind, as well as the fact that the discussions were being held without reference to the United Nations, his Government considered that the discussions could not lead to measures that would ensure the development of an independent and united Namibia through a fully democratic process and was convinced that the Turnhalle discussions would ultimately fail.
4. His Government had watched with deep concern the growing number of violent incidents provoked by the continuing South African presence in Namibia. As a result of those incidents four Namibians had been sentenced to death. Canada believed that those sentences were invalid in law in view of the illegality of the South African presence in Namibia and that they could only have a negative effect on the prospects for a peaceful resolution; it therefore urged that the sentences not be carried out.
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5. In a move made in Pretoria on 29 August 1976, the Canadian Government had set forth those views before the South African Government and appealed to it to reach an accommodation as soon as possible with the United Nations on the future of Namibia, pointing out that otherwise, the situation might deteriorate so far as to become a threat to international peace and security. The response of the South African Government had been disappointing to say the least and had demonstrated that the latter's position remained unchanged.
6. However, in recent months developments in southern Africa and the intense political and diplomatic activity going on in both Rhodesia and South Africa gave rise to some hope. Although progress was very slow, his Government was convinced that the situation in Namibia could be resolved provided the international community made the necessary effort.
7. In the meantime, the United Nations should continue to pursue its efforts in favour of Namibian independence, in particular, by making concrete arrangements such as elaborating programmes designed to prepare Namibians for independence. Of particular importance in that sense were the United Nations Educational and Training Programme for Southern Africa and the Institute for Namibia. His delegation had already had occasion to draw attention to its support for UNETPSA and its intention of supporting the Institute because of the role which the latter would play during the difficult period that would follow independence.
8. Even before the budget of the Institute had been finalized Canada had announced its intention of contributing $100,000 to the Institute. In March, during the Pledging Conference for all programmes for southern Africa, Canada had indicated that a further contribution to the Institute for Namibia would be subject to assessment of the operations and programmes of the Institute, its over-all budget, financial prospects and the support it received. Unfortunately, the constant efforts it had made since March 1976 to obtain details of the Institute's budget and operations had met with little success and it had therefore been unable, so far, to commit further funds. While his delegation understood that the budget had to be considered by various bodies and that that was a lengthy process which was no doubt justified, it hoped that the process could be speeded up for, in the absence of an authoritative document explaining the programmes and financing of the Institute, it was not surprising that voluntary contributions for 1976 had not reached the original target. None the less, the Institute was now in operation and he hoped that the budget estimates and supporting documents concerning programme development would be revised in a pragmatic form to show progressive development from year to year. His delegation also hoped that, as in the case of the Trust Fund for South Africa and UNETPSA, there would continue to be an ad hoc Committee for the Fund composed of seven or eight diplomats who would maintain a keen interest in the Institute's development.
I . .. A/C.4/31/SR.32 English Page 4 (Mr. Cignac, Canada)
9. In respect to the organization of United Nations activities relating to Namibia, his delegation had noticed that within the Secretariat there were many competent officials working on such questions but that, unfortunately, their activities often overlapped; it asked the Secretary-General to examine the matter and remedy it.
10. In conclusion, he noted that the present Commissioner for Namibia, Mr. MacBride, did not plan to seek reappointment for a further term, and therefore warmly thanked him for the commitment, energy and great determination he had displayed in the performance of his important functions.
11. Mr. ABDALLA (United Arab Emirates) expressed satisfaction at the participation of SWAPO in the Committee's work on Namibia and said that SWAPO had provided very useful information.
12. The question of Namibia had been on the General Assembly's agenda for many years but South Africa had impeded all efferts to reach a conclusion and had rejected all the solutions proposed.
13. His Government attached very great importance to the question of Namibia for it considered that the presence of South Africa in the Territery was a threat to Africa and to the rest of the world.
14. In defiance of the decisions of the United Nations and of world public opinion, South Africa continued to consolidate its presen·:~e in Namibia by fragmenting its territory through its policy of bantustar:-i :z,r+-ion. It thought to delude the world by convening a so-called Constitutional Conference in which representatives chosen by it participated, while the true representatives of the Namibian people (SWAPO) were kept outside. In addition, the Pretoria regime continued to oppress the Namibian people, whom it brutally repressed. The United Nations had repeatedly found that the South African policy in Namibia ~as a crime against mankind. In addition, the illegality of South Africa's administration of Namibia had been confirmed in an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice.
15. His delegation believed, therefore, that the only acceptable solution was one that would enable the Namibian people to exercise its right to self-determination and independence in accordance with the provisions of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). The United Nations Council for Namibia should be able to meet in the Territory in order better to carry out its mandate and help the population of the Territory to prepare for independence.
16. He took the opportunity to draw a parallel between the situation in Namibia and that in the territories occupied by Israel whose attitude, in his view, was comparable to that of South Africa. Like the African countries, the United Arab
I ... A/C.4/31/SR.32 English Page 5 (Mr. Abdalla, United Arab Emirates)
Emirates would like the problem to be resolved peacefully and he reaffirmed his delegation's support for the Namibian people. His Government had followed with interest the Security Council debates on the question and was sorry that the Council had not been able to adopt the resolutions submitted to it, due to the triple veto of three of its permanent members. He appealed to those members to reverse their position so that the Council might take the necessary measures.
17. Mr. SEKYI (Ghana) said it seemed a sad commentary of the effectiveness of the United Nations that the General Assembly should still have the question of Namibia on its agenda. However, it was reasonable to think that, if the Security Council had not been deliberately and persistently paralysed, South Africa would already have handed over the administration of the Territory to the United Nations. Everyone knew ¥ho was responsible for that paralysis: they were the ones who enabled the South African regime to continue to violate the Charter, attack Angola and Zambia, pose a nuclear threat to the African continent and occupy Namibia in defiance of world public opinion and the resolutions and directives of the Security Council and General Assembly. There lay the crux of the matter.
18. South Africa was perpetuating its hold on Namibia and proceeding with the Balkanization of the Territory by setting up Bantustans. The elements of the situation in Namibia were well known and were examined and summarized in the documents before the Committee. In addition to South Africa's military occupation of and illegal presence in the Territery, the suppression of political freedoms and ruthless repression of the authentic representatives of the people of Namibia, there had been ever more frequent acts of aggressiun against Angola and Zambia.
19. The situation in Namibia was even more serious than the Rhodesian situation compounded as it was by the stubborn policy of Bantustanization carried out by military forces 10 times as dangerous as the Rhodesian forces and also by the fact an alien occupying Power illegally administered the Territory.
20. The situation in Namibia displayed all the worst and most virulent features of colonialism and, as such, had an economic raison d'etre. Two thirds of the land belonged to the white population (10 per cent of the total) and one third to the African population {90 per cent of the total). The European-occupied areas of course contained all the known mineral wealth and would apparently not be affected by the Bantustanization programme.
21. Nearly half the country's gross domestic product was expatriated to South Africa, the United States of America and the United Kingdom. The earning sectors of the economy, mining, commercial farming and fisheries, were almost all in the hands of the white settlers and foreign companies. Fifty per cent of the Territory's exports went to South Africa and 80 per cent of its imports came from that country. The per capita income of the Africans was $250 as compared with $4,250 for the whites.
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22. Investments were therefore extremely profitable. South West Africa was the principal supplier of gem diamonds and accounted for 40 to 50 per cent of the profits of the De Beers Group, the South African company which dominated diamond production and sales in South Africa and Namibia. In 1973, less than 2 per cent of the total earnings had been returned to the African workers whereas 80 per cent had gone into the coffers of the South African Government in the form of taxes and 6 to 9 per cent had gone into the De Beers profit account. The same applied to the mining ef base metals, a sector which was almost entirely in the hands of Unite~ States citizens.
23. That monstrous system of economic exploitation was the raison d'etre of the no less monstrous system of political repression. If the economic exploitation was terminated, the illegal eccupation would die a natural death or, if the illegal occupation was ended, that gross exploitation could not be maintained much longer. However, to ask South Africa to cease the occupation and vacate the Territory would also be to ask the co-owners of the Namibian economy and the joint beneficiaries of its economic exploitation to forgo the lucrative proceeds.
24. Mining accounted for 50 to 60 per cent of the gross domestic product of Namibia. Off-shore fishing and commercial farming were in the hands of South African companies and white settlers of South African origin. Diamond mining, which accounted for 64 per cent of all mining, was practically the preserve of the De Beers Group acting through its subsidiary, CDM. The mining of base metals, the second most important source of revenue, was 80 per cent-controlled by the American-dominated Tsumeb Corporation. The remainder was exploited by United Kingdom, Canadian and South African companies. In addition, there ¥Tas the great new growth industry of uranium mining. The Rossing mine was said to be among the largest and most cheaply explcited in the world and for the next 25 to 80 years might well account for a crucial proportion of the world's uranium requirements. Enormous investments were now being made to develop that industry; 60 per cent of the assets would be owned by the Rio Tinto Zinc Corporation in the United Kingdom, 20 per cent by two South African corporations and 10 per cent by the Compagnie miniere et nucleaire de France (Total). The Rossing mine was of vital economic interest to countries seeking to protect themselves against oil shortages and of vital strategic interest to nuclear and aspiring nuclear Powers looking for cheap fissionable materials.
25. There was a disturbing coincidence between those countries whose nationals largely owned the Namibian economy in conjunction with South Africa and those Governments which generally used their veto to prevent any weakening of South Africa's position in Namibia. Those countries were the United States, the United Kingdom and France, whose use of a triple veto in the Security Council had recently been particularly noted. He hoped that that was only a coincidence but confessed that it was none the less a disquieting one.
I . .. A/C.4/31/SR.32 English Page 7 (Hr. Sekyi, Ghana) 26. The final phase of the Organization's relations with South Africa over Namibia could perhaps be said to have begun with the explicit advisory opinion given by the International Court of Justice in 1971. On that basis, the Security Council had, in February 1972, initiated contacts with all parties concerned with a view to enabling the people of Namibia to exercise their right to self-determination. When the Security Council had met to consider the Secretary-General's report, the apartheid regime, after some 13 months of intransigence, had made the first of its so-called concessions, which had been destined to buy time. It had professed to be ready to respect the wishes of the whole population, not to delay the act of self determination and to co-operate with the Secretary-General. It had specifically pledged to :r.-erlidt all political parties to participate fully and freely in the process leading to self-determination. The Security Council had seemed satisfied but the immediate aftermath had been eight months of Bantustanization in Namibia and the establishment of the Ovambo homeland with a legislature said to be self governing but to which the majority of the members had been appointed. Since the opposition parties, including SWAPO, had been proscribed and their leaders incarcerated, only 2.3 per cent of the electorate had voted. The Security Council had reacted on 11 November 1973 by ending the first phase of its contacts with South Africa over Namibia.
27. The General Assembly had appointed the .._'irst Commissioner for Namibia and had recognized SWAPO as the authentic representative of the people of Namibia. South Africa had continued for another year in its policy of repression, its illegal occupation of Namibia and its confrontation with the United Nations. It had then been excluded from participation in the General Assembly and had been rescued from outright expulsion from the United Nations only by a triple veto, exercised on grounds not yet clearly understood by his delegation.
28. However, shortly thereafter, the Security Council had adopted its resolution 366 (1974) reiterating the demands it had previously made of South Africa and providing for another meeting on or before 30 May 1975 for the purpose of reviewing South Africa's compliance with the terms of the resolution. Once again, the apartheid regime had suddenly seemed to reverse itself by coming out with new professions of compliance with United Nations resolutions and co-operation with the Organization. Although no member of the Security Council had regarded those professions as unequivocal or satisfacto~y, there had once again been a veto blocking the adoption of measures under Chapter VII of the Charter, on the ground that there was no threat to international peace since Mr. Muller had once again professed to be ready for a dialogue with the Secretary-General's representative and the President of the Council for Namibia.
29. All that had happened afterwards had been the inauguration of the so-called Constitutional Conference along with continued South African occupation of Namibia in defiance of the United Nations and the International Court cf Justice, an even more objectionable form of Bantustanization designed to entrench the exclusive and permanent white occupation of the best two thirds of Namibia's territory, intensified repression of SWAPO and a military build-up in Namibia, from which attacks had later been launched against Angola and Zambia.
I ... A/C.4/31/SR.32 English Page 8 (Mr. Sekyi, Ghana) 30. For its part, the Security Council had again met. It had looked as if the final ultimatum would be given to South Africa. Nearly all speakers had condemned South African policies and had called for South African withdrawal from the Territory and for elections under United Nations supervision. On 30 January 1976, the Security Council had adopted resolution 385 (1976) in which it had decided to remain seized of the matter and, in the event of non-compliance by South Africa with the terms of the resolution, to consider the appropriate measures to be taken under the Charter.
31. The South African reaction to that had been the most arrogant and the most contemptuous to date. It had calmly continued its build-up of armed forces and its illegal occupation of Namibia; it had calmly proceeded with its Bantustanization and imprisoned its opponents, particularly the members of SHAPO; it had calmly passed death sentences on the leaders of S\1APO; it had calmly ignored the call for United Nations-supervised elections; and, after the deadline had expired, it ha~ calmly stated that it had no intention of treating with SWAPO leaders and that 1t did not think that there would be any mandatory sanctions either.
32. It had been right. The Security Council had met and a triple veto had once again prevented the adoption of appropriate measures under the Charter. Once again the three Powers had been unable to accept that the illegal military occupation of Namibia posed any threat to peace and, although they had maintained that they supplied no arms to South Africa, they would hear of no measure which would ensure that no other country did so. The reason had once again been that a dialogue was in process with Vorster, who no longer condescended even to equivocate but openly defied the United Nations, who openly kept saying that he had nothing to discuss with SWAPO and whose regime now boasted that its military and naval deterrents were effective even against a super-Power- in other words, a permanent member of the Security Council - and, with the assistance or connivance of its Western friends, was quickly trying to make the deterrent nuclear. It had been said that Mr. Kissinger had initiated delicate negotiations and that nothing must be done to annoy Vorster, certainly nothing which would effectively erode the position of military strength from which he could negotiate, act defiant or dictate his terms.
33. As a result of the triple veto, the Security Council now found itself in a strange situation: it contended that the activities of Ian Smith in Rhodesia were a threat to peace but that those of Vorster in Namibia were not. Actually, the sit~aticn in Namibia was exactly the same as that in Rhodesia in 1966, writ large. The elements were the same: a minority regime which had become illegal; a refusal to recognize the legitimate authority- the United Kingdom in one case, the United Nations in the other; internal political repression; the imprisonment of the authentic representatives of the people; recourse to spurious constitutional conferences and the use of guns against freedom fighters.
34. But there was also in Namibia now - as there had not been in Rhodesia then - a record of serious aggression against neighbouring sovereign States, and with the military build-up, the potential of future aggression remained serious. There was in Namibia now - as there had never been in Rhodesia - an illegal occupation by
I ... A/C.4/31/SR.32 English Page 9 (Mr. Sekyi, Ghana) an alien power maintained by military force in confrontation with the proper authority, in that case the United Nations. In its effects if not in its general character, that situation was indistinguishable from an act of naked aggression. In Namibia, the Africa population was smaller but the stakes were much higher as they included the mineral wealth of a much larger area and one of the la~gest sources of strategic materials. Moreover, there were many more aggressors and the weapon of aggression was the much larger military machine which was on the way to becoming nuclear.
35. 1he:e was.n~ elemen~ o~ danger in Rh~desia that was not present in much larger measure 1n Nam1b1a. Per1od1cally, Mr. Sm1th, like Mr. Vorster, professed a readiness to negotiate with the legitimate authority, but that had not led to much in either case and it had never altered the fundamental character of the situation as a threat to international peace and security, far greater in the case of Namibia than in that of Rhodesia. The argument that it was not timely to take measures against South Africa at least as effective as those which had been taken against Rhodesia because talks with Mr. Vorster were imminent was unconvincing at best and wore thinner each time it was used. If it turned up once again in the Security Council, its exponents could not escape the accusation that they were acting more out of regard for their pecuniary and strategic interests in Namibia than from any belief in Mr. Vorster 1 s peaceful intentions, still less because they had considered the situation objectively or had true regard for the legitimate interests and aspirations of Africans.
36. Even as the Security Council debated those matters, enormous investments were pouring in to develop the giant uranium mines in Namibia and the investors were saying openly that they -would pursue their plans regardless of anything said by the United Nations Council for Namibia or the International Court of Justice. One day, natural uranium from the Rossing mine might be inserted in a nuclear reactor supplied by France, thus providing the apartheid regime with large quantities of plutonium 236. When that happened South Africa would no longer need the triple veto. By that time Africa might have decided to depend no longer on the United Nations but to try to defend itself by whatever conventional or nuclear means it might have been able to obtain. His delegation hoped that long before that happened the United Nations would make a manful effort to rescue Namibia from the clutches of the apartheid South African regime. It hoped that the Organization would truly endeavour to vindicate its credibility and that the Security Council would regain its prestige as the action unit by acting on behalf of the General Assembly, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter.
37. The position of his Government was that the Security Council should recommend that South Africa be suspended or expelled until it complied with the decisions of the Security Council and of the General Assembly with regard to Namibia; that the Council should recommend to the General Assembly that all measures be taken to enable the Council for Namibia to discharge its responsibilities; that the General Assembly reaffirmed its recognition of SWAPO as the only legitimate organization
I .•. A/C.4/3l/SR.32 English Page 10 (Mr. Sekyi, Ghana) representing the whole of Namibia; and that the Security Council should decide to take action against South Africa under Chapter VII of the Charter.
38. Should South Africa continue to refuse to comply with the Security Council resolution within a period of three months the Uni~ed Nations, in exercise of its legal responsibility, should take over the administration of the Territory of Namibia by whatever means it deemed fit and hand it over to SvlAPO.
39. Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia) recalled that he had taken an active interest in flamibia since the special session held in 1967 on the question of what was then called South West Africa. The African nations had then been lulled with promises and had been led to believe that all the problems would be settled if a United Nations Council for Namibia could be created. They had been beguiled thus because some Powers were not prepared to see Namibia freed. The African countries had then started to elaborate all sorts of resolutions, but Namibia was still under the South African yoke.
40. Introducing resolution A/C.4/31/L.29, he emphasized that the first preambular paragraph referred to '1 all the resolutions'' so that South Africa and its overt and covert supporters should not be able to use the pretext that a particular resolution contained a condemnation or reference to apartheid and that other bodies dealt with the question of apartheid. In operative paragraph 1, the term liwi thout undue delay;1 had been used because the term ;as soon as possible' 1 had all sorts of connotations. With regard to operative paragraph 2, it was very desirable that the United Nations Commissioner for Namibia, who was deeply dedicated to the cause of freedom for Namibia, should act as liaison officer.
41. He asked the African States not to present other draft resolutions so as not to complicate the question. The time had come to adopt that very simple draft -.·esoluti m. Namibia's economic and financial interests would not be jeopardized, for the leaders of SWAPO had pledged not to undertake any hasty nationalizations and to give due respect to all interests.
AGENDA ITEM 25: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRA.llfTING OF IHDEPENDENCE TO TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AHD PEOPLES (continued)
Question of Guam (A/C.4/31/L.26)
42. Mr. RIFAI (Secretary of the Committee) said it was the expectation of the Secretary-General that the costs related to the implementation of draft resolution !-./C.4/31/L.26, with specific reference to "the sending of a visiting mission to Guam, would be met from within the appropriations that would be made available for the over-all programme of work of the Special Committee in 1977. Accordingly, the adoption of the draft would not entail additional financial implications.
43. The CHAiffi1~N announced that Benin and the Lao People's Democratic Republic had joined the sponsors of the draft resolution. He would give the floor to representatives who wished to explain the position they would take in the vote on the draft resolution. I . .. A/C.4/31/SR.32 English Page 11
44. Mr. SCRANTON (United States of America) said that his delegation would vote against draft resolution A/C.4/31/L.26 mainly because of the language of the fifth preambular paragraph and operative paragraph 5 of the resolution and the chapter on Guam in the Special Committee's report, which the draft resolution approved. That chapter expressed concern over the presence of the military installations on Guam and stated that the maintenance of those bases constituted an obstacle to the exercise by the island's population of their right to self-determination.
45. Although his delegation recognized the legitimate interest of the Committee in promoting self-determination in Non-Self-Governing Territories, it did not recognize the Committee's right to question the legitimacy of the bases and found it inappropriate that the Committee should express its concern over their maintenance.
46. Furthermore, he assured the Committee that the maintenance of military installations in the Territory would in no way inhibit the population's right to self-determination. The inhabitants of Guam were United States citizens and shared in the basic freedoms guaranteed by the United States Constitution; they also had regular democratic elections and could freely express their views on the future status of Guam, as they had recently done in the referendum of 4 September 1976, during which 90 per cent of the voters had expressed the desire that the Territory should remain a part of the United States.
47. As to the fifth preambular paragraph and operative paragraph 5 of the draft resolution, he found it totally inappropriate that the Committee should consider, let alone approve, a resolution challenging the presence of United States bases on Guam; those bases were an important element in the defence of the United States, of which Guam was a part, and contributed to the security of the Pacific region. The presence of military installations on Guam was consistent with the United Nations Charter, which recognized the right of self-defence and in no way limited the authority of an administering Power to set up military bases in a Non-Self-Governing Territory.
48. His delegation also disagreed with the assertion in the fourth preambular paragraph that there was a need "to accelerate progress towards the full implementation of the Declaration with respect to Guam", since it could not accept the implication that the rate of progress had been unsatisfactory.
49. His delegation had already had occasion to express concern, with regard to the resolution on American Samoa, that independence should be considered the single possible result of the process of self-determination, whereas it was only one of the possible alternatives. That concern also applied to the draft resolution on Guam. His delegation would therefore vote against the draft resolution under consideration.
50. Mr. PAYPOOL (Papua New Guinea) said that his delegation would vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.4/31/L.26 since it wished to see the people of the South Pacific emancipated from the yoke of colonialism. However, if a separate vote was taken on the individual paragraphs, it would have reservations on some of them.
51. Mr. HOYLE (Australia) said that the question of the presence of United States military installations on Guam had long deflected the Special Committee and the General Assembly from effective consideration of the situation in the Territory and I . .. A/C.4/31/SR.32 English Page 12 (Mr. Hoyle, Australia) the aspirations of the people as to their future. Moreover, the draft resolution before the Corrmittee failed to take account of the right, recognized in the Charter, of individual or collective self-defence; the military presence of an administering Power could be justified by obligations relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as well as local defence. His delegation would therefore vote against draft resolutive A/C.4/31/L.26.
52. Mr. LAL (Fiji), speaking in explanation of vote, said that his delegation would abstain in the vote on the draft resolution, particularly since, while it supported the right of the people of Guam to self-determination, it had some reservations with regard to operative paragraph 5, which departed from the formulation adonted by the Special Committee during the current year.
53. Mr. HEPBURN (Bahamas) said that his country had only recently acceded to independence and that it supported unconditionally the right of all colonial peoples to self-determination and independence, in accordance with resolution 1514 (XV). In that regard, his delegation agreed with the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.4/31/L.26. On the other hand, it had some reservations with regard to operative paragraph 5 among others and would therefore abstain in the vote on the draft resolution.
54. Mr. ESFANDIARY (Iran) said that his delegation had consistently taken a firm position in support of the principle of self-determination, independence and decolonization in accordance with the United Nations Charter. Nevertheless, the document before the Committee departed from the draft consensus on Guam reached by the Special Committee, which was a constructive text that could have led to an early solution of the problem. In his delegation's opinion, the continuing presence of United States military bases on Guam would not be an inhibiting factor in permitting the people of the Territory to exercise their right of self-determination. It therefore had reservations regarding the fifth preambular paragraph and operative paragraph 5 of draft resolution A/C.4/31/L.26, particularly since that kind of approach would not facilitate the process of decolonization. It would therefore abstain in the vote on the draft resolution. However, that attitude did not in any way imply that his Government hesitated to recognize the right of peoples of colonized territories to self-determination and independence. Although his delegation was abstaining in the vote, it was only because the text of the draft resolution did not reflect the existing realities in the Territory.
55. Mr. QUARTIN-SANTOS (Portugal), explaining his vote on draft resolution A/C.4/31/L.26, said that his country had consistently upheld the rights of all the colonial peoples to self-determination and independence. However, his delegation regretted the inclusion in the draft resolution of certain remarks not pertaining to the subject under consideration, the decolonization of Guam. He referred to the fifth preambular and operative paragraph 5. Neither the United Nations Charter nor resolution 1514 (XV) prohibited the establishment of military bases in any
I ... A/C.4/3l/SR.32 English Page 13 (Mr. Quartin-Santos, Portugal) colonial territory. It was up to the people of Guam to decide, through their freely and democratically elected bodies, whether they wanted ~aintenance of such military installations. For those reasons Portugal would abstain in voting on the draft resolution.
56. Mr. KOUAME (Ivory Coast) said that his delegation would abstain in voting on draft resolution A/C.4/3l/L.26 even though Guam was one of the colonial territories to which resolution 1514 (XV) applied. The text raised a very controversial question, the installation of military bases by an administering Power in a Non-Self-Governing Territory. If the question of the security of a people and military bases constituted one of the aspects of the problem of decolonization, it was an extremely delicate and complex question, one that should be considered in the more general context of the United Nations debate on international security. His delegation would abstain in voting on the draft resolution because it believed that the question under consideration did not fall within the competence of the Fourth Committee.
57. Mr. BRUM (Uruguay) said that his delegation would vote ~~ainst the draft resolution under consideration, basing its vote on the United Nations documentation before the Committee. Document A/31/23/Add.B (part three) indicated that the people of Guam wished to maintain their present relations with the United States. In no part of that document did the authors indicate that <...:lection of the island's legislature had taken place under other than free and normal conditions. In a note addressed to the Secretary-General in January 1976, the Secretary of the legislature of Guam had requested him not to intervene in the Territory's affairs. His delegation would vote against the draft resolution in as much as it respected the wishes and rights of the people of the Territory.
58. Mr. GARVALOV (Bulgaria) said that his delegation would vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.4/3l/L.26 since that document constituted a clear response to the real situation in the Territory and was in accordance with the provisions of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. As a whole, the resolution reaffirmed the rights of the inhabitants of Guam to self-determination and independence.
59. His delegation believed that the administering Power's military bases in the Territory ran counter to the interests of its inhabitants and were an obstacle to the exercise of their right to self-determination and independence.
60. Mr. FADHLI (Democratic Yemen) said that his delegation would vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.4/31/L.26 for reasons of principle. It had always defended the right of the populations of colonial territories to self-determination and independence, just as it had always opposed the maintenance of foreign military installations and bases on those Territories.
/ ... A/C.4/3l/SR.32 English Page 14
61. At the request of the representative of the United States~ a recorded vote was taken on draft resolution A/C.4/3l/L.26.
In favour: Afghanistan, Albania~ Algeria~ Bahrain, Barbados, Benin, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, China, Comoros, Congo, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Ecuador, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Hungary, India, Iraq, Jamaica, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Libyan Arab Republic, Madagascar, Mali, Mexico, Mongolia, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Poland, Sao Tome and Principe, Sierra LeoLe, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Togo, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zambia.
Against: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, DeP~ark, Dominican Republic, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Grenada, Haiti, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay.
Abstaining: Argentina, Austria, Bahamas, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Chad, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, lhlaysia, Nepal, Norway, Oman, Paraguay, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Spain, Surinam, Sweden, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Upper Volta, Zaire.
62. Draft resolution A/C.4/3l/L.26 was adopted by 60 votes to 21, with 42 abstentions.
63. The CHAIRMAN requested delegations wishing to explain their votes to do so at the following meeting.
Question of French Somaliland (A/C.4/3l/L.27)
64. Mr. BADAWI (Egypt) said, in referring to operative paragraph 14 of draft resolution A/C.4/3l/L.27, that the Secretary-General would appoint the members of a referendum observation group after consultation with the concerned parties. Collaboration should be established between the United Nations observers and the members of the Organization of African Unity Fact-·Finding Mission.
65. Mr. BENTINCK (Netherlands), speaking on behalf of the nine countries of the European Community, welcomed the general outline of draft resolution A/C.4/3l/L.27 because it correctly stressed the right of the people of that Territory to self determination and independence and the necessity to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the future State. Nevertheless, the nine countries of the
I ... A/C. 4 /31/~:CL 32 - :~vcli S 11 P'i[:"C 15 (Mr. Bentinck, Hetherlands)
European Community had doubts regarding certain elements in the draft and wished to put on record that the consultations preceding the elaboration of the draft had not been as extensive as they might have wished.
66. His delegation felt that operative paragraph 6 was superfluous, since the French Government had made a positive declaration that the referendum on the future of the 'I'erritory would be conducted on a Territory-wide basis. Furthermore, operative paragraph 7 was not in accordance with the United Nations Charter nor did it take account of the situation in the area. Nevertheless, the nine countries of the European Community were greatly satisfied that the Territory would shortly become independent, since it would prove to be a contribution to stability and prosperity in that region.
67. The CHAIRMAN announced that Niger and Togo had joined the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.4/31/L.27. He also pointed out that in the English text of paragraph 13 of the draft resolution, the words "French Somaliland" should be inserted after the words "the people of".
68. Mr. KITI (Kenya), referring to the financial implications (A/C.4/31/L.28) of the draft resolution on French Somaliland, observed that the Secretariat was thinking of sending a third mission to attend the independence celebrations of the Territory. His delegation considered that one United Nations representative would suffice.
69. Mr. RIFAI (Secretary of the Committee) said that document A/C.4/31/L.28 had been prepared in consultation with the parties concerned and would be considered by the Fifth Committee, where the comments of the representative of Kenya would certainly be taken into consideration.
70. ~~. FADHLI (Democratic Yemen) said that his delegation wished to become a sponsor of draft resolution A/C.4/31/L.27.
71. Mr. LECOMPT (France) said that for legal reasons his delegation could not take part in the vote on draft resolution A/C.4/3l/L.27, since that text concerned a Territory which was still subject to French sovereignty. The draft resolution ran counter to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of States set out in Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter. For that reason his Government considered that the injunctions addressed to it were irreceivable.
72. Paragraph 7 in particular was unacceptable and unjustified, for there was, properly speaking, no French military base at Djibouti. The troops stationed in Djibouti were there for a purely defensive purpose, namely the surveillance and protection of the boundaries of the Territory. His Government therefore refused to withdraw its troops before the Territory became independent. Subsequently, it would be for the new State to decide what relations it wished to establish with France.
73. His delegation also rejected the wording of paragraph 6, for the arrangements for the accession ,of the lerritory to independence had been defined without ambiguity and the process would be brought to a conclusion in democratic conditions. / ... A/C.4/31/SR.32 English Page 16 (Mr. L~compt~ France)
74. He was surprised that the sponsors of the draft had not mentioned in paragraph 14 that France had proposed to invite United Nations representatives to observe the referendum on independence and presented the sending of observers as a decision imposed on France from outside. His delegation nevertheless supported the objectives of the sponsors of the draft resolution, for it~ too, wished to see the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the future State preserved.
75. The essential purpose of the debate was to make the two States bordering on the Territory give unequivocal assurances guaranteeing the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the future State and to have those assurances recorded by the international community. However, although the two countries in question were sponsors of the draft resolution, the text was not fully satisfactory. France also wished to promote true national union before independence, so that the Territory could accede to international sovereie;nt:r in a spirit of reconciliation. In that connexion, he announced that talks among the representatives of the various parties and liberation movements would be held in Paris early in 1977.
76. His Government was currently seeking to solve nationality problems impartially, on the basis of two criteria: residence of the person concerned in the Territory for at least five years and direct affiliation to a resident.
77. France would do all it could to ensure that the Territory acceded to independence with respect for the interests of all, and in an atmosphere of calm and confidence.
78. The CHAIRMAN observed that draft resolution A/C.4/31/L.27 was to be put to the vote at the current meeting; he asked delegations wishing to explain their vote whether they would agree to do so at the following meeting.
79. Mr. TCHICAYA (Gabon) said that his delegation would vote for draft resolution A/C.4/31/L.27, although it had certain reservations concerning paragraphs 3, 5, 6 and 7.
80. Mr. KOUAME (Ivory Coast) said that the wishes of all sectors of the population of the Territory and of all parties involved should be taken into consideration in the draft resolution. However, the statement by the representative of France showed that general ogreement had not yet been reached. His delegation would vote for the draft resolution without enthusiasm, in the hope that before it was adopted by the General Assembly consultations would be held that would allow the text to be redrafted so that it could be adopted unanimously.
81. The CHAIRMAN announced that Yemen had become a sponsor of the draft resolution.
82. At the request of the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany~ a recorded vote was taken on draft resolution A/C.4/31/L.27. I . .. A/C.4/3l/SR.32 English Page 17
In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Austria, BahaMas, Bahrain, Barbados, Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Chad, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Ecuador, Eg,ypt, El Salvador, Eq~atorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Republic, Hadagascar, Malawi, Halaysia, I!ali, Mauritania, Mexico, ~1ongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Iifepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua., Niger, Nip;eria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Surinam, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.
Against: None.
Abstaining: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Spain, United Kinf,dom of Great Britian and Northern Ireland, United States of America.
83. Draft resolution A/C.4/3l/L.27 \vas adopted by }-_11 "'Cot~_:!;~~E~~·- with 18 abstentions.------··~-----~-~~~~