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Home , Madrid Principles, Miatsum, OSCE Minsk Group, Philip Remler, Robert Kocharyan, Vazgen Sargsyan

2020 | 06 OSCE Insights Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg (IFSH), Centre for OSCE Research (CORE)

Philip Remler | Richard Giragosian Marina Lorenzini | Sergei Rastoltsev OSCE Group: Lessons from the Past and Tasks for the Future

DOI: 10.5771/9783748922339-06

https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748922339-06, am 29.12.2020, 18:09:22 Open Access - https://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb OSCE Minsk Group: Lessons from the Past and Tasks for the Future

Philip Remler, Richard Giragosian, Marina Lorenzini, Sergei Rastoltsev*

Abstract The international community, acting through the OSCE Minsk Group, has been unable to induce the leaders of and to resolve the Karabakh conflict, which began in 1988 and burst into a new round of fighting in September 2020. Leaders and populations on both sides had become increasingly maximalist; any leader willing to compromise could be branded a traitor. The 2020 fighting drastically changed facts on the ground. With ’s assistance, Azerbaijan recovered much of the land it lost a generation previously. But Azerbaijan was compelled to permit to deploy a large peacekeeping force, something it had resisted for 25 years. While its authority is diminished, the Minsk Group can play a role going forward in restoring confidence and communication between the sides, opening borders, and ultimately leading negotiations on the future status of the region. Keywords Karabakh, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Russia, Turkey, OSCE To cite this publication: Philip Remler, Richard Giragosian, Marina Lorenzini, Sergei Rastoltsev, OSCE Minsk Group: Lessons from the Past and Tasks for the Future, OSCE Insights 6 (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2020), at: https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748922339-06

Introduction1 over thirty years the Karabakh conflict has defied efforts to find a solution.2 The fighting that engulfed Azerbaijan Since 1992 the Minsk Group of the OSCE and Armenia on 27 September 2020 re- has been the international body officially minded the world – yet again – that for mandated to mediate. It led serious nego- tiations throughout that time but proved unable to persuade the leaders of Azer- * Philip Remler (principal drafter) baijan and Armenia to make the mutu- Carnegie Endowment for al concessions necessary for peace. The International Peace recent intensive combat changed the sit- Dr Richard Giragosian uation on the ground, diminished the Regional Studies Center, [email protected] current role of the Minsk Group, and Marina Dolcetta Lorenzini, M.A. challenged its work in the future. This The Fletcher School, Tufts University report seeks reasons for past failure and [email protected] prospects for a future role. Sergei Rastoltsev The report is structured in four sec- IMEMO, Moscow [email protected] tions. The first analyses the strategies em-

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https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748922339-06, am 29.12.2020, 18:09:22 Open Access - https://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb Philip Remler, Richard Giragosian, Marina Lorenzini, Sergei Rastoltsev ployed by the warring sides in the Minsk the region, forced the inhabitants out, Group negotiations from the ceasefire in and repelled Azerbaijani counterattacks. 1994 until the hostilities were renewed Nagornyy Karabakh achieved de facto sep- on 27 September 2020. The second dis- aration, though the 1994 ceasefire (the cusses efforts by the Minsk Group during Bishkek Protocols) brought no political that period. The third section analyses the settlement. United Nations (UN) Secu- aims and reactions of the main stakehold- rity Council Resolutions still consider ers since 27 September. The fourth sec- Karabakh part of Azerbaijan.3 tion lays out some parameters for future The provinces that Armenian forces prospects. captured surrounding Karabakh fell into three categories: Provinces between Nagornyy Karabakh Negotiating strategies after the 1994 and Armenia: and Kelbajar, the ceasefire Soviet Red district of the 1920s. Lachin was occupied in May 1992, To understand why Azerbaijan launched days after the capture of . Kelbajar an offensive on 27 September 2020, we was captured in a March–April 1993 op- must understand the sides’ aims in the eration. The fighting forced the Kurdish hostilities of the early 1990s and their and Azerbaijani population out of both. aims since the ceasefire. Armenia and Nagornyy Karabakh consid- ered these provinces existentially vital, as they ensured land access between them. Armenia Provinces between Nagornyy Karabakh and : The fall of Kelbajar led The initial aim of the Karabakh move- to revolution in Azerbaijan. Armenian ment was “” – unification of forces launched a summer 1993 offensive Nagornyy Karabakh with Soviet Armenia that captured the provinces of Qubadli, via official transfer from Soviet Azerbai- , and , forcing out the jan. After the collapsed, inhabitants. This region, south from the overt aim changed to independence Karabakh to the Aras River, borders Iran; from Azerbaijan, though desire for uni- it was considered strategically important. fication with Armenia remained. Arme- Provinces east of Nagornyy Karabakh: nian forces were victorious in the fight- Also in summer 1993, Armenian forces ing that started in 1988 and grew by captured the strategic town of 1992 to include full-scale military oper- and parts of Füzuli province. The ations. Armenians expelled Azerbaijani towns were looted for construction ma- forces from Nagornyy Karabakh, cap- terials; little infrastructure remained, tured Shusha (for centuries the fortified and the front lines were mined to pre- seat of Azerbaijani power in Karabakh), vent an Azerbaijani counterattack. These occupied a buffer zone surrounding provinces were considered the Armeni-

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https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748922339-06, am 29.12.2020, 18:09:22 Open Access - https://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb OSCE Minsk Group: Lessons from the Past and Tasks for the Future an side’s easiest and cheapest bargaining tions, hoping the international communi- chips. ty would eventually accept de jure the de The Armenian side’s goal was to pre- facto situation. serve as much of those territorial gains as possible. Rifts emerged between the strategy of then-president Levon Ter-Pet- Azerbaijan rosyan and that of a harder-line group in both Nagornyy Karabakh and Arme- Azerbaijani leaders faced the opposite nia. Ter-Petrosyan and his group believed dilemma. Whereas Armenia strove to that success could only be ensured by drag out negotiations until facts on the trading some of the Armenian-occupied ground were recognized de jure, Azerbai- provinces in return for a peace agreement jan sought to change those facts and that would ensure the security and status ensure that the existing situation never of Nagornyy Karabakh against a poten- gained international recognition. Current tially richer and more militarily powerful President , like his Armeni- future Azerbaijan.4 The harder-line group an counterparts, feared domestic instabil- believed that Armenia need not make ity if he deviated from maximalist terri- concessions and that its task was to main- torial demands. tain the status quo while stalling until The most direct way to change facts on the international community and Azer- the ground was through armed combat, baijan recognized Nagornyy Karabakh’s and Azerbaijan consistently devoted sub- independence. stantial resources to its military with that That internal rift made bargaining end in mind. Another strategy for chang- with Azerbaijan difficult for Armenian ing facts on the ground involved mobi- leaders. Large parts of the populace lizing international community pressure sympathized with the hard-line group on Armenia to force concessions during and increasingly opposed compromise. negotiations. In the 1990s Azerbaijanis Assassinations and threats of violence hoped their oil and gas resources would blocked moves toward compromise and prompt the West to pressure Armenia. sabotaged deals agreed by the leaders.5 After disappointments in negotiations in Indeed, as Armenia’s Prime Minister the (US) (Key West, 2001) admitted after signing and (Rambouillet, 2006), how- the ceasefire on 9 November 2020, “[...] ever, the Azerbaijani leadership apparent- when I signed that document, I realized ly concluded that only Russia had the that I was facing the threat of my person- capacity to move the Armenians. Azerbai- al death, not only in a political but also jan’s sabre-rattling, its insistence on keep- in a physical sense.”6 In 1999 gunmen ing snipers and heavy weaponry on the stormed the parliament and assassinated front lines, and its offensive of April 2016 senior officials and key legislators, ensur- were aimed at reminding the internation- ing the failure of a peace plan. Thereafter, al community in general – but Russia in Armenia’s leaders temporized in negotia- particular – that the situation was unsta-

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https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748922339-06, am 29.12.2020, 18:09:22 Open Access - https://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb Philip Remler, Richard Giragosian, Marina Lorenzini, Sergei Rastoltsev ble and that action was needed to force ries to Azerbaijan. Aliyev believed the Armenian concessions. None of these tac- deal would shelve the Karabakh problem, tics, however, bore the results Azerbaijan which had brought down the five previ- desired. ous leaders of his country. The deal suit- ed Ter-Petrosyan’s strategy of reaching a deal before Azerbaijan was able to de- Minsk Group activity since 1992 ploy its oil wealth. But Ter-Petrosyan, fac- ing internal opposition, had been com- Established in 1992, the OSCE Minsk pelled in March 1997 to accept Nagornyy Group’s efforts comprised three phases. Karabakh’s leader, , as The first, 1992–98, was marked by Rus- prime minister. Ter-Petrosyan’s last sup- sian efforts to circumvent the OSCE porter wielding military force – Defense and counter-efforts by Western powers to Minister – abandoned contain Russia. In 1994, when a military him over the peace plan. In January 1998, stalemate was reached, Russia’s forceful the hard-line group, now controlling all first Minsk Group negotiator, Vladimir levers of Armenian armed power, forced Kazimirov, bypassed Western mediators Ter-Petrosyan to resign. Kocharyan be- and set up ceasefire negotiations at a came president, Sargsyan became prime Commonwealth of Independent States minister, and they rejected the OSCE (CIS) meeting in Bishkek, aiming to se- plan.7 cure deployment of a Russian-led peace- The second phase, 1998–2005, start- keeping force over expected Western ob- ed with negotiations between Kocharyan jections. Azerbaijan refused and signed and Aliyev that were secret not only from the ceasefire document in Baku without their publics but from their senior offi- any peacekeeping mechanism. cials as well. In 1999 they orally agreed In 1997 France and the US joined Rus- their own plan: a land swap that would sia as Minsk Group Co-Chairs, and Kaz- annex Nagornyy Karabakh to Armenia imirov was replaced. Working together, de jure in exchange for Armenian terri- the Co-Chairs drafted a peace plan in two tory along the Iranian border between documents, negotiating interim disposi- Azerbaijan and its Nakhchivan exclave. tions and final status separately (hence In autumn 1999 they briefed the Minsk called the “step-by-step” plan). Armenian Group Co-Chairs on the plan and asked and Azerbaijani presidents Ter-Petrosyan them to put it in writing. Just weeks and accepted the plan later, on 27 October 1999, extremist gun- when it was presented in July 1997. Nei- men took over the Armenian parliament ther had any illusions that a status agree- and assassinated several officials, includ- ment could be reached. Both believed ing prime minister Sargsyan and parlia- that the agreement they would sign ment president . As would give Armenia a permanent de facto a result, Kocharyan informed the Min- protectorate over Nagornyy Karabakh in sk Group that he could no longer sup- exchange for returning occupied territo- port the peace deal. The Minsk Group

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https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748922339-06, am 29.12.2020, 18:09:22 Open Access - https://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb OSCE Minsk Group: Lessons from the Past and Tasks for the Future

Co-Chairs tried to keep the plan alive cess with the assent of the US and France, by skewing it towards Armenian interests which could not invest such high-level – keeping the Armenian acquisition of political capital. After 1997, the Minsk Nagornyy Karabakh but eliminating the Group was a rare example of Russia–West land that Azerbaijan would receive in cooperation and remains an exception return, replacing it only with access to today despite tensions over Ukraine, Syr- a road to Nakhchivan. This change was ia, and elsewhere. Part of the reason for unacceptable to Azerbaijan; Aliyev reject- that success, however, has been the will- ed the plan at negotiations in Key West ingness of the US and France since 2008 (2001). Aliyev, who spent a lifetime ce- to cede Russia the initiative in the Group. menting his personal power base in Azer- Sargsyan and Aliyev continued to baijan, died in 2003 and was succeeded meet to please Medvedev, but in reali- by his son, Ilham Aliyev, who had little ty neither was interested in negotiating power base beyond his clan. The elder a compromise that would cause unrest Aliyev could be confident of surviving among their populaces. Despite Russian popular unrest if he made concessions; optimism before a summit in Kazan in the younger could not. Neither Azerbai- 2011 – trying to persuade the presidents jan nor Armenia was thereafter capable of to sign an agreement on just a few of real compromise. the principles – Aliyev and Sargsyan re- The third phase, from 2005 to the fused. The “Kazan Formula” (the final, present, saw a return to a scaled-down heavily abridged iteration of the Madrid version of the step-by-step plan in a Principles), though often cited, became a short document of “principles”, eventu- dead letter, though some discrete points ally codified and presented to the par- remain relevant. The Minsk Group went ties in Madrid at the end of 2007. into a dormancy that lasted through the The , aimed at saving Azerbaijani offensive of 2016, the Arme- the negotiation process, mandated the re- nian revolution of 2018, and the 2020 turn of some occupied territories, guaran- fighting. During these events, the main tees of interim protection for Nagornyy mediator was Russia, whose overriding Karabakh against Azerbaijani military ac- aim appears to have been to deploy a tion, and eventually an undefined “bind- Russian peacekeeping force, reviving the ing expression of popular will” to deter- effort made in 1994. mine final status. Agreement on that sta- Thus, for the last twenty years – since tus would unlock the return of remaining extremists sabotaged the deal reached be- occupied territories. tween Kocharyan and Aliyev – the sides Dmitry Medvedev, during his presi- have engaged in what one Russian ne- dency of Russia (2008–2012), devoted gotiator called a “simulacrum of nego- great efforts to mediating between his tiations”. Part of this charade was the Armenian and Azerbaijani counterparts, ritual blaming of the Minsk Group for and Ilham Aliyev. Russia the sides’ own failure to compromise. began to dominate the negotiation pro- The Minsk Group accommodated this,

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https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748922339-06, am 29.12.2020, 18:09:22 Open Access - https://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb Philip Remler, Richard Giragosian, Marina Lorenzini, Sergei Rastoltsev knowing that providing political cover Political effects of the recent fighting to those leaders would be essential to the compromises required for peace. In The offensive Azerbaijan began in reality, however, by not pushing back September 2020 was a continuation of against the leaders, the Group was pro- the two policies it pursued for years to viding them with political cover to avoid change facts on the ground: reclaiming making peace. Mediators cannot make territory and concentrating international peace; warring parties must. Leaders on pressure on Armenia. By recapturing oc- both sides had painted themselves into cupied territory, Azerbaijan could deny a corner: promising to deliver maximal- Armenia bargaining chips in subsequent ist demands without compromise, they negotiations. With Turkish military as- convinced their populations that com- sistance, Azerbaijan met with greater promise was treason. Leaders adapted ac- than expected success. Rapidly advanc- cordingly. In early 1993 Heydar Aliyev, ing through four provinces, on 7 Novem- still exiled in his native Nakhchivan, ber the Azerbaijani army recaptured the could tell the American ambassador pri- mountain fortress of Shusha in the heart vately: “Even when we had Karabakh, it of Nagornyy Karabakh, making it capable wasn’t ours.” Today, his son repeats a sin- of shelling the capital and gle slogan, “Karabakh is Azerbaijan,” and interdicting the , with its declares that Azerbaijan will not offer the road connecting Stepanakert with Arme- “high degree of autonomy” it once pro- nia.9 posed for the region.8 The second prong of Azerbaijan’s strat- One other aspect of OSCE efforts: egy was marshalling international pres- in 1996 the Chair-in-Office appointed a sure. By threatening a wider war and Personal Representative to be based in greater instability close to Russia’s bor- the region, as opposed to the Co-Chairs, ders, the Azerbaijani leadership hoped who flew in on occasion. For 24 years, to push Russia into putting meaningful Ambassador Andrzej Kasprzyk has filled pressure on Armenia. The success of that role. In the absence of a peacekeep- the military campaign accomplished this. ing force or permanent observation mis- Both strategies were enabled by the sup- sion, Kasprzyk’s office carried out most port of Turkey, which provided military of what little monitoring there has been, assistance, including the Bayraktar TB2 conducting brief observation missions on combat drones that tipped the balance limited segments of both sides of the in the fighting, plus diplomatic support line of contact. Since these were only by to reinforce Aliyev’s pressure on Russia.10 advance permission from the sides, how- Turkey transported mercenaries from Syr- ever, findings were of limited use. ia to Azerbaijan and placed F-16s in Gan- ja; their presence had little significance in military terms but spoke loudly to Russia of what could happen if things got out of control.11

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https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748922339-06, am 29.12.2020, 18:09:22 Open Access - https://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb OSCE Minsk Group: Lessons from the Past and Tasks for the Future

Russia’s counter, embodied in Foreign not from Putin, but in a statement by the Minister Lavrov’s statement of 14 Octo- Russian Foreign Ministry, which repeated ber,12 offered only to freeze the sides the stock position that, were Armenia it- in place with the promise of handing self to be attacked, Russia would fulfil its back five provinces in which Azerbaijan alliance obligations under the Collective was already advancing rapidly and which Security Treaty. Meanwhile, Russia called it was close to regaining anyway, while on all sides in the conflict to observe leaving the fate of Lachin, Kelbajar, and the ceasefire they agreed in Moscow on Shusha to the final political solution. 10 October.14 Russia had been left with Lavrov made clear that the price for this its frequent dilemma in the South Cau- would be the deployment of Russian casus: how to balance between Armenia peacekeepers. and Azerbaijan, maintaining influence For over 25 years Azerbaijan had on both while minimizing destabilization rejected Russian peacekeepers. Deploy- by either. ing a Russian peacekeeping contingent Russia has appeared unwilling to sup- would preserve the regime in Nagornyy port Pashinyan, who is unpopular in Rus- Karabakh and freeze the conflict for an- sian media for leading a “colour revolu- other generation. The advantage given tion”. On coming to power, Pashinyan to Azerbaijan by the full support of tried to reassure Putin that “he viewed Turkey would be squandered, along with democracy as a firm belief, rather than a the advanced weaponry that brought suc- geopolitical orientation”.15 Although that cess. Aliyev did not bother to respond distinction may not have mollified Putin, to Lavrov’s offer. Negotiations sequen- it is hard to believe that disapproval of tially hosted by the Russians, French, one leader could upend a generations- and Americans resulted in “humanitari- long Russian–Armenian alliance. It is an” ceasefires that collapsed, sometimes more likely that Putin believed a greater in minutes, as Azerbaijan pressed ahead prize was within reach: strategic partner- with its offensive. Aliyev dismissed inter- ship with Azerbaijan gained by granting national concerns by stating that he was Aliyev some of his war aims. If that shat- merely enforcing UN Security Council tered Nagornyy Karabakh’s hopes of uni- Resolutions on the books since 1993, fication with Armenia or independence, when Armenian offensives captured large Armenia would be left in a bind. Its se- parts of Azerbaijan and displaced the curity remained dependent on Russia, as populations.13 Turkey’s military venture in Azerbaijan Armenia and Nagornyy Karabakh, conveniently demonstrated. Putin had al- which for many years ignored improv- ready created a precedent: in 2003 he was ing Azerbaijani military capabilities, nev- willing to sacrifice his Transdniestrian er found an effective response to the clients when offered Russia mil- rapid Azerbaijani advance. Prime Minis- itary basing rights and geopolitical orien- ter Pashinyan appealed to Putin for help tation through the Kozak Memorandum. but on 31 October received a cold reply,

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https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748922339-06, am 29.12.2020, 18:09:22 Open Access - https://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb Philip Remler, Richard Giragosian, Marina Lorenzini, Sergei Rastoltsev

Turkey’s involvement in the Karabakh pushed on to capture both Lachin – war was a sharp break with past poli- thereby cutting Nagornyy Karabakh off cy: former president Süleyman Demirel from Armenia – and Stepanakert, the used to say it would take minutes to capital. The prospect of creating another be drawn into Karabakh but years to 80,000 Armenian refugees could hardly get back out. Despite speculation about have been daunting to Aliyev, who must President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s “neo- still deal with about 850,000 Azerbaijani Ottoman” strategy, his interventions ap- refugees and persons internally displaced pear to be opportunistic, triggered when- by the fighting over Karabakh in the early ever the prospect of enlarging Turkey’s 1990s.19 footprint and influence beckons. There To answer this question we must first is strong public support for Azerbaijan examine what the peacekeepers accom- in Turkey. Armenian statements in Au- plish. First, they provide a five-year (or gust 2020 seeking to revive the Treaty more) security guarantee for Nagornyy of Sèvres (1920) may have prompted Er- Karabakh, whether or not agreement is doğan to action.16 There was little else reached on status. Second, they project at stake for Turkey, which already had Russian power throughout the South direct road and rail access to Armenia, Caucasus, a longstanding Russian objec- Azerbaijan, and Central Asia through tive. Third, Russian peacekeepers will . Turkey’s yearly $248 million in oversee transport between Nagornyy exports to Armenia are unlikely to ex- Karabakh and Armenia. Russian border pand noticeably – or to be noticed if they guards will oversee transport between cease.17 the Azerbaijani exclave of Nakhchivan France and the US, the Minsk Group’s and the rest of Azerbaijan through Ar- Western Co-Chairs, which had ceded the menia’s Meghri region; they could poten- initiative to Russia, attempted to mediate tially also control Armenian trains head- ceasefires but did little after they broke ed to and from Iran through the bridge down. The passivity of the Western pow- rail link over the Aras River at Julfa, ers allowed both Russia and Turkey more in Nakhchivan. These functions will in- room to manoeuver. crease Russian influence over the com- merce and economy of the region. Why, then, did Aliyev stop his offen- The ceasefire and its aftermath sive and agree to this expansion of Rus- sian power? We infer that Putin (and pos- For decades, Azerbaijan rejected Russian sibly Erdoğan) exerted enough pressure demands for a peacekeeping force. Why, on him. It is possible that Putin already then, did Aliyev accept the Russian cease- had an understanding with Erdoğan. It fire plan on 9 November, which included is probable that Putin made promises to the deployment of 1,960 heavily armed Aliyev to gain his compliance. The cease- peacekeepers?18 From a military point of fire’s stability will depend on how well view the Azerbaijani army could have Russia honours those secret promises and

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https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748922339-06, am 29.12.2020, 18:09:22 Open Access - https://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb OSCE Minsk Group: Lessons from the Past and Tasks for the Future understandings, but that is ipso facto im- baijan) they may shift that blame onto possible for us to ascertain. We can de- Russia and its peacekeepers instead. duce that there is disagreement over the role of Turkey. Aliyev clearly envisioned a Turkish role equal to Russia’s; Russia Prospects for negotiations envisioned minor Turkish technical assis- tance.20 Russia and Turkey are still work- There is nothing in the ceasefire agree- ing out whatever understandings they ment about future negotiations on the had. Russia has gotten its way so far, status of Nagornyy Karabakh, as Aliyev but if Erdoğan believes he is not being triumphantly made clear in his 10 allowed an appropriate role, he is unlike- November address to the nation.22 Ulti- ly to remain passive. mately, however, it is courting future Lavrov has made clear that Russia will trouble to leave a reduced Nagornyy seek UN Security Council endorsement Karabakh sitting there indefinitely with- of the ceasefire, which would at a mini- out any status. Azerbaijan may not yet mum imply endorsement of the Russian wish to welcome Karabakhis back into peacekeeping force, preventing changes the fold with “a high degree of autono- in its composition.21 From the time of my”, and the Karabakhis may be too em- Medvedev’s initiative until 2016, includ- bittered to want interaction with Azerbai- ing in the “Kazan Formula”, Russia had jan, but ultimately re-opening transporta- seemed to accept the prospect of a multi- tion and commercial links will raise prac- national, neutral peacekeeping force un- tical questions that must be answered der OSCE auspices that would mandate through negotiations. Azerbaijan could troop and command limits to prevent argue that, since the war with Armenia any one country from monopolizing the is over, this is now a domestic question peacekeeping function. After the Azerbai- for Azerbaijan (using as a precedent Rus- jani offensive of April 2016, however, sia’s ending the mandate of the OSCE Lavrov tried to pressure Azerbaijan and Assistance Group to Chechnya after im- Armenia into accepting a Russian peace- posing a military solution in that war). keeping force. It is indicative of Russia’s Russia and others, however, may press priorities that the most fully elaborated Azerbaijan to open negotiations with in- clauses of the current ceasefire plan are ternational mediation. those which establish the Russian armed If such negotiations take place, Russia presence in the region and which do has already made clear that it will not not provide for a peacekeeping role for allow changes to the Minsk Group ne- the OSCE. One potential effect of the gotiating format.23 As mentioned above, enlarged Russian role, which freezes the Russia has dominated that format for new front line: whereas leaders previous- over a decade. Russia’s clear intent, by ly found in the Minsk Group a scapegoat keeping the current format, is to main- to take public blame for their own failure tain that dominance. Keeping that format to achieve peace, now (especially in Azer- is preferable to the alternatives most fre-

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https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748922339-06, am 29.12.2020, 18:09:22 Open Access - https://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb Philip Remler, Richard Giragosian, Marina Lorenzini, Sergei Rastoltsev quently proposed: replacing current Co- over Armenian positions in the nego- Chairs with other, unspecified countries, tiations. creating a separate seat at the table for the Some have suggested shifting the negoti- Karabakh Armenians, or making Turkey ating forum to the UN to give the pro- a Co-Chair. Any of these would hinder cess new impetus. There are a number negotiations: of obstacles to overcome, including the • New Co-Chairs would face a steep opposition of some stakeholders and the and time-consuming learning curve. existence of four UN Security Council The Co-Chairs should maintain closer Resolutions that, Azerbaijan argues, jus- links with other Minsk Group coun- tify its military actions.24 Russia would tries, including both Turkey and Swe- be strengthened in its quest for another den, which will chair the OSCE in UNSC Resolution endorsing its deploy- 2021. Closer contact may improve ment of peacekeepers, cementing Russia’s transparency, but the balance of pow- regional footprint into international law. er within the Group is unlikely to There is no evidence that the UN might shift. find more success in persuading the lead- • Karabakh Armenians, whose leaders ers of Armenia and Azerbaijan than did ruled Armenia from 1998 to 2018, the Minsk Group Co-Chairs, all of whose were well-represented in negotiations countries are permanent members of the during that time. Armenia has repeat- Security Council. edly demanded inclusion of Nagornyy There have been calls to convene the Karabakh in negotiations as a sepa- Minsk Conference (in which the entire rate side, not to promote a settlement Minsk Group would participate), origi- but to bolster the case for interna- nally scheduled for 1992 but blocked tional recognition and to spare Ar- by successive objections from the sides. menia the onus of rejecting compro- The inability to convene the Conference mises. Under new negotiations the led to the Co-Chair structure of today. Karabakhis could either replace Arme- It is generally held that convening the nia (if parties accept that this is an in- Conference would make sense only to ternal dispute with international ram- finalize the text of a political solution ifications) or take places within the on which the sides had already made Armenian delegation (signalling that sufficient progress and to serve as a this remains an international dispute). venue for a donors’ conference to pro- • Turkey’s inclusion as Co-Chair would mote post-war stability. If the Confer- have a toxic effect, giving irredentist ence convenes prematurely, we might ex- hardliners among the Armenian dias- pect the unproductive mutual recrimina- pora in the West – whose ancestors tions already seen in the OSCE Perma- underwent the Genocide at the hands nent Council. Another perennially pro- of the Ottoman Turks – a moral veto posed move is Armenian recognition of Nagornyy Karabakh’s independence. This

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https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748922339-06, am 29.12.2020, 18:09:22 Open Access - https://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb OSCE Minsk Group: Lessons from the Past and Tasks for the Future might affect Armenian morale but would • establishment of communications in- be a gesture without impact outside that frastructure for civilian contact be- context.25 tween the sides, including for sustain- able transport access between Arme- nia and Nagornyy Karabakh; The Minsk Group going forward • dialogue through UNHCR/ICRC for a humanitarian needs assessment for Finally, then, we see a prospective role remaining Karabakh Armenians and for the OSCE Minsk Group in the Rus- returning Azerbaijani IDPs; sian-brokered ceasefire with regard to • protection and restoration of the reli- the following: the negotiations on con- gious and cultural heritage of the re- fidence- and security-building measures gion;26 (CSBMs) between the sides; the future • establishment of markets for each status of Nagornyy Karabakh; and the side, aiming later to establish markets mechanics of a regional peace agreement. accessible to both sides; CSBMs need to start with rendering • establishment of joint working groups the region secure for current residents to perform necessary cooperation on and returning displaced persons. The US infrastructure, health, and such eco- and the European Union are unlikely ei- nomic functions as banking; and ther to put large civilian assistance pres- efforts, including through civil soci- ences on the ground or to provide fi- ety, to restrain hostile rhetoric. The nances without oversight to Russia, Ar- prospects of success at first are dim, menia, or Azerbaijan. The OSCE should but every little bit helps. These efforts establish a presence to negotiate and im- may eventually expand to include plement the projects necessary for both joint civil society programmes, e.g., remaining and returning populations. for young leaders. This presence could be a continuation Negotiations on the future status of of or successor to the current office of Nagornyy Karabakh and its inhabitants the Personal Representative of the Chair- will be long and hard. The ceasefire has person-in-Office. In addition to general set new lines of contact in concrete. Both humanitarian relief for reconstruction sides – which have just seen once more of homes and other vital infrastructure, that it is possible to change facts on the these include: ground through combat – will take time • demining; to come to terms with the new equilib- • force/heavy weapons disengage- rium. But that does not mean a respite ment/withdrawal; for the Western powers in the Minsk • police/police training; Group – not only the US and France, • a future OSCE role in military/civilian but also , Turkey, and . observation of the ceasefire; They need to work together to come up with an alternative to a prospective

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https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748922339-06, am 29.12.2020, 18:09:22 Open Access - https://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb Philip Remler, Richard Giragosian, Marina Lorenzini, Sergei Rastoltsev

Russian plan, which will inevitably con- 2020. A ceasefire there might create op- tain clauses cementing Russia’s footprint portunities for developing relations fur- in the region. The most essential prepara- ther. tion for that effort is to listen to the con- A regional agreement could also in- cerns of affected populations throughout clude fully opening the land border be- the region. Decision-makers of all outside tween Armenia and Turkey. Since Soviet powers (including Turks and Russians) times, a weekly train had run between require a better understanding of the his- Kars in Turkey and Leninakan (now tory, culture, and people of these coun- Gyumri) in Armenia. In 1993 Turkey tries. budgeted funds to open the road bor- A regional peace agreement is needed to der, too, to automobile and truck traf- normalize relations, in the first instance fic. However, the March 1993 offensive between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and against Kelbajar, in part staged from Ar- to open international borders, e.g., be- menia, led Turkey to stop train service tween Turkey and Armenia. By signing and cancel its plans for the road border. the Alma-Ata Protocols of 21 December Attempts in 2009 to normalize relations, 1991, which founded the CIS, Armenia, strongly backed by the US, met opposi- and Azerbaijan, along with other Sovi- tion from key constituencies. With the et Union Republics, agreed to recognize reversion of Kelbajar to Azerbaijani con- one another as independent within So- trol, the events that led to the closure viet-era borders. But the Karabakh con- of this border have been reversed. Re-es- flict was already entering its full combat tablishing border communications may phase, and the two countries never estab- produce an opportunity to pursue overall lished relations or agreed borders. Azer- normalization. baijan considered the Karabakh war ag- gression by Armenia, and Armenia con- sidered it Azerbaijani aggression against Conclusion the populace of Nagornyy Karabakh. Rus- sia’s 2014 actions in Crimea and eastern The recent combat marked a break with Ukraine, with their implications for the the psychology of the last 26 years: Alma-Ata Protocols, further complicated for the first time since the ceasefire of these considerations. 1994, both Baku and Yerevan now real- As a first step, the Minsk Group ize that military force can achieve polit- should try to mediate a formal cease- ical goals. Both capitals had been accus- fire along Azerbaijan’s border with Ar- tomed to military stalemate and adapted menia – especially necessary in view of their strategies to that mindset. Military the prospective return of Azerbaijani dis- actions were demonstrative, not strategic, placed persons to their former homes meant to impress a domestic and/or in- in Kelbajar and Lachin provinces, which ternational audience, not materially to border Armenia. Clashes have occurred change facts on the ground. There is along the border, most recently in July no going back to that mindset. Russian

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https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748922339-06, am 29.12.2020, 18:09:22 Open Access - https://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb OSCE Minsk Group: Lessons from the Past and Tasks for the Future peacekeepers may keep armed hostilities Azeri place names, only the non-Latin from breaking out again, but they cannot characters have been changed for com- extinguish the idea on both sides that re- prehensibility. Translated titles in foot- notes are marked “(TR)”. suming combat might in future change 3 UNSC Resolutions 822 (30 April 1993), the balance again. 853 (29 July 1993), 874 (14 October It is therefore imperative that multi- 1993), and 884 (12 November 1993). lateral negotiations re-start. Negotiations 4 Jirair Libaridian, Why Negotiations run unilaterally – e.g., by Russia – or by Failed, Armenian Mirror-Spectator, 2 November 2020, at: secret collaborations – e.g., with Turkey – https://mirrorspectator.com/2020/11/02/ will not serve the interests of either com- why-negotiations-failed/. batant side or their people. It is for the 5 See, e.g., Philip Remler, Chained to the Minsk Group – all Co-Chairs, supported Caucasus, IPI, 2016, at: https://www.ipin by all other members – to step up to their st.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/1605 -Chained-to-the-Caucasus.pdf. responsibilities, build confidence and se- 6 “PM addresses the nation”, Office to the curity between the combatants, and to- Prime Minister of the Republic of Arme- gether formulate and negotiate new plans nia, 12 November 2020, at: https://www. to deliver a just and lasting peace to the primeminister.am/en/statements-and-mes entire region. sages/item/2020/11/12/Nikol-Pashinyan-S peech/. 7 “The step-by-step approach […] cannot serve as a basis for resolution.” Robert Notes Kocharyan, undated letter to Minsk Group Co-Chairs, early 1998. 1 The authors wish to thank the members 8 “Aliyev excluded any special status for of the peer review panel, colleagues in Nagornyy Karabakh” (TR), TASS, 17 member institutions, and other trusted November 2020, at: https://tass.ru/mezhd colleagues with whom we shared drafts unarodnaya-panorama/10023751?noredir of this report, and who provided valuable =true. insights at every stage. 9 Ilham Aliyev, Facebook post, 8 Novem- 2 A note on terminology: following de ber 2020, at: https://www.facebook.com/ Waal, the term “Nagornyy Karabakh” PresidentIlhamAliyev/photos/a.10151996 designates the polity named Montane- 474470315/10164122626875315/. Karabakh Autonomous District (NKAO 10 On drones: “After the Karabakh conflict – “Nagorno-Karabakhskaya Avtonom- everyone is talking about the ‘drone rev- naya Oblast”) in Soviet times, known to- olution’” (TR), Meduza, 19 November day in Armenian as Artsakh (Thomas de 2020, at: https://meduza.io/feature/2 Waal, , New York and Lon- 020/11/19/posle-karabahskogo-konf don: New York University Press, 2003). likta-vse-govoryat-o-revolyutsii-dron “Armenia” designates the Republic of ov. On diplomatic support: “Erdoğan: Armenia. “Karabakh conflict” designates Time to resolve Nagornyy Karabakh” the conflict that broke out in 1988 after (TR), Deutsche Welle Türkçe, 29 Septem- the NKAO Supreme Soviet petitioned ber 2020, at: https://www.dw.com/tr/erdo Soviet authorities to transfer the NKAO 11 Kareem Fahim/Isabelle Khurshudyan/Za- from Soviet Azerbaijan to Soviet Arme- karia Zakaria, “Deaths of Syrian merce- nia. For reasons of space, place names naries show how Turkey, Russia could in Armenian have been transliterated; in get sucked into Nagorno-Karabakh con-

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https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748922339-06, am 29.12.2020, 18:09:22 Open Access - https://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb Philip Remler, Richard Giragosian, Marina Lorenzini, Sergei Rastoltsev

flict”, Washington Post, 14 October 2020, between Turkey and the Allies replaced at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/wo Sèvres for its signatories and became a rld/middle_east/azerbaijan-armenia-turk founding document of the Republic of ey-nagorno-karabakh/2020/10/13/2cdca1 Turkey. e6-08bf-11eb-8719-0df159d14794_story.h 17 “Armenia”, Observation of Economic tml. Complexity, at: https://oec.world/en/pr 12 “Lavrov called for Russian peacekeepers ofile/country/arm. in Nagornyy Karabakh” (TR), Regnum.ru, 18 “Statement by President of the Republic 14 October 2020, at: https://regnum.r of Azerbaijan, Prime Minister of the Re- u/news/polit/3089582.html; “Foreign public of Armenia and President of the Minister Sergey Lavrov’s interview with Russian Federation” (TR), President of Russian and foreign media on current Russia, 10 November 2020, at: http://kre international issues, Moscow, November mlin.ru/events/president/news/64384. 12, 2020”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 14 19 UNHCR, Azerbaijan: Analysis of gaps October 2020, at: https://www.mid.ru/ru/ in the protection of internally displaced press_service/minister_speeches/-/asset_p persons (IDPs), October 2009, p. 3, at: ublisher/7OvQR5KJWVmR/content/id/4 https://www.unhcr.org/4bd7edbd9.pdf. 381977. 20 Ilham Aliyev, “Ilham Aliyev and Presi- 13 Ilham Aliyev, Facebook post, 31 October dent of Russia met by 2020, at: https://www.facebook.com/Pres videoconference” (TR), Facebook post, identIlhamAliyev/photos/a.10151996474 10 November 2020, at: https://www.fac 470315/10164085858605315/. ebook.com/PresidentIlhamAliyev/vide 14 “Statement of the Russian MFA on the os/831550284329696; Lavrov 12 Novem- appeal by the Prime Minister of the Re- ber 2020 press conference, cited above public of Armenia…”, RF Ministry of (note 12). Foreign Affairs, 31 October 2020, at: 21 Lavrov 12 November 2020 press confer- https://www.mid.ru/ru/press_service/sp ence, cited above (note 12). okesman/official_statement/-/asset_publ 22 Ilham Aliyev, “Ilham Aliyev addressed isher/t2GCdmD8RNIr/content/id/44119 the people” (TR), Facebook post, 10 39. November 2020, at: https://www.facebo 15 Mikayel Zolyan, “Can ‘New Armenia’ ok.com/PresidentIlhamAliyev/videos/402 disentangle democratic change from 316387790506. geopolitics?”, OC Media, 25 July 2018, at: 23 See, e.g., Lavrov 12 November 2020 press https://oc-media.org/features/analysis-can conference, cited above (note 12). -new-armenia-disentangle-democratic-cha 24 Ilham Aliyev, Facebook post, 31 October nge-from-geopolitics/. 2020, at: https://www.facebook.com/Pres 16 Jirair Libaridian, “A step, this time a big identIlhamAliyev/photos/a.10151996474 step, backwards”, , 1 September 470315/10164085858605315/. 2020, at: https://www.aravot-en.am/20 25 Russia’s President Putin, answering ques- 20/09/01/263436/?fbclid=IwAR0Fxh9x tions from the press on 17 November luqFMXcvcLu3JNqtuERdX4Oxca5B5 2020, chided Armenia for not having fol- o7EjUrp94tPBABlStLUbyg. With the lowed Russia’s example in Crimea by rec- Treaty of Sèvres, the victorious allies of ognizing Nagornyy Karabakh’s indepen- World War I intended to partition the dence, then achieving unification and Ottoman Empire. The treaty was never presenting the international community ratified. Subsequent treaties signed vari- with a fait accompli. However, much of ously by parties to Sèvres, including Ar- the international community has brand- menia (Treaty of Kars, 1921), rendered ed Russia’s actions violations of interna- it moot. The 1923 Treaty of Lausanne tional law and imposed severe sanctions,

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https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748922339-06, am 29.12.2020, 18:09:22 Open Access - https://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb OSCE Minsk Group: Lessons from the Past and Tasks for the Future

which Armenia’s much smaller economy ter of the Republic of Azerbaijan Jeyhun would have been ill-equipped to weath- Bayramov” (TR), RF Ministry of Foreign er. “Answers to media on the situation Affairs, 15 November 2020, at: https://w in Nagorno-Karabakh” (TR), President of ww.mid.ru/en/telefonnye-razgovory-mini Russia, 17 November 2020, at: http://kre stra/-/asset_publisher/KLX3tiYzsCLY/con mlin.ru/events/president/news/64431. tent/id/4434452. 26 “Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s tele- phone conversation with Foreign Minis-

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https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748922339-06, am 29.12.2020, 18:09:22 Open Access - https://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb