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From League of to United Nations Author(s): Leland M. Goodrich Reviewed work(s): Source: International Organization, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Feb., 1947), pp. 3-21 Published by: The MIT Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2703515 . Accessed: 09/05/2012 23:09

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http://www.jstor.org FROM TO UNITED NATIONS

byLELAND M. GOODRICH*

I. On April18, 1946,the League Assemblyadjourned after taking the necessarysteps to terminatethe existenceof the League of Nationsand transferits propertiesand assetsto the UnitedNations. On August1, thistransfer took place at a simpleceremony in .Thus, an im- portantand, at onetime, promising experiment in internationalcoopera- tioncame formally to an end.Outside of Geneva, no importantnotice was takenof this fact. Within the counselsof the UnitedNations, there was an apparentreadiness to writethe old League offas a failure,and to re- gard the new organizationas somethingunique, representing a fresh approachto the worldproblems of and security.Quite clearly therewas a hesitancyin manyquarters to call attentionto the essential continuityof the old League and the new UnitedNations for fear of arousinglatent hostilitiesor creatingdoubts which mightseriously jeopardizethe birth and earlysuccess of the new organization. This silenceregarding the League couldwell be understoodat a time whenthe establishment of a generalworld organization to takethe place of the discreditedLeague was in doubt,when it was uncertainwhether theUnited States Senate would agree to Americanparticipation, and when thefuture course of the was in thebalance. Though careful considerationhad beengiven within the Departmentof to League experiencein theformulation of proposals, it was quiteunder- standablethat officersof the Department,in the addresseswhich they deliveredand reportswhich they made on the DumbartonOaks Pro- posals,should have for the most part omitted all referencesto theLeague exceptwhere it seemedpossible to pointto the greatimprovements that had been incorporatedin the new Proposals.Nor was it surprising,in view of the past relationof the UnitedStates to the League and the knownantipathy of the Soviet Union to thatorganization, that ofState Stettinius in hisaddress to thelUnited Nations Conference in San Franciscoon April26, 1945,failed once to referto theLeague of Nations,

* LHLAND M. GOODRICH, Professorof Political Science at Brown Universityand Professor of InternationalOrganization at the FletcherSchool of and ,was Secretaryof the Committeeon the PacificSettlement of Disputes of CommissionIII at the UnitedNations Conferenceat .He is co-editorof the Documentson AmericanForeign Reations series,co-author, with , of Charterof the UnitedNations: Commerdaryand Documents,and a formerDirector of the Peace Foundation. 3 4 INTERNATIONALORGANIZATION or thepart of an AmericanPresident in theestablishment of it.' In fact, fromthe addressesand debatesat the San FranciscoConference, the personnelassembled for the Conference Secretariat, and theorganization and procedureof the Conference,it wouldhave been quite possiblefor an outsideobserver to drawthe conclusionthat this was a pioneereffort in worldorganization.2 Since the UnitedNations came into beingas a functioningorganization there has been a similardisinclination on the partof those participating in itswork to call attentionto itstrue relation to the League of Nations. Whilethe circumstanceswhich make it necessaryfor those officially connectedwith the UnitedNations to be so circumspectin theirrefer- encesto the League of Nationscan be appreciated,the studentof inter- nationalorganization is free,in factis dutybound, to take a moreinde- pendentand objectiveview of the relationsof the two organizations.If hisstudies lead himto theconclusion that the United Nations is in large measurethe resultof a continuousevolutionary development extending wellinto the past, iinsteadof beingthe productof new ideas conceived underpressure of the recentwar, that should not be the occasionfor de- spair,as we know fromthe past that those social institutionswhich have beenmost successful in achievingtheir purposes are thosewhich are theproduct of gradual evolutionary development, those which in general conformto establishedhabits of thought but which nevertheless have the innercapacity for adaptation to newconditions and newneeds. Whileprogress largely depends upon the discoveryand applicationof newideas and techniques,it has alwaysbeen considered the of prac- tical statesmanshipto be able to build on the past, adaptingwhat has beenproven to be usefulin pastexperience to theneeds and requirements of the changingworld. Thus the framnersof the AmericanConstitution, whilethey created much that was new,did not hesitateto drawheavily uponthe institutionsand principleswhich were a partof theircommon backgroundof experience in Americaand in England.At thetime of the establishmentof the League of Nations,the view was commonlyheld, certainlywith more justification than today in relationto the United Nations,that somethingreally unique was beingcreated. However, we have cometo recognizethat even theLeague systemwas primarilya systematizationof pre-warideas and practices,with some innovations added in the lightof experience.Sir AlfredZimmern has expressed thisfact very well in thesewords: . . . The League of Nationswas neverintended to be, noris it, a revolutionaryorganization. On the contrary,it acceptsthe world I United Nations Conferenceon Interna- Conference,see GraysonKirk and Lawrence tional Organization, Document 15, P/3, H. Chamberlain,"The Organizationof the April27, 1945. San Francisco Conference,"in Political Sci- 2 For an authoritativedescription of the enceQuarterly, LX (1945), p. 321. FROM LEAGUE OF NATIONS TO UNITED NATIONS 5 ofstates as it findsit and merelyseeks to providea moresatisfactory means forcarrying on some of the businesswhich these states trans- act between one another. It is not even revolutionaryin the more limited sense of revolutionizingthe methods for carryingon inter- state busihess. It does not supersede the older methods. It merely supplementsthem.3 We have come to recognizethe various strandsof experience-the Euro- pean Concert of Powers, the practice of arbitrationin the settlementof disputes, internationaladministrative cooperation, to mention only a few-which enteredinto the fabricof the League. Should we be surprised to findthat what was true of the League of N,ations is even more true of the United Nations? Those who have thus farattempted a comparisonof the United Nations with the League of Nations have, generallyspeaking, been concerned with pointing out the differences.4Furthermore, comparison has been made of the textual provisionsof the Covenant and the provisionsof the Charter, not taking into account actual practice under the Covenant. Such a basis of comparisonnaturally leads to an exaggeratedidea of the extent of the gap which separates the two systems.If in similarfashion the Constitutionof the as it existed on paper at the time it became effectivein 1789 were compared with the Constitutionas it is applied today, the conclusionundoubtedly would be that a revolution had occurredin the interveningperiod. Obviously,any usefulcomparison ofthe League and the United Nations mustbe based on the League system as it developedunder the Covenant. If that is done, it becomes clear that the gap separatingthe League of Nations and the United Nations is not large, that many provisions of the have been taken directlyfrom the Covenant, thoughusually with changes of names and rearrangementsof words,that other provisionsare little more than codifications,so to speak, of League practice as it developed under the Covenant,and that stillother provisions represent the logical development of ideas whichwere in processof evolutionwhen the League was actively functioning.Of course there are many exceptions,some of them impor- tant. But the point upon which attention needs to be focused for the serious student of internationalaffairs is that the United Nations does not representa break withthe past, but ratherthe continuedapplication of old ideas and methods with some changes deemed necessary in the lightof past experience.If people would only recognizethis simple truth, theymight be moreintelligent in theirevaluation of past effortsand more tolerantin theirappraisal of presentefforts.

B AlfredZimmern, The League of Nations the United Nations: Points of Difference," and theRule ofLaw, , 1936, p. 4. in Department of State, Bulletin, XIII, p. 4 See, forexample, Clyde Eagleton, " Cove- 263. nant of the League of Nations and Charterof 6 INTERNATIONALORGANIZATION IL Space does not permita detailedanalysis with a viewto establishing the exact extentto whichthe UnitedNations is a continuationof the Leaguesystem. All thatis attemptedhere is to considerthe moreimpor- tant featuresof the UnitedNations system, particularly those with re- spectto whichclaims to uniquenesshave been made,with a viewto de- terminingto whatextent in generalthis continuity can be said to exist. Relationto the Peace Settlement Onepoint that has beenmade in favor of the United Nations as a special claimto uniquenessis thatits Charteris an independentinstrument, un- connectedwith the which are in processof being made for settling the politicaland economicissues of WorldWar IL'* In contrast,it is arguedthat the League, by virtueof the fact that its Covenantwas made at the Peace Conference,and incorporatedin each of the peace treaties,was fromthe beginningso involvedin the issuesof the peace settlementthat it was neverable to overcomethe initialhandicap of beinga League to enforcethe peace treaties.It is true,of course,that underthe Covenantand underother provisions of the peace treaties, the League had placed upon it certainresponsibilities in connection withthe carryingout ofthe peace settlement.6This connectionwas not, in the earlyyears of the League,regarded as an unmixedevil. One dis- tinguishedobserver, while recognizing that a principalfunction of the League was "to executethe peace treaties,"concluded on the basis of the firstyears of experiencethat this connectionon balance serveda usefulworld purpose.7 It mightbe suggestedthat the criticismthat later cameto be madeof the Leagueon theground of its relation to thepeace treatieswas primarilyan attackupon the treaties themselves and would have been directedagainst any internationalorganization which proved incapableof revising them. Without further arguing this point, however, the questioncan be raisedas to howdifferent will be the relationof the UnitedNations to the peace settlementfollowing II? Whilethe Charteris a separateinstrument and was made at a con- ferencecalled specially for the purpose, the United Nations will inevitably becomeintimately and directlyassociated with the peace treatiesonce theyare made.For onething the original Members of the United Nations werethose states that wereat war withone or moreof the Axispowers at thetime of the San FranciscoConference. Furthermore, the interpre- I See, forexample, Clyde Eagleton, "Cove- of Danzig. of Peace with , nantof the League of Nationsand Charterof Part III, sectionIV, Annex,chapter II, and the United Nations: Pointsof Difference,"in sectionXI. Departmentof State, Bulletin,XIII, p. 264. 7 W. E. Rappard, InternationalRelation. 6 See, for example, the provision of the Viewedfrom Geneva, New Haven, 1925, p. Treaty of Versaillesrelating to the adminis- 14-16. trationof the Saar Basin and the protection FROM LEAGUEOF NATIONSTO UNITED NATIONS 7 tationto date ofthe provisions of Article 4 ofthe Chartermakes it clear thatthe conductof a non-memberstate during the war is an important factorin determiningwhether that state shall be admittedto member- ship.While Article 107 dissociatesthe UnitedNations as a peace organi- zation fromaction taken in relationto enemystates, once the peace treatieshave beenmade theywill become part of the existingeconomic and politicalorder on thebasis ofwhich the UnitedNations will seek to maintainpeace and security.It is difficultto see how an international organizationfor maintainingpeace and security,such as the United Nationsis, can do so on any otherbasis. Furthermore,in connection withthe making of the peace treaties, we alreadysee theUnited Nations beingcalled upon to exerciseimportant functions of administrationor guaranteesimilar to thosewhich the League was askedto perform.Thus the UnitedNations guarantee of the specialregime for parallels veryclosely the League guaranteeof Danzig in its basic conception, and the proposedrole of the UnitedNations in connectionwith "terri- toriesdetached from enemy states in connectionwith the SecondWorld War" 8 is almostidentical to thatof the League in relationto "colonies and territorieswhich as a consequenceof the late war [WorldWar I] have ceased to be underthe sovereigntyof the States whichformerly governedthem." 9 In thissame connectionwe shouldconsider the respective powers and responsibilitiesof the two organizationsin regardto the revisionof the twopeace settlements.One seriouscriticism made of the League of Na- tionswas itsineffectiveness as an instrumentalityfor the revision of those provisionsof the peace treaties which had cometo be recognizedas unfair and unjust.Under the Covenantof the League the Assemblywas em- poweredto advise the revisionof treatieswhich had become "inap- plicable" andthe consideration of international conditions whose continu- ationmight affect the peace of the world.'0 This provision remained a dead letterfrom the beginning, due to theAssembly's lack ofpower of decision and meansof enforcement." How muchmore effective is the UnitedNa- tionslikely to be inthis respect? According to Article14 ofthe Charter the GeneralAssembly recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation,regardless of origin,which is likelyto impairfriendly relationsamong nations. While there is no specificmention made of the revisionof treaties, the General Assembly is clearlyauthorized under this Articleto discussany situationhaving its originin unsatisfactorytreaty provisionsand to make recommendationsthereon.'2 There is, however,

8 Charterof the UnitedNations, Article 77. New York, 1937, p. 106-11. 9 Cotenantof the League of Nations,Article 12 See discussion in Leland M. Goodrich 12, paragraph1. and Edvard Hambro, Charterof the United 10Ibid., Article19. Nations: Commentaryand Documents,Boston 11Frederick S. Dunn, Peaceful Change, 1946, p. 104-06. 8 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION no obligation on the part of Members to accept any recommendation that may be made. Thus the power conferredunder this Articledoes not go substantiallybeyond that of the Assembly under Article 19 of the Covenant and thereis the same chance, if not likelihood,that the United Nations will be ineffectiveas an instrumentfor treaty revision. Further- more, whilethe SecurityCouncil is given broad powersto take necessary action to maintain peace and security,the powers which the Council has to bind Members are limited to those falling within the general categoryof enforcementaction and do not extendto the powerto impose upon partiesto a dispute or states interestedin a particularsituation any particularterms of settlementor adjustment.That was made clear in the discussionsat San Francisco.'3

Basic Characterof TwoOrganizations The statementhas been made that the United Nations is "potentially and actually much stronger" than the League of Nations.'4 That state- ment mightlend itselfto some misunderstanding,particularly in view of the fact that it is only one of many statementsthat have been made suggestingthat the United Nations inherentlyis a more powerful or- ganization and thereforemore likelyto achieve its purpose by virtue of the specificprovisions of its Charterthan was the League of Nations. We can start,I think,with the fundamentalproposition that the United Nations, as was the League of Nations, is primarilya cooperativeenter- priseand fallsgenerally within the categoryof leagues and instead of withinthat of federalunions. Except in one situation, neither the United Nations nor its principalpolitical organs have the authority to take decisions binding on Members without their express . Without this power,it is impossibleto regard the organs of the United Nations as constitutinga governmentin the sense of the federalgovern- ment of the United States. The essential characterof the United Nations is specificallyaffirmed in the firstof the principleslaid down in Article 2 of the Charterwhere it is stated that "the organizationis based on the principleof the sovereignequality of all its members."This principlewas not expresslystated in the Covenant of the League of Nations,but was, nevertheless,implicit in its provisions. Since both the United Nations and the League of Nations are based primarilyupon the principle of voluntary cooperation,the point that needs special considerationis whether,more or less as an exceptionto the general principle,the Charter contains provisionswhich give to the or- gans ofthe United Nations greaterauthority than was vested in the corre-

13 See Goodrich and Hambro, op. cit., p. Handbook on the New World Organization, 152-53, 155-59. New York, 1946, p. 16. 14Louis Dolivet, The United Nations: A FROM LEAGUE OF NATIONS TO UNITED NATIONS 9 spondingorgans of the League. In this connectiona greatdeal of emphasis has been placed upon the provisionsof the Charter regulatingvoting in the General Assemblyand the SecurityCouncil. It is, of course,true that underArticle 18 of the Charterdecisions of the General Assemblycan be taken by a two-thirdsmajority of the memberspresent and voting,in- stead of by unanimousvote of those present,as was the requirementfor the League Assembly.It must be borne in mind,however, that on ques- tions of policy the General Assemblycan only recommend,and that con- sequently any decision taken is a decision to make a recommendation. Also, it is quite unfairto compare these provisionswithout taking into account the practice of the League Assembly under the Covenant. In several importantrespects the rule of the Covenant was interpretedso as to bringactual League practicefairly close to the provisionsof the Char- ter.15For one thing,it was provided in the rules of the Assemblythat a state whichabstained fromvoting was not to be countedas present,with the result that abstention was a means by which certain of the conse- quences of the unanimityrule could be avoided. More important,how- ever, was the rule whichwas establishedin the firstsession of the League Assembly,that a resolutionexpressing a wish, technicallyknown as a "voeu," might be adopted by a majority vote. This had the effectof making possible a whole range of Assembly decisions by majority vote which did not differin any importantrespect from decisions which may be taken by the General Assembly by majority or two-thirdsvotes.18 Furthermore,it should be noted that the League Assemblyearly came to the conclusionthat the decision to recommendan amendmentto the Covenant underArticle 26 mightbe taken by a majorityvote,17 with the result that the power of the Assemblyto initiate amendmentsactually could be exercised more easily than under the Charter of the United Nations. Thus it would seem erroneousto view the provisions of the Charter with respect to the power of the General Assembly to make decisions as representingany fundamentallydifferent approach fromor any great advance over the comparable provisionsof the Covenant of the League of Nations as interpretedin practice. When we turnour attentionto the SecurityCouncil we findadmittedly that an importantchange has been made. Under the League Covenant the Council was governed by the unanimityrule except in procedural matters,and this proved a serioushandicap, particularlywhen the Coun- cil was acting under Article 11 of the Covenant. It was possible for a memberof the Council, accused of threateningor disturbingthe peace, to prevent any effectiveaction under this Article by the interposition 15See Margaret E. Burton, The Assembly nationalOrganization, Baltimore, 1940, p. 24. of the League of Nations, Chicago, 1941, p. 17 League of Nations,Records of theSecond 175-205. Assembly, Plenary Meetings, p. 733-35. See 16 See C. A. Riches, MajorityRule in Inter- also, Burton,op. cit.,p. 187. 10 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION ofits ,as happenedin the case ofJapanese aggression in in 1931and the threatof Italian aggressionin in 1935.Under the Charterit is possiblefor a decisionto be takenbinding Members of the United Nations withouttheir express consent. Furthermore, this decisionmay require specific acts uponthe part of the Membersof the UnitedNations and is notto be regardedas a simplerecommendation as was the case withdecisions taken by the League Councilunder Articles 10 and 16. Nevertheless,there are importantpoints to be keptin mindbefore we concludethat a revolutionarystep has been taken. In the firstplace, a decisionby the SecurityCouncil can onlyhave the effectof a recom- mendationwhen the SecurityCouncil is engagedin the performanceof its functionsunder Chapter VI, i.e. whenit is seekingto achievethe pa- cificsettlement or adjustmentof a disputeor situation.Furthermore, whilethe decisionof the SecurityCouncil with respect to enforcement actionunder Chapter VII is bindingupon Membersof the UnitedNa- tions,including those not representedon the SecurityCouncil, such decisionscannot be takenwithout the concurrenceof all the permanent membersof the SecurityCouncil. Consequently, in a situationcompara- ble to that of Japaneseaggression against in Manchuriain 1931 and the threatof Italian aggressionagainst Ethiopia in 1935,where the League Counciladmittedly failed on accountof the unanimity principle, the SecurityCouncil would be preventedfrom taking any decision. Underthe Charterthe SecurityCouncil has power,which the League Councildid not have,to take actionagainst the smallpowers, but the experienceof the past would seem to show that it is not the smaller powers,acting alone, who are mostlikely to disturbthe peace. When dealingwith threats by smallerpowers acting alone the League Council was reasonablyeffective; it failedonly when small powers had theback- ingof great powers. In spiteof important changes in thetechnical provi- sionsof the Charter,one is forcedto the conclusionthat so faras the actual possessionof poweris concerned,the UnitedNations has not ad- vancedmuch beyond the League of Nations and thatin comparablesitua- tionsmuch the same result is to be anticipated.In thelast analysis under eithersystem success or failure is dependentupon the ability of the more powerfulmembers to cooperateeffectively for common ends. Finally,the provisionsof the Charterwith regardto amendments and withdrawalfollow in all essentialrespects the provisions of the Cove- nant and the practicesdeveloped thereunder. Under both Charterand Covenantno amendmentrecommended by the Assemblycan become effectiveuntil ratified by the greatpowers. The Covenantwas a little morerestrictive than the Charterin onerespect, requiring ratification by all membersof the League whoserepresentatives composed the Council, FROM LEAGUEOF NATIONSTO UNITED NATIONS 11 plusa majorityof all othermembers, thereby giving any Council member a "veto." On the otherhand, the Charter,while limiting the "veto" to permanentmembers, requires approval by two-thirdsof the Members of the UnitedNations. In practice,the charterprovisions are not likely to have substantiallydifferent results. Likewise,with respect to withdrawal,the League and the UnitedNa- tionssystems do not differin any importantrespect. The Covenantof the League expresslypermitted withdrawal under certainconditions whichwere not, however, enforced in practice.'8The Chartersays noth- ing about withdrawalbut it is understoodon the basis of a declaration adoptedat San Franciscothat the right of withdrawal can be exercised.'9 No doubtinfluenced by theLeague practiceand conformingto it, it was decidedthat no legalconditions should be attachedto theexercise of this rightand that no attemptshould be made to forcea state to remaina Member,although it was made clearthat a moralobligation to continue as a Memberexists and thatthe right of withdrawal should only be exer- cisedfor very good reasons. Basic Obligationsof Members Enumeratedin Article2 ofthe Charter are certainbasic obligationsof Membersof the UnitedNations. These includethe obligationto settle disputesby peaceful means in sucha mannerthat international peace and securityare notendangered, the obligationto refrainfrom the threator the use of forceagainst the or politicalindependence ofany state,and the obligationto giveassistance to the UnitedNations in anyaction taken under the terms of the Charter. Similar commitments phrasedin somewhatdifferent language and with somewhatdifferent meaningswere to be foundin variousArticles of the Covenant.20From thepoint of view of form the Charter does represent a somewhatdifferent approachin that these basic commitments are groupedtogether as Princi- plesbinding upon all Members.The phraseologyof the Charter in certain respectsundoubtedly represents improvement. For instance,the provision of Article2, paragraph4, by whichMembers are to refrain"from the threator use offorce against the territorial integrity or political independ- ence of any state" representsan advanceover the correspondingprovi- sionsof the Covenant which made it possiblefor members to takerefuge in the technicalitythat an undeclaredwar in the materialsense was no warand thattherefore such use ofarmed force did not constitutea "re sortto war." On the otherhand, in one importantrespect, the basic

18 Article1, paragraph2. p. 86-89. 19For text,see UNCIO, VerbatimMinutes 20 Articles10; 12, paragraph 1; 13, para- of theNinth PlenarySession, 25, 1945, graphs 1 and 4; 15, paragraphs 1 and 6; 16, Document 1210, P/20, p. 5-6; for text and paragraphs1 and 3; and 17. comment,see Goodrichand Hambro,op. cit., 12 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION obligationsof the Members of the United Nations may prove to be less satisfactorysince, in the matterof enforcementaction, the obligationof the Members of the United Nations is to accept and carryout decisions of the Security Council and to give assistance to the United Nations in any action taken underthe Charter,while under Article 16 ofthe Cove- nant, the obligationof membersextended to the taking of specificmeas- ures against any state resortingto war in violationof its obligationsunder the Covenant. While this obligationwas weakenedby resolutionsadopted by the Assemblyin 1921, it neverthelessproved capable of providingthe legal basis forimportant action against in 1935.

III. The elementof continuityin the progression fromLeague of Nations to United Nations is perhaps most obvious when we examine the struc- ture of the two organizations.The General Assemblyis the League As- sembly,from the point of view of the basic principlesof its composition, powers and procedures.We have already seen froman examinationof voting proceduresthat the practical differencebetween the League pro- visions and theiractual application and the Charterprovisions has been greatlyexaggerated. The powers of the General Assembly,as compared with those of the League Assembly,have been somewhatrestricted, it is true. The General Assembly's powers of discussion under Article 10 of the Charterand succeedingarticles are fullyas broad and comprehensive as the League Assembly's powers under Article 3, paragraph 3 of the Covenant. Only in respect to the making of recommendationshas the power of the General Assemblybeen limited,and this, it can be argued, is in line withthe practicewhich developed under the Covenant according to which the Council, and not the Assembly,ordinarily dealt with dis- putes and situationswhich endangeredpeace and good understanding.2' The significantdifference is that under the Chartera party to a dispute cannot by its act alone transferthe dispute from the Council to the Assembly,as was possibleunder Article 15, paragraph9, ofthe Covenant. The SecurityCouncil, fromthe point of view of composition,is the old League Council. One importantchange, however, has been introduced into the Charter. The League Council had general responsibilitiesand functions,whereas the Security Council is a highly specialized organ. Instead of having one council with broad powers as did the League, the United Nations has three,among whichthe various functionsand powers of the League Council are divided. To a certain extent this new set-up was anticipated in League practice. At the time when the League's prestige as a peace and security organization was low, the Assembly created a special committeeknown as the Bruce Committeeto inquire 21 See Burton,op. cit.,p. 284-374. FROM LEAGUE OF NATIONS TO UNITED NATIONS 13 and reporton the possibilitiesof givingthe economic and social work of the League greaterautonomy. This Committeerecommended the estab- lishmentof a new organ to be knownas the Central Committeefor Eco- nomicand Social Questionsto whichwould be entrustedthe directionand supervisionof the work of the League committeesin this field.22This proposed Committee,while it never was set up, was in effectthe fore- runnerof the presentEconomic and Social Council. So far as the Trusteeship Council is concerned,there is a somewhat similar backgroundof development.While the Council was responsible underthe Covenant forthe supervisionof the-administration of mandates, in actual practicethe Council came to relyvery heavily on the Mandates Commissionwhich, under the Charter, has come to be elevated to the rank of a principalorgan, responsible not to the Council but to the Gen- eral Assembly.This very responsibilityof the TrusteeshipCouncil to the General Assemblywas to some extent anticipated in the practice of the League. Over the protest of some members,.the League Assemblyearly assertedand exercisedthe rightto discussand expressits opinionon man- dates questions. While the Council was technicallyresponsible for the enforcementof the provisionsof the Covenant, there can be little doubt but what the Assemblyexercised a real influenceboth on Council action and upon the mandatorypowers.23 The Secretariatof the United Nations is clearly a continuationof the League Secretariat,not onlyin name, but also largelyin substance. While the Charterprovisions would permitits organizationon somewhatdiffer- ent lines, with separate staffsfor the principalorgans of the United Na- tions, it seems clear that the conceptionof a unifiedSecretariat has pre- vailed.24"The role of the Secretary-Generalas the administratorof the United Nations derives fromthat of his counterpartin the League of Nations," 25 but has clearlyassumed greaterimportance and scope under the provisionsof the Charter. Due to political circumstancesand the personalityof the firstholder of the office,the Secretary-Generalof the League never came to exercisea strongguiding hand in the directionof the League's work. The Charter of the United Nations, however,both expresslyand by implication,gives the Secretary-Generalgreater power and seems to expect more constructiveleadership fromhim. More par- ticularly,the role whichthe Secretary-Generalwill be called upon to play in connectionwith the coordinationof the workof the specialized agencies will requirethe exerciseof initiativeand strongleadership.26

22 League of Nations, MonthlySummary, cember 1945, p. 84-94; Walter H. C. Laves 1939, Special Supplement. and Donald Stone, "The United Nations 23 See Quincy Wright,Mandates underthe Secretariat,"Foreign Policy Reports, League of Nations,Chicago, 1930, p. 133-35. 15, 1946. 24 See Report of the PreparatoryCommis- 25 Laves and Stone, op. cit.,p. 183, sion of the United Nations, PC/20, 23 De- 26 Ibid., p. 186 et seq. 14 INTERNATIONALORGANIZATION Withrespect to the Court,it is clearlyrecognized that, while it was decidedto setup a newCourt under a newname, it willbe essentiallythe same as the PermanentCourt of InternationalJustice.27 The factthat thisCourt is regardedas oneof the principal organs of the United Nations does notin substancedistinguish it fromthe Permanent Court. For pur- posesof expediency it seemedadvisable to maintainthe fictionthat the PermanentCourt of International was independentof the League system,but a carefulexamination of the actual organizationand work ofthe Court will leave no doubtthat the Court functioned as fullywithin the frameworkof the League as will the InternationalCourt of Justice withinthe framework of the United Nations. IV. Like the League ofNations, the UnitedNations is a "generalinterna- tional organization" in the sensethat its functionsand actionscover the wholerange of mattersof internationalconcern. Both the Preamble and thestatement of Purposes contained in ArticleI ofthe Charter make this clear. In fact this generalityof purposeand functionis moreex- plicitlystated in the Charterthan it was in the Covenant,though in the practiceof the League it cameto be fullyrecognized. The Charterof the UnitedNations, in its generalarrangement and substantiveprovisions, dividesthe major activitiesof the Organizationinto threecategories: (1) the maintenanceof internationalpeace and security,by the pacific settlementof disputesand the takingof enforcementmeasures; (2) the promotionof internationaleconomic and social cooperation;and (3) the protectionof the interests of the peoples of non-self-governing territories.

The Pacific Settlementof Disputes The Chartersystem for the pacificsettlement of disputes,28while differingfrom that of the League in many details of substanceand phraseology,follows it in acceptingtwo basic principles:(1) thatparties to a disputeare in thefirst instance to seeka peacefulsettlement by means oftheir own choice; and (2) thatthe political organs of the international organizationare to interveneonly when the dispute has becomea threat to thepeace, and thenonly in a mediatoryor conciliatorycapacity. The obligationwhich Members of the UnitedNations accept under Article2, paragraph3 is to " settletheir international disputes by peaceful meansin such a mannerthat international peace and security,and justice, are not endangered."Under Article 34, paragraph1, the partiesto any

27 UNCIO, Report of the Rapporteur of LX (1946), p. 1-52. Committee IV/1, Document 913, IV/1/74 28 For detailed analysis, see Leland M. (1). See also Manley 0. Hudson, "The Goodrich,"Pacific Settlementof Disputes," Twenty-FourthYear of the World Court," in AmericanPolitical Science Review, XXXIX in AmericanJournal of Internatinal Lawf (1945), p. 956-970. FROM LEAGUE OF NATIONS TO UNITED NATIONS 15

dispute "the continuanceof whichis likelyto endangerthe maintenance of internationalpeace and security,shall, firstof all seek a solution" by peacefulmeans of theirown choice. Furthermore,by the termsof Article 36 of the Statute of the Court,Members may by declarationaccept under certainconditions the compulsoryjurisdiction of the Court. Declarations made by Membersof the United Nations acceptingthe compulsoryjuris- dictionof the PermanentCourt of InternationalJustice and still in force are declared to be acceptances under this Article. The legal obligationswhich Members of the United Nations have thus assumed are substantiallythe same as the obligationsof League members under the Covenant and supplementaryagreements. The Covenant itself did not place upon membersof the League the obligation to settle all theirdisputes by peaceful means. However, forty-sixstates accepted the compulsoryjurisdiction of the PermanentCourt by making declarations underArticle 36 of the Statute.29By Article2 of the General Pact forthe Renunciation of War of 1928 (Kellogg-Briand Pact), the signatories agreed that "the settlementor solution of all disputes or conflictsof whatevernature or of whateverorigin they may be . . shall never be sought except by pacificmeans." The powers of the United Nations organs forthe pacificsettlement of disputesare substantiallythe same as those of the principalorgans of the League. Under the Charter, as under the Covenant, the functionsof political organs in this connection are limited to discussion, inquiry, mediationand conciliation.It is clear fromthe wordsof the Charterand fromthe discussionsat San Francisco, that the SecurityCouncil has no power of finaldecision in connectionwith its functionsof pacificsettle- ment.30The Charter does, however, seek to differentiatebetween the functionsand powers of the General Assemblyand the SecurityCouncil in a way that the Covenant did not do. More specificallyit makes the SecurityCouncil primarilyresponsible for the maintenanceof peace and security,does not permita party to a dispute to have the mattertrans- ferredat its request to the General Assembly,and limitsthe powerof the General Assemblyin principleto that of discussion.This constitutesan importantdeparture from the textual provisionsof the League Covenant which gave the Council and Assemblythe same general competenceand expresslyallowed a party,acting underArticle 15, paragraph9, to have a dispute transferredat its request to the Assembly.It is significant,how- ever,that out ofsome 66 disputesthat came beforethe League, onlythree were actually broughtbefore the Assemblyunder this provision.It would thus appear, and this is the conclusionof a carefulstudent of the Assem-

29 See Manley 0. Hudson, "The Twenty- 30 See UNCIO, Report of the Rapporteur Fourth Year of the World Court," op. cit., of Committee III/2, Document 1027 p. 33. III/2/31(1), p. 4. 16 INTERNATIONALORGANIZATION bly,31that actual practice under the Covenant resulted in a differentiation offunction. This the Charterseeks to makeobligatory. In certainother respects the Chartersystem departs from the League pattern,but the importanceof these differencescan be greatlyexag- gerated.The eliminationof the requirementof unanimityin votingthe- oreticallyincreases the power of the SecurityCouncil, as comparedwith the League Council,in dealingwith disputes and situations,but con- sideringthat the SecurityCouncil can only recommend,and that in Leaguepractice, agreement of the great powers was likelyto resultin the necessaryagreement among all membersof the Council,the practical importanceof this difference is not likely to be great.Furthermore, under the Charterprovision is made for the considerationby the Security Counciland GeneralAssembly of situations as well as disputes,but this does not meanany increasein the powersof the UnitedNations organs, particularlythe SecurityCouncil, as comparedwith those of the cor- respondingorgans of the League. In fact,it can be arguedthat the pro- visionsof the Chartersuffer somewhat in flexibilityand capacityfor growth,as comparedwith the corresponding provisions of the Covenant, because of the greaterdetail and consequentrigidity of certainof its terms.A comparisonof experience under the Charter to datein thepeace- fulsettlement or adjustmentof disputesand situationswith that of the Leaguegives little basis for a confidentconclusion that the Charter system is inherentlybetter than, or forthat matter, significantly different from, thatwhich operated under the terms of the Covenant.32

EnforcementAction It is in respectto enforcementaction that the provisions of the Charter seemto offerthe most marked contrast to theprovisions of the Covenant,33 but hereagain when we comparethe Charterprovisions with the wayin whichthe Covenantprovisions were actually applied the differencesdo not appear so great.The League system,as originallyconceived, was based on the principlethat oncea memberhad resortedto warin viola- tionof its obligationsunder the Covenant,other members were immedi- atelyobligated to applyeconomic and financialsanctions of widescope againstthe offendingstate. The Councilwas empoweredto recommend

31 See MargaretE. Burton,The Assemblyof Journal of InternationalLaw, XI (July, theLeague ofNations, p. 284 et seq. 1946), p. 513-33; and United Nations,Report 32 On the operationof the League system, ofthe Security Council to the General A8emmbly, see WilliamE. Rappard, The Questfor Peace, A/93,October 3, 1946. Cambridge,1940, p. 134-207; Burton,op. cit., 38 For analysis of the United Nations sys- p. 284-374; and T. P. Conwell-Evans, The tem for the enforcementof peace and secu- League Councilin Action,London, 1929. On rity,see GraysonKirk, "The Enforcementof the workof the SecurityCouncil to date, see Security,"in Yale Law Journal,LV (August Clyde Eagleton, "The Jurisdictionof the 1946), p. 1081-1196. SecurityCouncil over Disputes," in American FROM LEAGUEOF NATIONSTO UNITED NATIONS 17 militarymeasures which members of the League weretechnically not re- quiredto carryout. As a matterof fact, in the one case wherethe provi- sionsof Article 16 weregiven anything like a realtest, the application of sanctionsagainst Italy in 1936,acting under the influenceof the resolu- tionsadopted by the Assemblyin 1921,34 the membersof the League establisheda mechanismfor the coordination of their individual acts, and proceededto applyselected economic and financialmeasures. No recom- mendationwas made by the Council for the applicationof military measures.35 The Chartermakes the Security Council responsible for deciding what enforcementmeasures are to be used to maintainthe peace. Obligations arisefor Members of the UnitedNations only when such decisions have been taken.This is a furtherdevelopment of the principlerecognized in the 1921Assembly resolutions and in theapplication of sanctions against Italy,that a centralcoordinating agency is neededto insurethe taking ofnecessary measures with the maximumof effectivenessand the mini- mumof inconvenienceand dangerto the participatingmembers. How- ever,the provisions of the Charter go muchfurther than did the Covenant in providingfor obligatory military measures and advancecommitments to place specificforces at the disposalof the SecurityCouncil. Even thoughcertain members of the League,notably , were insistent uponthe need of specific military commitments, little was donein League practiceto meetthis need. The GenevaProtocol of 1924was one notable attemptto meet this demand,by methodswhich in certainrespects anticipatedthe Charter,but it nevercame into force. The framersof the Charter,no doubtrecognizing this as a defectin the League system, sought to remedythe deficiencyby providingin somedetail for military agree- mentsbetween members of the United Nations and theSecurity Council, and fora militarystaff committee to assistthe Security Council in draw- ingup advancedplans and in applyingmilitary measures. It can, however,be queriedwhether the Chartersystem will be more effectivethan the League system, in viewof the requirement of unanimity of the permanentmembers of the SecurityCouncil. If we imagineits applicationin situationssuch as theItalian-Ethiopian and Sino-Japanese affairs,it is difficultto see how the UnitedNations would achieve any betterresults than did the League. Like the League,but forsomewhat differenttechnical reasons, the UnitedNations, in so faras its enforce- mentactivities are concerned,is an organizationfor the enforcementof peaceamong the smaller states. If thepermanent members of the Security Councilare in agreement,it willbe possibleto take effectiveaction under

84 League of Nations, Recordsof theSecond InternationalSanctions (A Reportby a Group Assembly,Plenary Meetings,p. 803. of Membersof the Royal Instituteof Inter- 35For summary of this experience, see national Affairs),London, 1938, p. 204-213. 18 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION the Charter. It is not likelythat such agreementwill be reached to take measuresagainst one of these great powersor against a prot6geof such a . Consequentlythe sphere of effectiveenforcement action by the United Nations is restrictedin advance, even more perhaps than was that of the League. Within the area of possible operation, the actual effectivenessof the United Nations system will depend upon political conditionswhich, if theyhad existed,would have also assured the success of the League of Nations.3" AdministrationofNon-Self-Governing Territories Here we encounternew names and phraseologyin the United Nations Charter, but the substance is very much the substance of the League mandates system. There are, of course, importantdifferences. For one thing,Chapter XI, "Declaration Regarding Non-Self-GoverningTerri- tories," is definitelyan addition. The idea, however,is not new, as it has been accepted by various colonial administrationsin recent years, and has found expression both in officialstatements and in authoritative writingson the subject.37However, it is new to have embodied in an internationalinstrument a definitestatement of principlesbinding upon all states engaged in the administrationof non-self-governingterritories and to place upon such states the additional obligationto make reports to an internationalauthority. So far as the trusteeshipsystem, strictlyspeaking, is concerned,it followsin generalthe lines of the mandates system.38The threecategories of A, B, and C mandates do not appear, but due to the freedomallowed in the draftingof trusteeshipagreements, there can be the same, if not greater,variety of provisions. Like the League mandates system, the institutionof the trusteeshipsystem is not made obligatory for any particularterritories; it is simplydeclared applicable to certainterritories to the extent that they are placed under it by agreement.Following the practiceunder the mandates system,the trusteeshipagreements, accord- ing to the Charter,are to be made by the states "directly concerned." They must in addition have the approval of the General Assemblyor the SecurityCouncil, dependingupon whetheror not they apply to strategic areas, but neitherorgan has any authorityto draftand put into effecta trusteeshipagreement for any territorywithout the specificapproval at least of the state in actual possessionof it. The machineryfor supervision and the lines of responsibilityhave been changed in that fortrusteeship areas other than strategicareas the ad-

" See Kirk, op. cit.; p. 1082. Nations trusteeshipsystem, see Ralph J. 37See, for example, Baron Lugard, The Bunche, "Trusteeshipand Non-Self-Govern- Dual Mandatein BritishTropical , 2nd ing Territoriesin the Charterof the United ed., London, 1923. Nations," in Organizingthe UnitedNation8, 38 For detailed analysis of the United Departmentof State Publication2573. FROM LEAGUE OF NATIONS TO UNITED NATIONS 19 ministrativeauthorities are responsibleto the GeneralAssembly and its agent,the Trusteeship Council. As has beenpointed out above,however, thischange as comparedwith the Leaguemandates system, was to some extentanticipated in League practiceby the rightwhich the Assembly assertedand exercisedto discussand makerecommendations with respect to the administrationof mandatedterritories. There is, however,in the Charterone importantpower vested in the United Nations organs, thoughin somewhatqualified form, which the Counciland Mandates Commissionof the League did not have and the lack of whichwas re- gardedas a seriousweakness of the League system. I referto theprovision forperiodical visits to the trusteeshipterritories which should make it possiblefor the Organization to getinformation on thespot and thereby checkupon and supplementthe reports of the administrative authorities.

InternationalEconomic and Social Cooperation Perhapsthe most important advance of the Charter over the Covenant of the League is to be foundin its provisionsdefining the objectives, policies,machinery and procedureof internationaleconomic and social cooperation.In this respect,the Charteroffers a wide contrastto the Covenant,which had only threearticles dealing specifically with the subject.In fact,the Preamble of the Covenant, containing the statement of purposesof the League,made no specificmention of cooperationin economicand socialmatters, though the very general phrase "in orderto promoteinternational order and cooperation"ywas reliedupon to justify numerousactivities for which no expressauthority was to be found. It is,nevertheless, true that the League in practicewas a quitedifferent matter.39It has been generally observed that the most permanently worth- whileactivities of the League of Nations were in thefield of international economicand socialcooperation. There was in thecourse of the League's existencea tremendousproliferation of organizationand an impressive recordof substantial achievement in makingavailable necessary informa- tion, in promotingadministrative and legislativeaction by member states,and in dealingdirectly with international economic and social evilsby administrativeaction. We have seenhow in 1939the recognition ofthe scope and importanceof this work led to theproposal that a Central Committeefor Economic and Social Questionsshould be set up to co- ordinateLeague activities in thisfield. Apartfrom the provisionfor a separateeconomic and social council thereis one importantorganizational difference between the League and UnitedNations systems, a differencewhich may proveto be of great

39 See, forexample, Denys P. Myers,Hand- quantitative basis, at least, of the League's bookof theLeague of Nations,Boston, 1935, economicand social activitiesduring the first forevidence of the relativeimportance on a fifteenyears of the League's existence. 20 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION importance,depending upon how the provisionsof the Charterare applied in practice. Whereas the League technical organizations dealing with health,economic and financialcooperation were developedwithin the frameworkof the League and operatedunder the generaldirection and controlof the principalLeague organs,the approachof the UnitedNa- tionshas been a differentone. This timewe have proceededon the as- sumptionthat special needs as theyarise should be metby the creation of appropriateautonomous organizations and that subsequently,these organizationsshould be broughtinto relationship with each other and with the UnitedNations by agreementsnegotiated by the organsempowered to act in suchmatters. The resultis thatinstead of having a numberof technicalorganizations functioning within the generalinternational or- ganizationand subjectto the generaldirection and supervisionof its principalorgans, as underthe League system,we nowhave a numberof specializedinter-governmental agencies, each operatingwithin a defined area and moreor less independentlyof the others. Sucha systemclearly has possibilitiesas to therange and typeof action that may be taken whichwere denied to the League systemoperating morecompletely under the influenceof politicalconsiderations. On the otherhand, there are obviouslycertain advantages in havingsome effec- tive coordinationof the operationof these various agencies as therewill be many pointsat whichtheir interests and activitieswill overlap.40 Underthe Charter the proposal is to take careof these common concerns by the specialagreements referred to above. It is too earlyto be certain as to whatthe practicalconsequences of this approach will prove to be.

V. To the studentof internationalorganization, it should be a cause neitherof surprisenor of concernto findthat the UnitedNations is for all practicalpurposes a continuationof the League ofNations. Rather it wouldbe disturbingifthe architects of world organization had completely or largelythrown aside the designs and materialsof the past. One cannot buildsoundly on thebasis ofpure theory. Man beingwhat he is, and the dominantforces and attitudesof being what they are; it is idle to expect,and foolhardyto constructthe perfectsystem of worldgovernment in our day. Profitingfrom the lessonsof past experi- ence,we can at mosthope to makesome progress toward the attainment ofa goal whichmay for a longtime remain beyond our reach. The United Nationsis not worldgovernment and it was not intendedto be such. Ratherit representsa muchmore conservative and cautiousapproach

40 See Herman Finer, The UnitedNations missionof the United Nations, PC/20, Decem- Economicand Social Council,Boston, 1945, ber 23, 1945, p. 40-48. 121 p.; also Reportof the PreparatoryCom- FROM LEAGUEOF NATIONSTO UNITED NATIONS 21 to theproblem of . As such,it inevitablyfalls into the stream of institutionaldevelopment represented by the League of Nationsand its predecessors.Different names may be used forsimilar things, and differentcombinations of words may be devisedto expresssimilar ideas. Theremay be changesof emphasis,and in fact importantsubstantive changes,deemed desirable in thelight of past experience or thought neces- saryin orderto meetchanged conditions. But thereis no realbreak in the streamof organizational development. The studentof internationalorganization must recognize the United Nationsfor what it quiteproperly is, a revisedLeague, no doubtimproved in somerespects, possibly weaker in others,but nonethelessa League, a voluntaryassociation of nations,carrying on largelyin the League traditionand by the League methods.Important changes have occurred in the worlddistribution of power, in the world'seconomic and political structure,in the world'sideological atmosphere. These changescreate new problemsand modifythe chancesof successor failurein meeting them,but the mechanicsremain much the same. Anyonedesiring to understandthe machinery, how it operates,the conditions of its success, mustlook to theexperience of the past, and particularlyto the richand variedexperience of that first attempt at a generalinternational organiza- tion,the League ofNations.