A History of U.S. Civilians in Field Comint Operations, 1953-1960

SECRET George F. Howe A History of U.S. Civilians in Field Comint Operations, 1953-1960 i(bl 11 I (b) (3)-P.L. 86-36 The use of civilians in field Comint operations, a accomplishing their m1ss10ns. They in turn had, since recurrent proposal, received close attention and was studied World War II, been heavily dependent upon conscription by several bodies during the period 195 3-1960, resulting for personnel trained as intercept operators. Most operators in a number of critical questions: Whose operations? left military service after one tour of duty, and the SCA's Whose civilians? What kinds of operations? Can civilians were engaged during the/1950's in continuous and be used instead of military personnel as intercept operators? expensive efforts to replace ./their experienced intercept If they are, can they be intermingled with the military, or operators with newly trained men. One estimate of the kept in compartmented units though collocated, or located costs of procuring and training came to $8,000 per man, only at all-civilian stations run by NSA? Could the pay and and losses through failure to re-enlist were estimated as perquisites of civilian operators, professionals in the high as 85 per cent. work, be such as to satisfy them without injuring the Despite this continuous flow of operators into and out of morale of the military personnel? Could a civilian the SCA's and a concurrent decline in the overall numbers professional corps of intercept operators encourage the available, the /U.S.' in the l 950's began expanding military operators to perform at higher levels in order to int<•~; 0,1,_\ion/ A go•l oc:::Jnioccept po>iiion• (of qualify subsequently for civilian employment? whic would be kept in operation and the remainder Would a civilian intercept operator program in NSA woul e stand-.by facilities available for emergency) was compete with the SCA's for the men the SCA's had to established in February 1954 with the approval of the JCS retain as Comint career personnel, and would NSA success and the Secretary of Defense. in competition undermine the SCA's? Deadlines for reaching this goal were deferred If civilians were used only in specialties for which repeatedly/between 1954 and 1958, culminating in 1958 military personnel were lacking, should they remain NSA in a reduction in the total number of positions employees or should each SCA develop its own overseas programmed. In fact, the SCA's would have needed at least civilian Comint group? How could dual control be .___ __.ladditional personnel during Fiscal Year 1958 to exercised well? man all positions and stations then scheduled, an almost These questions emerged; this short history presents impossible task. attempts to solve them. Specifically, in each of the SCA's, approximately 60 per Grounds for Considering the Use of Civilian intercept cent of the personnel served one tour; the other 40 per cent Operators Overseas were career specialists. Re-enlistment ratios differed for Although the U.S. Co mint effort was aided by collection each group and varied by service: for first-tour personnel, activities conducted by CIA, and by Second and Third the re-enlistment rate in the ASA was about 5.9 per cent, Parties, it was primarily dependent upon intercept the NSG about 10.8 per cent, and the AFSS about 17 per operations of the three SCA's. Consequently, success of the cent. For career personnel, the rates ~ere about 87, 95, intercept effort and quality of intercepted raw traffic, and 77 per cent. Also, after deducting time required for which furnished the very basis of Comint production, basic and technical training and six months for initial hinged to a high degree on the effectiveness of the SCA's in experience at a station, and allowing for return to the U.S. I IAfqI'.>Lt: VIA COMifq'f (t'fAfqMt:B OfqLY SECltl!T 5 ibi i3j-P.L. 86-36 and subsequent processing previous to discharge, less than operations. No atl-ci".ilian station would be attempted. The two years of productive service was realized in a four-year program was transmitted formally to the Chief of ASA in tour of duty. And this period was additionally shortened by January 195 5, to be implemented by June. military duties which on occasion required that an operator Within NSA, responsibility for the program was placed be away from his intercept position. on PROD, which assigned it to NSA-60.J These problems, together with an awareness of highly I lwas designated the CIVOP Project ofl"1c_e_r __ ..,....Du-n""·n_g ..... satisfactory British experience with civilian operators for February, April and May 1955, theDbillets were more than a decade, and CIA experience since 1951, allocated to NSA-60Z (a new administrative control provided the basis for consideration of the use of civilian point). To fill these, the Agency followed normal hiring intercept operators at U.S. sites overseas. procedures: PERS obtained applications from former Initial Consideration of the Possibilities intercept operators who had/completed their military As noted previously, in early 1954 the services were service in an SCA; NSA-60 made the selections from suddenly faced with sharply expanded personnel about 600 candidates /and managed the ensuing requirements for overseas collection, while their manpower preparations and placements. resources were reduced. And as their experienced intercept Applications from several candidates already employed operators left, the quantity and quality of intercept dropped by NSA facilitated .the first steps. Those hired for non considerably, creating serious problems for NSA. Morse intercept were tested for technical proficiency at Vine Hill Farms Station; the Selection Committee CIA, c::::Jha tempting to relocate its civilian (including NSA and ASA representatives) relied on records operators proposed to expand its intercept of experience in selecting Morse operators, and arranged activities to severa ot er stations of substantial size. It for a refresher course for them. The appointees also visited further proposed manning these stations with experienced elements/of NSA concerned with tasks relevant to their civilians recently discharged from the services. future work overseas. Representatives of NSA and CIA subsequently worked out NSA sent them in smal~~J.U.li:i...J.Ju....L..u.s;..J.1.LW&.1.C1~~~5;.;...., the terms of a mutually acceptable agreement. Before it ASA put them to work at gained USCIB's endorsement, however, NSA restudied the The use of civilian operators and determined that NSA might .....,..... __,,,.,,... .............. ~~---...-~ ..... ~~~~~~~~~......1 first CIVOP reported at his overseas station in July 1955. be in a better position to employall, or many, of the Others followed at intervals extending well into 1956, thus operators needed. Reasons given for\ this were (1) that avoiding the simultaneous rotation of excessive numbers NSA would be in a better position to furnish career-related when the time came. jobs and training during periods of rotation to the U.S., and (2) that NSA was in a better position to recruit Extending the Program to Include Civilian Non-Intercept experienced civilian operators among discharged service Personnel personnel. The CIVOP Program had hardly reached the stage of In 1954, NSA devised and coordinated a plan for using operations in the field when a broader use of civilians civilian intercept operators at military overseas stations, and began to receive serious consideration. ASA, encouraRed by ASA, whose intercept responsibilities were greatly enlarged G-1, Army General Staff, made plans to hire!"""1ivilian under the expanded intercept program, showed interest in operators as Army civilian employees. The Na~cing its testing the plan. NSA offered to provide civilian billetsand obligations under ~nded intercept program, the initial costs of practical tests atASA stations, and the contemplated addingL_J civilians in three annual Department of Defense instructed the Director, NSA, to increments to jts Commt activities. Also, ASA requested proceed with appropriate planning. DoD further requested that NSA furnis.iQnon-operator billets overseas to be that the Director of Central Intelligence defer for three filled while the CIVOP pilot program was in progress. months plans for CIA to develop a large corps of civilian NSJ\.subsequently agreed, .and the billets were allocated to operators. .. ASA as followµ::}or cryptan~lysts;Ofor linguists and The CIVOP Pilot Program cryptolinguists····Uo··for an IBM ...specialist,··· fo..··r··.··.····t···.·r •..• a•.•·.·.f ..f .. i'..and c..· arlysvo or... ····fi·o·rspecialists SIT analym.D in the Details of the CIVOP Pilot Program werertegod~~ed by maintenance of.equipment. representatives ofNSA and ASA during tht'l~tter pt:J 1954. NSA agreed to provide billets and funds for Profoials to Expa;,d the Civilian Operator Progt"am in civilian operators; it would ~so ~ecruit and trair,.t e(l1. Scope and Time ASA agreed to allocatethein t{) not more than two of its In August/1955 an 'NSA Task Group ~onsidered far existing stations jn eilch of the two main theaters of reaching proposals for the use of civilians overseas: ibi i 1 i u1• E8HlfiiT eMA'libi i3i-f'.L. 8G-.3fi HOJQbJ! .~...:, r::- ( lj CC(" 6 .;£&1 'll'lt!L,:) i b j i J! - •JJ ~~ 4 rJJ c OGA ibi il i ibi i3i ibi i3j-P.L. 86-36 CIA SECRET (bl 11 I (b) (3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(3)-50 USC 403 The group recognized chat the maximum size of the A critical problem was the year to be spent in the overseas civilian corps would be determined by the number United States on tasks and specialized training needed by of jobs available in the United States during a one-year professionals for advancement.

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