2020 | 06 OSCE Insights Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg (IFSH), Centre for OSCE Research (CORE) Philip Remler | Richard Giragosian Marina Lorenzini | Sergei Rastoltsev OSCE Minsk Group: Lessons from the Past and Tasks for the Future DOI: 10.5771/9783748922339-06 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748922339-06, am 29.12.2020, 18:09:22 Open Access - https://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb OSCE Minsk Group: Lessons from the Past and Tasks for the Future Philip Remler, Richard Giragosian, Marina Lorenzini, Sergei Rastoltsev* Abstract The international community, acting through the OSCE Minsk Group, has been unable to induce the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan to resolve the Karabakh conflict, which began in 1988 and burst into a new round of fighting in September 2020. Leaders and populations on both sides had become increasingly maximalist; any leader willing to compromise could be branded a traitor. The 2020 fighting drastically changed facts on the ground. With Turkey’s assistance, Azerbaijan recovered much of the land it lost a generation previously. But Azerbaijan was compelled to permit Russia to deploy a large peacekeeping force, something it had resisted for 25 years. While its authority is diminished, the Minsk Group can play a role going forward in restoring confidence and communication between the sides, opening borders, and ultimately leading negotiations on the future status of the region. Keywords Karabakh, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Russia, Turkey, OSCE To cite this publication: Philip Remler, Richard Giragosian, Marina Lorenzini, Sergei Rastoltsev, OSCE Minsk Group: Lessons from the Past and Tasks for the Future, OSCE Insights 6 (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2020), at: https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748922339-06 Introduction1 over thirty years the Karabakh conflict has defied efforts to find a solution.2 The fighting that engulfed Azerbaijan Since 1992 the Minsk Group of the OSCE and Armenia on 27 September 2020 re- has been the international body officially minded the world – yet again – that for mandated to mediate. It led serious nego- tiations throughout that time but proved unable to persuade the leaders of Azer- * Philip Remler (principal drafter) baijan and Armenia to make the mutu- Carnegie Endowment for al concessions necessary for peace. The International Peace recent intensive combat changed the sit- Dr Richard Giragosian uation on the ground, diminished the Regional Studies Center, Yerevan [email protected] current role of the Minsk Group, and Marina Dolcetta Lorenzini, M.A. challenged its work in the future. This The Fletcher School, Tufts University report seeks reasons for past failure and [email protected] prospects for a future role. Sergei Rastoltsev The report is structured in four sec- IMEMO, Moscow [email protected] tions. The first analyses the strategies em- 1 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748922339-06, am 29.12.2020, 18:09:22 Open Access - https://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb Philip Remler, Richard Giragosian, Marina Lorenzini, Sergei Rastoltsev ployed by the warring sides in the Minsk the region, forced the inhabitants out, Group negotiations from the ceasefire in and repelled Azerbaijani counterattacks. 1994 until the hostilities were renewed Nagornyy Karabakh achieved de facto sep- on 27 September 2020. The second dis- aration, though the 1994 ceasefire (the cusses efforts by the Minsk Group during Bishkek Protocols) brought no political that period. The third section analyses the settlement. United Nations (UN) Secu- aims and reactions of the main stakehold- rity Council Resolutions still consider ers since 27 September. The fourth sec- Karabakh part of Azerbaijan.3 tion lays out some parameters for future The provinces that Armenian forces prospects. captured surrounding Karabakh fell into three categories: Provinces between Nagornyy Karabakh Negotiating strategies after the 1994 and Armenia: Lachin and Kelbajar, the ceasefire Soviet Red Kurdistan district of the 1920s. Lachin was occupied in May 1992, To understand why Azerbaijan launched days after the capture of Shusha. Kelbajar an offensive on 27 September 2020, we was captured in a March–April 1993 op- must understand the sides’ aims in the eration. The fighting forced the Kurdish hostilities of the early 1990s and their and Azerbaijani population out of both. aims since the ceasefire. Armenia and Nagornyy Karabakh consid- ered these provinces existentially vital, as they ensured land access between them. Armenia Provinces between Nagornyy Karabakh and Iran: The fall of Kelbajar led The initial aim of the Karabakh move- to revolution in Azerbaijan. Armenian ment was “miatsum” – unification of forces launched a summer 1993 offensive Nagornyy Karabakh with Soviet Armenia that captured the provinces of Qubadli, via official transfer from Soviet Azerbai- Zangilan, and Jabrayil, forcing out the jan. After the Soviet Union collapsed, inhabitants. This region, south from the overt aim changed to independence Karabakh to the Aras River, borders Iran; from Azerbaijan, though desire for uni- it was considered strategically important. fication with Armenia remained. Arme- Provinces east of Nagornyy Karabakh: nian forces were victorious in the fight- Also in summer 1993, Armenian forces ing that started in 1988 and grew by captured the strategic town of Agdam 1992 to include full-scale military oper- and parts of Füzuli province. The ations. Armenians expelled Azerbaijani towns were looted for construction ma- forces from Nagornyy Karabakh, cap- terials; little infrastructure remained, tured Shusha (for centuries the fortified and the front lines were mined to pre- seat of Azerbaijani power in Karabakh), vent an Azerbaijani counterattack. These occupied a buffer zone surrounding provinces were considered the Armeni- 2 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748922339-06, am 29.12.2020, 18:09:22 Open Access - https://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb OSCE Minsk Group: Lessons from the Past and Tasks for the Future an side’s easiest and cheapest bargaining tions, hoping the international communi- chips. ty would eventually accept de jure the de The Armenian side’s goal was to pre- facto situation. serve as much of those territorial gains as possible. Rifts emerged between the strategy of then-president Levon Ter-Pet- Azerbaijan rosyan and that of a harder-line group in both Nagornyy Karabakh and Arme- Azerbaijani leaders faced the opposite nia. Ter-Petrosyan and his group believed dilemma. Whereas Armenia strove to that success could only be ensured by drag out negotiations until facts on the trading some of the Armenian-occupied ground were recognized de jure, Azerbai- provinces in return for a peace agreement jan sought to change those facts and that would ensure the security and status ensure that the existing situation never of Nagornyy Karabakh against a poten- gained international recognition. Current tially richer and more militarily powerful President Ilham Aliyev, like his Armeni- future Azerbaijan.4 The harder-line group an counterparts, feared domestic instabil- believed that Armenia need not make ity if he deviated from maximalist terri- concessions and that its task was to main- torial demands. tain the status quo while stalling until The most direct way to change facts on the international community and Azer- the ground was through armed combat, baijan recognized Nagornyy Karabakh’s and Azerbaijan consistently devoted sub- independence. stantial resources to its military with that That internal rift made bargaining end in mind. Another strategy for chang- with Azerbaijan difficult for Armenian ing facts on the ground involved mobi- leaders. Large parts of the populace lizing international community pressure sympathized with the hard-line group on Armenia to force concessions during and increasingly opposed compromise. negotiations. In the 1990s Azerbaijanis Assassinations and threats of violence hoped their oil and gas resources would blocked moves toward compromise and prompt the West to pressure Armenia. sabotaged deals agreed by the leaders.5 After disappointments in negotiations in Indeed, as Armenia’s Prime Minister the United States (US) (Key West, 2001) Nikol Pashinyan admitted after signing and France (Rambouillet, 2006), how- the ceasefire on 9 November 2020, “[...] ever, the Azerbaijani leadership apparent- when I signed that document, I realized ly concluded that only Russia had the that I was facing the threat of my person- capacity to move the Armenians. Azerbai- al death, not only in a political but also jan’s sabre-rattling, its insistence on keep- in a physical sense.”6 In 1999 gunmen ing snipers and heavy weaponry on the stormed the parliament and assassinated front lines, and its offensive of April 2016 senior officials and key legislators, ensur- were aimed at reminding the internation- ing the failure of a peace plan. Thereafter, al community in general – but Russia in Armenia’s leaders temporized in negotia- particular – that the situation was unsta- 3 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748922339-06, am 29.12.2020, 18:09:22 Open Access - https://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb Philip Remler, Richard Giragosian, Marina Lorenzini, Sergei Rastoltsev ble and that action was needed to force ries to Azerbaijan. Aliyev believed the Armenian concessions. None of these tac- deal would shelve the Karabakh problem, tics, however, bore the results Azerbaijan which had brought down the five previ- desired. ous leaders of his country. The deal suit- ed Ter-Petrosyan’s strategy of reaching a deal before Azerbaijan