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The Evolving Dilemma of the Status Quo in Nagorno-Karabakh

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The Evolving Dilemma of the Status Quo in Nagorno-Karabakh security and human rights 27 (2016) 467-478 brill.com/shrs The Evolving Dilemma of the Status Quo in Nagorno-Karabakh Anahit Shirinyan Academy Associate with Chatham House, The Royal Institute of International Affairs Abstract The 4-day war in Nagorno-Karabakh in April 2016 has shown that a shift in the political and military balance of power between the conflicting parties is not enough to reverse the status quo by military means. The use of force and the threat of war aggravate the conflict’s security dilemma, further consolidating the status quo. As the osce Minsk Group’s mediation efforts remain hostage to the geopolitics behind the conflict, it is the political will of the conflicting parties and their adherence to fair play and mutual compromise that can shift the logic of the conflict’s dynamics into a more constructive course. Keywords Nagorno-Karabakh – Armenia – Azerbaijan – osce Introduction Over the last 3 years the logic of the peace process over the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has significantly altered. With the peace talks between Armenia and Azerbaijan in a stalemate since 2011, the gradual “unfreezing” of the conflict culminated into the 4-day war in April 2016.1 The threat of war has emerged as 1 For a detailed record of how the flare-up unfolded, see: E. Sanamyan, “April 2016 war in Karabakh: a chronology”, 6 April 2016, http://yandunts.blogspot.am/2016/04/april-2016-war -in-karabakh-chronology.html. © nhc, 2017 | doi 10.1163/18750230-02703010 Downloaded from Brill.com09/23/2021 10:12:13AM via free access <UN> 468 Shirinyan a bargaining chip and simultaneously a major stumbling block to progress at the negotiation table. In parallel, growing geostrategic contention in Eurasia, the ongoing crises in Ukraine and Syria have heightened the geopolitical implications of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, further upping the stakes. The conflict risks be- coming a new battleground for clashing interests as various actors may seek to gain geopolitical advantage from it against the background of conflicts in neighbouring regions. These developments have pushed the Minsk Group of the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (osce), mediating the peace process under the co-chairmanship of France, Russia and the us, to the margins of the peace process. As a result, the Minsk Group efforts have inadvertently re- focused from conflict resolution to conflict management, trying to avoid at minimum a slide-back to war. This has sparked criticism over the mission’s ef- ficiency and relevance. With the overall Karabakh fatigue in the Western flank of the Minsk Group, Moscow is in the unofficial lead once again. Yet, Moscow’s role is constrained by its own contradictory engagements within the context of the conflict, even more so since April 2016. The Karabakh peace process is arguably in its most challenging phase: while the status quo remains unsustainable, so do the attempts to change it either by threat or use of force. “Military diplomacy” pushes peace talks further to the edge. This results in a vicious cycle of an entrenched status quo and increased risk of a renewed war – leaving little to no room for a breakthrough. Implications of the April War for the osce Led Minsk Group Talks The 4-day war of April 2016 is the newest watershed in the dynamics of the conflict. A year on, the impact of the militarisation of the peace process is more acute than ever and will continue to affect the conflict’s dynamics in the future. There are 2 major interpretations as to what Azerbaijan – broadly seen as the one to have initiated the April 2016 flare-up2 – was trying to achieve by its offensive against Nagorno-Karabakh. One interpretation suggests that Azerbaijan had planned to achieve considerable territorial gains – in line with its longtime rhetoric that it will take lands by force if talks fail – by employ- ing blitzkrieg type tactics. This version is based on the analysis of the military 2 T. de Waal, “Dangerous Days in Karabakh”, 2 April 2016, http://carnegie.ru/commentary/ 2016/04/02/dangerous-days-in-karabakh/iwiu. security and humanDownloaded rights from 27 Brill.com09/23/2021 (2016) 467-478 10:12:13AM via free access <UN> The Evolving Dilemma of the Status Quo in Nagorno-Karabakh 469 tactics, the sequence and nature of the arsenal that Azerbaijan employed when it launched the attack.3 A more widespread interpretation maintains that Azerbaijan aimed at reaching a limited military advantage to attract international attention and get more favourable terms for itself at the negotiat- ing table. These scenarios are not necessarily mutually exclusive, and could be alternate maximum and minimum goals, given the fact that this was the first serious probe of where the military balance stands since the 1994 ceasefire and following a decade of Azerbaijani military build-up.4 Having accumulated vast amounts of sophisticated weaponry fueled by oil and gas revenues, Azerbaijan is at the peak of its military build-up. The coun- try’s defence budget is undergoing severe cuts5 following the collapse of oil prices and devaluation of the manat, and the perceived change in the military balance of power between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the latter’s favour make now the best time to use military might for both military and political gains. Behind the logic of the April 4-day war were also geopolitical drivers. The flare-up came amidst deterioration of Armenia’s foreign political standing fol- lowing the September 2013 U-turn,6 and Yerevan’s subsequent difficulties in as- serting itself in the old yet new “Eurasian family”. As the security situation not only along the Line of Contact (LoC) around Nagorno-Karabakh, but also on the Armenia-Azerbaijan de jure border started to deteriorate drastically since 2014, Armenia found its formal allies in the Collective Treaty Security Organi- sation (csto) as well as the Eurasian Economic Union (eeu) aligning more with Azerbaijan which they considered a more valuable partner in strategic and economic terms.7 3 Details of the April 2016 military actions remain limited and are only available through first- hand sources. See for example, Armenian Defence Ministry spokesperson’s interpretation: “Analysis of the 4-day April war”, Armenpress, 14 April 2016, https://armenpress.am/eng/ news/843561/analysis-of-the-4-day-april-war.html. 4 M. Seputyte and O. Ummelas, “Oil Riches Help Azerbaijan Outgun Armenia in Military Spending”, Bloomberg, 6 April 2016, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-04-06/ oil-riches-help-azerbaijan-outgun-armenia-in-military-spending. 5 J. Kucera, “Struggling Economy Forces Big Defense Spending Cuts in Azerbaijan”, Eurasianet, 3 October 2016, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/80741. 6 Following around 4 years of negotiations with the European Union (eu) over an Associa- tion Agreement, Armenia announced in September 2013 its intention to join the Russian-led Customs Union (now Eurasian Economic Union) – reportedly under pressure from Russia. 7 Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, in particular, have closer bonds with Azerbaijan due to their common Turkic heritage, while Belarus has been benefitting from Azerbaijan’s financial assistance. On its part, Russia has pursued military-commercial interests with Azerbaijan security and human rights 27 (2016) 467-478 Downloaded from Brill.com09/23/2021 10:12:13AM via free access <UN> 470 Shirinyan Yerevan had mainly been able to keep up in the arms race with its mod- est budget by acquiring Russian weaponry at discounts, but particularly since 2010, Russian arms sales to Azerbaijan started to intensify.8 This resulted in Azerbaijan’s acquisition of Russian sophisticated weaponry of an offensive na- ture which Armenia could not afford.9 More importantly, this has breached the spirit of the so-called strategic partnership between Yerevan and Moscow, offering a degree of political confidence to Baku. This meant that the formal political deterrents against war by force of Armenia’s political and security alliances had been eroded. While a major escalation was expected at any moment, the Armenian side was caught by surprise, pointing to a major miscalculation over the conflict’s dynamics. Although the escalation was militarily contained, it revealed inad- equate equipment and negligence at the Armenian side of the frontline as a result of corruption that spread to the defence sector. There was also a political element to the Armenian unpreparedness. Some evidence suggests10 that the Armenian side had received reassurances from Moscow that Azerbaijan would not attempt a larger scale military offensive. This might have as well included reassurances from Moscow – as a response to mounting Armenian resent- ment over Russian arms deliveries to Azerbaijan – that Baku would not use its Russia-acquired offensive weaponry against Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh. This might point to the fact that Moscow was either unable or unwilling to prevent the April escalation, even though the fighting was put to a halt by Moscow’s intervention. Moscow’s subsequent diplomatic reengagement with the parties, in parallel to the Minsk Group efforts, confirmed conjectures of a new Russian plan at the negotiation table. Limited territorial gains and perceptions of reversed dynamics to the status quo in favor of Azerbaijan offered a moral boost to the Azerbaijani govern- ment and public alike. At the same time, the Armenian side also claimed the notwithstanding a “conflict of interest” between that and its declared “strategic partner- ship” with Armenia. 8 According to various sources, bilateral contracts signed between Moscow and Baku dur- ing 2010–2011 amounted to $4 billion worth of weaponry. See for example, E. Danielyan, “Aliyev Eyes More Russian Arms Supplies”, Azatutyun.am, 14 August 2013, https://www .azatutyun.am/a/25075315.html. 9 Yerevan managed to acquire equivalents only after receiving a $200 million loan from Russia in 2015, though the arms deliveries were delayed, for unknown reasons, until after the April war.
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