2013  2013 5Th International Conference on Cyber Conflict

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

2013  2013 5Th International Conference on Cyber Conflict 2013 2013 5th International Conference on Cyber Conflict PROCEEDINGS K. Podins, J. Stinissen, M. Maybaum (Eds.) 4-7 JUNE 2013, TALLINN, ESTONIA 2013 5TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON CYBER CONFLICT (CYCON 2013) Copyright © 2013 by NATO CCD COE Publications. All rights reserved. IEEE Catalog Number: CFP1326N-PRT ISBN 13 (print): 978-9949-9211-4-0 ISBN 13 (pdf): 978-9949-9211-5-7 ISBN 13 (epub): 978-9949-9211-6-4 Copyright and Reprint Permissions No part of this publication may be reprinted, reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence ([email protected]). This restriction does not apply to making digital or hard copies of this publication for internal use within NATO, and for personal or educational use when for non-profit or non- commercial purposes, providing that copies bear this notice and a full citation on the first page as follows: [Article author(s)], [full article title] 2013 5th International Conference on Cyber Conflict K. Podins, J. Stinissen, M. Maybaum (Eds.) 2013 © NATO CCD COE Publications Printed copies of this publication are available from: NATO CCD COE Publications Filtri tee 12, 10132 Tallinn, Estonia Phone: +372 717 6800 Fax: +372 717 6308 E-mail: [email protected] Web: www.ccdcoe.org Layout: Marko Söönurm Legal Notice: This publication contains opinions of the respective authors only. They do not necessarily reflect the policy or the opinion of NATO CCD COE, NATO, or any agency or any government. NATO CCD COE may not be held responsible for any loss or harm arising from the use of information contained in this book and is not responsible for the content of the external sources, including external websites referenced in this publication. CYCON 2013 SPONSORS TECHNICAL SPONSOR DIAMOND SPONSOR GOLD SPONSORS SPONSOR ABOUT THE NATO CCD COE The NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (NATO CCD COE) is an international military organisation accredited in 2008 by NATO´s North Atlantic Council as a “Centre of Excellence”. Located in Tallinn, Estonia, the Centre is currently supported by Estonia, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia, Spain, and the USA as Sponsoring Nations. The Centre is not part of NATO’s command or force structure, nor is it funded by NATO. However, it is part of a wider framework supporting NATO Command Arrangements. The NATO CCD COE’s mission is to enhance capability, cooperation and information-sharing between NATO, NATO member States and NATO’s partner countries in the area of cyber defence by virtue of research, education and consultation. The Centre has taken a NATO-orientated, interdisciplinary approach to its key activities, including academic research on selected topics relevant to the cyber domain from legal, policy, strategic, doctrinal and/ or technical perspectives, providing education and training, organising conferences, workshops and cyber defence exercises and offering consultations upon request. For more information on the NATO CCD COE, please visit the Centre’s website at http://www.ccdcoe.org. For information on Centres of Excellence, visit NATO’s website “Centres of Excellence” at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_68372.htm. Foreword Cyber conflicts are increasingly moving towards an operational theatre, where physical and cyber space are becoming hardly distinguishable, where the surrounding cyber ecosystem is global, dynamic and involves tens of thousands networks, and where the sheer volume of cyber security incidents data that needs to be collected, analyzed and acted upon is staggering. In this ecosystem we are talking about monitoring tens of thousands of networks that connect hundreds of thousands, if not millions of devices. Consequently, it is becoming evident that we have to move from passive perimeter-bound cyber defense, where we have spent tremendous amounts of effort, time and money in protecting every single item along the perimeter of the cyber ecosystem, towards active cyber defense and offensive actions that secure resiliency of our cyber-kinetic operations, even in the presence of adversary attacks. Not less importantly, the paradigm of perimeter cyber defense leaves our cyber-kinetic operations vulnerable to insider attacks. The models of achieving resiliency of cyber-kinetic operations are still at active research and development stage, but several of them have proven their value, including self-organization and adaptation to evolving cyber security situations, prediction of potential adversary cyber attacks and other disruptive events before their occur, and recovery and restoration of operational capacities after the attacks. Whatever the future technology of resilient cyber-kinetic operations will emerge, it is undisputable fact that the center piece of this technology is automation of cyber security data analysis and decision-making processes that underlay defensive and offensive actions in cyber conflict. We look on automation not only as an enabling technological device to proceed with cyber conflict operations, but also extend its associated impact on the behavioral entities acting in strategic and legal space. In order to have a better chance of securing our mission critical information systems (and critical information infrastructure in general), we must make defenses smarter and more autonomous. However, while reducing the role of the human in the loop may provide benefits like quicker reaction time, better anomaly detection and a potential shift in strategic balance of power, it will also lead to new security challenges. Many of these challenges have a profound impact on the ethical, moral and legal aspects of cyber security, which can only be addressed in open-minded and multi-disciplinary discussions. Research and development of different automated procedures of supporting defensive and offensive cyber security operations have been conducted over a number of years, but mostly as independent isolated efforts, e.g. automatic alarm correlation procedures exploited in different intrusion detection systems, automatic vi vulnerability scanners, data mining techniques for generating patterns of new cyber attacks, expert systems advising IT personnel how to recover networks and systems after the impact of the cyber attack, machine learning and genetic algorithms to model the propagation of computer viruses and botnets, and others. The mission and vision of this conference is to look on automation of cyber conflict operations from synergistic multi-disciplinary perspective. The conference intention was to underscore the role of automation not just as enabling cyber security technology, but as a critical factor, which makes the future cyber defense and offense possible, and what kind of legal, social and moral implications we have to be concerned. In this context the annual Cyber Conflict (CyCon) conferences conducted yearly in Tallinn by the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence are continuing to provide their unique perspective. This distinctiveness is marked by an innovative synergistic approach to the conceptual framework, architectures, processes and systems of cyber security and conflict. It holistically examines computer science and IT technologies, law, strategic and policy matters, military doctrine, social and economic concerns and human behavioral modeling with respect to cyber space. The proceedings of this 5th International Conference on Cyber Conflict 2013 (CyCon 2013) are collected in this volume. The 26 were selected by the conference program committee following a rigorous peer review process. The papers are spread across the legal, policy, strategic, and technical spectra of cyber conflict, specifically focusing on the issues of automation. They include sophisticated analyses of topics like offensive and defensive cyber activities, the concept of the cyber space, its legal and technical boundaries, and the fundamental notions of cyber attacks, cyber attackers, cyber conflict, and cyber warfare. This volume is arranged into five chapters. The first chapter, Cyber Space – Automatic Information Sharing and Access, discusses the models of organizing cyber security information into a ubiquitous smart space, where information can be shared by cooperative cyber defense parties, can be automatically aggregated, and can be accessed depending on the operational context. The second chapter, Attack Modeling – Washing Away the Borders between Cyber and Kinetic Attack, discusses important issues of modeling cyber attacks, looks on limits of automatically generated cyber attacks, and explores new paradigms of cyber attacks, which directly impact entities and processes in the kinetic (physical) world. The third chapter, Cyber Attack Threat Assessment and Impact propagation is devoted to a wide spectrum of technical and legal issues associated with the analysis of the threat and impact of cyber attacks. The fourth chapter, Cyber Command – Towards Automatic Operations, collects number of papers that examine automatic procedures of tactical cyberspace operations, algorithms of detecting complex cyber attacks by automatic correlations of intrusion alerts from multiple sources, and novel architectures of building autonomic (automatic and autonomous) cyber vii security decision-making processes. The final chapter, Cyber Conflict - Politics, Semantics, Ethics and Moral,
Recommended publications
  • Statistical Structures: Fingerprinting Malware for Classification and Analysis
    Statistical Structures: Fingerprinting Malware for Classification and Analysis Daniel Bilar Wellesley College (Wellesley, MA) Colby College (Waterville, ME) bilar <at> alum dot dartmouth dot org Why Structural Fingerprinting? Goal: Identifying and classifying malware Problem: For any single fingerprint, balance between over-fitting (type II error) and under- fitting (type I error) hard to achieve Approach: View binaries simultaneously from different structural perspectives and perform statistical analysis on these ‘structural fingerprints’ Different Perspectives Idea: Multiple perspectives may increase likelihood of correct identification and classification Structural Description Statistical static / Perspective Fingerprint dynamic? Assembly Count different Opcode Primarily instruction instructions frequency static distribution Win 32 API Observe API calls API call vector Primarily call made dynamic System Explore graph- Graph structural Primarily Dependence modeled control and properties static Graph data dependencies Fingerprint: Opcode frequency distribution Synopsis: Statically disassemble the binary, tabulate the opcode frequencies and construct a statistical fingerprint with a subset of said opcodes. Goal: Compare opcode fingerprint across non- malicious software and malware classes for quick identification and classification purposes. Main result: ‘Rare’ opcodes explain more data variation then common ones Goodware: Opcode Distribution 1, 2 ---------.exe Procedure: -------.exe 1. Inventoried PEs (EXE, DLL, ---------.exe etc) on XP box with Advanced Disk Catalog 2. Chose random EXE samples size: 122880 with MS Excel and Index totalopcodes: 10680 3, 4 your Files compiler: MS Visual C++ 6.0 3. Ran IDA with modified class: utility (process) InstructionCounter plugin on sample PEs 0001. 002145 20.08% mov 4. Augmented IDA output files 0002. 001859 17.41% push with PEID results (compiler) 0003. 000760 7.12% call and general ‘functionality 0004.
    [Show full text]
  • Start List 2021 IRONMAN Copenhagen (Last Update: 2021-08-15) Sorted by PRO, AWA, Pole Posistion and Age Group (AG) Search for Your Name with "Ctrl F"
    Start list 2021 IRONMAN Copenhagen (last update: 2021-08-15) Sorted by PRO, AWA, Pole Posistion and Age Group (AG) Search for your name with "Ctrl F" BIB First name Last name AG AWA TriClub Nationallty Please note that BIBs will be given onsite according to the selected swim time you choose in registration oniste. 1 Hogenhaug Kristian MPRO DNK (Denmark) 2 Molinari Giulio MPRO ITA (Italy) 3 Wojt Lukasz MPRO DEU (Germany) 4 Svensson Jesper MPRO SWE (Sweden) 5 Sanders Lionel MPRO CAN (Canada) 6 Smales Elliot MPRO GBR (United Kingdom) 7 Heemeryck Pieter MPRO BEL (Belgium) 8 Mcnamee David MPRO GBR (United Kingdom) 9 Nilsson Patrik MPRO SWE (Sweden) 10 Hindkjær Kristian MPRO DNK (Denmark) 11 Plese David MPRO SVN (Slovenia) 12 Kovacic Jaroslav MPRO SVN (Slovenia) 14 Jarrige Yvan MPRO FRA (France) 15 Schuster Paul MPRO DEU (Germany) 16 Dário Vinhal Thiago MPRO BRA (Brazil) 17 Lyngsø Petersen Mathias MPRO DNK (Denmark) 18 Koutny Philipp MPRO CHE (Switzerland) 19 Amorelli Igor MPRO BRA (Brazil) 20 Petersen-Bach Jens MPRO DNK (Denmark) 21 Olsen Mikkel Hojborg MPRO DNK (Denmark) 22 Korfitsen Oliver MPRO DNK (Denmark) 23 Rahn Fabian MPRO DEU (Germany) 24 Trakic Strahinja MPRO SRB (Serbia) 25 Rother David MPRO DEU (Germany) 26 Herbst Marcus MPRO DEU (Germany) 27 Ohde Luis Henrique MPRO BRA (Brazil) 28 McMahon Brent MPRO CAN (Canada) 29 Sowieja Dominik MPRO DEU (Germany) 30 Clavel Maurice MPRO DEU (Germany) 31 Krauth Joachim MPRO DEU (Germany) 32 Rocheteau Yann MPRO FRA (France) 33 Norberg Sebastian MPRO SWE (Sweden) 34 Neef Sebastian MPRO DEU (Germany) 35 Magnien Dylan MPRO FRA (France) 36 Björkqvist Morgan MPRO SWE (Sweden) 37 Castellà Serra Vicenç MPRO ESP (Spain) 38 Řenč Tomáš MPRO CZE (Czech Republic) 39 Benedikt Stephen MPRO AUT (Austria) 40 Ceccarelli Mattia MPRO ITA (Italy) 41 Günther Fabian MPRO DEU (Germany) 42 Najmowicz Sebastian MPRO POL (Poland) If your club is not listed, please log into your IRONMAN Account (www.ironman.com/login) and connect your IRONMAN Athlete Profile with your club.
    [Show full text]
  • Legacy Image
    5-(948-~gblb SOWARE ENGINEERING LABORATORY SERIES SEL-95-004 PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTIETH ANNUAL SOFTWARE ENGINEERING WORKSHOP DECEMBER 1995 National Aeronautics and Space Administration Goddard Space Flight Center Greenbelt, Maryland 20771 Proceedings of the Twentieth Annual Software Engineering Workshop November 29-30,1995 GODDARD SPACE FLIGHT CENTER Greenbelt, Maryland The Software Engineering Laboratory (SEL) is an organization sponsored by the National Aeronautics and Space AdministratiodGoddard Space Flight Center (NASAIGSFC) and created to investigate the effectiveness of software engineering technologies when applied to the development of applications software. The SEL was created in 1976 and has three primary organizational members: NASAIGSFC, Software Engineering Branch The University of Maryland, Department of Computer Science .I Computer Sciences Corporation, Software Engineering Operation The goals of the SEL are (1) to understand the software development process in the GSFC environment; (2) to measure the effects of various methodologies, tools, and models on this process; and (3) to identifjr and then to apply successful development practices. The activities, findings, and recommendations of the SEL are recorded in the Software Engineering Laboratory Series, a continuing series of reports that includes this document. Documents from the Software Engineering Laboratory Series can be obtained via the SEL homepage at: or by writing to: Software Engineering Branch Code 552 Goddard Space Flight Center Greenbelt, Maryland 2077 1 SEW Proceedings iii The views and findings expressed herein are those of, the authors and presenters and do not necessarily represent the views, estimates, or policies of the SEL. All material herein is reprinted as submitted by authors and presenters, who are solely responsible for compliance with any relevant copyright, patent, or other proprietary restrictions.
    [Show full text]
  • The Spirit of Discovery
    Foundation «Интеркультура» AFS RUSSIA 2019 THE SPIRIT OF DISCOVERY This handbook belongs to ______________________ From ________________________ Contents Welcome letter ………………………………………………………………………………………………………… Page 3 1. General information about Russia ………………………………………………………………… Page 4 - Geography and Climate ……………………………………………………………………………… Page 4 - History ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. Page 5 - Religion ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… Page 6 - Language ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… Page 6 2. AFS Russia ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… Page 7 3. Your life in Russia …………………………………………………………………………………………………… Page 11 - Arrival ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. Page 11 - Your host family ……………………………………………………………………………………………… Page 12 - Your host school …………………………………………………………………………………………… Page 13 - Language course …………………………………………………………………………………………… Page 15 - AFS activities ……………………………………………………………………………………………………. Page 17 * Check yourself, part 1 ………………………………………………………………………………………. Page 18 4. Life in Russia …………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. Page 20 - General information about Russian Families ………………………………… Page 20 - General information about the School system……………………………… Page 22 - Extracurricular activities …………………………………………………………………………………… Page 24 - Social life …………………………………………………………………………………………………………… Page 25 - Holidays and parties ……………………………………………………………………………………. Page 28 5. Russian peculiarities ………………………………………………………………………………………….. Page 29 6. Organizational matters ………………………………………………………………………………………
    [Show full text]
  • Exploring Corporate Decision Makers' Attitudes Towards Active Cyber
    Protecting the Information Society: Exploring Corporate Decision Makers’ Attitudes towards Active Cyber Defence as an Online Deterrence Option by Patrick Neal A Dissertation Submitted to the College of Interdisciplinary Studies in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of DOCTOR OF SOCIAL SCIENCES Royal Roads University Victoria, British Columbia, Canada Supervisor: Dr. Bernard Schissel February, 2019 Patrick Neal, 2019 COMMITTEE APPROVAL The members of Patrick Neal’s Dissertation Committee certify that they have read the dissertation titled Protecting the Information Society: Exploring Corporate Decision Makers’ Attitudes towards Active Cyber Defence as an Online Deterrence Option and recommend that it be accepted as fulfilling the dissertation requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Social Sciences: Dr. Bernard Schissel [signature on file] Dr. Joe Ilsever [signature on file] Ms. Bessie Pang [signature on file] Final approval and acceptance of this dissertation is contingent upon the candidate’s submission of the final copy of the dissertation to Royal Roads University. The dissertation supervisor confirms to have read this dissertation and recommends that it be accepted as fulfilling the dissertation requirements: Dr. Bernard Schissel[signature on file] Creative Commons Statement This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial- ShareAlike 2.5 Canada License. To view a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ca/ . Some material in this work is not being made available under the terms of this licence: • Third-Party material that is being used under fair dealing or with permission. • Any photographs where individuals are easily identifiable. Contents Creative Commons Statement............................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Getting to Yes with China in Cyberspace
    Getting to Yes with China in Cyberspace Scott Warren Harold, Martin C. Libicki, Astrid Stuth Cevallos C O R P O R A T I O N For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/rr1335 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data ISBN: 978-0-8330-9249-6 Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. © Copyright 2016 RAND Corporation R® is a registered trademark Cover Image: US President Barack Obama (R) checks hands with Chinese president Xi Jinping after a press conference in the Rose Garden of the White House September 25, 2015 in Washington, DC. President Obama is welcoming President Jinping during a state arrival ceremony. Photo by Olivier Douliery/ABACA (Sipa via AP Images). Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions.html. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.
    [Show full text]
  • GQ: Practical Containment for Measuring Modern Malware Systems
    GQ: Practical Containment for Measuring Modern Malware Systems Christian Kreibich Nicholas Weaver Chris Kanich ICSI & UC Berkeley ICSI & UC Berkeley UC San Diego [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] Weidong Cui Vern Paxson Microsoft Research ICSI & UC Berkeley [email protected] [email protected] Abstract their behavior, sometimes only for seconds at a time (e.g., to un- Measurement and analysis of modern malware systems such as bot- derstand the bootstrapping behavior of a binary, perhaps in tandem nets relies crucially on execution of specimens in a setting that en- with static analysis), but potentially also for weeks on end (e.g., to ables them to communicate with other systems across the Internet. conduct long-term botnet measurement via “infiltration” [13]). Ethical, legal, and technical constraints however demand contain- This need to execute malware samples in a laboratory setting ex- ment of resulting network activity in order to prevent the malware poses a dilemma. On the one hand, unconstrained execution of the from harming others while still ensuring that it exhibits its inher- malware under study will likely enable it to operate fully as in- ent behavior. Current best practices in this space are sorely lack- tended, including embarking on a large array of possible malicious ing: measurement researchers often treat containment superficially, activities, such as pumping out spam, contributing to denial-of- sometimes ignoring it altogether. In this paper we present GQ, service floods, conducting click fraud, or obscuring other attacks a malware execution “farm” that uses explicit containment prim- by proxying malicious traffic.
    [Show full text]
  • How to Analyze the Cyber Threat from Drones
    C O R P O R A T I O N KATHARINA LEY BEST, JON SCHMID, SHANE TIERNEY, JALAL AWAN, NAHOM M. BEYENE, MAYNARD A. HOLLIDAY, RAZA KHAN, KAREN LEE How to Analyze the Cyber Threat from Drones Background, Analysis Frameworks, and Analysis Tools For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RR2972 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication. ISBN: 978-1-9774-0287-5 Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. © Copyright 2020 RAND Corporation R® is a registered trademark. Cover design by Rick Penn-Kraus Cover images: drone, Kadmy - stock.adobe.com; data, Getty Images. Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute www.rand.org Preface This report explores the security implications of the rapid growth in unmanned aerial systems (UAS), focusing specifically on current and future vulnerabilities.
    [Show full text]
  • Advanced Persistent Threats
    Advanced Persistent Threats September 30, 2010 By: Ali Golshan ([email protected]) Agenda Page Current Threat Landscape 2 The Disconnect 10 The Risk 19 What now? 25 Section 1 Current Threat Landscape • Context • Common Targets for APTs • Recent Attacks • Shift in Purpose • Repercussions Section 1 - Current Threat Landscape Context Conventional Cyber Attacks • Conventional cyber attacks use known vulnerabilities to exploit the un-specific targets • Examples include malware (viruses, worms and Trojans), and traditional hacking and cracking methods Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) • There is a new breed of attacks that is being referred to as Advanced Persistent Threats • APTs are targeted cyber based attacks using unknown vulnerabilities, customized to extract a specific set of data from a specific organization • APTs have the following characteristics that make them particularly dangerous: • Persistent: The persistent nature makes them difficult to be extracted • Updatable: The attacker can update the malware to be able to continuously evade security solutions even as they are upgraded Section 1 - Current Threat Landscape APTs target specific organizations to obtain specific information Since these are specialized attacks, they are customized for their targets, and are designed to extract very specific information based on the target. Most common targets are: Government agencies • Government agencies are targeted by Foreign Intelligence Services (FIS) • APTs can be used for theft of military level secrets and in cyber warfare for destabilization along with conventional warfare • 2007 McAfee report stated approximately 120 countries are trying to create weaponized internet capabilities • Example: The Russia-Georgia war of 2008 was the first example of a APT coinciding with conventional warfare.
    [Show full text]
  • Red Teaming the Red Team: Utilizing Cyber Espionage to Combat Terrorism
    Journal of Strategic Security Volume 6 Number 5 Volume 6, No. 3, Fall 2013 Supplement: Ninth Annual IAFIE Article 3 Conference: Expanding the Frontiers of Intelligence Education Red Teaming the Red Team: Utilizing Cyber Espionage to Combat Terrorism Gary Adkins The University of Texas at El Paso Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss pp. 1-9 Recommended Citation Adkins, Gary. "Red Teaming the Red Team: Utilizing Cyber Espionage to Combat Terrorism." Journal of Strategic Security 6, no. 3 Suppl. (2013): 1-9. This Papers is brought to you for free and open access by the Open Access Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Strategic Security by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Red Teaming the Red Team: Utilizing Cyber Espionage to Combat Terrorism This papers is available in Journal of Strategic Security: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol6/iss5/ 3 Adkins: Red Teaming the Red Team: Utilizing Cyber Espionage to Combat Terrorism Red Teaming the Red Team: Utilizing Cyber Espionage to Combat Terrorism Gary Adkins Introduction The world has effectively exited the Industrial Age and is firmly planted in the Information Age. Global communication at the speed of light has become a great asset to both businesses and private citizens. However, there is a dark side to the age we live in as it allows terrorist groups to communicate, plan, fund, recruit, and spread their message to the world. Given the relative anonymity the Internet provides, many law enforcement and security agencies investigations are hindered in not only locating would be terrorists but also in disrupting their operations.
    [Show full text]
  • An Email Application with Active Spoof Monitoring and Control
    2016 International Conference on Computer Communication and Informatics (ICCCI -2016), Jan. 07 – 09, 2016, Coimbatore, INDIA An Email Application with Active Spoof Monitoring and Control T.P. Fowdur, Member IEEE and L.Veerasoo [email protected] [email protected] Department of Electrical and Electronic Engineering University of Mauritius Mauritius Abstract- Spoofing is a serious security issue for email overview of some recent anti-spoofing mechanisms is now applications. Although several anti-email spoofing techniques presented have been developed, most of them do not provide users with sufficient control and information on spoof attacks. In this paper In [11], the authors proposed an anti-spoofing scheme for IP a web-based client oriented anti-spoofing email application is packets which provides an extended inter-domain packet filter proposed which actively detects, monitors and controls email architecture along with an algorithm for filter placement. A spoofing attacks. When the application detects a spoofed security key is first placed in the identification field of the IP message, it triggers an alert message and sends the spoofed header and a border router checks the key on the source message into a spoof filter. Moreover, the user who has received packet. If this key corresponds to the key of the target packet, the spoofed message is given the option of notifying the real sender of the spoofing attack. In this way an active spoof control the packet is considered valid, else it is flagged as a spoofed is achieved. The application is hosted using the HTTPS protocol packet. A Packet Resonance Strategy (PRS) which detects and uses notification messages that are sent in parallel with email different types of spoofing attacks that use up the resources of messages via a channel that has been secured by the Secure the server or commit data theft at a datacenter was proposed in Socket Layer (SSL) protocol.
    [Show full text]
  • OCLC Use by Library Clusters. Illinois Valley Library System OCLC Experimental Project Report No. 5
    DOCUMENT RESUME ED 241 063 IR 050 673 AUTHOR Bills, Linda G. TITLE OCLC Use by Library Clusters. Illinois Valley Library System OCLC Experimental Project Report No. 5. INSTITUTION Illinois State Library, Springfield.; Illinois Valley Library System, Pekin. PUB DATE May 83 GRANT LSCA-I-79-IX-C NOTE 67p.; For related documents, see IR 050 445 and IR 050 665. PUB TYPE Legal/Legislative/Regulatory Materials (090) -- Reports - Research/Technical (143) EDRS PRICE MF01/PC03 Plus Postage. DESCRIPTORS Attitudes; *Cataloging; Cost Effectiveness; Input Output Devices; *Interlibrary Loans; *Library Networks; *Online Systems; Records (Forms); Regional Cooperation; *Shared Services IDENTIFIERS *Illinois Valley Library System; Multitype Library Networks; *OCLC; Resource Sharing ABSTRACT A project was conducted from 1980 to 1982 to examine the costs and benefits of OCLC use in 29 small and medium-sized member libraries of the Illinois Valley Library System (IVLS). Academic, school, public, and special libraries participated in the project. A major project objective was to determine whether the sharing of an OCLC terminal by two to five libraries in close geographic proximity could significantly cut costs and yet provide acceptable service. This report describes specific cluster work arrangements for cataloging and interlibrary loan, including cataloging at the host library; cataloging from printouts; cataloging by the host library; conducting part of the cataloging procedure at the guest library and the rest at the host library; limiting interlibrary loan activity to lending of materials requested via OCLC; lending and borrowing through the host library; lending and borrowing by the guest library; and dial access interlibrary loan use and shared use of a portable terminal.
    [Show full text]