security and human rights 27 (2016) 467-478
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The Evolving Dilemma of the Status Quo in Nagorno-Karabakh
Anahit Shirinyan Academy Associate with Chatham House, The Royal Institute of International Affairs
Abstract
The 4-day war in Nagorno-Karabakh in April 2016 has shown that a shift in the political and military balance of power between the conflicting parties is not enough to reverse the status quo by military means. The use of force and the threat of war aggravate the conflict’s security dilemma, further consolidating the status quo. As the osce Minsk Group’s mediation efforts remain hostage to the geopolitics behind the conflict, it is the political will of the conflicting parties and their adherence to fair play and mutual compromise that can shift the logic of the conflict’s dynamics into a more constructive course.
Keywords
Nagorno-Karabakh – Armenia – Azerbaijan – osce
Introduction
Over the last 3 years the logic of the peace process over the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has significantly altered. With the peace talks between Armenia and Azerbaijan in a stalemate since 2011, the gradual “unfreezing” of the conflict culminated into the 4-day war in April 2016.1 The threat of war has emerged as
1 For a detailed record of how the flare-up unfolded, see: E. Sanamyan, “April 2016 war in Karabakh: a chronology”, 6 April 2016, http://yandunts.blogspot.am/2016/04/april-2016-war -in-karabakh-chronology.html.
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Implications of the April War for the osce Led Minsk Group Talks
The 4-day war of April 2016 is the newest watershed in the dynamics of the conflict. A year on, the impact of the militarisation of the peace process is more acute than ever and will continue to affect the conflict’s dynamics in the future. There are 2 major interpretations as to what Azerbaijan – broadly seen as the one to have initiated the April 2016 flare-up2 – was trying to achieve by its offensive against Nagorno-Karabakh. One interpretation suggests that Azerbaijan had planned to achieve considerable territorial gains – in line with its longtime rhetoric that it will take lands by force if talks fail – by employ- ing blitzkrieg type tactics. This version is based on the analysis of the military
2 T. de Waal, “Dangerous Days in Karabakh”, 2 April 2016, http://carnegie.ru/commentary/ 2016/04/02/dangerous-days-in-karabakh/iwiu.
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tactics, the sequence and nature of the arsenal that Azerbaijan employed when it launched the attack.3 A more widespread interpretation maintains that Azerbaijan aimed at reaching a limited military advantage to attract international attention and get more favourable terms for itself at the negotiat- ing table. These scenarios are not necessarily mutually exclusive, and could be alternate maximum and minimum goals, given the fact that this was the first serious probe of where the military balance stands since the 1994 ceasefire and following a decade of Azerbaijani military build-up.4 Having accumulated vast amounts of sophisticated weaponry fueled by oil and gas revenues, Azerbaijan is at the peak of its military build-up. The coun- try’s defence budget is undergoing severe cuts5 following the collapse of oil prices and devaluation of the manat, and the perceived change in the military balance of power between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the latter’s favour make now the best time to use military might for both military and political gains. Behind the logic of the April 4-day war were also geopolitical drivers. The flare-up came amidst deterioration of Armenia’s foreign political standing fol- lowing the September 2013 U-turn,6 and Yerevan’s subsequent difficulties in as- serting itself in the old yet new “Eurasian family”. As the security situation not only along the Line of Contact (LoC) around Nagorno-Karabakh, but also on the Armenia-Azerbaijan de jure border started to deteriorate drastically since 2014, Armenia found its formal allies in the Collective Treaty Security Organi- sation (csto) as well as the Eurasian Economic Union (eeu) aligning more with Azerbaijan which they considered a more valuable partner in strategic and economic terms.7
3 Details of the April 2016 military actions remain limited and are only available through first- hand sources. See for example, Armenian Defence Ministry spokesperson’s interpretation: “Analysis of the 4-day April war”, Armenpress, 14 April 2016, https://armenpress.am/eng/ news/843561/analysis-of-the-4-day-april-war.html. 4 M. Seputyte and O. Ummelas, “Oil Riches Help Azerbaijan Outgun Armenia in Military Spending”, Bloomberg, 6 April 2016, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-04-06/ oil-riches-help-azerbaijan-outgun-armenia-in-military-spending. 5 J. Kucera, “Struggling Economy Forces Big Defense Spending Cuts in Azerbaijan”, Eurasianet, 3 October 2016, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/80741. 6 Following around 4 years of negotiations with the European Union (eu) over an Associa- tion Agreement, Armenia announced in September 2013 its intention to join the Russian-led Customs Union (now Eurasian Economic Union) – reportedly under pressure from Russia. 7 Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, in particular, have closer bonds with Azerbaijan due to their common Turkic heritage, while Belarus has been benefitting from Azerbaijan’s financial assistance. On its part, Russia has pursued military-commercial interests with Azerbaijan
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Yerevan had mainly been able to keep up in the arms race with its mod- est budget by acquiring Russian weaponry at discounts, but particularly since 2010, Russian arms sales to Azerbaijan started to intensify.8 This resulted in Azerbaijan’s acquisition of Russian sophisticated weaponry of an offensive na- ture which Armenia could not afford.9 More importantly, this has breached the spirit of the so-called strategic partnership between Yerevan and Moscow, offering a degree of political confidence to Baku. This meant that the formal political deterrents against war by force of Armenia’s political and security alliances had been eroded. While a major escalation was expected at any moment, the Armenian side was caught by surprise, pointing to a major miscalculation over the conflict’s dynamics. Although the escalation was militarily contained, it revealed inad- equate equipment and negligence at the Armenian side of the frontline as a result of corruption that spread to the defence sector. There was also a political element to the Armenian unpreparedness. Some evidence suggests10 that the Armenian side had received reassurances from Moscow that Azerbaijan would not attempt a larger scale military offensive. This might have as well included reassurances from Moscow – as a response to mounting Armenian resent- ment over Russian arms deliveries to Azerbaijan – that Baku would not use its Russia-acquired offensive weaponry against Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh. This might point to the fact that Moscow was either unable or unwilling to prevent the April escalation, even though the fighting was put to a halt by Moscow’s intervention. Moscow’s subsequent diplomatic reengagement with the parties, in parallel to the Minsk Group efforts, confirmed conjectures of a new Russian plan at the negotiation table. Limited territorial gains and perceptions of reversed dynamics to the status quo in favor of Azerbaijan offered a moral boost to the Azerbaijani govern- ment and public alike. At the same time, the Armenian side also claimed the
notwithstanding a “conflict of interest” between that and its declared “strategic partner- ship” with Armenia. 8 According to various sources, bilateral contracts signed between Moscow and Baku dur- ing 2010–2011 amounted to $4 billion worth of weaponry. See for example, E. Danielyan, “Aliyev Eyes More Russian Arms Supplies”, Azatutyun.am, 14 August 2013, https://www .azatutyun.am/a/25075315.html. 9 Yerevan managed to acquire equivalents only after receiving a $200 million loan from Russia in 2015, though the arms deliveries were delayed, for unknown reasons, until after the April war. 10 These are implied from subsequent public comments by Armenia’s President Serzh Sargsyan during his meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Sargey Lavrov in Yerevan (April 2016) and his official visit to Russia (March 2017).
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An Ill-Conceived Opening? War of Narratives
The expectations that the April flare-up would move the deadlock and act as a catalyst for renewed talks turned out to be misplaced. In fact the opposite dynamics were observed. The April war brought about a new blow to the en vironment that was not conducive to peace even before that. It further deep- ened the gap between the societies, consolidating patriotic and nationalist narratives on both sides, while the negotiating parties returned to the table with different approaches, yet again. Armenia has hardened its stance, and its aim is not to reward Azerbaijan’s “military blackmail” in any way. Its point of departure is that confidence- and security-building measures (csbms)11 should be put in place before moving to actual negotiations. It has furthermore asserted its preference for a full resolution package that would also envisage a solution for the final status of Nagorno-Karabakh, rather than shelve that issue until a later stage. In contrast, Azerbaijan wants so-called comprehensive negotiations – a move-on to actual talks without establishing prior csbms, as it also wants to be able to continue to use the threat of war as a bargaining chip. Essentially, Baku’s approach appears to be based on the premise of shifting the logic of talks from “territories in exchange for status” to a “territories in exchange for non-use of force” formula. The Minsk Group-brokered meeting held in Vienna between Presidents Serzh Sargsyan and Ilham Aliyev in May 2016 tried to satisfy both sides. A state- ment that followed informed that the two presidents had agreed to finalise ceasefire violation investigative mechanisms and expand the osce monitoring mission, as well as hold comprehensive talks later in June. The agreement was further confirmed at a trilateral meeting between the presidents of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia in St. Petersburg held in June 2016 as a separate Russian initiative. However, csbms that would strengthen the ceasefire regime have long been rejected by Baku that fears they would cement the status quo. Arguably, they would also render Baku’s leverage of military force obsolete. Subsequently, the talks have been stalled once again, with each side putting the accent on their
11 These include formal osce monitoring/investigative mechanisms that would determine which side has violated the ceasefire, hence discouraging such violations.
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The “Lavrov Plan”
The rumoured new proposal put forth by Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in 2015 is a modification of the document, drawn from the same “Ma- drid Principles”,12 that both sides were close but failed to sign in Kazan in 2011. The meeting in Kazan preceded a 3-year-long diplomatic endeavor spearhead- ed by Russia’s then president Dmitry Medvedev. Though a Kazan agreement would have been problematic for both sides, Armenia gave its consent while Azerbaijan rejected. While Russian officials and analysts have denied the existence of a “La vrov plan”, various sources speak of a phased plan, where the Armenian side is implied to concede 5 territories around Nagorno-Karabakh in exchange for an interim status for Nagorno-Karabakh; the referendum is “relegated to the background”.13 It also implies return of displaced persons, peacekeeper de- ployment and an opening of communications. The proposed plan seems close to the Azerbaijani vision of “comprehensive negotiations” which favours a step-by-step approach as opposed to a packaged resolution. Compared to past dissatisfaction with Russia’s role in the process, Azerbaijani officials have been upbeat about the renewed Russian efforts following the 4-day war. This is in contrast with the Armenian position which seeks full resolution to the final status of Nagorno-Karabakh.
12 The “Madrid Principles” were first formulated in 2007 and formally accepted by Armenia and Azerbaijan as a basis of negotiations. While these have undergone modifications over the last 10 years, they mainly imply withdrawal of Armenian forces from territories around Nagorno-Karabakh, an interim status for Nagorno-Karabakh, peacekeeper deployment, return of displaced persons, a corridor between Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia and a vote to decide the final status of Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenia and Azerbaijan have different approaches about the sequence and timing of implementation, with the big- gest blockage being the issue of the final status of Nagorno-Karabakh. For the “Madrid Principles”, see: http://www.aniarc.am/2016/04/11/madrid-principles-full-text/. 13 See Tatul Hakobyan’s comments in: Z. Agayev and S. Khojoyan, “Russia Says Armenian- Azeri Peace Deal Is Closer Than Ever”, Bloomberg, 12 July 2016, https://www.bloomberg .com/news/articles/2016-07-12/russia-says-armenian-azeri-peace-deal-is-closer-than -ever and R. Stepanian, “Karabakh Independence Vote ‘Still Backed By Mediators’”, Azatutyun.am, 13 July 2016, http://www.azatutyun.am/a/27856092.html.
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Moscow’s renewed interest in the peace process is intertwined with its broader geopolitical goals in the context of the ongoing crisis between the West and Russia, dynamics in Russian-Turkish relations as well as in the Eurasian integration project. While there is probably more mystery attributed to the “Lavrov plan” than is actually the case, some basic conjectures could be drawn from a glance at the current geostrategic setting. Moscow seeks expansion of the eeu and might be tempted to advance its long-pursued peacekeeping role in the Karabakh conflict zone. Azerbaijan is willing to bargain. In Armenia, this has driven speculations of a possible deal behind Yerevan’s back. In theory, a partial redrawing of the status quo around Nagorno-Karabakh – short of final resolution though – could pave the way for eeu expansion on the one hand and possibly even new Russian military presence in the region. There are also some hints of a potential scenario where Turkey might be drawn into the equation – subject to dynamics in Russo-Turkish relations. Par- ticularly since the re-warming of relations between Ankara and Moscow since the summer of 2016, both have exchanged mutual appreciations of the possible role that the other could play in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict’s resolution process. In parallel, Lavrov has announced Russia is ready to help Armenia and Turkey normalise relations, even though there seems to be no new prospects for such a dialogue. In the newest geostrategic setting, an open border between Armenia and Turkey is an open border between the eeu and Turkey. From Moscow’s per- spective, restored connection across the Turkey-Armenia-Azerbaijan divide could in theory “compensate” the loss of Ukraine for the “Eurasian project”, augment Moscow’s role in the South Caucasus, with further implications of increased Russian clout in the Middle East. Mounting Eurasianist sentiments in Turkey14 could in turn play into this equation. If these conjectures are true, this is a far-fetched scenario. Turkey has long maintained it will not open the border with Armenia unless there is a solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict which suits Azerbaijan. Armenia on the other hand has long maintained Turkey has no role to play in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict’s resolution due to its overt alignment with one of the conflicting parties – Azerbaijan. Yerevan has also insisted on the de-linkage of Armenia-Turkey normalisation from the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The “ carrot” of restored transport communications is not a new invention and it has not been able to alter the conflict’s own specific dynamics in the past. However, apart from a push-back by the conflict’s own dynamics, the “ Lavrov plan” faces some other hurdles – not least instigated by Moscow’s
14 M. Gurkan, “The rise of the Eurasianist vision in Turkey”, Al-monitor, 17 May 2017, http:// www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2017/05/turkey-rise-of-euroasianist-vision.html.
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Karabakh Fatigue
Against this background, and notwithstanding renewed risk of a war, the Western interest, or capacity, for a more serious engagement in the conflict’s resolution remains low. This could possibly include higher level diplomatic engagements from France and the us16 and/or more assertive security
15 For a background read, see: A. Shirinyan, “Assessing Russia’s Role in Efforts to Resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: From Perception to Reality”, Caucasus Edition: Journal of Conflict Transformation, February 2013, http://caucasusedition.net/analysis/assessing -russias-role-in-efforts-to-resolve-the-nagorno-karabakh-conflict-from-perception-to -reality/. 16 A case in point is the Armenian-Turkish rapprochement in 2008–2010. Though eventu- ally derailed by geopolitics, the reconciliation process was strongly driven by high-level diplomatic efforts primarily by Switzerland and the us, but also France and Russia.
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assurances.17 However, Karabakh is not a priority in the current flux of geo- strategic challenges across the continent, and the high possibility of yet an- other failure in the Karabakh peace process adds to the level of disinterest. The Minsk Group format remains hostage to the geopolitical deliberations evolv- ing in the context of the conflict. Not only is it constrained by the lack of for- mal arrangements to ensure non-use of force and return to conflict resolution, but it risks being marginalised further as all sides are likely to seek unilateral advantages beyond the Minsk Group format. This might explain the partial eagerness to cede the initiative to Moscow, as long as it formally remains an element of the overall Minsk Group format. Moscow has maintained its separate efforts are complementary to the joint Minsk Group endeavors. The Minsk Group as a whole, as well as the us and France separately, tend to endorse Moscow’s special role – at least to a degree. However, as discussed, Russian involvement also comes with Moscow’s spe- cific interests, which are not necessarily shared either by the conflicting par- ties or other Co-Chair countries. Some evidence points to differing priorities in moving ahead as seen from Russia on the one hand, and the us and France on the other. For example, it is unclear as to how much the proposed csbms agreed in Vienna (the meeting took place at the us’ initiative) and later reiter- ated by both France and the us are compatible with the ideas in the “Lavrov plan”. While in rhetoric the 2 processes are presented as complementary, in logic one would assume it is counterintuitive to invest considerable financial and political capital into the installment of csbms if the sides were really as close to an agreement as the “Lavrov plan” would suggest. Given the constraints within the formal mediation process, the conflict’s dynamics will continue to be largely driven by geopolitical developments in the background as well as the new peculiar balance of power between the conflicting parties (re)established post April 2016.
The New Old Status Quo
A year after the 4-day war in April 2016, a new trend of paradoxes consolidating the old conflict paradigms have emerged.
Consolidated Status Quo While, preceding the April 2016 war, both the military and political balance had shifted in favour of Azerbaijan, that alone has not proved enough to
17 Yet, osce’s peacekeeping capabilities remain ambiguous, while the very composition of peacekeeping forces is a separate point of contention.
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reverse the status quo either militarily or politically. Azerbaijan’s attempts to challenge the status quo militarily has further consolidated the state of play, resulted in hardened government and societal positions on the Armenian side, and has made Baku hostage to its own rhetoric and actions, unable to adopt a more flexible approach at talks. In an unpopular move after the April war, Armenia’s President Serzh Sargsyan unveiled details of the deal in Kazan to which the Armenian side had agreed: the Armenian troops would withdraw from 5 territories around Karabakh and allow peacekeepers; the final decision on the status for Karabakh would be postponed. Despite the fact that the Kazan deal would have proven to be a hard sell in Armenia, it was Azerbaijan that did not agree to the plan.18 This disclosure reconfirmed the Armenian perceptions of Azerbaijan’s intransigent and maximalist position at the peace talks, and its unwilling- ness to consider even the vague possibility of Karabakh’s independence in exchange for Armenian withdrawal from surrounding territories. The peace process as a whole is viewed with suspicion and skepticism in Armenia, let alone in N agorno-Karabakh, in light of the lack of readiness seen on behalf of Azerbaijan for equivalent concessions. Baku’s insistence on a phased plan raises doubts whether it will follow through on further steps. The erosion of trust in international guarantees after the failure to uphold the Budapest Memorandum over the situation in Ukraine further plays into the risks. The disclosure on Kazan might also imply that though that deal may have been possible in 2011, it is no longer possible in the post April 2016 reality. Inside Armenia, any deal that Armenia might be negotiating without the participation of Nagorno-Karabakh at the talks is also increasingly viewed as anti-democratic, and hence illegitimate. However, the government seems committed to the “Madrid Principles”; in addition, the opposition Congress- People’s Party of Armenia running for the April 2017 Parliamentary elections has put the conflict’s immediate resolution based on the “Madrid Principles” at the forefront of its electoral campaign. No alternative discussions on possible concessions on the part of Azerbaijan have been heard.
Unilateral Security Arrangements The failure of agreeing on non-use of force and csbms as a prerequisite for peace talks has resulted in the Armenian side’s de facto unilateral measures for strengthening the ceasefire regime. Over the last year, the Karabakhi side
18 S. Khojoyan and A. Halpin, “War May Resume at ‘Any Moment,’ Armenian President Warns”, Bloomberg, 25 April 2016, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-04-24/ caucasus-war-may-resume-at-any-moment-armenian-president-says.
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Constrained Peace Process At the technical level, the mediators are constrained by the imperative to keep parity, as well as depend on the goodwill of the conflicting parties – whether in broadening the osce monitoring mission on the ground, or creating a more conducive atmosphere for peace talks. The closure of the osce office in Yerevan21 – the last remaining osce mission in the South Caucasus – was a missed opportunity to achieve a compromise on 1 issue between Armenia
19 E. Sanamyan, “Fighting in Karabakh Flares As Azerbaijan Marks Memorial”, Eurasianet, 27 February 2017, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/82606. 20 See, Statement by the Co-Chairs of the osce Minsk Group, Vienna, 17 May 2017, http://www .osce.org/minsk-group/318171. 21 E. Danielyan, “osce Forced By Azerbaijan To Close Yerevan Office”, Azatutyun.am, 4 May 2017, https://www.azatutyun.am/a/28468566.html.
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22 There are 2 resolutions that touched on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict that were cir- culated at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe prior to the April war. One of them, on the Sarsang reservoir, was adopted, whereas another was rejected amidst osce Minsk Group calls that such resolutions might complicate Karabakh talks. See for example: E. Davtyan, “Draft pace resolutions rock the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process”, 04 January 2016, https://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/field-reports/item/13318-draft -pace-resolutions-rock-the-nagorno-karabakh-peace-process.html.
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