SECRET
George F. Howe
A History of U.S. Civilians in Field Comint Operations, 1953-1960
i(bl 11 I (b) (3)-P.L. 86-36
The use of civilians in field Comint operations, a accomplishing their m1ss10ns. They in turn had, since recurrent proposal, received close attention and was studied World War II, been heavily dependent upon conscription by several bodies during the period 195 3-1960, resulting for personnel trained as intercept operators. Most operators in a number of critical questions: Whose operations? left military service after one tour of duty, and the SCA's Whose civilians? What kinds of operations? Can civilians were engaged during the/1950's in continuous and be used instead of military personnel as intercept operators? expensive efforts to replace ./their experienced intercept If they are, can they be intermingled with the military, or operators with newly trained men. One estimate of the kept in compartmented units though collocated, or located costs of procuring and training came to $8,000 per man, only at all-civilian stations run by NSA? Could the pay and and losses through failure to re-enlist were estimated as perquisites of civilian operators, professionals in the high as 85 per cent. work, be such as to satisfy them without injuring the Despite this continuous flow of operators into and out of morale of the military personnel? Could a civilian the SCA's and a concurrent decline in the overall numbers professional corps of intercept operators encourage the available, the /U.S.' in the l 950's began expanding military operators to perform at higher levels in order to int<•~; 0,1,_\ion/ A go•l oc:::Jnioccept po>iiion• (of qualify subsequently for civilian employment? whic would be kept in operation and the remainder Would a civilian intercept operator program in NSA woul e stand-.by facilities available for emergency) was compete with the SCA's for the men the SCA's had to established in February 1954 with the approval of the JCS retain as Comint career personnel, and would NSA success and the Secretary of Defense. in competition undermine the SCA's? Deadlines for reaching this goal were deferred If civilians were used only in specialties for which repeatedly/between 1954 and 1958, culminating in 1958 military personnel were lacking, should they remain NSA in a reduction in the total number of positions employees or should each SCA develop its own overseas programmed. In fact, the SCA's would have needed at least civilian Comint group? How could dual control be .___ __.ladditional personnel during Fiscal Year 1958 to exercised well? man all positions and stations then scheduled, an almost These questions emerged; this short history presents impossible task. attempts to solve them. Specifically, in each of the SCA's, approximately 60 per Grounds for Considering the Use of Civilian intercept cent of the personnel served one tour; the other 40 per cent Operators Overseas were career specialists. Re-enlistment ratios differed for Although the U.S. Co mint effort was aided by collection each group and varied by service: for first-tour personnel, activities conducted by CIA, and by Second and Third the re-enlistment rate in the ASA was about 5.9 per cent, Parties, it was primarily dependent upon intercept the NSG about 10.8 per cent, and the AFSS about 17 per operations of the three SCA's. Consequently, success of the cent. For career personnel, the rates ~ere about 87, 95, intercept effort and quality of intercepted raw traffic, and 77 per cent. Also, after deducting time required for which furnished the very basis of Comint production, basic and technical training and six months for initial hinged to a high degree on the effectiveness of the SCA's in experience at a station, and allowing for return to the U.S.
I IAfqI'.>Lt: VIA COMifq'f (t'fAfqMt:B OfqLY SECltl!T 5 ibi i3j-P.L. 86-36
and subsequent processing previous to discharge, less than operations. No atl-ci".ilian station would be attempted. The two years of productive service was realized in a four-year program was transmitted formally to the Chief of ASA in tour of duty. And this period was additionally shortened by January 195 5, to be implemented by June. military duties which on occasion required that an operator Within NSA, responsibility for the program was placed be away from his intercept position. on PROD, which assigned it to NSA-60.J These problems, together with an awareness of highly I lwas designated the CIVOP Project ofl"1c_e_r __ ..,....Du-n""·n_g ..... satisfactory British experience with civilian operators for February, April and May 1955, theDbillets were more than a decade, and CIA experience since 1951, allocated to NSA-60Z (a new administrative control provided the basis for consideration of the use of civilian point). To fill these, the Agency followed normal hiring intercept operators at U.S. sites overseas. procedures: PERS obtained applications from former Initial Consideration of the Possibilities intercept operators who had/completed their military As noted previously, in early 1954 the services were service in an SCA; NSA-60 made the selections from suddenly faced with sharply expanded personnel about 600 candidates /and managed the ensuing requirements for overseas collection, while their manpower preparations and placements. resources were reduced. And as their experienced intercept Applications from several candidates already employed operators left, the quantity and quality of intercept dropped by NSA facilitated .the first steps. Those hired for non considerably, creating serious problems for NSA. Morse intercept were tested for technical proficiency at Vine Hill Farms Station; the Selection Committee CIA, c::::Jha tempting to relocate its civilian (including NSA and ASA representatives) relied on records operators proposed to expand its intercept of experience in selecting Morse operators, and arranged activities to severa ot er stations of substantial size. It for a refresher course for them. The appointees also visited further proposed manning these stations with experienced elements/of NSA concerned with tasks relevant to their civilians recently discharged from the services. future work overseas. Representatives of NSA and CIA subsequently worked out NSA sent them in smal~~J.U.li:i...J.Ju....L..u.s;..J.1.LW&.1.C1~~~5;.;...., the terms of a mutually acceptable agreement. Before it ASA put them to work at gained USCIB's endorsement, however, NSA restudied the The use of civilian operators and determined that NSA might .....,..... __,,,.,,...... ~~---...-~ ..... ~~~~~~~~~...... 1 first CIVOP reported at his overseas station in July 1955. be in a better position to employall, or many, of the Others followed at intervals extending well into 1956, thus operators needed. Reasons given for\ this were (1) that avoiding the simultaneous rotation of excessive numbers NSA would be in a better position to furnish career-related when the time came. jobs and training during periods of rotation to the U.S., and (2) that NSA was in a better position to recruit Extending the Program to Include Civilian Non-Intercept experienced civilian operators among discharged service Personnel personnel. The CIVOP Program had hardly reached the stage of In 1954, NSA devised and coordinated a plan for using operations in the field when a broader use of civilians civilian intercept operators at military overseas stations, and began to receive serious consideration. ASA, encouraRed by ASA, whose intercept responsibilities were greatly enlarged G-1, Army General Staff, made plans to hire!"""1ivilian under the expanded intercept program, showed interest in operators as Army civilian employees. The Na~cing its testing the plan. NSA offered to provide civilian billetsand obligations under ~nded intercept program, the initial costs of practical tests atASA stations, and the contemplated addingL_J civilians in three annual Department of Defense instructed the Director, NSA, to increments to jts Commt activities. Also, ASA requested proceed with appropriate planning. DoD further requested that NSA furnis.iQnon-operator billets overseas to be that the Director of Central Intelligence defer for three filled while the CIVOP pilot program was in progress. months plans for CIA to develop a large corps of civilian NSJ\.subsequently agreed, .and the billets were allocated to operators. .. ASA as followµ::}or cryptan~lysts;Ofor linguists and The CIVOP Pilot Program cryptolinguists····Uo··for an IBM ...specialist,··· fo..··r··.··.····t···.·r •..• a•.•·.·.f ..f .. i'..and c..· arlysvo or... ····fi·o·rspecialists SIT analym.D in the Details of the CIVOP Pilot Program werertegod~~ed by maintenance of.equipment. representatives ofNSA and ASA during tht'l~tter pt:J 1954. NSA agreed to provide billets and funds for Profoials to Expa;,d the Civilian Operator Progt"am in civilian operators; it would ~so ~ecruit and trair,.t e(l1. Scope and Time ASA agreed to allocatethein t{) not more than two of its In August/1955 an 'NSA Task Group ~onsidered far existing stations jn eilch of the two main theaters of reaching proposals for the use of civilians overseas: ibi i 1 i u1• E8HlfiiT eMA'libi i3i-f'.L. 8G-.3fi HOJQbJ! .~...:, r::- ( lj CC(" 6 .;£&1 'll'lt!L,:) i b j i J! - •JJ ~~ 4 rJJ c OGA ibi il i ibi i3i ibi i3j-P.L. 86-36
CIA SECRET
(bl 11 I (b) (3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(3)-50 USC 403
The group recognized chat the maximum size of the A critical problem was the year to be spent in the overseas civilian corps would be determined by the number United States on tasks and specialized training needed by of jobs available in the United States during a one-year professionals for advancement. If the number of bi I lets perib:Jation and by the length of the overseas tour. were to be sufficient, only NSA could provide enough of Thu billets in the CONUS and tours of three years them. If the casks and training were co be fitting. woul allow an overseas maximum ofllbillecs. They administration by NSA would be necessary. The majority assumed that the overseas positions ~be filled by of the Group favored a plan for using civilians in various personnel recently discharged from the SCA's, and by field Comint operations which would yield a joint ochers in the Comint agencies.at home, and chat NSA NSA-SCA operation. The minority asserted chat the plan would provide the extra billets needed for administration, would bring about a fundamental change in the training, operational control/and ocher aspects of support. relationship of NSA and the services with reference to Finally, they assumed thatthe SCA's would be receptive to overseas stations, and would involve dual control over the use of civilians overseas. selection, training and career management. as well as an The Task Group discussed three fundamentally unsound division of responsibilities. different ways of establishing a corps of civilians in field In summary, the Task Group proposed chat the services Co mint operations: ( 1) an NSA corps, including whole establish requirements, by numbers and types, for civilian N.SA intercept stations; (2) an SCA operation, in which specialists to be employed at their overseas bases. The each SCA had/its own civilian corps, which NSA might, or services would contribute billets and funds to a central might not, have recruited, selected, cleared and trained; personnel pool, in accordance with those requirements. and (3) a joint NSA-SCA operation, in which NSA NSA would administer the pool, consisting of NSA civilian /employees were placed under the operational employees in every respect, and would assign chem to control of commanders of SCA units, while the SCA's overseas SCA establishments at which they would be under provided the necessary funds, billets, and local logistic the operational control of the commanding officer. Each support. employee would spend one year in four in the United Scates
(bl 11 I I JltHDLE Yli\ COl'ollNT Cl h\W4ELS Gr4LY (b) (3)-P.L. 86-36 SECRET 7 Bbl 111 /~j,b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 SECRET
at NSA or an SCA, od a Joq. or in training. NSA would be The Chief, ASA, was advised in April 1956 by Chief, responsible for budg~tihg, allocation of billets, recruiting, ASA, Far East, that the CIFCO (Army) Program was a selecting, training, cfe~ril'lg,\placing, security S\lpervision, success which deserved continuation, even though it raised career management a11.d (<>t~tion. The civilians sho.uld be some administrative problems. In May 1956, however, able to hold membership in military reserve organizations, Chief, ASA, Europe, stated that the CIFCO Program had and legislation would. qe• .. sought to exempt them frorn already demonstrated that no civilians should be used in conscription and to requitb them.\to remain at their posts in overseas Comint activities unless they possessed unique cases of military emergency.. \\ \ ~ skills unobtainable among the military. Civilian specialists The Task Group recornmendeH that a limited number woul
SECRET
Although the SCA's rejected the plan for using civilian .__,,....__.~nit commander came the opinion that all objectives intercept operators at \military stations, they recognized the of the CIVOP program could be attained through an necessity of using civilians for advanced, specialized upward revision of the grade structure for military technical activities. AFSS\ endorsed that portion of NSA's intercept operators. CIFCO Plan, and urged its early implementation. ASA, on Questionnaires answered by a large portion of the the other hand, informe.d DIRNSA that it would develop intercept operators themselves suggested certain subjects in its own civilian ern•. ploym·.. en·t.. program,. and asked~ which training should be intensified. At all four stations, arrangements be made for \transfer ofOof the L_J work schedules, leaves and disciplinary policies had CIFCO (A) civilian employees, including some intercept satisfied the men, though interest was expressed in having operators, from NSA to ASA. That would be the first stage the chiefs of NSA field activities exercise more control in filling the initial []Army spaces furnished to ASA for over personnel administration. overseas civilians, a number. that\. could be expanded later. Analytic units in PROD reported that the copy received At the same time, ASA recognized that it lacked the jobs from the civilian operators was more accurate and plentiful and training facilities which \its ClFCO employees would than that previously obtained. Also, notations (operator's require during their rotation years in.the United States, and comments) furnished by the civilian operators engaged in it therefore proposed that NSA and\ASA adopt an inter General Search were most helpful. agency career plan. COLL, which had administered the program until DIRNSA did not accept that proposal. He agreed October 1956, reported that it had encountered minor instead that ASA might attempt to recruit civilian problems in hiring, security, training, travel, promotion personnel then stationed oversea.s in NSA's CIFCO (A) policy, and others. The besetting difficulty was housing Program, but only subject to the \stipulation that their re shortages at stations. COLL also noted that, had employment in NSA would not be guaranteed after the program been continued, overseas tours would have transfer. He further stipulated \that NSA employees begun terminating during July 1957, and that overseas who were unwilling to transfer, but had been replacements for returning operators, as well as their requested by ASA to do so, would, whenever feasible, be absorption into activities at NSA, would have posed detailed to ASA. During an ASA employee's rotation to problems. the U.S., NSA would accept him on detail when he could In conclusion, PROD recommended that the CIFCO be properly used by NSA. (A) Program be enlarged and made permanent, and that NSA's Evaluation of the CIFCO (A} Pilot Program in the NSA field activities in the theaters be responsible for a 1956 larger role in its administration. It proposed that each SCA install a liaison team to work with NSA on ·matters of Conclusions reached by the SCA's differed somewhat administration and support. from the findings of NSA when PROD evaluated the CIFCO (A) pilot program in 1956. Fromllof the0 •••••• ASA station commanders, after months o/expirience with To be concluded next issue. civilian operators in their units, came recommendations that the program be continued because it retained experienced men whose output was superior. They attributed that superiority to the high level of skills, the George F. Howe retired in 1971 after serving over ability to rely on a continuity of two years on particular fifteen years as NSA Historian. He is the author of many problems, and the lack of interruptions in regular work at studies and histories of cryptologic operations, a bi the intercept positions. The civilians, they said, had ography of Chester A. Anhur, a history of the United States, and the official Army history of U.S. operations actually stimulated some military operators to perform at in Northwest Africa in World War II. higher levels than had previously been the case. From the
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