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European Parliament Presented at REHVA Supporters Seminar Feb 12, 2009 by Ms Sirpa Pietikäinen MEP

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European Parliament Presented at REHVA Supporters Seminar Feb 12, 2009 by Ms Sirpa Pietikäinen MEP European Parliament presented at REHVA supporters seminar Feb 12, 2009 by Ms Sirpa Pietikäinen MEP www.EPP-ED.eu 2009 Visits and Seminars Unit DG Communication EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ©2009 European Parliament, Visits and Seminars Unit European Union EU 27 (2007) Candidate countries ©2009 European Parliament, Visits and Seminars Unit EU Institutions The European Parliament The Council of the EU ¾Ministers of 27 Member States ¾785 Members of the Parliament (MEP) ¾EU legislative power (shared with EP) ¾EU legislative power (shared with Council) ¾EU budgetary power (shared with EP) ¾EU budgetary power (shared with Council) ¾foreign policy decisions ¾parliamentary control of other institutions ¾agricultural policy decisions ¾President Mr Hans-Gert Pöttering ¾rotating presidency The European Commission ¾27 Commissioners ¾control of planning and implementation ¾presents legislative initiatives ¾President Mr Jose Manuel Durao Barroso ©2009 European Parliament, Visits and Seminars Unit The Presidencies of EU Institutions The President The President of the European Parliament of the European Commission Mr Hans-Gert Pöttering Mr Jose Manuel Durao Barroso The Presidency of the Council of the European Union France Sweden July - December 2008 July - December 2009 Czech Republic January - June 2009 ©2009 European Parliament, Visits and Seminars Unit European Parliament Parliament’s powers Legislative power Parliamentary control Most EU laws are adopted Parliament supervises other jointly by the European EU institutions and can pass Parliament and the Council of a vote of no-confidence in the the EU European Commission Budgetary power Enlargement decisions Parliament decides the EU Parliament‘s assent is annual budget together with required for the accession of the Council any new Member States ©2009 European Parliament, Visits and Seminars Unit European Parliament Seats per Member State in EU27 MEMBER EU27 EU27 EU27 MEMBER EU27 EU27 EU27 STATE2007 2009 2009 STATE 2007 2009 2009 Nice Lisbon Nice Lisbon Germany99 99 96 Austria 18 17 19 France78 72 74 Bulgaria 18 17 18 United Kingdom 78 72 73 Denmark 14 13 13 Italy 78 72 73 Finland 14 13 13 Spain54 50 54 Slovakia 14 13 13 Poland 54 50 51 Ireland 13 12 12 Romania 35 33 33 Lithuania 13 12 12 Netherlands27 25 26 Latvia 9 8 9 Belgium 24 22 22 Slovenia 7 7 8 Czech24 22 22 Estonia 6 6 6 Greece 24 22 22 Cyprus 6 6 6 Hungary24 22 22 Luxembourg 6 6 6 Portugal24 22 22 Malta 5 5 6 Sweden 19 18 20 785 736 751 ©2009 European Parliament, Visits and Seminars Unit Political Groups EPP-ED: Group of the European People’s Party (Christian Democrats) and European Democrats PES: Socialist Group in the European Parliament 785 ALDE: Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe 100 UEN: Union for Europe 43 of the Nations Group Greens/EFA: Group of 288 The Greens / European Free Alliance GUE/NGL: Confederate Group of the European 217 United Left - Nordic Green Left IND/DEM: Independence / Democracy Group 44 Non-attached 22 41 30 ©2009 European Parliament, Visits and Seminars Unit Situation as of 13 January 2009 Committees • Committee on Foreign Affairs • Committee on Development • Committee on International Trade • Committee on Budgets • Committee on Budgetary Control • Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs • Committee on Employment and Social Affairs • Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety • Committee on Industry, Research and Energy 20 • Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection • Committee on Transport and Tourism • Committee on Regional Development • Committee on Agriculture • Committee on Fisheries • Committee on Culture and Education • Committee on Legal Affairs • Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs • Committee on Constitutional Affairs • Committee on Women's Rights and Gender Equality • Committee on Petitions ©2009 European Parliament, Visits and Seminars Unit How the Parliament Works PLENARY SESSIONS h 11 part-sessions in Strasbourg h 4 additional sessions in Brussels EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ELECTIONS 2009 COMMITTEE MEETINGS POLITICAL h 15 weeks allocated for GROUPS h parliamentary committee 12 weeks meetings in Brussels allocated for meetings of the political groups in Brussels SECRETARIAT The European Parliament’s Secretariat is located in Luxembourg and Brussels ©2009 European Parliament, Visits and Seminars Unit Budget of the European Union Financial year 2009 SUSTAINABLE GROWTH SUSTAINABLE GROWTH EU AS A Competitiveness Competitiveness GLOBAL PLAYER Cohesion 6% 45% 31% 2009 EUR 133.8 billion 1% 6% 11% AGRICULTURAL EXPENDITURE CITIZENSHIP, FREEDOM, RURAL DEVELOPMENT SECURITY AND JUSTICE OTHER EXPENDITURE INCL. ADMINISTRATION ©2009 European Parliament, Visits and Seminars Unit EU Budget Revenue Financial year 2009 Customs duties, agricultural duties, and sugar levies Miscellanous VAT-based resource 17% 1% 17% 2009 65% GNI based resource ©2009 European Parliament, Visits and Seminars Unit Legislative power How co-decision works The European Commission Commission proposal The European The Council Parliament of the European Union First reading in Parliament (Parliament opinion) First reading in Council (Council position) Second reading in Parliament (if necessary) Second reading in Council (if necessary) Conciliation committee (if necessary) Final vote in third reading Final vote in third reading (if necessary) (if necessary) ©2009 European Parliament, Visits and Seminars Unit How it works 4Rapporteur 4Shadow rapporteurs 4Informal consultations: political groups, comission, council president 4Open commitee meetings 4Exchange of views 4Amendments 4Voting 4plenary ©2009 European Parliament, Visits and Seminars Unit ©2009 European Parliament, Visits and Seminars Unit Information on internet www.europarl.europa.eu ©2009 European Parliament, Visits and Seminars Unit.
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