DOI 10.1515/bz-2020-0037 BZ 2020; 113(3): 853–878
Dirk Krausmüller
When Christologyintersects with embryology: the viewpointsofNestorian, Monophysite and Chalcedonian authorsofthe sixth to tenth centuries
Abstract: The notion that the soul comes into existencesimultaneouslywith the bodyatthe moment of conception was originallyintroduced into the Patristic discourse as an alternative to the Origenist notion of apre-existing soul. Yet from the sixth century onwards it was itself regarded as an Origenisttenet. Now it was claimedthat onlythosewho believed the soul to be created after the bodyweretrulyorthodox. The present article examines the links between this development and the Christologicalconversies.
Adresse: Dr.Dirk Krausmüller,Gratian-Marx-Str.8/25, 1110 Wien, Österreich; [email protected]
In Patristic literature the ensoulment of the embryoisexplainedinthree differ- ent ways:the soul either pre-exists the bodyand enters it at the moment of con- ception (prohyparxis), or comes into being at the moment of conception (synhy- parxis), or appears after the bodyhas been formed (methyparxis). From the late fourth century onwardsthe first option, which had once been proposed by Ori- gen, met with increasingresistence since manyconsidered it to be irreconcilable with the Christian faith. By contrast, the second and third options werewidely regarded as equallyorthodox. Their proponents disagreed but did so without rancour as nothing much was at stake. This situation, however,changed in the middle of the sixth century when two developments took place. On the one hand, not only prohyparxis but also synhyparxis was now widelysuspected
This article is partofthe project “Reassessing ninth century philosophy.Asynchronic approach to the logical traditions” (SALT)that hasreceivedfunding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the EuropeanUnion’sHorizon research and innovation programme (grant agreement No. ). 854 Byzantinische Zeitschrift Bd. 113/3, 2020: I. Abteilung of being an Origenist position, and on the other hand,the Christological impli- cationsofthe different positions wereseen more clearlythan before. This article makes the case thatNestorians,Monophysites and Chalcedonians chose the op- tion that best fitted their understanding of the incarnation and at the same time allowed the most effective polemic. Accordingly, it does not offer an exhaustive discussion of all evidence regarding the ensoulment of the embryobut deals mainlywith texts wherethe specific case of Christ’sbodyand soul is discussed. The timeframe is between the sixth and the tenth century. The debate is not al- ways continuous and it is not always possibletosituate aparticularstatement in its historical context.Yet comparison of the texts shows thatthe representatives of the different views werecognizant of alternative interpretations.¹
Before delving into the discussion afew words are in order about the terms of the debate. Those who were in favour of prohyparxis borrowed from Platonic phi- losophythe notionofanever-moving and self-moving soul.² The championsof synhyparxis alsoturned to Platobut chose amore selective approach since they onlysought to provethat the soul was fullydeveloped at the moment of concep- tion. Those who defended methyparxis could appeal to Scripture and to Aristotle. In the first casethreeverses playedanimportant role: Genesis 2:7: ‘AndGod formedthe human being as dust from the earth and breathed into his face a breath of life and the human being became aliving soul’ (καὶἔπλασεν ὁ θεὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπονχοῦνἀπὸτῆςγῆςκαὶἐνεφύσησενεἰςτὸπρόσωπον αὐτοῦ πνοὴνζωῆςκαὶἐγένετο ὁἄνθρωπος εἰςψυχὴνζῶσαν), which seemed to implyatemporal sequence; Exodus 21:22– 23: ‘But when two men fight and hit apregnant woman and her child comes out not yetfigured, he shall be made to paythe penalty,asthe husband of the woman maylay upon him, he shall paywith avaluation, but if it is figured he shall give asoul for asoul’ (ἐὰνδὲμάχωνται δύο ἄνδρες καὶ πατάξωσινγυναῖκα ἐνγαστρὶἔχουσαν καὶἐξ- έλθῃ τὸ παιδίον αὐτῆςμὴἐξεικονισμένον ἐπιζήμιον ζημιωθήσεται καθότι ἐπι- βάλῃὁἀνὴρτῆςγυναικὸςδώσει μετὰἀξιώματος, ἐὰνδὲἐξεικονισμένον ἦν
The debatebetween creatianists and traducianists will not be consideredsinceall authors dis- cussed in this article were creatianists of one stripe or another.See R. Hennings,Disputatio de origine animae (CPL , )orthe victory of creatianism in the fifth century,inE.A.Living- stone (ed.), Studia Patristica .Leuven , –.This does,ofcourse, not mean that therewere no longerany traducianists. See Symeon Stylites (the YoungerofAntioch), Sermo ;ed. A. Mai, NovaPatrum Bibliotheca VIII/.Rome , –,which dates to the later sixth century. Plato, Phaedrus, c–a.See D. Blyth,The ever-movingsoul in Plato’s “Phaedrus”. TheAmerican Journal of Philology (), –,esp. –. D. Krausmüller,When Christology intersects with embryology 855
δώσει ψυχὴν ἀντὶ ψυχῆς), which gave the impression as if the embryowas not considered ahuman being before the formation of the bodywas completed; and Zachariah 12:1 ‘Says the Lord … who forms the spirit of ahuman being in him’ (λέγει κύριος … πλάσσων πνεῦμα ἀνθρώπου ἐναὐτῷ), which suggested that the soul was createdinanalreadyexistingbody. In the second casethe main point of reference was twotreatises of Aristotle, De anima and De genera- tione animalium. AccordingtoDe anima asequence of souls appears in the human embryo, first the nutritive soul, which is also found in plants and is re- sponsiblefor growth and nutrition, then the sensitive soul, which is alsofound in animalsand is responsible for movement and perception, and lastlythe ra- tional soul, which is onlyfound in human beingsand which appears when the bodyisfullyformed.³ By contrast, De generatione animalium introduces the notion of amind thatcomes from the outside.⁴ Knowledge of these theories was mediated through the commentary tradition whereitwas debated whether or not Aristotle considered the highest faculty to be separable from the body.⁵
Towards the end of the fourth century the bishop and theologian Gregory of Nyssa composed the treatise De hominis opificio in which he set out his views about the make-up of the human being.⁶ Following Aristotle, he distinguished between anutritive power,asensitive power,and arational power,which appear in sequence in the human embryo. Yetinone point he parted ways with the phi- losopher.Heclaimed that the rational soul was present in the embryofrom the
Aristotle, De anima II/, a–b. Aristotle, De generatione animalium II., b. Arguments for inseparability can be found in the writings of the Peripatetic philosopher Alexander of Aphrodisias.Bycontrast,Neoplatonic philosophers stressed the independence of the highestfaculty from the body, which allowed them to reconcile the views of Plato and Aristotle. See P. Moreaux, Alexandre d’Aphrodise: exégète de la noétique d’Aristote. Liège/ Paris ;and H.J. Blumenthal,Aristotle and Neoplatonism in lateantiquity:interpretations of De anima. London .Evenmodern historians of philosophyhavenot agreed on the exact meaningofAristotle’sstatements.See C. Shields,Aristotle, De anima, translated with an intro- duction and commentary.Oxford , –;J.M.Rist,NotesonAristotle De anima .. TheClassicalPhilology (), –;L.P.Gerson,The unity of intellect in Aristotle’s “De anima”. Phronesis (), –;and R. Polansky,Aristotle’sDeanima. Cambridge , –. Gregory of Nyssa, De hominis opificio.PG, –.See C. Scholten,Welche Seele hat der Embryo? Johannes Philoponos und die antikeEmbryologie. Vigiliae Christianae (), –,esp. –;A.Meredith,The concept of the mind in Gregory of Nyssa and the Neoplatonists,inE.A.Livingstone (ed.), Studia patristica .Oxford , –; and S. Wessel,The reception of Greek scienceinGregory of Nyssa’s “De hominis opificio”. Vig- iliae Christianae (), –. 856 Byzantinische Zeitschrift Bd. 113/3, 2020: I. Abteilung moment of conception and that it regulated the actitivy of the lower faculties, which werenot part of it.⁷ He did not,however,gosofar as to accept the Platonic concept of apre-existent soul, which Origenhad introducedinto the theological discourse.⁸ In the twenty-eighth chapter he dealt with the question in systematic fashion. He maintained that synhyparxis was the golden mean between two dia- metricallyopposite but equallywrong extremes, prohyparxis and methyparxis.⁹ Accordingtohim, those who defendedthe latter theory basedtheir arguments on Genesis 2:7. ¹ ⁰ He rejected their interpretation, arguingthat if the bodycame first the soul would be created for the sake of the bodyand thus have alower ontological status thanit.¹¹ All three positions reappear in the ensuingperiod of Christological contro- versies. Foralong time, however,they werenot aligned with the different camps. Theodoret of Cyrus and Eutherius of Tyanawereboth representatives of the ‘Antiochene school’.¹² In theirwritingsthey emphasised the differencebe- tween the divinity and the humanityofChrist.¹³ Yetthey did not hold the same views about the formation of the human being.Eutherius explained thatthe human being was one ‘because neither part has ahypostasis that precedes with- out the other’ (διὰ τὸ μηδέτερονχωρὶςτοῦἑτέρου προάγουσαν ἔχειν τὴν ὑπόστασιν),¹⁴ whereas Theodoretclaimed ‘that the embryoisensouled when the bodyhas been fullyformed in the womb’ (τοῦ σώματος ἐντῇμήτρᾳ τελείου διαπλασθέντος, τότε ψυχοῦσθαι τὸἔμβρυον), in accordancewith Genesis2:7 and Exodus 21:22.¹⁵ The same observation can be made whenweturn to the Mono- physites. Philoxenus of Mabbugdeclared that the soul was created in the body
Gregory of Nyssa, De hominis opificio . PG , C–D. See M.-H. Congourdeau,L’embryon et son âme dans les sources grecques (VIe siècle av.J.-C.– Ve siècle apr. J.-C.). Paris , –. Gregory of Nyssa, De hominis opificio . PG , B–. Ibid., C–. Ibid., C–D. On the notion of a ‘School of Antioch’,see A.M. Schor,Theodoret’speople: social networks and religious conflict in late Roman Syria. Berkeley , –. See e.g. R.A. Norris,Manhood and Christ: astudyinthe ChristologyofTheodore of Mop- suestia. Oxford ;and P. Bruns,Finitum non capax infiniti. Ein antiochenisches Axiom in der Inkarnationslehre Babais des Großen(†nach ). Oriens Christianus (), –. EutheriusofTyana, Confutationes, ;ed. M. Tetz,Eine Apologie des Eutherios vonTyana. PTS .Berlin , .–. Theodoret of Cyrus, Quaestio in Exodum ;ed. J. F. Petruccione,trans.R.C.Hill,Theodor- et of Cyrus, The Questionsonthe Octateuch (OnGenesis and Exodus). Washingon, DC , –.Asimilar view is expressed in the treatise Graecorum affectionum curatio .– ;ed. P. Canivet,Théodoret de Cyr, Thérapeutique des maladies helléniques. SC, .Paris , .See Congourdeau,L’embryon (as footnote above), –. D. Krausmüller,When Christology intersects with embryology 857 forty days after the conception and referred to Exodus 21:22and Zacharias 12:1as proof texts.¹⁶ By contrast, Severus of Antioch, drawing his inspiration from Greg- ory of Nyssa, insisted that the soul and the bodywerecreated simultaneously, even though Genesis 2:7might seem to implyatemporalsequence.¹⁷ It appears that the choice was largely determined by aperson’sbackground: ‘Syrians’ took aBiblicist line whereas ‘Greeks’ had recourse to philosophy. All these authors rejected the view thatthe soul pre-existed the body. Their stance reflects an intellectual climate that became increasinglyhostile to Plato- nising interpretations of the Christian faith. Thisdevelopment reached its first peak duringthe reign of Justinian. In 527the emperor closed the Academyin Athens and in 553anecumenical council convened by him condemned the teachings of Origenand his follower Euagrius. Yetthis does not mean that there werenolonger dissenting voices.Atthis point we need to turn to Leontius of Byzantium, aPalestinian monk who was known for his Origenist leanings, and to John Philoponus, aChristian philosopher who taught in Alexandria.¹⁸ On the face of it they held mutuallyexclusive positions. In his treatise Contra Nestorianos et Eutychianos Leontius did not challengethe argument that body and soul werecreated simultaneously. By contrast,Philoponus statedinhis trea- tise De opificio mundi thatthe soul appeared in the embryoafter the bodyhad been formed. Yetclose readingofthe texts suggests that this is not the whole story.Leontius puts forward twocomplementary definitions of soul and body, which reveal his philosophical allegiance.¹⁹ In the first case he speaks of an ‘in- corporeal self-moved substance’ (οὐσία ἀσώματος αὐτοκίνητος), which is how Plato’sunderstanding of the soul is summarised in doxographical literature.²⁰
Philoxenus of Mabbug, Commentaryonthe Prologue of the Gospel of John,quoted in Moses Bar Kepha, Liber de anima ;trans. O. Braun,Moses BarKepha und sein Buch vonder Seele. Freiburg , .OnPhiloxenus see most recentlyD.A.Michelson,The practical Christology of Philoxenos of Mabbug. Oxford . Severus of Antioch, Letter to the scriniarius Simus,quoted in Moses Bar Kepha, Liber de anima,trans. Braun, –.OnSeverus see J. Lebon,Lachristologie de monophysisme syrien, in A. Grillmeier /H.Bacht (eds.), Das Konzil vonChalkedon: Geschichteund Gegenwart,vol. . Würzburg , –. On Leontius see D. Hombergen,The second Origenist controversy,Anew perspective on Cyril of Scythopolis’ monasticbiographies as historical sources for sixth-century Origenism. Rome , –.OnPhiloponus see the articles in R. Sorabji (ed.), Philoponus and the rejection of Aristotelian science. nd ed. London . Leontius of Byzantium, ContraNestorianosetEutychianos;ed. B.E. Daley,Leontius of By- zantium: Complete Works.Oxford , .–. Leontius of Byzantium, ContraNestorianos et Eutychianos ;ed. Daley, .–.Cf. Pseu- do-Galen, Definitiones medicae ;ed. K.G. Kühn,Galeni opera omnia, .Leipzig , .–. 858 Byzantinische Zeitschrift Bd. 113/3, 2020: I. Abteilung
In the second case he uses the formula ‘natural instrumental bodythat has life in potentiality’ (σῶμα φυσικὸν ὀργανικὸνδυνάμει ζωὴν ἔχον).²¹ This formula is of Aristotelian provenance. It is, however,adefinition not of the bodybut of the soul, which is characterised as ‘first entelechyofanatural instrumental body that has life in potentiality’ (ἐντελέχεια πρώτη σώματος φυσικοῦ, ὀργανικοῦ, δυ- νάμει ζωὴν ἔχοντος).²² By truncating it,Leontius could signal to his readers that he wishedtoreplacethe Aristotelian inseparable soul with the Platonic separa- ble one. ForPlato the soul existed not onlyafter the separation from the body but also before its union with it.Thisraises the possibility thatLeontius,too, ac- cepted the pre-existenceofsouls. Indeed, the passagecontains other features, which suggest as much. He claims that he will employ the anthropological para- digm exclusively in order to illustrate ‘thatthe Word is united with the bodyfrom us in its very substance’ (τοῦ αὐτῇ τῇ οὐσίᾳ τὸνΛόγον ἡνῶσθαι τῷἐξἡμῶν σώματι).²³ This is an unusual characterisation of the incarnation since it only considers one part of the human compound. Instead one would have expected him to use the phrase ‘with the human being from us’ (τῷἐξἡμῶνἀνθρώπῳ), which would also have included the soul.²⁴ The following argument is equally odd. Leontiustells us that both the Word and the soul are invisibleand immortal ‘even though our soul and the Word come to be in avisibleand mortal body’ (καίπερ ἐν ὁρατῷ καὶ θνητῷ σώματι τῆς ἡμετέρας ψυχῆςκαὶτοῦ Λόγου γεγενημένων).²⁵ The wayinwhich the sentenceisphrased givesthe impression that not onlythe Word but also the soul is alreadyexistent when it appears in the body.²⁶ Since Leontius picks his terminologywith great care these featuresmust be considered significant. When we turn to Philoponus we seem to enter adifferent world. He con- cludes from Genesis 2:7and Exodus 21:22thatensoulment onlytakes place after the bodyhas been fullyformed.²⁷ YetScriptural proof texts are clearlyof secondary importance to him. His argument is largely derivedfrom the philo-
Leontius of Byzantium, ContraNestorianos et Eutychianos ;ed. Daley, .–. Aristotle, De Anima II/, a–. Leontius of Byzantium, ContraNestorianos et Eutychianos;ed. Daley, .–. If he had used the term ‘flesh’ (σάρξ)hewould have made amuch less explicit statement, sinceaccordingtoPatristic tradition it denotedthe compound of bodyand soul. Leontius of Byzantium, ContraNestorianos et Eutychianos ;ed. Daley, .–. Significantly, he uses the same verb in both cases. Thus he downplaysthe difference be- tween the eternal Word and the soul, which most Christiansregarded as acreated being. John Philoponus, De opificio mundi VI/;ed. G. Reichardt,Johannis Philoponi de opificio mundi libri VII. Leipzig , .–.. D. Krausmüller,When Christology intersects withembryology 859 sophical discourse.²⁸ With Aristotle, he declares thatthe formation of the embryo is the task of the nutritive soul.²⁹ Yethis readingofAristotle is heavilyinfluenced by Platonic notions. He distinguishesbetween two typesofentelechy, one that is inseparableand one that is separable from the body.³⁰ This allows him to safe- guard the immortality of the rational soul. In his treatment he repeatedlyrejects synhyparxis,with the argument that the rational soul would then also disappear with death, as is the case with animals.³¹ This is arather odd line of reasoning. A closer look suggests that one further aspect needstobetaken into account.Phil- oponus does not saythat the rational soul is created in the pre-existing bodybut that it is infused into it,which is aclear reference to the Aristotelian ‘intellect from the outside’ (θύραθεννοῦς). Whatthis meansfor the soul can be seen from the following statement: ‘But the soul of human beings has come to be from adifferent origin, for having asubstance that is separable from the bodies, it is infused into them from the outside after the formation … and for this reason it is again (!) separated when (sc. the body) is corrupted and is not equallydis- solvedwhen (sc. the body) is dissolved(ἡδὲτῶνἀνθρώπων ψυχὴἐξἑτέρας γέγονεν ἀρχῆς· χωριστὴνγὰρσωμάτων ἔχουσα τὴνοὐσίαν ἔξωθεν αὐτοῖςεἰσκρί- νεται μετὰ τὴνδιάπλασιν … καὶ διὰ τοῦτο φθειρομένου πάλιν χωρίζεται καὶ οὐ συνδιαλύεται αὐτῷ λυομένῳ).³² One gets the impression as if the crucial factor is not the pre-existenceofthe bodybut the pre-existenceofthe soul. This does not mean that Philoponus is an Origenist for he claims that ‘no … rational soul pre-exists’ (μηδεμιᾶς … προϋπαρχούσης ψυχῆςλογικῆς),³³ and he states that the souls of human beingscame into existence ‘after the coming-to-beofthe world’ (μετὰ τὴντοῦκόσμου γένεσιν).³⁴ It seems that for him avery brief time- span was sufficient to ensure the separability of the soul.³⁵ Leontius and Philoponus had to tread carefullybecause they might have been accused of Origenism. By contrast, there is no evidence for polemic be- tween the champions of the other twoopinions. Eutherius and Theodoret on
See Scholten,Seele (as footnote above), –,who compares De opificio mundi with Philoponus’ philosophical works. Discussion of this topic would go beyond the scopeofthis paper.See also the brief remarks in Congourdeau,L’embryon (as footnote above), . John Philoponus De opificio mundi VI/;ed. Reichardt, .. Ibid., .–.. John Philoponus De opificio mundi VI/;ed. Reichardt, .–. Ibid., .–. John Philoponus, De opificio mundi VII/;ed. Reichardt, .–. John Philoponus, De opificio mundi,I/;ed. Reichardt, .–.. Scholten,Seele (as footnote above), ,concludesthat Philoponus was acreatianist. This is certainlytrue but it does not invalidate the ‘brief’ pre-existenceproposed here. 860 Byzantinische Zeitschrift Bd. 113/3, 2020: I. Abteilung the one hand,and Philoxenus and Severus on the other evidentlydid not con- sider the topic to be of such importance that they felt the need to inveighagainst each other.This irenic attitude, however,was not to last forever.
In the first half of the sixth century Nestorians could still holdthe view thatsoul and bodyare created at the same time.InLeontius of Byzantium’streatise Contra Nestorianos et Eutychianos aNestorian interlocutor claims that the human being cannot be used as an analogyfor the incarnatedWord because the Word pre-ex- ists the flesh whereas in it ‘neither of the parts has its being without the other’ (οὐδ᾽ὁπότεροναὐτῶνδίχα θατέρου τὸ εἶναι ἔσχηκεν).³⁶ Thus he insinuates that the position of the Chalcedonians is inconsistent.Iftheir Christology is correct and they nevertheless wish to use the anthropological paradigm they can only meaningfullydosowhen theyaccept that the soul, too, pre-exists the body. From the argument it is clear that synhyparxis is regarded as a ‘safe option’, which rules out an Origenistunderstanding of the soul. By the end of the century the situation had changed radically. In his Liberdeunione Babai the Great,a Nestorian monkwho had studied at the School of Nisibisand was well versed in speculative theology, claimedthatthe soul was created in the embryoforty days after conception, in accordancewith Exodus 21:22and Genesis 2:7, ³ ⁷ and that up to that point the bodygrew like aplant or azoophyte,³⁸ aview that mayowe something to Aristotle. He regarded it as impossible that asoul could be present in abodythat wasnot yetfullyformed, and supported his con- tention with the argument that damageorloss of vitalorgans forced the soul to leave its receptacle.³⁹ Thisinitself would not be surprising.Aswehaveseen The- odoret had been of the sameopinion. YetBabai then launches into ablistering attack against thosewho accepted the notion of synhyparxis.
ܐܩܕܠ ܕܝ ̈ ܡܢ ܘ ̈ ܡܢ ܬܐ ܕܕ ̈ ܠܚ ܐ : ̇ ܬܝܗ ܐܝ ܬܐ ܥܝ ܬܪ ܕܪ ̈ ܥܐ ܫܝ ܝܢ ܗܠ ܢܡܐܦ ܝܬ ܝܐ ܚܦ ̇ ܐܡ ܪܝܢ . ܗ ̇ ܝ ܝܣ ܓܢ ܘܪ ܘܐ ܦܐ ܚܢ . ܝܢ ܝܗ ܝܬ ܕܐ ܠܡ ܫ ̈ ܢܦ ܬܐ ܢܐܘܟ ܬܝ ̈ ܢܪܝܬ ܨܐ ܒܝ ܐܕܓܪ ܠܦ ܛܪ ̈ ܢܨ ܦܢ . ܕܥܠ ̈ ܐܦ ܝܗܕܐ ܢܠܥܝ ܡܛ ܬܐ ܪܘ ܫܒ : ܛܠ ܕܡ ܐܠܗܕ ܡܐܡ̇ ܢܢ ܪܝ ܢܐ ܗܟ . ܐܕܟܢ ܐܝ ܠܐ ܬܪ ̈ ܢܙܬܝ ܝ ̈ ܒܢ ܢ ܘܐ ܬܗ ܬܐ ܝܘ ܚܕ . ܕܕܘܟ ܠܐ ܝܚܡܠ ܡܫ ܕܩܡܐ ܢܘ ܐܕܝܡ ܡܩ ܡܢ ܗܐ ܐܠ ܢܒܘܡ ܫܐ ܪܢ : ܘܐܘܝ ܕܗ ܐܘܠܗ ܝܘ ܗܘ ܐܚܢܫ ܒܪ ܕܟܐܘܝܢ ܚܕ ܘܡܐ ܩܢ . ⁴⁰
Leontius of Byzantium, ContraNestorianos et Eutychianos ;ed. Daley, .–. Babai of Nisibis, Liber de unione X, trans. A. Vaschalde,Babai Magni liber de unione, . Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium, .Rome/Paris , ., .. Ibid., .–.See also Appendix, .–. Ibid., .–. Babai of Nisibis, Liber de unione,X;ed. A. Vaschalde,Babai Magni liber de unione, . Cor- pus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium .Rome /Paris , .–. D. Krausmüller,When Christology intersects with embryology 861
That one part does not precedethe other is the opinion of those wicked ones,evenifthey express themselvesobscurely, and of Origen the pagan, that
Hereitisclaimedthat whoever speaksofsynhyparxis in reality holds the view that the soul pre-exists the body. This rather surprising shift is the consequence of twodevelopments, aheightened awareness of the Christological implications of the different options and an even more aggressive attitude towards Origenists.⁴² Chalcedonian and Monophysitetheologians felt thatthey had to opt for synhyparxis in the case of Christ because otherwise they could not uphold their belief that the incarnation resultedinone hypostasis or nature.Once the Nestorians realised this fact they pounced on their adversaries, arguingthat in the ordinary human being the bodypreceded the soul and that this must then also be true for Christ’shumanity,since accordingtoHebrews 4:15 he was like us in all respects apartfrom sin.⁴³ They themselvescould hold such aview be- cause they believed that the divine Word and the human being Jesus weresep- arate hypostases even after the union. This does not,however,mean that for Nestorians everything was plain sailing.Two options presented themselves to them: either the Word united itself first with the bodyand then with the soul, or the union onlyhappened when the soul appeared. Babai ruled out the second option because he thoughtthat it would run counter to the account of the Annunciation.⁴⁴ Indeed, for him it was little better than adoptionism.⁴⁵ Accord- ingly,hehad to explain whythere werenot two successive unions with the Word, first of the bodyand then of the soul. His solution was to maintain that it was in both cases the Word that effected the union.⁴⁶ Babai who wrotehis treatises in Syriac livedinthe PersianEmpire. Yetthis does not mean that Nestorianism had disappeared from Greek-speakingmilieus inside the Roman Empire. In the late sixth or earlyseventh century an anony- mous Nestorian author wroteaChristological treatise against Chalcedonians
Iwould liketothank Grigory Kessel and Nicolás Bamballi for translatingthis passage. See D. Krausmüller,Origenism and anti-Origenism in the latesixth and seventh centuries, in J. Kalvesmaki /R.D.Young(eds.), Evagrius and his legacy.Notre Dame, Indiana , – . Babai of Nisibis, Liber de unione,X,tr. Vaschalde, .. Ibid., .–. Ibid., .–.. Ibid., .–. 862 Byzantinische Zeitschrift Bd. 113/3, 2020: I. Abteilung and Monophysites, which is partially preserved as quotations in Leontius of Jer- ualem’s Contra Nestorianos.⁴⁷ This author started from the same premises as Babai but came to adifferent conclusion.
Πάντα τὰ κατὰ φύσιν ἡμῖνκαὶἐνΧριστῷὁρῶνται· ὡμοιώθη γὰρ ἡμῖνκατὰ πάντα χωρὶς ἁμαρτίας, ἡ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν γέννησις ἡμῶνπροϋπάρχουσαν ἔχει τὴνδιάπλασιν, τῆς ἑνώσεως αὐτῶντῆςπρὸςψυχάς· ἀνάγκη οὖν ὑποστάντος τοῦ σώματος τοῦ κυριακοῦ πρὸ τῆςψυχῆς ἢἰδίαν ἔχειν ὑπόστασιν, εἶτα ἐμπνευσθείσῃ αὐτῷ ψυχῇἐντρίτοις καὶ τῷ Λόγῳ καθ᾽ ὑπόστασιν ἑνωθῆναι, δύο ὑποστάσεων συναφθεισῶν ἀλλήλαις, ὅπερ ζητητέον πῶς ἔσται, καὶ τίνι τρόπῳ μόνον γίνεται· οὐ γὰρ ἄλλῳ πλὴντῷκατ᾽ εὐδοκίαν μόνην, ἢ τῷ σώματι προήνωτο ὁ Λόγος, καὶὕστερον ἐπέπνευσεν ἑαυτῷ καὶ τῇ σαρκὶ τὴνψυχὴντὴνζῶσαν, οὐ διὰ μέσης ψυχῆςσαρκὶὁΛόγος ἥνωται, ἀλλὰ διὰ μέσης σαρκὸςμᾶλλον τῇ ψυχῇἡνώθη, ὅπερ ἄθεσμον, διὰ γὰρτῶνοἰκειοτέρων καὶἐγγυτέρων τοῖςπορρωτέρω συνάπτεταί τι.⁴⁸ Everythingthat belongs to our natureisalso seen in Christ,for he became likeusinall respects apart from sin, but our begettingaccording to nature is such that the formation (sc. of the bodies) exists beforetheir union with the souls.Itis, then, necessary when the lordly bodygained hypostasisbeforethe soul, (1) either that it had its own hypostasis,and was hypostaticallyunited with the soul that was breathed into it in thirdplace, and with the Word,sothat twohypostases wereconnectedwith one another,inwhich case one must ask how this could be, and in what manner it can happen only, for it is possible in no other way than in the manner according to good pleasure, (2) or that the Word was first unitedwith the bodyand afterwards breathed intohimself and into the flesh the livingsoul, in which case the Word was not united with the flesh through the mediationofthe soul, but rather was united with the soul through the mediation of the flesh, which is illicit,because somethingisconnected with the things that arefurther removed from it throughthe things that aremorefamiliar and closer.
Like Babai, the anonymous author baseshis argument on Hebrews 4:15.Heavers that in ordinary human beingsthe bodyprecedesthe soul and that the same must then also be true for Christ’shumanity.Moreover,heaccepts thatthe union can onlyhavehappened once. Yetthen the arguments diverge. The anon- ymous author rejects the solution proposed by Babai, and instead claims that the incarnation onlytook place when the soul was created. This means that the bodyexisted independentlybefore the union, aposition, which the anony- mous author does not find problematic because for him the union onlyestab-
See D. Krausmüller,Leontius of Jerusalem, atheologian of the th century. The Journal of TheologicalStudies (), –.See also P. T. R. Gray,Leontios of Jerusalem, Against the Monophysites.Testimonies of the Saints and Aporiae. Oxford ,who argues for an earlier date. Leontius of Jerusalem, ContraNestorianos II/. PG , C–D. D. Krausmüller,When Christology intersects with embryology 863 lishes aloose relationship of good pleasure.⁴⁹ Fortunately for us, he takes the trouble to explain whythe alternative needstoberuled out.Hestates thatthe union of bodyand divinity had to be established through the soul because it was closer to the divinity.The phrase διὰ μέσης ψυχῆς is most likelyanallusion to afamous statement of Gregory of Nazianzus: ‘The uncontainable is contained through the mediation of the intelligible soul, which mediates between the divin- ity and the denseness of the flesh’ (ὁἀχώριστος χωρεῖται διὰ μέσης ψυχῆςνοε- ρᾶςμεσιτευούσης θεότητι καὶ σαρκὸςπαχύτητι).⁵⁰ It maybethat the anonymous author onlyformulated his argument in this waybecause Chalcedonians (and possiblyalso Monophysites) referred to Gregory’sdictum in order to exclude the scenario sketched by Babai. Interestingly,inhis response Leontius of Jerusalem does not speak about these conceptual problems but rather rejects the anonymous author’spremise.
᾿Aλλ᾽ἔστιν ὁμολογούμενον, ὅτι καὶ καταδεξάμενος τὰ φυσικὰἡμῶνὁκύριος, τῶν ὑπὲρ φύσιν ἡμετέραν οὐ χηρεύει· πολὺ γὰρτοῦδε μᾶλλον ἀπεμφαίνει πρὸςτὸνἡμέτερον τῆς γεννήσεως τρόπον ἄσπορος αὐτοῦ κύησις καὶἄφθορος ἀπότεξις, ἀλλὰ καὶἡἄλιμος αὐτοῦ τεσσαρακοντοῦτις νηστείακαὶτὰτοιάδε· ἐπὶ οὖνΧριστοῦ καὶ τόδε ὑπὲρτὴνἡμετέραν φύσιν πιστεύομεν οἰκονομηθῆναι, ὡς ἅμα τε εἶναι τὴνσάρκα αὐτοῦ, καὶἐψυχωμένην εἶναι, καὶ τοῦ θείου Λόγου σάρκα εἶναι ἐψυχωμένην ψυχῇ λογικῇ τε καὶ νοερᾷ.⁵¹ But it is agreed that the Lord, even though he assumed our natural properties,was not bereft of the properties that arebeyond our nature, for his conception without semen and birth without corruption was rather much moredifferent fromthe manner of our begetting, but also his fastingfor forty days without feelinghungry and other such things. In the case of Christ,then, we believethis,too,tobearranged beyond our nature, that simultaneously his flesh comes into being, and is ensouled, and that the flesh of the divine Word is ensouled with arational and intellectual soul.
Instead of claiming thatinordinary human beingsbodyand soul come into ex- istenceatthe same time and thatthis is then also the casewith the incarnation, Leontius questions the relevance of Hebrews 4:15 for the discussion. He points out thatChrist’shumanitydiffered from other human beingsnot onlythrough sinlessnessbut also through the conception without semen, and the birth with- out corruption. This then permits him to claim that synhyparxis is just one further supernatural feature in Christ’slife.
On this notion see F. G. McLeod,TheodoreofMopsuestia revisited. Theological Studies (), –,esp. –. Gregory of Nazianzus, Oratio .;ed. C. Moreschini,Grégoire de Nazianze,Discours – . SC, .Paris , .–. Leontius of Jerusalem, ContraNestorianos II/. PG , D–A. 864 Byzantinische Zeitschrift Bd. 113/3, 2020: I. Abteilung
Leontius’ willingness to accept the anonymous author’sview about the en- soulmentofthe embryoshowsthat this view was not onlyheld by Nestorians. Indeed, several of his own arguments are basedonthis conceptual framework. At one point the anonymous author claims that Mary should not be called God- bearer because ahuman being can onlygivebirth to ahuman being.Leontius responds by claiming that this is not even the case with ordinary human beings.
Ἄλλως τε εἰ τοῦ εἶναι αὐτοῦ αἴτιον εἶναι δεῖ τὸν ἀληθῶςλεγόμενον τεκεῖνπάντα, οὐδεὶς ἄνθρωπος ἀνθρώπου πατήρ, οὐδὲἕτερον ζῷον ζῷον ἕτερον τέτοκε· ψυχὴνγὰρνοητικὴν ἢ αἰσθητικὴνοὐκἔχει τὰ σπέρματα, ἀλλὰ μετὰ τὴνμόρφωσιν καὶ τελείαν διοργάνωσιν τοῦ ἀψύχου ἐμβρύου ψυχοῦται τὸ ζῷον, καὶ μάλιστα ἄνθρωπος ὑπὸ τοῦ πλάττοντος πνεῦμα ἐν αὐτῷ θεῷ, διὸ καὶ φονέαζῴου τὴνμετὰ τὴνδιαμόρφωσιν αἴτιον τῆς ἐξαμβλώσεως κρίνει ὁ θεῖος νόμος, ἄρα οὖνσαρκοτόκοι μόνον καὶ μάλιστα οἱ πατέρες, οὐδεὶςδὲἀνθρωποτόκος καθ᾽ὑμᾶςἐστιν.⁵² Furthermore, if it is necessary that the one whoistrulysaid to be cause of the beingofit must beget all, no human beingwould be afather of ahuman being, nor would one living beinghavebegotten another livingbeing, for the semen does not have the intelligible and sensitive soul, but the livingbeing, and especiallythe human being, is ensouled after the formation and completeorganisation of the soulless embryo, by God whoforms the spirit in it,wherefore the divine lawjudges the one whocauses amiscarriage after the formation to be the murderer of alivingbeing, it follows that the fathers in particular areonlybegetters of flesh and nobodywould be abegetterofahuman beingaccording to you.
HereLeontius accepts the view thatthe soul onlyappears when the bodyisfully formed, and even adds areference to Exodus 21:22. The allusion to Zachariah 12:1 givesthe impression that like Babai, he believed the soul to be created. Yetother passages suggest that this is not the entire story.When discussingGenesis 2:7he states that ‘the divine inbreathingwas united in ahypostasis with the bodyof Adam that had been formedfirst’ (τῷ πλασθέντι πρῶτον σώματι ᾿Αδὰμτὸ θεῖον ἐμφύσημα καθ’ ὑπόστασιν ἡνώθη).⁵³ At first sight this appears to be an un- equivocal referencetomethyparxis. The statement is, however,less clear-cut than it first seems. In this case Leontius does not saythat Adam’ssoul was created in the pre-existingbody. He merelyspeaks of the endowment of Adam’sbodywith the soul. Moreover,herephrases the Biblical verse in such away that it corre- sponds to traditional definitions of the human being as ‘the soul … that has been united in ahypostasis with the body’ (ἡ ψυχή … καθ’ ὑπόστασιν ἡνωμένη
Ibid., B–C. Ibid., B–. D. Krausmüller,When Christology intersects with embryology 865
τῷ σώματι).⁵⁴ The obvious consequenceofthis reformulation is the replacement of ‘the soul’ (ἡ ψυχή)with ‘the divine inbreathing’ (τὸ θεῖον ἐμφύσημα), which sends aclear signal to the readersthat these two terms refertoone and the same reality.Ihave discussed this statement and other passages wherethe term ap- pears in arecent article. From Leontius’ equation of divine inbreathingand di- vine ‘emanation’ (ἀπόρροια)Ihave concluded thatheconceivesofthe soul as apre-existingentity,which had been in God.⁵⁵ If this interpretation is correct Leontius would have opted for aposition that was considered strictlyanti-Ori- genist but onlyinorder to manipulate it in such away thatitallowed for an Or- igenistreading. Such ascenario presupposes that methyparxis was also widely accepted in Chalcedonian circles. That this was indeedthe case can be seen from apassageinthe Ambigua of Maximus the Confessorwho flourished in the first half of the seventh century.⁵⁶
Maximus opens the discussion with arhetorical strategythat had alreadybeen used by Gregory of Nyssa. He presents synhyparxis as the happy medium be- tween prohyparxis and methyparxis as two diametricallyopposed but equally wrongextremes.The discussion of prohyparxis has repeatedlybeen the subject of scholarlyenquiry.There Maximus rejects Origen’snotion of amonad of pre- existing minds that entered their bodies at alater stageand instead sets out his ownteachingabout the eternal ‘reasons’ (λόγοι)inGod.⁵⁷ By contrast, the discussion of methyparxis has elicited less interest.⁵⁸ Yetitwas clearly of great importance to Maximus. Onlyhere does he directlyaddress his adversaries as ‘youpeople’ (ὦ οὗτοι)and consistentlyuse the second person plural.⁵⁹ These are clear signs that he intervened in acontemporary debate. Maximus claims that it is easy to speak of methyparxis but that deeper engagment reveals concep-
See e.g. Anastasius the Sinaïte, Capita vi adversus monotheletas .;ed. K.-H. Uthemann, Anastasii Siinaitae sermonesduo in constitutionem hominissecundum imaginem Dei necnon opuscula adversus monotheletas. CC, Series Graeca .Turnhout , .–. D. Krausmüller,Human souls as consubstantial Sons of God: The heterodoxanthropology of Leontius of Jerusalem. Journal of Late Antique Religion and Culture (), –. Thereisasubstantial literature on Maximus’ life and teachings. See most recentlythe con- tributionsinP.Allen /B.Neil (eds.), The OxfordHandbookofMaximus the Confessor.Oxford . See the seminal work of P. Sherwood,The earlier AmbiguaofStMaximus the Confessor and his refutation of Origenism. Rome ;see also A. Louth,Maximus the Confessor. London/New York , –. See esp. M.-H. Congourdeau,L’animationdel’embryon humain chez MaximeleConfes- seur. Nouvelle revue théologique (), –. Maximus, Ambigua ad Johannem. PG , C–, B–. 866 Byzantinische Zeitschrift Bd. 113/3, 2020: I. Abteilung tual problems.⁶⁰ At first he statesthat abodywithout asoul is dead and thatit was thereforeimpossiblefor the embryotogrow prior to its ensoulment.⁶¹ This is indeedaproblem that ariseswhen the case for methyparxis is exclusivelymade on the basis of Scripture. YetbyMaximus’ time the champions of methyparxis had long moved beyond this point.Theymade use of Aristotelian concepts, de- claring that the embryowas fashionedfirst by the nutritive soul and then by the sensitivesoul, before the rational soul appeared. Maximus ridicules this concep- tual framework, claiming that human beingswould then be parents of plants and animals.⁶² Then he turns to another opinion, which does not seem to be at- tested elsewhere. According to him some people wereworried that the rational soul would be somehow involved in the messy business of conception and there- fore concluded that it would onlybeinfused forty days later.⁶³ Biblical proof texts playasubordinaterole in Maximus’ treatment.Onlyonce does he refer to Exodus 21:22onwhich the champions of methyparxis built their argument. He claims that the verse does not refer to the enteringofthe soul but to the for- mationofthe body.⁶⁴ This is arather lame argument since it does not explain whythe one responsible for amiscarriageinearlypregnancyonlyhas to pay afine.⁶⁵ In the last part of his discussion Maximus considers the implication of the different models for the incarnation. He explains that therewas no interval be- tween the coming-to-be of the bodyand the coming-to-be of the soul and that ‘the Lordwas united with the flesh through the mediation of the rational soul’ (διὰ μέσης ψυχῆςλογικῆς ἑνωθῆναι σαρκὶ τὸνκύριον)and not through the me- diation of asoulless body.⁶⁶ Thisstatement bears astriking similaritytothe argu- ment of the anonymous Nestorian, which shows clearly that we are dealing with the samediscourse. YetMaximus’ adversaries wereundoubtedlyChalcedonians. Had they belonged to adifferent Christological sect he would not have hesitated to point it out.Indeed, it appears thatMaximus responded to people who shared the views of Leontius of Jerusalem.
Ibid., C–. Ibid., C–B. Ibid., B–D. Ibid., B–C. Ibid., D–A. Philoponus ridiculed this interpretation, see John Philoponus, De opificio mundi VI/;ed. Reichardt, .–.. Maximus, Ambigua ad Johannem. PG , A–. D. Krausmüller,When Christology intersects with embryology 867
Διὸ μάλιστα περιέχομαι τοῦ τῆςσυνυπάρξεως λόγου … αὐτὸντῆςφύσεως ποιητὴν ἔχων … τοῦ τοιούτου λόγου ἔχων συνήγορόντεκαὶδιδάσκαλον ἀπαραλόγιστον τὸνγενόμενον ἀληθῶς ἄνθρωπον, καὶ τὴνφύσιν τελείως ἔχουσαν ἅμα τῷ εἶναι κατὰ τὴνγένεσιν ὑφί- στασθαι δι᾽ἑαυτοῦ βεβαιωσάμενον, καὶ μόνην καινοτομήσαντα τὴνκαινοτομίαν τῆς φύσεως, λέγω δὴ τὴνδιὰσπορᾶςσύλληψιν καὶ τὴνδιὰφθορᾶςγέννησιν, ἅπερ ἡ φύσις μετὰ τὴνπαράβασιν ἐπεσπάσατο … ἀλλ᾽ οὐ τὸνλόγον τῆςφύσεως καθ᾽ὃἔστι καὶ γίνεσθαι πέφυκεν ἅμα τῷ εἶναι ἐκψυχῆςλογικῆς ὑφισταμένη καὶ σώματος.⁶⁷ ThereforeImost of all hold fast to the concept of simultaneous existence … havingthe maker of naturehimself … as an advocate and undeceivedteacher of such aconcept,who trulybecame ahuman being, and made surethroughhimself that the naturegains hy- postasis as one that is complete simultaneouslywith its beinginrespect of coming-to-be, and whoonlyinnovated twothings in nature, that is, the conception through semen and the birth through corruption, which the natureacquiredafter the fall … but not the account of nature,accordingtowhich it is and comestobebynature, simultaneouslywith its being, as beingconstituted from arational soul and abody.
This statement is immediatelyfollowed by apassagethat rules out ‘innovation’ (καινοτομία)increation and makes the casethatnocreature can changeits na- ture, which defines what it is.⁶⁸ It has often been discussed but without consid- eration of the specific context in which it is found.⁶⁹ Maximus sets himself the task to show that there is astrict parallelism between Christ’shumanity and or- dinary human beings. He claims that synhyparxis is required by the ‘account of nature’ (λόγος τῆςφύσεως)and that it must thereforeapply in both cases be- cause otherwise Jesus would not be in all respects like us apartfrom sin. Yet he does admitthat thereare twoexceptions, the conception and birth of Christ, which weaken his argument considerably.Aswehaveseen Leontius of Jerusalem claims that these are supernatural events, which limit the significance of He- brews 4:15,and that it is therefore entirelyconceivable that synhyparxis is also asupernatural trait.Maximus has to exclude this optionatall costs.Hedoes
Ibid., Β–C. Ibid., D–A. See J.-M. Garrigues,Maxime le Confesseur.LaCharité, avenir divin de l’homme. Paris , –;L.Thunberg,Microcosm and mediator: the theological anthropology of Maximus the Confessor.Chicago , ,J.-C. Larchet,Ladivinisation de l’hommeselon Maxime le Con- fesseur.Paris , –, –, –, –;D.Skliris, “Hypostasis”, “per- son”, “individual”, “mode”:acomparison between the terms that denoteconcretebeing, in M. Vasilievich (ed.), Knowingthe purpose of everythingthroughthe Resurrection. Proceedingsof the Symposium on St Maximus the Confessor,Belgrade, October –, .Alhambra, CA /Belgrade , –,esp. ;and A. Louth,St. Maximos’ distinction between λόγος and τρόπος and the ontologyofthe person, in S. Mitralexis /G.Steiris /M.Podbielski /S. Lalla (eds.), Maximus the Confessor as aEuropean philosopher.Eugene, OR , –. 868 Byzantinische Zeitschrift Bd. 113/3, 2020: I. Abteilung so by claiming that the conception through semen and the birth through corrup- tion werenot originallypart of human nature but wereonlyintroduced into it after the fall.⁷⁰ Maximus’ adversaries weremost likelydrivenbyanti-Origenist concerns.⁷¹ Forthem, as for Babai, synhyparxis in ordinary human beings would have opened the door for prohyparxis and thus for the Origenist heresy. Maximus’ rejection of prohyparxis mayhavehad the function to show thatthis was abaselessfear.
Maximus’ life-time was aperiod of dramatic political change. In the 630s and 640s the Eastern provinces of the Roman Empire werelost to the Arab invaders. Once the Muslim Caliphate had been established all three Christological sects flourishedand manytheological works wereproduced. Thisraises the question: did the debate about the ensoulment of the embryoalso continue? In the case of the Chalcedonians or Melkites the evidence is slight.Inthe later seventh century the monk Anastasius of Sinai wrotetwo sermons about the divine image.⁷² In the formertext he liststhe different options, rejecting prohyparxis as heretical but mentioning synhyparxis and methyparxis without comment.⁷³ In the latter text he claims thatonly synhyparxis is correct.Hecomes to this conclusion because he has aparticular understandingofthe divine imageinthe human being.He believes thatAdam was created in the imageofthe incarnated Word. Since in the caseofChrist the components appeared simultaneouslythe samemust applytothe conception of ordinary human beings.⁷⁴ Later authorsshow even less interest in the question. In the first half of the eighth century John of Dam- ascus, aformerCaliphal administrator who had become monk in Palestine, de- clares in his Expositio fidei that soul and bodyare created at the same time. But he then onlyrejects prohyparxis as aheretical opinion.⁷⁵ Methyparxis as athird option is not even considered. Gregory’sopinionthatthe soul must mediate be- tween God and the bodyismentioned but without reference to an alternative view.⁷⁶ Even in John’santi-Nestorian treatisesthe topic is not discussed. There
See Thunberg,Microcosm, ibid., . See G. Benevich,Maximus Confessor’spolemic against anti-Origenism. Revue d’histoireec- clésiastique (), –,who focuses on Maximus’ sixth and seventh letters. In these cases it is clear that Maximus’ opponentsare Chalcedonians. Forthe followingsee Congourdeau,L’embryon (as footnote above), –. Anastasius of Sinai, Sermo I/;ed. Uthemann (as footnote above), .–.. Ibid., .–.. John of Damascus Expositio fidei ;ed. B. Kotter,Die Schriften des Johannes vonDamas- kos, . PTS, .Berlin , .–. John of Damascus, Expositio fidei , ;ed. Kotter, .–; .–. D. Krausmüller,When Christology intersects withembryology 869 we onlyfind the banal statement that the humanity does not pre-exist the union.⁷⁷ When we turn to Theodore AbuQurrah, the bishop of Carrhae, who flourishedinthe late eighth and earlyninth century we find thatthe situation is not much different.Inhis opuscula Theodore onlysaysthat the Word assumed an ensouled bodyinto his hypostasis.⁷⁸ This silence is rather peculiarsince members of the other two camps contin- ued to discuss the topic. In the late eighth century the Nestorian Theodore Bar Koni, ateacher of Scripture,explained in his Book of Scholia thatthe soul was created after the body.⁷⁹ His contemporary,patriarch TimothyI(780 – 823), a highlylearned man who exercised his function in Baghdad, the new capital of the Caliphate, spelt out the Christological implications of this view.Inaletter to the Christians of Basraheexplainedthat the Evangelist John said ‘the Word became flesh’ but not ‘the Word became ahuman being’ since he united himself first with the bodyalone, at the moment of conception, and onlyafter forty days with the soul as well, just as it is the casewith ordinary human beings. In order to support this view he pointed out that bodyand soul were also sep- aratelyunited with the Word duringthe three days between death and resurrection.⁸⁰ This is in keepingwith Babai’sposition, which suggests that the alternative explanation of the anonymous Nestorian author was considered to be tooextreme. In order to explain how the bodyisformedwithout asoul Timothyhad re- course to Aristotelian philosophy. He distinguishedthe nutritive and sensitive powers from the rational soul that wascreated later.⁸¹ He thus was of the same mind as Maximus’ Chalcedonian adversaries. Interestingly,this conceptual framework alsoappears in the writingsofMonophysiteauthors. One of their number,Jacob of Edessa, alearned monk who flourished in the earlyeighth cen- tury,rejected prohyparxis and methyparxis. In aletter to the styliteJohn of Litar- ba he declared that both options were heretical, the former because it was de- fended by Origen, and the latter because it implied thatthe soul was created
John of Damascus, ContraNestorianos;ed. B. Kotter,Die Schriften des Johannesvon Dam- askos. PTS, .Berlin , .–. TheodoreAbu Qurrah, Opusculum ,trans. J. C. Lamoreaux,TheodoreAbu Qurrah. Library of the ChristianEast, .Provo,Utah , .See also idem,The biography of TheodoreAbu Qurrah revisited. DOP (), –. See V. B erti,L’au-delà de l’âme et l’en-deçà bu corps.Approches d’anthropologiechréti- enne de la mort dans l’Église syro-orientale. Paradosis, .Fribourg , ,note . TimothyI,Epistula , .For amoredetailed discussionsee Berti,ibid., –. TheodoreBar Koni, Book of Scholia II/,trans. R. Hespel /R.Draguet,TheodoreBar Koni, Livre des scolies (recension de Seert), I. MimreI-V. CSCO, .Leuven , .Cf. Berti, L’au-delà, –. 870 Byzantinische Zeitschrift Bd. 113/3, 2020: I. Abteilung for the sake of the bodyand thus ontologicallyinferior,anargument that we have alreadyencountered in Gregory of Nyssa’s De hominis opificio. Yethe does acknowledge the existenceofthe nutritive and sensitivepowers.Unlike Gregory,heconsiders them to be parts of one single soul, which graduallyun- folds itself. That he should engagewith Aristotle is not surprising since he was familiar with the philosopher’sworks.⁸² In the later ninth century another Monophysiteauthor,Moses BarKepha, in- serted Jacob’stext into his Liberdeanima. There it is part of an extensive discus- sion of the question. Moseswho was extremelywell-read starts the discussion with ahistorical overview. He explains that originallytherehad been no agree- ment among ‘Syrian’ and ‘Greek’ Monophysites since the former tended to opt for methyparxis and the latter for synhyparxis.⁸³ Yethemakes it clear that for a Monophysite of his generation only synhyparxis was acceptable, no doubt for Christological reasons.⁸⁴ Then he launches into adebate with the defenders of prohyparxis and methyparxis. In the lattercase exegesis of Scripture is again at the centre. Moses explains thatGenesis 2:7does not implyatemporalse- quence and that Exodus 21:22concerns itself alone with the formation of the bodyand not with the soul, an argument that we have alreadyencountered in Maximus.⁸⁵ In the second step he then strivestoshow that methyparxis leads to absurd consequences.Heclaims that death involves bothbodyand soul, which are separated from one another,and that at the conception bothbody and soul must also be present,since beginning and end must correspond to one another.Moreover,heavers that if one accepted methyparxis the human being would at first not be ahuman beingand onlylater become one, which is impossiblebecause one and the same beingcannot be itself and its exact opposite.⁸⁶ One can ask whyMonophysites and Nestorians continued to debate the issue whereasthe Melkites did not.One possibleanswer is that in Iraq members of the former two sects livedside by sideand had to defend theirpositions against one another.Bycontrast, Melkites who werestrongest in Western
JacobofEdessa, Letter to John of Litarba,quoted in Moses Bar Kepha, Liber de anima , trans. Braun, .See J. J. van Ginkel,Greetingstoavirtuous man: the correspondenceof JacobofEdessa, in B. ter Haar Romeney (ed.), JacobofEdessa and the Syriac cultureofhis day. Leiden /Boston , –,esp. –. Moses BarKepha, Liber de anima,ibid., –. Ibid., –. Ibid., –. Ibid., –. D. Krausmüller,When Christology intersects with embryology 871
Syria and Palestinemay have livedinaconfessionallymore homogeneous world.⁸⁷
The texts that we have analysed reflect the lively intellectual climate in the Ca- liphate. Evidence for Byzantium is more limited. Intellectual activity was largely restricted to the capital Constantinople. There we have no evidence for continu- ous engagement with the topic. In the eighth and earlyninth century the theo- logical debate focused on asingle issue, the veneration of images. Topics that had no bearing on it werenot discussed. The situation onlychanged in the sec- ond half of the ninth century.Inhis Amphilochia the learned Patriarch Photius (858–867, 877– 886) offers an exegesis of Exodus 21:22. Surprisingly he claims that this verse and Genesis 2:7are evidence for methyparxis. What he has to say, however,turns out to be aliteral quotation from Theodoret of Cyrus.⁸⁸ A more considered treatment is found in atreatise against the heresy of the Theo- paschites,which targets the MonophysiteArmenians.⁸⁹ There Photius argues that the human compound is not asuitable paradigm for the incarnated Word. In this context he makes the following statement.
Ἐφ᾽ἑκάστου τῶν ἀνθρώπων αἱ δύοφύσεις τὸν ἴσον χρόνον ἔχουσι τῆςοὐσιώσεως συνε- πόμενον, ἢ βραχεῖ γε χρόνῳ τῆςθατέρας ἡἑτέρα τὸ προγενέστερον ἥρπασεν – ὁ γὰρ φρενοβλαβὴςκαὶτῆςμετεμψυχώσεως Ὠριγένους μῦθος εἰςτὸνΠυθαγόρειον ἀναγόμενος λῆρον ἔξω τῶν ἡμετέρων ὀργίων εἰ βούλοιτο περιπλανάσθω – ἀλλ᾽ οὕτω μὲν ἰσόχρονος ἡ σύστασις ἔγγιστα τῶν ἐν ἡμῖνθεωρουμένων φύσεων, οὐ προϋφέστηκεν ἀξιολόγῳ χρόνῳ θατέρας ἡἑτέρα.⁹⁰ In the case of each of the human beings the twonatures have the simultaneity of sub- stantiation as acorollary,orone has snatched priority over the other by abrief time – for Origen’sderanged myth of the transmigration of souls,which is derivedfromthe blather of the Pythagoreans, maystrayoutside our rituals if it so wishes – but the constitution of the natures that areseen in us is virtuallysimultaneous,one does not pre-exist the other for a considerable amount of time.
Thereisscant evidencefor the presenceofNestorians in these regions and there was no dis- agreement with the Monophysites who did live there. See Photius, Amphilochium ;ed. L.G. Westerink,Photii patriarchae Constantinopolitani epistulae et amphilochia VI/.Leipzig , .–. On this disputesee I. Dorfmann-Lazarev,Arméniens et Byzantins àl’époque de Photius: deux débats théologiques après le Triomphe de l’Orthodoxie. CSCO,Subsidia, .Leuven . Photius Epistula ;ed. B. Laourdas/L.G.Westerink,Photii patriarchae Constantinopo- litani epistulae et amphilochia, .Leipzig , .–. 872 Byzantinische Zeitschrift Bd. 113/3, 2020: I. Abteilung
This statement is immediatelyfollowed by the Christological application. Pho- tius points out that the divine Word existed from eternity.The claim that the soul comes into existence togetherwith the bodywhereas the Word pre-exists the flesh is alreadyfound in Maximus’ writings. YetPhotius introduces asignifi- cant modification. He claims that the soul is created shortlybefore the body.⁹¹ In order to forestall criticism he condemns Origenism. We are not told whyitwas so importanttoaffirm the soul’spre-existence. It is possible that Photius agreed with Philoponus thatthe soul had to exist on its own even if onlyfor avery brief timespan in order to ensure that it could continue to exist after its separa- tion from the body. What is missing is adiscussion of the Christological implica- tions. Does the Word first unite with ahuman soul and then with ahuman body? We do not know how Photius dealt with this problem or whether he was even aware of it. The issue is discussed in much greater depth in ashort treatise by Arethas (d. c. 944), the metropolitan of Caesarea, avery learned man, who playedanim- portant role in the ecclesiastical politics of the time.⁹² Accordingtothe proem it was composed afteradiscussion with the monk Nicetas the Paphlagonian, a well-known author of encomia in honour of saints, who was equallybelligerent.⁹³ It is written in fiendishly difficult Greek, which poses considerable problems to the understanding.The first argument,which accordingtothe pinax was directed ‘against Aristotle and those who saythat in the womb the embryoisprovided for by avegetative power’ (πρὸς ᾿Aριστοτέλη καὶ τοὺςλέγοντας φυτικῇ δυνάμει τὸ ἔμβρυον ἐντῇμήτρᾳ διοικεῖσθαι), is unfortunatelynolonger extant.⁹⁴ We only have the lastparagraph where Arethas pokes fun at those who claim that at the beginning thereisonlyanutritive soul. He pointsout that if one assumed that aplant can become ahuman being, one would also have to accept as truth that the nymph Daphne was transformed into alaurel tree.⁹⁵ We have al- readyencountered asimilar argument in Maximus.
This featurehas no bearingonthe polemic against the Armenians.Thereforewecan be cer- tain that it reflects Photius’ personalopinion. Arethas, Opusculum ;ed. L.G. Westerink,Arethae archiepiscopi Caesariensis scripta mi- nora, .Leipzig , –. Arethas, Opusculum .–;ed. Westerink, .–.Nicetas was deeplyinvolvedin church politics.His Life of Patriarch Ignatius is an anti-Photian pamphlet. Foracomprehensive studysee S. Paschalides, Νικήτας ΔαβὶδΠαφλαγών, τὸ πρόσωπο καὶ τὸἔργο του.Thessaloniki . Arethas, Opusculum , pinax;ed. Westerink, .–. Arethas, Opusculum .;ed. Westerink, .–. D. Krausmüller,When Christology intersects with embryology 873
That Arethas should dismiss Aristotelian teachinginsuch an off-hand wayis surprising since he composed scholia on the Categories and in general showed great interest in ancient philosophy.⁹⁶ Yetitisnot difficult to see whyhetook this stance. He was concerned that the soul might lose its status as aself-suffi- cient being.Hecomplains that it would die with the bodylike the souls of ani- mals if it could onlyfunction when the organs are fullyformed.⁹⁷ This was, of course, aview that nobodyheld at the time.Yet it is worth noting that Babai be- lieved the soul was dependent on the bodyand would become unconscious after death.⁹⁸ It is not always easy to getasense of the arguments since the text is not a technical treatise likethe Liberdeanima but arhetorical tourdeforce. Yetsome observations can be made.Inone case Arethas responds to the objection that the soul does not remember its stayinthe womb by stating that it wasoverwhelmed by the matter thatsurrounded it.⁹⁹ In another case we encounter astring of argu- ments and counterarguments. The championsofmethyparxis declared that the nutritive soul wasresponsible for the formation of the body. When their oppo- nents told them that the human being would then be controlled by an ‘irrational nature’ (ἄλογον φύσιν)they repliedthat nature producedthe embryo ‘with rea- son’ (μετὰ λόγου)since it operatedaccordingtoadivineplan. Arethas brushes off this reasoning and asserts thatthe naturalprocessesare controlled by the ra- tional soul.¹⁰⁰ Twice he mentions arguments that werealreadyfound in earlier texts,that synhyparxis was an Origenist teaching, and that the punishment for those who cause amiscarriageproves methyparxis. In the first case he has this to say.
Ἐπὰνγάρτινες τῇἀληθείᾳ τῶντοιούτων καταβροντηθεῖεν ἐφοδίων, ἐπὶ μόνης τῆς ἱερᾶς δῆθεν αὐτοῖς ἀποσαλεύοντες ἀγκύρας, ἐνδιαβάλλειν πειρῶνται τὴντῆςψυχῆςτελειότητα, ἐπὶ προΰπαρξιν αὐτὴν ἀναφέρειν ἀδολεσχοῦντες τοὺς ἐντελῆ δογματίζοντας ταύτῃ τὴνεἰς γένεσιν πρόοδον, ποίοις καὶ τίσι λόγοις τοῦτο κρατύνοντες, αὐτοὶἂνεἰδοῖεν.¹⁰¹
See P. Kotzia-Panteli,OnArethas of Caesarea’sscholia on Porphyry’sIsagogeand Aristo- tle’sCategories. Hellenika (), –;and J. Whittaker,Arethas and the “Collection philosophique”,inD.Harlfinger/G. Prato(eds.), Paleografia ecodicologia greca. Atti del II Col- loquio internazionale Berlino-Wolfenbüttel, – ottobre .Alessandria , –. Arethas, Opusculum .;ed. Westerink, .–.. See e.g. F. Gavin,The sleep of the soul in the earlySyriac church. Journal of the American Oriental Society (), –,esp. . Arethas, Opusculum .;ed. Westerink, .–. Arethas, Opusculum .;ed. Westerink, .–.. Arethas, Opusculum .;ed. Westerink, .–. 874 Byzantinische Zeitschrift Bd. 113/3, 2020: I. Abteilung
Forwhen some people arethunderstruckbythe truth of such arguments,they ride at a single anchor that is supposedly sacredtothem, and attempttoslander the completeness of the soul, pratingthat those whointheir doctrinesaccord to it aprogression to coming-to- be that is complete,they themselveswill know,with which and what kind of arguments they support this view.
AccordingtoArethas such an opinion givesthe impression as if God was con- strainedinhis actions by fear of being misunderstood by human beings, which would be ridiculous. In the second case the reasoning goes as follows.
Ἔτι εἰ μὴ τῇ πρώτῃ προαγωγῇ τάχιστα τὸ χαρακτηρίζον ἐνιδρυθείητῇἀνθρωπίνῃ συστάσει, οὔτ᾽ἄντιδιοίσῃ τῆςτῶνἀλόγων συλλήψεως ἄνθρωπος οὔτ᾽ἂνἐνδίκως εἰςαἷμα δίκην ὑπόσχῃὁταῖς ἐπιφόροις ἀμβλώσεως ἐνεχόμενος, κατὰ φυτοῦ φέρε καὶ βοὸςκαὶκυνὸς ἤ τινος τούτων τὸνθυμὸνκαθοπλίσας.¹⁰² Furthermore, if that which imprints were not established in the human constitution right at the first production, the human beingwould not differ in anythingfromthe conception of beasts,nor would the one whoisliable for the miscarriage of pregnant women justlyincur the penalty of losinghis life, sincehewould have armed his anger against aplant,perhaps, and acow and adog or anyone of these.
At first one might think that this refers to Exodus 21:22since Arethas speaks of anger.Yet it would be very odd if this were the case because the statement flatly contradictsthe Biblical verse. Thus it seems more likelythat Arethas appealed to contemporarylaw.¹⁰³ Thiswas aclever move, because previous attempts by Max- imus and Moses BarKepha to reinterpretExodus 21:22had been quite unsatisfac- tory. In the second part of his treatise Arethas discusses the implications of me- thyparxis for the union of the Word with the flesh.
Ὁ γάρτοι ψυχῆςκατὰ γένεσιν ἀτελὴςλόγος βαθμούςτεψυχῶντοὺςσυνίστορας τούτῳ ἐπεισκρίνειν τῇ διαπλάσει παρασκευάσας καὶ τὸνθεὸνΛόγον οὐκ ἀνθρώπῳ κατασπεύσει τὸ πρῶτον, ἀλλὰ φυτῷ τὴνκαθ᾽ὑπόστασιν ἕνωσιν αὐτοῦ πεποιῆσθαι· αὕτη γὰρ ἀρχὴ τοῖςτῶν ζῴων ἐμβρύοις, καθὰ τῷ Σταγειρίτῃ δοκεῖ· καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο ἀλόγῳ, καὶ μετ᾽ἐκεῖνο εἰς ἄνθρωπον ἀποτελευτήσει τριετίζοντα τὴν ὥραν, οὔπω καὶ τοῦτον συντετελεκότα τὸν λόγον καὶ τὴν ἀνθρώπου διάθεσιν, ἐπεὶ μηδὲ τότε συμπληροῦσθαι ταῖςλογικαῖς ἐνεργείαις τὸ καθ᾽ἡμᾶςἔγνωμεν.¹⁰⁴
Arethas, Opusculum .;ed. Westerink, .–. See C. Cupane /E.Kislinger,Bemerkungenzur Abtreibung in Byzanz. JÖB (), – ,esp. –. Arethas, Opusculum .;ed. Westerink, .–.. D. Krausmüller,When Christology intersects with embryology 875
Forthe incompleteaccount of the soul as regards its coming-to-be causes the experts to insert stagesofsouls into the formation and leads to the rash conclusion that the divine Word effects his hypostatic union at first not with ahuman being, but with aplant,for this is the beginningfor the embryos of livingbeings,according to the opinion of the Stagirite, and afterwardswith abeast,and after that it will end up beingahuman being, whoisthree years old, sincewehavelearnt that even then our existenceisnot completed as regards the rational operations.
Hereweget another summary of Aristotelianembryology, which is then summa- rilydismissed with the quotation from Gregory of Nazianzus that had already been produced by the anonymousNestorian and by Maximus.¹⁰⁵ Unlikeearlier authors, Arethas claims thatifone accepted methyparxis the rational soul would onlyappear when achild is three years old, or even later. This is arather extreme interpretation of Aristotle’steachings.The subsequent paragraph shows whyitappears in the text.There Arethas refers to the Biblical storyofthe twelve- year-old Jesuswho confounded those present in the temple with his wisdom.¹⁰⁶ This story becomes the starting point for acomplex argument.
Ἆρ᾽ οὖντίνι ταύτην τὴνπλήρη σοφίας δῶμεν ἀπόκρισιν; τῷἀνθρώπῳ; καὶ πῶς; οὐ γάρτι ἄλλο ἢ τὸ τεράστιον οὕτω καὶ καινοτόμον τῷ μήπω συντετελέσθαι τὸν ἀνθρώπου λόγον, ὥςγεφασί, τῇ τοῦ κυρίου ἐνανθρωπήσει προσμαρτυρήσομεν, ὃν ἄνθρωπον κατὰ πάντα χωρὶς ἁμαρτίας μετὰ τοῦἀχράντου τόκου καὶ τὸἐνβίῳ ἄληπτον ἐνθεωρηθείηκαὶεἴτι ἄλλο μὴἄγαν ὑπερπετῶςκαὶκατὰ φάσμα τὴνφύσιν ὑπεραλλόμενον. ἀλλὰ τῷ προσειληφότι θεῷ; ἀλλ᾽ὀλεθρίῳ τῇἑτοιμότητι καὶ νῦν ᾿Aπολινάριος παρεισδύσεται θεὸντῇπροσλήψει ἀντι- σηκοῦντα εἰσβιαζόμενος τὰἀνθρώπινα.¹⁰⁷ To whom then shall we attributethis answer, which is full of wisdom?(1) To the human being? But how?For if the reason of the human beingisnot yetaccomplished, as they say, we will ascribe to the inhumanation of the Lord nothingelse but monstrosity and in- novation. One can see that this one is in all respects ahuman being, together with the undefiled birth and the irreproachable conduct,and whatever else thereisthat does not transcend the natureinanextremelylofty way, which would turn it intoaphantom. (2) Or to the godwho assumed it?But then Apollinaris will now,too, slip in with destructive readiness, forcingGod to counterbalancethrough assumptionthat which is human.
The purpose of this argument is to show that the soul must be completefrom the moment of conception. It is claimedthat what Jesus did waspotentiallypossible for ordinary human beingsaswell. Arethas states thatotherwise Jesus’ preco- cious wisdom would be an ‘innovation’ (καινοτομία)innature. Like Maximus,
Ibid., .–. Luke :–. Arethas, Opusculum .;ed. Westerink, .–. 876 Byzantinische Zeitschrift Bd. 113/3, 2020: I. Abteilung
Arethas appeals to Hebrews 4:7inorder to emphasise that Christ’shumanity cannot be categoricallydifferent from ours. Yethealso has to contend with the troublingnotion that Christ’sbirth was without corruption. Maximus had ex- plained this feature away by claiming that corruption was aconsequenceofthe fall. Arethas does not avail himself of this argument,instead adding the rather lame comment that featuresofthis kind are not ‘very supernatural’.Inasecond step he then plays the heresiological card. He claims that those who accept that ordinary human beingsreceive theirrational soul onlylater are necessarilyfol- lowers of Apollinaris of Laodicea who taught that in Christ the place of the human rational soul was taken up by the divinity.¹⁰⁸ Thisisclearlyaspecious argument.Itdoes not consider the possibility that Christ’ssoul could have been strengthened by the HolySpirit so as to be able to do thingsthat are beyond the reach of ordinary human beings. At this point we need to ask: was thereadebate about embryologyinCon- stantinople at the beginning of the tenth century? As Ihavealreadymentioned Arethas wrotehis treatise after aconversation with Nicetas the Paphlagonian who appears to have defended the notion of methyparxis. Unfortunately, the ac- count of this conversation is no longer extant as the folio is missing in the manu- script.Weonlyfind the brief comment thatthe tone had been irenic.¹⁰⁹ Moreover, we do not know whether Nicetas had produced all the arguments that are refuted in Arethas’ treatise. In the end, we cannot entirely rule out the possibility that the discussion was merelyanintellectual game.¹¹⁰ Even if this is the case, how- ever,wecan see very clearly that Byzantine intellectuals of the time had avery good knowledge of the debate and its terms.Itmay well be that they had access to further texts,which are now lost.
To conclude: The notion thatthe soul comes into existencesimultaneouslywith the bodyatthe moment of conception was originallyintroduced into the Patristic discourse as an alternativetothe Origenistnotion of apre-existing soul. Yetin the course of the sixth century,when anti-Origenistsentiment intensified, manypeople came to the conclusionthat synhyparxis was simplyafront behind which the Origenists hid, probablynot without justification, as some authors in- deed tried to smuggle in the concept.Instead, they promoted methyparxis as a
On Apollinaris see T. J. Carter,The Apollinarian Christologies:astudyofthe writings of Apollinarius of Laodicea. PhD thesis,Heythrop CollegeUniversityofLondon , –. Arethas, Opusculum .;ed. Westerink, .–. Indeed, in other sources Nicetas is accused of Origenist leanings.See D. Krausmüller, What is paradise and whoisinit? The discussion about the abode of the souls of the righteous in sixth- to eleventh-century Byzantium. Byzantinoslavica (), –,esp. –. D. Krausmüller,When Christology intersects with embryology 877 safe option, although the sources show thatevenitcould be subverted. The Christological controversies also had an impact on the debate. The Chalcedo- nians and Monophysites had to subscribe to synhyparxis in the case of Christ be- cause otherwise they could not show thatthe union resulted in one hypostasis or nature. By contrast,the Nestorians who posited amuch looser relationship be- tween humanityand divinity opted for methyparxis. The Nestorians and some Chalcedonians insisted thatthere was no categorical differencebetween the coming-to-beofChrist’shumanityand ordinary human beings, since according to Scripture Christ wasinall respectslike us apart from sin. Other Chalcedo- nians, for fear of being tarred with the Origenistbrush, claimed that in ordinary human beingsthe soul appeared after the bodywhereas Christ wasaspecial case and synhyparxis was asupernatural feature, along with conception without semen and birth without corruption. They could come to this conclusion because they put less emphasis on the full humanityofChrist.